Standards; Plasticity of top-level Reference

[Jeff Dooley 920522.1000]

(Bill Powers 920514b)

The only reference signals (and perceptions) that can't be
changed freely as required by higher levels are systems
concepts.

As you point out, output of higher-order control systems
enables the plasticity of the lower-order system reference
values. But then there is an apparent problem, illustrated in
your comment above, which stems from our apparent inability to
go up a level so that systems concepts can have adaptable
reference signals too. If a world-view can be considered a
systems concept (in the sense that it can organize
principles), then how can we explain the possibility that a
"world-view" can change (Ptolemy vs. copernicus, etc.).

Difficulties like these have surfaced in philosophy of science
recently surrounding attempts to provide a normative
epistemology within the scope of a purely scientific
(naturalistic) study of how we come to know anything. This
problem boils down to how we can derive norms or prescriptive
standards from an apparently descriptive account of
epistemology.

I think that some of the work of Larry Laudan may help clarify
these questions as they may pertain to system concept reference
adjustment.

In Laudan's _Science and Values_, (U. Cal. Press, 1984) he
proposes a circular causal loop in which AIMS, THEORIES, and
METHODS are all recursively interdependent and plastic as a
function of incremental changes among one another over time
and practice. An important point in Laudan's model (he calls
it "the reticulated model of scientific rationality") is that
the thing is grounded in practice. One way this grounding is
achieved is through the actual realizability of aims
through methods. Methods are in turn constrained by
theories while the theories are justified by the methods.
The thing is entirely circular and intended to
self-correct over time as each vertex of the triangle impinges
upon each other one. New perceptions are introduced into the
system as practice continues and are either harmonious or
anomalous. These perceptions occasion either assimilation of
the system concept (world view) in case they are harmonious
or accommodation of the world view if they are anomalous.
(They may also be irrelevant and have no impact). Though
Laudan doesn't invoke any explicitly control-theory language,
it seems that his model could be described as an n-order
control system for the derivation of scientific norms. It
also is an explanation for the rationality of scientific
change and the rational role of norms and values fueling such
change.

My question here is simply: can we let systems concepts have
plastic reference values as a function of all the other-order
reference changes at any point on the analog continuum of
experience? This sort of ties the reference hierarchy into a
closed loop with all the other reference levels at the same
time.

jeff dooley dooley@well.sf.ca.us

[From Rick Marken (920522 14:30)]

Jeff Dooley (920522.1000) says:

(Bill Powers 920514b)

The only reference signals (and perceptions) that can't be
changed freely as required by higher levels are systems
concepts.

If a world-view can be considered a
systems concept (in the sense that it can organize
principles), then how can we explain the possibility that a
"world-view" can change (Ptolemy vs. copernicus, etc.).

Two possibilities: 1) ptolomy vs copernicus is not a system concept
level difference. They could just be two different models (programs?) that
are possible components of a "science" system concept. If one of the
principles of this concept is "best fit to data" and "simplest" then you
adopt copernicus. If it's "best bit to data" using existing assumptions"
(epicycles) then its ptolemy. 2) ptolemy vs copernicus are system
concepts. Whichever you believe (have a reference for) is then a result of
previous reorganizations (random selection of system level references
triggered by intrinsic error). So people would only adopt one if
doing so happens to produce the least intrinsic error. Intrinsic
error might result from observed discrepencies between model
predictions and observations (if the person cared about such things) or
something else (desire to differ from the church?).

I think that some of the work of Larry Laudan may help clarify
these questions as they may pertain to system concept reference
adjustment.

My question here is simply: can we let systems concepts have
plastic reference values as a function of all the other-order
reference changes at any point on the analog continuum of
experience? This sort of ties the reference hierarchy into a
closed loop with all the other reference levels at the same
time.

If this is what Laudan is suggesting then I think it might help
if he hooked up these ideas in a working model. My guess is that
he could quickly eliminate this hypothesis; if lower level outputs
influenced the reference signals of systems that determine the reference
signals of the system that determines the output then it seems like there
could be problems; like positive feedback type effects. But maybe
it could work? It just doesn't seem to make much sense in terms of
the architecture of the PCT model as it currently stands. Perhaps
if you gave a quantitative analysis or functional diagram of Lauden's
suggestion it would clarify his point.

By the way, the references for the highest order systems (in the
PCT model) can be varied -- but not as a means of controlling
some higher order variable. So changes in the references for the top
level variabls cannot be SYSTEMATIC (as are the changes in reference for
the tension in my muscles which varies to maintain the position
of my outstretched arm even while someone is pressing down on my
hand with variable force). The top level references are varied
UNSYSTEMATICALLY by the reorganization system -- and they stop
changing once intrinsic error disappears. This aspect of the model
seems to me to give a good account of why people adopt certain system
concepts rather than others -- its BY CHANCE. People become christians
because by adopting that reference they have been able to reduce intrinsic
errors that result from fighting with their family. People become
dodger fans because, by adopting this reference they reduce the intrinsic
error that comes from the stares generated by wearing an oakland A's
jersey at Dodger stadium. People believe in Copernicus because everyone
else does (it looks to me like the sun goes around the earth -- but I'll
never tell). I like the fact that system concepts (in control theory)
are not selected systematically; and this goes for the "control theory
system concept too (to the extent that it is a system concept). There is,
really, no good reason to adopt it except that it feels good. Of course,
part of that good feeling comes from accounting for data to within .001%.
So it seems like the only scientifically RIGHT thing to do. So why aren't
social scientists moving to PCT in droves? Because it doesn't feel
good to them; they are happy with their own system concepts and they
don't even know that there is a system concept to change (if system
concepts really are the TOP of the hierarchy and control theory and
ptolomy and copernicus are system concepts then it seems to me that
we would not even be able to see that there is a CHOICE. I think a
case can be made for the fact that "real" system concepts are invisible
to consciousness -- you can take the point of view of that system concept,
put you shouldn't be able to see it AS an optional point of view.).

Regards

Rick

···

**************************************************************

Richard S. Marken USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)

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[From Rick Marken (920522 19:00)]

Well, it looks like the machine is still up so let me
make one quick observation. I think there has been some
confusion about what control theory says about control
and what it says about the processes that might influence
control -- ie. consciousness. This confusion becomes
particularly acute in the discussion of standards (principles)
where there is talk about "setting appropriate standards"
and such. When we talk like this, WHO do we imagine to
be "setting the appropriate standards"? The hierarchical
control model says it is the "higher order systems". The
references for principles are AUTOMATICALLY set by the systems
controlling system concepts. The references for programs are
automatically set by the systems controlling system concepts
and/or principles, etc. The point is that all this varying
of lower level references to control higher level perceptions
is carried out smoothly and automatically by the control
hierarchy. I hate to point this out again, but this process is
nicely illustrated by my hierarchical spreadsheet and (in a
less abstract manner) by Bill's "Little Man". So ordinarily,
there is no external "agent" (other than the control hierarchy
itself) that sets references -- and varies them -- and this
varying happens automatically. This means that principles are
varied AUTOMATICALLY to control system concepts; if the system
concept control systems need to vary the honesty principle
reference to preserve the perception of the system concept, it
DOES it; that's YOU doing it -- but there is no choice going
on; no conscious decision to be a little more or lest honest in
this particular situation. It just happens (just as you muscles
tense automatically to control the position of your limb).

When we talk about a person "setting appropriate standards" I
think we are talking about a phenomenon that is external to
the PCT hierarchy. Subjectively, when I talk to myself and
say "maybe I should try X" it is my consciousness that is
doing this. Consciousness is like something that hovers
over the hierarchy and tinkers with it occasionally; at least,
consciousness is what CAN tinker with the hierarchy.

I think we know a hell of a lot LESS about how consciousness
works (in terms of phenomena and models) then we know about
how hierarchical control works. But I do think that consciousness
(the feeling of having to choose -- "should I do X or Y"?)
only comes up when there is some degree of internal conflict
or lack of "output functions" that can be used to control
the required perceptions. When you are in control you are
rarely conscious of it -- unless you make some effort to
notice how well your hierarchy is working. When there is a
failure of control (due to conflict, lack of skill or insuperable
disturbance) then consciouness is there. As I said in
an earlier post -- moving consciousness to systems that don't
need attending to can create more problems than it might
solve.

Best regards

Rick

     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)

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