[From Bill Powers (2010.03.27.1030 MDT)]
Martin Lewitt (2010.1222.MDT) --
ML: I think that "strength of will" like many words and phrases is overloaded. There are at least two meanings, one is the actual strength, intensity or persistence of effort that results in the achieving of a goal.
BP: That's one way to judge how hard the person is trying to achieve the goal. The amount of effort reflects the size of error signals amplified by the output function, so it depends on two factors: how much error there is, and how much effort the output function generates to correct a given amount of error. The latter is a way of judging how important the controlled variable is to the person; if it's only slightly important, the person might expend some effort to correct an error, but not very much. If a person seems willing to expend maximum effort just to correct what seems like a very small amount of error, we can conclude that the variable being controlled is very important to that person.
But this doesn't appear to have much to do with the concept of "will". It's just how a control system works.
ML: ... The other would be the ability to resist impulses and urges, deferring gratification in persuit of a longer term goal. I think the latter is the more interesting issue for PCT.
BP: Yes. The first question of interest is what we mean by an impulse or urge, and the next one is what we mean by "resisting" it.
A "urge" seems to be something like seeing a chocolate sundae and suddenly wanting to eat it, which looks a lot like stimulus and response. If a control system is involved, somehow it must be dormant until the chocolate sundae is seen, after which a pre-existing goal for eating a chocolate sundae suddenly becomes effective, or an error signal that existed all along suddenly becomes able to activate an output function for eating. This is a matter for experimental study; there doesn't seem to be any way to reason out what is likely to happen or what makes it happen. Whatever is found to be the truth, we can modify the model as required.
This has been discussed before on CSGnet, without any firm conclusions being reached. I think we just have to accept that it does happen: the sundae appears and suddenly we start controlling for getting a spoon and slurping up the sundae.
Given that the desire for a sundae exists and that it suddenly starts to become effective in producing behavior, what does it mean to say we "resist" the "urge or impulse" to eat it?
There is clearly a reference signal specifying that some lower system should be experiencing the taste of the sundae and all its other delightful properties. Excuse me for a minute, I have some ice cream in the freezer and it's calling to me ...
... heck, I forgot that I used the last of the chocolate sauce a while ago.
So how do I stop wanting a chocolate sundae? Given that reference signal, why don't I now put on my shoes and a coat, go start the car and drive it to store, get some chocolate sauce, bring it home, and have my sundae? I'm still here typing, and I didn't go. How did I manage to not go? To say I am going to resist the urge to eat is to imply that there is still active control that is pushing us in the direction of eating, so to avoid eating we have to push back against this continuing urge.
There are only two main choices: either I turn off the reference signal or otherwise disable that control system again, or I activate another control system that says, every time I start to do something to correct the error, "Do you want to be a big fat slob? It's morally wrong to indulge your primitive desire for sensations at the cost of serious future trouble, and shows that you're an inferior childish human being."
The latter is the will-power solution. In short, I somehow call up a lot of goals that require NOT eating the sundae, and try to achieve those goals at the same time as the goal of eating the sundae, a goal that is still there as active as ever. The resulting conflict prevents any action from taking place, so I don't eat the sundae. "Resistance" implies conflict.
I still want to eat the sundae, and at the same time I castigate myself for my moral failings and weak will, so I am in continual conflict every time I see a sundae. When people eat sundaes in from of me, I yell at them for being self-indulgent and self-destructive, at the same time I am drooling and wishing I could have one, too. So this is not a happy situation, even though my will power has prevailed. I feel stronger because of my will power, and weaker because of the conflict. The only good thing about this is that I don't gain a lot of weight.
There is some evidence of intrinsic or genetic differences in the tendency to seek sensation rather than defer gratification. The sensation seekers, while disadvantaged in deferring gratification, don't seem disadvantaged in the area of developing physical skills and imposing their "strength of will" in sports competition for example.
I think this will make more sense if we think in terms of controlling low-order and high-order perceptions. If the hierarchy were working normally, a higher-order system that wants to achieve a goal does so by adjusting the reference signals of lower-order systems. If a specific low-order system's controlled variable would work against achievement of the higher-order goal, whether the achievement be immediate or in the future, the higher-order system would simply reduce (perhaps to zero) the reference signal going to the lower-order system. That lower-order system would stop wanting the contraindicated perception, and some other lower-order system would start wanting something different. No problem at all. No will power needed, either. If I want to turn left at the corner, I set the reference for turning right to zero, and the reference for turning left to a nonzero value. Why should that require will power?
We are all sensation-seekers. That's the second level of control in PCT, and is used by just about every higher control system. This isn't a question of abandoning sensation-seeking for loftier goals, but of controlling sensations in a way consistent with, and as a means for, achievement of higher-order goals. I'm pretty sure the will-power solution almost always involves conflict, and is not a good solution because of that. Other solutions require resolving the conflicts, in the manner of the method of levels, so the lower-level reference signals are set to the values appropriate to the higher-order goals, with no great effort required, since that's how the hierarchy would normally operate if there were no conflicts.
Best,
Bill P.