And from the same B, you can get A0, A1, A2 ... ? This sounds a lot like
>solving a problem by naming it. If B is a set of readings from a
>spectrograph (say a plot of intensity versus wavelength displayed on a
>CRT screen), and A0 is the color person a0 sees, B0 is the color person
>b0 sees, and so forth, where does this supervention take place?
It's 'supervenience', not 'supervention' (a little trick to show up
people who don't have the right friends to correct them, the first time
they make that mistake). It's not a process, so it doesn't take place
anywhere. What it's for is to let you say things such as that a disk
has a particular virus on it and that virus caused the computer to
crash, without having to claim that computer viruses are fundamental
consitutuents of the universe.
It does seem a bit odd that each differently-wired PIF will detect a
different An supervening on the one B, but I can't actually see
anything wrong with it. And would you say it was a fundamental mistake to
say that the computer disk you sent me about a year and a half ago had
Litte Man 2 on it, just because LM2 is really made up of magnetic
domains?
>No, not at all. Look at Rick Marken's spread-sheet model again. The
>second level perceptions are arbitrary combinations of the first-level
>perceptions, which are arbitrary combinations of the external variables.
>Yet perceptions at both levels (actually all three levels) are perfectly
>controllable by acting in the usual manner -- by having an effect on
>lower-level reference signals, or on external variables.
Hmm, I'll have to think about this one some more, but it seems to me
that it would be rather easy to slap sensors and effectors together
in such a way that the the sensors could not achieve their reference
levels. Rick's spreadsheet world is kinda simple compared to the one we
live in.
Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au