[From Ted Cloak (2009.07.31.1553 MST)]
Thank you, Rick, for your quick and thoughtful reply.
Would these changes help? (Changes indicated between ++.)
"I want to be able to state forthrightly, at the very start, that PCT is the
only neuroscience-based theory which can plausibly +and completely+ explain
how behavior works. In other words, PCT is the only theory which can
+demonstrate how an animal's+ nervous system +continually+ mediates between
its genetic, ontogenetic, epigenetic, cultural, and experiential inputs and
its muscular (and glandular) outputs."
...
"The idea that activity might be goal-directed at every level +of a nervous
system+ simply hasn�t occurred to the cognitivists."
I do intend to give much more emphasis than I did in the beta version to the
point that most (all?) behavior is involved in compensating for
environmental
disturbances. But I don't think that would grab attention at the very start;
until people see the beauty of PCT they couldn't appreciate that. For the
same reason, they wouldn't see why a closed-loop theory is a must.
Again, thanks. All: Please jump in.
[From Rick Marken (2009.07.31.1255)]
Dear Bill and Fellow CSGers,
I�m getting ready to update and finalize my PowerPoint presentation,
�Perceptual Control Theory and the Evolution of Culture�...
I want to be able to state forthrightly, at the very start, that PCT is
the
only comprehensive neuroscience-based theory which can plausibly explain
how
behavior works.
I don't see that it's necessary to be so dramatic about it. PCT may be
more comprehensive than some theories. But it may be less
comprehensive than others. Comprehensiveness is nice but I don't think
it's the main reason most people accept or reject a theory. I know
people who are very dedicated to very non-comprehensive,
neuroscience-based theories that only explain memory, for example. I
think "plausibility" is a somewhat better basis for a sales pitch; PCT
is the only plausible theory because it's the only theory that takes
into account the fact that behavior takes place in a "disturbance
prone" environment. PCT shows how organisms are able to consistently
produce intended results in such an environment; the nervous system
must be able to specify intended results, compare these specifications
to the actual state of the result and produce output signals that end
up having effects in the environment that keep any discrepancy between
specification and perception small.
HTMW is a marvelous piece of work
I agree. If I could write like Pinker PCT would be world famous by now.
So: HTMW seems pretty good on the input side...
But: How is action caused by beliefs and desires? ...
I think HTMW leaves a very big gap here. Even ignoring the drawback of not
having each input level tied to output, I have to conclude that Pinker is
not giving us a comprehensive neuroscience theory of behavior.� Apparently
cognitive neuroscience just doesn�t do that.
I think the problem is that Pinker is giving an open loop neuroscience
theory of behavior. I use a quote from HTMW in my _Revolution_ paper
to demonstrate this fact. An open loop model won't work (produce
consistent behavioral results) in a disturbance prone environment.
The idea that activity might be goal-directed at every level simply hasn�t
occurred to the cognitivists.
I don't think this is correct. Many cognitivists talk about a
hierarchy of goals. You can see this in the AI world in particular.
Many AI programs are architected as goal directed hierarchies. The
goals in these programs are, in fact, references for controlled
variables. For example, in chess playing programs one high level goal
is "control of the center" and actions (subgoals, like making a move)
are selected in order to bring the controlled variable ("state of the
center of the board") to the state "controlled". It's when the
cognitivists started doing behavioral research that they went back to
being open loop. I discovered this when doing research for the talk I
gave last year at Ucla. I found that the first Newell and Simon chess
playing program was designed as a hierarchy of control loops; and they
described the program correctly as being goal directed. But then I
read some research they did to try to determine why good chess players
play better than bad ones and they concluded that good players have
more board arrangements stored in memory that are associated with the
appropriate moves. So any particular board arrangement is more likely
to be associated with an appropriate move for a good than for a poor
player: it was an open loop S-R model of chess (board position causes
chess move).
So my proposition still stands: Perceptual Control Theory is the only
comprehensive neuroscience-based theory of behavior and, therefore, the
only
comprehensive naturalistic theory of behavior.
I�m still looking for disconfirmation of that proposition.
Any ideas?
My only ideas are stated above. I'd recommend emphasizing the
plausibility angle (only PCT explains how organisms can produce
intended results in a disturbance prone world) and forget the
comprehensiveness angle (except to point out that PCT can, in
principle, explain all behavior).
Best
RIck
···
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 3:08 PM, Ted Cloak<tcloak@unm.edu> wrote:
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com