The bogeyman under all beds (was Information and Control)

[Martin Taylor 2012.12.16.09.39]

That seems indeed to be the limit of your interest in understanding

PCT – and limiting it is indeed.
I grant that when you are dealing with “the great unwashed”, the
fact that people are always controlling is probably the first thing
that must be got across, and I agree that it is useful to discover
the sets of interlocking variables that are being controlled during
any activity, especially if that activity is a common one such as
walking. But to me the “how” and the “how much” of control is
equally interesting. I know you do modelling, and I expected your response to refer to
that. The parameterized PCT models often do a great job of fitting
what people do. But as you know, there are characteristic
differences in detail between what people do when they control X in
a tracking task and what the “standard” models do when controlling
X, even when the fit of the model is very good in RMS terms. Those
characteristic differences should be clues to where research is
needed, new models to be invented, and so forth. But if you consider
that the research is complete when you have found that a particular
variable is being controlled and that control is good and well
fitted by the model, you have left an opportunity to learn more
about the workings of the control system inside the biological
system.
My own preference is to discover and to use as many different tools
as I can to look at the workings of the brain. And how do you propose to do that if the only allowable research is
to discover the variables being controlled?
This is an engineering difference between us. You have very strongly
said that if the control equations ever lead to a form output =
F(input), the whole thinking is S-O-R. That is simply wrong. The
fact of control leads to such equations. One difference between
control and S-O-R is the existence of the reference value, which
allows you to say that if the person at this moment “likes” what the
disturbance does to the perception, the output will not oppose it,
even though at other times it might have done. Another difference is
in what you have been unnecessarily pointing out in these related
threads (in fact it started with Kent’s hypotheses) that
environmental feedback functions are not fixed. S-O-R approaches
cannot handle that.
Recently you have asserted that Bruce Abbott and I are closet S-O-R
theorists, despite repeated demonstrations that the techniques that
lead you to make that assertion work best when control is good. I
don’t know how Bruce came to PCT, but you may remember that in
Durango Bill said to the audience that I was the only person he knew
who came to PCT from the realization that his own theory was
actually a special case of PCT in action. I think it unlikely that
my approach to PCT research is actually hidden S-O-R thinking poking
through a thin PCT veneer (though of course I can’t be sure).
You see the bogeyman of S-O-R under every bed, and try to scare it
away with so much shouting that you scare away instead the guard
dogs waiting to save the baby from the real bogeymen. The real
bogeymen are not under the bed; they are outside the house. The
guard dogs may not be as skilled as they could become, but many of
them want to be, and never will after you scare them away.
Do you know the old story of Gelert, the faithful guard dog? The
knight Llewellyn went away on some mission or other, leaving Gelert
to guard the baby. While he was gone, a wolf came in. Gelert fought
and killed it, and hid the baby under the cot in case other dangers
appeared. Llewellyn came back and saw all the blood and no baby.
Thinking Gelert had killed and eaten the baby, he killed Gelert, and
almost immediately heard the baby cry and saw the body of the wolf.
When I read this around the age of 8 or 9 I thought it the saddest
story I ever read. The problem is that you are doing this on CSGnet, not in a forum
where the majority of the readers might not understand that
intentional behaviour is control. On CSGnet, I think most people
either joined already believing it or very quickly learned that it
must be so.
I can’t think of any examples of such people you have scared away. I
can think of examples of people you have scared away who knew useful
techniques and understood about control but wanted to learn more
about PCT specifically.
More to the point, look a bit more closely before you leap to the
conclusion that whenever someone says something you don’t really
understand, it must be the S-O-R bogeyman under the bed.
How can I do that? It’s completely open-ended. At the moment I am
interested in investigating the limits of control through the use of
information theory. At another time it might be the investigation of
Kent’s hypotheses of social interaction and personal freedom. Yet
again it might be the kind of study of the evolution of the
artifacts of language and culture about which I talked at the 1993
CSG meeting in Durango. More technically, it might be the
mathematics of the evolution of cultural and/or linguistic
spin-glasses (the spin-glasses are described but not explained in
the “mutuality” presentation on my web site). The characteristic
differences between model and human in simple tracking is another
area that could lead to interesting extension. The structure of
multi-level complex control hierarchies is one to which you
referred. As I think you may remember, I have proposed a different
way in which the control systems for perceptions at and above Bill’s
category level interact with control systems at lower levels. I’d
like to find a way to distinguish these possibilities – and others
that may be thought up by other people.
I think your approach rules out all of these directions of research.
There really are bogeymen out there, but I don’t think there are
many in here. Barking at every shadow doesn’t encourage the people
in here who would like to learn so that they could go out there and
defend against the real bogeymen.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2012.12.15.1645)]

        Martin Taylor

(2012.12.15.14.01)–

        MT: I think this is a reasonable place to make a comment

about something that has been bothering me for quite a long
time. Rick would like PCT to be widely understood
(correctly, of course) and used, as do we all, I imagine.
But he frequently asserts that the only valid research that
should be done with PCT is to search for “the controlled
variable”, as though everyone controlled the same variables
all the time.

      RM: What I am pushing is the idea that research aimed at

understanding behavior should be aimed at determining the
variables that are being controlled when we see a person doing
some behavior of interest, like walking, talking of playing
chess.

        MT: Furthermore, in

this and related threads, Rick has strongly defended the
position that PCT cannot tell you anything about what
happens inside a person’s head (except what variable s/he is
controlling).

      RM: That's news to me. It's not only controlled perceptions

that are in a person’s head (according to PCT); it’s the
references for these perceptions and memories of these
perceptions, and manipulations of these perceptions in your
head, as imaginings, etc. I would hope that we will eventually
find ways to study all of the “things in your head” that are
posited by PCT.

        MT: If you believe that

PCT can tell you something about what happens inside the
head, Rick says you are an S-R theorist, and don’t really
understand PCT.

      RM: No, I say you are an S-R psychologist if you believe that

what is in your head are processes that convert input
information into outputs. It’s the information processing view
of mind: S-O-R. And PCT shows that it is wrong.

        MT:I do not see how

Rick can expect PCT to be considered useful to people who
want to know what goes on inside people’s heads if PCT
cannot provide information about what goes on inside
people’s heads if you understand it properly.

      RM: I consider PCT useful to people who want to know what is

inside people’s heads when they control. I know it will not be
considered useful to people who don’t know that people
control, the same people who want to know what goes on between
S and R. So I’m trying to get those people to understand what
control is, how it works and that behavior is control.

        MT: If such people

believe Rick, they will look at PCT, learn that it isn’t
what they are seeking, and go on to use other ways of
thinking about why people do what they do. That would be
unfortunate, but I think we have seen it happen on CSGnet
more than once over the years.

      RM: If people left CSGNet because they learned that PCT

wouldn’t help them study people as S-O-R or information
processing systems then they were wise to leave because they
were right. If they had stayed they would have just gotten
madder and madder at PCT, unless they were willing to
reorganize their ideas about how behavior works and start
studying it in a new way.

It’s a puzzle.

  RM: It's a puzzle to you only because you are misunderstanding my

positions. But I blame myself for any misunderstanding and I’ll
try to be more clear about what my position is.

  But in the mean time maybe you could tell be the kind

of research you would like to do that you think I am ruling out.

[From Rick Marken (2012.12.16.1130)]

Martin Taylor (2012.12.16.09.39)–

      RM: What I am pushing is the idea that research aimed at

understanding behavior should be aimed at determining the
variables that are being controlled when we see a person doing
some behavior of interest, like walking, talking of playing
chess.

MT: That seems indeed to be the limit of your interest in understanding

PCT – and limiting it is indeed.

RM: I do research in order to understanding the controlling done by living system. I use PCT as the basis of that research.

MT: But to me the "how" and the "how much" of control is

equally interesting.

RM: Me too.

MT: I know you do modelling, and I expected your response to refer to

that.

RM: Implicit in my response was that you study control using the methods associated with testing for controlled variables, which certainly involves modeling. Testing control models is the main way I have tested to determine what variables organisms control and how they control them.

MT: The parameterized PCT models often do a great job of fitting

what people do. But as you know, there are characteristic
differences in detail between what people do when they control X in
a tracking task and what the “standard” models do when controlling
X, even when the fit of the model is very good in RMS terms.

RM: I’m not quite sure I understand all you are saying here. But I do agree with:

MT: Those

characteristic differences should be clues to where research is
needed, new models to be invented, and so forth.

RM: Couldn’t agree more; that’s what research is about. All I’m saying is that all those models are closed loop control models and an important aspect of fitting the models to the behavior is finding the right definition of the controlled variables.

MT: But if you consider

that the research is complete when you have found that a particular
variable is being controlled and that control is good and well
fitted by the model, you have left an opportunity to learn more
about the workings of the control system inside the biological
system.

RM: I didn’t mean to imply that finding controlled variables is the be all and end all of research on control. All I meant to say is that this research must be based on an understanding that behavior is organized around the control of perceptual variables. So the concept of controlled variable should turn up as a central feature of all research on control, whether the focus is on the limitations of control, how control works or why a particular variable is being controlled.

MT: My own preference is to discover and to use as many different tools

as I can to look at the workings of the brain.

RM: Me too. But I think it’s important to use those tools with an awareness that behavior is organized around the control of perceptual variables; so the first step in all research on control must be the determination of what variable(s) are under control.

      RM: I would hope that we will eventually

find ways to study all of the “things in your head” that are
posited by PCT.

MT: And how do you propose to do that if the only allowable research is

to discover the variables being controlled?

RM: Again, I am not trying to limit the way you do research; I am, however, trying to make it clear that in whatever research you do the determination of what variables are under control – controlled variables --must be a first step. One reason for this is that it may turn out that no variables are controlled; the behavior may in fact be open loop, in which case different methods of study – such as those currently used in research psychology, which were borrowed from sciences that study non-living systems – would be appropriate.

      RM: No, I say you are an S-R psychologist if you believe that

what is in your head are processes that convert input
information into outputs. It’s the information processing view
of mind: S-O-R. And PCT shows that it is wrong.

MT: This is an engineering difference between us. You have very strongly

said that if the control equations ever lead to a form output =
F(input), the whole thinking is S-O-R.

RM: No, not at all. In fact, output = F(input) is the “organism” equation of PCT. What PCT notes is that, at the same time, input = G(output)+ H(d) and when you solve these equations simultaneously you find that output = -H/G(d), which is the "behavioral illusion’, the illusion that output is a function of disturbances (stimuli) via the organism, when, in fact, the observed disturbance-output relationship has nothing to do with the organism. PCT also shows that there is no way to observe the actual input-output relationship in a control system because it occurs within a closed-loop. So while there is, according to PCT, the relationship that you describe as output = F(input) you can only get an estimate of that relationship via modeling and the modeling, of course, has to include a correct definition of input, which is the controlled variable.

MT: That is simply wrong. The

fact of control leads to such equations.

RM: PCT doesn’t lead to the equation output = F(input); that equation is an important assumption of PCT.

MT: One difference between

control and S-O-R is the existence of the reference value, which
allows you to say that if the person at this moment “likes” what the
disturbance does to the perception, the output will not oppose it,
even though at other times it might have done. Another difference is
in what you have been unnecessarily pointing out in these related
threads (in fact it started with Kent’s hypotheses) that
environmental feedback functions are not fixed. S-O-R approaches
cannot handle that.

RM: The main difference between PCT and S-O-R is that PCT recognizes that output is being affected by input while, at the same time, input is being affected by output. That is

(1) output = F(input)

and at the same time

(2) input - G(output) + H(d)

In order to understand the relationship between variables in a control loop you have to solve these equations simultaneously.

This is all gone over in lovely detail in Powers’ 1978 Psychological Review Paper. Why you are so troubled by what I am saying and not troubled by that paper (which I presume you have read) is very difficult for me to understand.

MT: Recently you have asserted that Bruce Abbott and I are closet S-O-R

theorists, despite repeated demonstrations that the techniques that
lead you to make that assertion work best when control is good.

RM: I think both you and Bruce are committed PCT theorists. But like many PCT theorists who have come to PCT out of a conventional scientific psychology background it is hard for you to give up on ideas that were very important to you and were rightly considered brilliant insights in the context of the causal model of behavior.

MT: You see the bogeyman of S-O-R under every bed, and try to scare it

away with so much shouting that you scare away instead the guard
dogs waiting to save the baby from the real bogeymen.

RM: Sorry, don’t mean to shout. I see this as just a fact based discussion. I’m not trying to force you or Bruce or anyone to do a particular kind of research. I am trying to show that doing research in a particular way – the way it’s always been done in experimental psychology – can be quite misleading. Again, this was precisely Bill’s point in the 1978 Psych Review paper.

Maybe the best way to handle this is just to look at your specific research proposals and I (and maybe Bill could join in) could give you anopinion about what you would learn about control from it.

  RM: But in the mean time maybe you could tell be the kind

of research you would like to do that you think I am ruling out.

MT: How can I do that? It's completely open-ended. At the moment I am

interested in investigating the limits of control through the use of
information theory.

RM: Well, I think we’ve covered why I think that’s not a good approach. But go ahead and do whatever you like; I look forward to seeing what you’ve learned.

MT: At another time it might be the investigation of

Kent’s hypotheses of social interaction and personal freedom. Yet
again it might be the kind of study of the evolution of the
artifacts of language and culture about which I talked at the 1993
CSG meeting in Durango. More technically, it might be the
mathematics of the evolution of cultural and/or linguistic
spin-glasses (the spin-glasses are described but not explained in
the “mutuality” presentation on my web site). The characteristic
differences between model and human in simple tracking is another
area that could lead to interesting extension. The structure of
multi-level complex control hierarchies is one to which you
referred. As I think you may remember, I have proposed a different
way in which the control systems for perceptions at and above Bill’s
category level interact with control systems at lower levels. I’d
like to find a way to distinguish these possibilities – and others
that may be thought up by other people.

I think your approach rules out all of these directions of research.

RM: Please feel free to do whatever kind of research you like. All I was doing was trying to show that an informational analysis of control can be quite misleading (if not totally useless). We just have a scientific disagreement. I certainly am willing to change my mind if you can show me some result of an informational analysis that reveals its usefulness. But I haven’t seen that yet. You (and Bruce) are convinced of it’s merits; I’m not. So?

MT: There really are bogeymen out there, but I don't think there are

many in here. Barking at every shadow doesn’t encourage the people
in here who would like to learn so that they could go out there and
defend against the real bogeymen.

RM: For me it's not a bogyman issue; it's a facts issue. I think I've shown, in several published papers and in the demos I've developed here in this discussion, that information about the disturbance to a controlled variable is not transmitted from input to output of a control system. It just doesn't work that way. But you don't find these demonstrations compelling or relevant so there we jolly well are. There is nothing stopping you from trying to convince people of the merits of using information theory to analyze control systems. And there is nothing stopping me from disagreeing if I think you are wrong.

I think it’s great if you want to keep trying to show me the merits of information theory and all those other research projects you describe above. But isn’t it ok for me to try to show that they are wrong if I think they are? We’re after the truth here, right? Not orthodoxy. Believe me, if you can show me an informational analysis that tells me something about control that I can see is both correct and something I could not have learned without information theory, I will be happy to enthusiastically celebrate your research.

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bill Powers (2012.12.16.2035 MST)]

Rick Marken (2012.12.16.1130) --

RM: No, I say you are an S-R psychologist if you believe that what is in your head are processes that convert input information into outputs. It's the information processing view of mind: S-O-R. And PCT shows that it is wrong.

MT: This is an engineering difference between us. You have very strongly said that if the control equations ever lead to a form output = F(input), the whole thinking is S-O-R.

RM: No, not at all. In fact, output = F(input) is the "organism" equation of PCT. What PCT notes is that, at the same time, input = G(output)+ H(d) and when you solve these equations simultaneously you find that output = -H/G(d), which is the "behavioral illusion', the illusion that output is a function of disturbances (stimuli) via the organism, when, in fact, the observed disturbance-output relationship has nothing to do with the organism. PCT also shows that there is no way to observe the actual input-output relationship in a control system because it occurs within a closed-loop.

BP: If you know what the closed-loop relationships are, and also know the controlled variable and the feedback function, can't you deduce what the forward equation of the control system is? Everything else is visible in the environment.

···

==================

I have a suggestion. Suppose we make a distinction between "Information" (capital I) and "knowledge." Knowledge would be a statement that a pencil can be used to write words on paper. Information would be a measure derived from how many letters there are in a given alphabet and how much our uncertainty about which words were written is reduced by the letter groups we recognize. So knowlege is at a higher level than Information. We take Information in through the senses where it is simply a matter of channel capacity and fidelity, and from there on the signals are used to construct knowledge.

I'm sure this distinction could be defined better, but introducing levels of perception into the discussion might resolve some of the problems.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2012.12.17.0840)]

Bill Powers (2012.12.16.2035 MST)–

RM: No, not at all. In fact, output = F(input) is the “organism” equation of PCT. What PCT notes is that, at the same time, input = G(output)+ H(d) and when you solve these equations simultaneously you find that output = -H/G(d), which is the "behavioral illusion’, the illusion that output is a function of disturbances (stimuli) via the organism, when, in fact, the observed disturbance-output relationship has nothing to do with the organism. PCT also shows that there is no way to observe the actual input-output relationship in a control system because it occurs within a closed-loop.

BP: If you know what the closed-loop relationships are, and also know the controlled variable and the feedback function, can’t you deduce what the forward equation of the control system is? Everything else is visible in the environment.

RM: Yes. Indeed, that’s what a control model is, right. We use the model, by trying to match its behavior to that of the observed variables, to deduce the “forward” equation: output = F(input). An important part of that is figuring out what the input – the controlled variable – is. So knowing the controlled variable is an essential part of the process. My main beef with both Martin and Bruce is that they implicitly or explicitly downplay the importance of determining controlled variables in PCT research.

==================

BP: I have a suggestion. Suppose we make a distinction between “Information” (capital I) and “knowledge.” Knowledge would be a statement that a pencil can be used to write words on paper. Information would be a measure derived from how many letters there are in a given alphabet and how much our uncertainty about which words were written is reduced by the letter groups we recognize. So knowlege is at a higher level than Information. We take Information in through the senses where it is simply a matter of channel capacity and fidelity, and from there on the signals are used to construct knowledge.

I’m sure this distinction could be defined better, but introducing levels of perception into the discussion might resolve some of the problems

RM: I guess I don’t care that much what it’s called; I just would like to see an emphasis (from PCT Information theorists) on the importance of determining controlled input variables when studying living control systems.

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2012.12.17.23.14]

Does this passage from [Martin Taylor 2012.12.14.10.05] go some way

to doing what you ask?
--------quote---------

···

On 2012/12/16 10:51 PM, Bill Powers
wrote:

  [From Bill Powers (2012.12.16.2035 MST)]




  I have a suggestion. Suppose we make a distinction between

“Information” (capital I) and “knowledge.” Knowledge would be a
statement that a pencil can be used to write words on paper.
Information would be a measure derived from how many letters there
are in a given alphabet and how much our uncertainty about which
words were written is reduced by the letter groups we recognize.
So knowlege is at a higher level than Information. We take
Information in through the senses where it is simply a matter of
channel capacity and fidelity, and from there on the signals are
used to construct knowledge.

  I'm sure this distinction could be defined better, but introducing

levels of perception into the discussion might resolve some of the
problems.

    It is important to recognize

that for Shannon, what constituted a “message” can be treated at
several different levels of perception. Suppose that the
transmitter intended to send a message inviting the recipient to
meet at a certain place and time. This message had to be
translated into words, the words into a letter or sound stream,
and the stream into a pattern of variation in an electric
current. At the receiving end, the receiver might interpret the
electrical pattern into a sound or letter stream. At one level
of perception, the message would have been correctly received if
the stream matched the transmitted stream. However, if that were
all that happened at the receiving end, the message would not
have been received. From the stream, the message still must be
converted into words, and the words into an understanding that
the transmitter wanted a meeting, that the meeting should be in
a particular location, and that it should be at a particular
time. Suppose the transmitter had identified the location as “at
Jake’s” and the receiver knew of no place that would be so
identified. Would the message have been correctly received at
that level? It would have been correctly received in that all
the words in it had been exactly as transmitted, but the meaning would not have
been conveyed. The message would have conveyed information about
when the meeting was requested, but it would not have conveyed
information about where.

---------end quote---------

    So the recipient could not

attend the meeting.

Martin