The Control of Behavior

[From Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.0930 MDT)]

I’m pretty sure that a basic tenet of PCT is that we don’t control our behavior, we control our perceptions, and we vary our behavior as necessary to bring our perception of some variable “out there” under control – we bring our perception of that variable to some defined state and then keep it there. However, it is also the case that, on occasion, our behavior can be the controlled variable. In such cases, it seems to me we vary our behavior so as to have our perception of our behavior match some reference condition.

Do I have that right?

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

1558 Coshocton Ave – Suite 303

Mount Vernon, OH 43050

www.nickols.us | fred@nickols.us

“Assistance at a Distance”

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1000 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.0930 MDT) --

... on occasion, our behavior can be the controlled variable. In such cases, it seems to me we vary our behavior so as to have our perception of our behavior match some reference condition.

Do I have that right?

Not quite. You're talking about different levels of control, and when you say "control behavior" you're referring to the actual motions of limbs and appendages, aren't you? So when you beckon someone to approach by holding up a finger and curling it toward you, what is the actual output you use to cause that finger-movement to occur?

Best,

Bill

PS I sent a reply to Gavin Ritz before it was done, by accident, but I think I had said about everything I wanted to so I'll leave it at that.

BP

I disagree from a neuroscience perspective.

We can only change perception through cognitive transformation however, the variables will always remain the same and even our initial perceptions (no matter the milliseconds they may be) may be the same as well however, when we introduce the cognitive transformation aspects of the perception, we can then “think” about what we saw, heard, felt, smelled, etc to garner the desired behavior. This truly stems in cognitive adaption optimization if you will and its not something that can be learned overnight…Just my two cents.

···

On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.0930 MDT)]

I’m pretty sure that a basic tenet of PCT is that we don’t control our behavior, we control our perceptions, and we vary our behavior as necessary to bring our perception of some variable “out there” under control – we bring our perception of that variable to some defined state and then keep it there. However, it is also the case that, on occasion, our behavior can be the controlled variable. In such cases, it seems to me we vary our behavior so as to have our perception of our behavior match some reference condition.

Do I have that right?

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

1558 Coshocton Ave – Suite 303

Mount Vernon, OH 43050

www.nickols.us | fred@nickols.us

“Assistance at a Distance”

[From Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.MDT)]

Hmm. Let's try a different example. If I have a goal (reference signal)
for myself as a "polite person" and the way I talk to people is part of that
and if I monitor my utterances to make sure they are consistent with my
notion of "polite" then it seems to me that I am trying to control my
utterances (a.k.a. verbal behavior).

Fred Nickols

From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 9:55 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: The Control of Behavior

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1000 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.0930 MDT) --

>... on occasion, our behavior can be the controlled variable. In such
>cases, it seems to me we vary our behavior so as to have our perception
>of our behavior match some reference condition.
>
>Do I have that right?

Not quite. You're talking about different levels of control, and when you

say

"control behavior" you're referring to the actual motions of limbs and
appendages, aren't you? So when you beckon someone to approach by
holding up a finger and curling it toward you, what is the actual output

you

use to cause that finger-movement to occur?

Best,

Bill

PS I sent a reply to Gavin Ritz before it was done, by accident, but I

think I

···

-----Original Message-----
had said about everything I wanted to so I'll leave it at that.

BP

bob hintz 2011.6.1.18

I have been attending physical therapy for the past month and have been working on my posture and my core strength in an attempt to reduce back pain. I am trying to develop a new habit so that I don’t have to think about standing up straight, and stronger muscles so that it is easier to stand and bend etc. Most days I do a set of exercises in the morning and a different set in the evening. Over the course of 30 days I have experienced a decrease in pain, which was my main goal.

I think the question might need to consider whether one is conscious of controlling one’s behavior. For awhile I even set a timer for 20 minutes so I would notice if I had been sitting in a chair without moving my body or mowing the grass for more than 20 minutes. The goal was to keep changing activity (time management issue). This might strike people as odd behavior, if they did not know what I was doing.

I doubt that any of us would do something we considered impolite, but we become quite conscious of our behavior when someone else calls us into account for behavior that they consider impolite. We all have different language (words, phrases) that are appropriate for different sets of others with whom we interact. When the boss enters the room but one of us doesn’t notice we might be embarrassed.

My overt behavior is the only means I have of controlling my relationship with others. I am quite conscious of the results of my behavior at many levels as I type this message and am grateful when the computer kindly underlines in red when I misspell a word so I can go back and fix it before I hit the send button. I am also hopeful that my message relates to the message that I am responding to in a useful fashion.

bob

···

On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 8:36 PM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.MDT)]

Hmm. Let’s try a different example. If I have a goal (reference signal)

for myself as a “polite person” and the way I talk to people is part of that

and if I monitor my utterances to make sure they are consistent with my

notion of “polite” then it seems to me that I am trying to control my

utterances (a.k.a. verbal behavior).

Fred Nickols

-----Original Message-----

From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)

[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill Powers

Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 9:55 AM

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Subject: Re: The Control of Behavior

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1000 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.0930 MDT) –

… on occasion, our behavior can be the controlled variable. In such

cases, it seems to me we vary our behavior so as to have our perception

of our behavior match some reference condition.

Do I have that right?

Not quite. You’re talking about different levels of control, and when you

say

“control behavior” you’re referring to the actual motions of limbs and

appendages, aren’t you? So when you beckon someone to approach by

holding up a finger and curling it toward you, what is the actual output

you

use to cause that finger-movement to occur?

Best,

Bill

PS I sent a reply to Gavin Ritz before it was done, by accident, but I

think I

had said about everything I wanted to so I’ll leave it at that.

BP

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1620 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.MDT)

Hmm. Let's try a different example. If I have a goal (reference signal)
for myself as a "polite person" and the way I talk to people is part of that
and if I monitor my utterances to make sure they are consistent with my
notion of "polite" then it seems to me that I am trying to control my
utterances (a.k.a. verbal behavior).

How do you know you are uttering anything?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1825 MDT)]

bob hintz 2011.6.1.18--

BH: I think the question might need to consider whether one is conscious of controlling one's behavior. For awhile I even set a timer for 20 minutes so I would notice if I had been sitting in a chair without moving my body or mowing the grass for more than 20 minutes. The goal was to keep changing activity (time management issue). This might strike people as odd behavior, if they did not know what I was doing.

BP: I'll ask the same question I asked Fred Nickols: when the alarm went off, how did you know it went off, and then how did you know whether you were moving or not?

BH: My overt behavior is the only means I have of controlling my relationship with others. I am quite conscious of the results of my behavior at many levels as I type this message and am grateful when the computer kindly underlines in red when I misspell a word so I can go back and fix it before I hit the send button. I am also hopeful that my message relates to the message that I am responding to in a useful fashion.

BP: Don't forget about the levels of perception and control. What you experience as a means of controlling perception at one level is the perception being controlled -- by some other means -- at a lower level. You can be aware at one level, or the other, or both.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1630 MDT)]

KP: I disagree from a
neuroscience perspective.

We can only change perception through cognitive transformation however,
the variables will always remain the same and even our initial
perceptions (no matter the milliseconds they may be) may be the same as
well however, when we introduce the cognitive transformation aspects of
the perception, we can then “think” about what we saw, heard,
felt, smelled, etc to garner the desired behavior. This truly stems in
cognitive adaption optimization if you will and its not something that
can be learned overnight…Just my two cents.

BP: You’re right, you can’t learn to perceive a new kind of variable
overnight, but that’s not how “control of perception” is meant.
The intended meaning of the phrase is controlling the magnitude or state
of a variable of a given kind, without changing what kind it is. In a
tracking task, for example, the controlled variable is the perceived
distance between the cursor and the target. If you can’t already perceive
that, you can’t do the task. But if you do perceive it, you can use the
mouse to move the cursor to alter the distance and make it match a
reference distance – zero, for example (cursor on target), on one inch
on the screen (cursor leading or lagging target, or beside or above
target).
If you have access to Living Control Systems III: the fact of control, check out demo 9-1, called “square circle.” It
demonstrates that what you call your behavior is really a perception of a
consequence of your actual motor outputs, not the motor outputs
themselves. You think of it as what you’re “doing”, but it can
be quite different from what you’re actually doing. If you do this demo,
type a “d” to put it in “direct” mode – I didn’t
realize for some time that the demo is easier to do and much clearer in
that model.

Best,

Bill P.

···

At 03:25 PM 6/18/2011 -0400, Kerry Patton <kerry.patton14@GMAIL.COM wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1630 MDT)]

···

At 03:25 PM 6/18/2011 -0400, Kerry Patton <kerry.patton14@GMAIL.COM wrote:

KP: I disagree from a neuroscience perspective.

Oops, the last word in my reply was "mode," but somebody else in here decided that I meant "model."

Best,

Bill P.

[From Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.1707 MDT)]

I perceive my mouth and tongue moving, I perceive sounds that seem to come
perceive some of those strings of words as constituting sentences, and my
memory and grasp of the language tells me those are "utterances."

Fred Nickols

···

from my mouth, I perceive some of those sounds as constituting words, I

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 4:23 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: The Control of Behavior

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1620 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.MDT)

>Hmm. Let's try a different example. If I have a goal (reference
>signal) for myself as a "polite person" and the way I talk to people is
>part of that and if I monitor my utterances to make sure they are
>consistent with my notion of "polite" then it seems to me that I am
>trying to control my utterances (a.k.a. verbal behavior).

How do you know you are uttering anything?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1755 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.1707 MDT) --

FN: I perceive my mouth and tongue moving, I perceive sounds that seem to come
from my mouth, I perceive some of those sounds as constituting words, I
perceive some of those strings of words as constituting sentences, and my
memory and grasp of the language tells me those are "utterances."

BP: OK, don't stop there. So if your behavior is known to you only as perceptions, what is it you're controlling, again?

Best,

Bill P.

from John Kirkland 1725 hours NZST June 16 2011

I'm not sure if this is related directly to the current thread.

It's framed here as a little question (modified after Richard
Gregory's approach):

To what extent is PCT's version of perception like an intelligent eye?

Any suggestions will be most welcomed.

JohnK

···

On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 11:58 AM, Bill Powers <powers_w@frontier.net> wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1755 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.1707 MDT) --

FN: I perceive my mouth and tongue moving, I perceive sounds that seem to
come
from my mouth, I perceive some of those sounds as constituting words, I
perceive some of those strings of words as constituting sentences, and my
memory and grasp of the language tells me those are "utterances."

BP: OK, don't stop there. So if your behavior is known to you only as
perceptions, what is it you're controlling, again?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.19.0902 MDT)]

John Kirkland 1725 hours NZST June 16 2011 –

JK: To what extent is PCT’s
version of perception like an intelligent eye?

BP: Do you refer to the eye that Maturana draws in his diagrams, looking
down at the rest of the diagram? There seem to be two directly
contradictory answers: a great extent, and none at all.
Perception as a process is purely mechanistic, requiring some rather
fancy computing, but no awareness. If we knew how the brain creates
perceptions, we could make a computer do it. So far we haven’t made a
real dent in that problem, other than figuring out one or two ways to
categorize and name perceptions.
Perception as an experience is something else entirely. I have never
produced a working model of any control system capable of knowing
that it was perceiving. I wouldn’t have a clue about how to put
consciousness into a program or a device. Yet consciousness, awareness of
perceiving, is to me the very essence of being alive. Here I am,
observing, and all around me and inside me is That Which Is Observed.
Definitely dualism, and definitely, for me, an observational fact. A
person who rejects dualism is simply letting logic substitute for direct
experience. Without awareness, neural signals would still be here, but I
wouldn’t be.
Among the things that are observed are a self (or several selves),
emotions, sensations (and perhaps 10 other levels of perception),
thoughts, opinions, desires, wishes, and so on – all the stuff of
existence. There it is, and here I am observing it. So what is doing the
observing? Whatever it is, I am it.
Is this Observer Self intelligent? No, I think not (my brain thinks not
– my brain is composing this post). The brain can be organized to handle
logic and reasoning, to analyze, to solve problems, to be good with
words, to appear intelligent. It often continues to do such things while
we are being aware of something else, which shows that it is the brain,
not the Observer, doing them. The Observer is presented with the results,
but has little to do with how they were obtained.
So – and this is the Big Question – what is the Observer for?
I’ve been trying to understand that for 60 or 70 years. That is – and
maybe this is part of the answer – I’ve been trying to get my brain to
fit this sort of experience into a framework that makes sense of all my
experiences.
In the Method of Levels we have been saying that reorganization follows
awareness. That idea was an attempt to explain why reorganization works
mainly where it is needed – where something is not working right –
rather than just anywhere, even if not needed. But there’s another way to
see that. Maybe awareness leads reorganization.
If awareness leads reorganization, maybe reorganization is the means by
which awareness accomplishes some particular kind of goal. What sort of
goal would that be? What do we, as aware entities, want, other than all
the detailed things that exist in the world of perception? Why do we want
anything? But mainly, what do we want? With PCT we now know how
wanting works, but that doesn’t answer the question of what there is to
want.

Unfortunately, there is no point of view from which we can observe the
Observer Self. Through thought and logic, we infer its existence, and we
Observe ourselves doing this inferring. But we can’t see it directly,
just as we can’t see the material universe that is the origin,
theoretically, of the perceptual signals we theoretically experience.
Perhaps, at this stage of our understanding, it is sufficient simply to
have the concept of an Observer Self, a concept that mirrors the
experience without actually bringing it into focus. Perhaps we will have
to assimilate this idea for a while and explore its implications before
we can get closer to anything like understanding it.

Best,

Bill P.

P.S. In PCT, John, behavior is defined as the means of controlling
perception, even when the perception is one of moving the arms, hands,
legs, and body.

···

Hi, Tim --

TC: thoughts occurred to me after reading your post ... I'm still tossing around the idea that the experience of the Observer self is not fundamentally different than any other experience. That is, being able to sense that there is an "I", even that "I" am composing this post, is different only in the same way that other perceptual experiences are from each other (the way in which the experience of 'honesty' is different from the experience of 'beside').

BP: When "I" think of writing this post, the "I" is there, thinking, and the writing is there -- and both are in awareness. That's how I know about either one. What's the difference between a perception's existing and a perception's being experienced?

I'm trying to approach this from the purely experiential viewpoint. Logic may say that awareness is not "fundamentally" different from perception, but when you say that, aren't you saying that it's experientially different?

TC: I wonder whether the perceptual capabilities to experience a sense of 'being aware' and a sense of 'I' are some of the capabilities that distinguish being human from being some other form of life.

BP: Possible, or it's also possible that this is what makes all living systems alike. How you reason about it depends on what your premises are. How you experience it, once you can distinguish thought from awareness of thought, doesn't depend on premises or logic.

TC: The other point that occurred to me concerns reorganisation and awareness. At the moment the two options seem to be that either reorganisation follows awareness or awareness follows reorganisation. What about a third possibility? Could it be possible that reorganisation _is_ awareness. Or at least they're both essential components of some underlying process that we haven't considered yet?

BP: Oh, yes, and that's what I'm looking for. I don't, however, think reorganization is the same thing as awareness, though it might result from awareness. What does a change in parameters of control have to do with a sense of observing something? The two processes seem quite different to me.

The basic observation that keeps returning is simply that if something exists in the field of awareness, something else is looking at it. Nothing we know about simply exists without being observed, although lots of things exist without our knowing of them, even inside our heads. Perception without awareness still seems to me like a television set presenting pictures and sounds to an empty room.

Bill

[From Rick Marken (2011.06.19.1230)]

Bill Powers (2011.06.19.0902 MDT)

Happy Father’s Day to both your Observer and the perceptual objects of it;-)

Perception as an experience is something else entirely. I have never
produced a working model of any control system capable of knowing
that it was perceiving. I wouldn’t have a clue about how to put
consciousness into a program or a device. Yet consciousness, awareness of
perceiving, is to me the very essence of being alive. Here I am,
observing, and all around me and inside me is That Which Is Observed.
Definitely dualism, and definitely, for me, an observational fact. A
person who rejects dualism is simply letting logic substitute for direct
experience. Without awareness, neural signals would still be here, but I
wouldn’t be.

I agree with the dualism that is the distinction between Observing (awareness of perceiving) and That Which is Observed (perception); I experience this distinction myself. But you seem to be saying that this dualism corresponds to a distinction between what is done by the brain (perception computed by neural signals) and what is done by non-brain processes (consciousness that exists as a non-brain phenomenon?).

My experience suggests that both the Observer and Observed are brain processes, though possibly of very different kinds. The experience I’m thinking of is that of being put under anesthesia, where I seem to have truly “lost consciousness” in a way that is quite different than "going to sleep. When I’m asleep and then wake, even if I cannot recall or even think that I have had any dreams, I am aware of time having passed; “I” (me as Observer) was apparently still there, though not at the same “level” of awareness. But with a “total” anesthetic it’s like my life didn’t exist (for me) during the time I was out.

I imagine that being under a total is probably like what it’s like being dead; no consciousness at all (which is consistent with your idea that consciousness is the essence of being alive). Anesthesia is removing consciousness by operating on the physical aspect of the body (probably on something having to do with the brain), which is why I think that both the Observer (consciousness) and Observed (perception) are functions of the brain (or at least some aspect of the physical body).

I am a dualist in the sense that I think there is a difference between perception (whether being experienced of not) and the neural basis of these perceptions (and the awareness of them); I am also a dualist in terms of recognizing a difference between consciousness and perception. But I am a monist when it comes to the basis of both consciousness and perception; it seems to me that it’s all the nervous system or physiology related to the NS that we don’t yet understand.

Whaddaya think?

Best

Rick

···


Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

Hi, Tim –

BP: Yes, it is fun, and your questioning helps me think about it more
productively. It’s too easy to run around in circles when you just think
these things without sharing them with anyone.

TC: I’m not sure I understand
this question. How is a perception existing and a perception being
experienced different? Are you getting at the idea that our whole network
of control systems is always ‘on’ so they all must have perceptions that
exist at any particular moment but we only ever experience a small
fraction of these perceptions at that particular moment?

BP: I define a perception as the presence of neural signals in an
afferent pathway. That’s a bit confusing because most people mean
conscious perception when they say perception, and I don’t blame
them. I really should say “perceptual signals,” shouldn’t
I?
According to my understanding of how living control systems work, every
neuromotor control system that’s in operation contains a perceptual
signal which is really what is being controlled. But we are aware of only
a few of these control systems and their perceptions at a time, which is
to say that only some of them are consciously perceived. This is
my basis for distinguishing between perception (perceptual signals) and
awareness, and for defining consciousness, or conscious experience, as
the combination of perceptual signals and awareness. Perceptual signals
can easily exist without awareness; controlling unconsciously, as in your
example of not remembering how you drove to some destination, is common.
But you know the perceptual signals must have been there because that’s
how control works.

It’s also possible to have awareness without perceptual signals. It’s
like waiting in the dark to see or hear something. You’re receptive, you
feel aware, but there’s nothing to receive.

BP:I’m trying to approach this
from the purely experiential viewpoint.

Logic may say that awareness is not “fundamentally” different
from

perception, but when you say that, aren’t you saying that it’s

experientially different?

TC: Hmmm.I’m not sure what a ‘purely’ experiential viewpoint would be.
Isn’t logic an experience too? Yes, I am saying that the sense of being
aware is experientially different from other perceptions … in the same
way that the sense of ‘honest’ is different from the sense of ‘put the
milk in after the tea’.

BP: Yes, logic is a perception, too. But you can either identify yourself
with the logical system, or distance yourself from it and observe it in
action as a phenomenon, rather than just believing whatever it comes up
with. When you identify with a hierarchical system, it’s as if you become
that system; its perceptions are your perceptions, its thoughts are your
thoughts, its world is your world. When you back away from that system,
you’re still aware of the perceptions but they’re no longer yours in the
same way. Instead of perceiving a world that is somehow just
there, you’re aware of perceiving, as well as being aware of
what you’re perceiving.

BP: Possible, or it’s also
possible that this is what makes all

living systems alike. How you reason about it depends on what your

premises are. How you experience it, once you can distinguish
thought

from awareness of thought, doesn’t depend on premises or logic.

TC: Doesn’t distinguishing thought from awareness of thought rely on some
premises too? Why is ‘awareness of thought’ not just another thought?
Doesn’t that depend on the way we define ‘thought’? Is an image a
thought, or a sense that someone is sneaking up behind
you?

BP: There’s a point during explorations of this kind where you start
thinking “What I just thought is a thought I was aware of. And so is
this thought, and this one about that one, and so on…” It looks
like an endless cycle. But eventually the light dawns – “I’m just
thinking one thought after another about other thoughts, and that whole
business, however many times I repeat the cycle, is just the same process
of thinking. and that’s a thought, too, but so what?” You perceive
the cycle, and from then on you’re outside it looking at it from a stable
place instead of going around and around. Then you are aware of the
thinking as something different from you the observer. The observer
doesn’t think. I recall your saying something very similar to this a
while ago.

TC: Yep, me too. The sense of
observing something, however, is one experience of awareness as I
experience it. I’ve had the experience of driving from A to B with my
mind being somewhere else entirely. It’s only when I arrive at B that I
become aware again of my immediate surroundings and I assume I didn’t
drive through any red lights or knock anyone down on the trip. Clearly
there must have been some awareness going on to enable me to drive from A
to B (even though ‘I’ wasn’t aware of it).

BP: Not awareness going on: perception. The perceptual signals were being
controlled, but you weren’t aware of them. You were being aware of other
perceptual signals instead, perhaps imagined ones.

I think there are probably measurable differences between controlling
with conscious involvement and doing it unconsciously or automatically.
This is something that needs experimental investigation. There may be
relevant studies in the literature on attention.

TC: Ah, I think I’ve just
realised what might be happening in our discussion. If I had my copy of
B:CP here with me I’d check the glossary because I have a vague memory
that you define ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ differently. I’ll check
that when I get to work but that might explain the difference - you’re
using the term ‘awareness’ to mean the sense of being aware and I’m using
the term to mean both ‘being conscious’ and ‘being aware’. If that’s
right, that’s just illuminated for me where the apparent divergence
between us has been.

BP: Yes, I think that’s it. The thing is, control systems don’t seem to
need awareness in them to control perfectly well. I never put awareness
into any of the physical control systems I designed and built, and they
worked anyway. This immediately tells me that perceptual signals, which
all control systems must have, are not the same as awareness. Awareness
and perceptual signals are two different things; each can exist without
the other. Put them together and you have conscious perception.

Best,

Bill

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.19/1540 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2011.06.19.1230) --

RM: I agree with the dualism that is the distinction between Observing (awareness of perceiving) and That Which is Observed (perception); I experience this distinction myself. But you seem to be saying that this dualism corresponds to a distinction between what is done by the brain (perception computed by neural signals) and what is done by non-brain processes (consciousness that exists as a non-brain phenomenon?).

BP: Glad for the corroboration. As to non-brain phenomena, I have no idea what they might be, and it's possible that awareness is a brain phenomenon. But there are some problems with that. The mobility of a awareness is the main one. How can one part of the brain be selectively receivng signals from all other levels and places in the brain? This would imply a massive switching network with pathways from every part of the brain to one switching station, and I don't think such a thing has ever been found. I have nothing against an explanation of awareness as a hitherto undiscovered (or unrecognized) brain function, but there doesn't seem to be any evidence for such a network.

On the other hand, your example of general anesthesia argues for awareness itself to reside in a neural form that can be turned off. There are places in the brain which, when damaged, result in permanent loss of consciousness as far as we can see from outside the brain. But I'm worried about all those pathways connecting perceptual signals of all levels to one central place: where are they?

RM: My experience suggests that both the Observer and Observed are brain processes, though possibly of very different kinds. The experience I'm thinking of is that of being put under anesthesia, where I seem to have truly "lost consciousness" in a way that is quite different than "going to sleep. When I'm asleep and then wake, even if I cannot recall or even think that I have had any dreams, I am aware of time having passed; "I" (me as Observer) was apparently still there, though not at the same "level" of awareness. But with a "total" anesthetic it's like my life didn't exist (for me) during the time I was out.

I imagine that being under a total is probably like what it's like being dead; no consciousness at all (which is consistent with your idea that consciousness is the essence of being alive). Anesthesia is removing consciousness by operating on the physical aspect of the body (probably on something having to do with the brain), which is why I think that both the Observer (consciousness) and Observed (perception) are functions of the brain (or at least some aspect of the physical body).

BP: The question is whether anaesthesia is affecting the source of the signals, the pathway, the switching network, the destination, or (as for one anaesthetic used in colonoscopies) the memory of what went on. Long ago I had some experiences with this; in one I could hear the surgeons talking, and in another I simply floated, detached from perceptions but aware, until I woke up. After Mary's colonoscopy, she kept asking when they were going to do it. Total amnesia for time near the event. I had a cardioversion last year -- same effect: suddenly the room got very quiet and everyone was gone. I could see a monitor showing normal sinus rhythm and realized it was over.

RM: I am a dualist in the sense that I think there is a difference between perception (whether being experienced of not) and the neural basis of these perceptions (and the awareness of them); I am also a dualist in terms of recognizing a difference between consciousness and perception. But I am a monist when it comes to the basis of both consciousness and perception; it seems to me that it's all the nervous system or physiology related to the NS that we don't yet understand.

BP: That's a matter of faith, which I won't argue with. I don't see why we have to choose among these possibilities; isn't it OK just to say I don't know? Can't I be a none-of-the-abovist?

Best,

Bill P.

Hi, Tim –

TC: I can see what you mean but
it wouldn’t be possible to have awareness without any perceptual
signals would it? Wouldn’t that be like speaking about the awareness of a
rock?

BP: I think it’s more like a radio turned on but tuned between
stations. Maybe there’s a little cosmic noise that tells you awareness is
still working; there’s just nothing to be aware of at the moment, at
least in the place you’re connected to. It’s like waiting for something
to happen. As Rick Marken said, it’s not like being under an anaesthetic
so it seems that you jumped instantly ahead in time.

TC: Yep, sure. But this again,
gets back to a point above - a control system doesn’t need awareness to
control but does awareness need a control system to be
aware?

BP: I don’t think so. It just needs to be turned on, like the radio.
Think of the time between the end of one thought and the beginning of the
next one. Think of the moment while the conductor has his baton raised
but hasn’t brought it down yet to start the music. You don’t hear the
music until it starts, but your ears are working fine. Check it out: look
for the moments when the perception you’re attending to pauses.

Best,

Bill P.

OK, OK; I get it. I'm not controlling my behavior, I'm controlling my
perception of my behavior.

Fred Nickols

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 5:59 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: The Control of Behavior

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1755 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.1707 MDT) --

>FN: I perceive my mouth and tongue moving, I perceive sounds that seem
>to come from my mouth, I perceive some of those sounds as constituting
>words, I perceive some of those strings of words as constituting
>sentences, and my memory and grasp of the language tells me those are
"utterances."

BP: OK, don't stop there. So if your behavior is known to you only as
perceptions, what is it you're controlling, again?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Chad Green (2011.06.21.14:30 EDT)]

Fred, your conclusion perhaps aligns with the conceptual-act model of emotion:

"According to the Conceptual-Act model, emotion is generated when a person categorizes his/her core affective state using knowledge about emotion. This theory combines elements of linguistic relativity and affective neuroscience."

Hence the importance of level 7 of HPCT as I have stated before on this list.

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

Fred Nickols <fred@NICKOLS.US> 6/20/2011 12:45 PM >>>

OK, OK; I get it. I'm not controlling my behavior, I'm controlling my
perception of my behavior.

Fred Nickols

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 5:59 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: The Control of Behavior

[From Bill Powers (2011.06.18.1755 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2011.06.18.1707 MDT) --

>FN: I perceive my mouth and tongue moving, I perceive sounds that seem
>to come from my mouth, I perceive some of those sounds as constituting
>words, I perceive some of those strings of words as constituting
>sentences, and my memory and grasp of the language tells me those are
"utterances."

BP: OK, don't stop there. So if your behavior is known to you only as
perceptions, what is it you're controlling, again?

Best,

Bill P.