The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal (p) is theory

[Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12]

···

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i’s, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT.  As Bill explains in the attached except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the controlled quantity “refers to some objective property of the external world”, rather “it refers to perceptual processes”. This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.Â

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

RM: Well, I’m afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.Martin’s point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental variables) are “objective properties of the real world” and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties. From this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this – hence the concern about how well p corresponds to q.i. My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world. From this point of view the main goal of PCT research is to determine what aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls.Â

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in  [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Best

Rick

Â

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn’t ‘sound right’. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don’t want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition…

Â

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism…q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism’s sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different…

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

RM: I don’t know if this captures it or not because I don’t understand what it is about q.i being “the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute p within the organism” that makes q.i <> p? I’m having difficulty understanding what the “net effect” of environmental variables is.Â

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe inÂ
[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Thanks

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-04_07:26:11 UTC]

···

Rick, in [Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12] you wrote: “This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.�

This sounds nice: PCT is about control of perception after all. But whose perception it is? Observer/experimenter’s or subject/controller’s?

While Martin is on a travel I dare to comment that my interpretation is that he has used to strongly state that there are not any “controlled environmental variables�. The abbreviation CEV used to mean previously “Complex Environmental
Variable� but now later it was changed to mean “Corresponding (complex) Environmental Variable�. That (complex) variable is that-which-is-perceived and the perception of it is controlled. The perception is controlled by affecting the CEV with the output in
such manner that the disturbance is counteracted. CEV corresponds to controlled perception because it is perceived (it is the object of perception) and its is affected by output (it is the object of output). But strictly speaking it is not controlled.

This of course is just my perception and interpretation and I hope Martin will tell his when he is again at the email.

Eetu

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically
in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i’s, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT. As Bill explains in the attached
except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the
controlled quantity “refers to some objective property of the external world”, rather “it refers to perceptual processes”. This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

RM: Well, I’m afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.Martin’s point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental
variables) are “objective properties of the real world” and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties. from this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this – hence the concern
about how well p corresponds to q.i. My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world. From this point of view the main goal of PCT research
is to determine what aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin
2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research
could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Best

Rick

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear
that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn’t ‘sound right’. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don’t want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition…

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism…q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism’s sensors and being transformed by
neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different…

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

RM: I don’t know if this captures it or not because I don’t understand what it is about q.i being “the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to
constitute p within the organism” that makes q.i <> p? I’m having difficulty understanding what the “net effect” of environmental variables is.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Thanks

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-04_11:46:00]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-04_07:26:11 UTC]

Â

EP: Rick, in  [Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12] you wrote: “This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.â€?

Â

EP: This sounds nice: PCT is about control of perception after all.

RM: Of course! No one ever said it's not. My problem is that there seems to be some confusion about what "control of perception" means. In PCT, "control of perception" means control of a perceptual signal that is typically a function of simple environmental variables such as those mentioned in the page from LCS I that I posted:; variables like force, angle and position. Symbolizing these variables as v the perceptions that are controlled in PCT can be represented mathematically as p = f(v.1,v.2,...v.n).Â
RM: Martin and others seem to take control of perception to mean control of a perceptual signal that is a function of complex environmental variables such as a tennis serve, backhand volley or lob (also mentioned in the LCS II quote). Martin calls these variables CEVs and considers them to be equivalent to what we call controlled quantities, q.i, in PCT. So the perception that is controlled in this view of control of perception is p = f(CEV) or, equivalently p = f(q.i).Â
RM: The difference between these two views of control of perception are profound (as I noted in the post to Bruce N.). Martin's view suggests that there are entities "out there" to be perceived and that the job of the perceptual functions is to provide an accurate representation of these entities. The PCT view is that there are only simple environmental variables out there -- eg. force, angle,and position -- and that the job of the perceptual functions is to construct, from the "infinity of different quantities that might be controlled", perceptual signals that are analogs of a subset of those quantities -- presumably the ones that, when controlled, allow us to keep our intrinsic variables under control.Â
RM: The difference between these two views of control of perception leads to very different approaches to how one goes about studying the behavior of living control systems. As I said in my post to Bruce N., Martin's approach leads to research aimed at determining how accurately perception represents the entities "out there" -- the CEVs -- that are being controlled. This approach assumes that one somehow already knows what the variables "out there" are the ones being controlled. The PCT approach, on the other hand, is aimed at determining what perceptual variables are being controlled when we see an organism performing some behavior.Â
RM: A good example of research based on the PCT understanding of "control of perception" can be found here:
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/eymkj4bxuorpyuy/Chasin'Choppers.pdf?dl=0&gt;https://www.dropbox.com/s/eymkj4bxuorpyuy/Chasin'Choppers.pdf?dl=0

RM: The goal of this research was to determine what perceptual variables -- what functions of simple physical variables, v -- are controlled when a person runs to intercept a moving object.Â
RM: A good example of research based on Martin's understanding of control of perception can be found...nowhere since you can't really study the controlling done by living organisms based on this way of looking at control of perception.
Â

EP: But whose perception it is? Observer/experimenter’s or subject/controller’s?

 RM: The subject/controller controls their own perception of the aspect of the environment they are controlling. An observer/experimenter can determine the perception (the aspect of the environment) that the subject/controller is controlling using some version of the test for the controlled variable. That's how we were able to determine the perceptual variables that the subject/controllers were controlling in the "Chasin' Choppers" object interception study noted above.>

Â

EP: While Martin is on a travel I dare to comment that my interpretation is that he has used to strongly state that there are not any “controlled environmental variablesâ€?. The abbreviation CEV used to mean previously “Complex Environmental Variableâ€? but now later it was changed to mean “Corresponding (complex) Environmental Variableâ€?. That (complex) variable is that-which-is-perceived and the perception of it is controlled. The perception is controlled by affecting the CEV with the output in such manner that the disturbance is counteracted. CEV corresponds to controlled perception because it is perceived (it is the object of perception) and its is affected by output (it is the object of output). But strictly speaking it is not controlled.

This of course is just my perception and interpretation and I hope Martin will tell his when he is again at the email.

RM: I think your perception of what Martin is saying is just right; and I think what Martin is saying is (as I noted above) just wrong. There is no CEV in the environment that is perceived. What Martin calls CEVs -- things like tables, windows and books -- are perceptions that are a subset of the infinity of possible perceptions that could be constructed from the sensory effects of simple physical (environmental) variables.Â
BestÂ

···

Â

Eetu

Â

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

Â

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

Â

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i's, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT.  As Bill explains in the attached except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the controlled quantity "refers to some objective property of the external world", rather "it refers to perceptual processes". This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.Â

Â

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

Â

RM: Well, I'm afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.Martin's point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental variables) are "objective properties of the real world" and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties. From this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this -- hence the concern about how well p corresponds to q.i. My point of view -- which is the PCT point of view -- is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world. From this point of view the main goal of PCT research is to determine what aspect of the environment -- what controlled quantities -- the control system controls.Â

Â

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the "formant control" study that you describe in  [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Â

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

Â

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Â

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

<labphon; labphon

Â

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Â

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

Â

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn't 'sound right'. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

Â

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don't want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.

Â

Â

Â

Â

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

Â

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

Â

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition...

Â

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism...q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism's sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different...

Â

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

Â

RM: I don't know if this captures it or not because I don't understand what it is about q.i being "the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute p within the organism" that makes q.i <> p? I'm having difficulty understanding what the "net effect" of environmental variables is.Â

Â

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the "formant control" study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Â

Thanks

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

--

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Â

Â

--

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Eetu

···

From: Eetu Pikkarainen (eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Monday, June 4, 2018 9:59 AM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’ csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal (p) is theory

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-04_07:26:11 UTC]

Rick, in [Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12] you wrote: “This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.”

HB : If this is true, Rick finaly read “the same q.i.” in similar way as I did. He read the same source of information in similar way in book B:CP. It was quite a long time (5 years), but better ever than never.

Bill P (B:CP)

ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior

HB : From definition of “error” is quite clear that perceptual signal is quite the same as “controlled quantity”.

EP : This sounds nice: PCT is about control of perception after all. But whose perception it is? Observer/experimenter’s or subject/controller’s?

HB : It’s incredible mess Eetu. On one side we have some perfect PCT explanation from Rick and Bruce N. and on other side perfect behavioristic explanation with “Behavior is control”, controlled aspect of environment and so on. So I don’t understand why Bruce for example is not using his discoveries about how differently LCS perceptions function.

BN ealier : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina

EP : While Martin is on a travel I dare to comment that my interpretation is that he has used to strongly state that there are not any “controlled environmental variables”. The abbreviation CEV used to mean previously “Complex Environmental Variable” but now later it was changed to mean “Corresponding (complex) Environmental Variable”. That (complex) variable is that-which-is-perceived and the perception of it is controlled. The perception is controlled by affecting the CEV with the output in such manner that the disturbance is counteracted. CEV corresponds to controlled perception because it is perceived (it is the object of perception) and its is affected by output (it is the object of output). But strictly speaking it is not controlled.

HB : Martin never answered me what exactly is CEV. But if your explanation is right than Martins CEV is quite similar to “Controlled quantity” in PCT.

Boris

This of course is just my perception and interpretation and I hope Martin will tell his when he is again at the email.

Eetu

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i’s, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT. As Bill explains in the attached except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the controlled quantity “refers to some objective property of the external world”, rather “it refers to perceptual processes”. This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

RM: Well, I’m afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.Martin’s point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental variables) are “objective properties of the real world” and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties. From this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this – hence the concern about how well p corresponds to q.i. My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world. From this point of view the main goal of PCT research is to determine what aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Best

Rick

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn’t ‘sound right’. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don’t want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition…

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism…q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism’s sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different…

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

RM: I don’t know if this captures it or not because I don’t understand what it is about q.i being “the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute p within the organism” that makes q.i <> p? I’m having difficulty understanding what the “net effect” of environmental variables is.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Thanks

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Eetu, Rick

image001172.png

image002104.png

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Monday, June 4, 2018 8:46 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal (p) is theory

[Rick Marken 2018-06-04_11:46:00]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-04_07:26:11 UTC]

EP: Rick, in [Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12] you wrote: “This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.â€?

EP: This sounds nice: PCT is about control of perception after all.

RM: Of course! No one ever said it’s not.

HB : So why you insist on RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) which is promoting wrong chain of control events which show that “Behavior is control” :

Behavior is control à controlled aspect of environment à controlled perceptual varibale. Do you understand that this has nothing to do with “Control of perception” ?

RM : My problem is that there seems to be some confusion about what “control of perception” means.

HB : You are right. It’s your problem and you are making serious confussions on CSGnet about what “control of perception” means

RM : In PCT, “control of perception” means control of a perceptual signal that is typically a function of simple environmental variables such as those mentioned in the page from LCS I that I posted:; variables like force, angle and position.

HB : Even you opposed to yourself “when perception of external environment” is concerned. I’ll not tlak now about internal variables that you missed.

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables….

RM : Symbolizing these variables as v the perceptions that are controlled in PCT can be represented mathematically as p = f(v.1,v.2,…v.n).

HB : Perceptions that are controlled in PCT are of heirarchical kind and range from intensities to a very high complexity of perceptual variables like “system concept”.

RM: Martin and others…¦

HB : Who are those others . I can prove to you that you were among them and that you are the one that is making serious confussions like this one. If I wouldn’t be arround to “speak in name of Bill” you would conquer CSGnet with your nosense RCT.

RM : …seem to take control of perception to mean control oof a perceptual signal that is a function of complex environmental variables such as a tennis serve, backhand volley or lob (also mentioned in the LCS II quote).

HB : That’s exactly what PCT is about. It means perceptual signal that is some function or more or less complex environmental variables.

The problem is only how pecisely perceptual signal “represents reality” so that control could be optimal. But generally we control perception of tennis serve, backhand volley etc. and generally it’s true that we control perceptions of evets so that we can live safe and satisfying lives.

We can’t control external events itself like in RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory). In RCT just external environment is controlled with “Control of behavior”. And that has nothing to do with PCT.

RM : Martin calls these variables CEVs and considers them to be equivalent to what we call controlled quantities, q.i, in PCT.

HB : If Martin said that then he is right. Speccially if he is in accordance with Bill.Â

Bill P (B:CP) : Consider once again the meaning of the term controlled quantity. A controlled quantity is controlled only because it is detected by a control system, compared with a reference, and affected by outputs based on the error thus detected. The controlled quantity is defined strictly by the behaving system’s perceptual computers; it may or may not be identifiable as an objective (need I put in quotes?) property of, or entity in, the physical environment. In general an observer will not, therefore, be able to see what a control system is controlling

RM : So the perception that is controlled in this view of control of perception is p = f(CEV) or, equivalently p = f(q.i).

HB : Again right if P=f(CEV) or f(q.i.). So if CEV is meant as “complex environmental variables” that are transformed in all senses (sensor functions) in LCS at some “cross section of time” than Martin is thinking right by my oppinon. I think that Martin is talking about equivalency between CEV and “state of affairs”.Â

But that means that Rick is directly criticizning Bill. Do you think Rick that you can do better than PCT with your RCT. You really think that with your kindergarten knowledge of mathematics and physiology, physics etc could be serious rival to Bill. You knowledge does not reach 1/100 of his knowledge. What’s wrong with you ?

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cid:image002.png@01D3FC4C.63DD7C10

cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0

RM: The difference between these two views of control of perception are profound (as I noted in the post to Bruce N.).

HB : Your post to Brcue and his discourses about his “new” diagram which should replace Bills’ will come on the line later

RM : Martin’s view suggests that there are entities “out there” to be perceived and that the job of the perceptual functions is to provide an accurate representation of these entities.

HB : Well let us Martin say what he meant. As I recall it’s not true what you are talking. He is acknowledging that “stability in intrinisc variables” are final goal of LCS survival. But you don’t. So if Martin really thinks that accurate perception is nedeed I just have to agree with. “Accurate perception” means better control which is nedded for keeping “internal variables” near genetically determined references. That’s how we siurvive.

RM : The PCT view is that there are only simple environmental variables out there – eg. force, angle,and position

HB : Where did you find this one ? Show me where PCT says that ?

Look above. You have direct definitions created by Bill through centuries. There’s nothing about “simple variables” in outer environment you are talking about. Where did you get it ? Maybe you mixed something. It’s not that there are “simple environmental variables” out there" but they are indeed complex as we can perceive more we “climb” hierarchy.

Â

“Input function” converts “input quantity” (state of affairs or CEV) into magnitude of one dimesional perceptual signal. Organisms are constructing their own perceptual world of neural signals and their own logic of functioning and representing world. Simple representation of eg. force, angle etc are just some of them. These are not “environmental variables”, these are constructs of human mind.

RM : – and that the job of the perceptual functions is to construct, from the “infinity of different quantities that might be controlled”, perceptual signals that are analogs of a subset of those quantities – presumably the ones that, when controlled, allow us to keep our intrinsic variables under control.

HB : This is exactly what is happening in hierarchy and organisms (see diagram on p, 191 B:CP or newer “Bill, Dug version”). I didn’t know that Martin is so far with understanding hierarchy of perceptions. He will thus have no problems understanding Henry Yin. But you will.

Not long ago (May 31, 2018 5:26 AM) you wrote :

RM earlier : So what Powers was able to see was that the consistent results that we see people producing – the walking, opening doors, and lifting suitcases that seem to simply be “emitted” by the organism – are controlled results of the organisms outputs

HB : It is obvious that old Rick with his RCT is in action with his “controlled results” in external environment as general principles which he is denying himslef. Â

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

RM: The difference between these two views of control of perception leads to very different approaches to how one goes about studying the behavior of living control systems.

HB : There is no significant difference if both views acknowledge that final goal is keeping control in organism. That’s what defitnition of control in PCT is.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : Do you think Rick that this definition is wrong ??? Or better. Do you agree with this definition of control ???

RM : As I said in my post to Bruce N., Martin’s approach leads to research aimed at determining how accurately perception represents the entities “out there” – the CEVs – that are being controlled.

HB : Martin is right. This is a great problem. Look yourself. You’ll never accuratelly reperesent in your mind Bills’ literature through perepction. Whatever you read in Bills’ literature you make wrong interpretation. But maybe you’ll succed in any other way. Maybe through “extrasensory perception” you could maybe get to real meaning of control which Bill presented.

RM : This approach assumes that one somehow already knows what the variables “out there” are the ones being controlled.

HB : I don’t understand. You just wrote that Martin is promoting :

RM (Above) ….perceptual signals tthat are analogs of a subset of those quantities – presumably the ones that, when controlled, allow us to keep our intrinsic variables under control.

HB : This is right Martins’ view, but you are saying that he didn’t thought of variables that are controlled in inner environment but outer ??? Nothing is controlled outside. So what is going to be. Which Martins statement is right. It can’t be both.

HB : But variables “out there” that are being controlled is with no doubt your view for years (RCT). You controlled in outer environment with “Control of behavior”. Let us say at least 5 years. You wanted to change Bills diagram (and you still do) so that it would contain “controlled variable” in environment, that is “controlled with output”.

But if you don’t beleive me we can go through CSGnet archives. I would be glad if you would join Bills’s idea that the most important thing is to "control aspects of internal environment.Â

RM : The PCT approach, on the other hand, is aimed at determining what perceptual variables are being controlled when we see an organism performing some behavior.

HB : The problem here is that internal environment is not controlled just with “outside effectors”. So PCT approach says that by cancelling also disturbances in environment (I assume both environments) orgsnisms achieve and maintain predefined state (inside organism not outside).

RM: A good example of research based on the PCT understanding of “control of perception” can be found here:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/eymkj4bxuorpyuy/Chasin%27Choppers.pdf?dl=0

HB : Ha,ha,ha I can’t beleive it. You are continuing with nonsense “toy helicopter game” which is not showing goal directed behavior but "stimuls – respons&quoot; behavioristic behavior. Moving of toy helicopter call for respons of “perusers”. I’ll seriously rethink whether to answer this nonsense. You are pushing it Rick.

RM: The goal of this research was to determine what perceptual variables – what functions of simple physical variables, v – are controlled when a person runs to intercept a moving object.

HB : Well maybe controlls perception of helicopter but people decide whether they move or not. But in “toy helicopter” experiment, helicopter is forcing people action. It’s “stimulus” from outside that is assumed to control people behavior. It’s pure 2stimulus – reespons" like in your “ribber band game” explanation. I hope that you understand that people can leave experiment in any moment. It is just as you described above what Martin thinks about control…

RM above : …perceptual signals that are analogs of a subset of those quantities – presumably the ones that, when controlled, allow us to keep our intrinsic variables under control.

HB : Of course we can support his point of control view with Bills’ statement, Tim Carey and probably others. But we can’t support this statement with RCT control theory.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

And just in case I’ll add also definition of PCT control from Tim Carey :

TC (2014) :

According to PCT, control is a process of acting to bring a perceived aspect of the world into a match with a mental specification for the state of that perception

But RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) explains control as it is seen in the behavior of living systems.

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

HB : Do you understand the difference between internal functioning of “behavior” and external ??? Do you understand that organisms has to keep their internal environment in “constant state” so to survive.

HB : If you want to “control simple or complex physical variables” you have to control “simple internal variables” where “references” are produced. References are not produced outside and can’t be observed from outside. But you can make better or worse guesses of what refefences are in organism.

You can perform and describe goal directed behavior if you understand organisms functioning not how you control external variables. You are still behaviorist Rick. It’s incredible how you oscilate in your oppinion. Much more than Martin.

This research (Marken, Schaffer,…) is useless in PCT sense. It’s behavioristic, hidding behind mathematics. Well you can expect everything for you again “disgraced” PCT.

RM: A good example of research based on Martin’s understanding of control of perception can be found…nowhere since you can’t really study the controlling done by living organisms based on this way of looking at control of perception.

HB : As far as I can recall Martins’ PCT example of “protocol” is the best example how PCT interaction function. But I can’t found any of your reseacrches, demos, tests that could reseamble to PCT. All I have read of your literature legacy point to behaviorism.

EP: But whose perception it is? Observer/experimenter’s or subject/controller’s?

RM: The subject/controller controls their own perception of the aspect of the environment they are controlling.

HB : This is of course RCT where people control perception of controlled environment and Ricky will not reveal how this happens and will of course not offer any proofs. Ricky don’t need proofs because he is the only one who can see directly what is happening in Reality. His interpretations of how control works in external environment is the only and “holy”, “sacred” real and true. Something like Bruce Nevin.Â

RM : An observer/experimenter can determine the perception (the aspect of the environment) that the subject/controller is controlling using some version of the test for the controlled variable.

HB : Ha,ha,ha experimenter can “determine” the perception that a subject is controlling…. Even Bruce Nevin wouldn’t beleivee this nonsense….

BN ealier : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina

HB : If perceptual signal is so unique for every person, how can you determine how perceptual signal looks like. You can’t determine exactly what person is perceiving even if she is looking somehwere you can assume she is looking. You can’t determine where focus of her attention is and you can determine what is happening with that perceptual signal in hierarchy. But you can make better or worse guess. It’s always a guess. Perceptual signal is quite complicated strucutre, but it can

Bill P (B:CP) :

…it si evven more apparent that the first order perceptual signal reflects only what happens at the sensory endings : the source of the stimulation is completely indefined and unsensed. If any information exists about the source of the stimulus, it exists only distributed over millions of first order perceptual signals and is explicit in none of them.

HB : Your better or worse guess can be “distributed” over milions signals in afferent nerv.

HB : And again how “precise” and reliable test is “TCV”

<

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables….

&nnbsp;

HB : If quantitative approach is not possible, then you can use the oldest possible and most reliable method : guessing.

RM : That’s how we were able to determine the perceptual variables that the subject/controllers were controlling in the “Chasin’ Choppers” object interception study noted above.

HB : Ha,ha,ha…. You are a joker Rick.

If we can conclude (I’m guessing of course) from your previous “researches” you always made “one case – one theory”. So I can assume from yourr previous habits of control that you are again making general conclussion on one case “Chasin’ Choppers” object interception study". Let us let beside that is “behavioristic” study on the basis of “stimulus – respons”.

But I’ll grant mayself a conclussion that you meant with “Chasin’ Choppers” study that can be generalized. So generally people can determine the perceptual variables that the subject is controlling. So we can expect all over tha world that when “Chasin’ Choopers” appears that will be able to predict their “responses”. Did anybody ever saw any body chasing Toy helicopter. How can such study be the basis for perdicting real life situation and behavior of people. Is it that you Rick is this medical phenomenon.

Usually we can very hardly predict and disturb people control so that we can “determine” what they will perceive and control. Thta’s what was our common conclussion with Richard.

"You can’t make someone do what (only) you want, but sometimes you can and sometimes you can’t influence them to do what both you and they want"

HB : If you say Rick that you are generally able to determine the perceptual variable the subject is forming inside “neural structure” and even how he is controllig it, despite limitations that you and Bruce Nevin offered, I assume that you have some “extrasensory” and Telepathic abbilities. But I would never think that you are both so good… :blush::blush:… generally speaking

EP: While Martin is on a travel I dare to comment that my interpretation is that he has used to strongly state that there are not any “controlled environmental variablesâ€?. The abbreviation CEV used to mean previously “Complex Environmental Variableâ€? but now later it was changed to mean “Corresponding (complex) Environmental Variableâ€?. That (complex) variable is that-which-is-perceived and the perception of it is controlled. The perception is controlled by affecting the CEV with the output in such manner that the disturbance is counteracted. CEV corresponds to controlled perception because it is perceived (it is the object of perception) and its is affected by output (it is the object of output). But strictly speaking it is not controlled.

This of course is just my perception and interpretation and I hope Martin will tell his when he is again at the email.

RM: I think your perception of what Martin is saying is just right; and I think what Martin is saying is (as I noted above) just wrong.

HB : These are insinuations with no limits. I expect again that you will offer no evidences that Martin is wrong and your RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) is rught. As usual when you have to prove your words, you buzz off.

RM : There is no CEV in the environment that is perceived.

RM earlier : Martin calls these variables CEVs and considers them to be equivalent to what we call controlled quantities, q.i, in PCT.

HB : If CEV are equivalent to “controlled quantites” in PCT than they have to be right from aspect of PCT and whatever you are saying Rick is wrong

HB : So by your oppinon we can’t observe “CEV” (Complex Environmental Variables) in environment but we can observe SEV (Simple environmental variables). And you are again contradicting to youself, as you are talking without thinking.

RM (earlier) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables…

RM : What Martin calls CEVs – things like tables, windows and books – are perceptions that are a subset of the infinity of possible perceptions that could be constructed from the sensory effects of simple physical (environmental) variables.

HB : Do I understand right that what Martin call CEV’s - things like tables, windows and books – aare perceptions that could be constructed from the sensory effects of simple physical (environmental) variables like atoms and molecules ???

Boris

Best

Rick

Eetu

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i’s, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT. As Bill explains in the attached except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the controlled quantity “refers to some objective property of the external world”, rather “it refers to perceptual processes”. This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

RM: Well, I’m afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.Martin’s point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental variables) are “objective properties of the real world” and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties. From this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this – hence the concern about how well p corresponds to q.i. My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world. From this point of view the main goal of PCT research is to determine what aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Best

Rick

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn’t ‘sound right’. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don’t want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition…

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism…q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism’s sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different…

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

RM: I don’t know if this captures it or not because I don’t understand what it is about q.i being “the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute p within the organism” that makes q.i <> p? I’m having difficulty understanding what the “net effect” of environmental variables is.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Thanks

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…

image002109.jpg

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Monday, June 4, 2018 1:42 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal (p) is theory

[Rick Marken 2018-06-03_16:41:12]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-03_08:59:53 ET]

BN: For the neurophysiologist, for the psychophysicist, and for whoever is controlling for understanding q.i as being physically in the environment and p as being physically inside the organism, p is understood to be a rate of firing that is related to q.i in some regular way, but not identical to q.i.

HB : So you contradict yourself in other post :

BN earlier : It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition,

HB : Your current statement (who knows how long will persist) is quite O.K. “Q.i.” is some function of environmental variables. Or some “state of affairs”.

It’s not clear what do you mean by “not identical” ? But the direction if understading Bill is quite right. So where is the problem with definition of “q.i.” Bill gave ?

cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0

RM: Whoever is controlling for understanding controlled quantities, q.i’s, as being physically in the environment is not controlling for understanding the controlling done by living systems in terms of PCT.

HB : So why are you talking all the time about “controlled aspect of environment”. From your sentence above It seems that we agree, that there isn’t any “controlled aspect of environment”.

RM : As Bill explains in the attached except from LCS I, controlled quantities correspond to aspects (functions) of environmental variables. Being an aspect of the environment means does not mean the controlled quantity “refers to some objective property of the external world”, rather “it refers to perceptual processes”. This is, a controlled quantity is a perception.

HB : Right.

Bill P :

The controlled quantity is defined strictly by the behaving system’s perceptual computers; it may or may not be identifiable as an objective (need I put in quotes?) property of, or entity in, the physical environment. In general an observer will not, therefore, be able to see what a control system is controlling

Bill P (B:CP)

ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior

BN: I proposed that a difference of role and point of view of this sort has been a source of sometimes rancorous disagreement.

RM: Well, I’m afraid that this rancorous disagreement is really about something very fundamental about the science of PCT.

HB : This is good thinking Rick. Finaly. You are going into fundamentals of PCT and Bruce Nevin is trying to change something.

RM : Martin’s point of view is that controlled quantities (which he has misleadingly relabeled controlled environmental variables) are “objective properties of the real world” and that the job of a control system is to perceive and control these properties.

HB : If this is true than I agree it’s wrong.

RM : From this point of view, the main goal of PCT research is to determine how well the system does this – hence the concern about how well p corresponds to q.i.

HB : I think you are on good way.

RM : My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world.

HB : This is PCT view.

RM : From this point of view the main goal of PCT research is to determine what aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls.

HB : Oh Jesus. There is no physical aspects of environment that are controlled speaking generally. It’s not in accordance with PCT. And you are contradicting yourself. See above.

RM (above) : My point of view – which is the PCT point of view – is that controlled quantities are not objective properties of the world; they are perceptual aspects of the world.

HB : If you want to bring in accordance both statements you have to put it this way :

… the main goal of PCT research is to determine what perceptual aspect of the environment – what controlled quantities – the control system controls. Whatever is in the head is perceptual construct not objective picture of the world. That was also Maturana’s findings about.

Boris

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

BN: The references are Katseff 2010; Katseff & Houde 2008; Katseff, Houde, & Johnson 2008, 2010, as follows:

BN: Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

RM: Great. Thanks. I got the dissertation. As in the case of the power law research, it looks like some excellent research talent and sophisticated technology being thrown at studies that miss the point of control. I think this research could serve as another good example of the problems that come from failure to understand that q.i is an aspect of the environment and not an objective property of it. But I may be wrong. What do you thnk q.i is in this research?

Best

Rick

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

In this last reference, they talk about how disturbance of one formant is resisted by actions that have the measured effect of shifting another. It seems clear that for the subject this is the perceived effect of correcting the heard vowel when it doesn’t ‘sound right’. It may be that their borrowed equipment was only able to shift one frequency band at a time.

I have created a diagram of a model. One discussion is in my Stanford presentation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj8D9k7QCUU

If you don’t want to watch the whole thing, the relevant parts begin at about 5:30, introducing what Katseff and Houde saw as a puzzle, and again at about 28:50 modeling a PCT solution to the puzzle.

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-02_22:20:45]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_18:12:04 ET]

BN: p is a numerical variable in a simulation which the theoretical model attributes to the organism. It is computed as a function of environmental variables, the same function of variables which specifies q.i. Therefore p = q.i by definition…

BN: Martin: p. is a signal within the organism which is computed by sensors and neural structures in the organism…q.i is the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organism’s sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute the signal p within the organism. q.i and p are necessarily different…

BN: Martin will not be able to correct my representation of his views until sometime next week. I think the basis for how he and Rick are talking past each other will turn out to be a difference of reference along these lines.

RM: I don’t know if this captures it or not because I don’t understand what it is about q.i being “the net effect of certain environmental variables impinging upon the organisms sensors and being transformed by neural structures so as to constitute p within the organism” that makes q.i <> p? I’m having difficulty understanding what the “net effect” of environmental variables is.

RM: Also, could you send me the reference to the “formant control” study that you describe in [Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07 ET]?

Thanks

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Fred

image001249.jpg

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Thursday, May 31, 2018 5:26 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal § is theory

[Rick Marken 2018-05-30_20:25:27]

FN: … How can p = q.i.?

RM: When I say that p = q.i I don’t mean that they are the same physical entities; I mean that p is the same function of environmental variables as q.i.

HB : If I’m honest, I don’t know what Rick meant by this one. I don’t understand how environmental variables can affect themselves ? And I think that with no doubt Rick should speak in Bills name, but he didn’t. He is speaking in his RCT name.

But I can offer you Bills explanation as it seems that I’m the only one that talks in his name. In diagram LCS III you can see that “Q.i.” is part of environmental variables that affect “input function”. I’ll wrote them here :

  1. Input quantity : Physical variables that affects sensory inputs of controller (may be multiple)

  2. Input function : Converst state of input quantitiy into magnitude of perceptual signal

We can conclude that “input quantity” from all (endless) variables in environment represent those which affect input function. Input function converts (transforms) them into perceptual signal. As input quantity is probably showing just amount (quantity) of variables that were transformed in input function, we can probably conclude that at least in quantitative sense p can be “equal” to q.i. But there are losses everywhere were transformation of mass and energy appears it’s probable that also here are present. So equality is also under “question mark”.

But in qualitatitve sense I think there is no way that “perceptual signal” could reflect reality as it is.

These are just conclussions that I made from PCT theory as I’m usually the one who “stand for Bills’ name”. But more precise analysis can be made.

cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0

RM: In fact, in much is not most of what we see as behavior – such as walking, opening doors, lifting suitcases – its hard to tell that what we are seeing are controlled quantities, q.i’s, being kept in variable reference states because disturbances to these variables and the outputs that nearly perfectly oppose those disturbances are invisible without instrumentation. This is why no one before Powers’ had managed to come to the realization that all behavior involves control.

HB : When you’ll stop bullshitting with “Behavior is control” and “Behavior involve control”. Powers didn’t come to realization that “Behavior is control” but just opposite, that “Behavior is not control” and that “Perception is controlled”. When you’ll prove that “Behavior can be controlled”. Show me in wlaking, oppenng the door, lifting how you control moving of the limbs (controlling muscle tension)

RM : Powers was able to do it because he was trained as a physicist.

HB : Powers was not just able to do it beucause physics but he did it because of offering physilogical evidences etc. See in his lietrature. But you are problematic because you are not offering anything but “rotation of tongue” and “mixing air”.

RM : … and he realized that the consistent results that we see people producing are constantly being affected by continuously varying disturbances, invisible to the observer,

HB : If wind is blowing and both observer and car that he observes are swept by wind, you really think that disturbances are invisible to observer…?

RM : ….that should make such consistency extremely unlikely. So these disturbances must be being precisely countered by continuously varying outputs, also invisible to the observer,

HB : Observable Behavior (varying outputs) is invisible to observer ???

RM : ….that are preventing these disturbances from having any effect on these results. So what Powers was able to see was that the consistent results that we see people producing – the walking, opening doors, and lifting suitcases that seem to simply be “emitted” by the organism – are controlled results of the organisms outputs: controlled quantities or q.i.

HB : Where exactly can we see this in PCT literature. Show us how walking is controlled result of the organisms output : controlled quantites or q.i. I hope that you understand if you will not be able to prove that, I’ll call you a lier.

RM : PCT was developed to explain how organisms are able to do this.

HB : PCT was developed to explain how organisms function and survive with “Control of perception” not “Control of behavior”. You really intend not stop with bullshitting. But I assume (I don’t know exactly) what you are controlling, that you are trying to take care of your ass, as you understand that almost all your work (books, articles) are worthless.

So the point of Powers theory is not that disturbances are being counteracted by “control of behavior” but contrary that disturbances are being canceled because of achieving and maintaining control inside organism.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

And it seems that your friend Tim Carey thinks the same :

TC (2014) :

According to PCT, control is a process of acting to bring a perceived aspect of the world into a match with a mental specification for the state of that perception

Boris

As I see it, it’s a great mess…. Although you sent the great message to CSGnet :

BN earlier : We are here to investigate, test, demonstrate, and promulgate perceptual control theory

HB : As I see it nobody don’t want to talk for Bill although this is the main point why we are here according to Bruce Nevin. Â Â

TCV1.so.jpg

image001161.jpg

image001209.jpg

···

From: Bruce Nevin (bnhpct@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Friday, June 1, 2018 2:35 PM
To: CSG csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal § is theory

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-01_07:00:44 ET]

BN : In summary, and again referring to the two-person diagram in (Bruce Nevin 2018-05-31_13:11:07),

HB : Let us understand. You are saying that your diagram (Bruce Nevin) is different from Bills so that’s why you didn’t use Bills diagrams ? So we can conclude that you are not using Bills’ diagram but yours BNCT diagram ?

Do you also understand that you changed your mind couple times ? You deviated significantly from PCT when I warned you.

cid:image001.jpg@01D3F927.73457950

You offered also this diagram (July 11, 2017 2:21 AM) :

Inline image 3

Why didn’t you use Bill’s diagram for explaining interaction between people. Is there anything wrong with it ?

cid:image002.jpg@01D3F665.6C7CE2D0

HB : Can you explain to us your diagram through “rubber band” experiment so that we could exactly compare and understand understand what are you changing in Bills’ theory (diagram)?

It seems that you try to prove that experimenter can quite exactly determine what subjects perceptual signal is and what are his/her references, so that experimenter can quite exactly determine what subject is controlling. Did I understand your logic right ?

BN : ….the observer/investigattor derives a measured value (a perception that is controlled by carrying out measuring and quantifying procedures) from his own S.o input and assigns that value to q.i in a diagram and a corresponding model/simulation of the subject’s control loop, but in the diagram and model q.i refers to the subject’s input S.s.

HB : Is this all happening in imagination of observer ? Did observer in anyway affect environment of Subject ?

I’ll stop here because it has to be clarifyed how observer acts. If ?

And I’d like to know what are exactly the differences between yours’ diagram and Bills’ ?

Boris

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

[Moved here from Rick’s new “Behavior is Control” thread. My apology for slow response, a lot going on here.]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 –

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I singled out, q.i is from the subject’s point of view a one-syllable word that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It’s also a controlled quantity from an observer’s point of view.

Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff’s point of view as experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word. The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the experimenter’s point of view, listening in the environment and using equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended sound. The subject’s control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips, jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1 appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite direction.

Katseff’s labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not consistently take the point of view of the subject. This is a common confusion when people who have known only the prevailing assumptions of psychology try to report the ‘objective data’ of their experiments. It requires us to read their reports with particular care so as to understand what is actually going on. The descriptions of the experimental setup and of the intentions of the work provide a basis for doing this.

The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the subject in headphones. Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure 3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says “the altered F1 heard by the subject” she means simply “the altered F1”, i.e. the disturbance, conceived as a ‘stimulus’. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the gray circles at the top) .

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler’s point of view (a) is the disturbance d, (b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why subjects “fail to compensate completely”. This ‘puzzle’ is what my talk at Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

···

/Bruce

···

[Rick Marken 2018-06-09_10:11:17]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 –

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I singled out, q.i is from the subject’s point of view a one-syllable word that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It’s also a controlled quantity from an observer’s point of view.Â

BN: Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff’s point of view as experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word.

RM: Yes, F1 was her hypothesis about one of what we would call the “lower level” quantities controlled when producing a vowel.Â

Â

BN: The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the experimenter’s point of view, listening in the environment and using equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended sound. The subject’s control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips, jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1 appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite direction.

 RM: Yes, it is great technology. Pretty advanced over “delayed feedback”!

BN: Katseff’s labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not consistently take the point of view of the subject.

RM: Actually, I believe she did take the subject’s point of view. The plot of “F1 heard” in the graph below is F1 from the point of view of the subject. The “heard” F1 is the state over time (trials) of the hypothesized controlled quantity, F1.Â

BN: The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the subject in headphones.

Â

BN: Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure 3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says “the altered F1 heard by the subject” she means simply “the altered F1”, i.e. the disturbance, conceived as a ‘stimulus’. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

RM: I think this is not quite right. “F1 produced” is the center frequency of F1 spoken into the microphone; it’s the frequency of F1 that enters the digital frequency shifting system. In PCT terminology "F1 produced" is the output variable, q.o, which is analogous to mouse position in a tracking task. The disturbance in the graph below is a step increase in the digital frequency shift from “no shift” to 250 Hz; so the disturbance, d, at each point in time is written between the vertical dashed lines at the top of the graph.
“F1 heard” is “F1 produced” (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance, d. So “F1 heard” – the grey dots in the graph below – is the hypothesized controlled quantity, q.i = q.o + d. Â

RM: “F1 heard” is equivalent to the cursor position in a compensatory tracking task where q.o = mouse position, d = the computer generated disturbance and q.i = cursor position, which is the sum of mouse and disturbance position. As in the tracking task, “F1 heard” is a hypothesis about a quantity (variable) that is being controlled when a person produces the vowel sound in “head”.Â

BN: Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the gray circles at the top) .

RM: Yes, it’s the heard value of F1 that jumps back to the pre-disturbance level . This shows that the disturbances was nearly completely effective at shifting the frequency of F1, indicating that the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity. The next step for a PCT researcher would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity – one that would include F1 – and then use that nifty digital system to introduce disturbances to this hypothesized variable to see whether it is protected from these disturbances. This, of course, would continue until the researcher came up with a definition of q.i that was protected from all disturbances that should have affected it.Â

BestÂ

Rick

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler’s point of view (a) is the disturbance d, (b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.Â

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why subjects “fail to compensate completely”. This ‘puzzle’ is what my talk at Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Katseff-Houde08.Fig2.JPG

Formants2.jpg

···

[Rick Marken 2018-06-11_10:02:14]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-10_18:30:26 ET]

RM: the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity

BN: Sorry, this is controverted by a century of acoustic phonetics, about 65 years of machine speech recognition and synthesis, and the successes of everyday technologies built on the basis of those achievements of science.

RM: This is probably better to discuss at the IAPCT meeting in October since it’s an interesting topic which, I believe, you are planning to give a talk on at the meeting and right now I want to try to work on other things. But I will suggest that you think about this research in terms of the “coin game”. The “ideal” pattern of the formants that correspond to a vowel, like those in the cool table below that you posted, are equivalent to the initial arrangement of the coins by S to “satisfy some condition or pattern”. The digital frequency shift is equivalent to moving one of the coins in the pattern to see if the position of that one coin is controlled. The result of the frequency shift to F1 was a small be consistent compensation for this shift; this is equivalent to a displacement of the coin in the coin game being compensated by being moved back a small amount proportional to the size of the displacement.Â

Â

RM: I say that F1 is not controlled for the same reason I would say that the position of the coin in the coin game is not controlled; there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak control. At this point in the coin game E would try to come up with other hypotheses about what it is about the coins that is being controlled. This is not easy but at least E knows that the movement of the displaced coin is at least weakly opposed. The next guess about the controlled variable in the coin game would be some aspect of the coins that this only weakly disturbed by that change in position of the disturbed coin. That’s what I am suggesting should be the next step in this research aimed at determining the variable(s) being controlled when producing the vowel component of words.Â

Best

Rick

Â

The formant values of the [æ] of “had” are between the values of [a] and those of [É›], and the formant values of the [I ] of “hid” are between those of [i] and those of [e].Â
Of the three vowels under consideration, the [æ] of “had” has the highest value of F1 (the [a] of “father” is higher), the [I] of “hid” has the lowest (the [i] of “heed” is lower), and the [É›] of “head” has a value of F1 intermediate between them.

Other combinations of formant frequencies distinguish vowels that occur in other languages but do not occur in English.

Why not talk about the higher harmonics and formants? F3 and F4 are less consequential. F3 is less important for distinguishing vowels than it is for distinguishing consonants, as suggested by the above figure 10.2 from Lieberman & Blumstein, but even for that F3 is not critical for intelligibility (e.g. Agrawal A. & Wen C. Lin (1975) “Aspects of voiced speech parameters on the intelligibility of PB words”, *JASA *57(1), 1975, 217-222). F3 and F4 generally track with F2, but F3 is affected by lip spreading (say “cheese”) and F4 may be affected by lip rounding.

OK, now why go through all that? A summary:

  • From an examination of how the human cochlea functions, we know that acoustic energy in the band of harmonic frequencies that we identify as a formant (created by the oral cavity acting as a band-pass filter) causes neural firing from hair cells in a corresponding band along the extent of the basilar membrane (acting as a band-pass filter). This distinct neural signal is the perception of a formant. Thus, we know that speakers perceive formants by means of sensory apparatus exquisitely suited to represent them as neural signals.Â
  • At a higher level they perceive vowels as functions of these formant-signals.Â
  • Furthermore, from other investigations we know that speakers produce different vowels by varying tensions in the musculature of the jaw, tongue, lips, etc., affecting the configuration of the oral cavity (itself surely not perceived as such) in such a way as to perceive the formants (and vowels) that they intend to perceive.
  • We also know that disturbing the frequencies of one or more formants should result in the perception of an altered vowel. This is clearly what happens with speech synthesis, etc.
    The fact that “subjects did not notice formant shifts” (as Katseff tells us) clearly indicates that something happened to move the disturbed formant back toward the intended frequency in the speech signal that they heard and were controlling in their headphones. Specifically, when the experimental apparatus raised the frequency of F1 in what they perceived to be their own voice transmitted through headphones, they should have heard the [æ] of “had”, but instead what they heard in their headphones was the intended [É›] vowel of “head”. In order to resist the disturbance, they acted so as to lower the frequency of F1 coming out of their mouths, which (if Katseff had noted it for us) would have approached the [I] of “hid”. Because of the headphones, the subjects did not hear the vowel of “hid” which they were actually producing.Â

Katseff (and her adviser, Houde) also describe what is going on and the purposes of their experiments in a way that clearly indicates that what the subjects heard in their headphones was the vowel that they intended to hear, e.g.:

Talkers compensate by opposing these feedback alterations. When vowel formants in auditory

feedback are raised, talkers lower those formants in their speech. Likewise, talkers

raise their vowel formants when those formants are lowered in their auditory feedback

(Houde & Jordan, 2002; Purcell & Munhall, 2006). This general result has been replicated

for F0 (Burnett, Freedland, Larson, & Hain, 1998) and for non-English speakers (Jones &

Munhall, 2005).

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, p. 448.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

In her dissertation, Katseff says (p. 53):

When subjects do not compensate at

all (percent compensation is 0), they produce their baseline F1, and when subjects

compensate fully (percent compensation is 100), they produce an F1 that exactly

opposes the feedback shift.

Regarding Figure 3.8 in her dissertation, previously displayed in this thread, she writes (p. 50):

The F1 in this talker’s /É›/ clearly decreased for increasing formant shifts.Â

​Likewise i

n in th
​e 2008​

lab report, e.g. on p 449:

As the formant values of their auditory feedback were raised, talkers lowered the formant

values of the /É›/ vowels that they produced. That is, they compensated for the change

in auditory feedback, closely mirroring the formant patterns observed in previous formant

shift experiments. The time course of this effect for a representative subject is illustrated

in Figure 2.

The descriptions in these (and other) paragraphs agree with the well-established empirical fact that changing the heights of the formants (particularly F1 and F2) changes what vowel is perceived.Â

But the captions below this and other figures appear to contradict this, e.g.:

Figure 2: Change in F1 feedback and F1 production in /E/ over the course of the experiment. Open

circles indicate the F1 values in talkers’ auditory feedback. Filled circles indicate the F1 produced

by talkers over the course of the experiment. Each open circle/filled circle pair represents one trial.Â

This is what has thrown you off. Where she says “auditory feedback” we understand her in terms of feedback in a control loop. But she does not understand negative feedback control loops. That’s the only explanation I have for why she thinks her term “auditory feedback” refers, not to the signal heard by the subject in the headphones, but rather to the disturbance that her apparatus contributes to that signal. She apparently thinks of the disturbance as ‘feedback’ because it is injected into the speech signal that the subject receives in headphones. She talks abundantly about the fact that the ‘compensation’ prevents this disturbance (mis-termed ‘feedback’) from materially affecting the speech signal in the headphones, but the speech signal in the headphones is not represented in the figures.Â

This interpretation is confirmed by various descriptive passages that I have quoted. I’ll add this one from Katseff & Houde (2008) p. 1:

Previous work shows that subjects generally change their speech to oppose the auditory feedback change.

For example, when F1 in auditory feedback is raised, making their /É›/ sound more like an /a/, subjects

compensate by speaking with a lower F1; the vowels they produce sound more like /ɪ/.

One of her main concerns is why resistance to the disturbance is incomplete.Â

These results suggest that both acoustic and sensorimotor feedback are part of one’s lexical expectation.

Because auditory feedback is altered while motor feedback is not, feedback from these two sources can

conflict. For small shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of potential conflict is small and the normal

motor feedback does not affect compensation. But for large shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of

conflict is large. Abnormal acoustic feedback pushes the articulatory system to compensate, and normal

motor feedback pushes the articulatory system to remain in its current configuration, damping the

compensatory response.

Katseff & Houde (2008:71)

I think she’s right, but she lacks the conceptual and theoretic means of PCT to understand it clearly. I have proposed how control in two sensory modalities come into conflict. I won’t elaborate that here.Â

She talks about various complicating factors, e.g. in her dissertation, p. 47:

Subjects who

compensate tend to oppose the change they hear in that, if their voice feedback has

a raised F1, they will speak with a lower F1. They will also, however, change their

production of F2, and plausibly other components of their speech as well. This is a

concern because calculating a subject’s change in production requires deciding which

dimensions might register a change. If one were to look at changes in F1 production

that result from F1 feedback shifts, subjects would appear to have compensated less

than they actually did. Understanding which dimensions actually change is also

important for understanding processing of auditory information. Subjects who can

produce an /E/ with a F1 that is 100Hz higher, but instead produce an /E/ with an F1

50 Hz higher and an F2 50 Hz higher, may perceive incoming vowels as a combination

of formants rather than as individual formants. To account for compensatory changes

in multiple formants, the experiments described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 measure

compensation in both F1 and F2.

As noted, raising all formants can be done by shortening the vocal tract, e.g. by lip-spreading or ‘speaking with a smile’. She also broaches other complicating factors, as for example ibid., p. 50;

It is likely that an

individual’s physiology, perception, or linguistic organization also affects compensation

for altered auditory feedback.

But setting these considerations aside, and finally to respond the the question implicit in the subject line of this thread, the general conclusion for PCT is that for vowel perception q.i at the sensors at the periphery of the nervous system is bands of excitation in regions of the basilar membrane within the cochlea, corresponding exactly to an acoustic phoneticianʽs perception of formants in a sound spectrogram. We could take it back to more primitive ‘aspects of the environment’ = perceptions controlled by scientists in a field that is logically and epistemically prior to acoustic phonetics, such as acoustics as a branch of physics, or physics more generally. I would be curious why that was thought to be necessary.

The Katseff & Houde references again are:

here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 1:12 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-09_10:11:17]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 –

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I singled out, q.i is from the subject’s point of view a one-syllable word that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It’s also a controlled quantity from an observer’s point of view.Â

BN: Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff’s point of view as experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word.

RM: Yes, F1 was her hypothesis about one of what we would call the “lower level” quantities controlled when producing a vowel.Â

Â

BN: The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the experimenter’s point of view, listening in the environment and using equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended sound. The subject’s control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips, jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1 appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite direction.

 RM: Yes, it is great technology. Pretty advanced over “delayed feedback”!

BN: Katseff’s labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not consistently take the point of view of the subject.

RM: Actually, I believe she did take the subject’s point of view. The plot of “F1 heard” in the graph below is F1 from the point of view of the subject. The “heard” F1 is the state over time (trials) of the hypothesized controlled quantity, F1.Â

BN: The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the subject in headphones.

Â

BN: Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure 3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says “the altered F1 heard by the subject” she means simply “the altered F1”, i.e. the disturbance, conceived as a ‘stimulus’. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

RM: I think this is not quite right. “F1 produced” is the center frequency of F1 spoken into the microphone; it’s the frequency of F1 that enters the digital frequency shifting system. In PCT terminology "F1 produced" is the output variable, q.o, which is analogous to mouse position in a tracking task. The disturbance in the graph below is a step increase in the digital frequency shift from “no shift” to 250 Hz; so the disturbance, d, at each point in time is written between the vertical dashed lines at the top of the graph.
“F1 heard” is “F1 produced” (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance, d. So “F1 heard” – the grey dots in the graph below – is the hypothesized controlled quantity, q.i = q.o + d. Â

RM: “F1 heard” is equivalent to the cursor position in a compensatory tracking task where q.o = mouse position, d = the computer generated disturbance and q.i = cursor position, which is the sum of mouse and disturbance position. As in the tracking task, “F1 heard” is a hypothesis about a quantity (variable) that is being controlled when a person produces the vowel sound in “head”.Â

BN: Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the gray circles at the top) .

RM: Yes, it’s the heard value of F1 that jumps back to the pre-disturbance level . This shows that the disturbances was nearly completely effective at shifting the frequency of F1, indicating that the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity. The next step for a PCT researcher would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity – one that would include F1 – and then use that nifty digital system to introduce disturbances to this hypothesized variable to see whether it is protected from these disturbances. This, of course, would continue until the researcher came up with a definition of q.i that was protected from all disturbances that should have affected it.Â

BestÂ

Rick

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler’s point of view (a) is the disturbance d, (b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.Â

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why subjects “fail to compensate completely”. This ‘puzzle’ is what my talk at Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Katseff-Houde08.Fig2.JPG

Formants2.jpg

···

[Rick Marken 2018-06-12_09:56:31]

​​​[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-11_17:19:48 ET]

RM> there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak control.Â

BN: I’m glad that you now accept that subjects in Katseff’s experiments resisted disturbances to F1, and that the two traces in the figures are d and q.o, with q.i not represented.

RM: I’ve always “accepted” that Ss resisted disturbances to F1, but I still don’t agree that the traces in the figure are d and q.o (disturbance and output); the traces are output (“F1 produced”) and hypothetical controlled quantity (“F1 heard”). The disturbance (frequency shift) is written at the top of the graph, as shown here:Â

RM: So the disturbance is “no shift”, then a “ramp” up shift, then the full “200 Hz F1 shift”, and then back to “no shift”. The fact that the plot of “F1 heard” is the plot of the hypothetical controlled quantity (call it q.i’) can be gleaned from Katseff’s description of that data:

The “heardâ€? formants…were calculated by adding the amount of formant shift to the formant that the subject
produced.
Â

RM: In other words, “F1 heard” is the F1 frequency produced by S (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance (d); so “F1 heard” = q.o + d which is q.i’, the variable that S is presumed to be controlling.Â

BN: But you still don’t accept that F1 is a controlled perception because subjects only resist about 50% of the disturbance.

RM: Yes, that is far too little resistance for F1 to be considered controlled. It is more resistance than I thought was happening – that’s why I drew the blue lines on the graph above. The 200 Hz disturbance moves F1 from 650 Hz to 750 Hz, a 100 Hz rather than the full 200 Hz change; so resistance is 50% effective. But that’s pretty ineffective if F1 were really a controlled variable.Â

BN: Katseff et al. point out that the resistance is incomplete. But the reason that it is incomplete is not that it is uncontrolled. The reason the resistance is incomplete, as Katseff et al. suggest in their way, is conflict.

RM: This is because they just can’t let go of the idea that control of F1 is essential to recognition of the vowel. Conflict certainly would account for the poor control of F1; but it doesn’t account for the fact that the subjects still say that they were hearing the intended vowel. Their varied output was keeping some variable – some q.i – in the reference state. As I said before (using the example of the coin game) the next step in PCT-based research on vowel control would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the acoustical variable that is controlled when people produce vowel sounds – a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity, q.i. This new hypothesis – new q.i’-- would very likely include F1 in its definition. It might even include acoustical transitions from the contextual consonants. But jumping to an explanation of this excellent data in terms of conflict really just reflects a lack of understanding of what control systems control – at least according to PCT. They control possibly rather complex functions of physical variables (such as temporal and spectral characteristics of the acoustical waveform) and the focus of PCT is on trying to figure out what these functions are.Â

RM: But again, all this is best left for discussion at the meeting, although it has been useful because it has convinced me that what I will talk about at the meeting will now be how to do PCT-based research; that is, how to do research on purpose!Â

BestÂ

Rick

The sounds that result from resisting the disturbance are result in a perception of the intended word, head, but the actions to produce those sounds result from control of muscle tensions and pressures (where the margins of the tongue contact the teeth) with values that result in a perception of another word, hid. Getting close enough to the sound of head without getting too close to the feel of hid, the best they can do is to resist only half of the disturbance to F1.

This may be exacerbated by the fact that the apparatus disturbed just one formant. Correcting a disturbance to F1 requires an articulatory change in the vertical dimension (tongue height or closeness, in the two usual ways of describing vowel articulation). But to avoid also changing F2, this vertical change must be done without change to the horizontal location of the occlusion, which determines the ratio of the volume of the oral cavity in the back of the mouth to the volume of the oral cavity in the front (between that occlusion and the open end of the oral cavity formed by the lips). This requires an unfamiliar articulation. What the subjects produce "sounds more
more like /ɪ/" of hid, but is not the usual articulation or sound of hid

Just as controlling the ‘feel’ of pronouncing a vowel within a syllable or word involves simultaneous control of a number of perceptions of muscle tensions and pressure, controlling the sound of pronouncing it involves control of several formants at once. But to recognize that word control sets reference levels simultaneously for both F1 and F2 is not to deny that F1 is controlled.

But yes, this will be good to discuss at the IAPCT conference at Northwestern in October, and we an let it rest until then.

/Bruce

​

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 1:03 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-11_10:02:14]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-10_18:30:26 ET]

RM: the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity

BN: Sorry, this is controverted by a century of acoustic phonetics, about 65 years of machine speech recognition and synthesis, and the successes of everyday technologies built on the basis of those achievements of science.

RM: This is probably better to discuss at the IAPCT meeting in October since it’s an interesting topic which, I believe, you are planning to give a talk on at the meeting and right now I want to try to work on other things. But I will suggest that you think about this research in terms of the “coin game”. The “ideal” pattern of the formants that correspond to a vowel, like those in the cool table below that you posted, are equivalent to the initial arrangement of the coins by S to “satisfy some condition or pattern”. The digital frequency shift is equivalent to moving one of the coins in the pattern to see if the position of that one coin is controlled. The result of the frequency shift to F1 was a small be consistent compensation for this shift; this is equivalent to a displacement of the coin in the coin game being compensated by being moved back a small amount proportional to the size of the displacement.Â

Â

RM: I say that F1 is not controlled for the same reason I would say that the position of the coin in the coin game is not controlled; there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak control. At this point in the coin game E would try to come up with other hypotheses about what it is about the coins that is being controlled. This is not easy but at least E knows that the movement of the displaced coin is at least weakly opposed. The next guess about the controlled variable in the coin game would be some aspect of the coins that this only weakly disturbed by that change in position of the disturbed coin. That’s what I am suggesting should be the next step in this research aimed at determining the variable(s) being controlled when producing the vowel component of words.Â

Best

Rick

Â

The formant values of the [æ] of “had” are between the values of [a] and those of [É›], and the formant values of the [I ] of “hid” are between those of [i] and those of [e].Â
Of the three vowels under consideration, the [æ] of “had” has the highest value of F1 (the [a] of “father” is higher), the [I] of “hid” has the lowest (the [i] of “heed” is lower), and the [É›] of “head” has a value of F1 intermediate between them.

Other combinations of formant frequencies distinguish vowels that occur in other languages but do not occur in English.

Why not talk about the higher harmonics and formants? F3 and F4 are less consequential. F3 is less important for distinguishing vowels than it is for distinguishing consonants, as suggested by the above figure 10.2 from Lieberman & Blumstein, but even for that F3 is not critical for intelligibility (e.g. Agrawal A. & Wen C. Lin (1975) “Aspects of voiced speech parameters on the intelligibility of PB words”, *JASA *57(1), 1975, 217-222). F3 and F4 generally track with F2, but F3 is affected by lip spreading (say “cheese”) and F4 may be affected by lip rounding.

OK, now why go through all that? A summary:

  • From an examination of how the human cochlea functions, we know that acoustic energy in the band of harmonic frequencies that we identify as a formant (created by the oral cavity acting as a band-pass filter) causes neural firing from hair cells in a corresponding band along the extent of the basilar membrane (acting as a band-pass filter). This distinct neural signal is the perception of a formant. Thus, we know that speakers perceive formants by means of sensory apparatus exquisitely suited to represent them as neural signals.Â
  • At a higher level they perceive vowels as functions of these formant-signals.Â
  • Furthermore, from other investigations we know that speakers produce different vowels by varying tensions in the musculature of the jaw, tongue, lips, etc., affecting the configuration of the oral cavity (itself surely not perceived as such) in such a way as to perceive the formants (and vowels) that they intend to perceive.
  • We also know that disturbing the frequencies of one or more formants should result in the perception of an altered vowel. This is clearly what happens with speech synthesis, etc.
    The fact that “subjects did not notice formant shifts” (as Katseff tells us) clearly indicates that something happened to move the disturbed formant back toward the intended frequency in the speech signal that they heard and were controlling in their headphones. Specifically, when the experimental apparatus raised the frequency of F1 in what they perceived to be their own voice transmitted through headphones, they should have heard the [æ] of “had”, but instead what they heard in their headphones was the intended [É›] vowel of “head”. In order to resist the disturbance, they acted so as to lower the frequency of F1 coming out of their mouths, which (if Katseff had noted it for us) would have approached the [I] of “hid”. Because of the headphones, the subjects did not hear the vowel of “hid” which they were actually producing.Â

Katseff (and her adviser, Houde) also describe what is going on and the purposes of their experiments in a way that clearly indicates that what the subjects heard in their headphones was the vowel that they intended to hear, e.g.:

Talkers compensate by opposing these feedback alterations. When vowel formants in auditory

feedback are raised, talkers lower those formants in their speech. Likewise, talkers

raise their vowel formants when those formants are lowered in their auditory feedback

(Houde & Jordan, 2002; Purcell & Munhall, 2006). This general result has been replicated

for F0 (Burnett, Freedland, Larson, & Hain, 1998) and for non-English speakers (Jones &

Munhall, 2005).

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, p. 448.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

In her dissertation, Katseff says (p. 53):

When subjects do not compensate at

all (percent compensation is 0), they produce their baseline F1, and when subjects

compensate fully (percent compensation is 100), they produce an F1 that exactly

opposes the feedback shift.

Regarding Figure 3.8 in her dissertation, previously displayed in this thread, she writes (p. 50):

The F1 in this talker’s /É›/ clearly decreased for increasing formant shifts.Â

​Likewise i

n in th
​e 2008​

lab report, e.g. on p 449:

As the formant values of their auditory feedback were raised, talkers lowered the formant

values of the /É›/ vowels that they produced. That is, they compensated for the change

in auditory feedback, closely mirroring the formant patterns observed in previous formant

shift experiments. The time course of this effect for a representative subject is illustrated

in Figure 2.

The descriptions in these (and other) paragraphs agree with the well-established empirical fact that changing the heights of the formants (particularly F1 and F2) changes what vowel is perceived.Â

But the captions below this and other figures appear to contradict this, e.g.:

Figure 2: Change in F1 feedback and F1 production in /E/ over the course of the experiment. Open

circles indicate the F1 values in talkers’ auditory feedback. Filled circles indicate the F1 produced

by talkers over the course of the experiment. Each open circle/filled circle pair represents one trial.Â

This is what has thrown you off. Where she says “auditory feedback” we understand her in terms of feedback in a control loop. But she does not understand negative feedback control loops. That’s the only explanation I have for why she thinks her term “auditory feedback” refers, not to the signal heard by the subject in the headphones, but rather to the disturbance that her apparatus contributes to that signal. She apparently thinks of the disturbance as ‘feedback’ because it is injected into the speech signal that the subject receives in headphones. She talks abundantly about the fact that the ‘compensation’ prevents this disturbance (mis-termed ‘feedback’) from materially affecting the speech signal in the headphones, but the speech signal in the headphones is not represented in the figures.Â

This interpretation is confirmed by various descriptive passages that I have quoted. I’ll add this one from Katseff & Houde (2008) p. 1:

Previous work shows that subjects generally change their speech to oppose the auditory feedback change.

For example, when F1 in auditory feedback is raised, making their /É›/ sound more like an /a/, subjects

compensate by speaking with a lower F1; the vowels they produce sound more like /ɪ/.

One of her main concerns is why resistance to the disturbance is incomplete.Â

These results suggest that both acoustic and sensorimotor feedback are part of one’s lexical expectation.

Because auditory feedback is altered while motor feedback is not, feedback from these two sources can

conflict. For small shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of potential conflict is small and the normal

motor feedback does not affect compensation. But for large shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of

conflict is large. Abnormal acoustic feedback pushes the articulatory system to compensate, and normal

motor feedback pushes the articulatory system to remain in its current configuration, damping the

compensatory response.

Katseff & Houde (2008:71)

I think she’s right, but she lacks the conceptual and theoretic means of PCT to understand it clearly. I have proposed how control in two sensory modalities come into conflict. I won’t elaborate that here.Â

She talks about various complicating factors, e.g. in her dissertation, p. 47:

Subjects who

compensate tend to oppose the change they hear in that, if their voice feedback has

a raised F1, they will speak with a lower F1. They will also, however, change their

production of F2, and plausibly other components of their speech as well. This is a

concern because calculating a subject’s change in production requires deciding which

dimensions might register a change. If one were to look at changes in F1 production

that result from F1 feedback shifts, subjects would appear to have compensated less

than they actually did. Understanding which dimensions actually change is also

important for understanding processing of auditory information. Subjects who can

produce an /E/ with a F1 that is 100Hz higher, but instead produce an /E/ with an F1

50 Hz higher and an F2 50 Hz higher, may perceive incoming vowels as a combination

of formants rather than as individual formants. To account for compensatory changes

in multiple formants, the experiments described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 measure

compensation in both F1 and F2.

As noted, raising all formants can be done by shortening the vocal tract, e.g. by lip-spreading or ‘speaking with a smile’. She also broaches other complicating factors, as for example ibid., p. 50;

It is likely that an

individual’s physiology, perception, or linguistic organization also affects compensation

for altered auditory feedback.

But setting these considerations aside, and finally to respond the the question implicit in the subject line of this thread, the general conclusion for PCT is that for vowel perception q.i at the sensors at the periphery of the nervous system is bands of excitation in regions of the basilar membrane within the cochlea, corresponding exactly to an acoustic phoneticianʽs perception of formants in a sound spectrogram. We could take it back to more primitive ‘aspects of the environment’ = perceptions controlled by scientists in a field that is logically and epistemically prior to acoustic phonetics, such as acoustics as a branch of physics, or physics more generally. I would be curious why that was thought to be necessary.

The Katseff & Houde references again are:

here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 1:12 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-09_10:11:17]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 –

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I singled out, q.i is from the subject’s point of view a one-syllable word that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It’s also a controlled quantity from an observer’s point of view.Â

BN: Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff’s point of view as experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word.

RM: Yes, F1 was her hypothesis about one of what we would call the “lower level” quantities controlled when producing a vowel.Â

Â

BN: The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the experimenter’s point of view, listening in the environment and using equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended sound. The subject’s control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips, jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1 appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite direction.

 RM: Yes, it is great technology. Pretty advanced over “delayed feedback”!

BN: Katseff’s labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not consistently take the point of view of the subject.

RM: Actually, I believe she did take the subject’s point of view. The plot of “F1 heard” in the graph below is F1 from the point of view of the subject. The “heard” F1 is the state over time (trials) of the hypothesized controlled quantity, F1.Â

BN: The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the subject in headphones.

Â

BN: Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure 3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says “the altered F1 heard by the subject” she means simply “the altered F1”, i.e. the disturbance, conceived as a ‘stimulus’. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

RM: I think this is not quite right. “F1 produced” is the center frequency of F1 spoken into the microphone; it’s the frequency of F1 that enters the digital frequency shifting system. In PCT terminology "F1 produced" is the output variable, q.o, which is analogous to mouse position in a tracking task. The disturbance in the graph below is a step increase in the digital frequency shift from “no shift” to 250 Hz; so the disturbance, d, at each point in time is written between the vertical dashed lines at the top of the graph.
“F1 heard” is “F1 produced” (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance, d. So “F1 heard” – the grey dots in the graph below – is the hypothesized controlled quantity, q.i = q.o + d. Â

RM: “F1 heard” is equivalent to the cursor position in a compensatory tracking task where q.o = mouse position, d = the computer generated disturbance and q.i = cursor position, which is the sum of mouse and disturbance position. As in the tracking task, “F1 heard” is a hypothesis about a quantity (variable) that is being controlled when a person produces the vowel sound in “head”.Â

BN: Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the gray circles at the top) .

RM: Yes, it’s the heard value of F1 that jumps back to the pre-disturbance level . This shows that the disturbances was nearly completely effective at shifting the frequency of F1, indicating that the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity. The next step for a PCT researcher would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity – one that would include F1 – and then use that nifty digital system to introduce disturbances to this hypothesized variable to see whether it is protected from these disturbances. This, of course, would continue until the researcher came up with a definition of q.i that was protected from all disturbances that should have affected it.Â

BestÂ

Rick

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler’s point of view (a) is the disturbance d, (b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.Â

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why subjects “fail to compensate completely”. This ‘puzzle’ is what my talk at Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-13_11:15:44 ET]

 what I will talk about at the meeting will now be how to do PCT-based research

Good!

Katseff-Houde08.Fig2.JPG

Formants2.jpg

···

[Rick Marken 2018-06-12_09:56:31]

​​​[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-11_17:19:48 ET]

RM> there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak control.Â

BN: I’m glad that you now accept that subjects in Katseff’s experiments resisted disturbances to F1, and that the two traces in the figures are d and q.o, with q.i not represented.

RM: I’ve always “accepted” that Ss resisted disturbances to F1, but I still don’t agree that the traces in the figure are d and q.o (disturbance and output); the traces are output (“F1 produced”) and hypothetical controlled quantity (“F1 heard”). The disturbance (frequency shift) is written at the top of the graph, as shown here:Â

RM: So the disturbance is “no shift”, then a “ramp” up shift, then the full “200 Hz F1 shift”, and then back to “no shift”. The fact that the plot of “F1 heard” is the plot of the hypothetical controlled quantity (call it q.i’) can be gleaned from Katseff’s description of that data:

The “heardâ€? formants…were calculated by adding the amount of formant shift to the formant that the subject
produced.
Â

RM: In other words, “F1 heard” is the F1 frequency produced by S (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance (d); so “F1 heard” = q.o + d which is q.i’, the variable that S is presumed to be controlling.Â

BN: But you still don’t accept that F1 is a controlled perception because subjects only resist about 50% of the disturbance.

RM: Yes, that is far too little resistance for F1 to be considered controlled. It is more resistance than I thought was happening – that’s why I drew the blue lines on the graph above. The 200 Hz disturbance moves F1 from 650 Hz to 750 Hz, a 100 Hz rather than the full 200 Hz change; so resistance is 50% effective. But that’s pretty ineffective if F1 were really a controlled variable.Â

BN: Katseff et al. point out that the resistance is incomplete. But the reason that it is incomplete is not that it is uncontrolled. The reason the resistance is incomplete, as Katseff et al. suggest in their way, is conflict.

RM: This is because they just can’t let go of the idea that control of F1 is essential to recognition of the vowel. Conflict certainly would account for the poor control of F1; but it doesn’t account for the fact that the subjects still say that they were hearing the intended vowel. Their varied output was keeping some variable – some q.i – in the reference state. As I said before (using the example of the coin game) the next step in PCT-based research on vowel control would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the acoustical variable that is controlled when people produce vowel sounds – a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity, q.i. This new hypothesis – new q.i’-- would very likely include F1 in its definition. It might even include acoustical transitions from the contextual consonants. But jumping to an explanation of this excellent data in terms of conflict really just reflects a lack of understanding of what control systems control – at least according to PCT. They control possibly rather complex functions of physical variables (such as temporal and spectral characteristics of the acoustical waveform) and the focus of PCT is on trying to figure out what these functions are.Â

RM: But again, all this is best left for discussion at the meeting, although it has been useful because it has convinced me that what I will talk about at the meeting will now be how to do PCT-based research; that is, how to do research on purpose!Â

BestÂ

Rick

The sounds that result from resisting the disturbance are result in a perception of the intended word, head, but the actions to produce those sounds result from control of muscle tensions and pressures (where the margins of the tongue contact the teeth) with values that result in a perception of another word, hid. Getting close enough to the sound of head without getting too close to the feel of hid, the best they can do is to resist only half of the disturbance to F1.

This may be exacerbated by the fact that the apparatus disturbed just one formant. Correcting a disturbance to F1 requires an articulatory change in the vertical dimension (tongue height or closeness, in the two usual ways of describing vowel articulation). But to avoid also changing F2, this vertical change must be done without change to the horizontal location of the occlusion, which determines the ratio of the volume of the oral cavity in the back of the mouth to the volume of the oral cavity in the front (between that occlusion and the open end of the oral cavity formed by the lips). This requires an unfamiliar articulation. What the subjects produce "sounds more
more like /ɪ/" of hid, but is not the usual articulation or sound of hid

Just as controlling the ‘feel’ of pronouncing a vowel within a syllable or word involves simultaneous control of a number of perceptions of muscle tensions and pressure, controlling the sound of pronouncing it involves control of several formants at once. But to recognize that word control sets reference levels simultaneously for both F1 and F2 is not to deny that F1 is controlled.

But yes, this will be good to discuss at the IAPCT conference at Northwestern in October, and we an let it rest until then.

/Bruce

​

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 1:03 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-11_10:02:14]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-10_18:30:26 ET]

RM: the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity

BN: Sorry, this is controverted by a century of acoustic phonetics, about 65 years of machine speech recognition and synthesis, and the successes of everyday technologies built on the basis of those achievements of science.

RM: This is probably better to discuss at the IAPCT meeting in October since it’s an interesting topic which, I believe, you are planning to give a talk on at the meeting and right now I want to try to work on other things. But I will suggest that you think about this research in terms of the “coin game”. The “ideal” pattern of the formants that correspond to a vowel, like those in the cool table below that you posted, are equivalent to the initial arrangement of the coins by S to “satisfy some condition or pattern”. The digital frequency shift is equivalent to moving one of the coins in the pattern to see if the position of that one coin is controlled. The result of the frequency shift to F1 was a small be consistent compensation for this shift; this is equivalent to a displacement of the coin in the coin game being compensated by being moved back a small amount proportional to the size of the displacement.Â

Â

RM: I say that F1 is not controlled for the same reason I would say that the position of the coin in the coin game is not controlled; there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak control. At this point in the coin game E would try to come up with other hypotheses about what it is about the coins that is being controlled. This is not easy but at least E knows that the movement of the displaced coin is at least weakly opposed. The next guess about the controlled variable in the coin game would be some aspect of the coins that this only weakly disturbed by that change in position of the disturbed coin. That’s what I am suggesting should be the next step in this research aimed at determining the variable(s) being controlled when producing the vowel component of words.Â

Best

Rick

Â

The formant values of the [æ] of “had” are between the values of [a] and those of [É›], and the formant values of the [I ] of “hid” are between those of [i] and those of [e].Â
Of the three vowels under consideration, the [æ] of “had” has the highest value of F1 (the [a] of “father” is higher), the [I] of “hid” has the lowest (the [i] of “heed” is lower), and the [É›] of “head” has a value of F1 intermediate between them.

Other combinations of formant frequencies distinguish vowels that occur in other languages but do not occur in English.

Why not talk about the higher harmonics and formants? F3 and F4 are less consequential. F3 is less important for distinguishing vowels than it is for distinguishing consonants, as suggested by the above figure 10.2 from Lieberman & Blumstein, but even for that F3 is not critical for intelligibility (e.g. Agrawal A. & Wen C. Lin (1975) “Aspects of voiced speech parameters on the intelligibility of PB words”, *JASA *57(1), 1975, 217-222). F3 and F4 generally track with F2, but F3 is affected by lip spreading (say “cheese”) and F4 may be affected by lip rounding.

OK, now why go through all that? A summary:

  • From an examination of how the human cochlea functions, we know that acoustic energy in the band of harmonic frequencies that we identify as a formant (created by the oral cavity acting as a band-pass filter) causes neural firing from hair cells in a corresponding band along the extent of the basilar membrane (acting as a band-pass filter). This distinct neural signal is the perception of a formant. Thus, we know that speakers perceive formants by means of sensory apparatus exquisitely suited to represent them as neural signals.Â
  • At a higher level they perceive vowels as functions of these formant-signals.Â
  • Furthermore, from other investigations we know that speakers produce different vowels by varying tensions in the musculature of the jaw, tongue, lips, etc., affecting the configuration of the oral cavity (itself surely not perceived as such) in such a way as to perceive the formants (and vowels) that they intend to perceive.
  • We also know that disturbing the frequencies of one or more formants should result in the perception of an altered vowel. This is clearly what happens with speech synthesis, etc.
    The fact that “subjects did not notice formant shifts” (as Katseff tells us) clearly indicates that something happened to move the disturbed formant back toward the intended frequency in the speech signal that they heard and were controlling in their headphones. Specifically, when the experimental apparatus raised the frequency of F1 in what they perceived to be their own voice transmitted through headphones, they should have heard the [æ] of “had”, but instead what they heard in their headphones was the intended [É›] vowel of “head”. In order to resist the disturbance, they acted so as to lower the frequency of F1 coming out of their mouths, which (if Katseff had noted it for us) would have approached the [I] of “hid”. Because of the headphones, the subjects did not hear the vowel of “hid” which they were actually producing.Â

Katseff (and her adviser, Houde) also describe what is going on and the purposes of their experiments in a way that clearly indicates that what the subjects heard in their headphones was the vowel that they intended to hear, e.g.:

Talkers compensate by opposing these feedback alterations. When vowel formants in auditory

feedback are raised, talkers lower those formants in their speech. Likewise, talkers

raise their vowel formants when those formants are lowered in their auditory feedback

(Houde & Jordan, 2002; Purcell & Munhall, 2006). This general result has been replicated

for F0 (Burnett, Freedland, Larson, & Hain, 1998) and for non-English speakers (Jones &

Munhall, 2005).

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, p. 448.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

In her dissertation, Katseff says (p. 53):

When subjects do not compensate at

all (percent compensation is 0), they produce their baseline F1, and when subjects

compensate fully (percent compensation is 100), they produce an F1 that exactly

opposes the feedback shift.

Regarding Figure 3.8 in her dissertation, previously displayed in this thread, she writes (p. 50):

The F1 in this talker’s /É›/ clearly decreased for increasing formant shifts.Â

​Likewise i

n in th
​e 2008​

lab report, e.g. on p 449:

As the formant values of their auditory feedback were raised, talkers lowered the formant

values of the /É›/ vowels that they produced. That is, they compensated for the change

in auditory feedback, closely mirroring the formant patterns observed in previous formant

shift experiments. The time course of this effect for a representative subject is illustrated

in Figure 2.

The descriptions in these (and other) paragraphs agree with the well-established empirical fact that changing the heights of the formants (particularly F1 and F2) changes what vowel is perceived.Â

But the captions below this and other figures appear to contradict this, e.g.:

Figure 2: Change in F1 feedback and F1 production in /E/ over the course of the experiment. Open

circles indicate the F1 values in talkers’ auditory feedback. Filled circles indicate the F1 produced

by talkers over the course of the experiment. Each open circle/filled circle pair represents one trial.Â

This is what has thrown you off. Where she says “auditory feedback” we understand her in terms of feedback in a control loop. But she does not understand negative feedback control loops. That’s the only explanation I have for why she thinks her term “auditory feedback” refers, not to the signal heard by the subject in the headphones, but rather to the disturbance that her apparatus contributes to that signal. She apparently thinks of the disturbance as ‘feedback’ because it is injected into the speech signal that the subject receives in headphones. She talks abundantly about the fact that the ‘compensation’ prevents this disturbance (mis-termed ‘feedback’) from materially affecting the speech signal in the headphones, but the speech signal in the headphones is not represented in the figures.Â

This interpretation is confirmed by various descriptive passages that I have quoted. I’ll add this one from Katseff & Houde (2008) p. 1:

Previous work shows that subjects generally change their speech to oppose the auditory feedback change.

For example, when F1 in auditory feedback is raised, making their /É›/ sound more like an /a/, subjects

compensate by speaking with a lower F1; the vowels they produce sound more like /ɪ/.

One of her main concerns is why resistance to the disturbance is incomplete.Â

These results suggest that both acoustic and sensorimotor feedback are part of one’s lexical expectation.

Because auditory feedback is altered while motor feedback is not, feedback from these two sources can

conflict. For small shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of potential conflict is small and the normal

motor feedback does not affect compensation. But for large shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of

conflict is large. Abnormal acoustic feedback pushes the articulatory system to compensate, and normal

motor feedback pushes the articulatory system to remain in its current configuration, damping the

compensatory response.

Katseff & Houde (2008:71)

I think she’s right, but she lacks the conceptual and theoretic means of PCT to understand it clearly. I have proposed how control in two sensory modalities come into conflict. I won’t elaborate that here.Â

She talks about various complicating factors, e.g. in her dissertation, p. 47:

Subjects who

compensate tend to oppose the change they hear in that, if their voice feedback has

a raised F1, they will speak with a lower F1. They will also, however, change their

production of F2, and plausibly other components of their speech as well. This is a

concern because calculating a subject’s change in production requires deciding which

dimensions might register a change. If one were to look at changes in F1 production

that result from F1 feedback shifts, subjects would appear to have compensated less

than they actually did. Understanding which dimensions actually change is also

important for understanding processing of auditory information. Subjects who can

produce an /E/ with a F1 that is 100Hz higher, but instead produce an /E/ with an F1

50 Hz higher and an F2 50 Hz higher, may perceive incoming vowels as a combination

of formants rather than as individual formants. To account for compensatory changes

in multiple formants, the experiments described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 measure

compensation in both F1 and F2.

As noted, raising all formants can be done by shortening the vocal tract, e.g. by lip-spreading or ‘speaking with a smile’. She also broaches other complicating factors, as for example ibid., p. 50;

It is likely that an

individual’s physiology, perception, or linguistic organization also affects compensation

for altered auditory feedback.

But setting these considerations aside, and finally to respond the the question implicit in the subject line of this thread, the general conclusion for PCT is that for vowel perception q.i at the sensors at the periphery of the nervous system is bands of excitation in regions of the basilar membrane within the cochlea, corresponding exactly to an acoustic phoneticianʽs perception of formants in a sound spectrogram. We could take it back to more primitive ‘aspects of the environment’ = perceptions controlled by scientists in a field that is logically and epistemically prior to acoustic phonetics, such as acoustics as a branch of physics, or physics more generally. I would be curious why that was thought to be necessary.

The Katseff & Houde references again are:

here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 1:12 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-06-09_10:11:17]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 –

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I singled out, q.i is from the subject’s point of view a one-syllable word that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It’s also a controlled quantity from an observer’s point of view.Â

BN: Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff’s point of view as experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word.

RM: Yes, F1 was her hypothesis about one of what we would call the “lower level” quantities controlled when producing a vowel.Â

Â

BN: The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the experimenter’s point of view, listening in the environment and using equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended sound. The subject’s control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips, jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1 appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite direction.

 RM: Yes, it is great technology. Pretty advanced over “delayed feedback”!

BN: Katseff’s labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not consistently take the point of view of the subject.

RM: Actually, I believe she did take the subject’s point of view. The plot of “F1 heard” in the graph below is F1 from the point of view of the subject. The “heard” F1 is the state over time (trials) of the hypothesized controlled quantity, F1.Â

BN: The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the subject in headphones.

Â

BN: Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure 3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says “the altered F1 heard by the subject” she means simply “the altered F1”, i.e. the disturbance, conceived as a ‘stimulus’. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

RM: I think this is not quite right. “F1 produced” is the center frequency of F1 spoken into the microphone; it’s the frequency of F1 that enters the digital frequency shifting system. In PCT terminology "F1 produced" is the output variable, q.o, which is analogous to mouse position in a tracking task. The disturbance in the graph below is a step increase in the digital frequency shift from “no shift” to 250 Hz; so the disturbance, d, at each point in time is written between the vertical dashed lines at the top of the graph.
“F1 heard” is “F1 produced” (q.o) plus the frequency shift disturbance, d. So “F1 heard” – the grey dots in the graph below – is the hypothesized controlled quantity, q.i = q.o + d. Â

RM: “F1 heard” is equivalent to the cursor position in a compensatory tracking task where q.o = mouse position, d = the computer generated disturbance and q.i = cursor position, which is the sum of mouse and disturbance position. As in the tracking task, “F1 heard” is a hypothesis about a quantity (variable) that is being controlled when a person produces the vowel sound in “head”.Â

BN: Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the gray circles at the top) .

RM: Yes, it’s the heard value of F1 that jumps back to the pre-disturbance level . This shows that the disturbances was nearly completely effective at shifting the frequency of F1, indicating that the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity. The next step for a PCT researcher would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity – one that would include F1 – and then use that nifty digital system to introduce disturbances to this hypothesized variable to see whether it is protected from these disturbances. This, of course, would continue until the researcher came up with a definition of q.i that was protected from all disturbances that should have affected it.Â

BestÂ

Rick

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff’s dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab, 444-461.

http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler’s point of view (a) is the disturbance d, (b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.Â

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why subjects “fail to compensate completely”. This ‘puzzle’ is what my talk at Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

philip 6/13 10:00

Boris: you'll not try to prove how precise is control done by behavior
but how unprecise is mechanism of "not controlling" external
environment

I have a feeling you distinguish between these two statements: "a
perception is a controlled variable" and "a controlled variable is a
perception". I think you favor the former?

···

On 6/13/18, "Boris Hartman" <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

Rick

RM: But again, all this is best left for discussion at the meeting, although
it has been useful because it has convinced me that what I will talk about
at the meeting will now be how to do PCT-based research; that is, how to do
research on purpose!

HB : If you changed your mind about "behavior is control" and you'll try to
turn to real basis of Bills' "central problem" and you'd like to make some
real PCT-based reseacrh where you'll not try to prove how precise is control
done by behavior but how unprecise is mechanism of "not controlling"
external environment but yet achieving consistent result my proposal is that
you turn all your research work you've done, which is mostly of
behavioristic content into right PCT version.

The bases for your PCT research was problematic although you had and have
good ideas. I would also advise you that you remake M/S article and do it
as it should be done with right "picture" of how nervous system function.
I'm sure your feeling that you've done something good will appear. You can
be on really good way that some day you'll become the No.1 PCT researcher.
Juts turn the way of research for 180 degress.

Boris

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
<csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2018 6:57 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal
(p) is theory

[Rick Marken 2018-06-12_09:56:31]

​​​[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-11_17:19:48 ET]

> there is consistent opposition to the disturbance but it is so small
that it suggests very weak control.

BN: I'm glad that you now accept that subjects in Katseff's experiments
resisted disturbances to F1, and that the two traces in the figures are d
and q.o, with q.i not represented.

RM: I've always "accepted" that Ss resisted disturbances to F1, but I still
don't agree that the traces in the figure are d and q.o (disturbance and
output); the traces are output ("F1 produced") and hypothetical controlled
quantity ("F1 heard"). The disturbance (frequency shift) is written at the
top of the graph, as shown here:

RM: So the disturbance is "no shift", then a "ramp" up shift, then the full
"200 Hz F1 shift", and then back to "no shift". The fact that the plot of
"F1 heard" is the plot of the hypothetical controlled quantity (call it
q.i') can be gleaned from Katseff's description of that data:

The “heard�? formants...were calculated by adding the amount of formant shift
to the formant that the subject
produced.

RM: In other words, "F1 heard" is the F1 frequency produced by S (q.o) plus
the frequency shift disturbance (d); so "F1 heard" = q.o + d which is q.i',
the variable that S is presumed to be controlling.

BN: But you still don't accept that F1 is a controlled perception because
subjects only resist about 50% of the disturbance.

RM: Yes, that is far too little resistance for F1 to be considered
controlled. It is more resistance than I thought was happening -- that's why
I drew the blue lines on the graph above. The 200 Hz disturbance moves F1
from 650 Hz to 750 Hz, a 100 Hz rather than the full 200 Hz change; so
resistance is 50% effective. But that's pretty ineffective if F1 were really
a controlled variable.

BN: Katseff et al. point out that the resistance is incomplete. But the
reason that it is incomplete is not that it is uncontrolled. The reason the
resistance is incomplete, as Katseff et al. suggest in their way, is
conflict.

RM: This is because they just can't let go of the idea that control of F1 is
essential to recognition of the vowel. Conflict certainly would account for
the poor control of F1; but it doesn't account for the fact that the
subjects still say that they were hearing the intended vowel. Their varied
output was keeping some variable -- some q.i -- in the reference state. As I
said before (using the example of the coin game) the next step in PCT-based
research on vowel control would be to come up with a new hypothesis about
the acoustical variable that is controlled when people produce vowel sounds
-- a new hypothesis about the controlled quantity, q.i. This new hypothesis
-- new q.i'-- would very likely include F1 in its definition. It might even
include acoustical transitions from the contextual consonants. But jumping
to an explanation of this excellent data in terms of conflict really just
reflects a lack of understanding of what control systems control -- at least
according to PCT. They control possibly rather complex functions of physical
variables (such as temporal and spectral characteristics of the acoustical
waveform) and the focus of PCT is on trying to figure out what these
functions are.

RM: But again, all this is best left for discussion at the meeting, although
it has been useful because it has convinced me that what I will talk about
at the meeting will now be how to do PCT-based research; that is, how to do
research on purpose!

Best

Rick

The sounds that result from resisting the disturbance are result in a
perception of the intended word, head, but the actions to produce those
sounds result from control of muscle tensions and pressures (where the
margins of the tongue contact the teeth) with values that result in a
perception of another word, hid. Getting close enough to the sound of head
without getting too close to the feel of hid, the best they can do is to
resist only half of the disturbance to F1.

This may be exacerbated by the fact that the apparatus disturbed just one
formant. Correcting a disturbance to F1 requires an articulatory change in
the vertical dimension (tongue height or closeness, in the two usual ways of
describing vowel articulation). But to avoid also changing F2, this vertical
change must be done without change to the horizontal location of the
occlusion, which determines the ratio of the volume of the oral cavity in
the back of the mouth to the volume of the oral cavity in the front (between
that occlusion and the open end of the oral cavity formed by the lips). This
requires an unfamiliar articulation. What the subjects produce "sounds more
more like /ɪ/" of hid, but is not the usual articulation or sound of hid.

Just as controlling the 'feel' of pronouncing a vowel within a syllable or
word involves simultaneous control of a number of perceptions of muscle
tensions and pressure, controlling the sound of pronouncing it involves
control of several formants at once. But to recognize that word control sets
reference levels simultaneously for both F1 and F2 is not to deny that F1 is
controlled.

But yes, this will be good to discuss at the IAPCT conference at
Northwestern in October, and we an let it rest until then.

/Bruce

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 1:03 PM Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu > <mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> > wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-11_10:02:14]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-10_18:30:26 ET]

RM: the location of F1 is not a controlled quantity. However, the output did
slightly compensate for the disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum
compensation was 1.2 %) suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is
related to a controlled quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity

BN: Sorry, this is controverted by a century of acoustic phonetics, about 65
years of machine speech recognition and synthesis, and the successes of
everyday technologies built on the basis of those achievements of science.

RM: This is probably better to discuss at the IAPCT meeting in October since
it's an interesting topic which, I believe, you are planning to give a talk
on at the meeting and right now I want to try to work on other things. But I
will suggest that you think about this research in terms of the "coin game".
The "ideal" pattern of the formants that correspond to a vowel, like those
in the cool table below that you posted, are equivalent to the initial
arrangement of the coins by S to "satisfy some condition or pattern". The
digital frequency shift is equivalent to moving one of the coins in the
pattern to see if the position of that one coin is controlled. The result of
the frequency shift to F1 was a small be consistent compensation for this
shift; this is equivalent to a displacement of the coin in the coin game
being compensated by being moved back a small amount proportional to the
size of the displacement.

RM: I say that F1 is not controlled for the same reason I would say that the
position of the coin in the coin game is not controlled; there is consistent
opposition to the disturbance but it is so small that it suggests very weak
control. At this point in the coin game E would try to come up with other
hypotheses about what it is about the coins that is being controlled. This
is not easy but at least E knows that the movement of the displaced coin is
at least weakly opposed. The next guess about the controlled variable in the
coin game would be some aspect of the coins that this only weakly disturbed
by that change in position of the disturbed coin. That's what I am
suggesting should be the next step in this research aimed at determining the
variable(s) being controlled when producing the vowel component of words.

Best

Rick

The formant values of the [æ] of "had" are between the values of [a] and
those of [ɛ], and the formant values of the [I] of "hid" are between those
of [i] and those of [e]. Of the three vowels under consideration, the [æ]
of "had" has the highest value of F1 (the [a] of "father" is higher), the
[I] of "hid" has the lowest (the [i] of "heed" is lower), and the [ɛ] of
"head" has a value of F1 intermediate between them.

Other combinations of formant frequencies distinguish vowels that occur in
other languages but do not occur in English.

Why not talk about the higher harmonics and formants? F3 and F4 are less
consequential. F3 is less important for distinguishing vowels than it is for
distinguishing consonants, as suggested by the above figure 10.2 from
Lieberman & Blumstein, but even for that F3 is not critical for
intelligibility (e.g. Agrawal A. & Wen C. Lin (1975) "Aspects of voiced
speech parameters on the intelligibility of PB words", JASA 57(1), 1975,
217-222). F3 and F4 generally track with F2, but F3 is affected by lip
spreading (say "cheese") and F4 may be affected by lip rounding.

OK, now why go through all that? A summary:

* From an examination of how the human cochlea functions, we know that
acoustic energy in the band of harmonic frequencies that we identify as a
formant (created by the oral cavity acting as a band-pass filter) causes
neural firing from hair cells in a corresponding band along the extent of
the basilar membrane (acting as a band-pass filter). This distinct neural
signal is the perception of a formant. Thus, we know that speakers perceive
formants by means of sensory apparatus exquisitely suited to represent them
as neural signals.
* At a higher level they perceive vowels as functions of these
formant-signals.
* Furthermore, from other investigations we know that speakers produce
different vowels by varying tensions in the musculature of the jaw, tongue,
lips, etc., affecting the configuration of the oral cavity (itself surely
not perceived as such) in such a way as to perceive the formants (and
vowels) that they intend to perceive.
* We also know that disturbing the frequencies of one or more formants
should result in the perception of an altered vowel. This is clearly what
happens with speech synthesis, etc.

The fact that "subjects did not notice formant shifts" (as Katseff tells us)
clearly indicates that something happened to move the disturbed formant back
toward the intended frequency in the speech signal that they heard and were
controlling in their headphones. Specifically, when the experimental
apparatus raised the frequency of F1 in what they perceived to be their own
voice transmitted through headphones, they should have heard the [æ] of
"had", but instead what they heard in their headphones was the intended [ɛ]
vowel of "head". In order to resist the disturbance, they acted so as to
lower the frequency of F1 coming out of their mouths, which (if Katseff had
noted it for us) would have approached the [I] of "hid". Because of the
headphones, the subjects did not hear the vowel of "hid" which they were
actually producing.

Katseff (and her adviser, Houde) also describe what is going on and the
purposes of their experiments in a way that clearly indicates that what the
subjects heard in their headphones was the vowel that they intended to hear,
e.g.:

Talkers compensate by opposing these feedback alterations. When vowel
formants in auditory

feedback are raised, talkers lower those formants in their speech. Likewise,
talkers

raise their vowel formants when those formants are lowered in their auditory
feedback

(Houde & Jordan, 2002; Purcell & Munhall, 2006). This general result has
been replicated

for F0 (Burnett, Freedland, Larson, & Hain, 1998) and for non-English
speakers (Jones &

Munhall, 2005).

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation
in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab,
p. 448.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf&gt;
http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

In her dissertation, Katseff says (p. 53):

When subjects do not compensate at

all (percent compensation is 0), they produce their baseline F1, and when
subjects

compensate fully (percent compensation is 100), they produce an F1 that
exactly

opposes the feedback shift.

Regarding Figure 3.8 in her dissertation, previously displayed in this
thread, she writes (p. 50):

The F1 in this talker’s /ɛ/ clearly decreased for increasing formant shifts.

​Likewise i

n in th

​e 2008​

lab report, e.g. on p 449:

As the formant values of their auditory feedback were raised, talkers
lowered the formant

values of the /ɛ/ vowels that they produced. That is, they compensated for
the change

in auditory feedback, closely mirroring the formant patterns observed in
previous formant

shift experiments. The time course of this effect for a representative
subject is illustrated

in Figure 2.

The descriptions in these (and other) paragraphs agree with the
well-established empirical fact that changing the heights of the formants
(particularly F1 and F2) changes what vowel is perceived.

But the captions below this and other figures appear to contradict this,
e.g.:

Figure 2: Change in F1 feedback and F1 production in /E/ over the course of
the experiment. Open

circles indicate the F1 values in talkers’ auditory feedback. Filled circles
indicate the F1 produced

by talkers over the course of the experiment. Each open circle/filled circle
pair represents one trial.

This is what has thrown you off. Where she says "auditory feedback" we
understand her in terms of feedback in a control loop. But she does not
understand negative feedback control loops. That's the only explanation I
have for why she thinks her term "auditory feedback" refers, not to the
signal heard by the subject in the headphones, but rather to the disturbance
that her apparatus contributes to that signal. She apparently thinks of the
disturbance as 'feedback' because it is injected into the speech signal that
the subject receives in headphones. She talks abundantly about the fact that
the 'compensation' prevents this disturbance (mis-termed 'feedback') from
materially affecting the speech signal in the headphones, but the speech
signal in the headphones is not represented in the figures.

This interpretation is confirmed by various descriptive passages that I have
quoted. I'll add this one from Katseff & Houde (2008) p. 1:

Previous work shows that subjects generally change their speech to oppose
the auditory feedback change.

For example, when F1 in auditory feedback is raised, making their /ɛ/ sound
more like an /a/, subjects

compensate by speaking with a lower F1; the vowels they produce sound more
like /ɪ/.

One of her main concerns is why resistance to the disturbance is incomplete.

These results suggest that both acoustic and sensorimotor feedback are part
of one's lexical expectation.

Because auditory feedback is altered while motor feedback is not, feedback
from these two sources can

conflict. For small shifts in auditory feedback, the amount of potential
conflict is small and the normal

motor feedback does not affect compensation. But for large shifts in
auditory feedback, the amount of

conflict is large. Abnormal acoustic feedback pushes the articulatory system
to compensate, and normal

motor feedback pushes the articulatory system to remain in its current
configuration, damping the

compensatory response.

Katseff & Houde (2008:71)

I think she's right, but she lacks the conceptual and theoretic means of PCT
to understand it clearly. I have proposed how control in two sensory
modalities come into conflict. I won't elaborate that here.

She talks about various complicating factors, e.g. in her dissertation, p.
47:

Subjects who

compensate tend to oppose the change they hear in that, if their voice
feedback has

a raised F1, they will speak with a lower F1. They will also, however,
change their

production of F2, and plausibly other components of their speech as well.
This is a

concern because calculating a subject’s change in production requires
deciding which

dimensions might register a change. If one were to look at changes in F1
production

that result from F1 feedback shifts, subjects would appear to have
compensated less

than they actually did. Understanding which dimensions actually change is
also

important for understanding processing of auditory information. Subjects who
can

produce an /E/ with a F1 that is 100Hz higher, but instead produce an /E/
with an F1

50 Hz higher and an F2 50 Hz higher, may perceive incoming vowels as a
combination

of formants rather than as individual formants. To account for compensatory
changes

in multiple formants, the experiments described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6
measure

compensation in both F1 and F2.

As noted, raising all formants can be done by shortening the vocal tract,
e.g. by lip-spreading or 'speaking with a smile'. She also broaches other
complicating factors, as for example ibid., p. 50;

It is likely that an

individual’s physiology, perception, or linguistic organization also affects
compensation

for altered auditory feedback.

But setting these considerations aside, and finally to respond the the
question implicit in the subject line of this thread, the general conclusion
for PCT is that for vowel perception q.i at the sensors at the periphery of
the nervous system is bands of excitation in regions of the basilar membrane
within the cochlea, corresponding exactly to an acoustic phoneticianʽs
perception of formants in a sound spectrogram. We could take it back to more
primitive 'aspects of the environment' = perceptions controlled by
scientists in a field that is logically and epistemically prior to acoustic
phonetics, such as acoustics as a branch of physics, or physics more
generally. I would be curious why that was thought to be necessary.

The Katseff & Houde references again are:

here again are the links to Katseff's dissertation, and to the shorter
reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered
auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf&gt;
http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental
Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

<http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf&gt;
labphon

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation
in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab,
444-461.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf&gt;
http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback
shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses&gt;
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 1:12 PM Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu > <mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> > wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-09_10:11:17]

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-08_10:48:10 ET]

Rick Marken 2018-06-06_19:40:05 --

BN: The references I cited report a number of experiments. In the one that I
singled out, q.i is from the subject's point of view a one-syllable word
that she hears herself repeating,

RM: It's also a controlled quantity from an observer's point of view.

BN: Yes, but the controlled quantity from Katseff's point of view as
experimenter is at a lower level of the hierarchy, the values of the
formants that constitute a vowel sound within the syllable/word.

RM: Yes, F1 was her hypothesis about one of what we would call the "lower
level" quantities controlled when producing a vowel.

BN: The apparatus shifts the lowest of these, F1. Outside this artificial
situation this could only be done by a speaker changing the shape of the
resonant cavity within their mouth. The subject resists the disturbance to
F1 by changing the shape of the resonant cavity within his mouth. From the
experimenter's point of view, listening in the environment and using
equipment that transcribes the sound produced by the subject as a sound
spectrogram, the syllable produced is different from that which he has been
asked to produce and which he in good faith intends to produce. The sound
that the subject hears in headphones, however, is close to that intended
sound. The subject's control actions counter the disturbance to F1 by
changing the shape of the resonant cavity formed in his mouth by his lips,
jaw, tongue, and velum. In the figures, the target frequency range for F1
appears on the left side, before the disturbance. As the disturbance ramps
up, the frequency range of F1 produced by the subject moves in the opposite
direction.

RM: Yes, it is great technology. Pretty advanced over "delayed feedback"!

BN: Katseff's labeling of these data points is confused, because she did not
consistently take the point of view of the subject.

RM: Actually, I believe she did take the subject's point of view. The plot
of "F1 heard" in the graph below is F1 from the point of view of the
subject. The "heard" F1 is the state over time (trials) of the hypothesized
controlled quantity, F1.

BN: The experimenter monitors two different concurrent sounds: (a) as
disturbed by the experimental apparatus, (b) as produced in the open
environment by the subject. Not represented is (c) the sound as heard by the
subject in headphones.

BN: Only the first two are represented in the figures. The caption of Figure
3.5 is confused and misleading. When she says "the altered F1 heard by the
subject" she means simply "the altered F1", i.e. the disturbance, conceived
as a 'stimulus'. The same confusion is seen in the caption for Figure 3.8:

RM: I think this is not quite right. "F1 produced" is the center frequency
of F1 spoken into the microphone; it's the frequency of F1 that enters the
digital frequency shifting system. In PCT terminology "F1 produced" is the
output variable, q.o, which is analogous to mouse position in a tracking
task. The disturbance in the graph below is a step increase in the digital
frequency shift from "no shift" to 250 Hz; so the disturbance, d, at each
point in time is written between the vertical dashed lines at the top of
the graph. "F1 heard" is "F1 produced" (q.o) plus the frequency shift
disturbance, d. So "F1 heard" -- the grey dots in the graph below -- is the
hypothesized controlled quantity, q.i = q.o + d.

RM: "F1 heard" is equivalent to the cursor position in a compensatory
tracking task where q.o = mouse position, d = the computer generated
disturbance and q.i = cursor position, which is the sum of mouse and
disturbance position. As in the tracking task, "F1 heard" is a hypothesis
about a quantity (variable) that is being controlled when a person produces
the vowel sound in "head".

BN: Notice how the value of F1 produced by the subject jumps quickly back to
the reference value of about 600 Hz as soon as the disturbance ends (the
gray circles at the top) .

RM: Yes, it's the heard value of F1 that jumps back to the pre-disturbance
level . This shows that the disturbances was nearly completely effective at
shifting the frequency of F1, indicating that the location of F1 is not a
controlled quantity. However, the output did slightly compensate for the
disturbance (Fig. 3.10 suggests that the maximum compensation was 1.2 %)
suggesting that the center frequency of F1 is related to a controlled
quantity but is not itself a controlled quantity. The next step for a PCT
researcher would be to come up with a new hypothesis about the controlled
quantity -- one that would include F1 -- and then use that nifty digital
system to introduce disturbances to this hypothesized variable to see
whether it is protected from these disturbances. This, of course, would
continue until the researcher came up with a definition of q.i that was
protected from all disturbances that should have affected it.

Best

Rick

For those who want the context, here again are the links to Katseff's
dissertation, and to the shorter reports and publications that I cited:

Katseff, Shira E. (2010). Linguistic constraints on compensation for altered
auditory feedback. Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf&gt;
http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~shira/katseff_dissertation.pdf

Katseff, Shira & John F. Houde, (2008). Compensation ?=? Mental
Representation. LabPhon11 abstracts, edited by Paul Warren, Wellington, NZ.

<http://old.labphon.org/LabPhon11/publish/LP11%20abstracts/Katseff%20and%20Houde.pdf&gt;
labphon

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2008). Partial compensation
in speech adaptation. 2008 Annual Report of the UC Berkeley Phonology Lab,
444-461.

<http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf&gt;
http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/phonlab/documents/2008/katseff_houde_annrpt08.pdf

Katseff, Shira, John F. Houde, & Keith Johnson, (2010). Auditory feedback
shifts in one formant cause multi-formant responses. Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 127.3:1955.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses&gt;
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42439355_Auditory_feedback_shifts_in_one_formant_cause_multi-formant_responses

The two perceptions monitored by the experimenter are:

(a) F1 as disturbed by the experimental apparatus

(b) F1 as produced in the open environment by the subject

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, Katseff does not talk about q.i for the
subject:

(c) F1 as heard by the subject in headphones

However, the relationship between (a) and (b) is clearly such that (c) would
continue the reference value seen on the left and at the extreme right of
Figure 3.8. From the PCT modeler's point of view (a) is the disturbance d,
(b) is q.o, and (c) is q.i, which is not represented.

Control for words and syllables sets references for control of auditory
perceptions such as those represented here as values of F1, and
simultaneously sets references for control of what it feels like to produce
those auditory perceptions. The latter references are more immediately
affected by error in control of auditory perceptions, and that effect is one
object of these experiments. Conflict between that and control of what it
feels like to produce a given word or syllable (part of the input to word
and syllable recognition, along with other inputs such as e.g. spelling) is
another object of these experiments, phrased in terms of explaining why
subjects "fail to compensate completely". This 'puzzle' is what my talk at
Stanford addresses. Other inputs to the perceptual input functions for
recognizing and controlling words are discussed in my LCS IV chapter and in
a couple of related papers that I have posted in our Researchgate project.

/Bruce

--

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

--

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

--

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Philip

···

-----Original Message-----
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2018 7:03 PM
To: boris.hartman@masicom.net
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The controlled quantity (q.i) is data, the perceptual signal (p) is theory

philip 6/13 10:00

Boris: you'll not try to prove how precise is control done by behavior but how unprecise is mechanism of "not controlling" external environment

PY : I have a feeling you distinguish between these two statements: "a perception is a controlled variable" and "a controlled variable is a perception". I think you favor the former?

HB : It's either. It doesn't matter. Perception is controlled in comparator and it is the only controlled variable in the loop. But it's true that the effects of this control through "uncontrolled behavior" (effects of output) can be seen in environment. Sometimes very precise. But if you make move after move in some longer time period I doubt that observer will guess what you are controlling.

Your question some time ago was very good.

PY : Let’s see if you can control what I say if I am controlling the truth of my statements. This is a game called persuasion. What statement will I admit?

HB : It's simply hard to guess what people control (think and feel) if they are not showing it clearly through behavior (in this case talking). It's specially hard if they don't want to show anything what they are controlling or if they show something else just to trick other persons what they are really controlling, so to achieve personal goals.

So that's why I think that simple cases like "tracking experiment", "rubber band game", "baseball catch" etc. which Rick was "performing" and in the same time making affirmation :

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables�.

HB : ...can't show real human nature of control and possibility that we could for sure know what they control.

Boris