[Martin Taylor 920309 11:00]
(Gary Cziko 920309.0745)
Gary says that the key to seeing control is the finding of zero or near zero
correlation. Inasmuch as the correlation between almost any two variables
in the universe is very near zero, that test would lead to the conclusion
that almost everything is linked by control.
(Bill Powers and Rick Marken 920308)
Bill and Rick both assert that control is a directly observable phenomenon.
I had said I thought it was a theoretical construct rather than a direct
observation, by which I meant something like "blueness" or "tastiness."
I think we are likely to get into an unnecessary war of words, here. To
Bill I would suggest that we have long agreed that the discovery of a possibly
controlled percept is often difficult and requires insight before the Test
can be applied. Even then, it is usually not easy to determine what
disturbances are occurring, and it is only for very low levels that the
outside observer (experimenter) can determine with precision that the
putative controlled variable in the subject's perception is close to the
one "observed" by the experimenter.
To Rick, I would point out that William James lived some time before Bill
Powers. One may credit Bill with a lot, but not with the discovery that
people achieve one purpose by variable means. And I doubt that James would
have taken it as an original observation, when he said: "Provided the same
conclusion be reached, the means may be as mutable as we like, for the
"meaning" of the stream of thought will be the same. What difference does
it make what the means are? "Qu'importe le flacon, pourvu qu'on ait l'ivresse.""
If, as an experimenter, one can presume some pattern in the mutually observable
environment represents a perceptual variable being controlled by the subject,
then one can attempt to disturb that pattern and see whether the subject
acts so that the pattern is restored or maintained. The pattern will show
little correlation with the experimenter's disturbances or with what the
experimenter observes of the subject's actions. If the experimenter happened
to be correct that what she did would have disturbed the pattern if the
subject had not been there, then there is evidence that the subject is
controlling. The presumption that the experimenter would have disturbed the
pattern is just that, a presumption. It is not an observation, because it
didn't happen. Explaining why things do not happen is trickier than providing
rationales for why they do happen. The failure of a presumed "cause" is
easier to justify as that it was not a cause than as that an exactly
countervailing cause was applied at the same time. I think this is at the root
of the communication difficulty with cause-effect psychologists. Causes have
effects, and PCT is supported when what should be causes are observed to
have little or no effects.
In PCT terms, one can model a subject and an experimenter seeking the
subject's perceptually controlled variables as being two control systems
with conflicting references. The experimenter's reference is that the
presumed percept of the subject should be altered, and the subject's
reference is that it should not be. This is an interesting contrast to
the description of communication, in which the two parties are assumed to
have common goals (that each should be satisfied that the communication has
happened as the other desired). And that raises interesting questions about
ethics in psychological experimentation.
Martin