The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

[Angus_Jenkinson]

Angus Jenkinson [23.9.17 22.02 BST]

Boris, hi. Sorry for the delay

Angus

Hi Angus,

···

On 21/08/2017, 13:24, “Boris Hartman” boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

From: Angus Jenkinson [mailto:angus@angusjenkinson.com]
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2017 1:46 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

[Angus Jenkinson, 2017-08-11; 11.37 UK]

Thanks Bruce

Maturana’s focus is on the continuous interrelationship of organisms with their ecological environment and the co-evolutionary learning process that develops cognitive organisation for phenomenological living-in-the-world as he puts it. So his thesis is less to do with control than co-operation or mutuality, but this is not to say that he takes a different line. Like Bill, he has roots in cybernetics.

HB : I think Angus it would be good if you read Bills’ opinion about relation between “autopoiesis� and “PCT�. I’m sure your understanding of both will be much better. Or maybe you already read it ?

BN > PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment.

HB : In which environment ?

Boris

Might one as well say that control is an epiphenomenon of intentional goals (equifinality), since it is control of outcome; relationships are bidirectional. But if your point is that behaviours are meaningless (cannot be explained) except as the means of retaining control, I agree. I am curious about “inversely�. I don’t think this can mean a strict inversion, of a mathematical kind, since there are a host of possible ways of adapting, indeed this is surely a partial explanation of ecological diversity.

However, my key response is to your thoughtful question.

At the same time, the environment as perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

the environment = as perceived = context = cue continued or modified behaviour, and more (the scenario or situation of the present; there is a recursive observation of oneself in the situation, at least for humans)

“…modifying their intentionâ€? (sorrry for unclarity): as a general example, “situationâ€? = cannot turn left, road blocked, (modification) take next left…>

…but I am interestted in the social process in which two or more agents/actors are interacting, each via control, into the “same situationâ€? – whiich is not the same, but their own perception – but in the course off this modifying the situation for the other. So whereas the blocked road is static, the social situation is dynamic and each party is performing (corrective) action with respect to (negative) feedback. I call this the autonomous bind, whereby, particularly in a close group, members are individually autonomous* and purposeful but collectively bound together in a multi-sided situation and interaction set. This bind continues through the flux of mutually reflexive polyvalent* action.

You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”.

Yes, in a way I do, by analogy (but only analogy) to the way that conventional physics attributes causality to forces etc. I am not a fan of “circular causality�, since it does not clearly differentiate the actions of a purposeful agent controlling behaviour to attain goals from causal mechanisms that happen to work in a circle, as is the case with some chemical and natural processes. It means that people fail to recognise the epistemological significance of Bill. Hence alternative language is needed for alternative explanations. I am interested to develop an ontology of explanatory agencies (rather than causes) for social events. I admit that at the moment I am fumbling for the right language and approach, but agency rather than cause is my current preferred term. Any ideas?

Returning to your point about behaviour as an epiphenomenon of control, control is the “agency� in this explanation. But the perceptual field is itself something achieved purposefully; agents are not neutral pure observers of their environment, they filter and select and form the perceptions that are to be controlled by other behaviours. They see the no entry sign but not the dog on the other side of the street. There is a feedback loop between the filtered perception and the filtering of perception as part of control.

Moreover, in a complex social environment with many agents, each member of the group makes (micro)-adjustments that modify “the situationâ€? (what is perceived in the filtered perceptual field by each person/actor), potentially for some or all the others, changing context…

Best

………â¦â€¦â€¦………………… ¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 12/08/2017, 22:58, “Bruce Nevin” bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.0812.14:57 PDT)]

How interesting to see that thread a year after I failed to read it the first time. My first perception on realizing that lapse of time is a perception of my gratitude that we are no longer stuck in the reciprocating bickering that characterizes that thread.

But focusing now on the Maturana quote, and on Angus Jenkin’s speculations deriving from it.

Maturana begins with an equivocation and proceeds from there with undefined abstractions. He apparently means outwardly observable actions when he says “behavior” (e.g. “each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit”), yet he defines behavior as a relation. In that relation, he emphasizes the potential for activity and change in the environment, and he says the observed “behaviors” are determined jointly by the organism and by the environment. Certainly, we agree on that last point.

PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment. PCT recognizes the relevant environmental variables as disturbances to the state of a variable which (rather: a perception of which) the organism is controlling, and PCT demonstrates how the corresponding ‘behaviors’ counter what would otherwise be the effect of those disturbances on the controlled variable. This is what Maturana calls the “coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium.” The equivocation and vagueness of his language possibly makes it difficult to see that he never mentions control or feedback.

Further, he doesn’t distinguish whether or not the “structural dynamics in the medium” included other autonomous control systems, nor the possibility thereby of conflict, cooperation, and other phenomena of collective control.

In short, the phenomenon of control, which is what PCT is about and what we talk about here, seems to be beyond his horizon.

“Recursive re-entry into the system” is one way of talking about the essential character of a negative-feedback control loop. Perhaps a theta symbol is useful to someone talking about it in an abstract way from an external point of view, imagining the observed but undisclosed organism on this side of the relation and the observed environment on the other.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment.

Yes, this is necessarily so, on the understanding that ‘actions’ or behavioral outputs are the means of which the agent controls certain perceptions of the environment.

The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent.

Yes, the relationship is one of continuous circular causation.

At the same time, the environment is [as?] perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

Generally, an intention (a reference value for a controlled perception) is relatively constant. In an hierarchical system of cascading control loops, a high-level control system varies the references or “intentions” of lower’ level systems as its means of controlling its input in the face of environmental disturbances. Is this what you are trying to say?

This is also a continuous process.

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:50 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:

From: Angus Jenkinson (2017-08-06)

I thought I would weigh in once again to this interesting conversation albeit a year after it started. It is in part because I may be meeting Maturana in a couple of weeks . And I am writing about this in a book.

It seems to be one of the most fundamental questions to explore. There is a PhD paper by Seth Miller that I think is extremely helpful in making sense of this. In the paper he introduces the Theta sign for a re-entry looping movement to describe the plethora of situations in which there is a recursive re-entry into the situation. He puts this into the context that I think Chad is referring to, that it is only possible to observe the entire movement from a metalevel.

Thus, the environment as context “re-enters� into the perceptual field modifying detailed motivation (perceptual goal appearance, i.e. what you want to bring about), with behaviour that “re-enters� and modifies the context.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment. The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent. At the same time, the environment is perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field. This is also a continuous process.

Thus, I do not think it is necessary to take the choice that you propose Alex. But, thank you for bringing this quotation in the first place.

………………………………………… ¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦……………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 23/09/2016, 21:23, “Alex Gomez-Marin” agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

Indeed. I am interested in the implications of the PCT asymmetry where P could stand for Procrustean, namely, do we shrink the genius of Maturana or are we willing to be heretic enough to conceive an extension of PCT…?

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:57 PM, Chad T. Green Chad.Green@lcps.org wrote:

[From Chad Green (2016.09.23.1557 EST)]

Alex, you noticed that, too. I don’t think Maturana’s a heretic. Perhaps he’s merely suggesting that we need to extend the PCT model to include the vantage point of the environment. I determined that about PCT years ago and moved on.

Best,

Chad

Chad T. Green, PMP
Research Office
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1575

“We are not what we know but what we are willing to learn.� - Mary Catherine Bateson

From: Alex Gomez-Marin [mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:00 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

“Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomy/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomo/physiological phenomena are necessary for behavior to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer, who conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behavior. What the observer sees is that each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit as a phenomenon of its domain of relations and interactions, arises in each case only when there is a coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium. Accordingly, the behavior that a living system exhibits is neither determined by it nor by the medium alone, even when a particular structural change in a living system may specifically interfere with its ability to generate a particular behavior.”

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/639.html

[Angus_Jenkinson]

[Angus Jenkinson (23.9.17.22.08)]

Bruce, in reply to 17/08/2017, 05:22

You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”.

Yes, in a way I do, by analogy (but only analogy) to the way that conventional physics attributes causality to forces etc. I am not a fan of “circular causality�, since it does not clearly differentiate the actions of a purposeful agent controlling behaviour to attain goals from causal mechanisms that happen to work in a circle, as is the case with some chemical and natural processes. It means that people fail to recognise the epistemological significance of Bill. Hence alternative language is needed for alternative explanations. I am interested to develop an ontology of explanatory agencies (rather than causes) for social events. I admit that at the moment I am fumbling for the right language and approach, but agency rather than cause is my current preferred term. Any ideas?

My usage of “circular causation” applies to the analysis of cause and effect around a negative-feedback control loop. Sensory feedback from the environment, which is transmitted in an inhibitory (‘negative’) sense (hence, negative feedback), combined in a comparator with a commensurate reference signal which is transmitted in an excitatory (positive sense) determines the error signal; which, through descending branches and recombining synapses determines reference signals from reference input functions at the next level down; which (perhaps mediated by more levels of cascading control) are amplified by metabolically derived energies to determine the strengths of output actions; which when combined with other effects on the aspects of the environment, perceptions of which are controlled, determine the sensory input, all in a continuous flow of circular causation with effectively no time lag.

You seem to suggest that you see determinacy throughout. Do you?  And when you say “effectively no time lag�, what does that mean?

Returning to your point about behaviour as an epiphenomenon of control, control is the “agency� in this explanation. But the perceptual field is itself something achieved purposefully; agents are not neutral pure observers of their environment, they filter and select and form the perceptions that are to be controlled by other behaviours. They see the no entry sign but not the dog on the other side of the street. There is a feedback loop between the filtered perception and the filtering of perception as part of control.

The reason I said actions are an epiphenomenon is that control actions are the observable aspect of behavior, and behavior is control of perceptual input–the entire loop, not just the environmentally observable parts. Equivocation in use of the word ‘behavior’ interferes with clarity and precision.

But this adds a disconnect; you divide the whole system into two things when perception is itself an action. Moreover, the perception is taking place throughout every part of the action and something as simple as moving an arm involves in some measure the whole body. Consider the many interrelated variables that are controlled in every moment. (I accept that my example is very much focused on processes of consciousness in a human. But this was for convenience only.)

I wrote in an earlier post about other ways in which our perceptual input functions and control loops, which constitute for us what we subjectively experience as the perceived universe, result from control processes. (I count reorganization among such processes, since it originates and re-establishes control.) You are talking here about the selectivity of perceptual input functions. Perception from an input function that generates a perceptual signal that we can label “dog” (Bill would call this a Category-level perception) simply does not enter an input function in a higher-level control system that is controlling the following of rules governing automobile traffic. It is not filtered out of the control hierarchy. The ‘filtering of perception’ here does not happen in real time; it has been accomplished long prior by the learning processes that established the perceptual input functions (e.g. ‘traffic sign’ amid the visual clutter) and control systems for obeying traffic laws while driving a car.

I somewhat agree. There is a distinction between the equivalent of forming or learning a rule, in your description, and the action of the rule. Filtering happens when it happens. Forming of a filter can happen anytime in the past, agreed. The systemic process of filtering whereby what reaches a particular feature (or level) of the operative organism as a signal set happens when it happens and may mean that some aspects (signals) never reach that function. Agreed. However, the integrated level of multi-dimension knowing will I suspect have some surprises for us in time.

A different point that may be lurking here is that we must be careful not to limit our notion of ‘controlled perception’ to those perceptions that we’re aware of.

Agreed

Moreover, in a complex social environment with many agents, each member of the group makes (micro)-adjustments that modify “the situation� (what is perceived in the filtered perceptual field by each person/actor), potentially for some or all the others, changing context

Yes. The study of collective control concerns side effects as well as intended effects of control by interacting autonomous control systems.

Your interest is not in perceptual control but in relations between autonomous control systems via their respectively perceived effects on their shared environment. If you want to speak more precisely about this, petition Kent McClellan for his modeling of collective control, and Martin Taylor for his related writing in collaboration with Kent. You will find that the way to achieve rigor and precision and clarity of language is to have a clear model of how autonomous control systems interact. This is a rapidly developing field, so you could make important contributions if you chose to pursue it.

First, thank you for your suggestions. Will follow up.

I am, however, at more than interested in PCT. My interest is not perhaps closely connected with some of those that others have, such as the detail of muscular activity as a spring. It is not my speciality and my interest in such matters is rich but from the sidelines for the most part. So I applaud what this group is doing often, even if my contributions are sporadic. BUT This is a revolutionary field and I think it shifts the whole paradigm of biological science with implications through to physics. I think it has the potential to be part of a new consensus of science. This however will not happen as long as we try to bend PCT to the rigors and language of the classical modern epistemology.

Moreover, my work in collective social matters depends in part on the implications of PCT. I think that the philosophical (epistemological) implication of PCT goes some way to answer the age-old questions of autonomy, freedom, and the relation between the systemness of the group and the agency of the individual.

But on the subject of language, while I accept that thre could be any number of cases where I could do better, I am also going to some trouble to find appropriate language that is not the old language of the modernist epistemology. This is because it gets people stuck in inappropriate assumptions without realising it. Causality is one of those cases.

I don’t think you can achieve clarity and precision in these matters without PCT and the investigation of collective control. You’ll be stuck painting suggestive word-pictures like Maturana, and before him Bateson, who, like him, had good ideas but lacked some essential conceptual and methodological tools. If that’s satisfying to you, go for it.

“BN> I don’t think you can achieve clarity and precision in these matters…Maturana…Batesonâ€?: AGREED. Maturana lacks an agent for cclosure, for example.

/Angus

···

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 4:46 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:

[Angus Jenkinson, 2017-08-11; 11.37 UK]

Thanks Bruce

Maturana’s focus is on the continuous interrelationship of organisms with their ecological environment and the co-evolutionary learning process that develops cognitive organisation for phenomenological living-in-the-world as he puts it. So his thesis is less to do with control than co-operation or mutuality, but this is not to say that he takes a different line. Like Bill, he has roots in cybernetics.

BN > PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment

Might one as well say that control is an epiphenomenon of intentional goals (equifinality), since it is control of outcome; relationships are bidirectional. But if your point is that behaviours are meaningless (cannot be explained) except as the means of retaining control, I agree. I am curious about “inversely�. I don’t think this can mean a strict inversion, of a mathematical kind, since there are a host of possible ways of adapting, indeed this is surely a partial explanation of ecological diversity.

However, my key response is to your thoughtful question.

At the same time, the environment as perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

the environment = as perceived = context = cue continued or modified behaviour, and more (the scenario or situation of the present; there is a recursive observation of oneself in the situation, at least for humans)

“…modifying their intentionâ€? (sorry for unclarity): as a general example, “situationâ€? = cannot turn left, road blocked, (modification) take next left…

…but I am interessted in the social process in which two or more agents/actors are interacting, each via control, into the “same situationâ€? – whhich is not the same, but their own perception – but in the course oof this modifying the situation for the other. So whereas the blocked road is static, the social situation is dynamic and each party is performing (corrective) action with respect to (negative) feedback. I call this the autonomous bind, whereby, particularly in a close group, members are individually autonomous* and purposeful but collectively bound together in a multi-sided situation and interaction set. This bind continues through the flux of mutually reflexive polyvalent* action.

You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”.

Yes, in a way I do, by analogy (but only analogy) to the way that conventional physics attributes causality to forces etc. I am not a fan of “circular causality�, since it does not clearly differentiate the actions of a purposeful agent controlling behaviour to attain goals from causal mechanisms that happen to work in a circle, as is the case with some chemical and natural processes. It means that people fail to recognise the epistemological significance of Bill. Hence alternative language is needed for alternative explanations. I am interested to develop an ontology of explanatory agencies (rather than causes) for social events. I admit that at the moment I am fumbling for the right language and approach, but agency rather than cause is my current preferred term. Any ideas?

Returning to your point about behaviour as an epiphenomenon of control, control is the “agency� in this explanation. But the perceptual field is itself something achieved purposefully; agents are not neutral pure observers of their environment, they filter and select and form the perceptions that are to be controlled by other behaviours. They see the no entry sign but not the dog on the other side of the street. There is a feedback loop between the filtered perception and the filtering of perception as part of control.

Moreover, in a complex social environment with many agents, each member of the group makes (micro)-adjustments that modify “the situationâ€? (what is perceived in the filtered perceptual field by each person/actor), potentially for some or all the others, changing context…

Best

…â…………………… ¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦……………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 12/08/2017, 22:58, “Bruce Nevin” bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.0812.14:57 PDT)]

How interesting to see that thread a year after I failed to read it the first time. My first perception on realizing that lapse of time is a perception of my gratitude that we are no longer stuck in the reciprocating bickering that characterizes that thread.

But focusing now on the Maturana quote, and on Angus Jenkin’s speculations deriving from it.

Maturana begins with an equivocation and proceeds from there with undefined abstractions. He apparently means outwardly observable actions when he says “behavior” (e.g. “each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit”), yet he defines behavior as a relation. In that relation, he emphasizes the potential for activity and change in the environment, and he says the observed “behaviors” are determined jointly by the organism and by the environment. Certainly, we agree on that last point.

PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment. PCT recognizes the relevant environmental variables as disturbances to the state of a variable which (rather: a perception of which) the organism is controlling, and PCT demonstrates how the corresponding ‘behaviors’ counter what would otherwise be the effect of those disturbances on the controlled variable. This is what Maturana calls the “coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium.” The equivocation and vagueness of his language possibly makes it difficult to see that he never mentions control or feedback.

Further, he doesn’t distinguish whether or not the “structural dynamics in the medium” included other autonomous control systems, nor the possibility thereby of conflict, cooperation, and other phenomena of collective control.

In short, the phenomenon of control, which is what PCT is about and what we talk about here, seems to be beyond his horizon.

“Recursive re-entry into the system” is one way of talking about the essential character of a negative-feedback control loop. Perhaps a theta symbol is useful to someone talking about it in an abstract way from an external point of view, imagining the observed but undisclosed organism on this side of the relation and the observed environment on the other.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment.

Yes, this is necessarily so, on the understanding that ‘actions’ or behavioral outputs are the means of which the agent controls certain perceptions of the environment.

The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent.

Yes, the relationship is one of continuous circular causation.

At the same time, the environment is [as?] perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

Generally, an intention (a reference value for a controlled perception) is relatively constant. In an hierarchical system of cascading control loops, a high-level control system varies the references or “intentions” of lower’ level systems as its means of controlling its input in the face of environmental disturbances. Is this what you are trying to say?

This is also a continuous process.

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:50 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:

From: Angus Jenkinson (2017-08-06)

I thought I would weigh in once again to this interesting conversation albeit a year after it started. It is in part because I may be meeting Maturana in a couple of weeks . And I am writing about this in a book.

It seems to be one of the most fundamental questions to explore. There is a PhD paper by Seth Miller that I think is extremely helpful in making sense of this. In the paper he introduces the Theta sign for a re-entry looping movement to describe the plethora of situations in which there is a recursive re-entry into the situation. He puts this into the context that I think Chad is referring to, that it is only possible to observe the entire movement from a metalevel.

Thus, the environment as context “re-enters� into the perceptual field modifying detailed motivation (perceptual goal appearance, i.e. what you want to bring about), with behaviour that “re-enters� and modifies the context.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment. The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent. At the same time, the environment is perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field. This is also a continuous process.

Thus, I do not think it is necessary to take the choice that you propose Alex. But, thank you for bringing this quotation in the first place.

………€¦â€¦……………………………………………………… ¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦.

Angus Jenkinson

On 23/09/2016, 21:23, “Alex Gomez-Marin” agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

Indeed. I am interested in the implications of the PCT asymmetry where P could stand for Procrustean, namely, do we shrink the genius of Maturana or are we willing to be heretic enough to conceive an extension of PCT…?

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:57 PM, Chad T. Green Chad.Green@lcps.org wrote:

[From Chad Green (2016.09.23.1557 EST)]

Alex, you noticed that, too. I don’t think Maturana’s a heretic. Perhaps he’s merely suggesting that we need to extend the PCT model to include the vantage point of the environment. I determined that about PCT years ago and moved on.

Best,

Chad

Chad T. Green, PMP
Research Office
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1575

“We are not what we know but what we are willing to learn.� - Mary Catherine Bateson

From: Alex Gomez-Marin [mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:00 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

“Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomy/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomo/physiological phenomena are necessary for behavior to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer, who conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behavior. What the observer sees is that each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit as a phenomenon of its domain of relations and interactions, arises in each case only when there is a coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium. Accordingly, the behavior that a living system exhibits is neither determined by it nor by the medium alone, even when a particular structural change in a living system may specifically interfere with its ability to generate a particular behavior.”

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/639.html

[Angus_Jenkinson]

[Angus Jenkinson: 2017-09-24.11.49]

Thanks for your response Bruce

[Bruce Nevin (2017.08.16.20:10 PDT)]

(Angus Jenkinson, 2017-08-11; 11.37 UK) –

BN > PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment

Might one as well say that control is an epiphenomenon of intentional goals (equifinality), since it is control of outcome; relationships are bidirectional. But if your point is that behaviours are meaningless (cannot be explained) except as the means of retaining control, I agree.

BN > If you are describing subjective experience in imprecise terms, then yes, intentions are the salient perception. If you are rigorously modeling how it is done in precise, quantifiable terms–that is, if you are engaged in PCT research, since there is no contender with those characteristics other than PCT–then control is the fundamental phenomenon out of which all intentions ultimately arise. I refer here for example to Bill’s paper on the origins of life, to various results on evolutionary ontogenesis and the origins of innate control systems, to the role of intrinsic error as the reason a hierarchical system of cascading control does not lead to infinite regress of higher levels setting reference values for lower levels, and to the reorganization system as well as innate and learned systems for exploration and learning. There are some nice generative models of control developing by reorganization ex (essentially) nihilo.

First, I quite agree about the importance of PCT. However, I do not hold with what appears to be a positivist position on the relationship between subjective and objective, nor that the only way of understanding something scientifically, i.e. rigorously, is quantitatively. Indeed I would suggest that if the only way that is used is quantitative then it will always be imprecise in so far as it is not possible to model everything mathematically. This does not mean that I do not value the mathematical as part of an approach. I certainly do. I just think of the last few centuries of science have suffered from a self-imposed ideological lacuna arrived at in an historical situation. Call me a maverick, but I am confident that it is only when we have widened our understanding of science that many of the contemporary problems will be resolved. In that sense if you identify PCT research exclusively with mathematical research, then I think you will limit its epistemological, philosophical and practical usefulness. What we gain from the mathematical will certainly be of advantage and in the present climate of science, no doubt useful for careers, journals and wider acceptance.

Considering the statement, “control is the fundamental phenomenon out of which all intentions ultimately arise�: can you explain how control can arise except as an intention? I mean that the point of control is to maintain or obtain a result and therefore it is itself a phenomenon of intention, is it not?

I am curious about “inversely�. I don’t think this can mean a strict inversion, of a mathematical kind, since there are a host of possible ways of adapting, indeed this is surely a partial explanation of ecological diversity.

BN > Perhaps I am using a technical term of mathematics inappropriately. When I said inverse, I meant that in the PCT model, as in PCT generative simulations and demonstrations, control outputs, when quantified, are indeed mathematically opposite to environmental disturbances, when commensurately quantified. PCT is a quantitative science.

Thank you.Â

Some PCT practitioners have defined it as a quantitative science as opposed to a science that makes use of quantitative methods. This is not true of all PCT researchers and practitioners. If all PCT practitioners would assume that it was a science that was mathematical rather than using mathematics as part of a multidimensional research focus, I suggest that it is ultimate value will be somewhat stunted. The reverse would be equally true.

BN > ‘Adaptation’ ambiguously can mean learning as a control process or ‘learning’ that results from reorganization, or both. Adaptation results in new reference values and/or existing or new perceptual input functions being subject to control in new ways. ‘Adaptation’ results in the system achieving a structural condition such that disturbances are resisted (countered by mathematically opposite control actions) which could not previously be resisted, and such that perceptions that were not (adequately) controlled are brought satisfactorily under control.

···

I broadly agree. “’Adaptation’ ambiguously can mean learning as a control process or ‘learning’ that results from reorganization, or bothâ€?.  Agreed. An organism or group can adapt to its situation at the moment and a species can adapt to a changing ecological niche. And there is some crossover insofar as some learning can be passed over to the next generation both biologically and culturally.  And the changing structural condition does allow the countering of disturbances by the attempt to negate them.

Interested in how you see creativity in this?

/Angus

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 4:46 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:

[Angus Jenkinson, 2017-08-11; 11.37 UK]

Thanks Bruce

Maturana’s focus is on the continuous interrelationship of organisms with their ecological environment and the co-evolutionary learning process that develops cognitive organisation for phenomenological living-in-the-world as he puts it. So his thesis is less to do with control than co-operation or mutuality, but this is not to say that he takes a different line. Like Bill, he has roots in cybernetics.

BN > PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment

Might one as well say that control is an epiphenomenon of intentional goals (equifinality), since it is control of outcome; relationships are bidirectional. But if your point is that behaviours are meaningless (cannot be explained) except as the means of retaining control, I agree. I am curious about “inversely�. I don’t think this can mean a strict inversion, of a mathematical kind, since there are a host of possible ways of adapting, indeed this is surely a partial explanation of ecological diversity.

However, my key response is to your thoughtful question.

At the same time, the environment as perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

the environment = as perceived = context = cue continued or modified behaviour, and more (the scenario or situation of the present; there is a recursive observation of oneself in the situation, at least for humans)

“…modifying their intentionâ€? (sorry for unclaritty): as a general example, “situationâ€? = cannot turn left, road blocked, (modification) take next left…

…but I am interested in the social process in which two or more agents/actors are interacting, each via control, into the “same situationâ€? – which is not the same, but their own perception – €“ but in the course of this modifying the situation for the other. So whereas the blocked road is static, the social situation is dynamic and each party is performing (corrective) action with respect to (negative) feedback. I call this the autonomous bind, whereby, particularly in a close group, members are individually autonomous* and purposeful but collectively bound together in a multi-sided situation and interaction set. This bind continues through the flux of mutually reflexive polyvalent* action.

You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”.

Yes, in a way I do, by analogy (but only analogy) to the way that conventional physics attributes causality to forces etc. I am not a fan of “circular causality�, since it does not clearly differentiate the actions of a purposeful agent controlling behaviour to attain goals from causal mechanisms that happen to work in a circle, as is the case with some chemical and natural processes. It means that people fail to recognise the epistemological significance of Bill. Hence alternative language is needed for alternative explanations. I am interested to develop an ontology of explanatory agencies (rather than causes) for social events. I admit that at the moment I am fumbling for the right language and approach, but agency rather than cause is my current preferred term. Any ideas?

Returning to your point about behaviour as an epiphenomenon of control, control is the “agency� in this explanation. But the perceptual field is itself something achieved purposefully; agents are not neutral pure observers of their environment, they filter and select and form the perceptions that are to be controlled by other behaviours. They see the no entry sign but not the dog on the other side of the street. There is a feedback loop between the filtered perception and the filtering of perception as part of control.

Moreover, in a complex social environment with many agents, each member of the group makes (micro)-adjustments that modify “the situationâ€? (what is perceived in the filtered perceptual field by each person/actor), potentially for some or all the others, changing context…

Best

……………………………………………………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 12/08/2017, 22:58, “Bruce Nevin” bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.0812.14:57 PDT)]

How interesting to see that thread a year after I failed to read it the first time. My first perception on realizing that lapse of time is a perception of my gratitude that we are no longer stuck in the reciprocating bickering that characterizes that thread.

But focusing now on the Maturana quote, and on Angus Jenkin’s speculations deriving from it.

Maturana begins with an equivocation and proceeds from there with undefined abstractions. He apparently means outwardly observable actions when he says “behavior” (e.g. “each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit”), yet he defines behavior as a relation. In that relation, he emphasizes the potential for activity and change in the environment, and he says the observed “behaviors” are determined jointly by the organism and by the environment. Certainly, we agree on that last point.

PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment. PCT recognizes the relevant environmental variables as disturbances to the state of a variable which (rather: a perception of which) the organism is controlling, and PCT demonstrates how the corresponding ‘behaviors’ counter what would otherwise be the effect of those disturbances on the controlled variable. This is what Maturana calls the “coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium.” The equivocation and vagueness of his language possibly makes it difficult to see that he never mentions control or feedback.

Further, he doesn’t distinguish whether or not the “structural dynamics in the medium” included other autonomous control systems, nor the possibility thereby of conflict, cooperation, and other phenomena of collective control.

In short, the phenomenon of control, which is what PCT is about and what we talk about here, seems to be beyond his horizon.

“Recursive re-entry into the system” is one way of talking about the essential character of a negative-feedback control loop. Perhaps a theta symbol is useful to someone talking about it in an abstract way from an external point of view, imagining the observed but undisclosed organism on this side of the relation and the observed environment on the other.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment.

Yes, this is necessarily so, on the understanding that ‘actions’ or behavioral outputs are the means of which the agent controls certain perceptions of the environment.

The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent.

Yes, the relationship is one of continuous circular causation.

At the same time, the environment is [as?] perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.

You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.

Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?

Generally, an intention (a reference value for a controlled perception) is relatively constant. In an hierarchical system of cascading control loops, a high-level control system varies the references or “intentions” of lower’ level systems as its means of controlling its input in the face of environmental disturbances. Is this what you are trying to say?

This is also a continuous process.

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:50 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:

From: Angus Jenkinson (2017-08-06)

I thought I would weigh in once again to this interesting conversation albeit a year after it started. It is in part because I may be meeting Maturana in a couple of weeks . And I am writing about this in a book.

It seems to be one of the most fundamental questions to explore. There is a PhD paper by Seth Miller that I think is extremely helpful in making sense of this. In the paper he introduces the Theta sign for a re-entry looping movement to describe the plethora of situations in which there is a recursive re-entry into the situation. He puts this into the context that I think Chad is referring to, that it is only possible to observe the entire movement from a metalevel.

Thus, the environment as context “re-enters� into the perceptual field modifying detailed motivation (perceptual goal appearance, i.e. what you want to bring about), with behaviour that “re-enters� and modifies the context.

It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment. The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent. At the same time, the environment is perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field. This is also a continuous process.

Thus, I do not think it is necessary to take the choice that you propose Alex. But, thank you for bringing this quotation in the first place.

… ¦………………………………………………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 23/09/2016, 21:23, “Alex Gomez-Marin” agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

Indeed. I am interested in the implications of the PCT asymmetry where P could stand for Procrustean, namely, do we shrink the genius of Maturana or are we willing to be heretic enough to conceive an extension of PCT…?

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:57 PM, Chad T. Green Chad.Green@lcps.org wrote:

[From Chad Green (2016.09.23.1557 EST)]

Alex, you noticed that, too. I don’t think Maturana’s a heretic. Perhaps he’s merely suggesting that we need to extend the PCT model to include the vantage point of the environment. I determined that about PCT years ago and moved on.

Best,

Chad

Chad T. Green, PMP
Research Office
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1575

“We are not what we know but what we are willing to learn.� - Mary Catherine Bateson

From: Alex Gomez-Marin [mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:00 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

“Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomy/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomo/physiological phenomena are necessary for behavior to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer, who conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behavior. What the observer sees is that each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit as a phenomenon of its domain of relations and interactions, arises in each case only when there is a coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium. Accordingly, the behavior that a living system exhibits is neither determined by it nor by the medium alone, even when a particular structural change in a living system may specifically interfere with its ability to generate a particular behavior.”

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/639.html

[_Boris_Hartman]

In the text below….

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 2:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.25.1750)]

Rupert Young (2016.09.24 1700)

AGM: Indeed. I am interested in the implications of the PCT asymmetry where P could stand for Procrustean, namely, do we shrink the genius of Maturana or are we willing to be heretic enough to conceive an extension of PCT…?

RY: Like any theory PCT is open to revision or extension. So, if you think something is missing by all means make a suggestion.

RY: In this instance could you explain: What it is you are proposing? What do you think is missing from PCT? How does the proposal fill the hole? What will the revised theory explain that it didn’t previously?

RM: Thank you Rupert. This is what has been missing from discussions of PCT on CSGNet: an explanation of what any proposed revision or extension of PCT would explain that PCT does not currently explain. In order to do this you have to had observed some phenomenon and then show, using modeling, that PCT in its current form doesn’t explain it.

RM: It’s important to understand, however, that in PCT “modeling” is not just curve fitting; it’s getting a working instantiation of the model to behave in the same way as does an organism placed in the same circumstances. Working PCT models are usually instantiated as computer programs but now, even better, as robotic systems.

HB : You don’t need to have some oberved phanomenon to explain how PCT works. It’s maybe better that you don’t explain PCT outside in organism as you can easily slip into RCT as I showed you 50 x.

RM: The PCT approach to modeling is described in Chapter 2 of B:CP (both editions). It’s an approach to modeling – and testing models against the results of experimental test – that drew me to PCT. What attracted me wasn’t just that PCT seemed like a nice theory of behavior; it was that every prediction of the theory could be tested quantitatively against observation; and every prediction held up perfectly.

HB : As usually you are dragging PCT into outside »obervation« which shows »control« in the environment. That’s not what PCT explains. Ande ven less how organisms work.

RM: I think the best description of the modeling approach to testing PCT can be found in the four BYTE articles that Bill wrote back in 1979, just as the microcomputer revolution was starting. These are available at Dag Forssell’s “Living Control Systems Publishing” site: http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/intro_papers/index.html.

HB : The best explanation is B:CP and LCS III……

RM: The modeling approach to evaluating PCT has been conspicuously missing from discussions on CSGNet. The power law discussion is the most recent example. The power law is an observed phenomenon whose explanation supposedly presents a challenge to the PCT model in its present form. But this claim was made without determining whether a working PCT model, behaving in the same circumstances as those in which the power law is observed, could produce the power law. It was simply asserted that it couldn’t. So when I produced a PCT model of one example of behavior that results in the power law and found that the model accounts for the power law, I was astonished to find that it was dismissed as a “put up job” or something like that.

RM: So it seems that CSGNet is no longer (if it ever was) a forum for dealing with PCT scientifically;

HB : CSGnet was always scientific forum until you came along with your RCT. Then it become unscientific.

RM : … it’s more of a forum for trying to verbalize what the theory “really” means, how people think the theory might explain this or that observation (without actually testing to see if it does or doesn’t) ,

HB : Your testing and demos are verbalizing what PCT mean. You try to verbalize your RCT into PCT. Bill told exactly what means scientific evidence. It’s the nature (physical and social) that is the final arbiter. And your testing and demos doesn’t stand testing aginst nature, I showed you many times that your way of scientific proving is wrong.

RM : ….and whether they think the theory needs some modification, either because it doesn’t seem consistent with the verbal theorizing of famous cyberneticians, doesn’t include recognized “truths” from conventional psychology

HB : Look who is saying this…

…, is too simple (not ennough complex math, figuratively and literally) or just doesn’t jibe with what people know to be true.

HB : I think that science have nothing to do with some offended individual who proved that doesn’t understand math.

RM: I think the work you do, Rupert, could help those of us interested in the science of PCT get back on a scientific track.

HB : Even designing robots need some gorund in knowledge how organisms works. And that is the basic premiss that is leading science on the CSGnet forum. So understanding and research which explain how orgainisms work will get PCT back to scientific track.

RM : I believe you have robots that can now produce behaviors that result in curved movement paths; the Baxter arm robot and the rover robot described in the paper you just got published. Baxter could produce voluntary curved arm movements; the rover could move around the floor in curved paths. If you could record and store those movements we could see whether movements produced by a PCT architecture result in the same kind of power relationship between curvature and velocity as that observed in the power law literature. I predict it will.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

[DagArchive]

RM: I think that must be based
on your interpretation of the letters and words of mine that you read. Of
course there is memory and attitude involved in interpreting what people
say. I think what you might be thinking of is my reluctance to accept the
idea that imagination plays a role in producing our perceptions – not
our interpretations (a cognitive process).
[From Dag Forssell (2016.10.02 10:40 PST)]

Rick Marken (2016.09.26.1255) in reply to

Dag Forssell (2016.09.26.09:55 PST)

I fail to see the difference. For sure you use your imagination full tilt
when reading messages on CSGnet.

Best, Dag

[AngusJ]

Angus Jenkinson, 2017-10-04.22.40

Hi Boris, thanks for this suggestion. I had not and still have not read this other than some references but I have tracked down that it is in a collected
works so I will do so with great interest

···

………………………â€â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

On 21/08/2017, 13:24, “Boris Hartman” boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

HB : I think Angus it would be good if you read Bills’ opinion about relation between “autopoiesis� and “PCT�. I’m sure your understanding of both will be much better. Or maybe you already read
it ?