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From: Angus Jenkinson [mailto:angus@angusjenkinson.com]
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2017 1:46 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?
[Angus Jenkinson, 2017-08-11; 11.37 UK]
Thanks Bruce
Maturana’s focus is on the continuous interrelationship of organisms with their ecological environment and the co-evolutionary learning process that develops cognitive organisation for phenomenological living-in-the-world as he puts it. So his thesis is less to do with control than co-operation or mutuality, but this is not to say that he takes a different line. Like Bill, he has roots in cybernetics.
HB : I think Angus it would be good if you read Bills’ opinion about relation between “autopoiesis� and “PCT�. I’m sure your understanding of both will be much better. Or maybe you already read it ?
BN > PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment.
HB : In which environment ?
Boris
Might one as well say that control is an epiphenomenon of intentional goals (equifinality), since it is control of outcome; relationships are bidirectional. But if your point is that behaviours are meaningless (cannot be explained) except as the means of retaining control, I agree. I am curious about “inversely�. I don’t think this can mean a strict inversion, of a mathematical kind, since there are a host of possible ways of adapting, indeed this is surely a partial explanation of ecological diversity.
However, my key response is to your thoughtful question.
At the same time, the environment as perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.
You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.
Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?
the environment = as perceived = context = cue continued or modified behaviour, and more (the scenario or situation of the present; there is a recursive observation of oneself in the situation, at least for humans)
“…modifying their intenttionâ€? (sorry for unclarity): as a general example, “situationâ€? = cannot turn left, road blocked, (modification) take next left…
…but I am interested in the social process in which two or moore agents/actors are interacting, each via control, into the “same situationâ€? – which is not the same, but their own perceptioon – but in the course of this modifying the situation for the otherr. So whereas the blocked road is static, the social situation is dynamic and each party is performing (corrective) action with respect to (negative) feedback. I call this the autonomous bind, whereby, particularly in a close group, members are individually autonomous* and purposeful but collectively bound together in a multi-sided situation and interaction set. This bind continues through the flux of mutually reflexive polyvalent* action.
You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”.
Yes, in a way I do, by analogy (but only analogy) to the way that conventional physics attributes causality to forces etc. I am not a fan of “circular causality�, since it does not clearly differentiate the actions of a purposeful agent controlling behaviour to attain goals from causal mechanisms that happen to work in a circle, as is the case with some chemical and natural processes. It means that people fail to recognise the epistemological significance of Bill. Hence alternative language is needed for alternative explanations. I am interested to develop an ontology of explanatory agencies (rather than causes) for social events. I admit that at the moment I am fumbling for the right language and approach, but agency rather than cause is my current preferred term. Any ideas?
Returning to your point about behaviour as an epiphenomenon of control, control is the “agency� in this explanation. But the perceptual field is itself something achieved purposefully; agents are not neutral pure observers of their environment, they filter and select and form the perceptions that are to be controlled by other behaviours. They see the no entry sign but not the dog on the other side of the street. There is a feedback loop between the filtered perception and the filtering of perception as part of control.
Moreover, in a complex social environment with many agents, each member of the group makes (micro)-adjustments that modify “the situationâ€? (what is perceived in the filtered perceptual field by each person/actor), potentially for some or all the others, changing context…
Best
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Angus Jenkinson
On 12/08/2017, 22:58, “Bruce Nevin” bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:
[Bruce Nevin (2017.0812.14:57 PDT)]
How interesting to see that thread a year after I failed to read it the first time. My first perception on realizing that lapse of time is a perception of my gratitude that we are no longer stuck in the reciprocating bickering that characterizes that thread.
But focusing now on the Maturana quote, and on Angus Jenkin’s speculations deriving from it.
Maturana begins with an equivocation and proceeds from there with undefined abstractions. He apparently means outwardly observable actions when he says “behavior” (e.g. “each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit”), yet he defines behavior as a relation. In that relation, he emphasizes the potential for activity and change in the environment, and he says the observed “behaviors” are determined jointly by the organism and by the environment. Certainly, we agree on that last point.
PCT recognizes that “behaviors” or observable actions are epiphenomena of control. The variation of the actions corresponds inversely to the variation of certain ‘phenomena’ in the environment. PCT recognizes the relevant environmental variables as disturbances to the state of a variable which (rather: a perception of which) the organism is controlling, and PCT demonstrates how the corresponding ‘behaviors’ counter what would otherwise be the effect of those disturbances on the controlled variable. This is what Maturana calls the “coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium.” The equivocation and vagueness of his language possibly makes it difficult to see that he never mentions control or feedback.
Further, he doesn’t distinguish whether or not the “structural dynamics in the medium” included other autonomous control systems, nor the possibility thereby of conflict, cooperation, and other phenomena of collective control.
In short, the phenomenon of control, which is what PCT is about and what we talk about here, seems to be beyond his horizon.
“Recursive re-entry into the system” is one way of talking about the essential character of a negative-feedback control loop. Perhaps a theta symbol is useful to someone talking about it in an abstract way from an external point of view, imagining the observed but undisclosed organism on this side of the relation and the observed environment on the other.
It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment.
Yes, this is necessarily so, on the understanding that ‘actions’ or behavioral outputs are the means of which the agent controls certain perceptions of the environment.
The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent.
Yes, the relationship is one of continuous circular causation.
At the same time, the environment is [as?] perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field.
You’ve lost me here. You seem to be saying that when the environment changes, the agent’s perceptions of the environment change, and as a consequence, the agent changes “their intention and behavior”. You attribute agency to “the intended perceptual field”. That phrase, “the intended perceptual field”, seems to refer to intended values of interrelated perceptions in a “field” of perceptions of the environment.
Can you express this more clearly in terms of negative-feedback control?
Generally, an intention (a reference value for a controlled perception) is relatively constant. In an hierarchical system of cascading control loops, a high-level control system varies the references or “intentions” of lower’ level systems as its means of controlling its input in the face of environmental disturbances. Is this what you are trying to say?
This is also a continuous process.
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:50 AM, Angus Jenkinson angus@angusjenkinson.com wrote:
From: Angus Jenkinson (2017-08-06)
I thought I would weigh in once again to this interesting conversation albeit a year after it started. It is in part because I may be meeting Maturana in a couple of weeks . And I am writing about this in a book.
It seems to be one of the most fundamental questions to explore. There is a PhD paper by Seth Miller that I think is extremely helpful in making sense of this. In the paper he introduces the Theta sign for a re-entry looping movement to describe the plethora of situations in which there is a recursive re-entry into the situation. He puts this into the context that I think Chad is referring to, that it is only possible to observe the entire movement from a metalevel.
Thus, the environment as context “re-enters� into the perceptual field modifying detailed motivation (perceptual goal appearance, i.e. what you want to bring about), with behaviour that “re-enters� and modifies the context.
It is impossible to imagine, sensibly, the agent acting independently of the environment. The critical turn is that the relationship is not the normal causal one. At no point does the environmental context “cause� the behaviour of the agent. At the same time, the environment is perceived context leads to the agent modifying their intention and behaviour via the agency of the modified intended perceptual field. This is also a continuous process.
Thus, I do not think it is necessary to take the choice that you propose Alex. But, thank you for bringing this quotation in the first place.
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Angus Jenkinson
On 23/09/2016, 21:23, “Alex Gomez-Marin” agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:
Indeed. I am interested in the implications of the PCT asymmetry where P could stand for Procrustean, namely, do we shrink the genius of Maturana or are we willing to be heretic enough to conceive an extension of PCT…?
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:57 PM, Chad T. Green Chad.Green@lcps.org wrote:
[From Chad Green (2016.09.23.1557 EST)]
Alex, you noticed that, too. I don’t think Maturana’s a heretic. Perhaps he’s merely suggesting that we need to extend the PCT model to include the vantage point of the environment. I determined that about PCT years ago and moved on.
Best,
Chad
Chad T. Green, PMP
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“We are not what we know but what we are willing to learn.� - Mary Catherine Bateson
From: Alex Gomez-Marin [mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:00 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: The Great Maturana: a PCT Heretic?
“Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomy/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomo/physiological phenomena are necessary for behavior to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer, who conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behavior. What the observer sees is that each of the different behaviors that a living system may exhibit as a phenomenon of its domain of relations and interactions, arises in each case only when there is a coincidence between a particular structural dynamics in the living system and a particular structural dynamics in the medium. Accordingly, the behavior that a living system exhibits is neither determined by it nor by the medium alone, even when a particular structural change in a living system may specifically interfere with its ability to generate a particular behavior.”
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/archive/fulltexts/639.html