[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0525.1807)]
Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1500)
If I take off my glasses I can't see anything (which is closer to my
experience of what, besides rancor, Bruce G. typically has to contribute these
discussions).
Flattery will get you nowhere.
--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.
www.joincanadanow.org
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.1821) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1505)]
> To a single color?
For a fixed set of wavelengths, yes.
So each perception = one color. So viewing the rainbow needs 7 seperate
perceptions for color alone?
> when we "see" something is each color a different perception or a
different
> perceptual signal? or are they one in the same?
Perceptual signals are the same as perceptions. Each perception
corresponds,
in theory, to a separate perceptual signal.
I think we run into he same problem here that we do with "goals". When
people talk about a "perception", what they generally mean are groups of
HPCT perceptions in certain configurations and relationships. Human beliefs
and inferences are in this category. When I say I "perceive" a rainbow, I am
talking about many perceptions, not one.
> How many different
> perceptions, or perceptual siganls are involved in my "seeing" a
rainbow?
Lot's. There are the color sensations, the curved bow configurations and
the
overall rainbow event.
How about the tilting of the head to see the rainbow? How about the standing
and balance required to look at it. When we look at a rainbow how high up
the hierarchy do you think we go. What nth order of perception do we need to
"view" and make sense of the rainbow? Again, is this all in one perception?
> Careful Rick, this might be a trick question.
How did I do?
You tell me.
btw, you never answered my question, with regard to your outfielder demo;
How many different perceptions are involved here? How much imagination is
used?
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1700)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.1821)--
So each perception = one color. So viewing the rainbow needs 7 seperate
perceptions for color alone?
At least.
> Perceptual signals are the same as perceptions. Each perception
> corresponds, in theory, to a separate perceptual signal.I think we run into he same problem here that we do with "goals".
I don't think so because we're talking about the PCT model.
When people talk about a "perception", what they generally mean are groups of
HPCT perceptions in certain configurations and relationships.
That's surely true.
Human beliefs and inferences are in this category.
Those are higher order perceptions. The perception of "belief in god" is one
perception. Of course, it's constructed of many lower level perceptions. That's
what the perceptual hierarchy is about. Perceptions at one level are functions
of perceptions at lower levels. My perception of the computer in front of me is
made up of other perceptions, including lines and shapes, that are themselves
made out of perceptions of color and brightness.
When I say I "perceive" a rainbow, I am talking about many perceptions, not
one.
Yes and no. The rainbow is a perception in itself so is one perception. But you
are also perceiving the colors, shapes, and so on that are themselves
perceptions that make up the rainbow perception. When I say "I perceive the
rainbow" I am just verbally noting the perception of the rainbow itself. But,
of course, I am also perceiving all the lower level perceptions that make up
the perception of rainbow, and I can note that I perceive them as well: I
perceive the red bow, the curved shape, etc.
How about the tilting of the head to see the rainbow?
That's not really part of the perception of the rainbow, is it? You will still
see a rainbow, even if you had to tilt your head differently. But if you were
color blind, so that all wavelengths looked the same to you, you would not see
a rainbow (just a white bow, I suppose) because the perception of a rainbow
depends on the existence of perceptions of different colors.
How about the standing and balance required to look at it.
These are other perceptions you are having at the time but they are not
essential to your seeing a rainbow. You could still see the rainbow if you were
sitting or falling down.
When we look at a rainbow how high up the hierarchy do you think we go.
I think a rainbow might be an event level perception (level 5 or 6 I think);
it's made up of configurations (bows), colors (spectrum) and intensities. I'd
say the rainbow is a 5th or 6th order perception.
What nth order of perception do we need to "view" and make sense of the
rainbow?
See above.
Again, is this all in one perception?
According to HPCT, yes. And no. The rainbow is one perception. The colors are
other perceptions. Lots of perceptions.
> How did I do?
You tell me.
Pretty darn well.
btw, you never answered my question, with regard to your outfielder demo;
I though I didn't have to if your assumptions about perception were wrong,
which they were.
Ah, I found it. Here's what you said:
Is a perceptual signal each wavelength?, and the perception
the intensity of the two? That is how I understand it. Am I
correct ? If I am correct, let's go to your oufielder catching demo.
Since you were not correct I didn't go to the outfielder demo.
How many different perceptions are involved here?
Where? If you mean in the outfielder model, that would be two; vertical optical
velocity and horizontal displacement.
How much imagination is used?
None at all.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.1943) ]
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.25.1421 MDT)]
When Marc Abrams gets his stress esperiment going, I trust that one of the
experiments will involve using different degrees of difficulty, tailored
to
produce known amounts of tracking error in each individual subject, like
1%, 2%. 5%, 10%, and 20%, If the indicators of stress are functions of
error in a control task, this should demonstrate the effect. For
comparison, of course, you would want to devise some simple task like
waving a fan that takes just as much physical effort to produce but
doesn't
involve a tracking error signal.
Absolutely, Don't forget the small adjustment you made for me by including
my ability to set the length of time from 1 to 10 minutes for a run. That in
conjunction with the degrees of difficulty should make for some interesting
experiments. One "problem" I have run into already is that my heart is not
"normal". Because of the damage from my heart attack my heart does not
respond "normally". This may present a problem. Not unlike someone who does
not sweat would cause for the GSR. But I am busy trying to learn how to use
them both. I would love to get down to D. Goldstein in south Jersey but I
can't because of my inability to drive at the present time. If these
experiments pan out I can see a number of different paths to take, not
unlike the tracking task, in showing control. this one would show "error",
and our ability to reduce it. I am hoping to show strong correlation between
the variabilty of heart rate & GSR to tracking task error. I would like to
see it point for point over the duration of the run, probably with some time
lag involved. Bill thinks I will see strong correlation only over the
"entire run" not point by point. He has a good point. We'll see if either
one of us is right. 
I think it might also be informative to provide a really nice reward, like
$20, for selecting the option of learning to do something relatively
simple. When the person indicates he would like to try it, there should be
"signs of stress" (that is, preparation for action) even before the task
is
started. And if asked, the subject might possibly indicate some sort of
positive feeling.
You betcha. I'm filing this one under experimental-designs-to-consider in
formulating the experiments. I can design something real easy to check this
out with both the GSR and HRVM. Nice thought.
Marc
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.2019) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1700)]
Me:
> I think we run into he same problem here that we do with "goals".
Rick:
I don't think so because we're talking about the PCT model.
Me:
> When people talk about a "perception", what they generally mean are
groups of
> HPCT perceptions in certain configurations and relationships.
Rick:
That's surely true.
So then I am correct in both cases. thatwe do run into the same "problems"
with perceptions that we do with goals and my "understanding" of perceptions
was correct
I said:
> In your example above, Is a perceptual signal
> each wavelength?, and the perception the intensity of the two?
So what I was "wrong" about was thinking that "perceptual signals" and
perceptions were somehow different. I tried expaining it by breaking down a
"perception" into it's "component" parts, which I described as seperate
signals. My understanding of a perception is accurate. And as you state
below. it is and is not what people think it is. Why do you think this would
not be confusing to someone trying to learn PCT?
> When I say I "perceive" a rainbow, I am talking about many perceptions,
not one.
Yes and no. The rainbow is a perception in itself so is one perception.
Ah yes, very clear indeed. Not every perception is as clean as looking at a
rainbow, although I disagree with your breakdown;
That's not really part of the perception of the rainbow, is it?
How do you "know" it's a rainbow and not something else? Doesn't that
involve some memory and imagination?
You will still see a rainbow, even if you had to tilt your head
differently.
Yes, but you must control for your head position and all that entails. How
many control systems do you think are involved in moving your head and
keeping it stationary. All of which must protected from disturbances if you
want to continue to look at the rainbow. The same with either standing or
sitting. Could you still see the rainbow if a disturbance blocked you vision
or forced you to look into the ground, or....?
But if you were
color blind, so that all wavelengths looked the same to you, you would not
see
a rainbow (just a white bow, I suppose) because the perception of a
rainbow
depends on the existence of perceptions of different colors.
Great point. Does a person who was not blind at birth, but lost sight in
late adult hood "percieve" a rainbow if someone tells him/her that it's out
there? Can an unsighted person have similar, perceptions to a sighted
person? The answer is Yes and No. Yes threy can "percieve" things, but no
it's not the same. When aperson blind from birth gained vision, he soon
committed suicide. he was very depressed. The world he "percieved" was
nothing like he imagined it to be. he could not tell the difference between
various kinds of shapes.
> How about the standing and balance required to look at it.
These are other perceptions you are having at the time but they are not
essential to your seeing a rainbow. You could still see the rainbow if you
were
sitting or falling down.
If you were falling you could not see the rainbow.
I think a rainbow might be an event level perception (level 5 or 6 I
think);
it's made up of configurations (bows), colors (spectrum) and intensities.
I'd
say the rainbow is a 5th or 6th order perception.
How do you infer that it's a 6th order perception? The 6th order does not
have that capability. Again, how do you know its a rainbow vs. something
else.
> Again, is this all in one perception?
According to HPCT, yes. And no. The rainbow is one perception. The colors
are
other perceptions. Lots of perceptions.
But you don't find this confusing? We have Perceptions about perceptions and
you think that it's all clear as a bell. Ok.
Pretty darn well.
We must use different scoring systems. I grade the attempt as excellent. I
grade the result as poor.
I though[t] I didn't have to if your assumptions about perception were
wrong,
which they were.
No. My thoughts on perceptions were right. My thoughts on perceptual signals
was wrong ( at least in your view, I'm not so sure that it should reamin
that way )
Since you were not correct I didn't go to the outfielder demo.
Ok, but in fact I was correct.
> How many different perceptions are involved here?
Where? If you mean in the outfielder model, that would be two; vertical
optical
velocity and horizontal displacement.
How many control processes do you think are involved in "vertical optical
velocity"
Let mr guess?, One. right?
> How much imagination is used?
None at all.
Ah yes, the wonderful world of models. No imagination necessary to catch a
ball. Just answer me one question. How does an outfielder know its a ball
instead of a pigeon?
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1900)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.2019)--
Me:
> > I think we run into he same problem here that we do with "goals".
Rick:
> I don't think so because we're talking about the PCT model.
Me:
> > When people talk about a "perception", what they generally mean are
>>groups of HPCT perceptions in certain configurations and relationships.
Rick:
> That's surely true.So then I am correct in both cases. that we do run into the same "problems"
with perceptions that we do with goals and my "understanding" of perceptions
was correct
Of course. You're always correct.
I said:
> > In your example above, Is a perceptual signal
> > each wavelength?, and the perception the intensity of the two?So what I was "wrong" about was thinking that "perceptual signals" and
perceptions were somehow different. I tried expaining it by breaking down a
"perception" into it's "component" parts, which I described as seperate
signals. My understanding of a perception is accurate.
See. Always right. It's uncanny.
> That's not really part of the perception of the rainbow, is it?
How do you "know" it's a rainbow and not something else?
Got me.
Doesn't that involve some memory and imagination?
It must.
> You will still see a rainbow, even if you had to tilt your head
> differently.Yes, but you must control for your head position and all that entails. How
many control systems do you think are involved in moving your head and
keeping it stationary. All of which must protected from disturbances if you
want to continue to look at the rainbow. The same with either standing or
sitting. Could you still see the rainbow if a disturbance blocked you vision
or forced you to look into the ground, or....?
No, you sure couldn't.
> But if you were color blind, so that all wavelengths
> looked the same to you, you would not see a rainbow
> (just a white bow, I suppose) because the perception of a
> rainbow depends on the existence of perceptions of different colors.Great point.
Why, thank you.
> > How about the standing and balance required to look at it.
>
> These are other perceptions you are having at the time but they are not
> essential to your seeing a rainbow. You could still see the rainbow if you
> were sitting or falling down.If you were falling you could not see the rainbow.
Well, it probably wouldn't be the main focus of your attention. But you _could_
see it. I just went out in front and tested it with a cloud (no rainbows
today). I fell down on the grass but still saw the cloud while I was falling.
But maybe this only works for clouds so I'll just assume you're right as
always.
> I think a rainbow might be an event level perception (level 5 or 6 I
> think); it's made up of configurations (bows), colors (spectrum) and
> intensities. I'd say the rainbow is a 5th or 6th order perception.How do you infer that it's a 6th order perception?
I think "event" perceptions were at 5th or 6th order.
The 6th order does not have that capability.
If you say so.
Again, how do you know its a rainbow vs. something
else.
What do you mean by "know"? The rainbow simply exists as a perception. If by
"know" you mean " how are you able to say 'that's a rainbow'" I think that's up
at the category level (for associative naming) and program level (for carrying
out the process of naming naming it).
> > Again, is this all in one perception?
>
> According to HPCT, yes. And no. The rainbow is one perception. The colors
> are other perceptions. Lots of perceptions.But you don't find this confusing? We have Perceptions about perceptions and
you think that it's all clear as a bell. Ok.
I can understand that it would not be easy or clear to a lay person. I studied
perception for years before I got involved in PCT and I know that my brain was
doing some somersaults in graduate school, certainly when I started in the
field. Perception is not an easy thing to understand. I think that, next to
the way a closed loop system works, understanding perception is the toughest
part of PCT. Now that I think of it, it might be worth it to try writing a
tutorial on perception aimed at the lay person. Perception is central to the
PCT approach to behavior and I think a lot of people have a l trouble getting
their arms around the PCT view of perception. I think most people look at
perception as being a "point of view" on things. Perception, to the layman,
means "subjective interpretation" or "the way things look to me". That's close
but perception is a bit more complicated than that. I'll try to write a simple
tutorial on perception from the PCT perspective. I think such a tutorial would
be very useful.
> Since you were not correct I didn't go to the outfielder demo.
Ok, but in fact I was correct.
Of course. I'll take those as rhetorical contingencies in the future.
How many control processes do you think are involved in "vertical optical
velocity"Let mr guess?, One. right?
Well, yes. That would have been my guess. I'm sure I'm wrong, though. How many,
really?
> > How much imagination is used?
>
> None at all.Ah yes, the wonderful world of models. No imagination necessary to catch a
ball. Just answer me one question. How does an outfielder know its a ball
instead of a pigeon?
These questions are way too difficult for me. Why toy with me? Please just tell
me how the fielder knows its a ball.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.25.1959 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.0525.1736)--
I may well be mistaken, but this is how I see it. PCT is a model
(defined by the a set of equations) that describes purposeful behavior.
As far as I know, PCT contains no comparable set of equations that
describes:1. Memory
2. Emotion
3. Imagination
4. CognitionThere are stories about how each of these might someday be incorporated
into a more encompassing model based on PCT. These stories are more or
less persuasive. They are not, however, models and as such lack
predictive power or the capacity to be rigorously tested.
There are degrees of predictivity. The proposals concerning the first three
subjects you mention do, in fact, lead to predictions: for example, the
predictions that (a) memory and imagination will work in terms of the same
kinds of perceptual entities, and (b) both remembered and imagined
experiences will fall into the same classes to which present-time
perceptions belong -- intensities, sensations ... system concepts. Further
there is (c) the proposal that perception and remembering/imagining of the
same variable are mutually exclusive -- you can't be perceiving your hand
palm up and simultaneously imagining the same hand palm down in the same
place. And probably a few others. These predictions come from a few basic
postulates about the PCT model.
We can't get as far with that sort of modeling primarily because the topics
themselves are poorly observed at least in the regards that might help us.
We also are limited because nobody is actually studying memory and
imagination from the standpoint of testing these models. Please don't blame
me for all the things I'm not doing.
It would certainly be possible to include emotions in a working model; all
you would need would be to postulate a few life-support systems and show
how behaving involves them, and how they are sensed. But the most direct
way we have of testing hypotheses about emotion is through observing them
in our private lives and asking others to verify or challenge our
observations. The problem there is the lack of means for objective
observations, and the fuzziness of language as a means of comparing
observations. The theory is ready to accomodate them if they should become
available. Most of what I have to say about emotions constitutes
predictions based on the underlying PCT model and the assumption that
emotions are basically our experience of the somatic effects of preparing
for action. Some of the predictions seem to be OK, some raise arguments. We
won't get much farther than that until someone devotes at least part of a
career to the subject.
As to cognition, that's a tough one because it touches on perception,
reasoning, memory, awareness, and higher-order concepts like logic and
principles. There are things to say in PCT about each of those subjects,
but to me the term cognition just indicates in a general sort of way that
we're talking about subjects of those kinds, not that there's some one
specific phenomenon called cognition. Cognition is a patchwork of subjects
that are dealt with in PCT under other headings.
Best,
Bill P.
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.2232) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1900)]
Of course. You're always correct.
No, but more then you would like to think.
See. Always right. It's uncanny.
I see by trying to explain my logic for thinking a certain way is met by
some of your arrogance, I'll refrain from doing that in the future.
> How do you "know" it's a rainbow and not something else?
Got me.
Try real hard, I'm sure you'll come up with something. You always do.
Well, it probably wouldn't be the main focus of your attention. But you
_could_
see it. I just went out in front and tested it with a cloud (no rainbows
today). I fell down on the grass but still saw the cloud while I was
falling.
But maybe this only works for clouds so I'll just assume you're right as
always.
What a great experiment. You looked up at a cloud and surprised yourself by
falling down. Neat trick. I wonder what you were controlling for when you
were "falling".
> > I think a rainbow might be an event level perception (level 5 or 6 I
> > think); it's made up of configurations (bows), colors (spectrum) and
> > intensities. I'd say the rainbow is a 5th or 6th order perception.
>
> How do you infer that it's a 6th order perception?I think "event" perceptions were at 5th or 6th order.
> The 6th order does not have that capability.
If you say so.
> Again, how do you know its a rainbow vs. something
> else.What do you mean by "know"? The rainbow simply exists as a perception. If
by
"know" you mean " how are you able to say 'that's a rainbow'" I think
that's up
at the category level (for associative naming) and program level (for
carrying
out the process of naming naming it).
So your smart ass remark "If you say so" just above is out of line, isn't
it?
> But you don't find this confusing? We have Perceptions about perceptions
and
> you think that it's all clear as a bell. Ok.
I can understand that it would not be easy or clear to a lay person. I
studied
perception for years before I got involved in PCT and I know that my
brain was
doing some somersaults in graduate school, certainly when I started in the
field. Perception is not an easy thing to understand. I think that, next
to
the way a closed loop system works, understanding perception is the
toughest
part of PCT. Now that I think of it, it might be worth it to try writing
a
tutorial on perception aimed at the lay person. Perception is central to
the
PCT approach to behavior and I think a lot of people have a l trouble
getting
their arms around the PCT view of perception. I think most people look at
perception as being a "point of view" on things. Perception, to the
layman,
means "subjective interpretation" or "the way things look to me". That's
close
but perception is a bit more complicated than that. I'll try to write a
simple
tutorial on perception from the PCT perspective. I think such a tutorial
would
be very useful.
Graduate school?, The greatest philosophers in the world have been trying
for 350 years to answer that question. I too believe the hierarchy is _part_
of the answer. The other part, awareness, is bit of a distance away. I
believe a"tutorial" would be a waste of time as long as you give yes and no
answers to questions. It might prove to be prudent to differentiate between
Perceptual signals and perceptions, with each having a specific meaning in
the model.
> How many control processes do you think are involved in "vertical
optical
> velocity"
>
> Let me guess?, One. right?Well, yes. That would have been my guess. I'm sure I'm wrong, though. How
many,
really?
More then 1
> > > How much imagination is used?
> >
> > None at all.
>
> Ah yes, the wonderful world of models. No imagination necessary to catch
a
> ball. Just answer me one question. How does an outfielder know its a
ball
> instead of a pigeon?
These questions are way too difficult for me. Why toy with me? Please just
tell
me how the fielder knows its a ball.
Review your graduate school books on perception.
I'm also real interested in your response to Bruce Gregory's post;
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0525.1736)]
I may well be mistaken, but this is how I see it. PCT is a model
(defined by the a set of equations) that describes purposeful behavior.
As far as I know, PCT contains no comparable set of equations that
describes:
1. Memory
2. Emotion
3. Imagination
4. Cognition
There are stories about how each of these might someday be incorporated
into a more encompassing model based on PCT. These stories are more or
less persuasive. They are not, however, models and as such lack
predictive power or the capacity to be rigorously tested.
Is my understanding flawed?
Well? Is his understanding flawed? I would like to know.
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2120)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.2232)--
>Rick Marken (2003.05.25.1900)--
> I just went out in front and tested it with a cloud (no rainbows
> today). I fell down on the grass but still saw the cloud while I was
> falling. But maybe this only works for clouds so I'll just assume
> you're right as always.What a great experiment. You looked up at a cloud and surprised yourself by
falling down. Neat trick.
No. I looked up at a cloud and while falling down was still able to see it,
proving that falling down does not prevent one from seeing a cloud. I'll leave
the rainbow version of the experiment up to you.
I believe a"tutorial" would be a waste of time as long as you give yes and
no
answers to questions. It might prove to be prudent to differentiate between
Perceptual signals and perceptions, with each having a specific meaning in
the model.
Yes. That would certainly be something to include.
> > How many control processes do you think are involved in "vertical
> > optical velocity"
> >
> > Let me guess?, One. right?
>
> Well, yes. That would have been my guess. I'm sure I'm wrong, though. How
> many, really?More then 1
Well, at least I was right about my being wrong.
I'm also real interested in your response to Bruce Gregory's post;
Bruce Gregory (2003.0525.1736)--
I may well be mistaken, but this is how I see it. PCT is a model
(defined by the a set of equations) that describes purposeful behavior...Is my understanding flawed?
Well? Is his understanding flawed?
Not really. I think Bill Powers (2003.05.25.1959 MDT) gave a nice reply to it.
We don't have detailed computational models of memory, emotion and imagination
-- but they are in the model, as is cognition (in various ways -- memory,
program and higher level perceptual control and so on). As Bill said, these
aspects of the model could be improved by actually studying memory, imagination
and emotion using the model. My studies of control of sequences and programs
certainly fits under the "cognition" rubric. These aspects of the model won't
develop as fast as the basic hierarchical perceptual control model of behavior,
however, if all people do is kvetch about how little others besides themselves
have done on them.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.0150) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2120)]
Not really. I think Bill Powers (2003.05.25.1959 MDT) gave a nice reply to
it.
We don't have detailed computational models of memory, emotion and
imagination
-- but they are in the model, as is cognition (in various ways -- memory,
program and higher level perceptual control and so on). As Bill said,
these
aspects of the model could be improved by actually studying memory,
imagination
and emotion using the model. My studies of control of sequences and
programs
certainly fits under the "cognition" rubric. These aspects of the model
won't
develop as fast as the basic hierarchical perceptual control model of
behavior,
however, if all people do is kvetch about how little others besides
themselves
have done on them.
If this is truly the way you feel. How can you toss anyone else's work aside
that might help us in this quest. Do you have to invent everything you use?
Studies of memory, and imagination have already been done with a control
model. His name is Argyris. Do you still think we should just trash his
stuff because he doesn't know PCT.?
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2340)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.0150) --
If this is truly the way you feel. How can you toss anyone else's work aside
that might help us in this quest. Do you have to invent everything you use?
Studies of memory, and imagination have already been done with a control
model. His name is Argyris. Do you still think we should just trash his
stuff because he doesn't know PCT.?
Of course not. If Argyris has done good studies of memory and imagination based
on a control model then I would be very interested in learning the details of
such studies. You have not presented any details at all about Argyris' work. If
you present the details of even one study and it turns out that the results are
useful, I (and I'm sure everyone else involved in PCT research) will be
thrilled to see them. And I will personally write to Argyris and thank him.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.0859 MDT)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.0150)--
Studies of memory, and imagination have already been done with a control
model. His name is Argyris.
I would greatly appreciate a description of Argyris' studies of memory and
imagination using a control model.
Best,
Bill
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1054) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2340)]
Of course not. If Argyris has done good studies of memory and imagination
based
on a control model then I would be very interested in learning the details
of
such studies.
Then why don't you pick up a book or two and see if it might be worthwhile.
Would you lik a recommendation or two?
You have not presented any details at all about Argyris' work.
No, and I don't plan to. If what I have said is not enough of an impetus
for you to investigate further, I have no desire to keep on trying. I would
be happy to discuss the finer points of his work, but not off my ideas of
it. I'm not in the business of "teaching" Action Science.
If you present the details of even one study and it turns out that the
results are
useful, I (and I'm sure everyone else involved in PCT research) will be
thrilled to see them. And I will personally write to Argyris and thank
him.
I wouldn't waste my time.
Marc
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.26.0900)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1054)--
Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2340)--
> Of course not. If Argyris has done good studies of memory and imagination
> based on a control model then I would be very interested in learning the
details
> of such studies.Then why don't you pick up a book or two and see if it might be worthwhile.
Would you lik a recommendation or two?
Because I have not heard anything that makes it seem like that would be
worthwhile. But I'm willing to take a look at one if it's available at the
library. So, yes, give me recommendation.
> You have not presented any details at all about Argyris' work.
No, and I don't plan to. If what I have said is not enough of an impetus
for you to investigate further, I have no desire to keep on trying. I would
be happy to discuss the finer points of his work, but not off my ideas of
it. I'm not in the business of "teaching" Action Science.
Of course. It seems like you're interested in selling rather than teaching it.
No wonder you're so upset. This must be the most frustrating sales call of your
career.
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1102)--
Rick Marken (2003.05.25.2355)--
> Bill, I think we have a more fundamental question that needs to be
> answered as honestly as possible, and that is do you and Rick want
> to go there. There being, emotion, memory, cognition, and imagination.
I certainly do. And I've gone there, to some extent, with cognition.
Where?
Program control. And sequence control. Bill also has published a paper on
another kind of cognitive control -- doing arithmetic, I believe.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1317) ]
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.0859 MDT)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.0150)--
Studies of memory, and imagination have already been done with a control
>model. His name is Argyris.I would greatly appreciate a description of Argyris' studies of memory and
imagination using a control model.
You've read *Action Science*. If you feel Argyris is not using a control
model then anything else I show you would be pointless.
So I will refer you to *Knowledge for Action* in it, is five year
intervention showing how imagination, inference, and by correlation memory
are used by people in organizations. if you see no value in this type of
work, fine. I couldn't disagree more. But then again the world doesn't
depend on us agreeing about anything.
Now that I know where both you and Rick stand I feel more comfortable in
understanding what may or may not be usefully talked about on this list. The
clarification was useful. I thank you both.
Marc
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.1158 MDT)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1317)--
>You've read *Action Science*. If you feel Argyris is not using a control
>model then anything else I show you would be pointless.
I'm confused. What kind of statements would you call "using a control
model?" I'll go through the manuscript again, I do remember that he
mentioned the word "control" -- I even remarked on it on the net. But
that's not "using a control model."
So I will refer you to *Knowledge for Action* in it, is five year
intervention showing how imagination, inference, and by correlation memory
are used by people in organizations. if you see no value in this type of
work, fine. I couldn't disagree more. But then again the world doesn't
depend on us agreeing about anything.
Did I ever say his work was valueless? I'm sure it's quite valuable, but it
doesn't tell us anything about theories of behavior -- that is, how
behavior works, rather than just what behaviors people produce.
Best,
Bill P.
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.25.1421) ]
[From Rick Marken (2003.05.26.0900)]
Because I have not heard anything that makes it seem like that would be
worthwhile. But I'm willing to take a look at one if it's available at the
library. So, yes, give me recommendation.
*Knowledge for Action*, Argyris, Jossey-Bass 1993
*Reasoning, Learning, and Action*, Jossey-Bass 1989
Of course. It seems like you're interested in selling rather than teaching
it.
No wonder you're so upset. This must be the most frustrating sales call of
your
career.
Really?, What am I trying to sell? What have I got to gain by making the
sale? Why would I be interested in selling Action Science to anybody on this
list? Do you really think my life depends on you and Bill "approving" what I
do or don't do?
Scottie should beam you back up, your ready.
Program control. And sequence control. Bill also has published a paper on
another kind of cognitive control -- doing arithmetic, I believe.
"cognitive control", very catchy. If you think Chap 8 in B:CP is the end all
in "cognition" what more can I say. And of course if Bill published a paper
on something it's all but wrapped up. You are really very funny.
Of course you will get the last word in this thread so let it rip, I'm done.
Marc
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1450) ]
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.1158 MDT)]
I'm confused.
Don't be. It is I who has been hallucinating all this. I have a very active
imagination
What kind of statements would you call "using a control model?"
It wasn't any one or two statements he made. After reading his 12 books,
upon reflection I imagined that he had an implicit control model in his head
when he developed his theory and methods.
I'll go through the manuscript again, I do remember that he
mentioned the word "control" -- I even remarked on it on the net. But
that's not "using a control model."
Don't waste your time. You will not find what you are looking for.
Did I ever say his work was valueless? I'm sure it's quite valuable, but
it
doesn't tell us anything about theories of behavior -- that is, how
behavior works, rather than just what behaviors people produce.
I see it differently. I am very happy to leave it at that. I'm done talking
Argyris on this list, there is no point.
Marc
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.1559 MDT)]
Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1450) --
>I see it differently. I am very happy to leave it at that. I'm done talking
>rgyris on this list, there is no point.
Yes, I do think it's time to give this prickly thread a rest. Don't give
up, though.
Best,
Bill P.
from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.26.1833) ]
[From Bill Powers (2003.05.26.1559 MDT)]
Yes, I do think it's time to give this prickly thread a rest. Don't give
up, though.
Give up? hardly :-), The more I read and learn about memory, imagination,
cognition, etc. The more convinced I am that I am on a good solid course.
You and Rick have done nothing to dissuade me. It's a bit discouraging that
I can't discuss some of this stuff on CSG net because the basis for all this
is HPCT, but that's life. I'll get over it. In fact, I already have. I'm
content to discuss on CSGnet what you and Rick want to talk about, and if I
have anything to add I'll be more then happy to do so. I'm going to develop
a lexicon for my own purposes. When I have the web page up I'll contact Rick
for a link from CSGnet.
Marc