The road to utopia -- revisted

CSGnet Archive CSG1999
21

[From Chris Cherpas (990811.2100 PT)]

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

If your reference level defines a nonzero amount of "stable and continuing"
as what you prefer, then what's good (for you) is what's stable and continues.
Otherwise it isn't.

Tautology, so true. But are you claiming that reorganization
doesn't universally lead to either a relatively stable set of
references or else the dissolution of the organism? It's not
just what I prefer, it's what reorganization -- and before that,
evolution -- produces.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

What you're trying to prove here is that there is an objective
basis for deciding this issue.

I don't think so. I'm claiming that all life is subjective, including
people who want to be objective. Of course, by arguing "logically"
I am making an "objective" claim -- stating that all life is subjective.
However, I don't think this causes any more problems than the
fact that the set of all sets can't be defined like all the other
sets. It's another instance of Godel's incompleteness theorem:
you can't have a closed language that's totally defined by elements
within the language.

You have a reference for being objective. I do too. However, I
believe that the individualist stance -- "I prefer what I prefer,
and that's the end of the argument" -- denies that we are all a
part of life, and that life itself has values, references, that are
common among us all. Therefore, the objectivity I would aspire to
is in the context of this more inclusive set of values than those
in individual nervous systems, however speculative that may be
at this point.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

You can't use what you're trying to prove as a premise in the argument.
Well, you can, but not if you want to convince me, or a logician, of anything.

I don't want to try to convince logicians -- it's too difficult, unless
they already subscribe to a pragmaticist, contextualist perspective
(instead of accepting only a truth-value formal logic as the end of the story).
Truth is a subset of what endures, not the other way around, in my view.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

Actually, I think that what's stable and continues -- SR theory -- sucks.

You've already shown how it is unstable and won't continue. It's your
own reorganization system that's to blame. It won't let you accept
SR theory, because of the conflicts with PCT.

Chris Cherpas (990811.1130 PT)--

Following the chain to the end leads to an absurd conclusion: having a
reference for not surviving. How can that be stable?

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

I'd say it's quite stable, although I'm not sure that "stable" is what I
prefer. Suicide has been a major cause of death throughout recorded
history. Suicide is one logical solution to a certain class of problems.

If it were "stable," and widespread throughout living systems, that
situation wouldn't last long, and it couldn't be considered stable
anymore. Suicide is not a major cause of death -- it's an exceptional
cause. It is a logical solution -- a neural solution -- not as
pervasive as the outcomes of chemical control systems which are not
suicidal (unless viewed anthropomorphically).

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

But one perfectly permissible value of a reference signal is zero.
You assume that to "have a value" is equivalent to having a _non-zero_
value, or a value high on a scale.

I don't understand why you say that. I thought my criterion of "stablity"
was vague enough to include any interpretations that are based on the
absence of something as well.

Chris Cherpas (990811.1130 PT)--

To be coherent, the science is only relatively objective,
but is ultimately subjective -- value-based. Science refines our
ability to organize towards continuing, towards stability. To be
"coherent" is another way of saying that there is a minimum of internal
conflict and instability.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

Well, I guess this shows that you like stability and coherence. But you're
going to have to look a long time to find an objective justification for
that preference. Why not just admit that you prefer it? You have the right.

I think PCT shows that we're stuck with that, because of the way
reorganization (and evolution) works, not that I personally prefer
stability and coherence.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

Is there ONLY ONE such set of preferences? Of course not: life is
a succession of bifurcating possibilities, and many branches would
be just as viable as many others.

...as many others, but not all others. That's the point. It's
bounded, constrained. Once it bifurcates into an unrecoverable,
entropic state, "it" isn't life anymore.

Chris Cherpas (990811.1130 PT)--

This is not teleological or to say that genes have
a purpose to survive. It merely says that what we call valuable is
a generalization of perceiving what continues and adapts, rather than what
falls apart.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

This assumes that we prefer that which continues and adapts rather than
what falls apart. Now you have to justify that, and in doing so you will
express still other reference conditions you will then have to justify, and
so on ad infinitum.

Not really. Life itself does not require justification. It does
not require a purpose. It _is_ purpose. Beyond that it can be said
to have stability, continuity, as does non-living matter. Purpose
is one way that stability occurs.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

You will never arrive at a self-evidently correct
statement of what is good.

Life itself defines the good (and the bad). Without life, the
question of the good does not arise. Once life is evident,
what is good is (within that context) self-evident.

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

You're treating "value" as if it were always positive and nonzero.

Again, I don't think I'm being that specific, so I don't think
I am treating it as positive and nonzero. I'm probably missing
something here.

Anyway, I sense that I'm more "right" and you're more "wrong"
on this, but I can't think of any more arguments. Maybe you can
persuade me that PCT cannot tell us what is "good" for life, not just
individuals, but I sense that we may be at an impasse that won't
be resolved in the near future.

Best regards,
cc

22

[From Bill Powers (990812.1920 MDT)]

Chris Cherpas (990811.2100 PT)--

Bill Powers (990811.2011 MDT)--

If your reference level defines a nonzero amount of "stable and continuing"
as what you prefer, then what's good (for you) is what's stable and

continues.

Otherwise it isn't.

Tautology, so true. But are you claiming that reorganization
doesn't universally lead to either a relatively stable set of
references or else the dissolution of the organism? It's not
just what I prefer, it's what reorganization -- and before that,
evolution -- produces.

Reorganization stops when the result is just barely good enough for an
organism to survive. Evolution stops when a species can just barely
survive. Considering that 99% of all species that have ever lived are
extinct (or some number like that) we can only conclude that evolution is
beneficial to life, but not to any particular species, and reorganization
is beneficial to the continuation of an organism, but not to any particular
line of continuation.

But that's not the argument here. The question is whether there is any
objective and universal code of morals or ethics, or any objectively best
way of life, such that one person can say to another, "This is what you
_should_ seek." In other words is there any reference condition that one
person has a justification for expecting another person to adopt whether
they want to or not?

You're arguing that there are objectively "best" kinds of organization, in
that some will promote survival and others will not, or will work against
it. As an empirical matter, I suppose I have to agree with you. But
empirical observations are not "ought's". There is no objective requirement
that an organism, or a species, survive. Nature is indifferent to our
survival, or to the survival of life itself. It is only we who care about
surviving, and since none of us has ever experienced anything but success
at this, we wouldn't recognize an error if it occurred (we _couldn't_
recognize it).

We have to ask why the subject of objective morals or ethics is of any
interest at all. I think the answer is not very flattering. What do people
do when they think they have discovered an objective way to evaluate other
people and their behavior as good or bad? They immediately start trying to
use their discovery as a lever to force other people to behave "right."
It's just another tool to use in trying to control other people; this
particular tool depends on bamboozling people with tricky logic, and
talking fast enough to keep their attention off the premises you're
slipping past them. It depends on getting tacit agreement to a falsehood:
the idea that logic is the highest level in the human hierarchy. If logic
were the highest level, then when you have made an airtight case for a
particular set of values being the true "good", the person whom you're
trying to convince would then be _forced_ by his own highest level of
organization to adopt those values.

But of course that is not what happens; if people don't like the outcome of
your logic, they just tell you to shove it, and go on doing as they please.
They aren't in the least "forced" to adopt the values you recommend, even
if they can't refute your logic, or even if they freely agree with it.

And this takes us to the real reason for thinking that there is no natural
and objective definition of the "good." If, as you say, reorganization
always works toward establishing stability and continuity, then why do we
have to do anything at all? If the "good" is just the inevitable outcome of
reorganization, all we have to do is wait, and everyone will arrive at the
same definition of morals and ethics. You don't have to persuade people to
behave in a way that inevitable. And if it's _not_ inevitable, the argument
is refuted.

Best,

Bill P.

23

[Chris Cherpas (990812.2240 PT)]

Thanks for the discussion. We agree on virtually all of this.
However, I will imagine utopias that I believe come closer
to what all people would prefer over other given scenarios, and
will believe the preferred worlds would be preferred because the
organization of such imagined cultures would be informed by PCT.
In any case, such places would not require force or persuading
for people to prefer them. I'll leave it at that.

Bill Powers (990812.1920 MDT)--

You're arguing that there are objectively "best" kinds of organization, in
that some will promote survival and others will not, or will work against
it. As an empirical matter, I suppose I have to agree with you. But
empirical observations are not "ought's". There is no objective requirement
that an organism, or a species, survive. Nature is indifferent to our
survival, or to the survival of life itself. It is only we who care about
surviving, and since none of us has ever experienced anything but success
at this, we wouldn't recognize an error if it occurred (we _couldn't_
recognize it).
...
And this takes us to the real reason for thinking that there is no natural
and objective definition of the "good." If, as you say, reorganization
always works toward establishing stability and continuity, then why do we
have to do anything at all? If the "good" is just the inevitable outcome of
reorganization, all we have to do is wait, and everyone will arrive at the
same definition of morals and ethics. You don't have to persuade people to
behave in a way that inevitable. And if it's _not_ inevitable, the argument
is refuted.

Best regards,
cc

24

[From Rick Marken (990813.0810)]

Bill Powers (990812.1920 MDT)

We have to ask why the subject of objective morals or ethics is of any
interest at all. I think the answer is not very flattering. What do people
do when they think they have discovered an objective way to evaluate other
people and their behavior as good or bad? They immediately start trying to
use their discovery as a lever to force other people to behave "right."
It's just another tool to use in trying to control other people;

This is why the discussion of objective (or absolute) morals or ethics
is of interest to me. It seems to me that a belief in absolute morals
is bound to lead to conflict, either interpersonal or intrapersonal.
It leads to interpersonal conflict if you act to make others behave in
accord with what you believe is the objectively right way to behave;
that is, if you try to control the behavior of other people. It leads
to interpersonal conflict if you are fighting your desire to make
others act correctly.

I think examples of this conflict are particularly evident in the
US where the vast majority of people have a strong belief in the
absolute rightness of Christianity and at the same time have a strong
belief in "religious freedom". For some people, the system that is
controlling for "the absolute rightness of Christianity is much
stronger than the system controlling for "religious freedom" and we
get the occasional person trying to kill Jews or gays (interpersonal
conflict of the worst kind). For others (most, fortunately) the system
controlling for "religious freedom" is much stronger than the system
controlling for the absolute rightness of Christianity; these people
don't bother anyone or even proselytize. But these latter people must
be suffering _some_ internal conflict because one part of them knows
(and is acting toward the goal) that everyone should be Christians.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken