RM: Thanks for your kind consideration and your informative analysis of the nature of perceptions. But I’m afraid I’ve been unclear- qualia play no part in behavior. The only part of a perception that can control anything is the information generated by the processes that follow the qualia in the process of perception. Perhaps this is a trivial observation, but I don’t think that this is clear in the literature on PCT and I think this leads to confusion on the part of the unsophisticated student of the theory.
The only aspects of perception (at least for sensory perception) that we are aware of are the qualitative ones- we don’t know what the brain is doing with the information produced by sensory systems. No one knew about simple and complex cells in the visual system until Hubel and Wiesel- although some had probably guessed! This might tend to make the unsophisticated think the the theory was about qualia- what most people think of as sensation, but it is really about something else. It is about sensory or internal process producing information. PCT is a misnomer. It’s only the latter stages of perception that are relevant, the internal information in the nervous system- in the encephalon at least with respect to complicate actions.
Imagine that all your senses are numbed and we have hotwired your brain to make you think that you are drinking lemonade. It should be clear that this is at least a theoretical possibility. Your actions would be the same as if you were actually drinking lemonade –you might want more or think you wwere satiated or that your thirst had been quenched. But the qualitative aspects of the experience would not exist- no taste, no smells, no feeling of the liquid going down your throat. This thought experiment should make the point clear. You are right that it is not necessary to understand what the experiences of others are like to develop the theory but I think it may be useful to point out that the theory is no really about perception as the term is commonly understood, its about internal information states in systems constructed in certain ways.
Incidentally, qualia are not objective and can play no part in any empirical science. information is as objective as it gets in systems in which the concept is relevant. This even if the exact form of the information is unknown. The defining characteristic of qualia is that they have no defining characteristics that are explicable in terms other than those used in the given modality. Tastes are only like other tastes, sounds like other sounds etc. Synesthetics might argue the point but for �normal� individuals the case is clear. Information is relatable in many forms off course.
Your thoughts?
Bob Eichler
PS See my site http://www.epistemology.be/ if you have any interest in qualia or the related issues of consciousness.
From:
Richard Marken
···
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2016 12:57 PM
To: : Re: The taste of lemonade -Qualia
[From Rick Marken (2016.10.12.1250)]
From Bob Eichler
RM; Hi Bob
RM: You make what I think is a rather brilliant point here:
BE: The experience of red and the taste of lemonade are essentially the same thing inside our heads- if qualia are a CNS phenomenon. Considerations like these force us to consider non CNS explanations for the qualitative aspects of experience.
BE: But we are not simply what’s going on in our CNS, we are also what’s going on in the transduction systems that produce the signals for the CNS.
RM: What I take you to be saying is that our perceptions are defined by what in PCT are called the perceptual functions. Perceptual functions include the sensory transduction functions carried out at the sensory surface as well as the more complex perceptual functions carried out by neural networks farther up into the CNS – functions that result in perceptions that are rather abstract like the lovingness of a relationship or the gambit being carried out by a move in chess. But the really brilliant part of your comment, I think, is this:
BE: Further : Sensation is not something we have, sensation is something we are, as “in the state of having …â€?
RM: Perhaps I think this is brilliant because this is what I also thought was the reason we experience perceptions – the qualia of experience – the way we do. I think it’s because we are the neurons that are the outputs of the perceptual functions. But your comment makes me realize that we are also the perceptual functions that produce those outputs. So the lovely tree outside looks the the way it does because that’s what that aspect of the world looks like when you are the neural network that is the perceptual functions and neural outputs of that are the outputs of that function.
RM: But the qualia of perception are not always colorful and shapely, like the tree (or sonorous and tuneful, like the music I’m listening to now). Higher level perceptions, like perceptions of honesty of political persuasion, seem more like ideas than perceptions (Powers says something like this when he talks about “Higher Levels” of perception in B:CP) – - but they are perceptual experiences (according to PCT anyway), just like the taste of lemonade.
RM: Although the question of why we experience the world the way we do is interesting, I don’t think an answer to that question is necessary in order to successfully understand behavior (our own and that of others) in terms of PCT. PCT does explain observed behavior in terms of the perceptual variables that are being controlled. But all we need to know about these perceptual variables is how they are computed by the perceptual functions – we don’t need to know how they are experienced by the behaving system.
RM: For example, a great deal of the navigational behavior of a bat can be understood as the bat controlling the time delay between emitted audio pulses, p(t), and their echo return, e(t). This variable, p(t)-e(t), is a bat’s perception of its distance from obstacles. We have no idea how the bat experiences this perceptual variable – the qualia that corresponds to this variable. Perhaps it is experienced in a way that is similar to the way we experience visual distance. But maybe we think that because that’s the only way we can imagine experiencing distance.
RM: Anyway, a really nice observation, Bob.
Best
Rick
And- sensation has two aspects, the qualitative and the essentially quantitative- information. Sensation has two components- transduction processes and the information they produce. ** So what then are the perceptions of PCT?** Qualia are had and not known, experienced but not known, what’s known is the information they produce. This sensory information is the aspect of experience that can control behavior, part of but not the whole sensation. Are perceptions sensations or are they sensations as realized by the CNS? I suggest that the perceptions of PCT are really packets of information and that PCT is more accurately called information control theory since it is this internal information that is determining behavior.
Realizing that the controlling influences on behavior are information in what ever form it takes –line labeling or whatever- may be a clarrifying step in the development of the theory.
Your thoughts?
Bob Eichler
TECHNICAL SERVICES
Vancouver WA
From: Richard Marken
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2016 2:06 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The taste of lemonade (was Re: Winter school …)
[From Rick Marken (2016.09.28.1405)]
Martin Taylor (2016.09.27.23.14) –
RM: In PCT, the taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable constructed as a vector combination of "...intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells)". Powers goes on: "However unitary and real this vector [perception] seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it".
MT: I suppose that really depends on what you mean by a "physical entity". Since all we ever have is perception, and no controllable perception is dependent on the input from only one sensor -- one retinal cone, one auditory hair cell, one taste bud or one anything else -- every perception that we control has the same issue; it is constructed, whether the perception is of the location of a cursor relative to a target or the politics of a political party.
RM: Exactly. And PCT just adds that, in theory, the raw materials for this construction are the sensory effects of environmental variables; and the construction is done by neural networks in in the nervous system that we call perceptual input functions.
MT: Every perception is as real as our ability to control it or a perception to which it contributes. Either you say that all such variables on which you can do a Test for the Controlled Variable have an existence in the outer world or you say that none of them do.
RM: I don’t think Bill’s point was that there is no outer would basis of perception. It was that there is not necessarily an entity in the outer world (per the models of physics and chemistry) that corresponds to that perception. The taste of lemonade does depend on outer world variables – concentrations of various molecules – but the particular concentrations of molecules we enjoy as lemonade is not a particular entity in the real world. It’s like humidity; we can perceive humidity and measure it’s outer world basis (in terms of temperature and water vapor concentration); but humidity doesn’t exist as a entity out there; just temperature (molecular motion) and water vapor (concentration of H2O).
MT: There's no in-between in which some controllable perceptions correspond to something "out there" and some do not Even what Bill called "intensities" are constructed, since they depend on contrasts between the outputs of some set of sensory receptors as compared to what they recently were, and as compared to what their neighbours' outputs are and were. Are those perceived intensities "out there"?
RM: I would say that they depend on variables that are out there; but even intensity perceptions are functions of these variables.
RM: This is the constructivist view of perception and it is at the heart of an understanding of behavior in terms of control of perception It is certainly at the heart of the hierarchical model of control, where the perceptions at each level of the hierarchy are *constructed* from lower level perceptions that are themselves constructed from still lower level perceptions.
MT: Yes, exactly. That is what I am saying. It is true of every perception other than the nerve impulses from individual sensors -- a retinal rod or cone, a hair cell, or a taste bud. Moreover, I say that for a perception to correspond to something "out there" it must either itself be controllable or it must be part of the input to a controllable perception.
RM: I don’t see why a perception must be controllable in order for it to correspond to something out there (by “correspond to” I presume you mean “function of”; a perception corresponds only to the function of external variables computed by the input function). I think there are a lot of things we can perceive – that are functions of external variables – that we can’t (or don’t) control. What is surely true is that in order to be controllable a perception must be a function of variables outside the control system – variables that the system itself can affect.
MT: Parenthetically, I think it worth mentioning once again that I developed in 1973 a three-level control model to explain the difference between the tactile perceptions induced by active touch (haptic perception, resulting in an object "out there" being perceived) versus passive touch, when the perception is that a body part is being touched. (Taylor, Lederman and Gibson "The tactile perception of texture", Chapter 12 in Carterette and Friedman (Eds) "Handbool of Perception III: Biology of Perceptual Systems, Academic Press 1973)
RM: I’d love to see a reprint, if you have one. Otherwise I think I can get it myself.
MT: My argument for the "out-thereness" of the taste of lemonade is precisely that you CAN do the TCV on it,
RM: OK, great.
MT: But it really doesn't matter what Bill said He was a wonderful guide and critic, but I don't think he ever claimed to be always correct.
RM: What Bill said that matters most is his theory and the evidence he mustered to support it. Indeed, he never claimed to be correct; he developed PCT as a proposal regarding how behavior works and he wanted (indeed., implored) people to subject the theory to rigorous test so that the theory could be corrected if necessary. What I object to is all the suggested “improvements” to Bill’s theory that are made without any scientific evidence that suggests that such improvements are necessary. Powers, like Newton, developed the theory; now what we need are tests of the theory. That’s the way to carry on Bill’s legacy; not by revising his theory because it does’t suit your taste but by putting it to the test.
Best
Rick
Richard S. Marken
“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers
–
–
Richard S. Marken
“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers