The taste of lemonade -Qualia

The discussion a while ago about perceptual qualities reminds me of what is known as the problem of “qualiaâ€? in philosophy and psychology. Qualia are the subjective aspects of experience, the tastes, sights, sounds, feels etc. unique to particular sensations. Some view the problem of qualia as the essential problem of consciousness (Searle –Berkeley).The problem of qualia iis sometimes viewed as determining how the central nervous system (CNS) produces them. But the real problem maybe determining why they exist at all and why they are different. The answer I think may have implications for the issues in PCT.

We have to think I believe that the information in the CNS is essentially all of the same type- line labeled signals. That is, the message is defined by the fibers that are active along with perhaps some other related variables like the amount and timing of the activity in the individual neural fibers. This because the nervous system is essentially hard wired at both ends –“sensors and effectors. But if this is the case it becomes very hard to imagine how variations in these few parameters could somehow account for the varieties of experience. The experience of red and the taste of lemonade are essentially the same thing inside our heads- if qualia are a CNS phenomenon. Considerations like these force us to consider non CNS explanations for the qualitative aspects of experience.

But we are not simply what’s going on in our CNS, we are also what’s going on in the transduction systems that produce the signals for the CNS. Further : Sensation is not something we have, sensation is something we are, as “in the state of having …â€? And- sensation has two aspects, the qualitative and the essentially quantitative- information. Sensation has two components- transduction processes and the information they produce. So what then are the perceptions of PCT? Qualia are had and not known, experienced but not known, what’s known is the information they produce. This sensory information is the aspect of experience that can control behavior, part of but not the whole sensation. Are perceptions sensations or are they sensations as realized by the CNS? I suggest that the perceptions of PCT are really packets of information and that PCT is more accurately called information control theory since it is this internal information that is determining behavior.

Realizing that the controlling influences on behavior are information in what ever form it takes –line labeling or whatever- may be a clariffying step in the development of the theory.

Your thoughts?

Bob Eichler

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Vancouver WA

···

From: Richard Marken

Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2016 2:06 PM

To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Subject: Re: The taste of lemonade (was Re: Winter school …)

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.28.1405)]

Martin Taylor (2016.09.27.23.14) –

    RM: In PCT, the taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable constructed as a vector combination of "...intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells)". Powers goes on: "However unitary and real this vector [perception] seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it".

MT: I suppose that really depends on what you mean by a “physical entity”. Since all we ever have is perception, and no controllable perception is dependent on the input from only one sensor – one retinal cone, one auditory hair cell, one taste bud or one anything else – every perception that we control has the same issue; it is constructed, whether the perception is of the location of a cursor relative to a target or the politics of a political party.

RM: Exactly. And PCT just adds that, in theory, the raw materials for this construction are the sensory effects of environmental variables; and the construction is done by neural networks in in the nervous system that we call perceptual input functions.

MT: Every perception is as real as our ability to control it or a perception to which it contributes. Either you say that all such variables on which you can do a Test for the Controlled Variable have an existence in the outer world or you say that none of them do.

RM: I don’t think Bill’s point was that there is no outer would basis of perception. It was that there is not necessarily an entity in the outer world (per the models of physics and chemistry) that corresponds to that perception. The taste of lemonade does depend on outer world variables – concentrations of various molecules – but the particular concentrations of molecules we enjoy as lemonade is not a particular entity in the real world. It’s like humidity; we can perceive humidity and measure it’s outer world basis (in terms of temperature and water vapor concentration); but humidity doesn’t exist as a entity out there; just temperature (molecular motion) and water vapor (concentration of H2O).

MT: There’s no in-between in which some controllable perceptions correspond to something “out there” and some do not. Even what Bill called “intensities” are constructed, since they depend on contrasts between the outputs of some set of sensory receptors as compared to what they recently were, and as compared to what their neighbours’ outputs are and were. Are those perceived intensities “out there”?

RM: I would say that they depend on variables that are out there; but even intensity perceptions are functions of these variables.

RM: This is the constructivist view of perception and it is at the heart of an understanding of behavior in terms of control of perception. It is certainly at the heart of the hierarchical model of control, where the perceptions at each level of the hierarchy are *constructed* from lower level perceptions that are themselves constructed from still lower level perceptions.

MT: Yes, exactly. That is what I am saying. It is true of every perception other than the nerve impulses from individual sensors – a retinal rod or cone, a hair cell, or a taste bud. Moreover, I say that for a perception to correspond to something “out there” it must either itself be controllable or it must be part of the input to a controllable perception.

RM: I don’t see why a perception must be controllable in order for it to correspond to something out there (by “correspond to” I presume you mean “function of”; a perception corresponds only to the function of external variables computed by the input function). I think there are a lot of things we can perceive – that are functions of external variables – that we can’t (or don’t) control. What is surely true is that in order to be controllable a perception must be a function of variables outside the control system – variables that the system itself can affect.

MT: Parenthetically, I think it worth mentioning once again that I developed in 1973 a three-level control model to explain the difference between the tactile perceptions induced by active touch (haptic perception, resulting in an object "out there" being perceived) versus passive touch, when the perception is that a body part is being touched. (Taylor, Lederman and Gibson "The tactile perception of texture", Chapter 12 in Carterette and Friedman (Eds) "Handbool of Perception III: Biology of Perceptual Systems, Academic Press 1973)

RM: I’d love to see a reprint, if you have one. Otherwise I think I can get it myself.

MT: My argument for the “out-thereness” of the taste of lemonade is precisely that you CAN do the TCV on it,

RM: OK, great.

MT: But it really doesn’t matter what Bill said He was a wonderful guide and critic, but I don’t think he ever claimed to be always correct.

RM: What Bill said that matters most is his theory and the evidence he mustered to support it. Indeed, he never claimed to be correct; he developed PCT as a proposal regarding how behavior works and he wanted (indeed., implored) people to subject the theory to rigorous test so that the theory could be corrected if necessary. What I object to is all the suggested “improvements” to Bill’s theory that are made without any scientific evidence that suggests that such improvements are necessary. Powers, like Newton, developed the theory; now what we need are tests of the theory. That’s the way to carry on Bill’s legacy; not by revising his theory because it does’t suit your taste but by putting it to the test.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Rupert Young (2016.10.10 13.30)]

Hello Bob,

Welcome! (not sure how long you’ve been on the list)

  There are a few things in your post which seem to be at odds with

PCT, which need some further discussion, but I’ll just flag
briefly here: " line labeled signals", I’d say no, but would need
to know what you mean; “control behavior”, it is perceptions that
are controlled not behaviour; "PCT is more accurately called ** information
control theory** ", no, it is only signals (perceptual)
signals that are controlled, any supposed “information” is merely
in the eye of the beholder.

  However, we've had discussions about this at various times, and

about a year ago I posted a relevant essay, attached, which might
be illuminating. It’s my own view, and work in progress, but
consistent with PCT, I think. In essence the role of consciousness
is as an enhanced learning mechanism for improving the quality of
control.

Rupert

Consciousness.pdf (119 KB)

···

On 09/10/2016 23:40, wrote:

        The discussion a while ago about perceptual qualities

reminds me of what is known as the problem of “qualia� in
philosophy and psychology. Qualia are the subjective aspects
of experience, the tastes, sights, sounds, feels etc. unique
to particular sensations. Some view the problem of qualia as
the essential problem of consciousness (Searle
–Berkeley).The problem of qualia is sometimes viewed as
determining how the central nervous system (CNS) produces
them. But the real problem maybe determining why they exist
at all and why they are different. The answer I think may
have implications for the issues in PCT.

Â

        We have to think I believe that the information in the

CNS is essentially all of the same type- line labeled
signals. That is, the message is defined by the fibers that
are active along with perhaps some other related variables
like the amount and timing of the activity in the individual
neural fibers. This because the nervous system is
essentially hard wired at both ends –sensors and effectors.
But if this is the case it becomes very hard to imagine how
variations in these few parameters could somehow account for
the varieties of experience. The experience of red and the
taste of lemonade are essentially the same thing inside our
heads- if qualia are a CNS phenomenon. Considerations like
these force us to consider non CNS explanations for the
qualitative aspects of experience.

Â

        But we are not simply what’s going on in our CNS, we are

also what’s going on in the transduction systems that
produce the signals for the CNS. Further : Sensation is not
something we have, sensation is something we are, as “in the
state of having …â€? And- sensation has two aspects, the
qualitative and the essentially quantitative- information.Â
Sensation has two components- transduction processes and the
information they produce. ** So what then are the
perceptions of PCT?** Qualia are had and not
known, experienced but not known, what’s known is the
information they produce. This sensory information is the
aspect of experience that can control behavior, part of but
not the whole sensation. Are perceptions sensations or are
they sensations as realized by the CNS? I suggest that the
perceptions of PCT are really packets of information and
that PCT is more accurately called ** information
control theory** since it is this internalÂ
information that is determining behavior.

Â

        Realizing that the controlling influences on behavior are

information in what ever form it takes –line labeling or
whatever- may be a clarifying step in the development of the
theory.

Â

Your thoughts?

Â

Bob Eichler

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Vancouver WA

Â

Â

Â

ts@e-z.net

[From Rick Marken (2016.10.12.1250)]

From Bob Eichler

RM; Hi Bob

RM: You make what I think is a rather brilliant point here:

···

BE: The experience of red and the taste of lemonade are essentially the same thing inside our heads- if qualia are a CNS phenomenon. Considerations like these force us to consider non CNS explanations for the qualitative aspects of experience.

Â

BE: But we are not simply what’s going on in our CNS, we are also what’s going on in the transduction systems that produce the signals for the CNS.Â

RM: What I take you to be saying is that our perceptions are defined by what in PCT are called the perceptual functions. Perceptual functions include the sensory transduction functions carried out at the sensory surface as well as the more complex perceptual functions carried out by neural networks farther up into the CNS – functions that result in perceptions that are rather abstract like the lovingness of a relationship or the gambit being carried out by a move in chess. But the really brilliant part of your comment, I think, is this:

BE: Further : Sensation is not something we have, sensation is something we are, as “in the state of having …â€?

RM: Perhaps I think this is brilliant because this is what I also thought was the reason we experience perceptions – the qualia of experience – the way we do. I think it’s because we are the neurons that are the outputs of the perceptual functions. But your comment makes me realize that we are also the perceptual functions that produce those outputs. So the lovely tree outside looks the the way it does because that’s what that aspect of the world looks like when you are the neural network that is the perceptual functions and neural outputs of that are the outputs of that function.

RM: But the qualia of perception are not always colorful and shapely, like the tree (or sonorous  and tuneful, like the music I’m listening to now). Higher level perceptions, like perceptions of honesty of political persuasion, seem more like ideas than perceptions (Powers says something like this when he talks about “Higher Levels” of perception in B:CP) – - but they are perceptual experiences (according to PCT anyway), just like the taste of lemonade.Â

RM: Although the question of why we experience the world the way we do is interesting, I don’t think an answer to that question is necessary in order to successfully understand behavior (our own and that of others) in terms of PCT. PCT does explain observed behavior in terms of the perceptual variables that are being controlled. But all we need to know about these perceptual variables is how they are computed by the perceptual functions – we don’t need to know how they are experienced by the behaving system. Â

RM: For example, a great deal of the navigational behavior of a bat can be understood as the bat controlling the time delay between emitted audio pulses, p(t),  and their echo return, e(t). This variable, p(t)-e(t), is a bat’s perception of its distance from obstacles. We have no idea how the bat experiences this perceptual variable –  the qualia that corresponds to this variable. Perhaps it is experienced in a way that is similar to the way we experience visual distance. But maybe we think that because that’s the only way we can imagine experiencing distance.Â

RM: Anyway, a really nice observation, Bob.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

And- sensation has two aspects, the qualitative and the essentially quantitative- information. Sensation has two components- transduction processes and the information they produce. So what then are the perceptions of PCT? Qualia are had and not known, experienced but not known, what’s known is the information they produce. This sensory information is the aspect of experience that can control behavior, part of but not the whole sensation. Are perceptions sensations or are they sensations as realized by the CNS? I suggest that the perceptions of PCT are really packets of information and that PCT is more accurately called information control theory since it is this internal information that is determining behavior.

Â

Realizing that the controlling influences on behavior are information in what ever form it takes –line labeling or whatever- may be a clariffying step in the development of the theory.

Â

Your thoughts?

Â

Bob Eichler

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Vancouver WA

Â

Â

Â

From: Richard Marken

Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2016 2:06 PM

To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Subject: Re: The taste of lemonade (was Re: Winter school …)

Â

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.28.1405)]


Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

Martin Taylor (2016.09.27.23.14) –

MT: I suppose that really depends on what you mean by a “physical entity”. Since all we ever have is perception, and no controllable perception is dependent on the input from only one sensor – one retinal cone, one auditory hair cell, one taste bud or one anything else – every perception that we control has the same issue; it is constructed, whether the perception is of the location of a cursor relative to a target or the politics of a political party.

Â

RM: Exactly. And PCT just adds that, in theory, the raw materials for this construction are the sensory effects of environmental variables; and the construction is done by neural networks in in the nervous system that we call perceptual input functions.

Â

MT: Every perception is as real as our ability to control it or a perception to which it contributes. Either you say that all such variables on which you can do a Test for the Controlled Variable have an existence in the outer world or you say that none of them do.

Â

RM: I don’t think Bill’s point was that there is no outer would basis of perception. It was that there is not necessarily an entity in the outer world (per the models of physics and chemistry) that corresponds to that perception. The taste of lemonade does depend on outer world variables – concentrations of various molecules – but the particular concentrations of molecules we enjoy as lemonade is not a particular entity in the real world. It’s like humidity; we can perceive humidity and measure it’s outer world basis (in terms of temperature and water vapor concentration); but humidity doesn’t exist as a entity out there; just temperature (molecular motion) and water vapor (concentration of H2O).

Â

MT: There’s no in-between in which some controllable perceptions correspond to something “out there” and some do not. Even what Bill called “intensities” are constructed, since they depend on contrasts between the outputs of some set of sensory receptors as compared to what they recently were, and as compared to what their neighbours’ outputs are and were. Are those perceived intensities “out there”?

Â

RM: I would say that they depend on variables that are out there; but even intensity perceptions are functions of these variables.

MT: Yes, exactly. That is what I am saying. It is true of every perception other than the nerve impulses from individual sensors – a retinal rod or cone, a hair cell, or a taste bud. Moreover, I say that for a perception to correspond to something “out there” it must either itself be controllable or it must be part of the input to a controllable perception.

Â

RM: I don’t see why a perception must be controllable in order for it to correspond to something out there (by “correspond to” I presume you mean “function of”; a perception corresponds only to the function of external variables computed by the input function). I think there are a lot of things we can perceive – that are functions of external variables – that we can’t (or don’t) control. What is surely true is that in order to be controllable a perception must be a function of variables outside the control system – variables that the system itself can affect.

RM: I’d love to see a reprint, if you have one. Otherwise I think I can get it myself.Â

Â

MT: My argument for the “out-thereness” of the taste of lemonade is precisely that you CAN do the TCV on it,

Â

RM: OK, great.

Â

MT: But it really doesn’t matter what Bill said He was a wonderful guide and critic, but I don’t think he ever claimed to be always correct.
Â

RM: What Bill said that matters most is his theory and the evidence he mustered to support it. Indeed, he never claimed to be correct; he developed PCT as a proposal regarding how behavior works and he wanted (indeed., implored) people to subject the theory to rigorous test so that the theory could be corrected if necessary. What I object to is all the suggested “improvements” to Bill’s theory that are made without any scientific evidence that suggests that such improvements are necessary. Powers, like Newton, developed the theory; now what we need are tests of the theory. That’s the way to carry on Bill’s legacy; not by revising his theory because it does’t suit your taste but by putting it to the test.

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

    RM: In PCT, the taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable constructed as a vector combination of "...intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells)". Powers goes on: "However unitary and real this vector [perception] seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it".

RM: This is the constructivist view of perception and it is at the heart of an understanding of behavior in terms of control of perception. It is certainly at the heart of the hierarchical model of control, where the perceptions at each level of the hierarchy are *constructed* from lower level perceptions that are themselves constructed from still lower level perceptions.

MT: Parenthetically, I think it worth mentioning once again that I developed in 1973 a three-level control model to explain the difference between the tactile perceptions induced by active touch (haptic perception, resulting in an object "out there" being perceived) versus passive touch, when the perception is that a body part is being touched. (Taylor, Lederman and Gibson "The tactile perception of texture", Chapter 12 in Carterette and Friedman (Eds) "Handbool of Perception III: Biology of Perceptual Systems, Academic Press 1973)