To know and to believe

CSGnet Archive CSG2009
1

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)]

I have been thinking about “to know” knowledge and “to imagine” knowledge and ask for comments about a conclusion, please.

Our knowledge about anything are perceptions inside our brain.

“To know” knowledge are thoughts that have input in our brain and that describe perceptions that have input outside our sensory cells (the brain).

“To imagine” or “to believe” knowledge are thoughts that have input in our brain and that describe perceptions that don’t have input outside our sencory cells (the brain).

In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about the (e.g.) polarisation of photons happening outside the author’s sensory cells and the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In this case both have “to imagine”/“to believe” knowledge.

Neither the people who have “to know” knowledge or "“to imagine”/“to believe” knowledge can say they have a “one to one” knowledge about something outside the sencory cells. And having the brain people have today, nobody will be able to give a “one to one” account about anbything outside our brain.

bjorn

2

[From Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06. 9:30 AM EDT)]

You have been a bit quiet lately. It is nice to hear from you again. This gets a bit philosophical. But, trying to construct such concepts into HPCT seems worthwhile.

I would agree that our “knowledge” consists of reference perceptions stored in our memory in our brain/neural system. However, our “beliefs” seem to be like our “knowledge” in terms of PCT.

I am not sure if it is significant in terms of understanding human behavior whether the source of our knowledge or belief came from the external environment through our senses or from an internal neural process we might call imagination or innate instincts.

I would like you to discuss this more. There is a popular claim (apart from PCT) that our perceptions are our reality. This makes sense to me within HPCT.

I also like your examples of “beliefs” in physics texts and the Bible. Which authors do we trust more for our beliefs based upon our “knowledge?”

Kenny

In a message dated 5/6/2009 4:57:07 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, bjsimon@ONLINE.NO writes:

···

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)]

I have been thinking about “to know” knowledge and “to imagine” knowledge and ask for comments about a conclusion, please.

Our knowledge about anything are perceptions inside our brain.

“To know” knowledge are thoughts that have input in our brain and that describe perceptions that have input outside our sensory cells (the brain).

“To imagine” or “to believe” knowledge are thoughts that have input in our brain and that describe perceptions that don’t have input outside our sencory cells (the brain).

In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about the (e.g.) polarisation of photons happening outside the author’s sensory cells and the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In this case both have “to imagine”/“to believe” knowledge.

Neither the people who have “to know” knowledge or "“to imagine”/“to believe” knowledge can say they have a “one to one” knowledge about something outside the sencory cells. And having the brain people have today, nobody will be able to give a “one to one” account about anbything outside our brain.

bjorn

Remember Mom this Mother’s Day! Find a florist near you now.

3

[From Rick Marken (2009.05.06.0950)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)

I have been thinking about "to know" knowledge and "to imagine" knowledge
and ask for comments about a conclusion, please.

Will do.

In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about�the�(e.g.)
polarisation� of photons�happening outside the author's sensory cells and
the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus
satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In
this case both have "to imagine"/"to believe" knowledge.

Neither the people who have "to know" knowledge or ""to imagine"/"to
believe" knowledge can say they have a "one to one" knowledge about
something outside the sencory cells. And having the brain people have today,
nobody will be able to give a "one to one" account about anbything outside
our brain.

True. But the people who have based their "imagined" knowledge on
careful tests against�their "to know" knowledge are, I think, in a
better position to have confidence that their "imagined" knowledge is
a reasonably correct -- if not perfectly one-to-one -- representation
of what is "out there" on the other side of the senses.

I think of "imagined" knowledge as theory; PCT and atomic theory are
imagined knowledge. I think of "to know" knowledge as data. Of course,
we only know this data as perception but if the perceptions (data
obtained in properly performed experiments) consistently behave almost
exactly as predicted by our imaginations (theories) then I think we
have a reasonable basis for taking those theories as pretty darn good
approximation to what is actually happening on the "other side" of
those perceptions.

What I have described above in a very oversimplified way is basically
how I see science working. Science is a process of testing
imaginations (theories) against perceptions (data). I think it's
worked pretty well so far. Certainly a lot better than deciding that
some author is "trustworthy" and to then believing that, because you
trust that person, what the person says is "true". That way lies,
well, all the bad things that happen in the world. The nice thing
about PCT for me is that you are not asked to believe it is correct
because Bill Powers is so trustworthy (which he is). You should accept
(or reject) any proposition of PCT only after testing it against data.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

4

From Jim Wuwert 2009.05.05 1440EST

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)]

BS: In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about the (e.g.) polarisation of photons happening outside the author’s sensory cells and the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In this case both have “to imagine”/“to believe” knowledge.

From the peanut gallery:

Actually, the book says that Jesus used 5 small barley loaves and 2 small fish to feed 5000 people. :slight_smile:

All e-mail correspondence to and from this address
is subject to the North Carolina Public Records Law,
which may result in monitoring and disclosure to
third parties, including law enforcement.
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER

5

The best book I've encountered on this topic is _Critique of Impure
Reason: An Essay on Neurons, Somatic Markers, and Consciousness_ by
Peter Munz.

···

On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 1:56 AM, Bjorn <bjsimon@online.no> wrote:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)]

I have been thinking about "to know" knowledge and "to imagine" knowledge
and ask for comments about a conclusion, please.

Our knowledge about anything are perceptions inside our brain.

"To know" knowledge�are thoughts that have input in our brain and that
describe perceptions that have input outside our sensory cells (the brain).
"To imagine" or "to believe" knowledge are thoughts that have input in our
brain and that describe perceptions that don't have input outside our
sencory cells (the brain).

In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about�the�(e.g.)
polarisation� of photons�happening outside the author's sensory cells and
the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus
satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In
this case both have "to imagine"/"to believe" knowledge.

Neither the people who have "to know" knowledge or ""to imagine"/"to
believe" knowledge can say they have a "one to one" knowledge about
something outside the sencory cells. And having the brain people have today,
nobody will be able to give a "one to one" account about anbything outside
our brain.

bjorn

6

KK: I would agree that our
“knowledge” consists of reference perceptions stored in our
memory in our brain/neural system. However, our “beliefs”
seem to be like our “knowledge” in terms of
PCT.
[From Bill Powers (2009.05.06.1545 MDT)]

Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06. 9:30 AM
EDT)

BP: I distinguish between beliefs and knowledge on the basis of evidence
and experimental testing. I suppose we can also distinguish between
primary and secondary beliefs and knowledge, primary referring to direct
experience alone, and secondary referring to a reliance on someone else’s
reports.

I saw the knave of hearts taking the tarts and sneaking away, so I know
he took them. I don’t know if he stole them – maybe he had
permission.

I saw the knave of hearts burping, wiping his mouth, and walking away
just after the tarts disappeared, so I believe quite strongly that he
stole them.

Knowing that the knave of hearts was in town, I rather believe he stole
the tarts because that’s just the sort of thing he would do.

My trustworthy friend Kenny told me he saw the knave of hearts steal the
tarts, so in a secondary way I accept that knowledge, though I’ll try to
check it out.

I read in a book that the knave of hearts stole the tarts. I don’t
believe anything about the knave’s guilt, or know anything about it. All
I know is what the book said, but that I do know because I read it
myself. It said right in the book, “Everything in this book is
true.” I don’t know if that statement is true, or believe
it.

The only things I claim to know are those I have verified for myself by
seeing the evidence, agreeing with the reasoning, knowing that the
evidence was obtained correctly, experimentally checking to see that I
can predict correctly what will happen, and then making it happen if that
is possible. Anything that meets all those criteria I would say I accept
about 90% as knowledge. I do not call things I only believe knowledge at
all. I would not be surprised if they turned out to be wrong.

Most scientists I have read about or met accept that last set of
criteria. I have also met quite a few people who think that is too
stringent and want to use more easily attained standards, like “I
have a gut feeling that I know.” I tend to disagree with such people
about most things from the nature of the universe to the best topping to
put on a pizza.

Best,

Bill P.

7

[From Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06.1915 EDT)]

I think you missed my point. I was trying to propose that our knowledge and our beliefs (however we define or establish them) appear in HPCT as reference perceptions. You have a method for distinguishing which of your references you perceive as knowledge and which as belief. That’s fine. But, when it comes to your behavior according to PCT, it is the reference perception and not its origin that matters. I certainly believe that and think I know it. What do you observe?

I also believe that PCT makes no distinction between what reference perceptions are right or wrong, true or false, knowledge or belief. PCT explains behavior but does not judge it in any absolute sense for every human. What human behavior is judged ethical or evil is a uniquely human matter, or so it seems. That may be in a different league and theory than PCT is. PCT surely has not explained where the moon came from much less the universe or what should be on the pizza’s. Who is qualified to give those answers or test them?

In a message dated 5/6/2009 6:18:15 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, powers_w@FRONTIER.NET writes:

KK: I would agree that our "knowledge" consists of reference perceptions stored in our memory in our brain/neural system.  However, our "beliefs" seem to be like our "knowledge" in terms of PCT.

[From Bill Powers (2009.05.06.1545 MDT)]

Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06. 9:30 AM EDT)

BP: I distinguish between beliefs and knowledge on the basis of evidence and experimental testing. I suppose we can also distinguish between primary and secondary beliefs and knowledge, primary referring to direct experience alone, and secondary referring to a reliance on someone else’s reports.

I saw the knave of hearts taking the tarts and sneaking away, so I know he took them. I don’t know if he stole them – maybe he had permission.

I saw the knave of hearts burping, wiping his mouth, and walking away just after the tarts disappeared, so I believe quite strongly that he stole them.

Knowing that the knave of hearts was in town, I rather believe he stole the tarts because that’s just the sort of thing he would do.

My trustworthy friend Kenny told me he saw the knave of hearts steal the tarts, so in a secondary way I accept that knowledge, though I’ll try to check it out.

I read in a book that the knave of hearts stole the tarts. I don’t believe anything about the knave’s guilt, or know anything about it. All I know is what the book said, but that I do know because I read it myself. It said right in the book, “Everything in this book is true.” I don’t know if that statement is true, or believe it.

The only things I claim to know are those I have verified for myself by seeing the evidence, agreeing with the reasoning, knowing that the evidence was obtained correctly, experimentally checking to see that I can predict correctly what will happen, and then making it happen if that is possible. Anything that meets all those criteria I would say I accept about 90% as knowledge. I do not call things I only believe knowledge at all. I would not be surprised if they turned out to be wrong.

Most scientists I have read about or met accept that last set of criteria. I have also met quite a few people who think that is too stringent and want to use more easily attained standards, like “I have a gut feeling that I know.” I tend to disagree with such people about most things from the nature of the universe to the best topping to put on a pizza.

Best,

Bill P.

···

Remember Mom this Mother’s Day! Find a florist near you now.

8

[From Rick Marken (2009.05.06.2030)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.00:30 AM EU ST)--

Thanks for your comments Rick.

Thanks for the thanks!.

I think the same way as you, but I think upon ordinary people outside this
group. I think�upon people writing about lesbians, about financial problems
or psycothic criminals in local newspapers. These people are not able to
test what they call "to know" knowledge.

Right. We all walk around with untested beliefs about all kinds of
things. Some are based on reading about beliefs where testing has
presumably been done (eg. the belief that the earth rotates). Others
are based on reading about beliefs that are just stuff people say (ie.
that there is a god who doesn't want you to work on Sunday). And
others are just based on what our parents told us or what we've come
up with on our own.

I am not sure I agree the way you express "to have confidence that their
"imagined" knowledge is a reasonably correct -- if not perfectly one-to-one
-- representation of what is "out there" on the other side of the senses".
I would say : "to have confidence that their "imagined" knowledge is a
reasonably correct of what we perceive as a representation��for what is "out
there" on the other side of the senses".

But we don't need to have confidence in a representation of what we
perceive. As you say in your next paragraph: "We know what we
perceive. That is our real world". Our imaginations, like the atomic
theory, are a representation of what we think is on the other side of
our senses; it's a theory of the real "real world" that is presumably
the basis of our perceptions.

We have not any idea of what is out there. And we will never get any.

Well, I think science has given us a pretty darn good idea what is out
there. It's not perfect but it's an awfully good approximation, I
think.

Look at a car and explain me
that the thing out there is nearly the same you perceive in your brain.

The car is what I perceive; no explanation needed. What is actually
out there (according to the imaginings of physics and chemistry) is a
collection of atoms reflecting electromagnetic waves (and/or
particles).

Again I agree, exept for your last part. Again I will say: "then I think we
have a reasonable basis for taking those theories as pretty darn good
approximation to what we perceive as a representation for what is�actually
happening on the "other side" of those perceptions".

This doesn't make sense to me. You seem to be saying that a theory is
an "approximation to what we perceive" as a representation of the real
world on the "other side" of our perceptions. I agree that the atomic
theory, say, is a perception and that it purports to represent what is
happening when we perceive certain chemical reactions. But I don't see
how the atomic theory is an approximation to a perception. I don't
even know what an approximation to a perception might be.

I have a problem here Rick. I just read Susan Greenfield's book "The human
Brain" again. On page 107 she writes:" Nicotine actually works at one type
of receptors - one of the docking areas- that is normally reserved for the
transmitter�acetylcholine. ....."
Tell me how I shall test this statement.

I don't know. It's not my area of expertise. I think it's impossible
for anyone to actually test every scientific claim that is made. In
most case we really have to trust people who have said they have done
the tests.

When I read different technical books I meet a lot of statements I am not
able to test. I have decided to trust Susan Greenfield and other authors.

I think that's a good idea. I think you only would test something
yourself if it's a claim that is 1) very important to you 2) very
surprising and 3) that you are in a position to test. Otherwise, I'm
afraid we just have to trust scientists to be honest and fair.

I know other people who have read books written by Martin Luther where he
has written: "Salvation or redemption is a gift og God's grace, attainable
only through faith in Jesus as the messiah". How shall they test this
statement?

It seems to me that that's pretty easy. First you have to figure out
what salvation or redemption means and then see if anyone who didn't
have faith in Jesus as messiah got the gift of these things, Of
course, if Luther framed it in a way that is untestable then I guess
you have to decide whether you want to believe a person who asks you
to believe such stuff.

What is the difference between me reading Susan Greenfield and expressing
one of her statements as "to know" knowledge and an other person who has
read Martin Luther's statement and kall it "to know" knowledge?

Nothing, as long as Luther's "knowledge" is as testable as
Greenfield's. I suspect it's not.

I feel I am on thin ice asking the last question.

Not really. People will believe whatever they want. I believe some
weird things myself (for example, I believe there is no such thing as
god but I also believe that god has spoken through J. S. Bach,
Beethoven and Mozart). These are not testable beliefs but no one
told me I would get in trouble if I didn't believe them so they're OK
with me;-)

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

9

KK: I think you missed my point. I was trying to propose that our
knowledge and our beliefs (however we define or establish them) appear in
HPCT as reference perceptions. You have a method for distinguishing
which of your references you perceive as knowledge and which as
belief. That’s fine. But, when it comes to your behavior
according to PCT, it is the reference perception and not its origin that
matters. I certainly believe that and think I know it. What
do you observe?
[From Bill Powers (2009.05.07.0904 MDT)]

Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06.1915
EDT)]

I would say they are perceptions. The reference perception simply
indicates how much of a perception I want to experience. The actual
appearance of a perception is what I experience happening, regardless of
what I would prefer that perception to be.

I think belief and knowledge are words I use to indicate how much weight
I give to any perception at higher levels, whether it matches or differs
from any reference value. The lowest weight is given to perceptions I am
least sure about, the ones I say I “believe”. I would say I
“believe” that the crossbar of a T is shorter than the vertical
stroke even though I can see that it definitely looks shorter, because I
know there is an illusion and I can’t remember which way it goes. After I
measure the crossbar and the vertical stroke with a ruler, I can say I
“know” they are equal in length as close as I can read the
scale. When controlling things, I give the most importance – use the
highest gain – to control things I am pretty sure about perceiving
correctly (that is, in ways I can verify). If I only “believe”
I am perceiving something, I don’t take apparent errors as seriously, nor
do I rely on it even if it seems to be under control. These are all
higher-level judgments about lower-level perceptions.

Best,

Bill P.

10

[From Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.0704 PDT)]

FWIW, I think the fields of mathematics and engineering have demonstrated fairly convincingly that there is a pretty darn good correlation between what we perceive, believe and theorize to be "out there" and what is actually "out there." Does that alter the fact that all we know of the world "out there" we know by way of our senses and perceptions? I don't think so but it also doesn't alter for me the fact that there is a coffee cup sitting next to my laptop as I write this and I can reach out, pick it up (with two fingers through the handle) and take a sip of coffee. If someone were observing me do that, I hazard the guess that there would be pretty good agreement between us as to what I had done. That coffee cup and that coffee aren't "in here" - they're "out there." Well, gee, I guess the coffee is "in here" now that I've taken a sip. Oh drat!

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols
Managing Partner
Distance Consulting, LLC
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

"Assistance at A Distance"
  
-------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Gavin Ritz <garritz@XTRA.CO.NZ>

(Gavin Ritz 2009.08.05.22.15)

Bjorn you point is well taken.

It's even worse we have taken a concept like mass and multiplied the
velocity squired and call it energy and we haven't the foggiest what is
energy.

Of-course science is in our head its pure a representation, the very idea of
energy and entropy is a total human construct. Our science and theories of
course corroborate our senses that we have constructed mathematically as
theories but to say that it's the truth I agree with you is just believing.

A simple experiment try measuring entropy and energy directly (it can't be
done) because it's all a construct.

Does one really think there is such a things as Hydrogen or oxygen (that is
also just a mental abstraction) of course one that is very clever?

Is science the truth, I don't know.

Regards

Gavin

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.08,09:50 AM EU ST)]

From Rick Marken (2009.05.06.2030)

All in your mail so far is OK for me.

bjorn: We have not any idea of what is out there. And we will never get
any.

Rick:

Well, I think science has given us a pretty darn good idea what is out
there. It's not perfect but it's an awfully good approximation, I
think.

I am insecure if I shall comment your last sentence, because I think we
agree. But I will do it.

You say that different theories are imaginations about what we think is on
the other side of our senses; it's a theory of the real "real world" that is
presumably the basis of our perceptions.

With the words "it's a theory" and "presumably" I absolutely agree.

But when you say: "I think science has given us a pretty darn good idea what
is out there. It's not perfect but it's an awfully good approximation, I
think", I am a little astonished.

All our observations are perceived in our head, all our experiments are
perceived in our head. When I do an experiment, I have a hypothesis in my
head and I perceive what happens doing the experiment in my head and I
observe the results from the experiment in my head.

I get a better idea not of what is outr there, but of what is in my head
initiated by something outside my sensingcells.

If I should know what is out there, I will say as Bill says in one of hiss
books, my "information" about the the things out there must pass beside my
retina and give me direct contact with the things.

When I write this I think upon Bill's example with the taste of limonade.
The taste is a perception that is created in my head. There is no taste out
there. It is a perception composed of different vectors from "salt",
"sweet", "acid", "bitters" and "umami".

bjorn:
Again I agree, exept for your last part. Again I will say: "then I think we
have a reasonable basis for taking those theories as pretty darn good
approximation to what we perceive as a representation for what is actually
happening on the "other side" of those perceptions".

Rick:
This doesn't make sense to me. You seem to be saying that a theory is
an "approximation to what we perceive" as a representation of the real
world on the "other side" of our perceptions. I agree that the atomic
theory, say, is a perception and that it purports to represent what is
happening when we perceive certain chemical reactions. But I don't see
how the atomic theory is an approximation to a perception. I don't
even know what an approximation to a perception might be.

The atomic theory talks about mass. Still we really don't know what mass is.
They are doing an experiment near Zurich these days. They hope that these
experiments will explain what mass is (among other questions). If they get
an answer (which I doubt), the atomic theory will be a better aproximation
to what we perceive.

Before Einstein's theory of relativity, Newton's theories were good
aproximations to what we perceived.

bjorn:
When I read different technical books I meet a lot of statements I am not
able to test. I have decided to trust Susan Greenfield and other authors.

Rick:
I think that's a good idea. I think you only would test something
yourself if it's a claim that is 1) very important to you 2) very
surprising and 3) that you are in a position to test. Otherwise, I'm
afraid we just have to trust scientists to be honest and fair.

From Rick Marken (2009.05.06.0950)]

Science is a process of testing
imaginations (theories) against perceptions (data). I think it's
worked pretty well so far. Certainly a lot better than deciding that
some author is "trustworthy" and to then believing that, because you
trust that person, what the person says is "true".

My point is that many people, also you and I, trust scientists to be honest
and fair.

If we shall trust e.g. Martin Luther to be honest and fair, we get the
problem that our believings in scientists are not of better quality than
other peoples believings in religion.

I think we stop talking about "to know" and "to believe". Thank you for your
comments.

bjorn

11

[From Bill Powers (2009.05.08.1041 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.0704 PDT) --

FN: FWIW, I think the fields of mathematics and engineering have demonstrated fairly convincingly that there is a pretty darn good correlation between what we perceive, believe and theorize to be "out there" and what is actually "out there."

As I understand it, to compute a correlation between A and B is it necessary to have measures of both A and B for comparison. If A is "what we perceive, believe and theorize to be 'out there'" and B is "what is actually out there", I can understand where we get the measure of A, but where does the measure of B come from?

Best,

Bill P.

12

[From Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.1122 PDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2009.05.08.1041 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.0704 PDT) --

>FN: FWIW, I think the fields of mathematics and engineering have
>demonstrated fairly convincingly that there is a pretty darn good
>correlation between what we perceive, believe and theorize to be
>"out there" and what is actually "out there."

BP: As I understand it, to compute a correlation between A and B is it
necessary to have measures of both A and B for comparison. If A is
"what we perceive, believe and theorize to be 'out there'" and B is
"what is actually out there", I can understand where we get the
measure of A, but where does the measure of B come from?

Hmm. I think it comes from the same place we get the measure of A. All is perception is it not? Sounds circular to me and closed loop is good is it not?

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols
Managing Partner
Distance Consulting, LLC
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

"Assistance at A Distance"
  
--
Regards,

Fred Nickols
Managing Partner
Distance Consulting, LLC
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

"Assistance at A Distance"

13

[From Rick Marken (2009.05.08.1130)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.08,09:50 AM EU ST)--

You say that different theories are imaginations about what we think is on
the other side of our senses; it's a theory of the real "real world" that is
presumably the basis of our perceptions.

With the words "it's a theory"� and "presumably" I absolutely agree.

But when you say: "I think science has given us a pretty darn good idea what
is out there. It's not perfect but it's an awfully good approximation, I
think", I am a little astonished.

I am rather astonishing , sometimes;-)

All our observations are perceived in our head, all our experiments are
perceived in our head. When I do an experiment, I have a hypothesis in my
head and I perceive what happens doing the experiment in my head and I
observe the results from the experiment in my head.
I get a better idea not of what is outr there, but of what is in my head
initiated by something outside my sensing cells.

I can't see how the results of an experiment give you a better idea of
what is in your head. They weren't in your head until you did the
experiment. If my theory predicts the results of my experiment then I
have more confidence in the theory as a model of the real world cause
of the perceptions that are the results of the experiment. I don't see
the problem with this. Isn't this what science is about; developing
and testing models which allow us to predict what we will perceive
when we manipulate perceptual variables (what we think of as the real
world) in various ways?

When I write this I think upon Bill's example with the taste of limonade.
The taste is a perception that is created in my head. There is no taste out
there. It is a perception composed of different vectors from "salt",
"sweet", "acid", "bitters" and "umami".

Yes, but by doing experiments we can develop models of the cause of
that perception. In fact we have a model of the real world basis of
this perceptions; it's called chemistry and physiology. Sensory cells
in the tongue are (in theory) differentially sensitive to different
chemicals (in theory these are sugar molecules, acidic molecules,
etc). So a combination of these chemicals (lemonade) differentially
stimulates the different sensors (in theory); this vector of sensory
intensities is combined (in theory) into the perception we experience
as the taste of lemonade. The perception being explained here is the
taste of lemonade; the explanation is a theory of what is going on in
the real world that causes that perceptual experience.

Before Einstein's theory of relativity, Newton's theories were good
aproximations to what we perceived.

They still are. I don't think theories are a one-to one map of what is
out there; they are an _approximation_. Einstein's theory is
(currently) a better approximation to the reality beyond our senses
than Newton's and Newton's was better than whatever preceded it. I
imagine something better will replace Einstein's theory eventually; so
then we'll have a new and even better concept of the reality that is
one the "other side" of our experience.

If we shall trust e.g. Martin Luther to be honest and fair, we get the
problem that our believings in scientists are not of better quality than
other peoples believings in religion.

For me, it's not trustworthiness that makes scientific belief of
better quality than religious belief; as I said (and perhaps you
missed it) it's _testability_.
Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

14

[From Bill Powers (2009.05.08.1259 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.1122 PDT) --

BP:I can understand where we get the
> measure of A, but where does the measure of B come from?

FN: Hmm. I think it comes from the same place we get the measure of A. All is perception is it not? Sounds circular to me and closed loop is good is it not?

Rick Marken (2009.05.08.1130) --

RM: I don't think theories are a one-to one map of what is

out there; they are an _approximation_.

You guys are both optimists. Fred, if you get the measure of B (the external reality) from the same place you get the measure of A (an internal perception), and the measure of B is also a perception, then you're just correlating one perception against another one, aren't you? Both are internal; neither is the external reality. Can you know anything about B except in the form of some perception?

Rick, you say a theory is an approximation. How do you know that? An approximation to WHAT? In order to say it's an approximation you have to have some way of knowing what is being approximated -- and the only way we can do that is to look at other perceptions.

As far as I can see there is absolutely no way we can know what the external reality is, or whether our models of it are even close in any regard. The best we can do is build up a model which, if there were a reality corresponding to it, would account for the perceptions we get as well as the relationships among the perceptions, including the relationship between perception of an action and other perceptions that change as an apparent result.

We are in the position of a person sitting in a control room with all kinds of meters and buttons on its walls, but no window that can be opened to look outside so we can see what the meters are measuring or what effects really arise from pressing the buttons. The only way to judge our models is to use them to predict what will happen to some meter readings when we press the buttons that change other meter readings. That tells us how useful the models are. It doesn't tell us if they are right.

Best,

Bill P.

15

[From Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.08)]

Bjorn, let’s discuss your example at bit. I can easily accept that I am controlling the position of my car while driving. And, my reference position is to be in front of the car I perceive to be currently in front of me producing an error. My understanding of PCT is that lower level control systems will act using various means to eliminate the error and achieve my goal.

Many factors will come into my awareness of how to act to achieve that goal without producing error in other goals I wish to control. For example, perceived relative horsepower may be one such factor. But, when coming to a curve, or to an area where road crews are working, I may not want to attempt to overtake the car until conditions are more suitable to use what I know to be my greater power.

Further, I have difficulty with an argument you might make about knowing any future event. The future is never known with certainty. I would say that all future perceptions are beliefs. That is something I would claim to know. I can accept the idea that my beliefs can have a degree of confidence. I suppose you could describe a belief with a very high degree of confidence as something you “know.” But, this is not an objective deterimination. It is subjective.

And, regardless of the degree of confidence, if you establish overtaking the car in front of you to achieve the reference position, the PCT explanation is that you will continue to act to accomplish that. If it turns out you cannot achieve that goal despite repeated attempts, error would persist and my guess is that you would reorganize and accept the current position (perhaps realizing that at some time the car in front of you will turn off the road, and your reference position will be satisfied.

Depending upon your definitions, I suppose you could say that every reference perception is either known or believed. Again, I don’t find the distinction very useful. When asked for your date of birth, do you know it beyond any doubt or merely believe it with a high degree of certainty? If someone says, “Kenny, I have your birth date as October 27, 1934, is that correct?” I would correct the error. For my reference is 1943. And whether you say I know it to be 1943 or believe it to be 1943, does it matter? I will still correct the date the person cited. Right?

As far as what is right or wrong, ethical or evil; that was a diffuse question. I guess you would ask someone in authority, like your Mom, a judge, or some God you know or believe in. Or, you can just decide for yourself, a very human possibility, until someone in authority over you rules otherwise.

In a message dated 5/8/2009 2:40:35 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, bjsimon@ONLINE.NO writes:

···

8om Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.08,08:20 AM EU ST)]

From Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06.1915 EDT)

But, when it comes to your behavior according to PCT, it is

the reference perception and not its origin that matters.

I read your sentence this way: “But, when it comes to your behavior according to PCT, it is the reference perception and not if it is something you believe or something you know as regards the reference that matters”.

If that is the meaning of “its origin”, I think it matters. E.g.,if you wish to overtake the car in front of you you either believe or you know it is possible. If you believe it weak, you may wait before you overtake it. If you know you can overtake it because your car is much more powerful, you may overtake it at once. Than the origin matters.

I certainly believe that and think I know it.

I don’t know what to say about that. If you believe “But, when it comes to your behavior according to PCT, it is the reference perception and not its origin that matters”, I think you know that you believe it, but you can’t know it and believe it at the same time.

I

I also believe that PCT makes no distinction between what reference

perceptions are right or wrong, true or false, knowledge or belief.

PCT explains behavior but does not judge it in any absolute sense for

every human. What human behavior is judged ethical or evil is a uniquely

human matter, or so it seems. That may be in a different league and
<theory than PCT is. PCT surely has not explained where the moon came
from much less the universe or what should be on the pizza’s.

I agree

Who is qualified to give those answers or test them?

I will not try to answer, because the questions are to diffuse.

bjorn

Remember Mom this Mother’s Day! Find a florist near you now.

16

(Gavin Ritz 2009.0905.14.29NZT)
[From Bill Powers (2009.05.08.1259 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2009.05.08.1122 PDT) --

Bill you are one clever person. That's exactly right because if B is a
mental construct and more than likely highly abstracted say in your system
level if it's Quantum Mechanics.

You would be one of the few people on this planet who would dare say that.

Your point is mine exactly and PCT backs up this notion.

BP:I can understand where we get the
> measure of A, but where does the measure of B come from?

FN: Hmm. I think it comes from the same place we get the measure of
A. All is perception is it not? Sounds circular to me and closed
loop is good is it not?

Rick Marken (2009.05.08.1130) --

RM: I don't think theories are a one-to one map of what is

out there; they are an _approximation_.

You guys are both optimists. Fred, if you get the measure of B (the
external reality) from the same place you get the measure of A (an
internal perception), and the measure of B is also a perception, then
you're just correlating one perception against another one, aren't
you? Both are internal; neither is the external reality. Can you know
anything about B except in the form of some perception?

Rick, you say a theory is an approximation. How do you know that? An
approximation to WHAT? In order to say it's an approximation you have
to have some way of knowing what is being approximated -- and the
only way we can do that is to look at other perceptions.

As far as I can see there is absolutely no way we can know what the
external reality is, or whether our models of it are even close in
any regard. The best we can do is build up a model which, if there
were a reality corresponding to it, would account for the perceptions
we get as well as the relationships among the perceptions, including
the relationship between perception of an action and other
perceptions that change as an apparent result.

We are in the position of a person sitting in a control room with all
kinds of meters and buttons on its walls, but no window that can be
opened to look outside so we can see what the meters are measuring or
what effects really arise from pressing the buttons. The only way to
judge our models is to use them to predict what will happen to some
meter readings when we press the buttons that change other meter
readings. That tells us how useful the models are. It doesn't tell us
if they are right.

Best,

Bill P.

17

[From Fred Nickols (2009.05.09.0644 PDT)]

Ø Bill
Powers (2009.05.09.0710 MDT)]

Ø In
1944, on graduating from high school at the age of 17, I had to get my birth
certificate to join the Navy. When a certified copy arrived from Oregon, my
family was flabbergasted: it said, August 29, 1926. All of my previous
birthdays had been celebrated on August 28th.

Bill:

In your shoes, I’d probably continue celebrating August 28th.
My mother’s birth certificate indicates she is a male. So much for “official”
documentation.

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

nickols@att.net | www.nickols.us

"Assistance at a Distance"SM

.

18

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-05-06 13:17 Pacific)]

The best book I've encountered on this topic is _Critique of Impure
Reason: An Essay on Neurons, Somatic Markers, and Consciousness_ by
Peter Munz.

(I've been posting so rarely I forgot to include the time stamp.)

···

On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 1:56 AM, Bjorn <bjsimon@online.no> wrote:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.05. 10:55 AM EU ST)]

I have been thinking about "to know" knowledge and "to imagine" knowledge
and ask for comments about a conclusion, please.

Our knowledge about anything are perceptions inside our brain.

"To know" knowledge�are thoughts that have input in our brain and that
describe perceptions that have input outside our sensory cells (the brain).
"To imagine" or "to believe" knowledge are thoughts that have input in our
brain and that describe perceptions that don't have input outside our
sencory cells (the brain).

In the case that one person reads a textbook in physics about�the�(e.g.)
polarisation� of photons�happening outside the author's sensory cells and
the other person reads religous book where the author describs how Jesus
satisfied 5000 people with five fishes. Both people thrust the author. In
this case both have "to imagine"/"to believe" knowledge.

Neither the people who have "to know" knowledge or ""to imagine"/"to
believe" knowledge can say they have a "one to one" knowledge about
something outside the sencory cells. And having the brain people have today,
nobody will be able to give a "one to one" account about anbything outside
our brain.

bjorn

19

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.00:30 AM EU ST)]

From Rick Marken (2009.05.06.0950)

Thanks for your comments Rick.

True. But the people who have based their “imagined” knowledge on
careful tests against their “to know” knowledge are, I think, in a
better position to have confidence that their “imagined” knowledge is
a reasonably correct – if not perfectly one-to-one – representation
of what is “out there” on the other side of the senses.

I think the same way as you, but I think upon ordinary people outside this group. I think upon people writing about lesbians, about financial problems or psycothic criminals in local newspapers. These people are not able to test what they call “to know” knowledge.

I am not sure I agree the way you express “to have confidence that their “imagined” knowledge is a reasonably correct – if not perfectly one-to-one – representation of what is “out there” on the other side of the senses”.

I would say : “to have confidence that their “imagined” knowledge is a reasonably correct of what we perceive as a representation for what is “out there” on the other side of the senses”.

We know what we perceive. That is our real world. We have not any idea of what is out there. And we will never get any. Look at a car and explain me that the thing out there is nearly the same you perceive in your brain.

I think of “imagined” knowledge as theory; PCT and atomic theory are
imagined knowledge. I think of “to know” knowledge as data. Of course,
we only know this data as perception but if the perceptions (data
obtained in properly performed experiments) consistently behave almost
exactly as predicted by our imaginations (theories) then I think we
have a reasonable basis for taking those theories as pretty darn good
approximation to what is actually happening on the “other side” of
those perceptions.

Again I agree, exept for your last part. Again I will say: “then I think we have a reasonable basis for taking those theories as pretty darn good approximation to what we perceive as a representation for what is actually happening on the “other side” of those perceptions”.

What I have described above in a very oversimplified way is basically
how I see science working. Science is a process of testing
imaginations (theories) against perceptions (data). I think it’s
worked pretty well so far.

Here I absolutely agree.

Certainly a lot better than deciding that
some author is “trustworthy” and to then believing that, because you
trust that person, what the person says is “true”.

I have a problem here Rick. I just read Susan Greenfield’s book “The human Brain” again. On page 107 she writes:" Nicotine actually works at one type of receptors - one of the docking areas- that is normally reserved for the transmitter acetylcholine. …"

Tell me how I shall test this statement.

When I read different technical books I meet a lot of statements I am not able to test. I have decided to trust Susan Greenfield and other authors. And I use some of their statements as “to know” knowledge.

Do you mean I shall say: Susan Greenfield knows that … and I believe her?

I know other people who have read books written by Martin Luther where he has written: “Salvation or redemption is a gift og God’s grace, attainable only through faith in Jesus as the messiah”. How shall they test this statement?

What is the difference between me reading Susan Greenfield and expressing one of her statements as “to know” knowledge and an other person who has read Martin Luther’s statement and kall it “to know” knowledge?

I feel I am on thin ise asking the last question.

bjorn

20

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2009.05.07, 00:30 AM EU ST)]

Tracy Harms

The best book I’ve encountered on this topic is Critique of Impure
Reason: An Essay on Neurons, Somatic Markers, and Consciousness by
Peter Munz.

You have recomanded that book earlier. And I have read it. I liked the book

bjorn