twisted hierarchies

[HANS_BLOM2]

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[Hans Blom, 961015]

(Bill Powers (961011.0600 MDT))

Now think in terms of and from the perspective of the cells of our
body and repeat the above. "What one cell does is control," says a
cell. "What two do, interacting in the same body, is not, though what
each of them does is indeed control. The interactions among cells has
a dynamic that almost surely involves attractor basins."

"On reflection, I'll buy that," says the other cell, who feels just
as autonomous.

The question is: what is metaphor and what is reality?

This is indeed a problem for any model that treats the behaving entity
as a single complex input-output function with a single highest goal. It
is also a problem when externally defined goals or consequences are not
distinguished from internally defined goals -- when, for example,
"survival" or "efficiency" are thought to be a goal of the behaving
system.

Thanks for your very interesting answer which clarifies your position. I
would like to add another perspective, though, the one from systems
theory. Systems theory posits that _anything_ can be called a system if
we just define what belongs to the system and what not, i.e. where the
boundaries are and how the system (the "inside") interacts with its
environment (the "outside"), i.e what the inputs and outputs of the
system are. If we take this perspective, we can see that we talk about
different systems. You talk about a system that largely coincides with
the human body, where the inputs are the sensor signals ("nerve
currents") and outputs are muscle contractions; these define the
boundaries -- and it seems that this boundary is located somewhere
slightly _within_ the body. In my post, I talked about a system that
coincides with a single cell of that body, with very different inputs and
outputs, both concentrations of chemicals; the cell membrane is now the
boundary. Clearly both are systems, because we can sufficiently
accurately define boundaries.

The next question is whether both are _control_ systems. Now we don't
have an accurate delimitation of what control systems are -- see numerous
previous discussions -- but here we can assume that a control system is a
system that strives for constancy of some of its internal quantities in
the face of variations in the outside environment. In that light, a cell
is clearly a control system: it keeps several of its internal variables
(ion, nutrient and waste product concentrations) between narrow limits,
largely due to actively controlled exchange mechanisms ("pumps").

So are both control systems? Yes, without a doubt. A cell is a control
system, and a huge assembly of cells is a control system. No conflict,
just different systems.

The next question would be _how_ such a control system is able to
control. A controller can control only in a benign environment, as I have
pointed out frequently. So control systems -- at least complex ones --
will attempt to control (influence?) their environment as well. In many
ways, a human cell is very much like a unicellular organism floating in
the ocean. If the properties of the ocean change dramatically, the cell
dies. So human cells can live (control) better when other cells provide
it with an environment with the desired properties. This seems to have
led to "cooperation" between diverse cell types, where each cell lives
off the "waste products" of other cells. Not a zero-sum game, because
everyone gains. Survival of the fittest, but with a twist: the fittest
are fit only because others are fit as well. Multicellular organisms have
formed a mutually supportive ecology. This links the two types of control
systems, single cell and body as a whole.

Does a cell _control_ the body? No, obviously not; each tiny little cell
is powerless to do so -- a single cell can influence its environment only
very, very slightly. But _together_ they do.

That's my point of view, anyway. From the perspective of the single cell,
it cannot control its world; but together, because of mutual gain, they
do a pretty good job.

Note that this same argument can be extended to _social_ control: the
whole human species, or parts thereof, can, without reservations, be
considered to be a system. A _control_ system? Yes, if this system tends
to stabilize some of its characteristics. Whether that is so is an
empirical question for which we have a Test. I tend to see the fact that
humans have a powerful drive to perpetuate the species as one such
constancy. But human societies have more constancies, such as division of
labor (just like in the cells of our body), although there are large
variations as well.

So, although I understand your arguments, I tend to see different
connections. Some points in case:

In a hierarchical control model, however, one subsystem sets goals for
another, thereby establishing relative levels of control. All systems at
a given level are independent of one another except for mutual
disturbances (which, in an optimally designed system, are minimized).

You see a different hierarchy from what I see. I tend to see the human
body as a whole as a hierarchical system that has developed all of its
levels in order to better serve the control processes of the individual
cells (and one can take this deeper to the level of DNA or genes). My
hierarchy seems to be an inversion of yours. Why do we have brains? A
brain consists of cells that have specialized, as all other cells, in
order to provide better control, a better environment, for _each_ cell.
Those lowly single cells have even reached the admirable feat of
convincing some cells to become nerve cells, in order to provide each
other with rapidly exchangeable information about how the "feel" (how
well they are in control). Even more admirable is maybe the feat, that
the cells have somehow arranged to remain together and even to carry that
togetherness into the next generation. And all that through blind
variation and selection of what survives best.

In this view all cells are -- as cooperating control systems -- at the
same level: they all live and must control within the same body with
largely the same properties of the intercellular fluid everywhere. These
systems are far from mutually independent. Each depends on the others; if
one group of cells would start to excrete a waste product that poisons
the other cells or to consume so much fuel that other cells starve, that
group does not only destroy the other cells but also itself. That is the
essence of a positive-sum game.

That mutual "disturbances" are minimized in an optimally designed system
is often -- but not always -- true. One reason is, of course, that if the
"waste product" of one "cooperating" controller poisons the control of
others, that disturbance ought to be minimized. A second reason is that
this is a human design strategy that tries to come to grips with an
otherwise overwhelming complexity. Several experiments have, however,
been done in the design of (even "herds" of) control systems through
artificial evolution. Usually these (and also the "herds") show little
independence of subfunctions and an appreciable degree of cooperation,
NOT minimization of interaction.

A "higher" system is not simply a larger collection of the same "lower"
systems, created by redrawing boundaries. It is a physically distinct
system, existing in a different place from the lower systems and
communicating via physical signals with the lower systems.

In my view, a "higher" system need not be _physically_ different from a
collection of "lower" systems. It is just a different _system_, with
differently defined boundaries. It just depends on what you consider to
be the "system under consideration".

In other words, the hierarchy is not "molecule, organelle, cell, organ,
organism, tribe ..." and so forth, as many people have defined a
hierarchy.

That "the" hierarchy exists (objectively) is a fiction. Within a certain
system, one may find a hierarchy -- or not. All depends on what one
defines as inputs and outputs, i.e. where boundaries are drawn, both
between the system as a total and its environment, and between subsystems
(which are systems in their own right) within the total system.

That is only a conceptual hierarchy, not a physical one. The hierarchy
in HPCT is proposed to be a physical hierarchy, in which systems at one
level are made of different cells from systems at a different level,
with specialized cells (neurons) carrying perceptual signals upward and
reference (or parameter-modifying, in a more complete model) signals
downward between levels. The actions of the system as a whole are
carried out by sending signals through neural cells to muscle cells, and
the muscle cells contract, applying forces to the cells making up bones
and tissues, through the cells which comprise the tendons.

This is a special hierarchy, that seems to be organized according to the
afferent-efferent distinction, and where a cell is at a higher level if
it combines more afferent (sensor) signals into a single signal, and
produces an output that spreads to more efferent (ultimately muscle)
signals. That is fine; such a view can provide a lot of insights about
the organization of the nervous system. But it is a hierarchy in which it
is not easy to subsume other types of cooperation (information exchange)
between cells (or organs or other subfunctions), such as the information
exchange through the ions in the bodily fluids, where cells are more in
parallel than in series, or through messenger signals (e.g. hormones and
enzymes), where paths exist _in addition to_ those of the nervous system.

The lowest level of behavioral control seems to consist of sensory
cells, spinal motor neuron cells, muscle cells, and tendon cells,
arranged to pass unidirectional effects around in a circle.

Yes, that is your (neuromuscular) model. This lowest level clearly does
not apply if the cell is to be the "system under consideration".

All systems at this level, and there are many hundreds of them, exist
independently of each other except for physical interactions due to
skeletal and energetic constraints. At this level the control systems
are autonomous, each acting to control its own sensory signal
independently of what the other systems at the same level are
controlling.

About autonomy see above. If a certain organismic control system is the
"system under consideration", the question of autonomy is, I think, the
question of the limits of control of that organism in its environment.

However, each system receives a composite reference signal from
locations higher in the nervous system, up to a meter or more away.

I see this differently. The heart, for instance, is a pretty autonomous
system: it keeps on beating even if all nerves to it are cut. It is not
_commanded_ from above. Its rate is partly under non-nervous control,
depending on the oxygen and carbon dioxide partial pressures in its
intra- and extracellular fluids. Nerves can _influence_ only; they do not
control. Their signals are, in a sense, polite questions (from other
cells) rather than commands.

This is the basic structure proposed by HPCT. It is intended to be not
metaphorical, but physical and neuroanatomical.

And because of the latter, not easily extended to other (fluid) control
paths, I think.

When we try to extend this hierarchy outside the whole organism, the
pattern immediately breaks down.

Of course! There are no neuroanatomical linkages between people.

There is, outside the skin of any organism, no known higher system which
sends reference signals directly into the highest control systems in the
brain.

This I doubt greatly. There is just too much information in the biology
literature that says that organisms adopt roles depending on the state of
their society. If an alpha male in an ape society dies, for instance, a
different male will immediately assume that role. And eagerly: if there
are more males in the group, there may be quite some fighting before the
matter of who is to be the alpha is settled. If there is only one male,
that male -- just anyone -- will do, as experiments have shown. A lot of
similar examples have been documented.

All information from the outside world that enters the brain must come
into it through the lowest level of sensory inputs, the sensory
receptors of the first level.

Yes, of course. But why would it be unthinkable -- except for your model
that says differently -- that perceptions install reference levels? It
is, of course, easy to salvage you model without change: just posit that
the reference level was there but only dormant, and is now activated by a
new perception. But that would be metatheory, I guess, and it would be
impossible to empirically distinguish between both points of view.

When we consider a group of people acting together, all we have is the
individuals, interacting, like control systems that all exist at the
same level of organization. There is no physically distinct higher
system which receives copies of their highest-level perceptual signals,
compares the result with some higher reference signal, and sends copies
of the ensuing error signal directly to the reference inputs of their
highest-level control systems. The pattern that holds within each
individual simply does not extend outside them.

There are no nerves that connect individuals, but there are a lot of
other types of signals that they send back and forth, with a great deal
of information. What's so special about nerves as information carriers
that could not be achieved by other modes of information transport? And
again, why would it be unthinkable -- except for your model -- that
perceptions set reference levels?

We can extend the hierarchy downward quite easily. The brain sends
reference signals to every organ, and to the hormone systems via the
neurohypophysis.

FIXED reference signals? Or do they vary? If the latter, as a function of
what? If they vary, is the brain still the top dog that issues commands
at will? Or is it just a clever postoffice that rapidly informs cells
about other cells?

The autonomic nervous system (of which I know practically nothing) is
part of the brain's way of controlling the biochemical organism.

I would rather say: the nervous system is _controlled by_ the biochemical
states of the cells, in that it rapidly sends the messages back and forth
that tell the cells about each other's (control) condition. The brain is
not the boss; it is the servant. An extremely clever servant, of course,
but a late-comer, just like the computer and the automobile, which are
also clever servants. Although we wouldn't want to do without them
anymore, lots of species survive nicely without them. The example of the
neocortex-computer analogy isn't that far-fetched: current research tries
to establish electronic connections to the brain. When that succeeds (a
matter of time, I think) we'll be able to access our computer (and the
www!) by "thought power", thus having added another layer to the brain.

There is also autonomic sensing, as discovered relatively recently.

What is autonomic sensing?

Within each cell, there are numerous control processes, but nobody has
looked at these systems to see where their reference signals come from
(although hormones seem one likely candidate).

I bet that the cells are not controlled; they are the controllers. If the
cells experience a too low level of sugars, they tell the brain to go
hunting for food, where hunting can take place in the clever ways in
which only a cooperative of cells -- and not a single cell alone -- can.

The upshot of this is that an organism, whether it consist of one cell
or billions, is a unit unto itself.

No disagreement. Just a matter of considering other levels.

COULD there be higher levels of control, invisible and inconceivable to
us and of which we know nothing? Of course. Anything we can imagine
COULD be.
The range of things that COULD be, if unfettered by demands for
evidence, is infinite. But I am interested only in what IS -- that is,
in what there seems to be some evidence for.

Now try to stand apart from your theory for a moment and ask yourself the
question: are my goals truly independent of the society in which I live?
Of my family and friends? Of the natural environment in which I live? Of
csgnet?

What controls and what is controlled may be mostly a matter of what we
consider, at any moment, "the (control) system under consideration".

Greetings,

Hans

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (961015.1415 MDT)]

Hans Blom, 961015 --

Systems theory posits that _anything_ can be called a system if
we just define what belongs to the system and what not, i.e. where the
boundaries are and how the system (the "inside") interacts with its
environment (the "outside"), i.e what the inputs and outputs of the
system are.

That way of speaking of systems isn't much help in analyzing a physical
system. I prefer to divide systems into units which can be characterized in
a consistent way under different conditions. For example, you could define a
control system as including its environment. But then you'd have to rewrite
the equations for the control system whenever the environment changed in any
way. If you define a system in terms of characteristics that stay the same
over different conditions, then at least you have something you can identify
if you see it again. I agree that the definition of a system is arbitrary,
but some definitions are more useful than others.

You talk about a system that largely coincides with
the human body, where the inputs are the sensor signals ("nerve
currents") and outputs are muscle contractions; these define the
boundaries -- and it seems that this boundary is located somewhere
slightly _within_ the body.

Actually, I think of the "behaving system" as the nervous system, with all
else (even the muscles) being treated as its environment, whether inside or
outside the body.

In my post, I talked about a system that
coincides with a single cell of that body, with very different inputs and
outputs, both concentrations of chemicals; the cell membrane is now the
boundary. Clearly both are systems, because we can sufficiently
accurately define boundaries.

The cell membrane is probably no better a basis for identifying a system
than the human skin is. I think of a system as more a collection of
variables and functions than a geometric volume.

In general, I have no objections to your remarks about cells and their
interactions; they're mostly innocent recitals of facts. But when you start
speaking of hierarchies and functions, your argument seems to get pretty
subjective:

<My

hierarchy seems to be an inversion of yours. Why do we have brains? A
brain consists of cells that have specialized, as all other cells, in
order to provide better control, a better environment, for _each_ cell.
Those lowly single cells have even reached the admirable feat of
convincing some cells to become nerve cells, in order to provide each
other with rapidly exchangeable information about how the "feel" (how
well they are in control).

This is nice poetry, but taken literally it doesn't mean much. Cells don't
do things like "convincing some cells to become nerve cells." If you have a
more exact way of putting your proposition, it would give me at least a hint
of the mechanisms you're talking about. But this whole approach comes
awfully close to argument from design. The cells design a brain in order to
provide each other with information??? Are you serious? Do they have
committee meetings and vote on what they want?

Even more admirable is maybe the feat, that
the cells have somehow arranged to remain together and even to carry that
togetherness into the next generation. And all that through blind
variation and selection of what survives best.

I think your faith in blind variation and selection is generating your
"facts" rather than the other way around. I don't find these "feats"
admirable; I find them unbelievable. I don't think the cells arranged
anything for any purpose like the ones you suggest. You're imputing
intelligence to systems which simply don't have that kind of intelligence.
The "reasons" you give are logical and rational, the sort of thing that a
philosopher, not one of the philosopher's cells, would make up. I really
can't take that kind of "analysis" seriously.

In my view, a "higher" system need not be _physically_ different from a
collection of "lower" systems. It is just a different _system_, with
differently defined boundaries. It just depends on what you consider to
be the "system under consideration".

If you want to slog around through that kind of intellectual mush, feel
free, but don't expect me to accompany you. The fact that subsystems _could_
be defined differently is irrelevant; once you've committed to a set of
definitions, you have to stick with them or all you end up with is a mess.

I am glad that you agree that the internal organization of the organism does
not extend outside its physical boundaries.

There are no nerves that connect individuals, but there are a lot of
other types of signals that they send back and forth, with a great deal
of information. What's so special about nerves as information carriers

that could not be achieved by other modes of information transport?

All signals that pass among different people have to enter them through
their lowest levels of perception; they cannot connect directly to the
highest reference signals in the same way that signals inside the system do.
I can see the difference; surely you can, too.

The brain sends
reference signals to every organ, and to the hormone systems via the
neurohypophysis.

FIXED reference signals? Or do they vary? If the latter, as a function of
what? If they vary, is the brain still the top dog that issues commands
at will?

Variable reference signals, just as the reference signals sent to motor
control systems are variable. These signals are a function of errors in the
behavioral control systems; the brain issues the reference signals as part
of its means of correcting errors. Yes, the brain is "top dog." It does not
have access to everything in the body, but where it does have access, it,
not the body, is in control. Just to be sure you understand exactly my
position, which is diametrically opposed to the one you state:

I would rather say: the nervous system is _controlled by_ the biochemical
states of the cells, in that it rapidly sends the messages back and forth
that tell the cells about each other's (control) condition. The brain is
not the boss; it is the servant.

This is one of the main reductionist myths that I have been fighting for
most of my life. You can't explain what the brain does by describing what
the cells of the body do, including the cells of which the brain is
composed. The organization of the brain transcends the organizations of its
individual components, just as an electronic circuit transcends the
properties of the electronic components that make it up. What you say above
is not a conclusion from observation; it's a statement of a position that is
supported by nothing more than arbitrary postulates with no basis in fact. I
do not know why you would "rather say" it that way. Perhaps if you explained
why, your statements would seem less bizzarre to me.

What is autonomic sensing?

Sensory signals that arise from sensory endings but are part of the pathways
that have traditionally been though of an "autonomic." Prior to discovery of
these pathways, the automonic nervous system was considered to be an
output-only system. I can't give you any particulars; I chanced across these
observations while reading about something else and didn't preserve the
source. I was surprised, I remember that -- almost as surprised as I was
when I read that 25% of the nerve fibers in the optic nerve carry _efferent_
signals.

Now try to stand apart from your theory for a moment and ask yourself the
question: are my goals truly independent of the society in which I live?
Of my family and friends? Of the natural environment in which I live? Of
csgnet?

Some are, some aren't. Solving an intellectual puzzle, for example, provides
satisfactions that nothing external to me seems to provide.

Best,

Bill P.

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 961022b]

(Bill Powers (961015.1415 MDT))

I will just answer parts of your otherwise also very interesting
post. Note that I have this strange (is it really?) tendency to reply
only to the remarks that I do not agree with or that I think need
elaboration.

My hierarchy seems to be an inversion of yours. Why do we have
brains? A brain consists of cells that have specialized, as all
other cells, in order to provide better control, a better
environment, for _each_ cell. Those lowly single cells have even
reached the admirable feat of convincing some cells to become nerve
cells, in order to provide each other with rapidly exchangeable
information about how the "feel" (how well they are in control).

This is nice poetry, but taken literally it doesn't mean much. Cells
don't do things like "convincing some cells to become nerve cells."

Thanks for the compliment about my poetry ;-). The _content_ of what
I write, however, is not different from the (almost inescapable)
theory that biology has come up with to "explain" the emergence of
multicellular organisms out of single celled ones. Why would single
cells congregate and like to be in each other's close neighborhood?
Because that provides a selective advantage. Because they are able to
control better that way. For mutual advantage. What other mechanism
is even imaginable? Enlighten me...

If you have a more exact way of putting your proposition, it would
give me at least a hint of the mechanisms you're talking about.

Read up about (evolutionary) biology and physiology and the way these
sciences talk about the "goals" of organisms, organ systems or cells.
In contrast to (H)PCT, "goals" in these sciences are not so much the
top level a priori givens that determine what else must be done, but
rather emerging properties of an ever more complex organization of
the system. Evolutionary biology: the brain emerges to give the genes
a better chance to propagate themselves. Physiology: the brain is an
additional tool to ensure the homeostasis of cells. Psychology cannot
stand alone; it needs to be linked to the other explanatory sciences
where it talks about the basic issue of what it is to be a human.

But this whole approach comes awfully close to argument from design.
The cells design a brain in order to provide each other with
information??? Are you serious?

Yes. Why else a brain? It _was_, after all, "designed" in a long
evolutionary process. Why did it become a well-surviving, robust
extra feature in organisms that could already survive pretty well
without a brain? Because that species could survive/propagate its
genes better _with_ a brain. What other possibilities can you think
of?

Why a brain? In order to tell the individual cells what to do? Yes,
that too, in the circular causality of a control system...

Do they have committee meetings and vote on what they want?

Now that you mention it, the parallels between cooperating cells and
the cooperating individuals of a social species loom pretty large...

I think your faith in blind variation and selection is generating
your "facts" rather than the other way around.

Should I interpret this as you thinking that the "facts" of biology
play no role in psychology? That we can do without them? I know a
couple of awfully convincing "facts" from biology/ethology, for
instance, about "social control" in societies of social organisms (a
higher level of cooperation between cells), which assure me that
"social control" is not such a ridiculous notion after all. At least
not for bees, ants, etc. Might similar mechanisms, maybe in a more
diluted form, not play a role in human behavior? They might. I do not
wish to exclude the possibility a priori as you seem to do.

I don't find these "feats" admirable; I find them unbelievable. I
don't think the cells arranged anything for any purpose like the
ones you suggest. You're imputing intelligence to systems which
simply don't have that kind of intelligence.

Don't they? Whence intelligence if not through exactly the sort of
process that I described?

The "reasons" you give are logical and rational, the sort of thing
that a philosopher, not one of the philosopher's cells, would make
up. I really can't take that kind of "analysis" seriously.

My cells "tell" me that being logical and rational is a pretty good
way to ensure their homeostasis ;-).

I am glad that you agree that the internal organization of the
organism does not extend outside its physical boundaries.

Hurray! We can find each other in tautologies...

All signals that pass among different people have to enter them
through their lowest levels of perception; they cannot connect
directly to the highest reference signals in the same way that
signals inside the system do. I can see the difference; surely you
can, too.

Sure. But then again, what's so special about cabling? Many
telephones, for instance, do not connect through cables anymore. Yet
the overall effect is exactly the same as if they were. What's so
unique about nerves that we can neglect all other ways of information
transfer?

I would rather say: the nervous system is _controlled by_ the
biochemical states of the cells ... The brain is not the boss; it
is the servant.

This is one of the main reductionist myths that I have been fighting
for most of my life. You can't explain what the brain does by
describing what the cells of the body do, including the cells of
which the brain is composed.

Why do you think so? One can -- and must, if it provides additional
insights -- consider even a control system in terms of the elementary
particles of physics. In many cases that is not necessary, of course,
nor desirable, if one wants to explain "high level" features. But the
link does exist, and neglecting it comes at a risk.

The organization of the brain transcends the organizations of its
individual components, just as an electronic circuit transcends the
properties of the electronic components that make it up.

Sure. It would be possible to describe the operation of a computer in
terms of the transistors that it is built up from. It is even
necessary to do so in order to explain some failure modes. But we
build successively higher levels: gates, flipflops, processors,
software kernels, applications, virtual machine upon virtual machine.
And in most cases, considering just a certain virtual machine (a word
processor, a spreadsheet or a compiler) suffices. But not if one is
interested in the details of _how_ a certain virtual machine
operates. Then one must descend a level.

What you say above is not a conclusion from observation; it's a
statement of a position that is supported by nothing more than
arbitrary postulates with no basis in fact. I do not know why you
would "rather say" it that way. Perhaps if you explained why, your
statements would seem less bizzarre to me.

Because I see that one and the same thing -- the human organism -- is
the focus of several sciences, each with its unique view, each
concentrating on different aspects of the same thing. Neither of
these sciences is ridiculous; each contributes to the overall
picture. I want a synthesis, however crazy that may appear to others.

What is autonomic sensing?

Sensory signals that arise from sensory endings but are part of the
pathways that have traditionally been though of an "autonomic."

Oh that. I thought you mentioned a new discovery. I've worked in this
area for 25 years now and never thought of autonomic regulation as
something new.

I was surprised, I remember that -- almost as surprised as I was
when I read that 25% of the nerve fibers in the optic nerve carry
_efferent_ signals.

Physiology says that the retina is part of the brain. Would it also
surprise you to know that fully one-third of all the cells of our
body -- the red blood cells -- are specialized in oxygen transport?
Maybe that is at least as important a function as the nervous system
;-).

Greetings,

Hans

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (961022.1430 MDT)]

The _content_ of what
I write, however, is not different from the (almost inescapable)
theory that biology has come up with to "explain" the emergence of
multicellular organisms out of single celled ones. Why would single
cells congregate and like to be in each other's close neighborhood?
Because that provides a selective advantage. Because they are able to
control better that way. For mutual advantage. What other mechanism
is even imaginable? Enlighten me...

These things don't happen BECAUSE they confer a selective advantage. They
happen AND they convey a selective advantage. If that's what happens. I
truly don't understand why biologists, who make so much noise about
approaching nature scientifically, flirt with these teleological images, and
then balk at learning about systems that truly can act telologically, doing
what they do precisely BECAUSE they intend the consequences. Is it that
biologists feel safe in using such purposive terms because they're convinced
that no system can be purposive, so nobody could accuse them of speaking
literally? I can't think of any other sensible reason.

What happens, as I see it, is that organisms pass on heritable
characteristics to their offspring with some variations. Some of the
variants are viable in the given environment and in the presence of other
organisms; many aren't. The variants that are viable become other lines,
even other species, but without any particular direction to the fanning-out
of types. There's no "survival of species." I rather doubt that "species"
are very important categories. As the variations continue, eventually what
we categorize as one species has changed enough that it can no longer
cross-reproduce with its parent species; we say a new species has appeared
and we create a new category. But it's just the same continuum of organisms
proliferating and changing shape as they go, every generation being a little
different, inwardly or outwardly, from the previous one.

That picture can be elaborated upon, but it's clear that we can easily talk
about evolution without even getting close to implying that organism evolve
IN ORDER TO function better.

There's nothing "inescapable" about the way biologists talk about evolution.
What they've done is to project a human story onto the evolution of
organisms. Instead of saying that some organisms live and others die, they
cast this process in terms of a grim battle for survival, with one organism
fighting other organisms to retain a hold on life, looking for every little
advantage that will give them an edge and crowd out their competitors. In
other words, they've taken their explanatory system from the way human
beings act, particularly those who DO consciously compete with others and
try to get an advantage at the expense of others (most human beings, in my
experience, seldom behave that way). I think people have reversed the actual
state of affairs; social Darwinism is not justified by the story of
evolution; rather, the story of evolution has been interpreted to justify
social Darwinism by making it appear "only natural." The concept of "nature
red in tooth and claw" is a human invention, invented with a purpose.

Now that we know how purposive systems work, we can distinguish processes
without purposes from processes guided by purposes. Evolution is a process
that is not guided by a purpose. As I have proposed, there may be some
purposive aspects to it, but they do not aim for any particular future
state, and do not anticipate the advantages of any particular change of form
or function. There is no longer any justification for speaking of evolution
as if it were guided by something like human intentions.

Of course in your scheme, an outcome of a blind process is as much a purpose
as an outcome systematically produced to satisfy a reference condition. That
failure to make a distinction, I suspect, makes my viewpoint hard to accept.

Best,

Bill P.

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 961024g]

(Bill Powers (961022.1430 MDT))

Why would single cells congregate and like to be in each other's
close neighborhood? Because that provides a selective advantage.
Because they are able to control better that way. For mutual
advantage. What other mechanism is even imaginable? Enlighten me...

These things don't happen BECAUSE they confer a selective advantage.
They happen AND they convey a selective advantage.

Exactly what I say. But then the advantage sticks, as Martin says.
What once was an advantage becomes the norm. The word "because" is
still useful, but only if one is aware that it is an after-the-fact
"because". Just like in psychotherapy ;-). Very little predictive
power, great explanatory (as in modeling and ordering information)
power.

If that's what happens. I truly don't understand why biologists, who
make so much noise about approaching nature scientifically, flirt
with these teleological images ...

They don't. You're fighting a straw man. I can assure you, biologists
agree with you ;-).

But it's just the same continuum of organisms proliferating and
changing shape as they go, every generation being a little
different, inwardly or outwardly, from the previous one.

But _with a direction_, just like in an E. coli simulation. What
remains is better adapted to and makes better use of the environment,
just like E. coli gets closer to where the food is. You have no
problems recognizing E. coli behavior as a control system. Is that
because an E. coli has a tail with which it can propel itself? That
in itself is not the reason, although it increases the "loop gain". I
remember a demo of mine in which even a dead spherical particle
without means of propagation had the same "goal seeking" behavior,
its only mechanism being selective absorbtion of a specific chemical
through which its volume changed as a function of that chemical's
concentration. That dead particle also climbed the concentration
gradient, although at a low "loop gain". That's a pretty good model
for evolution...

It is the _direction_ of a process that we correlate with purpose and
control. And we need to investigate that process. It is one thing to
say that E. coli controls its position, but a quite different thing
to investigate the way in which this control comes about.

There's nothing "inescapable" about the way biologists talk about
evolution. What they've done is to project a human story onto the
evolution of organisms. Instead of saying that some organisms live
and others die, they cast this process in terms of a grim battle for
survival, with one organism fighting other organisms to retain a
hold on life, looking for every little advantage that will give them
an edge and crowd out their competitors.

Are you serious? When is the last time you read a biologist's account
of evolution and its mechanisms? This is a straw man if I've ever
seen one!

Now that we know how purposive systems work, we can distinguish
processes without purposes from processes guided by purposes.

What we're looking for now is how purpose CAME ABOUT. It is fine to
posit that some systems are purposive and others are not, but I think
that is important to try to retrace the path of ever higher loop
gains, if I may call it that.

Of course in your scheme, an outcome of a blind process is as much a
purpose as an outcome systematically produced to satisfy a reference
condition.

The outcome of the blind process _was_ (the evolution of) purpose. I
would like to understand that process better.

Greetings,

Hans