Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[_Erling_Jorgensen1]

[From Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.24.2245 EST)]

Rick Marken (2014.11.24.1640)

RM: But I guess I'll try one more time and see if we can get anywhere on

this. So here's a question:

RM: In the rubber band demo described on p. 245 of B:CP, how would you

describe what E is doing when he places S's finger on the target coin?

EJ: I would say E is controlling (his/her perception of) the location of S's
finger, compensating for the disturbances that S's movements create when the
finger moves away from the coin that E is trying to get the finger over.

RM: If, however, you do see that E is controlling S's finger position then we

can start talking about what is going on here from a PCT perspective.

EJ: I readily agree that S's finger position is being controlled by E, (and
of course we know that means E's perception of same.) My only problem, as
I've tried to make clear in all three of my posts, is the insistence on
calling that a "behavior," the assertions of you and Bill notwithstanding.

EJ: I acknowledge that the rubber-band demonstration as well as your dog/
sheep simulation (despite its limited degrees of freedom, which make it harder
to spot disturbances) both show that something about S is being controlled by
E. I am only asking for more rigor in our language when we try to specify
what that "something" is.

EJ: If this is enough of an acknowledgment in your eyes, and not too much of
a concession as to what I am asking, then I would be interested in reading
what you have been wanting to say about this phenomenon of one person's
control of something about another person.

All the best,
Erling

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of

something in the environment? In previous messages you have also
claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter
the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering it
in the intended direction.
Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big
rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what
appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I
wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of
its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got
my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I kept
digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat
oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So
I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I
could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side. (Was I
controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its
position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn
earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I
decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).
As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not
controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it
was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its
position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They
couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of
perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the
ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was not able
to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what
were my actions?
I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill’s PCT. “Perception:
the control of behaviour”, it was not. (Not even the control of
someone else’s behaviour).
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

                  TH:

Yes, we should recognize the behavior of
individuals as a subject of control by other
individuals. Further, we should not lose track of
the PCT meaning of control when it becomes easy to
go astray by misconstruing part of the loop
(output) as control, per se.

          RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about

“control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning
of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected
state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at
least I always try to. So when I talk about “control of
behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral
variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to
the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo: http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html )
in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from
disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of
objective measures of control, which show quantitatively
how well some behavioral variable has been controlled (how
well the variable has been protected from disturbances to
its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo.
These are the measures of RMS error and stability under
“Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior of the
sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by
the sheepdog (you).

[wmansell]

I am with Rick. There are lots of things we have some control over in the service of controlling our perception. These other things are often less reliable in our ability to control them and more dependent on context, but nonetheless they are controlled, as a MEANS to control perception…
Warren

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of

something in the environment? In previous messages you have also
claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter
the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering it
in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big

rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what
appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I
wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of
its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got
my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I kept
digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat
oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So
I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I
could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side. (Was I
controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its
position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn
earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I
decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not

controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it
was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its
position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They
couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of
perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the
ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was not able
to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what
were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill's PCT. "Perception:

the control of behaviour", it was not. (Not even the control of
someone else’s behaviour).

Martin

–

                  TH:

Yes, we should recognize the behavior of
individuals as a subject of control by other
individuals. Further, we should not lose track of
the PCT meaning of control when it becomes easy to
go astray by misconstruing part of the loop
(output) as control, per se.

          RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about

“control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning
of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected
state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at
least I always try to. So when I talk about “control of
behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral
variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to
the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo: http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html )
in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from
disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of
objective measures of control, which show quantitatively
how well some behavioral variable has been controlled (how
well the variable has been protected from disturbances to
its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo.
These are the measures of RMS error and stability under
“Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior of the
sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by
the sheepdog (you).

Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Psychological Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.25.10.13]

So long as this is the circuit under consideration, there's no

difference in stability between controlling perception and
controlling the environmental variable being perceived. There has
never been any difference between Rick and me on that.
But there are two issues between us, one semantic and one technical.
As I understand Rick, if the environmental variable (and the
perception) do not change as a result of the output, control is no
longer occurring. I say that so long as a perception differs from
its reference value and some output occurs because of that error,
control continues. That’s why I twice presented the story of the
rock, on which Rick has not commented to date. I say that even while the rock remains immobile despite what I do to
try to move it, I am controlling a perception of its location
(though unsuccessfully). I understand Rick to say I am not
controlling that perception, on the grounds that Rick says that in
the elastic band demo, if S decides not to control the position of
the knot, E cannot control the location of S’s finger and therefore
E cannot be controlling E’s perception of S’s finger location.
I also tried to get Rick to define a limiting case between when E is
and is not controlling by asking about a case in which S doesn’t
care where the finger is, so long as it is within some distance
(defined by S) of the target location. If S’s tolerance range
includes the bar, for example, S’s finger movements may include
those involved in moving a glass to S’s lips, no matter what E does
with that end of the knotted bands. Rick did say that no matter how
big Ss tolerance range, E still controls S’s finger location, but he
also said that if S decides to give up controlling the knot location
and goes to the bar instead, E no longer controls S’s finger
location. I wonder what difference Rick sees in the two situations,
from E’s point of view?
The technical issue is that the circuit above is not complete. An
imagination loop is missing, both at the level illustrated and at
any level for which the perceptual signal contributes to the
illustrated perceptual signal. If, at any contributing level, the
perceptual value comes from imagination (or memory) instead of
directly from the senses, the stability of perceptual control
becomes decoupled from the stability of control of the corresponding
environmental variable. The decoupling might be minor or it might be
complete, but the two no longer track exactly together.
To see this decoupling, think of P in the diagram being a function
X+Y, and S as sensing X and Y from the environment. D can influence
both X and Y, but for a while, Y is invisible to the sensory system
and is filled in by the imagination loop. If the imagined value of Y
tracks the environmental value closely, the environmental variable
remains as stabilized as is the perceptual variable, but if the
imagined Y deviates from the environmental Y, the prceptual value P
remains stable while the environmental X+Y does not.
The above are the two main reasons are why I strongly object to
conflating “control of an environmental variable” with “control of
perception of the environmental variable”. Only the perception is
controlled; the two can be equated if and only if the environmental
variable is the sole determinant of the perceptual variable. A secondary reason why I entered the thread in the first place was
that conflating control of perception with control of the
corresponding environmental variable led very obviously into a lot
of unnecessary confusion, confusion that would not exist if it was
kept clear (a) that control does not stop when the control actions
fail to influence the environmental variable since it is PERCEPTION
that is controlled, and (b) “control” has an everyday meaning
different from the technical PCT meaning, the everyday meaning
saying that something is “controlled” only when the PCT meaning
would say that “control is good”; in everyday speech, PCT “poor
control” is equivalent to everyday speech “uncontrolled”. I would prefer it if on CSGnet we try to use the PCT meanings of
words rather than the everyday meanings, as we do with the word
“perception”.
Martin

···

On 2014/11/25 6:31 AM, Warren Mansell
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

wmansell@gmail.com

    I am with Rick. There are lots of things we have

some control over in the service of controlling our perception.
These other things are often less reliable in our ability to
control them and more dependent on context, but nonetheless they
are controlled, as a MEANS to control perception…
Warren

[Frank_Lenk]

I spent considerable time writing the below before I saw Warren’s post from this morning, which in a couple of sentences pretty much summarizes the main points I was trying to get across. I am attaching my views below in case anyone else finds them useful.

Frank

[Frank Lenk 2014.11.25.10:45 CST]

I hesitate to get in the middle of all this, given the vastly greater PCT experience of those involved. In what follows, I attempted at a synthesis, but then went beyond that and so may have just muddied the waters further. I apologize for the latter
in advance:

1. All we know are our perceptions. While we believe there is a real world out there, we don’t have unmediated access to it. We only know the world as perceived through our senses and minds.

2. If all we can know are our perceptions, then from our individualistic point of view, all we can control are our perceptions.

3. But if, by controlling our perceptions, we aren’t in fact simultaneously controlling some important part of the real world, then we would die. There must be a correlation between these two, though the correlation can be good or bad, just as our ability
   to keep our perceptions controlled to their references can be good or bad.

4. What Rick’s demo’s provides us is access to that which we don’t have outside of a simulation - that is, a “god mode” where we get to look at what is actually going on in the (simulated) real world. And then we can see that yes, the behavior of that
   simulated real world is simultaneously being controlled as the actors in that world control their perceptions.

5. But back in our unsimulated real world, we never know the degree to which we are affecting the real world beyond our senses. In Institutional Economics, we have a concept of “warranted knowledge”, where what is warranted is what holds up after repeated
   experiments, inquiries and debates by a community of interested participants. This social process can be viewed as analogous to what goes on inside an individual as his/her perceptual systems figure out what is invariant in order to construct references out
   of repeated perceptions. Using this concept, we can have warranted knowledge of the real world, but not full knowledge. I think what this community is debating is whether it is warranted to perceive ourselves as controlling the real world, and by extension,
   other living control systems. Inversely but equivalently, is it warranted to view ourselves as, in some way and at some times, being controlled by others?

6. We all agree that living control systems have their own purposes. As a result, any ability to control our perceptions of them is likely to be worse than our ability to control our perceptions of inanimate objects. But
   we have some ability to control our perceptions of other living control systems. This is one of the key points Bill makes about the rubber band experiment. Given a reference for the knot being over a mark on the
   table, the experimenter (E) can make the subject (S) move his finger anywhere within a radius of the mark given by the relative elasticities of the rubber band. "Wherever E places her finger, there is only only one place where S’s finger can be * if the
   knot is to remain stationary.*” (B:CP, 2nd edition, pg. 245, emphasis in the original) S ince many can view this experiment simultaneously, it seems warranted to believe that S’s finger really did change position,
   and so E could control S’s finger position, if E were controlling her perception of it and the reference does not change. This seems to be Rick’s point.

7. But the important thing is not control of the finger, but control of the reference, as Bill’s emphasis indicates. The experimenter suggested it; the subject adopted it. The experiment tests whether the subject adopted it or not by creating a variety
   of disturbances. E perceives S as having adopted it, and given the tests, it is warranted to believe S really adopted it. It seems to me that when we talk about controlling other humans, we typically mean something like this – control of their references
   more than controlling their behavior. After all, as soon as S figures out what E is really up to – controlling his finger – S can adopt a new reference with regard to finger position that no amount of disturbance by E can much affect. Real control of others
   means controlling references. And, since references are stored perceptions, this can mean controlling their perceptions as well.

8. I’ll go back to the example of mothers attempting to teach their children manners, or moral behavior in general. Here the goal is to not just control our perception of our children’s behavior, but to control our perception of their perceptions and
   references. We want our children to be good because they perceive it as the right thing to do, not to simply avoid trouble or please us. But perceptions aren’t given and fixed. Children have to be taught to consider others, to exercise their powers of perception
   to perceive events from others’ point of view, in order to develop the references that allow them to control for being respectful, honest, etc. in a variety of situations.

9. And, I would argue that it is warranted for parents to perceive their children’s perceptions and references as having actually changed. We put our children in many difficult situations, we observe them when they don’t know we are, we ask how they behaved
   when we were not around. We test to see if they are controlling for the perception of being respectful to classmates, to teachers, to other parents and especially to us. And we don’t think we have done our job as parents until they repeatedly pass these kinds
   of tests. When they are older, we can ask them directly and find that by and large, what they mean by being respectful agrees with what we mean.

10. None of this changes the fact that our little loving living control systems had a choice in this every step of the way and that the choices they made were made only if they made sense in terms of controlling their own perceptions to their own references.
    But we parents had a hand in determining those perceptions and references, just as in the rubber band experiment the experimenter has a hand in determining the errors that are perceived and the reference for the subject.

11. In sum, all I can control directly are my own perceptions. But in so doing, I exert forces in the real world that affect others’ perceptions and what they are trying to control. The effect is that it is warranted for me to believe I control some aspects
    of the real world and others in it. I do so only indirectly, given my mediated access to it and them and the operation of their own control systems, but not unintentionally or necessarily poorly. And others do the same to me.

Frank

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of something in the environment? In previous messages you have also claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering
it in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).
I kept digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling
its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was
not able to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill’s PCT. “Perception: the control of behaviour”, it was not. (Not even the control of someone else’s behaviour).

Martin

–

TH: Yes, we should recognize the behavior of individuals as a subject of control by other individuals. Further, we should not lose track of the PCT meaning of control when it
becomes easy to go astray by misconstruing part of the loop (output) as control, per se.

RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about “control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at least I always try to. So when I
talk about “control of behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html ) in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of objective measures of control, which show quantitatively how well some behavioral
variable has been controlled (how well the variable has been protected from disturbances to its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo. These are the measures of RMS error and stability under “Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior
of the sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by the sheepdog (you).

Dr Warren Mansell

Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Psychological Sciences

2nd Floor Zochonis Building

University of Manchester

Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL

Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website:
http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on
A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[Kent]

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.24.1100)]

It’s interesting to note that in the midst of this discussion of behavioral control we’ve had an online example of one person controlling the behavior of another. See below.

···

On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 2:57 PM, “Boris Hartman”
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

O.K. I see I made a mistake as I mixed persons and you make a good use of it. But that also shows what kind of person you are. And this is not the first
that you are using initials with »double meaning«.

I made a mistake as I thought you are citating Bill. Now I understand that you citated Barb. So ii think you showed your mean personality (Mr.Hyde).

RM: Now I’m liberal, but to a degree. As a moderator of this list I’ve been pretty easy going about ad hominum attacks like those above. But I’m kind of reaching the limits of my tolerance. So please try to make your points without the ad hominum remarks
or I will remove you from the list.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

Hi Kent,

thanks for noticing Rick’s attempt of control J. He didn’t yet controlled me. But his attempt was quite unexpected. If he will realize his threat then I’ll try to behave unexpectedly too. So whether he’ll manage to control me or not, is still »open question«. But you are right. He didn’t answer arguments. He argumented from a point of »using power«. Interesting. Isn’t it this something what could be predicted from LCS ?

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of “McClelland, Kent” (MCCLEL@Grinnell.EDU via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 6:10 PM
To: rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.24.1100)]

It’s interesting to note that in the midst of this discussion of behavioral control we’ve had an online example of one person controlling the behavior of another. See below.

On Nov 23, 2014, at 5:38 PM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.23.1340)]

On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 2:57 PM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

O.K. I see I made a mistake as I mixed persons and you make a good use of it. But that also shows what kind of person you are. And this is not the first that you are using initials with »double meaning«.

I made a mistake as I thought you are citating Bill. Now I understand that you citated Barb. So ii think you showed your mean personality (Mr.Hyde).

RM: Now I’m liberal, but to a degree. As a moderator of this list I’ve been pretty easy going about ad hominum attacks like those above. But I’m kind of reaching the limits of my tolerance. So please try to make your points without the ad hominum remarks or I will remove you from the list.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

I wonder if Rick would be willing to discuss this interaction from the point of view of the argument he’s been making in this thread?

Best to all,

Kent

[_Boris_Hartman]

Rick,

I wrote my answer into your text.

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 12:12 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.23.1515)]

On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB : Rick it’s good that you start thinking about the problem of »control« and of other possibilities. It seems that finaly you are prepared to talk.

RM: No, I’m pretty much done talking about “control of behavior”. I’ve done what I can – even reducing myself to quoting “scripture” (p. 245 of B:CP) – to show that control of behavior is an observable (and pretty ubiquitous) phenomenon that is explained by PCT. But no one’ on CSGNet is buying it (as you correctly predicted). So if people think “control of behavior” doesn’t exist then there is really nothing to talk about.

HB :

Maybe we could still find some place to clear up some (maybe we could call it) misunderstandings. So maybe you could for a start explain what you meant by »control of behavior« ? Or you could define these terms ? When you are talking about »control of behavior of LCS«, can we say that we can also »control perception« of other LCS ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1030)]

···

Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.24.2245 EST)

RM: In the rubber band demo described on p. 245 of B:CP, how would you

describe what E is doing when he places S’s finger on the target coin?

EJ: I would say E is controlling (his/her perception of) the location of S’s

finger, compensating for the disturbances that S’s movements create when the

finger moves away from the coin that E is trying to get the finger over.

RM: OK, but you’re putting a lot of theory into that description. Do you really see E controlling a perception of S’s finger? Or are you saying that you see this based on your knowledge of PCT? I believe that what you see is what I see: E controlling S’s finger, moving it from it’s initial position to the target coin by pulling on E’s end of the rubber band. That is, you see E controlling S’s behavior. I don’t believe you see E controlling a perception of the location of S’s finger; that’s an explanation (based on PCT) not a description of E’s behavior.

RM: If, however, you do see that E is controlling S’s finger position then we

can start talking about what is going on here from a PCT perspective.

EJ: I readily agree that S’s finger position is being controlled by E, (and

of course we know that means E’s perception of same.) My only problem, as

I’ve tried to make clear in all three of my posts, is the insistence on

calling that a “behavior,” the assertions of you and Bill notwithstanding.

RM: Your problem with the term “behavior” comes from your understanding, based on control theory, that what we see as behavior is outputs varying to produce controlled results. The theory tells you that a behavior like the changing position of S’s finger in the rubber band demo is both a controlled result (of muscle forces) and an output that varies to produce a controlled result (the knot on the coin). But that view of behavior is actually a theory, not a fact. Most psychologists don’t see behavior that way; they see behavior as simply an output. There is no such thing as a controlled result for most (all?) psychologists. So for a conventional psychologist the movement of S’s finger – S’s behavior – is a caused result of muscle forces.

RM: Both the conventional and control theory psychologist see the same moving finger; they see S’s behavior. And both can see that that behavior is being controlled by E. But the two psychologists would have very different explanations of why E is able to control S’s behavior. The conventional psychologist would say that E’s pulls on the rubber band are a stimulus that causes S’s finger movements. The control theory psychologist would say that E’s pulls are a disturbance to a result S is trying to control (a controlled variable; the distance between knot and coin) and S is exerting this control by varying his outputs (finger position) to compensate for that disturbance.

RM: So there is nothing wrong or unclear about referring to what people do as “behavior”. The word “behavior” refers to observable, measurable phenomena. We study tracking behavior (measuring it as variations of the cursor around the target and as mouse movements), baseball fielder behavior (measuring it as the movements of the fielder on the ground and, to the extent possible, variations in the optical trajectories of the ball on the fielder’s eyes), operant behavior (measured as bar presses per second or reinforcements per second), etc. The difference between conventional psychology and control theory psychology is in the explanation of these behaviors. Conventional psychology says that behavior is caused output; control theory psychology says that behavior is controlled input.

EJ: I acknowledge that the rubber-band demonstration as well as your dog/

sheep simulation (despite its limited degrees of freedom, which make it harder

to spot disturbances) both show that something about S is being controlled by

E. I am only asking for more rigor in our language when we try to specify

what that “something” is.

RM: You say you want more rigor but I believe that what you are actually doing (unintentionally, of course) is imposing a theoretical interpretation on an observation. Interestingly enough, this is exactly what Skinner did with operant conditioning and it was the reason he failed to be the discoverer of the control of input model of behavior. Skinner observed that bar pressing caused the delivery of food. So the behavior Skinner observed was a rat consistently causing the delivery of food pellets. But since Skinner’s theoretical preference was for a causal (rather than a purposive) model of behavior, Skinner chose to describe is behavior as food delivery causing (selecting) bar pressing. He called the bar pressing behavior an “operant” and said that the behavior he observed was really more correctly seen as operants “selected by their consequences”. So Skinner’s description of behavior was actually a theoretical statement. If Skinner had just stuck with describing the behavior he saw – bar presses causing food delivery – he might have come up with a control model to explain what was going on – a model that actually explains the behavior correctly (as opposed to the selection by consequences model that actually : see my demonstration of this at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Select.html).

EJ: If this is enough of an acknowledgment in your eyes, and not too much of

a concession as to what I am asking, then I would be interested in reading

what you have been wanting to say about this phenomenon of one person’s

control of something about another person.

RM: I would rather have your understanding than your acknowledgement but I think we are moving in that direction. So if we can all agree that the phenomenon we are observing in the rubber band demo (and in my “Control of behavior” demo) is control of behavior – E is controlling S’s behavior (finger position) in the rubber band demo and the dog (you) controlling the sheep’s behavior (horizontal position on the screen) in the “Control of Behavior” demo – then we can look at the PCT explanation of what is going on when we see control of behavior (an explanation which I’m sure you’re familiar with, Erling) and see what the implications of that explanation are. I’ll do that in another post. But maybe you could start that discussion off yourself, Erling. I’m sure you understand the PCT explanation of how E is able to control S’s behavior in the rubber band demo as well as I do. I think it would be great if you would start it off the theoretical explanation of the control of behavior that is seen in the rubber band demo.

Best regards

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Tracy_Harms]

[from Tracy Harms 2014.11.25.14 EST]

···

On Nov 25, 2014 1:30 PM, “Richard Marken” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1030)]
…

RM: Both the conventional and control theory psychologist see the same moving finger; they see S’s behavior. And both can see that that behavior is being controlled by E. But the two psychologists would have very different explanations of why E is able to control S’s behavior.
RM: … The difference between conventional psychology and control theory psychology is in the explanation of these behaviors. Conventional psychology says that behavior is caused output; control theory psychology says that behavior is controlled input.
TH: I am unconvinced that a control-theory practitioner can “see that that behavior is being controlled by E.” It is precisely because behavior is controlled input that we must guess what the aims of E are, if we’re to say S control’s E’s behavior.

TH: S may rely on E’s aims to accomplish S’s aims, and I am happy to call that manipulating E, or perhaps even controlling E. But it does not seem enough to claim S controls E’s behavior. Behavior being what it is, I propose that to control an agent is to take as one’s own aim (reference level) an aim of the agent. When this kind of intention is at work it’s clear to me that control of behavior is occurring, in the control-theory sense of the word. Where it isn’t, it’s not. To control another’s position, motions, or actions is not, per se, to control their behavior. The fact that they are behaving through it all does not mean their behavior is what is controlled.

TH: Insofar as sheep, for example, are kept together without (e.g.) an intent to form in them an intention to stay together, their behavior is not controlled. (Their relative locations in the field are being controlled.)

Tracy
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: “Tracy Harms” kaleidic@gmail.com
Date: Nov 25, 2014 2:12 PM
Subject: Re: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters
To: “Richard Marken” rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc:

[from Tracy Harms 2014.11.25.14 EST]

On Nov 25, 2014 1:30 PM, “Richard Marken” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1030)]
…
RM: Both the conventional and control theory psychologist see the same moving finger; they see S’s behavior. And both can see that that behavior is being controlled by E. But the two psychologists would have very different explanations of why E is able to control S’s behavior.
RM: … The difference between conventional psychology and control theory psychology is in the explanation of these behaviors. Conventional psychology says that behavior is caused output; control theory psychology says that behavior is controlled input.

TH: I am unconvinced that a control-theory practitioner can “see that that behavior is being controlled by E.” It is precisely because behavior is controlled input that we must guess what the aims of E are, if we’re to say S control’s E’s behavior.

TH: S may rely on E’s aims to accomplish S’s aims, and I am happy to call that manipulating E, or perhaps even controlling E. But it does not seem enough to claim S controls E’s behavior. Behavior being what it is, I propose that to control an agent is to take as one’s own aim (reference level) an aim of the agent. When this kind of intention is at work it’s clear to me that control of behavior is occurring, in the control-theory sense of the word. Where it isn’t, it’s not. To control another’s position, motions, or actions is not, per se, to control their behavior. The fact that they are behaving through it all does not mean their behavior is what is controlled.

TH: Insofar as sheep, for example, are kept together without (e.g.) an intent to form in them an intention to stay together, their behavior is not controlled. (Their relative locations in the field are being controlled.)

Tracy

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1230)]

···

Kent McClelland (2014.11.24.1100)–

KM: It’s interesting to note that in the midst of this discussion of behavioral control we’ve had an online example of one person controlling the behavior of another. See below.

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.23.1340)]

KM: I wonder if Rick would be willing to discuss this interaction from the point of view of the argument he’s been making in this thread?

RM: You bet. This is indeed an attempt to control behavior. I have a reference for a certain level of civility of discussions on CSGNet. Ad hominum attacks are a disturbance to that perception. I happen to be in the position of having the ability to delete people from CSGNet. So I am trying to get Boris to stop the ad hominum attacks (on me, but I would feel the same if they were directed at anyone) using “control by contingency” in the hopes that he would prefer to stay on CSGNet rather than keep up the attacks. Of course, I knew that this attempt at arbitrary control of behavior could lead to conflict if attacking me was more important to Boris than staying on CSGNet; and indeed I see from Boris’ recent posts that it has led to conflict… So I now have to choose between continuing to control for a civil CSGNet by deleting Boris if he continues his ad hominum attacks, just put up with the attacks (that is, stop controlling for what I see as a civil CSGNet) or try to figure out a way to solve this cooperatively (which is as likely as Obama figuring out a cooperative way to deal with the Republicans; it’s hard to cooperate with people who hate your guts).

On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 2:57 PM, “Boris Hartman”
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

O.K. I see I made a mistake as I mixed persons and you make a good use of it. But that also shows what kind of person you are. And this is not the first
that you are using initials with »double meaning«.

I made a mistake as I thought you are citating Bill. Now I understand that you citated Barb. So ii think you showed your mean personality (Mr.Hyde).

RM: Now I’m liberal, but to a degree. As a moderator of this list I’ve been pretty easy going about ad hominum attacks like those above. But I’m kind of reaching the limits of my tolerance. So please try to make your points without the ad hominum remarks
or I will remove you from the list.

RM: But there is a lesson here. And that is that, because we are control systems, we can’t help trying to be in control and among the most important things that we try to control is the behavior of other people. I think we are unaware of how often we are involved in controlling other people’s behavior because the behavior of the people we want to control is usually what we would like it to be. That is, we usually need to take no action to get people’s behavior to our reference specification for it. For example, when I teach class I rarely think of myself as controlling the behavior of the students because they are rarely behaving in a way that is a disturbance to the way I would want to see them behaving. But I do occasionally have students who are engaged in disruptive behavior – such as fairly loud conversations while I am lecturing – and then my controlling is revealed in the fact that I take action (usually by just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students) aimed at stopping the behavior – controlling that is virtually always successful. But our efforts to control other people’s behavior are not always that successful, particularly when it is done arbitrarily, as was the case with Boris.

RM: Actually, a better way for me to deal with Boris’ behavior may be to see if others find his CSGNet postings as offensive (in terms of their ad hominum attacks) as I do. If others don’t mind them then I certainly won’t take unilateral action to prevent them from appearing o CSGNet

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[wmansell]

I think Frank’s description is much more compelling than my brief attempt, but it does chime with it! However, I do agree with Martin it is important to consider processes such as the imagination mode, in which an imagined perception can stand in for current perception of the environment from the senses, during the process of control.

Warren

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of something in the environment? In previous messages you have also claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering
it in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).
I kept digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling
its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was
not able to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill’s PCT. “Perception: the control of behaviour”, it was not. (Not even the control of someone else’s behaviour).

Martin

–
Dr Warren Mansell

Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Psychological Sciences

2nd Floor Zochonis Building

University of Manchester

Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL

Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website:
http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on
A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

TH: Yes, we should recognize the behavior of individuals as a subject of control by other individuals. Further, we should not lose track of the PCT meaning of control when it
becomes easy to go astray by misconstruing part of the loop (output) as control, per se.

RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about “control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at least I always try to. So when I
talk about “control of behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html ) in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of objective measures of control, which show quantitatively how well some behavioral
variable has been controlled (how well the variable has been protected from disturbances to its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo. These are the measures of RMS error and stability under “Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior
of the sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by the sheepdog (you).

[_bara0361]

I agree that it’s important to avoid attacking, and strive for professionalism. I’m going to continue reading your thread and mulling all of this over. Â

Â

Now it’s getting to be time to focus on the coming holiday weekend. I’m certainly thankful that Dad had so many wonderful friends and colleagues, and that you continue to honor him with your lively (!) discussions and continued efforts to teach, explain and share the very complicated theory we call PCT!

Â

Sincerest wishes for a Happy Thanksgiving…

Â

*barb

Â

Â

Â

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I think Frank’s description is much more compelling than my brief attempt, but it does chime with it! However, I do agree with Martin it is important to consider processes such as the imagination mode, in which an imagined perception can stand in for current perception of the environment from the senses, during the process of control.
Warren

On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, Frank Lenk csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I spent considerable time writing the below before I saw Warren’s post from this morning, which in a couple of sentences pretty much summarizes the main points I was trying to get across. I am attaching my views below in case anyone else finds them useful.

FrankÂ

[Frank Lenk 2014.11.25.10:45 CST]

I hesitate to get in the middle of all this, given the vastly greater PCT experience of those involved. In what follows, I attempted at a synthesis, but then went beyond that and so may have just muddied the waters further. I apologize for the latter
in advance: Â

1. All we know are our perceptions. While we believe there is a real world out there, we don’t have unmediated access to it. We only know the world as perceived through our senses and minds.

2. If all we can know are our perceptions, then from our individualistic point of view, all we can control are our perceptions.

3. But if, by controlling our perceptions, we aren’t in fact simultaneously controlling some important part of the real world, then we would die. There must be a correlation between these two, though the correlation can be good or bad, just as our ability
   to keep our perceptions controlled to their references can be good or bad.Â

4. What Rick’s demo’s provides us is access to that which we don’t have outside of a simulation - that is, a “god mode� where we get to look at what is actually going on in the (simulated) real world. And then we can see that yes, the behavior of that
   simulated real world is simultaneously being controlled as the actors in that world control their perceptions. Â

5. But back in our unsimulated real world, we never know the degree to which we are affecting the real world beyond our senses. In Institutional Economics, we have a concept of “warranted knowledge�, where what is warranted is what holds up after repeated
   experiments, inquiries and debates by a community of interested participants. This social process can be viewed as analogous to what goes on inside an individual as his/her perceptual systems figure out what is invariant in order to construct references out
   of repeated perceptions. Using this concept, we can have warranted knowledge of the real world, but not full knowledge. I think what this community is debating is whether it is warranted to perceive ourselves as controlling the real world, and by extension,
   other living control systems. Inversely but equivalently, is it warranted to view ourselves as, in some way and at some times, being controlled by others?Â

6. We all agree that living control systems have their own purposes. As a result, any ability to control our perceptions of them is likely to be worse than our ability to control our perceptions of inanimate objects. But
   we have some  ability to control our perceptions of other living control systems. This is one of the key points Bill makes about the rubber band experiment. Given a reference for the knot being over a mark on the
   table, the experimenter (E) can make the subject (S) move his finger anywhere within a radius of the mark given by the relative elasticities of the rubber band. "Wherever E places her finger, there is only only one place where S’s finger can be * if the
   knot is to remain stationary.*� (B:CP, 2nd edition, pg. 245, emphasis in the original)  S ince many can view this experiment simultaneously, it seems warranted to believe that S’s finger really did change position,
   and so E could control S’s finger position, if E were controlling her perception of it and the reference does not change. This seems to be Rick’s point.Â

7. But the important thing is not control of the finger, but control of the reference, as Bill’s emphasis indicates. The experimenter suggested it; the subject adopted it. The experiment tests whether the subject adopted it or not by creating a variety
of disturbances. E perceives S as having adopted it, and given the tests, it is warranted to believe S really adopted it. It seems to me that when we talk about controlling other humans, we typically mean something like this – control of their references
more than controlling their behavior. After all, as soon as S figures out what E is really up to – controlling his finger – S cS can adopt a new reference with regard to finger position that no amount of disturbance by E can much affect. Real control of others
means controlling references. And, since references are stored perceptions, this can mean controlling their perceptions as well.

8. I’ll go back to the example of mothers attempting to teach their children manners, or moral behavior in general. Here the goal is to not just control our perception of our children’s behavior, but to control our perception of their perceptions and
references. We want our children to be good because they perceive it as the right thing to do, not to simply avoid trouble or please us. But perceptions aren’t given and fixed. Children have to be taught to consider others, to exercise their powers of perception
to perceive events from others’ point of view, in order to develop the references that allow them to control for being respectful, honest, etc. in a variety of situations.Â

7. And, I would argue that it is warranted for parents to perceive their children’s perceptions and references as having actually changed. We put our children in many difficult situations, we observe them when they don’t know we are, we ask how they behaved
   when we were not around. We test to see if they are controlling for the perception of being respectful to classmates, to teachers, to other parents and especially to us. And we don’t think we have done our job as parents until they repeatedly pass these kinds
   of tests. When they are older, we can ask them directly and find that by and large, what they mean by being respectful agrees with what we mean.

8. None of this changes the fact that our little loving living control systems had a choice in this every step of the way and that the choices they made were made only if they made sense in terms of controlling their own perceptions to their own references.
   Â But we parents had a hand in determining those perceptions and references, just as in the rubber band experiment the experimenter has a hand in determining the errors that are perceived and the reference for the subject.Â

9. In sum, all I can control directly are my own perceptions. But in so doing, I exert forces in the real world that affect others’ perceptions and what they are trying to control. The effect is that it is warranted for me to believe I control some aspects
   of the real world and others in it. I do so only indirectly, given my mediated access to it and them and the operation of their own control systems, but not unintentionally or necessarily poorly. And others do the same to me.Â

FrankÂ

From: “csgnet@lists.illinois.edu” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Reply-To: “wmansell@gmail.com” wmansell@gmail.com

Date: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 at 5:31 AM

To: Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net

Cc: “csgnet@lists.illinois.edu” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

I am with Rick. There are lots of things we have some control over in the service of controlling our perception. These other things are often less reliable in our ability to control them and more dependent on context, but nonetheless they are
controlled, as a MEANS to control perception…
Warren

–
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Psychological Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Â
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Â
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406
Â
See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England
Â
The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now
.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of something in the environment? In previous messages you have also claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering
it in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).
I kept digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling
its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was
not able to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill’s PCT. “Perception: the control of behaviour”, it was not. (Not even the control of someone else’s behaviour).

Martin

–
Dr Warren Mansell

Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Psychological Sciences

2nd Floor Zochonis Building

University of Manchester

Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL

Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Â

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Â

Website:
http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406
Â

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

Â

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on
A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

TH: Yes, we should recognize the behavior of individuals as a subject of control by other individuals. Further, we should not lose track of the PCT meaning of control when it
becomes easy to go astray by misconstruing part of the loop (output) as control, per se.

RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about “control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at least I always try to. So when I
talk about “control of behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html ) in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of objective measures of control, which show quantitatively how well some behavioral
variable has been controlled (how well the variable has been protected from disturbances to its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo. These are the measures of RMS error and stability under “Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior
of the sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by the sheepdog (you).Â

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1350)]

···

Tracy Harms (2014.11.25.14 EST)–

TH: I am unconvinced that a control-theory practitioner can “see that that behavior is being controlled by E.” It is precisely because behavior is controlled input that we must guess what the aims of E are, if we’re to say S control’s E’s behavior.

RM: Good point. Let me try to convince you;-) I think the most important thing for a control theory practitioner to understand is what control is. Control is an observable phenomenon that is seen when a variable is kept in a particular state, protected from the effects of disturbances that would cause that variable to move from that state. S’s behavior in the rubber band demo can be seen to be controlled in this sense. The position of S’s finger (S’s behavior) is a variable that is kept in a particular state (over the target coin) on each trial, protected from the the effect of the disturbance created by the fact that the finger starts in different initial positions of the finger on each trial; if the finger were not under control it would have ended up on the target coin each time.

RM: So it’s easy to see that S’s behavior ()finger position) is under control and it’s also easy to see that it is E, via pulls on his end of the rubber band, that is effecting this control. Once it has been determined that S’s finger position is under control and that E is the system controlling that variable, the control theory practitioner can start doing the research needed to determine how this control is occurring, research that will involve testing to determine the exact nature of he perceptual input that is under control.

TH: S may rely on E’s aims to accomplish S’s aims, and I am happy to call that manipulating E, or perhaps even controlling E. But it does not seem enough to claim S controls E’s behavior. Behavior being what it is, I propose that to control an agent is to take as one’s own aim (reference level) an aim of the agent.

RM: I think you mean E controls S right? Anyway, what you are proposing is an explanation, not a description of control of behavior, of control of behavior. You seem to be saying (assuming the control theory model) that E can only control S’s behavior by getting S to adopt E’s reference for the behavior E wants to see S produce. This is actually no necessary at all. E’s control of S’s behavior is readily (and simply) explained as E producing appropriate disturbances (via the rubber band pulls) to the variable S is controlling (knot on coin). S must move his own finger appropriately in order to protect the variable he is controlling from these disturbances. In so doing he is moving his finger in the way E wants him to move it.

TH: When this kind of intention is at work it’s clear to me that control of behavior is occurring, in the control-theory sense of the word. Where it isn’t, it’s not. To control another’s position, motions, or actions is not, per se, to control their behavior. The fact that they are behaving through it all does not mean their behavior is what is controlled.

TH: Insofar as sheep, for example, are kept together without (e.g.) an intent to form in them an intention to stay together, their behavior is not controlled. (Their relative locations in the field are being controlled.)

RM: Your position seems that when the behavior of a control system is being controlled it is not really being controlled unless the system being controlled wants to do that behavior. Seems strange to me but much of this discussion seems pretty strange to me. For some reason this topic (of control of behavior) really gets to people. There is apparently a very strong desire to see behavior as uncontrollable. Any ideas about why that is?

Best

Rick

–
Tracy

---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: “Tracy Harms” kaleidic@gmail.com

Date: Nov 25, 2014 2:12 PM
Subject: Re: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters
To: “Richard Marken” rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc:

[from Tracy Harms 2014.11.25.14 EST]

On Nov 25, 2014 1:30 PM, “Richard Marken” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1030)]
…

RM: Both the conventional and control theory psychologist see the same moving finger; they see S’s behavior. And both can see that that behavior is being controlled by E. But the two psychologists would have very different explanations of why E is able to control S’s behavior.

RM: … The difference between conventional psychology and control theory psychology is in the explanation of these behaviors. Conventional psychology says that behavior is caused output; control theory psychology says that behavior is controlled input.

TH: I am unconvinced that a control-theory practitioner can “see that that behavior is being controlled by E.” It is precisely because behavior is controlled input that we must guess what the aims of E are, if we’re to say S control’s E’s behavior.

TH: S may rely on E’s aims to accomplish S’s aims, and I am happy to call that manipulating E, or perhaps even controlling E. But it does not seem enough to claim S controls E’s behavior. Behavior being what it is, I propose that to control an agent is to take as one’s own aim (reference level) an aim of the agent. When this kind of intention is at work it’s clear to me that control of behavior is occurring, in the control-theory sense of the word. Where it isn’t, it’s not. To control another’s position, motions, or actions is not, per se, to control their behavior. The fact that they are behaving through it all does not mean their behavior is what is controlled.

TH: Insofar as sheep, for example, are kept together without (e.g.) an intent to form in them an intention to stay together, their behavior is not controlled. (Their relative locations in the field are being controlled.)

Tracy

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1420)]

···

Martin Taylor (2014.11.24.20.06) –

MT: Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of

something in the environment?

RM: No, I really believe that control is done by control of perception. The perceptions controlled are based on aspects of the environment that can also be perceived and measured by an observer of the control system. So the thermostat controls a perception of an aspect of the environment that an observer can also perceive, a perception called “temperature”. It is the observer’s perception of the variable controlled by the control system – such as the observer’s measure of the room temperature as indicated on a thermometer – that is used in the computation of the objective measures of control that I’m talking about here.

MT: In previous messages you have also

claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter
the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering it
in the intended direction.

RM: Not true. Control is not an all or none thing; it varies from none to perfect. Controlling is certainly going on even when it is not successful (perfect) but how unsuccessful does it have to be before you stop calling it “control”? That’s a judgement call. And, as I said, I’m liberal, but to a degree. If control is close to none I’m inclined to say that there is no control. But if you want to say control is going on even when there is no control but the system is organized as a zero gain negative feedback loop around a controlled (or would be controlled) variable then that’s OK with me.

MT: Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big

rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what
appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I
wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of
its position?).

RM: You were trying to control a perception of it’s position, which corresponds to it’s actual position. You were not controlling successfully, indeed, at all.

MT: I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn't, so I got

my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?)

RM: You were trying to control a perception of it’s position, which corresponds to it’s actual position. You were not controlling successfully again.

MT: I kept

digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat
oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So
I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I
could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side. (Was I
controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its
position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn
earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I
decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

RM: Yes. Now you were controlling your perception of the position of the rock and, of course, of the rock itself.

MT: As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not

controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it
was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its
position.

RM: Well then you clearly didn’t understand my position.

MT: But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying

to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They
couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of
perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the
ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was not able
to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what
were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill's PCT. "Perception:

the control of behaviour", it was not. (Not even the control of
someone else’s behaviour).

RM: I don’t think I’m departing at all from PCT. I don’t think PCT says that perception varies independently from the aspect of the environment to which it corresponds. I think that’s completely your idea.

Best

Rick

Martin

–

          RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about

“control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning
of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected
state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at
least I always try to. So when I talk about “control of
behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral
variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to
the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo: http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html )
in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from
disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of
objective measures of control, which show quantitatively
how well some behavioral variable has been controlled (how
well the variable has been protected from disturbances to
its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo.
These are the measures of RMS error and stability under
“Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior of the
sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by
the sheepdog (you).

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.25.17.35]

I see. You distinguish two states: "trying to control" a perception

and “controlling a perception”. What is the operational distinction
between them? Are you intending to substitute the everyday meaning
of “control” for the usual PCT one, which I understand to be “acting
within a feedback loop so as to influence a perception toward its
reference value”?
True. It has been increasingly difficult to understand as this
thread has progressed. Actually, that’s badly worded. For the most
part it has been easy to understand what you have written, but not
why you were writing it, when it has seemed (and seems) like an
increasingly fervent effort to insert a wholly arbitrary and
unnecessary construction into PCT. That construction is your
dividing line that tells someone acting to influence a perception:
“Now you are controlling your perception” – “Ooops, now you are
not” when to the protagonist, nothing has changed except possibly
the momentary difficulty of control.
I refer you to B:CP p 222 in the second edition, or any of the
figures in chapter 15.

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1420)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.24.20.06) –

            MT: In previous

messages you have also claimed that “control” exists not
when someone is trying to alter the state of a
perception but only when they succeed in altering it in
the intended direction.

          RM: Not true. Control is not an all or none thing; it

varies from none to perfect. Controlling is certainly
going on even when it is not successful (perfect) but how
unsuccessful does it have to be before you stop calling it
“control”? That’s a judgement call. And, as I said, I’m
liberal, but to a degree. If control is close to none I’m
inclined to say that there is no control. But if you want
to say control is going on even when there is no control
but the system is organized as a zero gain negative
feedback loop around a controlled (or would be controlled)
variable then that’s OK with me.

            MT: Unless I missed

it, you never commented on my example of the big rock.
In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what
appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was
digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with
my foot. It didn’t move. (Was I controlling its
position? Was I controlling my perception of its
position?).

          RM: You were trying to control a perception of it's

position, which corresponds to it’s actual position. You
were not controlling successfully, indeed, at all.

            MT: I bent down to

pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got my spade to dig it
up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its position?
Was I controlling my perception of its position?)

          RM:  You were trying to control a perception of it's

position, which corresponds to it’s actual position. You
were not controlling successfully again.

            MT: I kept digging,

and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat
oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy
to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug
as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to
tilt it to one side. (Was I controlling its position?
Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By
tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth
under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I
decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I
controlling its position? Was I controlling my
perception of its position?).

          RM: Yes. Now you were controlling your perception of

the position of the rock and, of course, of the rock
itself.

            MT: As I understand your comment above, you would say I

was not controlling the rock’s position until I got it
to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted
it, I was controlling its position.

          RM: Well then you clearly didn't understand my

position.

          RM: I don't think I'm departing at all from PCT. I

don’t think PCT says that perception varies independently
from the aspect of the environment to which it
corresponds. I think that’s completely your idea.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1545)]

···

Martin Taylor (2014.11.25.10.13)–

MT: The above are the two main reasons are why I strongly object to

conflating “control of an environmental variable” with “control of
perception of the environmental variable”. Only the perception is
controlled; the two can be equated if and only if the environmental
variable is the sole determinant of the perceptual variable.

RM: I see what you are getting at. You are saying that the perception that is actually controlled may differ from the aspect of the environment that is controlled if a large component of the controlled perception comes from imagination. So if the perceptual variable controlled is p = aX+bY and X comes from imagination rather than the environment then the perception that is controlled, aX’+bY, where X’ indicates that the X variable comes from imagination, will not correspond to the aspect of the environment that is controlled, aX+bY.

RM: Actually, I’m not sure that the perception aX’+bY would be controlled; after all, the system is set up to control aX+bY so it’s outputs have to affect this environmental variable in order to control it. But the system is not perceiving its own effects on aX+bY if it’s not perceiving X. So I’m not sure there would be much controlling done by this system. I’ll have to set up a simulation and see what happens.

RM: But anyway, even if it works and the system is able to control aX’+bY differently than aX+bY, I don’t see how this relates to the issue of control of behavior. An observer can see that E is controlling Ss behavior (and can objectively measure how well E is controlling Ss behavior using quantitative measures like RMS and stability). So E is controlling S’s behavior regardless of what perceptual aspect of that behavior is actually being control or whether a large or small component of that perception comes from imagination.

RM: Anyway, I’ll get back to you ASAP on when a system controls a perception that is derived partly from imagination.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1610)]

···

HB : Maybe we could still find some place to clear up some (maybe we could call it) misunderstandings. So maybe you could for a start explain what you meant by »control of behavior« ?

RM: I think I’ve explained it in several other posts. But let me try one more time. “Behavior” refers to variable aspects of what people do. So variations in the position of a person’s finger on a table is a behavior. A behavioral variable (or any variable) is controlled if it is consistently brought to a particular state in the face of disturbances that should prevent this consistency. So a behavior, like that of the position of a person’s finger, is controlled because it is consistently brought to a particular state (finger over target coin) in the face of disturbances (different initial positions of the finger and/or coin on each trial) that should prevent this consistency. And we can see that this control is being effected by the actions of another agent, in the case of the rubber band demo the E.

HB: Or you could define these terms ?

RM: In the above I’ve defined “behavior” and “control”.

HB: When you are talking about »control of behavior of LCS«, can we say that we can also »control perception« of other LCS ?

RM: No, we cannot control the perception of another control system Nor can we set the references for another living control system. However, we can control the outputs of a control system. As I said in a much earlier post, living control systems are autonomous in the sense that they set their own references (goals); but once a reference has been selected, the system becomes controllable due the disturbance opposing nature of control.

So, as I said in that earlier post, PCT shows that living control systems are autonomous and controllable. One of the many apparent paradoxes of control.

Best

Rick

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

Phil on 11/24/14 4:19 pm

Rick, remember that very complicated paper which facetiously utilized “PCT”? The one about Kahler geometry and Ricci flow, written by that spinal cord researcher from Australia. Quite an involved paper but you pointed out that the authors application of PCT involved: “a computational selection of references/output which theoretically minimized all error signals simultaneously” (paraphrased). You were adamant that this could not be a proper application of PCT for the very reason that “references are not chosen or selected in pct, but are continuously varied”.

RM (just now): but once a reference has been selected, the system becomes controllable.

…

PY: Thus, your argument is highly convoluted and tragically flawed. I will say nothing more other than the fact that the only way to effectively control a control system or servomechanism is by selecting the reference value. Refer to Bill’s 1960 paper.

best regards

···

–

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1700)]

···

Phil on 11/24/14 4:19 pm

PY: Rick, remember that very complicated paper which facetiously utilized “PCT”?

RM: Actually, no. But I’ll take your word for it.

PY: You were adamant that this could not be a proper application of PCT for the very reason that “references are not chosen or selected in pct, but are continuously varied”.

RM (just now): but once a reference has been selected, the system becomes controllable.

RM: You’re right. The problem was my use of the word “select” as the definition of autonomy. In fact, the references to all but the highest level control systems in a hierarchy are varied as necessary (not voluntarily selected) as the means of controlling the systems’ perceptions; they are not “selected” in the sense that they can be arbitrarily set to any value. What I should have said is that living control systems are autonomous in the sense that their references are determined by the system itself and not, as in artificial systems, by an outside user.

PY: Thus, your argument is highly convoluted and tragically flawed.

RM: I hope the tragedy has ended happily.

PY: I will say nothing more other than the fact that the only way to effectively control a control system or servomechanism is by selecting the reference value. Refer to Bill’s 1960 paper.

RM: Yes, this is the only way to do it “effectively”, in the sense that the control system itself cannot resist your control. And, of course, you can’t really select the values of a living control systems references – at least not yet;- But as shown in Bill’s 1973 (and 2005) book (B:CP) you can certainly do it by disturbing a variable a person is controlling (as in the rubber band demo), at least while the person continues to control that variable and you don’t make the person do something that “inconveniences” them, like burning their finger.

Best

Rick

best regards

–

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble