Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.24.1750)]
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FL: But we have some ability to control our perceptions of other living control systems. This is one of the key points Bill makes about the rubber band experiment. Given a reference for the knot being over a mark on the table, the experimenter (E) can make the subject (S) move his finger anywhere within a radius of the mark given by the relative elasticities of the rubber band.

RM: Actually, even if S had a varying reference for the relationship between knot and mark E could move S's finger to a target coin and keep it there.
Â

FL quoting Powers: "Wherever E places her finger, there is only only one place where S’s finger can be if the knot is to remain stationary.� (B:CP, 2nd edition, pg. 245, emphasis in the original)

RM: Right, that's why E can control S's finger.
Â

FL: Since many can view this experiment simultaneously, it seems warranted to believe that S’s finger really did change position, and so E could control S’s finger position, if E were controlling her perception of it and the reference does not change. This seems to be Rick’s point.Â

RM: Not really. My point is simply that E can be observed to control S's finger position. Control of behavior is a fact. How E effects this control (and why S can be controlled in this situation) is explained by PCT. But you don't need any PCT concepts -- perception, references,etc -- to know that control of behavior is happening. As I said in my earlier post to Erling,  all the arguments about whether control of behavior is possible have used PCT to deny the existence of the fact of control of behavior. So I suggested that in order to get this discussion back into the realm of science we start by understanding what control of behavior is, in fact, not in theory. Once we agree that control of behavior is a fact -- an observable, measurable phenomenon -- then we can move on to the theoretical explanation of what's going when we see control of behavior happening (as we do in the rubber band demo and my "Control of behavior" demo.
Â

FL: 7. But the important thing is not control of the finger, but control of the reference, as Bill’s emphasis indicates.Â

RM: I think you are confused. First, references are not controlled; perceptions are. Second, the explanation of the FACT that S's finger is controlled is that E has a reference for the position of S's finger and can bring the perception of the finger to the reference by disturbing the variable S is controlling. S has a reference for the perception he is controlling -- the perception of the knot's position relative to the coin -- and it's because S is controlling that perception that E can control S's finger.Â

FL: The experimenter suggested it; the subject adopted it.

RM: Yes, the experimenter asked S to control the knot/coin relationship and because the subject agrees to control that perception, his finger becomes controllable. The subject has not agreed to control of moving his finger in the way E wants him to move it.Â
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FL: The experiment tests whether the subject adopted it or not by creating a variety of disturbances. E perceives S as having adopted it, and given the tests, it is warranted to believe S really adopted it. It seems to me that when we talk about controlling other humans, we typically mean something like this – control of their references more than controlling their behavior.Â

RM: We cannot control other people's references. We can control the outputs that are used to resist disturbances to a controlled perception. But PCT aside, when I talk about controlling other people I am talking about the fact that it is various aspects of their behavior that can be controlled -- in fact, not in theory.
Â

FL: After all, as soon as S figures out what E is really up to – controlling his finger – S can adopt a new reference with regarrd to finger position that no amount of disturbance by E can much affect.Â

RM: It's not a new reference that S can adopt in order to stop being controlled. S has to stop controlling the variable that is allowing E to control his behavior via disturbance to the controlled variable. If S continues to control the knot/coin relationship but at a new reference value his actions are still controllable. Variations in the value of a reference change only the value at which a perceptual variable is maintained; it doesn't change what perceptual variable is being controlled.

FL: Real control of others means controlling references.Â

RM: This is not quite true. But it would take to long to explain why.Â
So that's enough for now.
BestÂ
Rick

8. I’ll go back to the example of mothers attempting to teach their children manners, or moral behavior in general. Here the goal is to not just control our perception of our children’s behavior, but to control our perception of their perceptions and references. We want our children to be good because they perceive it as the right thing to do, not to simply avoid trouble or please us. But perceptions aren’t given and fixed. Children have to be taught to consider others, to exercise their powers of perception to perceive events from others’ point of view, in order to develop the references that allow them to control for being respectful, honest, etc. in a variety of situations.Â

7. And, I would argue that it is warranted for parents to perceive their children’s perceptions and references as having actually changed. We put our children in many difficult situations, we observe them when they don’t know we are, we ask how they behaved when we were not around. We test to see if they are controlling for the perception of being respectful to classmates, to teachers, to other parents and especially to us. And we don’t think we have done our job as parents until they repeatedly pass these kinds of tests. When they are older, we can ask them directly and find that by and large, what they mean by being respectful agrees with what we mean.
8. None of this changes the fact that our little loving living control systems had a choice in this every step of the way and that the choices they made were made only if they made sense in terms of controlling their own perceptions to their own references. Â But we parents had a hand in determining those perceptions and references, just as in the rubber band experiment the experimenter has a hand in determining the errors that are perceived and the reference for the subject.Â
9. In sum, all I can control directly are my own perceptions. But in so doing, I exert forces in the real world that affect others’ perceptions and what they are trying to control. The effect is that it is warranted for me to believe I control some aspects of the real world and others in it. I do so only indirectly, given my mediated access to it and them and the operation of their own control systems, but not unintentionally or necessarily poorly. And others do the same to me.Â

FrankÂ

From: "<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu" <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Reply-To: "<mailto:wmansell@gmail.com>wmansell@gmail.com" <<mailto:wmansell@gmail.com>wmansell@gmail.com>
Date: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 at 5:31 AM
To: Martin Taylor <<mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net>mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net>
Cc: "<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu" <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

I am with Rick. There are lots of things we have some control over in the service of controlling our perception. These other things are often less reliable in our ability to control them and more dependent on context, but nonetheless they are controlled, as a MEANS to control perception...

Warren

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

TH: Yes, we should recognize the behavior of individuals as a subject of control by other individuals. Further, we should not lose track of the PCT meaning of control when it becomes easy to go astray by misconstruing part of the loop (output) as control, per se.

RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about "control" on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at least I always try to. So when I talk about "control of behavior" I am always talking about keeping a behavioral variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to the herd in my "Control of Behavior" demo: <http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html&gt; http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html\) in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of objective measures of control, which show quantitatively how well some behavioral variable has been controlled (how well the variable has been protected from disturbances to its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo. These are the measures of RMS error and stability under "Sheepdog control" which show how well the behavior of the sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by the sheepdog (you).Â

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of something in the environment? In previous messages you have also claimed that "control" exists not when someone is trying to alter the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering it in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn't move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn't, so I got my spade to dig it up but it didn't move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I kept digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not controlling the rock's position until I got it to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They couldn't have been "behaviours" because behaviours are control of perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was not able to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill's PCT. "Perception: the control of behaviour", it was not. (Not even the control of someone else's behaviour).

Martin

--
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Psychological Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: <mailto:warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk>warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
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Tel: <tel:%2B44%20%280%29%20161%20275%208589>+44 (0) 161 275 8589
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Website: <http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406&gt; http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Â

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Frank Lenk <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:
See <http://teamstrial.net>teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England
Â
The highly acclaimed therapy manual on <http://www.amazon.co.uk/Transdiagnostic-Approach-Method-Levels-Therapy/dp/0415507642/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1351756948&sr=8-1&gt; A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check <http://www.pctweb.org>www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of  <http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose&gt;Doing Research on Purpose.Â
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

Phil 11/24 around 5:30

Rick

living control systems are autonomous in the sense that their references are determined by the system itself and not, as in artificial systems, by an outside user.

Phil

I have never seen a diagram where a control system influences it’s own reference. Thus, as far as Bill has shown in his work, I am forced to conclude that ALL control systems have reference inputs from…other control systems.

Rick

And, of course, you can’t really select the values of a living control systems references – at least not yet;- But as shown in Bill’s 1973 (and 2005) book (B:CP) you can certainly do it by disturbing a variable a person is controlling

Phil

Bill never said that you can select the values of a living control system’s references by disturbing a variable a person is controlling…

Don’t get me wrong, I’m not trying to say that I don’t completely understand exactly what you’re saying. Yea, you can control the the position of a person’s finger, granted that you know the perception controlled (by applying The Test). But why exactly are you trying to prove that the behavior of an LCS is controllable?

Your choice of wording is so disturbing to the others here on CSG that you’ve prompted over 100 posts to clarify an idea which is very…hard to place in terms of fundamental importance to PCT. It looks like you’re trying to add a second stage to the rubber band experimentation. But I don’t think you’re making PCT any better by trying to prove something which isn’t a generally agreed upon problem.

If I may. it seems like you’re trying to point out that the behavior of a control system can be controlled once it’s hidden variables are determined. That is, an observed behavior can be made to match a reference value for that behavior to any arbitrary degree of exactitude - but by applying disturbances to hidden variables which are not directly observed (because they are not directly observable, ie they are hidden). We know, of course, that these variables are rather imagined (i.e. stored in memory). I’m sure you would have a hard time controlling a persons behavior if you keep forgetting heir reference value. Anyway, It seems you have discovered a way to efficiently connect the words coming out of your mouth to phenomena that you observe in real-time and still find that you are error-free, despite others trying to disturb your error-free state. Congratulations. you are in control, and no PCT-oriented person can dispute that control is a fact. However, I think what you’re saying can be trivially summed up in this way: “the behavior of a human being or any perceptual control system can be controlled given complete information of both observable and hidden variables”.

The core of your argument, and the fundamental theorem of PCT, is that the reference value needs to be measured. and of course, if the probability distribution function of the reference has a value of 1 at a single point and a value of 0 at all others - meaning that you know the systems reference with absolute certainty - then yes, what you have taken hours to say can be summed up as an essentially very true statement.

P.S. We need to discuss these matters in person, not on CSG. Very soon I’m going to release an entirely revamped PCT and I would appreciate if you would take the time to sign a copy of your new book for me so I can see what other brilliant but very disturbing things you’re trying to say.

kind regards

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1940)]

···

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 6:17 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

Phil 11/24 around 5:30

RM: living control systems are autonomous in the sense that their references are determined by the system itself and not, as in artificial systems, by an outside user.

PY: I have never seen a diagram where a control system influences it’s own reference.

RM: I’m sorry, I was using “system” in two ways. I meant that the references for individual control systems within a person (the whole system) cannot be set from outside the person (the whole system). Of course the references for any individual control system within a person are set by other control systems withing that person, not be any control system itself. Sorry about the confusion.

PY: Thus, as far as Bill has shown in his work, I am forced to conclude that ALL control systems have reference inputs from…other control systems.

RM: Yes, of course! But they are control systems within the person so no one outside the person access to them (as they do with, say, a thermostat, where access to its reference is right there on the wall.

RM: And, of course, you can’t really select the values of a living control systems references – at least not yet;- But as shown in Bill’s 1973 (and 2005) book (B:CP) you can certainly do it by disturbing a variable a person is controlling

Phil

Bill never said that you can select the values of a living control system’s references by disturbing a variable a person is controlling…

RM: Right. Again I was unclear. The “do it” was referring to controlling behavior, not references. You can control behavior by disturbance to a controlled variable but you can’t control references that way.

PY: Don’t get me wrong, I’m not trying to say that I don’t completely understand exactly what you’re saying. Yea, you can control the the position of a person’s finger, granted that you know the perception controlled (by applying The Test).

RM: But you actually don’t need to know what an LCS is controlling in order to control its behavior. The sheepdog certainly doesn’t know what the sheep is controlling that makes it possible for it to control the sheep. The dog has just learned that moving toward the sheep allows it to control a perception it is controlling for: the closeness of the sheep to the herd.

PY: But why exactly are you trying to prove that the behavior of an LCS is controllable?

RM: Very good question. First, I’m not trying to prove that the behavior of an LCS is controllable; that’s an established fact. I’m sticking with the topic because I think it’s important to understand what’s going on when LCS’s control each other because it’s a very important social phenomenon. We are are controllers and one of the most important perceptions we want controlled is the behavior of other people. So we are controlling each other all the time – sometimes successfully, sometimes with disastrous results – not because we are bad but because we are control systems and control systems are always acting to make their experience of the world the way they want it to be. And one of the things that most often makes our experience of the world not the way we want it to be is the way other people behave.

RM: Given the ubiquity of this phenomenon – a phenomenon that is responsible for some of the greatest accomplishments and some of the worst catastrophe’s of humanity – I think it’s worth it to try to understand what’s going on when the object of one’s control is not an inanimate aspect of the environment but another LCS.

PY: Your choice of wording is so disturbing to the others here on CSG that you’ve prompted over 100 posts to clarify an idea which is very…

RM: I know. People are clearly controlling with very high gain for believing that it is impossible to control the behavior of an LCS. Why they are controlling for this is an interesting phenomenon in and of itself.

PY: .hard to place in terms of fundamental importance to PCT.

RM: Well, one person’s unimportant is another person’s important. It’s important to me for reasons I give above. But if it’s so unimportant why have there been over 100 posts on the topic, most trying to show that control of behavior doesn’t even happen. It looks like it’s kind of important, in a bad way, to a lot of people on CSGNet. I really would like to know why.

PY: It looks like you’re trying to add a second stage to the rubber band experimentation.

RM: Nope. All I’m doing is pointing out what Bill pointed out on p. 245 of B:CP.

PY: But I don’t think you’re making PCT any better by trying to prove something which isn’t a generally agreed upon problem.

RM: How would ignoring the fact that behavior can be controlled – a fact the is explained by PCT – make PCT better?

PY: If I may. it seems like you’re trying to point out that the behavior of a control system can be controlled once it’s hidden variables are determined.

RM: Nope. Just that the behavior of a control system can be controlled. To understand that fact one has to know what control is. And knowing what control is is fundamental to understanding control theory.

PY: That is, an observed behavior can be made to match a reference value for that behavior to any arbitrary degree of exactitude - but by applying disturbances to hidden variables which are not directly observed (because they are not directly observable, ie they are hidden). We know, of course, that these variables are rather imagined (i.e. stored in memory). I’m sure you would have a hard time controlling a persons behavior if you keep forgetting heir reference value.

RM: No, you don’;t have to know what variable an LCS is controlling or the reference for that variable in order to successfully control its behavior. This is demonstrated in my “Control of Behavior” demo; when you control the behavior of the sheep you are doing so without knowing what perception he sheep is controlling or the sheep’s reference for that perception (which is varying randomly anyway). Indeed, you don’t even know that it’s a control system.

PY: Anyway, It seems you have discovered a way to efficiently connect the words coming out of your mouth to phenomena that you observe in real-time and still find that you are error-free, despite others trying to disturb your error-free state. Congratulations. you are in control, and no PCT-oriented person can dispute that control is a fact. However, I think what you’re saying can be trivially summed up in this way: “the behavior of a human being or any perceptual control system can be controlled given complete information of both observable and hidden variables”

RM: Correct, if you stop at the word “controlled” its correct; the part starting with “given” after that is wrong.

PY: The core of your argument, and the fundamental theorem of PCT, is that the reference value needs to be measured. and of course, if the probability distribution function of the reference has a value of 1 at a single point and a value of 0 at all others - meaning that you know the systems reference with absolute certainty - then yes, what you have taken hours to say can be summed up as an essentially very true statement.

RM: This is not true. You don’t have to know the value of the reference for a controlled variable in order to control a control system’s behavior. I actually already explained that I had though that you did have to have a person adopt a fixed reference in order to control their behavior but it tums out you don’t. So your statement above is not a good summary of my argument.

P.S. We need to discuss these matters in person, not on CSG. Very soon I’m going to release an entirely revamped PCT and I would appreciate if you would take the time to sign a copy of your new book for me so I can see what other brilliant but very disturbing things you’re trying to say.

RM: OK, I’m doing a class over there in Spring. Maybe then. Right now I’m busy working, taking care of family issues, ranting on CSGNet and writing a book about control of behavior – really;-)

Best

Rick

kind regards

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.25.23.02]

True. In fact that is exactly the point I've been trying to make.

Controlling the perception does not necessarily mean equally good
control of the corresponding environmental variable when the
perception has inputs other than directly from the senses.
You are correct. But that doesn’t change its ability to control its
PERCEPTION of aX’ + bY, and if X’ is a good match for X, aX+ bY will
be reasonably well controlled.
Although I was primarily thinking of higher-level variables, here’s
a trivial example of the kind of situation I’m thinking of. You are
controlling one slot car and I am controlling another. I am trying
to keep my car a constant distance behind yours. My controlled
variable is location of Red Car minus location of Blue Car. You are
just playing around with your car, unconcerned about mine. So far,
it’s a simple tracking study in which your car is the target and
mine is the cursor. Now your car goes behind an obstacle. I no longer can perceive from
my sensors the distance between the two cars, but I can imagine what
yours might be doing, and I can continue to control my perception of
the distance between them, most probably better than I could by
simply stopping my car and waiting until I see yours again. Maybe my imagination is aided by hearing the changing sound of your
car as you brake or accelerate, but that won’t be as accurate as
would be the direct view of your car. When your car emerges from
behind the obstacle, my perception will again be based on sensory
data, and if my imagination wasn’t too far wrong, I won’t have too
much error to correct. But the error I must correct will be more
than if I had been able to see your car all along, and it might be
much more if you had decided to accelerate or brake in a way I had
not imagined or judged from the sound changes while your car was
hidden from me.
Nor do I. I think that’s a completely separate issue. To me. control
of an aspect of behaviour such as the perception of S’s finger
location in the elastic band study (or the control of “closing the
door” behaviour by asking “Please close the door”) is exactly the
same as control of an aspect of an inanimate object such as the
location of my rock. At least in that, I think we are on the same
side of the argument, and I’ve never said otherwise. In fact, a few
weeks ago I described how protocols such as “Please do X” facilitate
control of aspects of behaviour to the benefit of all parties
concerned. However, where we are not on the same side of the argument is that
in both cases – behaviour and inanimate object properties – I
think the discussion would be much less confused if we insisted on
talking of control as being only of perception, with stabilization
of externally observable variables being talked about as a
consequence of control of perception rather than as having equal or
primary status.
Just in case you might get me wrong here, I would point out, as I
have done before, that the consequential stabilization of the
environment is what keeps us alive, and from that point of view,
control of perception is but a means to the greater end (no pun
intended).
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1545)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.25.10.13)–

            MT: The above are the two main reasons are why I

strongly object to conflating “control of an
environmental variable” with “control of perception of
the environmental variable”. Only the perception is
controlled; the two can be equated if and only if the
environmental variable is the sole determinant of the
perceptual variable.

      RM: I see what you are getting at. You are saying that the

perception that is actually controlled may differ from the
aspect of the environment that is controlled if a large
component of the controlled perception comes from imagination.
So if the perceptual variable controlled is p = aX+bY and X
comes from imagination rather than the environment then the
perception that is controlled, aX’+bY, where X’ indicates that
the X variable comes from imagination, will not correspond to
the aspect of the environment that is controlled, aX+bY.

      RM: Actually, I'm not sure that the

perception aX’+bY would be controlled; after all, the system
is set up to control aX+bY so it’s outputs have to affect this
environmental variable in order to control it.

      But the system is not perceiving its

own effects on aX+bY if it’s not perceiving X.

      RM: But anyway, even if it works and

the system is able to control aX’+bY differently than aX+bY, I
don’t see how this relates to the issue of control of
behavior.

[Richard_H_Pfau]

Ref: Phil 11/24 around 5:30

Just two points:

Phil: I have never seen a diagram where a control system influences it’s own reference. Thus, as far as Bill has shown in his work, I am forced to conclude that ALL control systems have reference inputs from…other control systems.

RP: Apparently not so. A child who puts his finger into the flame of a burning candle, establishes a reference value himself concerning not to put his finger into the burning flame of a candle.

Phil: P.S. We need to discuss these matters in person, …

RP: Such “discussion in person” leads to the idea that we would benefit from another CSG Conference – where such matters can be presented and discussed in depth, by carefully prepared paper presentations and/or panel discussions. I hope that someone or a group in the CSG system takes the initiative in organizing such a conference.

(As an aside, I find myself agreeing with Rick’s general position and discussion - but my thinking is stimulated and enriched by nearly all views and points presented)

With Regards,

Richard Pfau

···

From: (Richard Pfau 2014.11.26 11:20 Nepal Time)

[Frank_Lenk]

[Frank Lenk 2014.11.26.08:40]

MT: I think the discussion would be much less confused if we insisted on talking of control as being only of perception, with stabilization of externally observable variables being talked about as a consequence of control of perception rather than as
having equal or primary status.

Once again, someone more experienced than I has said it better than I.

Frank

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1545)]

Martin Taylor (2014.11.25.10.13)–

MT: The above are the two main reasons are why I strongly object to conflating “control of an environmental variable” with “control of perception of the environmental variable”. Only the perception is controlled; the two can be equated if and only if the environmental
variable is the sole determinant of the perceptual variable.

RM: I see what you are getting at. You are saying that the perception that is actually controlled may differ from the aspect of the environment that is controlled if a large component of the controlled perception comes from imagination. So if the perceptual
variable controlled is p = aX+bY and X comes from imagination rather than the environment then the perception that is controlled, aX’+bY, where X’ indicates that the X variable comes from imagination, will not correspond to the aspect of the environment that
is controlled, aX+bY.

RM: Actually, I’m not sure that the perception aX’+bY would be controlled; after all, the system is set up to control aX+bY so it’s outputs have to affect this environmental variable in order to control it.

But the system is not perceiving its own effects on aX+bY if it’s not perceiving X.

RM: But anyway, even if it works and the system is able to control aX’+bY differently than aX+bY, I don’t see how this relates to the issue of control of behavior.

[Frank_Lenk]

[From Frank Lenk (2014.11.26.11:28)]

Rick – thank you for taking the time to write such an extensive reply. As I’ve said before, I’m sure my thinking is not completely clear at this point, and I appreciate your help in making it more so. Here is my perception of your argument. Please let
me know if I am getting this right.

1. We control perceptions.
2. It is a fact – something observable and measurable - that controlling our perceptions can result in control of others’ behavior.
3. The conditions under which such a fact can occur are:
4. E has a reference for some aspect of S’s behavior (position of S’s finger over one coin in the case of the rubber band experiment). That aspect is E’s controlled variable
5. S has a reference for some other aspect of S’s behavior (position of the knot over a different coin). That aspect is S’s controlled variable.
6. E’s controlled variable is uncontrolled from S’s perspective, and S’s controlled variable is uncontrolled from E’s perspective.
7. E is able generate output that disturbs S’s controlled variable
8. There is no inconvenience to S caused by these disturbances
9. Under these conditions, E can generate disturbances in S’s controlled variable that generate behavior by S such that E’s reference for S’s behavior is maintained (finger stays over the coin).
10. E can maintain this kind of control over S’s behavior, even if S were to shift her references (keep the knot a variety of fixed distances from the coin rather than on top of it).
11. Because the finger staying over the coin is a fact, control of behavior is a fact.
12. But this fact is explained by understanding that both E and S are controlling their perceptions to their references as PCT theorizes.

RM: I think you are confused.

I hope I am less so now. I think where I was most confused is that I thought that E’s control depended upon E knowing what S’s reference was. I see now that E can control the location of S’s finger even without knowing S’s reference. What matters most
(I think!) is that E and S have different controlled variables – they care about different things. In essence, S allows E to control finger position because all S cares about is knot position.

Frank

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.24.1750)]

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Frank Lenk
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

FL: But we have some ability to control our perceptions of other living control systems. This is one of the key points Bill makes about the rubber band experiment. Given a reference
for the knot being over a mark on the table, the experimenter (E) can make the subject (S) move his finger anywhere within a radius of the mark given by the relative elasticities of the rubber band.

RM: Actually, even if S had a varying reference for the relationship between knot and mark E could move S’s finger to a target coin and keep it there.

FL quoting Powers: "Wherever E places her finger, there is only only one place where S’s finger can be if the knot is to remain stationary. ” (B:CP, 2nd edition, pg. 245, emphasis
in the original)

RM: Right, that’s why E can control S’s finger.

FL: Since many can view this experiment simultaneously, it seems warranted to believe that S’s finger really did change position, and so E could control S’s finger position,
if E were controlling her perception of it and the reference does not change. This seems to be Rick’s point.

RM: Not really. My point is simply that E can be observed to control S’s finger position.
Control of behavior is a fact. How E effects this control (and why S can be controlled in this situation) is explained by PCT. But you don’t need any PCT concepts – perception, references,etc – to know that control of behavior is happening. As I said
in my earlier post to Erling, all the arguments about whether control of behavior is possible have used PCT to deny the existence of the fact of control of behavior. So I suggested that in order to get this discussion back into the realm of science we start
by understanding what control of behavior is, in fact, not in theory. Once we agree that control of behavior is a fact – an observable, measurable phenomenon – then we can move on to the theoretical explanation of what’s going when we see control of behavior
happening (as we do in the rubber band demo and my “Control of behavior” demo.

FL: 7. But the important thing is not control of the finger, but control of the reference, as Bill’s emphasis indicates.

RM: I think you are confused. First, references are not controlled; perceptions are. Second, the explanation of the FACT that S’s finger is controlled is that E has a reference for the position of S’s finger and can bring the perception of the finger to
the reference by disturbing the variable S is controlling. S has a reference for the perception he is controlling – the perception of the knot’s position relative to the coin – and it’s because S is controlling that perception that E can control S’s finger.

FL: The experimenter suggested it; the subject adopted it.

RM: Yes, the experimenter asked S to control the knot/coin relationship and because the subject agrees to control that perception, his finger becomes controllable. The subject has not agreed to control of moving his finger in the way E wants him to move
it.

FL: The experiment tests whether the subject adopted it or not by creating a variety of disturbances. E perceives S as having adopted it, and given the tests, it is warranted to believe S really adopted it. It seems to me that when we talk about controlling
other humans, we typically mean something like this – control of their references more than controlling their behavior.

RM: We cannot control other people’s references. We can control the outputs that are used to resist disturbances to a controlled perception. But PCT aside, when I talk about controlling other people I am talking about the fact that it is various aspects
of their behavior that can be controlled – in fact, not in theory.

FL: After all, as soon as S figures out what E is really up to – controlling his finger – S can adopt a new reference with regard to finger position that no amount of disturbance by E can much affect.

RM: It’s not a new reference that S can adopt in order to stop being controlled. S has to stop controlling the variable that is allowing E to control his behavior via disturbance to the controlled variable. If S continues to control the knot/coin relationship
but at a new reference value his actions are still controllable. Variations in the value of a reference change only the value at which a perceptual variable is maintained; it doesn’t change what perceptual variable is being controlled.

FL: Real control of others means controlling references.

RM: This is not quite true. But it would take to long to explain why.

So that’s enough for now.

Best

Rick

8. I’ll go back to the example of mothers attempting to teach their children manners, or moral behavior in general. Here the goal is to not just control our perception of our children’s behavior, but to control our perception of their perceptions and
   references. We want our children to be good because they perceive it as the right thing to do, not to simply avoid trouble or please us. But perceptions aren’t given and fixed. Children have to be taught to consider others, to exercise their powers of perception
   to perceive events from others’ point of view, in order to develop the references that allow them to control for being respectful, honest, etc. in a variety of situations.

7. And, I would argue that it is warranted for parents to perceive their children’s perceptions and references as having actually changed. We put our children in many difficult situations, we observe them when they don’t know we are, we ask how they behaved
   when we were not around. We test to see if they are controlling for the perception of being respectful to classmates, to teachers, to other parents and especially to us. And we don’t think we have done our job as parents until they repeatedly pass these kinds
   of tests. When they are older, we can ask them directly and find that by and large, what they mean by being respectful agrees with what we mean.

8. None of this changes the fact that our little loving living control systems had a choice in this every step of the way and that the choices they made were made only if they made sense in terms of controlling their own perceptions to their own references.
   But we parents had a hand in determining those perceptions and references, just as in the rubber band experiment the experimenter has a hand in determining the errors that are perceived and the reference for the subject.

9. In sum, all I can control directly are my own perceptions. But in so doing, I exert forces in the real world that affect others’ perceptions and what they are trying to control. The effect is that it is warranted for me to believe I control some aspects
   of the real world and others in it. I do so only indirectly, given my mediated access to it and them and the operation of their own control systems, but not unintentionally or necessarily poorly. And others do the same to me.

Frank

From: “csgnet@lists.illinois.edu” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Reply-To: “wmansell@gmail.com” wmansell@gmail.com

Date: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 at 5:31 AM

To: Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net

Cc: “csgnet@lists.illinois.edu” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu

Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

I am with Rick. There are lots of things we have some control over in the service of controlling our perception. These other things are often less reliable in our ability to control them and more dependent on context, but nonetheless they are
controlled, as a MEANS to control perception…
Warren

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 4:28 AM, Martin Taylor
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.24.20.06]

[From Rick Marken ( 2014.11.23.1640)]

Do you REALLY mean that control is NOT control of perception, but of something in the environment? In previous messages you have also claimed that “control” exists not when someone is trying to alter the state of a perception but only when they succeed in altering
it in the intended direction.

Unless I missed it, you never commented on my example of the big rock. In case you forgot, the (true) story is this. I saw what appeared to be a small stone in a new flowerbed I was digging. I wnated to put it aside, so I nudged it with my foot. It didn’t move.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). I bent down to pick it up, but I couldn’t, so I got my spade to dig it up but it didn’t move. (Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).
I kept digging, and fount that the "small stone was actually a somewhat oval granite rock about 1.3m x 70 cm x 40 cm, too heavy to lift. So I got some timbers and a car jack, and dug as much under it as I could, in order to use the jack to tilt it to one side.
(Was I controlling its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?). By tilting and getting more and more timbers and tehn earth under it, I managed to raise it to ground level, where I decided to keep it as a garden feature. (Was I controlling
its position? Was I controlling my perception of its position?).

As I understand your comment above, you would say I was not controlling the rock’s position until I got it to move, but once it was moving nearer to where I wanted it, I was controlling its position. But if you say that, then what were my actions of trying
to dislodge it with my foot, then my hands, and then my spade? They couldn’t have been “behaviours” because behaviours are control of perception, and, apparently, control of perception depends on the ability to control an environmental variable. Since I was
not able to move the rock, I was not controlling my perception of it. So what were my actions?

I think you are departing a LONG way from Bill’s PCT. “Perception: the control of behaviour”, it was not. (Not even the control of someone else’s behaviour).

Martin

–
Dr Warren Mansell

Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Psychological Sciences

2nd Floor Zochonis Building

University of Manchester

Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL

Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel:
+44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website:
http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on
A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

TH: Yes, we should recognize the behavior of individuals as a subject of control by other individuals. Further, we should not lose track of the PCT meaning of control when it
becomes easy to go astray by misconstruing part of the loop (output) as control, per se.

RM: I agree. And I think that whenever we talk about “control” on CSGNet we should always use the PCT meaning of that word: maintaining a variable in a preselected state, protected from disturbance. I always do, or at least I always try to. So when I
talk about “control of behavior” I am always talking about keeping a behavioral variable, such as the position of the sheep relative to the herd in my “Control of Behavior” demo:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html ) in a preselected state (close to the herd), protected from disturbances (the movements of the herd). Examples of objective measures of control, which show quantitatively how well some behavioral
variable has been controlled (how well the variable has been protected from disturbances to its preselected state) are shown at the end of the demo. These are the measures of RMS error and stability under “Sheepdog control” which show how well the behavior
of the sheep (location relative to the herd) was controlled by the sheepdog (you).

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.26.1715)]

···

On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

KM: I wonder if Rick would be willing to discuss this interaction from the point of view of the argument he’s been making in this thread?

RM: You bet. This is indeed an attempt to control behavior. I have a reference for a certain level of civility of discussions on CSGNet.

RM :Ad hominum attacks are a disturbance to that perception…

HB : There is no need to »attack others« because they don’t »attack« me.

RM: Maybe we have a language problem here. Let me explain what I think an ad hominum attack is. It’s when you attack the person making an argument rather than the argument itself. For example, when you say to me:

HB: But that also shows what kind of person you are.

RM: That is an ad hominum attack on me because you and saying something negative about my person rather than about my argument. Similarly, when you say:

HB: So ii think you showed your mean personality (Mr.Hyde).

RM: You are again saying something negative about my person rather than about my argument.

RM: Name calling is also an ad hoiminum attack, even if the names are not particularly “bad” in themselves. So when you call a person a “behaviorist” or a “self-regulation theorist” you are using those words to attack the person rather than the person’s argument. It’s like calling a person a “communist” or a “liberal” (as they do regularly on Fox News here in the US; media central for ad hominum attacks). While there is nothing bad about being a communist or a liberal (or for that matter a behaviorist of a self-regulation theorist) when you use the words as though they were bad things for a person to be, you are attacking the person, not the person’s arguments. It is not an ad hominum attack, however, if you say something like “what you are saying sounds like behaviorism (or self-regulation theory) and here’s why” because you are commenting on the argument, not the person making it.

RM: I don’t mind spirited arguments on CSGNet – I rather enjoy them, actually – but I think it’s possible to have such arguments in a civil manner by trying to avoid attacking the people making the arguments – that is, by avoiding ad hominum attacks. I know that’s hard to do – I don’t have a perfect record on it myself – but I think we should at least give civility a chance.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Erling_Jorgensen1]

[From Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.27.1315 EST)]

Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1030)

Hi Rick,
You seem to have a lot of theories about what goes on in my head.

EJ: I would say E is controlling (his/her perception of) the location of

S's
finger, compensating for the disturbances that S's movements create when the
finger moves away from the coin that E is trying to get the finger over.

RM: OK, but you're putting a lot of theory into that description. Do you

really see E controlling a perception of S's finger? Or are you saying that
you see this based on your knowledge of PCT?

EJ: I put the theory part in parentheses deliberatively. Although I must
say, I don't think I share your faith in phenomenological realism. What we
see is always shaped (so says my theory) by existing knowledge, the language
community one shares, and what perceptual functions have already been
constructed.

RM: I believe that what you see is what I see: E controlling S's finger,

moving it from it's initial position to the target coin by pulling on E's end
of the rubber band. That is, you see E controlling S's behavior.

EJ: No, I really do see a location. It's right out there in the environment.
It's the position of one thing (the finger) in relation to another thing (the
coin). And that's not much of a theoretical statement. If we asked someone
the position of the finger, they might well say, "above the coin." It's
really quite plain.

EJ: I also see movements. The arm seems to move around, mostly from the
elbow. Sometimes the wrist moves, or the fingers pull tighter on the rubber
band. The eyes seem to change their direction of gaze. When body parts move,
I tend to call those things behaviors.

EJ: Actually, the main theoretical word in your paragraph is "controlling,"
which you have defined quite well in other posts. If it is enough to say the
movement was brought to a halt and thus controlled, then any old placement
would be adequate. But it is precisely the location over the coin that
matters. And so, the _location_ of S's finger is being controlled by E, a
point I have readily admitted.

RM: Your problem with the term "behavior" comes from your understanding,

based on control theory, that what we see as behavior is outputs varying to
produce controlled results. ... But that view of behavior is actually a
_theory_, not a fact. Most psychologists don't see behavior that way; they see
behavior as simply an output. There is no such thing as a controlled result
for most (all?) psychologists.

EJ: Here we've changed from a particular psychologist (me) to various ones
from memory and imagination. Seeing as the question was about what I see, you
might want to stick with the psychologist you've got. This psychologist sees
a location being controlled, with small residual movements not making much
difference but not being controlled. I realize this may not make your point
quite so well.

EJ: You mentioned in your reply to Phil --

Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1940):

RM: People are clearly controlling with very high gain for believing that

it is impossible to control the behavior of an LCS. ... It looks like it's
kind of important, in a bad way, to a lot of people on CSGNet. I really would
like to know why.

EJ: You seem to be controlling with very high gain for _not_ understanding
what others are saying, at least what I have been saying. The term "behavior"
always needs further specification as to what is meant. That's why I believe
it is imprecise. What appears obvious to you does not seem that way to me.
No amount of capitalization or claiming it is a "fact" changes that for me.

EJ: I acknowledge that...something about S is being controlled by E. ...

If this is enough of an acknowledgment in your eyes, and not too much of
a concession as to what I am asking, then I would be interested in reading
what you have been wanting to say about this phenomenon of one person's
control of something about another person.

RM: I would rather have your understanding than your acknowledgement but I

think we are moving in that direction.

EJ: I laughed when I read this. Actually, Rick, I think I would rather have
your acknowledgment than your understanding. If you would grant the primacy
of things like "location" being controlled in the case under discussion,
without insisting that it must be called a "behavior," then I believe the
discussion would be further along toward the analysis portion you say you want
to get to. From my paradigm, I cannot force you to do that.

RM: So if we can all agree ...

EJ: If I adopted your paradigm for the moment, that control of behavior is
possible, I would say this: "Stop it, Rick! Stop trying to get me to say
that 'behavior' is controlled, when what I plainly see is that 'location' is
controlled. Stop doing that!"

EJ: You stated in that same reply to Phil --

RM: Right now I'm busy working, taking care of family issues, ranting on

CSGNet and writing a book about control of behavior -- really;-)

EJ: This is the first up-a-level comment I have seen from you on this
particular thread. It helps me understand the high gain going on from one
particular side of this discussion. I'm sorry if my view of "behavior"
doesn't cooperate with your project.

All the best,
Erling

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1500)]

···

Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.27.1315 EST)

EJ: … And so, the location of S’s finger is being controlled by E, a

point I have readily admitted.

RM: So you don’t consider the location of S’s finger to be S’s behavior? It seems to me that S has a lot to do with where his or her finger is located.

RM: I would rather have your understanding than your acknowledgement but I

think we are moving in that direction.

EJ: I laughed when I read this. Actually, Rick, I think I would rather have

your acknowledgment than your understanding. If you would grant the primacy

of things like “location” being controlled in the case under discussion,

without insisting that it must be called a “behavior,” then I believe the

discussion would be further along toward the analysis portion you say you want

to get to.

RM: Sure, if you don’t want to call it behavior it’s fine with me. Seems like a rather restrictive communication choice but you are certainly free (in the “autonomy” sense) to make it.

EJ: From my paradigm, I cannot force you to do that.

RM: I can’t from mine either. I can only control the variables formerly known as your behaviors when they are the means of protecting variables you are controlling from the disturbances that I produce. I can only control the position of your finger in the rubber band demo, for example, as long as you are controlling the position of the knot relative to the coin – even if you are controlling that variable relative to a varying reference. Once you stop controlling the position of the knot relative the coin you are free of my control!

Happy Thanksgiving

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[_Boris_Hartman]

David Goldstein (2014.11.23.1737)

I agree with you about putting my shot as far as possible from the other person.

I can’t control whether the person will try and be where I hit the ball.

However, I assume that the person will try and be there. If the distance is too great and my shot arrives there quickly, the person may not try.

HB : Great David. My observations are quite similar to yours. It seems that final arbiter (or ultimate authority, »real reality« as Bill would put it) is observing and participating in tennis game if we want to talk about what control events are happening in the game. We could learn also from videos. The same is probably for »dog and sheep« and for any other event we want to analyze.

So when I hit the ball where I wanted (control of perception is succesfull as Martin put it) I try to return to my »starting« position (that’s probably what all tennis players do) and start to observe carefully opponent (assuming that opponent will be there »on the ball« as you said). Both actions were experienced before,  as they should contribute to better control in next sequence of the game.Â

So I try to anticipate (control in imagination) what opponent will do. I can’t control his »behavior« as whatever I could do was disturbing his controlled perceptions as much as i can with my shot on the opponent’s side, so that his control would be poor.

So observiing opponent and conntrolling in imagination is offering possibility for better or as Martin put it more »succesfull« control, because if I’ll stand in good position in relation to the ball when it arrives (we say it to be »on the ball« what means that we are in technically right position for example for choosen forehand shot which enable optimal control), my control of perception has much more chances to be succesfull. So choosing right which perceptions to control from opponents movement is important part of succesfull control.

So in the playing game I’m busy with choosing which perception to control and than controlling that percpetions as much as possible succesfully so realizing goals in my hierarchy. And probably opponent is doing the same. So we are disturbing each other perception in such a way so that our control would be  poor, what usualy happens when my or opponent’s control is succesful. If I want to win the game. But I can play tennis also with other intentions.

DG :

I really can’t control anything about what the other Person does.

HB :

I think that you’ve done a great job David. I think that we can’t »control behavior of other person« in sports game, but also not in everyday life.

I like your example of homeostatical control which is, as I see it, the »final authority« for determining what can be controlled and who can be controlled and why can’t be controlled in organisms…as we are talking about oorganisms survival. I think it’s the basics to understand how much people can be controlled.

Best,

Boris

David

···

From: D Goldstein [mailto:davidmg@verizon.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 11:47 PM
To: boris.hartman@masicom.net
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 23, 2014, at 5:20 PM, “"Boris Hartman"” (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

David,

as I’m tennis player too, I can say only that I fully agree with you, and probably will all other tennis player. Only consider one detail.

DG:

I am not able to control the other person except maybe where the other person is when my ball arrives there.

HB : I’m experiencing it diferently. I don’t control where the other person will be when ball arrive on the other side. I control rather for »where opponent will not be«, when ball arrive on other side. So if I want to win a point I will try ,beside placing the ball as far as possible from opponent, to spin the ball or give the ball as much as possible acceleration, and so on, so that it will be harder for the opponent to return the ball or control the shot, which he will choose. But i can’t control whether opponent will be on the ball or not when ball arrive in opponents part of the playground. But I can control what I will do with ball or whether i’ll catch it if opponent is precisely shoting the ball enough away from me.

Maybe we can see the example with drop-shot. My attempt is to place the ball in the field as much as possible far from the opponent, hoping that he will not be there on the ball, when ball arrives on te other side. Or passing-shot… So I’m not at all »controlling« for the opponent to be »on the ball«or to be there when the ball will fall in his part of the playground. And this is what I think most players are doing to win the point. It’s quite similar to tactics in table tennis, although there are differences. The bases of the tactics is to make control of returning the ball harder for the opponent. So if I would place the ball near opponent, it’ quite easy for him to control the return and thus the winning of the point. I hope we understand what I wanted to say.

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of David Goldstein (davidmg@verizon.net via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2014 7:07 PM
To: rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

David Goldstein (2014.11.23.1240)

I would like to continue with the tennis example. I may be able to control where I hit the ball, say to the baseline close to the right sideline. I cannot control whether the other person will hit it back. I cannot control how the other person will hit it back (down-the-line, crosscourt, shallow, deep, slice, topspin, flat). My control is very limited over the details of what happens when and if my ball arrives where I want it to go. I have no control over whether the other person calls my shot in or out. If I disagree with the call, I can ask to play the point over. The “knot” for each of us, is keep the ball in play. That is the reference perception. We can’t both achieve the reference perception on a specific point. It is a one person wins and the other person loses situation for a specific point. I can try a nd make it harder for the other person to achieve the reference perception. If the other person has a weak backhand ( I am a lefty and let’s say the other person is a righty), I would play to his backhand. I cannot control whether or how the other person will return my shot. I am not able to control the other person except maybe where the other person is when my ball arrives there. And that is based on the other person wanting to achieve the reference perception.

David

Sent from my iPad

On Nov 22, 2014, at 1:03 AM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

<image001.png>

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.21.2200)]

Martin Taylor (2014.11.21.23.01)–

MT: Look, I have no problem with accepting that when you control your perception of an environmental variable well, that environmental variable is stabilized. What I have a problem with is the result of saying that it is the environmental variable that is controlled with the implication that therefore the perception is stabilized.

RM: I didn’t know that was wrong? Let’s say the perception that is under control is p = a1x1+a2x2 where x1 and x2 are the environmental variables. So the aspect of the environment that is controlled is a linear combination of x1 and x2. So there is really nothing in the environment that corresponds to p; it is a function of environmental variables that corresponds to p. When this function of environmental variables is controlled p is controlled. So controlling p is really equivalent to controlling the aspect of the environment (a1x1+a2x2) that corresponds to p.

MT: The causation is, of course, circular, and for life purposes the stabilization of the environmental variable is more important than that of the perception.

RM: I don’t see how perception and environmental variable can be controlled separately. When you control a perception you are controlling the aspect of the environment (what you call the “environmental variable”) that corresponds to the perception. How could one vary independently of the other?

MT: But that doesn’t alter the fact that only the perception can be controlled. Problems arise in situations like this thread when the environmental variable is taken to be the controlled variable. It isn’t, and the fact that you, as a rubber-band subject, could have opted out of the situation or added your own variations of the knot position without changing what E was controlling, demonstrates that it isn’t.

RM: I don’t understand this at all. Are you saying that I could have stopped controlling for the coin being over the knot and E would have still been able to control his perception of my finger even though my finger was no longer under his control?

MT: Sometimes wording matters. I’ve taken your side on other occasions by pointing out that when control is good, the environmental variable is just as controlled as is the perception,

RM: But what you call the “environmental variable” (which I would prefer to call the “aspect of the environment” for the reasons I mention above) always corresponds to the perceptual variable, whether control is good or bad.

and it really doesn’t matter much if you say the environmental variable is controlled. After all, that’s teh foundation for the Test for the Controlled variable. But when to make that point leads to a fruitless discussion that could be stopped in its tracks by insisting on the fact that it is the perception that is controlled, I think it would be best to not make the point.

RM: I’m sorry, I don’t understand. Are you saying that it is possible to control a perception of behavior without actually controlling the behavior (the “environmental variable”) that is perceived?

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

Hi Rick and everybody,

It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«. It was quite close, I must admitt speccialy in one moment :

MT :

Almost everyone (Boris excluded) seem to agree that the experimenter does control the subject’s behaviour

HB :

I thought at first that PCT »is lost«, but a lucky moment occured as Martin »returned« with his precise PCT thinking. Thanks Martin. And many of you showed great devotion to PCT and great knowledge, so it seems that for now PCT is »control of perception«. There are many ways of perceiving and understanding »reality«, but I think that PCT is the best.

I would appreciate only that »PCT school theory« stays on the CSGnet. I’m sure that similar theoretical fundamentals of School system which were exposed on ECACS are safe with Martin. I’m asking that because I’ve written it in my PhD, which is not finished and published yet. I’m lazy. I admitt.

But as I didin’t find the words to persuade Rick to abandon reasoning »of controlling student behavior« I counter-acted with my PCT vision of how students control. Theory »of controlling students behavior« is present in probably 90% of World school systems. I hope that one day »PCT school theory« will come into schools and make children happier. J

I’d like to say also some words to *barb. I’m sorry if I caused you any troubles. I tried my best to »shield« PCT and your good PCT logic. I think that only turning »influence« into »disturbances« gives your thoughts the full PCT power. PCT wording doesn’t automatically means understanding PCT. Understanding of »control« can be presented in many languages and forms. And maybe your understanding is the best garantie that CSGnet will not »deviate« again.

As the »task« is done, you can »kick« me out of CSGnet, if you feel so. I’ll respect your decision. But maybe in a few months I’ll be usefull for some similar discussion as it seems to be periodical event.

Only few words with Rick (bellow).

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2014 2:16 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.26.1715)]

On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

KM: I wonder if Rick would be willing to discuss this interaction from the point of view of the argument he’s been making in this thread?

RM: You bet. This is indeed an attempt to control behavior. I have a reference for a certain level of civility of discussions on CSGNet.

RM :Ad hominum attacks are a disturbance to that perception…

HB : I like your wording »disturbance to that perception« not »controlled behavior«. On general I think Rick that you are a great PCT thinker who can contribute a lot to PCT. I’m realy sometimes impressed by your PCT knowledge. And I didn’t know how to explain to you that you should use only your PCT knowledge. T looks like it happened. I hope that disagreements will disapear and that we could be again PCT friends. Â

HB earlier : There is no need to »attack others« because they don’t »attack« me.

I think that attack is not only »ad hominum attack«. Depends what kind of »error« person experience. Some person can be offended when his name is said wrongly. It’s relative as any »fact« in reality depending from the person that observes the »fact« and how experience is felt. For example :

RM earlier:

But attributing fake statements to make it seem like your Dad agreed with them would be rather poor form, I think. If the capitalized sentence above is actually something your Dad said then I hope Boris will prove it by showing us where he said it; and if it proves to be true that your Dad said it then I would just be dismayed that Bill would say such a thing. But if this is a fake attribution then I think Boris would deserve a good old fashioned shaming.

HB :

If you’ll be honest you knew excatly that I mixed the persons, but you were using my mistake to point out that if I don’t manage to prove (as you knew that I can’t) than I’ll deserv »old fashioned shaming«. This is for me serious attack with humiliation. Something very negative as you said to do to one person. That’s how I felt your writings.

RM earlier: Maybe we have a language problem here. Let me explain what I think an ad hominum attack is. It’s when you attack the person making an argument rather than the argument itself. For example, when you say to me:Â

HB earlier : But that also shows what kind of person you are.

RM earlier : That is an ad hominum attack on me because you and saying something negative about my person rather than about my argument. Similarly, when you say:

HB earlier : So I think you showed your mean personality (Mr.Hyde).

HB: I’m sorry for that Rick, but in the »fire of the battle« we both used »ugly means« as we were trying to show our points as right and others as much as possible false and unworthy. But that’s probably what people do in their lives all over the World as they are LCS. They follow their goals and usualy don’t carefully choose means to achieve their goals. Specially politics. Maybe they do.

RM: You are again saying something negative about my person rather than about my argument.

HB : Rick I don’t want to go into the »battle« again, but if you’ll go back in our threads you’ll see that you didn’t answer almost on 70% of my arguments.Â

RM: Name calling is also an ad hoiminum attack, even if the names are not particularly “bad” in themselves. So when you call a person a “behaviorist” or a “self-regulation theorist” you are using those words to attack the person rather than the person’s argument.

It’s like calling a person a “communist” or a “liberal” (as they do regularly on Fox News here in the US; media central for ad hominum attacks). While there is nothing bad about being a communist or a liberal (or for that matter a behaviorist of a self-regulation theorist) when you use the words as though they were bad things for a person to be, you are attacking the person, not the person’s arguments. It is not an ad hominum attack, however, if you say something like “what you are saying sounds like behaviorism (or self-regulation theory) and here’s why” because you are commenting on the argument, not the person making it.

HB: I’m aware that I used terms you wrote above in »negative« meaning. I’m sorry also for that. But as you said that you don’t have perfect record yourself, I suppose I could learn also from you J. I didin’t started with such terms. They were already part of CSGnet, when I joined. Maybe Martin will remember, Fred…?

RM: I don’t mind spirited arguments on CSGNet – I rather enjoy them, actually – but I think it’s possible to have such arguments in a civil manner by trying to avoid attacking the people making the arguments – that is, by avoiding ad hominum attacks. I know that’s hard to do – I don’t have a perfect record on it myself – but I think we should at least give civility a chance.

HB : I agree.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.28.1200)]

···

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB: RM earlier: But attributing fake statements to make it seem like your Dad agreed with them would be rather poor form, I think. If the capitalized sentence above is actually something your Dad said then I hope Boris will prove it by showing us where he said it; and if it proves to be true that your Dad said it then I would just be dismayed that Bill would say such a thing. But if this is a fake attribution then I think Boris would deserve a good old fashioned shaming.

HB : If you’ll be honest you knew excatly that I mixed the persons, but you were using my mistake to point out that if I don’t manage to prove (as you knew that I can’t) than I’ll deserv »old fashioned shaming«. This is for me serious attack with humiliation. Something very negative as you said to do to one person. That’s how I felt your writings.

RM: Ah, I think I finally understand the problem here. I apparently did make a mistake in not noticing that Boris had made a mistake (referring to Barb as “he” rather than “she”, but it was certainly not intentional. Here’s the original sequence:

---

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

---

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement). I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[Kent]

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.28.1700)]

Rick Marken (2014.11.28.1200)

Hi Rick,

You end your post to Boris with this statement:

KM: I’m still not convinced. Although like you I’m very concerned about the ubiquitous evidence that people try (often with considerable success) to control (their perceptions of) other people’s behavior, I still think that in terms of PCT it is incorrect
to describe these occurrences as people controlling the behavior of other people. As a sociologist, my research and thinking has been focused on social power and people’s attempts control others every since I started trying to understand PCT and apply it to
sociology more than 25 years ago, and like you I have a strong investment in seeing that people use PCT correctly. So while I agree that this is a question of great political importance, I think your analysis of it is wrong.

KM: Here is my argument: I think it is correct to say that person A can control the environmental circumstances in which person B controls B’s perceptions, and further that person A’s stabilization or disruption of person B’s environment can have the effect
of either expanding or limiting B’s degrees of freedom to control various perceptions that B might want to control, thus facilitating or impeding person B’s opportunities for controlling perceptions of B’s own choosing.

KM: But if behavior is the control of perception, as I believe it is, person A’s stabilization or disruption of person B’s environment is not the equivalent of controlling B’s perceptions. Person B’s perceptions belong entirely to B, and person A does
not have the direct access to B’s perceptions that would be needed if A were to actually control them.

KM: To make my argument more concrete let me apply it to the classic rubber-band experiment that Rick repeatedly invoked in support of his argument ever since the beginning of this set of threads. Here is how he describes it

Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1350)

RM: Good point. Let me try to convince you;-) I think the most important thing for a control theory practitioner to understand is what control is. Control is an observable phenomenon that is seen when a variable is kept in a particular state, protected
from the effects of disturbances that would cause that variable to move from that state. S’s behavior in the rubber band demo can be seen to be controlled in this sense. The position of S’s finger (S’s behavior) is a variable that is kept in a particular state
(over the target coin) on each trial, protected from the the effect of the disturbance created by the fact that the finger starts in different initial positions of the finger on each trial; if the finger were not under control it would have ended up on the
target coin each time.

RM: So it’s easy to see that S’s behavior ()finger position) is under control and it’s also easy to see that it is E, via pulls on his end of the rubber band, that is effecting this control. Once it has been determined that S’s finger position is under
control and that E is the system controlling that variable, the control theory practitioner can start doing the research needed to determine how this control is occurring, research that will involve testing to determine the exact nature of he perceptual input
that is under control.

Rick Marken (2014.11.24.1750)

···

RM: Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman”
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior
can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t
see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB: RM earlier: But attributing fake statements to make it seem like your Dad agreed with them would be rather poor form, I think. If the capitalized sentence above is actually something
your Dad said then I hope Boris will prove it by showing us where he said it; and if it proves to be true that your Dad said it then I would just be dismayed that Bill would say such a thing. But if this is a fake attribution then I think Boris would deserve
a good old fashioned shaming.

HB : If you’ll be honest you knew excatly that I mixed the persons,
but you were using my mistake to point out that if I don’t manage to prove (as you knew that I can’t) than I’ll deserv »old fashioned shaming«. This is for me serious attack with humiliation. Something very negative as you said to do to one person. That’s
how I felt your writings.

RM: Ah, I think I finally understand the problem here. I apparently did make a mistake in not noticing that Boris had made a mistake (referring to Barb as “he” rather than “she”, but it was certainly not intentional. Here’s the original
sequence:

---

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

---

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement).
I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that
disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that
control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances,
control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[dmg]

David Goldstein (2014.11.29.0853)

I agree with Kent’s description.

Getting another person to do a specific behavior (for example, move off the center of the street and walk on the sidewalk) is something that requires the other person’s cooperation, even if you are a policeman.

David

···

RM: Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman”
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior
can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t
see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB: RM earlier: But attributing fake statements to make it seem like your Dad agreed with them would be rather poor form, I think. If the capitalized sentence above is actually something
your Dad said then I hope Boris will prove it by showing us where he said it; and if it proves to be true that your Dad said it then I would just be dismayed that Bill would say such a thing. But if this is a fake attribution then I think Boris would deserve
a good old fashioned shaming.

HB : If you’ll be honest you knew excatly that I mixed the persons,
but you were using my mistake to point out that if I don’t manage to prove (as you knew that I can’t) than I’ll deserv »old fashioned shaming«. This is for me serious attack with humiliation. Something very negative as you said to do to one person. That’s
how I felt your writings.

RM: Ah, I think I finally understand the problem here. I apparently did make a mistake in not noticing that Boris had made a mistake (referring to Barb as “he” rather than “she”, but it was certainly not intentional. Here’s the original
sequence:

---

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

---

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement).
I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that
disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that
control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances,
control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[_Boris_Hartman]

Hi Rick,

First I need to apologize to everybody for posting something without background. Some posts I’ve been sending to CSGnet, ended in personal e-mail boxes. So answer to Rick’s post where he described »control of students behavior« ended there. I asked Rick if he wants me to post it on CSGnet, but he didn’t answer yet. My computer once did the same mistake, but then I got immediate Rick’s answer that I made a mistake and aksed me if I could post it to CSGnet. High gentlemen’s move. I can say that when I and Rick talked or talk in person directly,  the discussion has a very high cultural level so I’m aksing myself whether we are the same persons when we are talking on CSGnet.Â

So I’ll wait for Rick’s answer about that post.

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.28.1200)]

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB : I’m not objecting to situations »where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior«.If it appears than it must be »perceptual illussion«.

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement). I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

HB :

I see that I made a mistake too, which misleaded you. Sorry for that. Our reorganization works good with some mistakes. It looks like natural mechanism. J

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

HB : I think that in only one way LCS can affect another LCS, and that is to disturb perception. What else can one LCS do to another LCS to »control it’s behavior« ? What mechanism in another LCS is someone »controlling«, so to say that he is »controlling behavior« of another LCS ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[Kent]

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.29.0900)]

Here’s another try on the post I sent off prematurely last night.

Rick Marken (2014.11.28.1200)

Hi Rick,

You end your post to Boris with this statement:

KM: I’m still not convinced. Although like you I’m very concerned about the ubiquitous evidence that people try (often with considerable success) to control (their perceptions of) other people’s behavior, I still think that in terms of PCT it is incorrect
to describe these occurrences as people controlling the behavior of other people. As a sociologist, my research and thinking has been focused on social power and people’s attempts control others every since I started trying to understand PCT and apply it to
sociology more than 25 years ago, and like you I have a strong investment in seeing that people use PCT correctly. So while I agree that this is a question of great political and social importance, I think your analysis of it is wrong.

KM: Here is my argument: I think it is correct to say that person A can control the environmental circumstances in which person B controls B’s perceptions, and further that person A’s stabilization or disruption of person B’s environment can have the effect
of either expanding or limiting B’s degrees of freedom to control various perceptions that B might want to control, thus facilitating or impeding person B’s opportunities for controlling perceptions of B’s own choosing.

KM: But if behavior is the control of perception, as I believe it is, person A’s stabilization or disruption of person B’s environment is not the equivalent of controlling B’s perceptions. Person B’s perceptions belong entirely to B, and person A does
not have the direct access to B’s perceptions that would be needed if A were to actually control them.

KM: To make my argument more concrete let me apply it to the classic rubber-band experiment that Rick repeatedly invoked in support of his argument about control of behavior.

KM: As those following this tangle of threads will recall, in the rubber-band experiment two people, an experimenter (E) and a subject (S), each loop one end of a pair of rubber bands knotted together in the middle around an index finger and then hold
the knotted rubber band parallel to a table top and a centimeter or two above it. The subject is informed covertly that his or her task is to keep the knot of the rubber band hovering directly above an inconspicuous dot on the table top. The experimenter (let’s
call her Amy) is told to move her end of the rubber band around slowly and randomly, while keeping some tension on it. E’s other task, and that of any onlookers, is to figure out what S is doing, or in other words, to ascertain S’s behavior. E (if this is
E’s first time doing the experiment) and other naive onlookers invariably have great difficulty figuring out what S (let’s call him Bob) is trying to do.

KM: I find it somewhat ironic to recall that the whole point of this experiment, as I understand it (and I have done it many times with groups of students), is that one cannot tell what another person’s behavior is (what perceptions are being controlled)
simply by observing that person’s physical actions, if one is starting from the definition of behavior used by conventional psychologists, that behavior consists of a person’s observable motor actions, which have been commanded by the person’s cognitive processing
in response to decoded environmental stimuli. It is only when one has put on “control theory glasses”, as Rick says in one of his finest publications, and begins to look at behavior in the PCT sense of controlling perceptions in a control-system loop, that
S’s actions begin to make sense. That Rick would cite this experiment in support of his argument that person A can control person B’s “behavior” astounds me.

KM: The way he gets to this tortured conclusion, of course, is by describing a variation of the rubber-band experiment in which E manipulates her end of the rubber band so that S’s finger is held steady (say, over a coin sitting on the table) in one position
(or else moved around in some pattern like a triangle or circle).

Here is how he describes this situation:

Rick Marken (2014.11.25.1350)

RM: . . . Control is an observable phenomenon that is seen when a variable is kept in a particular state, protected from the effects of disturbances that would cause that variable to move from that state. S’s behavior in the rubber band demo can be seen
to be controlled in this sense. The position of S’s finger (S’s behavior) is a variable that is kept in a particular state (over the target coin) on each trial, protected from the the effect of the disturbance created by the fact that the finger starts in
different initial positions of the finger on each trial; if the finger were not under control it would have ended up on the target coin each time.

RM: So it’s easy to see that S’s behavior ()finger position) is under control and it’s also easy to see that it is E, via pulls on his end of the rubber band, that is effecting this control. Once it has been determined that S’s finger position is under
control and that E is the system controlling that variable, the control theory practitioner can start doing the research needed to determine how this control is occurring, research that will involve testing to determine the exact nature of he perceptual input
that is under control.

Rick Marken (2014.11.24.1750)

RM: My point is simply that E can be observed to control S’s finger position. Control of behavior is a fact. How E effects this control (and why S can be controlled in this situation) is explained by PCT. But you don’t need any
PCT concepts – perception, references,etc – to know that control of behavior is happening.

KM: Thus, Rick’s argument is that holding a finger steady in a particular position is S’s behavior and that E is controlling that behavior. But is the finger position S’s behavior? I would say no. In my view, S’s finger position is simply one link in a chain
of physical causality that forms a feedback path, from S’s physical arm movements through the position of the finger to the knot in the rubber band (and the dot on the table) and back via light waves to S’s eyes, which then allows S to control the perception
of holding knot above the dot. S’s finger is in that position only because it is the only place, given the physics of the way the rubber band stretches, for it to be if S wants to use it in holding the rubber band when controlling the perception of knot over
dot. To make my argument a little clearer, consider this imagined scenario.

KM: In the middle of the experiment, S notices an itch on his right ear. S picks up a pen in his left hand, slides it into the loop in the rubber band in place of his right index finger, which he detaches from the loop and then uses it to scratch the itch
in his ear, all the while controlling his perception of keeping the knot over the dot.

KM: S’s control of his perception of knot over dot is unchanged, but is E still controlling the position of the finger? No. Is E controlling S’s right index finger (or any of his other fingers, for that matter)? Not hardly. Consider the perceptions is
S controlling: the perception of scratching the itch in his ear, the perception of holding the pen in the loop of the rubber band, and, most importantly, the perception of holding the knot over the dot. Is S controlling the perception of the position of his
right-hand index finger? Probably not. If his middle finger works better for scratching the itch, that’s the one he’ll use. The position of his right index finger is just irrelevant from his point of view.

KM: What can E control in this scenario (or in any of the variations of the experiment that we have considered)? The only thing that E can control is (her perception of) the position of S’s end of the rubber band, which is linked to E’s end of the rubber
band by a set of physically causal connections and is thus part of the feedback loop that E uses to control her perception. In the imagined scenario that I just offered, E is definitely not controlling S’s behavior (no matter what definition of behavior you
are using).

KM: It looks to me as if Rick has got himself caught in the trap that he has often (brilliantly) described as a trap for conventional psychologists who want to interpret the results of their laboratory experiments as having something to do with their subjects’
behavior. He is interpreting a subject’s physical movements, which have been predetermined by the the physical setup of the experiment, as the subject’s own behavior.

KM: Let me offer a few other examples of supposed behavioral control, just to make my point a little more explicit.

KM: Bob is running down the street. Amy trips Bob, and he falls flat on his face. Has Amy caused Bob to fall down? Yes. Is “falling down” Bob’s behavior? No. Falling down indicates a total lack of control of his perception of running down the street and
thus is not his behavior in any PCT sense. Has Amy controlled Bob’s behavior, because he is no longer running down the street? Well, she has destabilized the environmental circumstances in which Bob is attempting to control his perceptions and thus has greatly
disturbed his perception of running down the street. But we will see how well Amy has controlled Bob’s behavior by whether he gets up and slugs her in the nose before he sets off again down the street.

KM: Amy and Bob are mother and small child. They are walking down the street hand in hand. Amy is hurrying to get home, but Bob is resisting every step of the way, pulling back as hard as his little body can pull in the opposite direction. Amy drags Bob
along, so that his body moves down the street in the direction of their house. Is Amy controlling the position of Bob’s body? Yes. Is she controlling his behavior? Emphatically not. (She really wishes she could.) But all she is controlling are the environmental
circumstances in which Bob is controlling his own perceptions. (I’ve borrowed this example, if memory serves, from one of the “leading questions” at the end of a chapter of B:CP.)

KM: Amy locks Bob in a small dark room with no windows. (Bob is now a grownup, so we don’t need to accuse Amy of child abuse.) Has she controlled his behavior by thus greatly stabilizing his environmental circumstances and reducing his degrees of freedom
in this way? Well, you might say that. In Bob’s environmental circumstances, a wide range of behaviors are currently ruled out, like touring Australia, running for President of the US (but maybe not Congress), robbing old ladies at gunpoint in the street,
or digging a garden. But Amy is not really in control of Bob’s control of his perceptions, as we have learned from innumerable TV and movie thrillers in which the hero makes some miraculous escape from circumstances just as dire as Bob’s.

KM: Amy gives Bob the keys to a penthouse in New York, along with a million dollars. Has she controlled his behavior? No, Bob can do whatever he wants with these fabulous expansions of the degrees of freedom to control his own perceptions in his newly
enhanced environmental circumstances. As generations of rich folks have learned when they pass their fortunes on to their kids, Amy has no control over Bob’s behavior, even though she has had considerable control over his environment for behaving. This kind
of enhancing the other person’s degrees of freedom to control perceptions is similar to what Martin is talking about in his discussion of “protocols” [Martin Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45].

KM: Let me restate my argument: It is correct to say that person A can control the environmental circumstances in which person B controls B’s perceptions, and further that A’s stabilization or disruption of B’s environment can have the effect of either
expanding or limiting B’s degrees of freedom to control various perceptions that B might want to control, thus facilitating or impeding person B’s opportunities for controlling perceptions of B’s own choosing. But it is incorrect to say that A can thus control
B’s behavior.

KM: To say that E can control S’s behavior in the rubber band experiment is as absurd as saying that the long-dead builder of an old house can reach out from the grave to control the behavior of all the house’s current occupants because he chose to put
the front door in the middle of the front of the house instead of off to one side, and they have to take some extra steps to get to the front door from the driveway. Our environmental circumstances limit (or enhance) our abilities to control our own perceptions,
but those circumstances, and the people who have stabilized those circumstances, have not thereby controlled our perceptions, and thus they do not control our behavior, if we are to understand behavior as the control of perception.

KM: It all comes back, as Erling pointed out some time back [Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.24 1130 EST)], to that slippery term ‘behavior’. I see Rick’s argument as incoherent because he is trying at the same time to use the conventional definition of behavior
(as observable movements) and the PCT definition (as control of perception) and somehow blend the two. An use of the term behavior always implies some theory of what behavior is, but you can’t have it both ways, because the two are incompatible. I also see
Rick’s argument as inconsistent with the line he has taken in many of his previous publications, most notably the “Control Theory Glasses” article, in which he argues, if I am remembering correctly, that people’s actions look entirely different if you put
on your control theory glasses and start seeing their behavior as control.

KM: By the way, I was impressed and heartened to see Rick’s gracious apology and admission of error to Martin [From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.2330)]. I hope, Rick, you will take the time to think through my critique before firing off yet another defense
of your (I think untenable) argument that a person can control another person’s behavior. By all means, correct me where I’m wrong, but please don’t just shoot again from the hip. Thanks.

My best,

Kent

···

RM: Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman”
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior
can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t
see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB: RM earlier: But attributing fake statements to make it seem like your Dad agreed with them would be rather poor form, I think. If the capitalized sentence above is actually something
your Dad said then I hope Boris will prove it by showing us where he said it; and if it proves to be true that your Dad said it then I would just be dismayed that Bill would say such a thing. But if this is a fake attribution then I think Boris would deserve
a good old fashioned shaming.

HB : If you’ll be honest you knew excatly that I mixed the persons,
but you were using my mistake to point out that if I don’t manage to prove (as you knew that I can’t) than I’ll deserv »old fashioned shaming«. This is for me serious attack with humiliation. Something very negative as you said to do to one person. That’s
how I felt your writings.

RM: Ah, I think I finally understand the problem here. I apparently did make a mistake in not noticing that Boris had made a mistake (referring to Barb as “he” rather than “she”, but it was certainly not intentional. Here’s the original
sequence:

---

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

---

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement).
I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that
disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that
control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances,
control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.29.12.59]

Kent, I'm going to take Rick's side here, provided you change

“controlling other people’s behaviour” to “controlling a perception
of other people’s behaviour”.
In your critique, all your examples concern the controller’s
influence on what I call the “effordances” for the other’s control
– the available mechanisms (or lack of them because of the
controller’s use of overwhelming force) for the other to influence
their perceptions. That is Type 1 of the four interaction types in
Figure 1 of [Martin Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45]. You ignore the
mechanism of the rubber-band demo (mis-described by Rick, who, I
fear, had a brain-fart when describing it), which is based on Type 3
interaction.
In the rubber-band demo, S and E have agreed (using a standard
protocol) that S will act to keep the KNOT, not a particular finger,
over the coin. E will be controlling a perception of S’s behaviour,
which is best described as “moving S’s end of the knotted band in a
pattern determined by E”. S uses only a behaviour best described as
“keeping the knot over the coin” in order to control a perception of
the location of the knot. As you point out, S has many available
ways of executing that behaviour, and need not use any one of them
consistently. So I disagree with Rick when he says that the
perceived behaviour being controlled is the movement of S’s finger.
That holds only while S chooses to use the finger to move the knot.
In the case of both S and E, a “behaviour” is described in the same
terms as the perception it is acting on within a control loop. It’s
an aspect of the total suite of behaviours the person uses to
control a myriad of perceptions. Consider the frequently used example of the man with a finger
pressing a button located beside the front door of a house. We
usually take this situation to ask “what is he doing”, but the words
could be “what is his behaviour”. Is he “pushing a button”? Is he
“listening for the sound of a bell”? Is he “controlling the
behaviour of a person in the house so that the person comes to the
door and opens it”? Is he “visiting Aunt Martha”? All of these
questions, to me, are questions about possible aspects of his
behaviour, and all of them could simultaneously be answered with
“Yes”.
All of that is true, and is interaction type 1 of Figure 1 in
[Martin Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45]
You don’t, so far as I can see, mention interactions type 2 or 4,
which also influence the other’s ability to control. The elastic
band demo is of type 3, which uses, but has no effect on, the
other’s ability to control a particular perception. It is only type
3 interaction that can “control a perception of another’s
behaviour”, and it can do that only by disturbing a perception in a
way that the controller reasonably expects will be countered by the
action (behaviour) the disturber is controlling for.
Just as a driver cannot independently control the position of the
car in its lane and the rotation angle of the steering wheel, so it
is not possible for E to control a perception of S’s behaviour if
the reference for that behaviour conflicts with actions S needs to
control some other perception. That is a classic conflict situation
in which two control units need the same resource in order to
control their perceptions. They can’t both succeed. Either E fails
or S gives in.
Martin

···

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.29.0900)]

    Here's another try on the post I sent off prematurely last

night.

      Rick

Marken (2014.11.28.1200)

Hi Rick,

You end your post to Boris with this statement:

                          RM: Unlike

disturbances, control systems systems
don’t just influence the behavior of other
control systems, they can also control
that behavior. And that’s true whether
everyone believes it or no one does.

      KM: I'm still not convinced. Although like you I'm very

concerned about the ubiquitous evidence that people try (often
with considerable success) to control (their perceptions of)
other people’s behavior, I still think that in terms of PCT it
is incorrect to describe these occurrences as people
controlling the behavior of other people. As a sociologist, my
research and thinking has been focused on social power and
people’s attempts control others every since I started trying
to understand PCT and apply it to sociology more than 25 years
ago, and like you I have a strong investment in seeing that
people use PCT correctly. So while I agree that this is a
question of great political and social importance, I think
your analysis of it is wrong.

      KM: Here is my argument: I think it is correct to say that

person A can control the environmental circumstances in which
person B controls B’s perceptions, and further that person A’s
stabilization or disruption of person B’s environment can have
the effect of either expanding or limiting B’s degrees of
freedom to control various perceptions that B might want to
control, thus facilitating or impeding person B’s
opportunities for controlling perceptions of B’s own
choosing.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.29.1315)]

···

David Goldstein (2014.11.29.0853)

DG: I agree with Kent’s description.

DG: Getting another person to do a specific behavior (for example, move off the center of the street and walk on the sidewalk) is something that requires the other person’s cooperation, even if you are a policeman.

RM: Hi David. I got this before I got Kent’s revised post so I’m a little confused because I didn’t see anything about cooperation in Kent’s first version. But at least it’s nice to see that you agree that living control systems can be controlled. I don’t agree that it requires their cooperation – I don’t think Skinner asked for and/or got cooperation from his pigeons not did the slaver’s get the cooperation of their slaves (in he form of their agreement to be enslaved). But at least you agree that people can be controlled (will do what you want) if they are willing to cooperate. And I agree.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.29.1445)]

···

On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 9:19 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

Hi Rick,

HB: First I need to apologize to everybody for posting something without background. Some posts I’ve been sending to CSGnet, ended in personal e-mail boxes. So answer to Rick’s post where he described »control of students behavior« ended there. I asked Rick if he wants me to post it on CSGnet, but he didn’t answer yet.

RM: Sorry, I didn’t notice that I didn’t post it to the net. Feel free to repost it.

Best

Rick

My computer once did the same mistake, but then I got immediate Rick’s answer that I made a mistake and aksed me if I could post it to CSGnet. High gentlemen’s move. I can say that when I and Rick talked or talk in person directly, the discussion has a very high cultural level so I’m aksing myself whether we are the same persons when we are talking on CSGnet.

So I’ll wait for Rick’s answer about that post.

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.28.1200)]

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 7:23 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: Hi Rick and everybody,

HB: It seems that we settle disagreements and PCT is »preserved« as theory »of control of perception«.

RM: Well, I’m glad we’ve settled it to your satisfaction. Apparently many (most?) people on CSGNet agree with you that PCT implies that behavior cannot be controlled. I certainly haven’t been able to convince anyone who didn’t already accept it that behavior can be controlled. And that is after using every tool in my tool chest. So I give up. But not before noting what I think is one very troubling implication of the idea that behavior cannot be controlled. If, in fact, behavior cannot be controlled then I can’t see how there could be any objection to situations where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior.

HB : I’m not objecting to situations »where it appears that people are controlling other people’s behavior«. If it appears than it must be »perceptual illussion«.

RM: In this sequence BP is Barb Powers. I’m replying to Barb’s post, actually agreeing with her that influencing is not controlling. Then Boris (HB) replied to me with what I thought was an attribution to Bill Powers (the capitalized statement). I thought this for two reasons: First, because it says “he wrote that” and Barb is definitely not a he, and second, because the capitalized statement is not a rephrase of what Barb Powers said. Indeed, it is very different. Barb had correctly said that disturbances can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system. The statement above incorrectly says that control systems can influence but cannot control the behavior of another control system.

RM: So I a apologize for mistakenly thinking that Boris was attributing the capitalized phrase above to Bill Powers. But the mistake was unintentional. I did not fake it in order to “shame” Boris for possibly making false attributions.

HB :

I see that I made a mistake too, which misleaded you. Sorry for that. Our reorganization works good with some mistakes. It looks like natural mechanism. J

RM: But if the capitalized phrase is an attempt to rephrase what Barb said it is still an incorrect restatement of what Barb said. But whether or not it was an attempt to restate what Barb said, the statement is just incorrect. Unlike disturbances, control systems systems don’t just influence the behavior of other control systems, they can also control that behavior. And that’s true whether everyone believes it or no one does.

HB : I think that in only one way LCS can affect another LCS, and that is to disturb perception. What else can one LCS do to another LCS to »control it’s behavior« ? What mechanism in another LCS is someone »controlling«, so to say that he is »controlling behavior« of another LCS ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

                         Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night