Universal Error Curve

[From Bill Powers (2001.04.17.0826 MDT)]

Dag Forssell shouldn't blame Rick Marken for the "Universal error curve,"
but me. My suggestion is somewhere back there in the archives. The problem
is that many control systems do not behave in the expected way when errors
are large. In the vicinity of zero error, the error signal behaves
normally: a small error gives a small error signal, and so on. But when
you're very far from the goal, the error can be enormous. I want to be in
San Francisco, but here I am in Colorado. The error signal ought to be big
enough to vaporize my muscles. Of course it's not that big; in fact, it's
smaller than it would be if I were just outside S.F. This sort of gradient
is observed everywhere, even in animals. When a hungry animal is allowed to
approach food pulling against a tether, the pulling force increases as the
animal gets closer to the food -- just the opposite of what we would expect
of a linear control system. Of course within a certain radius of the food,
the force declines very rapidly as the animal gets close to it, implying a
shrinking error signal. This seems to be a very general phenomenon,
although I can't claim to have done any research on it.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0417.1305)]

Bill Powers (2001.04.17.0826 MDT)

Dag Forssell shouldn't blame Rick Marken for the "Universal error curve,"
but me. My suggestion is somewhere back there in the archives. The problem
is that many control systems do not behave in the expected way when errors
are large. In the vicinity of zero error, the error signal behaves
normally: a small error gives a small error signal, and so on. But when
you're very far from the goal, the error can be enormous. I want to be in
San Francisco, but here I am in Colorado. The error signal ought to be big
enough to vaporize my muscles. Of course it's not that big; in fact, it's
smaller than it would be if I were just outside S.F. This sort of gradient
is observed everywhere, even in animals. When a hungry animal is allowed to
approach food pulling against a tether, the pulling force increases as the
animal gets closer to the food -- just the opposite of what we would expect
of a linear control system. Of course within a certain radius of the food,
the force declines very rapidly as the animal gets close to it, implying a
shrinking error signal. This seems to be a very general phenomenon,
although I can't claim to have done any research on it.

It seems to me that there is another, equally plausible, alternative. If
you are in Colorado, and want to be in San Francisco, you can implement a
plan (a controlled sequence of perceptions). So long as you are
implementing this plan the error associated with the implementation can be
kept arbitrarily small. The other alternative is to set the gain on the "I
am in San Francisco" control loop very low. (Alternatively, you can set the
reference level for this perception to zero). Neither of these alternatives
requires the ad hoc introduction of a "universal error curve."

BG

[From Bill Curry (2002.04.30.0815 )]

Rick Marken (2002.04.29.1710)

....The phenomenon that the UEC explains is the phenomenon I describe above: where
a
controlled variable is pushed or kept far from its reference state with the
result that control of that variable stops or never starts. Like the knife that
is not retrieved, the Napoleon that isn't eaten, etc. This kind of thing happens
all the time. I think the "universal" part of the name means that this
non-linearity of the error curve might be a feature of _all_ comparator functions
in living control loops.

> Might not "giving up" be
> just as well explained by reorganization, which several objectors suggested?

Sure. But the situations I'm thinking of seem to involve something more like a
"truncation of" rather than a change in the control process. The bakery case may
be the most obvious. I want a Napoleon and it's easy for me to get it if I go
into the bakery; but I just pass by and am not "pulled into" the Napoleon
purchasing control process by getting close to the Napoleon dispenser. This is
the phenomenon that I think the UEC explains. It doesn't look or feel like
reorganization because I still like Napoleons and will control for one if doing
so is made easy (I get into the "control" range of the UEC).

The UEC may be a possible formulation to account for the phenomenon of "giving up"
but can't normal hierarchical control provide a more parsimonious explanation? For
example, you appear to have a "pass by the bakery" program level control system
informed by memories of over-indulging in Napoleons. I would venture that you have
another program control system for eating a Napoleon if you enter the bakery door.
The conflict gets resolved one way or the other depending on relative gain at moment
of the event.

My best,

Bill C.

···

--
William J. Curry Capticom, Inc.
bill@powerseed.com 603.756.9933

[From Rick Marken (2002.04.30.0810)]

Bill Curry (2002.04.30.0815 ) --

The UEC may be a possible formulation to account for the phenomenon of "giving up"
but can't normal hierarchical control provide a more parsimonious explanation?

Not really. In the situations I'm thinking of there is really no "giving up" in the
sense of abandoning the goal. I still want the Napoleon and I will take a bite if it
is placed next to me with a fork and cup of coffee. The UEC explains why I don't fight
my way across town and into the bakery given the massive error that presumably exists
when I want a Napoleon and there is none nearby. I think of "giving up" as abandoning
an unachievable goal. Such "giving up" is done by a higher level system perceiving the
futility (or other negative consequences) of the quest to achieve the lower level goal
and resetting the hopeless goal to zero. This kind of hierarchical control would
explain what happens when I'm sitting Napoleonless in my kitchen and conclude that "I
don't really want a Napoleon after all" because producing that perception would just be
too much of an inconvenience. The UEC explains why massive error doesn't drive massive
output; why my Napoleon goal doesn't drive me bolting out the door, into my car (this
is LA) and over to the bakery a block away.

Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 08:46) --

Rather than introducing the UEC as an explanatory principle and adducing a
property of comparators for which no physical property of neural systems
has been observed, it seems to me that another explanation is more
straightforward. Casting about for means to control the variable in
question (the knife lost overboard, etc.) and controlling by those means in
imagination, I remember or imagine undesired consequences. It is not
conflict that I avoid, but those undesired consequences...

Yes. This is the hierarchical control explanation of why the goal of getting the knife
is abandoned (set to zero by a higher level system). The UEC explains why the dropped
knife doesn't "pull" me overboard as I am reaching to control for the knife being in my
hand.

Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 10:25) --

"I see that you have chosen not to retrieve the knife, Mr. Marken."
"That's a choice? What, you want me to drown, right?"

Yes, of course it's a choice. The UEC explains why I stop reaching for the knife
_before_ I have chosen not to retrieve it (ie. before a higher level system has reset
the reference for the "knife in hand" control system to zero).

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Rick Marken (2002.04.30.0900)]

Stephen O'Shaughnessy wrote:

Is the goal the knife or is the goal to cut something?

The unstated goal in my example was "grasping the knife". The goal is set as
the means of achieving another, higher level goal, cutting the bait, which is
set as the means of achieving a still higher level goal, catching fish, etc.
All these goals are being set -- and achieved, except in the case of grasping
the knife -- simultaneously.

Is the goal to taste pastries or to satisfy a hunger ( or higher, to restore
the body's reserve of energy)?

I was think of the case where I just felt like a nosh -- a technical yiddish
term for controlling for the perception of good tasting stuff.

Its much easier to pass a bakery on a full stomach than on an empty one.

Actually, for me a bakery is hard to pass even after a big meal.

At what point do these 'disturbances' shift from being references in some
system to disturbances in this system? In other words, how do you partition
a system of interest from all the other systems?

I don't know what you mean be "these 'disturbances'". A disturbance is a
variable that has an effect on a controlled variable that is independent of a
system's own effects on that controlled variable. A disturbance never shifts
from being a disturbance to being a reference. A disturbance to a controlled
variable is always a disturbance to a controlled variable. Does that make
sense?

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 10:25)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 08:46)--

···

At 08:48 AM 4/30/2002 -0400, I wrote:

This relation of controlling in imagination to consequent control in act has been used, as I recall, to explain "planning" and "anticipation".

... or, more pertinently, to explain "choosing". Bill Curry (2002.04.30.0815) is advancing the same notion.

Not that the mechanism underlying choice is well specified either, but this approach is a twofer, explaining both choice and "giving up". (For non-native speakers of English: "twofer" < "two for [='fer'] the price of one".)

"I see that you have chosen not to retrieve the knife, Mr. Marken."
"That's a choice? What, you want me to drown, right?"

         /Bruce Nevin

Is the goal the knife or is the goal to cut something?

Is the goal to taste pastries or to satisfy a hunger ( or higher, to restore
the body's reserve of energy)? Its much easier to pass a bakery on a full
stomach than on an empty one.

At what point do these 'disturbances' shift from being references in some
system to disturbances in this system? In other words, how do you partition
a system of interest from all the other systems?

Steve O

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnevin@CISCO.COM]
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2002 9:26 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Universal Error Curve

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 10:25)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.04.30 08:46)--
At 08:48 AM 4/30/2002 -0400, I wrote:

This relation of controlling in imagination to consequent control in act
has been used, as I recall, to explain "planning" and "anticipation".

... or, more pertinently, to explain "choosing". Bill Curry
(2002.04.30.0815) is advancing the same notion.

Not that the mechanism underlying choice is well specified either, but this
approach is a twofer, explaining both choice and "giving up". (For
non-native speakers of English: "twofer" < "two for [='fer'] the price of
one".)

"I see that you have chosen not to retrieve the knife, Mr. Marken."
"That's a choice? What, you want me to drown, right?"

         /Bruce Nevin

I think the key to my misunderstanding was the simultaneity (is that a
word?) of the situation. I saw the goal (grasping the knife) as a reference
set by some higher goal (cutting bait). When the knife disappeared the goal
disappeared with it (replaced by some other goal, searching for a missing
knife?). I didn't see the need for a catch all (universal) error function.
Goal achievement is simply interrupted by the higher level. A new goal is
set and the old one ceases.

Suppose the boat pitches and throws the knife overboard. Is that different
from pitching and throwing the hand off trajectory (but not moving the
knife)? In the second case the knife remains the goal and the same set of
system variables operate. The force of the pitch is a disturbance. In the
first case several things can happen:

1. The hand keeps moving to where the knife was. The goal remains (in the
imagination), although the environment has changed. The hand can still move
to the same point in space. But what is the perception being controlled?
Is it hand in space or is it the visual of hand over knife?

2. The hand immediately starts a search pattern (at some level the goal is
the same, but what level?). This thought prompted me to ask how we partition
the system of interest. It seems you can always go up a level to get an
explanation. The original system no longer exists, but higher levels that
set it up (and not included in the system of interest) do still exist.

3. I dive overboard after the knife. Now I have the knife but I can't cut
the bait, it's back on the boat. The environment has so drastically changed
that its not the same problem anymore. But at some level, outside the
original system, the goal to cut bait still exists.

4. I 'regroup' and start looking for something else with which to cut bait
(my teeth? :slight_smile: ) Again, the original problem is dropped and a new one(s) are
created.

I guess what's giving me trouble is in how the system is being defined.

As far as disturbances, I was looking at any given system as being a subset
of a larger system. Can't you always go up a level? Is there a practical
upper limit? I know HPCT has set some useful levels. But are they the only
ones possible? So, looking at the system of interest, actions outside the
system that affect the system are disturbances. This would include
reference signals at levels not currently recognized as part of the current
system under study. That's what I was thinking anyhow, I not sure if it
makes much sense.

Is the goal of cutting bait a higher level (vertical) or a different control
system (horizontal)? In either case can't the control system with the goal
of grasping the knife simply be dropped and the components reset for a
different goal?

Respectfully befuddled,

Steve O

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Marken [mailto:marken@MINDREADINGS.COM]
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2002 9:06 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Universal Error Curve

[From Rick Marken (2002.04.30.0900)]

Stephen O'Shaughnessy wrote:

Is the goal the knife or is the goal to cut something?

The unstated goal in my example was "grasping the knife". The goal is set as
the means of achieving another, higher level goal, cutting the bait, which
is
set as the means of achieving a still higher level goal, catching fish, etc.
All these goals are being set -- and achieved, except in the case of
grasping
the knife -- simultaneously.

Is the goal to taste pastries or to satisfy a hunger ( or higher, to

restore

the body's reserve of energy)?

I was think of the case where I just felt like a nosh -- a technical yiddish
term for controlling for the perception of good tasting stuff.

Its much easier to pass a bakery on a full stomach than on an empty one.

Actually, for me a bakery is hard to pass even after a big meal.

At what point do these 'disturbances' shift from being references in some
system to disturbances in this system? In other words, how do you

partition

a system of interest from all the other systems?

I don't know what you mean be "these 'disturbances'". A disturbance is a
variable that has an effect on a controlled variable that is independent of
a
system's own effects on that controlled variable. A disturbance never shifts
from being a disturbance to being a reference. A disturbance to a controlled
variable is always a disturbance to a controlled variable. Does that make
sense?

Best regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Rick Marken (2002.04.30.1400)]

Stephen O'Shaughnessy wrote:

I think the key to my misunderstanding was the simultaneity (is that a
word?) of the situation. I saw the goal (grasping the knife) as a reference
set by some higher goal (cutting bait). When the knife disappeared the goal
disappeared with it (replaced by some other goal, searching for a missing
knife?).

It's great that you are asking these questions. How else can any of us learn!

I would say that the goal (the reference signal specifying "grasped knife") was
still there in the knife example; what changed was the _perception_ (of the
position of the knife relative to the grasp). If the reference for "knife
grasped" (r) is, say a neural current value of 100, then when the knife slides
into the deep the perception of "knife relative to grasp" goes from, say, a
neural current value of 90 to a neural current value of 0; i.e., error gets
huge. Such an error would cause the reaching hand to go off into the deep, too,
were it not (I think) for the UEC.

I didn't see the need for a catch all (universal) error function.
Goal achievement is simply interrupted by the higher level. A new goal is
set and the old one ceases.

This does happen in many cases. A good example is in my "Levels of Intention"
demo which is accessible from http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/demos.html.
When the error starts increasing exponentially (after a polarity reversal) a
higher level system eventually steps in and changes the polarity of the
relationship between hand and cursor movement. But if this did not happen -- if
a higher level system in you were not able to change the polarity -- you would
still eventually stop moving your hand (stop controlling the cursor) even
though the error is continually increasing. This is the phenomenon that is
being explained by the UEC.

Bill Powers makes the same points as me in his recent post (Bill Powers
(2002.04.30.0853 MDT)). That (and this) post also suggests some simple tracking
studies that could be done to map out the UEC. I think the development of such
studies would be a very good exercise for those who _don't_ like the idea of a
UEC. Who better to do tests of a model than those who are most skeptical of its
merits.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

Thanks for being patient with a newbie.

Steve O

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Marken [mailto:marken@MINDREADINGS.COM]
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2002 1:57 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Universal Error Curve

It's great that you are asking these questions. How else can any of us
learn!

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.01.1500)]

Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02) --

In my case the disturbance can be described as defense of my notion
of how to do science and in a particular an aversion to Explanatory

Principles.

The UEC is a description.

I would describe the UEC as a functional component of a working model of
control.

As I understand it, the UEC says if an elementary control system
produces its maximum output without correcting error it "gives up".

The UEC says that increases in error beyond a certain point lead to
_decreases_ rather than further increases in output. That is, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between error and output.

Now that you know what the UEC is, is the disturbance removed?

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02)]
In my case the disturbance can be described as defense of my notion of
how to do science and in a particular an aversion to Explanatory
Principles.
The UEC is a description. The only evidence for the UEC is observed
changes in behavioral outputs for which it seems to me there is an
alternative explanation without adding any new Explanatory
Principles.
As I understand it, the UEC says if an elementary control system produces
its maximum output without correcting error it “gives up”. This
is generalized (in some unspecified way) to cases where a hierarchical
control system “gives up” because it imagines that it
would be unable to resist a disturbance no matter how hard it tried, by
no matter what (imagined) means.

This is construed as a way of resolving external conflict by avoiding
it.

One alternative explanation involves internal conflict. The system is
controlling something else with higher gain. For example, it could be
controlling aversion to imagined consequences, or it could simply be
controlling something else at the same time. Putting maximum output into
this conflict prevents control of much of anything else.

Another alternative explanation involves going up a level from the
conflict. It appears to me that when we cast about for alternative means
to the same end we have done something like going up a level. At this
level of reconsideration we may decide that something else that we are
controlling is more important. We may decide this for any number of
reasons, including the perception that we aren’t getting control of this
conflicted variable in any way that we can try or imagine.

I don’t think the processes of deciding and choosing are well understood
in PCT, but when we do understand them we will have an explanation for
everything that the UEC describes. Conversely, the UEC provides no
insight into deciding and choosing. We decide and choose things all the
time without being confronted with a disturbance that we cannot
resist.

    /Bruce

Nevin

[Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02)]

Rick Marken (2002.05.01.1500)--

> The UEC is a description.

I would describe the UEC as a functional component of a working model of
control.

> As I understand it, the UEC says if an elementary control system
> produces its maximum output without correcting error it "gives up".

The UEC says that increases in error beyond a certain point lead to
_decreases_ rather than further increases in output. That is, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between error and output.

Now that you know what the UEC is, is the disturbance removed?

No. This is a description. It is not an explanation. Nor does it say how the UEC (a descriptive statement about the error signal) is a functional component of a working model of control.

A working model of control should show the observed behavior (the non-monotonic relationship between error and output) as an effect of its working.

Methodologically, the importation of observed results as their own causes could be called "the method of adducing dormitive principles".

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:01 PM 5/1/2002 -0500, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2002.05.02.0645)] --

Bill Powers (2002.05.01.1840 MDT)]

<snip>

I do believe that a process like decision-making or choosing does occur in
some kinds of behavior (I experience it when designing electronic
systems). But the only explanation of what happens during that process is
given by PCT -- I don't know of any other explanation at all. Perhaps this
is just a matter of my ignorance.

Could you say some more about what you've just said or point me to the
relevant reading? More particularly, what is it you experience when
designing electronic systems? How does PCT explain it?

Regards,

Fred Nickols
740.397.2363
nickols@safe-t.net
"Assistance at a Distance"
http://home.att.net/~nickols/articles.htm

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.02.0815)]

Me:

Now that you know what the UEC is, is the disturbance removed?

Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02) --

No...A working model of control should show the observed behavior (the
non-monotonic relationship between error and output) as an effect of its
working...Methodologically, the importation of observed results as their own
causes could be called "the method of adducing dormitive principles"

Bill Powers (2002.05.01.1840 MDT)

The attached Figure from a book by McMahon shows the observed relationship
between stretch and force in a frog muscle fiber...

This curve explains why it is that when muscles are used to exert very
large forces, as in arm-wrestling, there comes a point where further stress
applied to the muscle causes a _decrease_ in muscle force, usually followed
by a collapse of the ability to generate any muscle force. ...

This phenomenon occurs at the lowest level of behavioral organization. It's
not unreasonable to suppose that the pattern is repeated at higher levels,
though confirmation would be needed. No dormitive principles here.

Ok, Bruce (and others who think the UEC is PCT apostasy), now that you know what
the UEC is and what phenomenon it explains, is the disturbance removed? (My
guess is that it's not).

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

Would you really expect the disturbance to be removed? Your (or anyone's)
explanation of something does not automatically provide others with
acceptance or agreement. PCT applies to single organisms. You've (Rick)
told me PCT can be applied to larger entities. Would this still be PCT or
something using PCT-like tools and methods? In this case I'm seeing
multiple entities with PCT loops (I'm not sure of how to apply the syntax
yet). One is you in the act of transmitting something (UEC ideas) into the
environment. Two is me (and everyone else) in the act of receiving
(pulling) something from the environment (UEC ideas). I can see how PCT can
be used to study culture or economics, but I'm going to limit myself to
single organisms (me in particular) for now.

Somewhere, further up the hierarchy, we process these ideas. Isn't this
where the disturbance will enter in? I guess question one: Do disturbances
enter the system at level one or can they enter at any level? I'm trying to
understand this debate in the context of PCT. It seems to me agreement or
disagreement with the idea is largely immaterial, unless the receiver
already holds exactly the same idea. I'm wondering if the current thread is
really a disturbance or just normal operation of PCT systems.

By placing an idea (thought, comment, or whatever) into the environment
aren't we trying to cause that thought to be duplicated in another organism?
Creation?!? Or this trying to take PCT too far?

Isn't conflict the result of two (or more) systems? Your perception, from
the environment, that your idea wasn't created in me. My transmission, into
the environment, that I'm having trouble processing the idea (either I can't
decode it or it clashes with existing loops in my systems). Thus I've not
(re)created the idea in my systems.

I'll be the first to admit I'm way to green on the topic of PCT and probably
stepping all over myself. I really feel like PCT is being applied too
broadly. It looks like it's being applied to the whole of the debate when
it's really only valid as applied separately to the individual engaged in
the debate. It also looks like one PCT system is being applied when there
are really several distinct systems operating. Specifically I see ego
maintenance systems, learning systems, and socialization systems.

I hope I've not offended anyone.

Steve O

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Marken [mailto:marken@MINDREADINGS.COM]
Sent: Thursday, May 02, 2002 8:17 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Universal Error Curve

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.02.0815)]

Me:

Now that you know what the UEC is, is the disturbance removed?

Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02) --

No...A working model of control should show the observed behavior (the
non-monotonic relationship between error and output) as an effect of its
working...Methodologically, the importation of observed results as their

own

causes could be called "the method of adducing dormitive principles"

Bill Powers (2002.05.01.1840 MDT)

The attached Figure from a book by McMahon shows the observed relationship
between stretch and force in a frog muscle fiber...

This curve explains why it is that when muscles are used to exert very
large forces, as in arm-wrestling, there comes a point where further

stress

applied to the muscle causes a _decrease_ in muscle force, usually

followed

by a collapse of the ability to generate any muscle force. ...

This phenomenon occurs at the lowest level of behavioral organization.

It's

not unreasonable to suppose that the pattern is repeated at higher levels,
though confirmation would be needed. No dormitive principles here.

Ok, Bruce (and others who think the UEC is PCT apostasy), now that you know
what
the UEC is and what phenomenon it explains, is the disturbance removed? (My
guess is that it's not).

Best regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.02.1200)]

Stephen O'Shaughnessy wrote:

Would you really expect the disturbance to be removed? Your (or anyone's)
explanation of something does not automatically provide others with
acceptance or agreement.

Exactly. The discussion of the UEC is a disturbance to a perception that some
individuals are controlling for. We know this because people are pushing back
against the idea. Indeed, one of these people, Dag Forssell, actually said that
talk about the UEC created an error for him. The implication (from a PCT
perspective) is that talk of the UEC pushed some variable Dag is controlling
away from its reference. I don't expect my (or Bill's) explanations of the UEC
to remove this disturbance. What _might_ result from these explanations,
however, is a change in the variable controlled -- to something more like what
Bill and I are controlling for -- so that talk about the UEC will no longer be
a disturbance.

An environmental variable (such as discussion of the UEC) is usually called a
"disturbance" only if it tends to push a controlled variable away from its
reference. For example, rain is a disturbance if you are having a picnic
outdoors. If you are not having a picnic, then rain may simply be rain. The
same is the case with talk of a UEC. Talk of a UEC is a disturbance if you are
controlling for, say, a perception of PCT as only what is written in B:CP. It's
just talk about a UEC (not a disturbance) if you are controlling for, say,
understanding how people control.

PCT applies to single organisms.

Yes. PCT applies to one organism at a time. The people who find discussion of
the UEC disturbing may all be controlling different perceptions. But each of
these people is controlling a perception that is disturbed by discussion of the
UEC.

You've (Rick) told me PCT can be applied to larger entities. Would this
still be PCT or
something using PCT-like tools and methods?

Yes, I (and Kent McClelland, for example) have used PCT to model aggregate
behavior. I think it's still PCT.

Somewhere, further up the hierarchy, we process these ideas. Isn't this
where the disturbance will enter in?

No. Disturbances are in the environment and they only act in the environment.
Disturbances have effects on the environmental variables that are perceived in
different ways at different levels of the hierarchy. So a disturbance might
affect a perceptual representation of the disturbed environmental variable at
one level but not at another. For example, a color filter is a disturbance to
perceptions at the sensation level but it might not be a disturbance to
perceptions of the same environmental variable at the configuration level. For
example, through the filter a bear might look blue instead of brown but it's
still shaped like a bear.

I guess question one: Do disturbances
enter the system at level one or can they enter at any level?

Again, disturbances don't enter the system. Only sensory measures of
environmental variables enter the system. Disturbances are environmental
variables that act on variables in the environment that are perceived by the
system. The UEC discussion exists in the environment of those who are offended
by it. They are presumably offended by it because this discussion (the textual
symbols that make up the discussion) results in a perception of something (say,
of PCT) that differs from the person's reference for that perception (for, say,
PCT as a particular, fixed entity).

I'm trying to
understand this debate in the context of PCT.

I am too. I hope my comments above help you see how I understand it from a PCT
perspective.

I hope I've not offended anyone.

Certainly not me. I think it's great that, as a newcomer, you have had courage
and interest enough to ask questions and describe what you think. This is a
good way to learn, especially if it is supplemented with observation and work
with the model (which I believe you are doing since you are part of the
Robotics project). Keep up the good work.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

i.kurtzer(2002.05.02.1350)

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.02.0815)]

Me:

>Now that you know what the UEC is, is the disturbance removed?

Bruce Nevin (2002.05.01 16:02) --

> No...A working model of control should show the observed behavior
(the
> non-monotonic relationship between error and output) as an effect
of its
> working...Methodologically, the importation of observed results
as their own
> causes could be called "the method of adducing dormitive
principles"

Bill Powers (2002.05.01.1840 MDT)

> The attached Figure from a book by McMahon shows the observed
relationship
> between stretch and force in a frog muscle fiber...

> This curve explains why it is that when muscles are used to exert
very
> large forces, as in arm-wrestling, there comes a point where
further stress
> applied to the muscle causes a _decrease_ in muscle force,
usually followed
> by a collapse of the ability to generate any muscle force. ...

> This phenomenon occurs at the lowest level of behavioral
organization. It's
> not unreasonable to suppose that the pattern is repeated at
higher levels,
> though confirmation would be needed. No dormitive principles
here.

Ok, Bruce (and others who think the UEC is PCT apostasy), now that
you know what
the UEC is and what phenomenon it explains, is the disturbance
removed? (My
guess is that it's not).

I don't think UEC is PCT apostacy. However, I do think it has not been
sufficiently tested to consider it "universal". That precious few other
PCT concepts that have been suffiently tested to be considered
scientifically solid facts (see hierarchy and reorganization) does not
weigh in favor of another minimally tested idea.
The McMahon figure (introduced to give weight to the UEC) shows the
nonlinear force/distance relation seen in an isolated muscle fiber.
This is a spring. There are no reference signals or error signals or
perceptual signals in that denervated fiber any more than in a rubber
band. I can also stretch some rubber band until there is plastic flow and
it has a different elastic constant. Have I proven a general principle
about living control systems? I think the idea of nonlinear error
functions is an justifiably explorable topic but currently its a "just so"
story.

Isaac

Best regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

Isaac Kurtzer
Ashton Graybiel Lab of Spatial Orientation
Brandeis University

[From Rick Marken (2002.05.02.1530)]

i.kurtzer(2002.05.02.1350).

I don't think UEC is PCT apostacy. However, I do think it has not been
sufficiently tested to consider it "universal".

That sounds much better Would you be willing to talk about it (or even test
the idea) if we changed the name from UEC to HNMEC (hypothetical
non-monotonic error curve)?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.05.02.1448 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (2002.05.02.0645) --

Could you say some more about what you've just said or point me to the
relevant reading? More particularly, what is it you experience when
designing electronic systems? How does PCT explain it?

Last question first. We're talking here about particular things a human
system happens to become organized to do, not about anything fundamental.
My proposals about levels of organization are meant to include things like
performing rule-driven behaviors (the so-called "logic level"), but they
don't have anything to say about _which_ rules will be in effect. For that,
we simply have to observe what people do. PCT can't help us there.

We would use PCT to explain how it is that a rule can be put into effect,
not a particular rule but any rule. Briefly, I would suppose that we
perceive our actions and their effects as being examples of a rule, compare
the perceived rule with the rule we intend to be in effect, and if there is
a discrepancy,. alter the reference signals being sent to lower systems so
as to reduce the discrepancy. "Was the move I just made (or imagined) a
legal move in chess? " If not, retract it before letting go of the piece,
and try a different move.

Designing electronic systems and probably most other kinds is a juggling
act, in which one considers different components, materials, and
relationships among parts while controlling for many variables. For
example, in the robot design that Bruce and I are working on, we've
considered servo motors of many sizes, weights, torque
capacities, speeds, prices, degrees of durability, and frictional losses.
We've looked at at least three ways of simulating a muscle's internal
spring characteristics and viscous damping (which we've decided to emulate
electronically rathen than use literal dashpots). We've considered plastic
construction materials and model-maker's plywood. We've considered direct,
cable, and chain drives. We've looked at electronic interfaces and
breadboarding materials, and at pressure-sensitive rubber for detecting
forces. We've looked at the way many other people have designed their
hexapods, and indeed two such people have joined in the effort and are
contributing their own extensive experience in building walking models.

The process is one of trying to meet many criteria (reference levels) as
closely as possible and all at the same time, even though initially the
reference conditions are highly uncertain. A great deal of it takes place
in imagination, as we put mental models into action to see what problems
arise. Each of the criteria involves its own controlled variable, and
reference levels for each one that we would like the final model to match.
For example, Bruce just worked out that a particular design would be able
to support a total of a little over 2 kilograms of weight on its six legs.
Is that enough? If it turns out that all the stuff we want to load on the
body weighs more than that, the answer is no: We'd satisfy one set of
criteria but make it impossible to satisfy others, and that would be a
conflict. So we could, if necessary, consider putting less load on the body
or increasing the power of the motors, or maybe other things we haven't
thought of yet.

As far as I can see, no real decisions have been needed yet. Each possible
design leaves a certain amount of overall error, but nothing has progressed
far enough to call for a choice to be made. As the model takes a more
definite shape, certain things catch the eye -- for example, in one drawing
there is a servo motor mounted on the distal leg segment, whereas in
biological systems the motive power for that segment would come from
muscles in the proximal segment. We aren't explicitly trying to mimic any
biological system, but the thought is always there in the background -- a
goal of lesser priority, meaning we control for it with lower gain than for
the others.

In my own design efforts over the years, I've always felt more disorganized
than I thought other people were. I don't have a nice neat plan that leads
uniformly toward the final design. I get a sense of the system gradually
taking shape as a photographic print in the developer gradually begins to
show forms . Many variables change as the design progresses, gradually
converging toward one definite form rather than another, until in the end
all other possibilities have fallen away, leaving the finished product. I'm
controlling for a lot of variables, herding them toward goal states which
themselves change during the development. There are tensions among the
different control processes, and reducing or eliminating them is one of the
means of moving toward the final design.

Needless to say, I see a great deal of reorganization going on, at least in
the way I design systems. In engineering schools there is a strong tendency
to try to solve problems by looking up solutions already worked out, but I
always seem to see something to improve on, or do differenty anyhow, and
probably waste a lot of time reinventing wheelss

Different people are different, is what it comes down to. But the hierarchy
of perception and control follows the same principles in all of them, or so
I think.

Best,

Bill P.

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols
740.397.2363
nickols@safe-t.net
"Assistance at a Distance"
http://home.att.net/~nickols/articles.htm