Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

bob hintz 2012 june 16

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]
From a PCT viewpoint, there really isn’t much difference between control
of perceptions of the inanimate environment and an environment that contains other control systems. There’s a practical difference, in that the physical laws that govern the inanimate environment change more slowly than the social norms that serve a similar purpose (as far as reorganization is concerned) in the cultural environment.

I find this an extraordinary statement. If no one else is present and I want to manipulate the salt shaker, I will move my body is some fashion to make physical contact with the salt shaker. If I can’t reach it from my seat, I will get up and move to a location that allows me to grasp it and then move back to the location where I wish to use it to flavor my food. I would not wonder if the salt was willing to help me flavor my meat. I would not ask it to move closer. I would not ask the table to slide it my way or if I did I would probably notice that nothing was happening. I think the distinction between animate and inanimate items in the world is one of the most basic distinctions that all biological entities use to organize the control of their perceptions. If PCT does not recognize this distinction, it would seem to be a severe limitation.

Is this the reason that Rick once commented something to the effect that he saw no use in the concept of “message” as a particular kind of output? I think of messages as crucial to understanding the interaction between control systems. Information processes seem to be very different from energy processes. Interaction within a family is different from interaction between members of different families and these differences seem to make a difference in understanding what is going on. Are these kinds of questions or concerns outside the boundaries of a PCT universe?

bob

···

On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 5:43 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]

bob hintz 2012 June 16

Just a quick note as I will be out of town most of today.

Whenever I take action related to any other human being (maybe any other independent control system), I do so in the context of my conception of the relationship that exists between us. It will always involve my use of cultural knowledge, if I am a competent member of the culture, so that even if we have never met, I will have some idea of what is appropriate between us. If we are acquainted, I will also have use of historical knowledge and a much more detailed conception of our relationship. I will also have knowledge regarding the particular situation that we currently find ourselves, i.e., a restaurant, a home, a baseball stadium, which also specifies what activities might be routinely acceptable by most participants most of the time. Whenever I do anything I necessarily test some part of all of this knowledge. If the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of view, I am not likely to become conscious of any of my taken for granted conceptions of reality. If it does not proceed in this fashion then I must begin to test specific possibilities, if I wish to correct the situation or my models.

I agree with all that, but since this is a mailing list concerned with PCT, I would use different language. I would talk about reorganization in the cultural context leading to action mechanisms that are usually effective in the cultural context. I would consider that if we are well acquainted, both of us have reorganized so that our control mechanisms that involve control of perceptions of each other are “well oiled”.

I would recognize that I am not usually conscious of my control in cases where “the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of view” whether the interaction involves another biological entity or some part of the inanimate environment, but I do become aware of it if “it does not proceed in this fashion”.

from a PCT viewpoint, there really isn’t much difference between control of perceptions of the inanimate environment and an environment that contains other control systems. There’s a practical difference, in that the physical laws that govern the inanimate environment change more slowly than the social norms that serve a similar purpose (as far as reorganization is concerned) in the cultural environment.

It seems to me that I do the PCT test only when the flow of interaction is disrupted.

Are you sure of that? Would you not say that you are conscious of performing The Test only when the control variable for which you are testing turns out not to be correct? Perhaps the person is unaware of your intended disturbance (isn’t listening), or is not controlling the perception you are trying to disturb (doesn’t care what you said). You perform The Test only by influencing the other person’s environment, and maybe the person is controlling a perception that involves that aspect of the environment, but controls the perception by acting on a different part of the environment that also is involved in her controlled perception, in which case your Test failed because the controlled perception was not the one you tested for. But if The Test succeeds, all that happens is that your control of your own perception is easy – the situation that so often means that the controlling is not conscious.

Martin T

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.17.23.10]

I am not clear what it is you don't understand, especially in the

context of the prior discussion. There is some barrier, and I don’t
know what it is, so I don’t know how to answer you. Of course there is a difference in the results of reorganization
when one is interacting with other control systems as compared with
when is interacting with inanimate objects. The result of
reorganizing with respect to inanimate objects is that we act
muscularly in ways that affect the object usefully; the result of
reorganizing with respect to other control systems is that we learn
to disturb their controlled perceptions in ways that get them to act
usefully. You talked about the fact that we have a pretty good idea
what effects certain disturbances will have on those whose culture
we are familiar with. I agreed with you, and simply put into PCT
language what you had said in everyday language. You now say it is
an “extraordinary statement”, which baffles me. You were on ground
that is very familiar to me; I gave a presentation at CSG '93 on how
this kind of cultural (and linguistic) regularity develops through
reorganization. If you are dealing with an inanimate object, you change its state by
applying force (chemistry, or whatever) to it so that your
perception of it matches your reference for that perception. If you
are dealing with another control system, you could try that, but it
usually requires a lot more force because the other control system
will usually counter your actions with its own. It’s much easier to
let the other control system use its own power systems to act the
way you want it to act by disturbing the appropriate perceptions it
is controlling. The “social norms” that allow you do do this (with a
reasonable assurance that the actions the other control system
produces will be the actions that reduce the error in your own
perception) are the direct equivalent to the physical laws that
allow you to manipulate inanimate objects in ways that reduce the
error in your own perceptions of them. The main difference is that
the cultural norms change more quickly than the physical laws,
though slowly with respect to our aging process.
There really isn’t much difference between control of perceptions of
the inanimate environment and of an environment that contains other
control systems, other than the actual means by which you effect
that control. Reorganization in a reasonably stable environment
allows you to control your perceptions equally effectively in the
social and in the inanimate environment.
He may not, but I do.
So do I. But you have to find the right definition of “message”.
Moving a glass on a dining table may be a potent message of
disapproval, or it may simply be putting the glass closer to hand.
Not all messages are carried by language.
No, they are very much within it, but to deal with such questions
using the science of PCT, it helps to start by formulating them in
the language of PCT. That translation is what I have been trying to
help you with in this series of interchanges. In the case of the
above comment, you seem to be ignoring the mantra: “All behaviour is
the control of perception” by looking only at the behaviour. There’s
another applicable mantra: “You can’t see what someone is doing by
looking at what they are doing”.
In your sentence: “Interaction within…going on.” you seem to be
dealing with external observation of the action outputs of the human
control systems, and these, according to PCT reorganization theory,
are almost necessarily different depending on the context of
reorganization — within a family, outside the family but within a
peer group, outside the peer group but within a social group, and
even depending on whether the interaction occurs face-to-face, by
immediate electronic communication, or in writing. You learn skating
differently on ice or on roller blades, and you learn different ways
of producing effective disturbances to other people in the family or
among strangers of the same social class, or among foreigners or
strangers of a different social class. But it’s the same
reorganization process that helps you learn control in these
different contexts.
The observable outputs may be radically different, but that doesn’t
mean the control mechanisms or the method of learning is different
in these different contexts, or even that the method of learning is
different from the method by which we learn mechanical skills. What
you learn when exposed to teaching of Geometry is different from
what you learn when exposed to teaching of Mediaeval Poetry but the
mechanisms of learning are unlikely to be radically different. From
a PCT viewpoint, the algorithms are the same while the boundary
conditions or variable values are different.
You don’t send messages to inanimate objects. Why? Because they are
controlling no perceptions that such messages could influence. You
don’t send complicated messages to your dog or cat because
complicated messages don’t disturb perceptions in a way that you can
modulate by changing the complex message, but you do send them
simple messages such as “Come” or “Walkies”, because those messages
are likely to disturb the pet’s controlled perceptions in a way that
produces a reasonably reliable control action. You send a complex
message like “I’m going out to the shop. If I’m not back in half an
hour, send out a search party” to someone you know very well,
because changes in such messages (e.g. change “half an hour” to “two
hours”) will alter the disturbance to a controlled variable in a way
that produces reliable differences in the action output.
I’m not sure when or in what context Rick said he saw no use for the
concept of “message”, but I doubt he intended to deny that we use
messages in the way I just described
Martin T

···

bob hintz 2012 june 16

  [Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]

  From a PCT viewpoint, there really isn't much difference between

control of perceptions of the inanimate environment and an
environment that contains other control systems. There’s a
practical difference, in that the physical laws that govern the
inanimate environment change more slowly than the social norms
that serve a similar purpose (as far as reorganization is
concerned) in the cultural environment.

  I find this an extraordinary statement.  If no one else is present

and I want to manipulate the salt shaker, I will move my body is
some fashion to make physical contact with the salt shaker. If I
can’t reach it from my seat, I will get up and move to a location
that allows me to grasp it and then move back to the location
where I wish to use it to flavor my food. I would not wonder if
the salt was willing to help me flavor my meat. I would not ask
it to move closer. I would not ask the table to slide it my way
or if I did I would probably notice that nothing was happening. I
think the distinction between animate and inanimate items in the
world is one of the most basic distinctions that all biological
entities use to organize the control of their perceptions. If PCT
does not recognize this distinction, it would seem to be a severe
limitation.

  Is this the reason that Rick once commented something to the

effect that he saw no use in the concept of “message” as a
particular kind of output?

  I think of messages as crucial to understanding the

interaction between control systems.

  Information processes seem to be very different from

energy processes. Interaction within a family is different from
interaction between members of different families and these
differences seem to make a difference in understanding what is
going on. Are these kinds of questions or concerns outside the
boundaries of a PCT universe?

  bob




    On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 5:43 PM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]

bob hintz 2012 June 16

          Just a quick note as I will be out of town most of today.



          Whenever I take action related to any other human being

(maybe any other independent control system), I do so in
the context of my conception of the relationship that
exists between us. It will always involve my use of
cultural knowledge, if I am a competent member of the
culture, so that even if we have never met, I will have
some idea of what is appropriate between us. If we are
acquainted, I will also have use of historical knowledge
and a much more detailed conception of our relationship.
I will also have knowledge regarding the particular
situation that we currently find ourselves, i.e., a
restaurant, a home, a baseball stadium, which also
specifies what activities might be routinely acceptable by
most participants most of the time. Whenever I do
anything I necessarily test some part of all of this
knowledge. If the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory
fashion from my point of view, I am not likely to become
conscious of any of my taken for granted conceptions of
reality. If it does not proceed in this fashion then I
must begin to test specific possibilities, if I wish to
correct the situation or my models.

      I agree with all that, but since this is a mailing list

concerned with PCT, I would use different language. I would
talk about reorganization in the cultural context leading to
action mechanisms that are usually effective in the cultural
context. I would consider that if we are well acquainted, both
of us have reorganized so that our control mechanisms that
involve control of perceptions of each other are “well oiled”.

      I would recognize that I am not usually conscious of my

control in cases where “the interaction proceeds in a
satisfactory fashion from my point of view” whether the
interaction involves another biological entity or some part of
the inanimate environment, but I do become aware of it if “it
does not proceed in this fashion”.

      >From a PCT viewpoint, there really isn't much difference

between control of perceptions of the inanimate environment
and an environment that contains other control systems.
There’s a practical difference, in that the physical laws that
govern the inanimate environment change more slowly than the
social norms that serve a similar purpose (as far as
reorganization is concerned) in the cultural environment.

          It seems to me that I do the PCT test only when the flow

of interaction is disrupted.

      Are you sure of that? Would you not say that you are conscious

of performing The Test only when the control variable for
which you are testing turns out not to be correct? Perhaps the
person is unaware of your intended disturbance (isn’t
listening), or is not controlling the perception you are
trying to disturb (doesn’t care what you said). You perform
The Test only by influencing the other person’s environment,
and maybe the person is controlling a perception that involves
that aspect of the environment, but controls the perception by
acting on a different part of the environment that also is
involved in her controlled perception, in which case your Test
failed because the controlled perception was not the one you
tested for. But if The Test succeeds, all that happens is that
your control of your own perception is easy – the situation
that so often means that the controlling is not conscious.

      Martin T

Hi Rick,

I put my answers into existing text. I tried to be short as possible, and I'll try to keep conversation in "step by step" form.

···

----- Original Message ----- From: "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU>
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 8:28 PM
Subject: Re: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1130)]

On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 3:42 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> > wrote:

RM : I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others.

BH : Are you suggesting that social environment can always control

individual and individual can always control social enviroment ?

RM: If by "social environment" you mean "people" then what I mean is
that people are always controlling and often what the control is other
people. So people always are controlling but they are not always
successful. So in this sense they (we) can't always control
(successfully) but they (we) can (and are) always trying.

BH : Well Rick, it seems to me, that you altered a little the course of the discussion.
Nice. I think that you made your first statement more relative
as I had a feeling that first statement was fully generalized. I also think that you left
more opened "space" for a constructive discussion or in your language
"cooperative control".
I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree that people
are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ? What didi you mean by
"successfull control" ?
What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't always control (successfully), but
they (we) can (and are) always trying".
Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?
Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

Best,

Boris

[From Bill Powers (2012.06.18.0845 MDT)]

But are people really often controlling other people ? What didi you mean by
"successfull control" ?
What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't always control (successfully), but
they (we) can (and are) always trying".

BP: Rick Marken and Martin Taylor are doing fine with this topic. I have only a couple of things to add.

First, we can't control "a person". We control variables, not things. We control some aspect of a person, such as which side of the person we're looking at (by moving ourselves around the person, or asking the person to turn around -- either one will do). When we ask a person to pass the salt, if's the location of the salt, not the person's action, that we're trying to control. The person may slide it, hand it over, toss it through the air, or refuse. We don't care what behavior is used (though someone may object to throwing the salt). If the person refuses, we can ask someone else -- it's not a person's behavior we're trying to control, but a consequence of the behavior.

Difficulties arise when the object of our control is exactly the person's behavior. Stop looking at me. Blow your nose. Stand up straight. Salute. Say the pledge of allegiance. Clean your room. Give me all your money. This is the kind of incident we might see going on between adults and children, between bosses and subordinates, husbands and wives, policemen and pedestrians or the drivers of cars, ticket collectors and concert-goers, bullies and victims. Think of any example in which the imperative form of a verb is used.

Another difficulty that can arise occurs when you choose a consequence of the other person's behavior to control that the other person is already controlling with that same behavior. The person may have been just about to pick up the salt and use it.

All controlling someone's behavior means is that you have in mind a way you want another person to behave, and you find a way to accomplish that. You can do it smoothly and without friction, or in a way calculated to arouse opposition and excuse violence. It's very hard to do it nicely because you never know what else the other person is controlling, so you can only guess at what variables important to that person would be disturbed by granting your request.

  Also, people like to play games about controlling other people's behavior without their realizing it. Say after me: Wah ("Wah"). Tahgoo ("Tahgoo"). Siam ("Siam"), Now say them one after the other: ("What a goose I am"). Or recall the academic myth about the class who expressed interest or disinterest in what the lecturer was saying in such a relationship to his actions as to cause the lecturer to end up pressing himself into one corner of the room. It's fun to control other people's behavior, at least until you come across a libertarian with a bad temper or find that you're the one being manipulated.

Yes, people do incorporate behaviors of other people into their means of controlling variables that matter to them. It's very common. But it causes problems when done without regard to what the other person is trying to control with that same behavior.

Best,

Bill P.

···

At 01:15 AM 6/18/2012, Boris Hartman wrote:

bob hintz 2012 june 18 response to Martin

OK, I perceive the distinction and it makes a difference in the output but the form of the internal loops are not affected by this difference in content. I do appreciate your efforts to help me learn this language and I hope my questions will make more sense as I become more competent.

To return to salt shaker and a concern about the form of the internal process. I chew my first taste of the meat and experience an error (it doesn’t taste right). In the past when this occurs, I have added salt to the meat and reduced this error. Is my output a search for salt? Do I now have a reference signal specifying zero distance between my hand and the salt shaker? If I were diagramming this process would I have a control loop immediately below the initial loop or would I also shift it to right (assuming time flows from left to right)? Is it important to note that at time 1 the distance between my hand and the salt shaker did not result in an error signal and that at time 2 it did? Did a loop regarding the distance to the salt shaker even exist at time 1, or was it created as output by the initial loop.

I think I need to take this as slowly as you might be willing to go.

bob

···

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 2:15 AM, boris_upc boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Hi Rick,

I put my answers into existing text. I tried to be short as possible, and I’ll try to keep conversation in “step by step” form.

----- Original Message ----- From: “Richard Marken” rsmarken@GMAIL.COM

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 8:28 PM

Subject: Re: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1130)]

On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 3:42 AM, boris_upc boris.hartman@masicom.net > > > > wrote:

RM : I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill’s

suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might

point out that we are always controlling and being controlled by

others.

BH : Are you suggesting that social environment can always control

individual and individual can always control social enviroment ?

RM: If by “social environment” you mean “people” then what I mean is

that people are always controlling and often what the control is other

people. So people always are controlling but they are not always

successful. So in this sense they (we) can’t always control

(successfully) but they (we) can (and are) always trying.

BH : Well Rick, it seems to me, that you altered a little the course of the discussion.

Nice. I think that you made your first statement more relative

as I had a feeling that first statement was fully generalized. I also think that you left

more opened “space” for a constructive discussion or in your language

“cooperative control”.

I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree that people

are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).

But are people really often controlling other people ? What didi you mean by

“successfull control” ?

What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can’t always control (successfully), but

they (we) can (and are) always trying".

Can you describe in PCT actors how “successfull control” or "unsuccessfull

control" would look like ?

Here are some hints :

1.Martin’s T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand

the problem.

  1. And maybe Kent’s M. articles about human interaction and

collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?

  1. Don’t forget Bill’s books :))

Best,

Boris

bob hintz 2012 june 18 response to Bill

Thanks for your input. I think that is what I was trying to say.

In my last post I wondered if the output of one control loop could be the creation or perhaps the activation of another control loop and how one might diagram that. Is that even a viable question?

bob

···

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 10:35 AM, Bill Powers powers_w@frontier.net wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2012.06.18.0845 MDT)]

At 01:15 AM 6/18/2012, Boris Hartman wrote:

But are people really often controlling other people ? What didi you mean by

“successfull control” ?

What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can’t always control (successfully), but

they (we) can (and are) always trying".

BP: Rick Marken and Martin Taylor are doing fine with this topic. I have only a couple of things to add.

First, we can’t control “a person”. We control variables, not things. We control some aspect of a person, such as which side of the person we’re looking at (by moving ourselves around the person, or asking the person to turn around – either one will do). When we ask a person to pass the salt, if’s the location of the salt, not the person’s action, that we’re trying to control. The person may slide it, hand it over, toss it through the air, or refuse. We don’t care what behavior is used (though someone may object to throwing the salt). If the person refuses, we can ask someone else – it’s not a person’s behavior we’re trying to control, but a consequence of the behavior.

Difficulties arise when the object of our control is exactly the person’s behavior. Stop looking at me. Blow your nose. Stand up straight. Salute. Say the pledge of allegiance. Clean your room. Give me all your money. This is the kind of incident we might see going on between adults and children, between bosses and subordinates, husbands and wives, policemen and pedestrians or the drivers of cars, ticket collectors and concert-goers, bullies and victims. Think of any example in which the imperative form of a verb is used.

Another difficulty that can arise occurs when you choose a consequence of the other person’s behavior to control that the other person is already controlling with that same behavior. The person may have been just about to pick up the salt and use it.

All controlling someone’s behavior means is that you have in mind a way you want another person to behave, and you find a way to accomplish that. You can do it smoothly and without friction, or in a way calculated to arouse opposition and excuse violence. It’s very hard to do it nicely because you never know what else the other person is controlling, so you can only guess at what variables important to that person would be disturbed by granting your request.

Also, people like to play games about controlling other people’s behavior without their realizing it. Say after me: Wah (“Wah”). Tahgoo (“Tahgoo”). Siam (“Siam”), Now say them one after the other: (“What a goose I am”). Or recall the academic myth about the class who expressed interest or disinterest in what the lecturer was saying in such a relationship to his actions as to cause the lecturer to end up pressing himself into one corner of the room. It’s fun to control other people’s behavior, at least until you come across a libertarian with a bad temper or find that you’re the one being manipulated.

Yes, people do incorporate behaviors of other people into their means of controlling variables that matter to them. It’s very common. But it causes problems when done without regard to what the other person is trying to control with that same behavior.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.18.12.19]

bob hintz 2012 june 18 response to Martin

OK, I perceive the distinction and it makes a difference in the output but the form of the internal loops are not affected by this difference in content. I do appreciate your efforts to help me learn this language and I hope my questions will make more sense as I become more competent.

To return to salt shaker and a concern about the form of the internal process. I chew my first taste of the meat and experience an error (it doesn't taste right). In the past when this occurs, I have added salt to the meat and reduced this error. Is my output a search for salt?

The output of the control system for the taste perception is a signal with no label. What it does depends on how your previous success and failure in controlling that perception have affected your reorganization. The "signal with no label" contributes to the reference values of lower-level control systems, and quite possible the combined effect of these might have the result that "your" (entire person) output to the external environment functions as a search for the salt. But it may not; especially it will not if you already know where the salt is.

Do I now have a reference signal specifying zero distance between my hand and the salt shaker?

That is quite likely to be one of the reference values induced by the "output signal with no label". But it need not be, if, for example, you owned a robotic salt dispenser that you could call by voice. As I said above, exactly what reference values will be associated with the "signal with no label" depend almost entirely on how you have reorganized in contexts similar to the one in which you find yourself. You are controlling lots of other perceptions related to the context, and many of them also contribute to creating the reference value that might well be "zero" for a perception of "distance between the salt shaker and my hand". [I'm not going to address how these reference values are created. I think Bill P. gave a description in B:CP, but last year he seemed to disavow it -- I think wrongly].

If I were diagramming this process would I have a control loop immediately below the initial loop or would I also shift it to right (assuming time flows from left to right)?

I think you are mixing two views, a functional view of the control structure and a time-line of signal events. Functionally, the control units are there all the time. The corresponding feedback loops may not be, because the loops pass through a changing environment. When you are dealing with the time-line of signal events, you are treading in dangerous territory, because the entire complex of feedback loops is functioning at all times, at all levels, if it is functioning at all. Yes, there are delays in responses to changes in signal values, but the analysis of such effects is more complex than is demanded by the present discussion.

Is it important to note that at time 1 the distance between my hand and the salt shaker did not result in an error signal and that at time 2 it did?

Let's consider why you were controlling for wanting the salt shaker to be in your hand. This involves going up a level or two in the control complex. "Why" always does.

You had a reference value for how the meat should taste. Before you tasted the meat, you had no perception of its taste, or rather, your perception of its taste, if you had any, was based entirely on imagination, not on sensory data. However, when you did taste the meat, the resulting perception did not match its reference value -- error. Since the perception of taste was a controlled variable, error meant some (unlabelled) action output. In this case the output would be intended to increase the saltiness of the taste, and you had reorganized over your lifetime so that in the dining-table context the effect of the output signal would be to set a reference value for some set of control systems that would eventually result in your ability to pour salt from the shaker onto your meat. If you had been in a different context, without access to a salt-shaker, your output actions would be different, and might result in an e-coli process of finding a way to get the salt (e.g. in a tent in the desert, with meat that you cooked by focusing the sun with a mirror, your means of getting salt on the meat would be different, and you might try a variety of ways to get it).

Did a loop regarding the distance to the salt shaker even exist at time 1, or was it created as output by the initial loop.

Remember, you don't control more than a tiny proportion of your perceptions at any one moment, even of the perceptions you are able to control. You may have been perceiving the distance to the salt shaker all the time you were at the table, or you may not. But it did not become a controlled perception until you experienced error in the taste of your meat. If you were not controlling the "distance to salt-shaker" perception, the potential for a loop to exist was there (as seen by an external analyst, or by yourself in imagination) but no signals were circulating in it. I don't know whether you would say that a loop existed but was inactive or that the loop was created when the "salt-in-hand" perception began to be controlled. It's a question of how you use language, and I have no real preference at this moment.

I think I need to take this as slowly as you might be willing to go.

That will be very slowly indeed, quite shortly. Your messages may get no reply for another month or so, after tomorrow.

Martin T.

bob hintz 2012 june 18 response to martin

As I think about the desert example, I might decide to just eat the meat even if it tastes funny rather than go hunting for salt in a random trial and error fashion. How do I simply let go of a control process that is already occurring? Do I have some method of calculating cost/benefit outcomes in my imagination, i.e., the meat will be cold if I have to take ten minutes to find salt in the camping gear and that will be worse than eating it warm without salt right now? Would this involve the unnamed output signal activating memory experiences after I realize I can’t see any salt in my immediate area? Is this what we normally call “thinking”? Would a couple who are talking about where to move the potted plant that is too heavy for either of them to move alone be engaging in a similar process as parts of a social control unit attempting to align their behavior as a single control unit to accomplish a shared outcome? How do we form explicit agreements on particular occasions and successfully act to accomplish the outcome?

I am also wondering about reorganization, but suspect that is a really huge issue. Minimally, I am wondering if changing values of existing control units connected in a hierarchy is part of a reorganization process or if it is limited to the creation of new units and/or levels of organization?

I hope you have an excellent trip while you are out of this loop.

bob

···

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.18.12.19]

bob hintz 2012 june 18 response to Martin

OK, I perceive the distinction and it makes a difference in the output but the form of the internal loops are not affected by this difference in content. I do appreciate your efforts to help me learn this language and I hope my questions will make more sense as I become more competent.

To return to salt shaker and a concern about the form of the internal process. I chew my first taste of the meat and experience an error (it doesn’t taste right). In the past when this occurs, I have added salt to the meat and reduced this error. Is my output a search for salt?

The output of the control system for the taste perception is a signal with no label. What it does depends on how your previous success and failure in controlling that perception have affected your reorganization. The “signal with no label” contributes to the reference values of lower-level control systems, and quite possible the combined effect of these might have the result that “your” (entire person) output to the external environment functions as a search for the salt. But it may not; especially it will not if you already know where the salt is.

Do I now have a reference signal specifying zero distance between my hand and the salt shaker?

That is quite likely to be one of the reference values induced by the “output signal with no label”. But it need not be, if, for example, you owned a robotic salt dispenser that you could call by voice. As I said above, exactly what reference values will be associated with the “signal with no label” depend almost entirely on how you have reorganized in contexts similar to the one in which you find yourself. You are controlling lots of other perceptions related to the context, and many of them also contribute to creating the reference value that might well be “zero” for a perception of “distance between the salt shaker and my hand”. [I’m not going to address how these reference values are created. I think Bill P. gave a description in B:CP, but last year he seemed to disavow it – I think wrongly].

If I were diagramming this process would I have a control loop immediately below the initial loop or would I also shift it to right (assuming time flows from left to right)?

I think you are mixing two views, a functional view of the control structure and a time-line of signal events. Functionally, the control units are there all the time. The corresponding feedback loops may not be, because the loops pass through a changing environment. When you are dealing with the time-line of signal events, you are treading in dangerous territory, because the entire complex of feedback loops is functioning at all times, at all levels, if it is functioning at all. Yes, there are delays in responses to changes in signal values, but the analysis of such effects is more complex than is demanded by the present discussion.

Is it important to note that at time 1 the distance between my hand and the salt shaker did not result in an error signal and that at time 2 it did?

Let’s consider why you were controlling for wanting the salt shaker to be in your hand. This involves going up a level or two in the control complex. “Why” always does.

You had a reference value for how the meat should taste. Before you tasted the meat, you had no perception of its taste, or rather, your perception of its taste, if you had any, was based entirely on imagination, not on sensory data. However, when you did taste the meat, the resulting perception did not match its reference value – error. Since the perception of taste was a controlled variable, error meant some (unlabelled) action output. In this case the output would be intended to increase the saltiness of the taste, and you had reorganized over your lifetime so that in the dining-table context the effect of the output signal would be to set a reference value for some set of control systems that would eventually result in your ability to pour salt from the shaker onto your meat. If you had been in a different context, without access to a salt-shaker, your output actions would be different, and might result in an e-coli process of finding a way to get the salt (e.g. in a tent in the desert, with meat that you cooked by focusing the sun with a mirror, your means of getting salt on the meat would be different, and you might try a variety of ways to get it).

Did a loop regarding the distance to the salt shaker even exist at time 1, or was it created as output by the initial loop.

Remember, you don’t control more than a tiny proportion of your perceptions at any one moment, even of the perceptions you are able to control. You may have been perceiving the distance to the salt shaker all the time you were at the table, or you may not. But it did not become a controlled perception until you experienced error in the taste of your meat. If you were not controlling the “distance to salt-shaker” perception, the potential for a loop to exist was there (as seen by an external analyst, or by yourself in imagination) but no signals were circulating in it. I don’t know whether you would say that a loop existed but was inactive or that the loop was created when the “salt-in-hand” perception began to be controlled. It’s a question of how you use language, and I have no real preference at this moment.

I think I need to take this as slowly as you might be willing to go.

That will be very slowly indeed, quite shortly. Your messages may get no reply for another month or so, after tomorrow.

Martin T.

Martin Taylor 2012.06.18.12.19]

[I'm not going to address how these reference values are created. I think Bill P. gave a description in B:CP, but last year he seemed to disavow it -- I think wrongly].

Please don't go away and leave me hanging. I don't recall disavowing anything I had previously vowed. If you're talking about the proposed role of memory in providing potential reference signals, I haven't disavowed that -- but it is just a proposal, and requires some sort of formal evidence to support it. I have proposed a lot of things, but very few of them have reached the status of accepted parts of the model, in my head, anyway. They're just possibilities.

Best,

Bill P.

It seems that the listserv may be working again so I'm resending a
couple of posts that I sent (unsuccessfully) yesterday (6/19).

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0930)]

bob hintz 2012 june 16

BH: I think the distinction between animate and inanimate items in the world
is one of the most basic distinctions that all biological entities use to organize
�the control of their perceptions.� If PCT does not recognize this distinction,
it would seem to be a severe limitation.

RM: Actually, this is the most important distinction made my PCT.
Animate "items" are control systems; inanimate items are cause-effect
systems.

BH: Is this the reason that Rick once commented something to the effect that he
saw no use in the concept of "message" as a particular kind of output?

RM: I don't recall saying such a thing. I think a message is a
particular kind of output; it's symbols (usually words) that are
intended to communicate something to someone else.

BH: �think of messages as crucial to understanding the interaction between
control systems.

RM: I think messages are often an important part of interactions
between control systems; but not always. Many interactions involve no
messaging at all. So I don't think messaging is crucial to
understanding interaction between control systems. What is crucial to
understanding the interaction between control systems is, I believe,
understanding how control works. Once you understand that you can
understand how messaging fits into things, when it does.

Best

Rick

�Information processes seem to be very different from

···

energy processes.� Interaction within a family is different from interaction
between members of different families and these differences seem to make a
difference in understanding what is going on.� Are these kinds of questions
or concerns outside the boundaries of a PCT universe?

bob

On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 5:43 PM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]

bob hintz 2012 June 16

Just a quick note as I will be out of town most of today.

Whenever I take action related to any other human being (maybe any other
independent control system), I do so in the context of my conception of the
relationship that exists between us. �It will always involve my use of
cultural knowledge, if I am a competent member of the culture, so that even
if we have never met, I will have some idea of what is appropriate between
us. �If we are acquainted, I will also have use of historical knowledge and
a much more detailed conception of our relationship. �I will also have
knowledge regarding the particular situation that we currently find
ourselves, i.e., a restaurant, a home, a baseball stadium, which also
specifies what activities might be routinely acceptable by most participants
most of the time. �Whenever I do anything I necessarily test some part of
all of this knowledge. If the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion
from my point of view, I am not likely to become conscious of any of my
taken for granted conceptions of reality. �If it does not proceed in this
fashion then I must begin to test specific possibilities, if I wish to
correct the situation or my models.

I agree with all that, but since this is a mailing list concerned with
PCT, I would use different language. I would talk about reorganization in
the cultural context leading to action mechanisms that are usually effective
in the cultural context. I would consider that if we are well acquainted,
both of us have reorganized so that our control mechanisms that involve
control of perceptions of each other are "well oiled".

I would recognize that I am not usually conscious of my control in cases
where "the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of
view" whether the interaction involves another biological entity or some
part of the inanimate environment, but I do become aware of it if "it does
not proceed in this fashion".

From a PCT viewpoint, there really isn't much difference between control
of perceptions of the inanimate environment and an environment that contains
other control systems. There's a practical difference, in that the physical
laws that govern the inanimate environment change more slowly than the
social norms that serve a similar purpose (as far as reorganization is
concerned) in the cultural environment.

It seems to me that I do the PCT test only when the flow of interaction
is disrupted.

Are you sure of that? Would you not say that you are conscious of
performing The Test only when the control variable for which you are testing
turns out not to be correct? Perhaps the person is unaware of your intended
disturbance (isn't listening), or is not controlling the perception you are
trying to disturb (doesn't care what you said). You perform The Test only by
influencing the other person's environment, and maybe the person is
controlling a perception that involves that aspect of the environment, but
controls the perception by acting on a different part of the environment
that also is involved in her controlled perception, in which case your Test
failed because the controlled perception was not the one you tested for. But
if The Test succeeds, all that happens is that your control of your own
perception is easy -- the situation that so often means that the controlling
is not conscious.

Martin T

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

BH : �I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by �"successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't �always control �(successfully),
but �they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. �The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

···

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

···

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : �I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by �"successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't �always control �(successfully),
but �they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. �The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)]

What do we mean by successful control? Follow the initial conditions, I say. What do they tell you?

Thales, the supposed founder of the school of natural philosophy, summed it up this way: Know Thyself. If he were alive today, I suspect that we would've said: Know Thy Cognitive Biases.

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 1:39 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

···

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by "successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't always control (successfully),
but they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? �Follow the initial conditions, I say. �What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance. A good measure of the
success of control is something called the stability factor, S. S is a
measure of the ratio of the variance of the variable if it were not
under control (the "expected" variance of the variable, Ve) to the
actual observed variance of the variable, Vo, during some fixed period
of time: S = 1-Vo/Ve. When control is good (successful) Vo will be
closed to 0 so S will be close to 1. When control is poor (not
successful) Vo will be nearly equal to Ve and S will be close to 0. So
successful control just means S close to 1.

CG: Thales, the supposed founder of the school of natural philosophy, summed it up this way: Know Thyself. �If he were alive today, I suspect that we would've said: Know Thy Cognitive Biases.

RM: I don't see what that has to do with defining successful control.
But I bet Thales would have been smart enough to know that knowing
your cognitive biases wouldn't help much since your cognitive biases
would bias your idea of what your cognitive biases were. In other
words, your cognitive biases make it impossible to get an unbiased
view of your cognitive biases. Or, to be more modern about it,
rationalism alone is not the way to know yourself; you have to use
science.

Best

Rick

···

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 1:39 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : �I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by �"successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't �always control �(successfully),
but �they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. �The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Chad Green (2012.06.21.1556)]

RM: "So successful control just means S [is] close to 1."

Precisely, isn't it wonderful how the mind works. You and I are describing the same thing from vastly different frames of reference. Why is it that I can recognize this connection?

To understand initial conditions, the origins of things and ideas, their very essence, is most empowering. After all, isn't that the purpose of the largest scientific instruments ever constructed?

As for cognitive biases, there's an intimidating list of them here: List of cognitive biases - Wikipedia . Personally, I'm interested in the ones that confound scientific investigation altogether. Where might they be listed? :slight_smile:

Best,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 2:57 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? Follow the initial conditions, I say. What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance. A good measure of the
success of control is something called the stability factor, S. S is a
measure of the ratio of the variance of the variable if it were not
under control (the "expected" variance of the variable, Ve) to the
actual observed variance of the variable, Vo, during some fixed period
of time: S = 1-Vo/Ve. When control is good (successful) Vo will be
closed to 0 so S will be close to 1. When control is poor (not
successful) Vo will be nearly equal to Ve and S will be close to 0. So
successful control just means S close to 1.

CG: Thales, the supposed founder of the school of natural philosophy, summed it up this way: Know Thyself. If he were alive today, I suspect that we would've said: Know Thy Cognitive Biases.

RM: I don't see what that has to do with defining successful control.
But I bet Thales would have been smart enough to know that knowing
your cognitive biases wouldn't help much since your cognitive biases
would bias your idea of what your cognitive biases were. In other
words, your cognitive biases make it impossible to get an unbiased
view of your cognitive biases. Or, to be more modern about it,
rationalism alone is not the way to know yourself; you have to use
science.

Best

Rick

···

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 1:39 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by "successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't always control (successfully),
but they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1820)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1556)--

RM: "So successful control just means S [is] close to 1."

CG: Precisely, isn't it wonderful how the mind works. �You and I are describing the
same thing from vastly different frames of reference.

RM: Wow. That is amazing. So when you said "Follow the initial
conditions" I should have known that you actually were saying "S=
1-Vo/Ve is a measure of how successful control is", but from a
different frame of reference.

CG: Why is it that I can recognize this connection?

RM: I wish I knew. Is it because you just studied harder in school? :wink:

CG: As for cognitive biases, there's an intimidating list of them here: List of cognitive biases - Wikipedia . �Personally, I'm interested in the ones that confound scientific investigation altogether. �Where might they be listed? :slight_smile:

RM: I think these "biases" are just the observed consequences of
people controlling for certain perceptions. The "bias" that confounds
scientific investigation is already on that list. It's called
"experimenter bias" and it's really just controlling (with very high
gain) for one's own theory being correct.

Best

Rick

···

Best,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 2:57 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? �Follow the initial conditions, I say. �What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance. A good measure of the
success of control is something called the stability factor, S. S is a
measure of the ratio of the variance of the variable if it were not
under control (the "expected" variance of the variable, Ve) to the
actual observed variance of the variable, Vo, during some fixed period
of time: S = 1-Vo/Ve. �When control is good (successful) Vo will be
closed to 0 so S will be close to 1. When control is poor (not
successful) Vo will be nearly equal to Ve and S will be close to 0. So
successful control just means S close to 1.

CG: Thales, the supposed founder of the school of natural philosophy, summed it up this way: Know Thyself. �If he were alive today, I suspect that we would've said: Know Thy Cognitive Biases.

RM: I don't see what that has to do with defining successful control.
But I bet Thales would have been smart enough to know that knowing
your cognitive biases wouldn't help much since your cognitive biases
would bias your idea of what your cognitive biases were. In other
words, your cognitive biases make it impossible to get an unbiased
view of your cognitive biases. Or, to be more modern about it,
rationalism alone is not the way to know yourself; you have to use
science.

Best

Rick

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 1:39 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : �I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by �"successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't �always control �(successfully),
but �they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. �The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

Sorry Rick that I jump in the conversation...I have again
troubles with your definition...

···

----- Original Message ----- From: "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2012 8:57 PM
Subject: Re: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? Follow the initial conditions,
I say. What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance.

HB : Bill defined CONTROL as (B:CP) : "Achievement and maintainance
of a preselected PERCEPTUAL STATE in the controlling system,
through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of
disturbances".

Do you feel the difference ? I think if you are talking about PCT
(perceptual control theory), there must be at least one word about
perception in the "definition".

And what did you mean by protecting variable from disturbances ?

As I see it, it seems to me that you are talking about variable
as something that exist outside the organism as some
"objective variable" which is maintained in some preselected state
and protected from disturbances...Did I missed something ?

I thought we are talking about "Perceptual control theory" PCT not
"Variable control protected theory" VCPT.

I always understood PCT as theory of living control system that all can do, is to control perception.
So in the PCT definition of control at least something like
perception should be mentioned. I think that Bill's "definition"
is much better.

Maybe it's better to read and quote masters of PCT
as I give you a hint ? :))

Best,
Boris

Hi Rick,

I put old text in the conversation, so that your progress ("process" of reorganization) is clearly seen :)).

And as always I appologize if I understand something wrong.

···

----- Original Message ----- From: "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2012 5:29 PM
Subject: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

RM : I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others.

HB : Are you suggesting that social environment can always control

individual and individual can always control social enviroment ?

RM: If by "social environment" you mean "people" then what I mean is

that people are always controlling and often what the control is other
people. So people always are controlling but they are not always
successful. So in this sense they (we) can't always control
(successfully) but they (we) can (and are) always trying.

HB : I agree that people are controlling continuously (always).
I also agree that people are not always successfull
(they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM : Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

HB : It was a nice process of trials and errors from always to often
and on the end is your oppinion how people are controllig far more
"that they think they are". Amazing...
Very nice reorganization. I'll put once again all your statements
in the row so the reorganization will be clearly seen.

RM earlier 1 :
First, you might point out that we are _always_ controlling
and being controlled by others.

RM earlier 2 :
If by "social environment" you mean "people"
then what I mean is that people are always controlling
and often what the control is other people.

RM 3 :
We are controlling when we ask people to pass the
salt or make the dinner tonight or ask for change
(non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a $2.5 item.

HB : So What I see here is very fine line of progress with "wording".
I suppose that wished state of your "fine progress" is probably
Bill's oppinion about PCT "control".

BP : First, we can't control "a person". We control variables, not things. When we ask a person to pass the salt,

if's the location of the salt, not the person's action, that we're trying
to control. The person may slide it, hand it over, toss it through the
air, or refuse. We don't care what behavior is used (though someone may
object to throwing the salt). If the person refuses, we can ask someone
else -- it's not a person's behavior we're trying to control, but a
consequence of the behavior.

HB : Is this what you wanted to write ?
Your statements are somehow convincing me, that you went through phases of behaviorism (your 1.statement) partly behaviorism (your 2. statement), to an unknown or hardly identified "behavioristic" approach in your 3. statement..

I also understand now why you tried to convince Martin T.
to take over conversation. You probably felt that your
1. and 2. statement were in form of : stimulus - respons, cause - effect, request for salt (stimulus) - behavior with giving the salt (effect, consequence), and so on...in one word
"controlled behavior with environmental 'stimuli' from other people".

BP : Environment can't control organism (LCS I).

HB : I make an interpretation that environmental "stimuli" produced by people can't control other organisms (living beings,
probably human too).

I think that this could be "PCT Mantra", as Martin T. would probably say.

RM : OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

BH : Yes Rick take a look at the literature of real PCT masters.
And that's not a shame. You'll learn from the best.
That's what I meant with "hints".

Best,

Boris

[From Chad Green (2012.06.22.1014)]

Rick, you know me more than you realize. Is that what you're trying to say? :slight_smile:

Is there not truth in all circumstances? Are you not trying to give it a name?

The theory that I seek defies labels, so how do you defend it?

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 9:17 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1820)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1556)--

RM: "So successful control just means S [is] close to 1."

CG: Precisely, isn't it wonderful how the mind works. You and I are describing the
same thing from vastly different frames of reference.

RM: Wow. That is amazing. So when you said "Follow the initial
conditions" I should have known that you actually were saying "S=
1-Vo/Ve is a measure of how successful control is", but from a
different frame of reference.

CG: Why is it that I can recognize this connection?

RM: I wish I knew. Is it because you just studied harder in school? :wink:

CG: As for cognitive biases, there's an intimidating list of them here: List of cognitive biases - Wikipedia . Personally, I'm interested in the ones that confound scientific investigation altogether. Where might they be listed? :slight_smile:

RM: I think these "biases" are just the observed consequences of
people controlling for certain perceptions. The "bias" that confounds
scientific investigation is already on that list. It's called
"experimenter bias" and it's really just controlling (with very high
gain) for one's own theory being correct.

Best

Rick

···

Best,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 2:57 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? Follow the initial conditions, I say. What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance. A good measure of the
success of control is something called the stability factor, S. S is a
measure of the ratio of the variance of the variable if it were not
under control (the "expected" variance of the variable, Ve) to the
actual observed variance of the variable, Vo, during some fixed period
of time: S = 1-Vo/Ve. When control is good (successful) Vo will be
closed to 0 so S will be close to 1. When control is poor (not
successful) Vo will be nearly equal to Ve and S will be close to 0. So
successful control just means S close to 1.

CG: Thales, the supposed founder of the school of natural philosophy, summed it up this way: Know Thyself. If he were alive today, I suspect that we would've said: Know Thy Cognitive Biases.

RM: I don't see what that has to do with defining successful control.
But I bet Thales would have been smart enough to know that knowing
your cognitive biases wouldn't help much since your cognitive biases
would bias your idea of what your cognitive biases were. In other
words, your cognitive biases make it impossible to get an unbiased
view of your cognitive biases. Or, to be more modern about it,
rationalism alone is not the way to know yourself; you have to use
science.

Best

Rick

Cheers,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> 6/21/2012 1:39 PM >>>

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1040)]

Either everyone finally agrees with me and has nothing more to say or
CSGNet is still broken. I'll assume the former until I find out
otherwise.

Best

Rick

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.19.0905)]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:15 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

BH : I agree that people are controlling continuously (always). I also agree
that people are not always successfull (they suffer or die if they are not).
But are people really often controlling other people ?

RM: Depends on what you consider "often" but I do think people are
controlling each other far more that they think they are. We are
controlling when we ask people to pass the salt or make the dinner
tonight or ask for change (non-verbally) by handing a cashier $5 for a
$2.5 item.

BH: What didi you mean by "successfull control" ?

RM: When you get what you want. When the person who is talking in the
movie theater stops talking when you say "shhh", for example.
Unsuccessful control occurs when you say "shhh" and the talking
continues.

BH: What does it mean that "in this sense they (we) can't always control (successfully),
but they (we) can (and are) always trying".

RM: We don't always get what we want but we try sometimes we might
find we get what we need.

BH Can you describe in PCT actors how "successfull control" or "unsuccessfull
control" would look like ?

RM: It's not necessarily all or none. The success of control can be
measured quantitatively in may cases. A recent example I have been
dealing with is hitting a baseball. This is task where successful
control is rather poor control: a good hitter gets a hit only 30% of
the time. Perfect control would be 100%. I would be lucky to hit 5%.
Batting average is a nice measure of control of hitting.

BH: Here are some hints :
1.Martin's T. discussion was top and it helps much to understand
the problem.
2. And maybe Kent's M. articles about human interaction and
collective control proceses (joint control) would help ?
3. Don't forget Bill's books :))

RM: OK, I'll take a look. What is the hint for, by the way?

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Chad Green (2012.06.22.1150)]

HB: "Bill defined CONTROL as (B:CP): 'Achievement and maint[e]nance of a preselected PERCEPTUAL STATE.'"

That masterful definition is more specific yet equally agreeable. :slight_smile:

What is the nature of this preselected perceptual state in living systems? I want to understand its dimensions (e.g., structure, pattern, process) a la Capra: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLiRXM2oZ_U .

Best,
Chad

Chad Green, PMP
Program Analyst
Loudoun County Public Schools
21000 Education Court
Ashburn, VA 20148
Voice: 571-252-1486
Fax: 571-252-1633

"If you want sense, you'll have to make it yourself." - Norton Juster

boris_upc <boris.hartman@MASICOM.NET> 6/22/2012 3:06 AM >>>

Sorry Rick that I jump in the conversation...I have again
troubles with your definition...

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2012 8:57 PM
Subject: Re: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change

[From Rick Marken (2012.06.21.1200)]

Chad Green (2012.06.21.1416)--

CG: What do we mean by successful control? Follow the initial conditions,
I say. What do they tell you?

RM: I don't understand. What do initial conditions have to do with it?
To measure the success of control (it seems to me) you have to know
what control is. I define it as the maintenance of a variable in a
pre-defined state, protected from disturbance.

HB : Bill defined CONTROL as (B:CP) : "Achievement and maintainance
of a preselected PERCEPTUAL STATE in the controlling system,
through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of
disturbances".

Do you feel the difference ? I think if you are talking about PCT
(perceptual control theory), there must be at least one word about
perception in the "definition".

And what did you mean by protecting variable from disturbances ?

As I see it, it seems to me that you are talking about variable
as something that exist outside the organism as some
"objective variable" which is maintained in some preselected state
and protected from disturbances...Did I missed something ?

I thought we are talking about "Perceptual control theory" PCT not
"Variable control protected theory" VCPT.

I always understood PCT as theory of living control system
that all can do, is to control perception.
So in the PCT definition of control at least something like
perception should be mentioned. I think that Bill's "definition"
is much better.

Maybe it's better to read and quote masters of PCT
as I give you a hint ? :))

Best,
Boris