[Richard Pfau 2012.06.11 13:10 EST]
Colleagues,
Enclosed, for your information, is a paper that I had planned to present at the now cancelled CSG Conference of 2012, Boulder, Colorado.
Corrections, suggestions for improvement, and other constructive feedback you may provide will be appreciated, since, as the paper indicates, the thinking behind it is a work in process.
With Regards,
Richard Pfau
It's an interesting exploration of the many different ways in which some people attempt to alter the behavior of others, or even themselves. Taken at face value it may well interest people who want to develop better methods of controlling behavior in either case.
There are some points that need to be introduced. One, perhaps a little too hard to make clear to the intended audience, is that controlling behavior is not what most individuals are doing. They are controlling perceived consequences of behavior, by varying the actual behavioral actions so as to counteract disturbances and cause repeatable indirect effects to appear. An example that seems to make this clear is controlling driving behavior. A car driver does not try to produce particular controlled movements of the steering wheel or pedals; instead what is controlled is the speed, direction, and position of the car on the road or relative to some particular destination, consequences of the way the steering wheel and pedals are used in the presence of disturbances.
The other main point that needs to be discussed is conflict. Since behavior is, for any individual, only a variable means for achieving some perceived result, any interference with that behavior may well cause the person to fail to achieve the desired result. In fact, the real issue in behavior change is quite likely to be not about the behavior itself, but about the effects that the person desires. One person want to generate a particular result of behavior (such a acquiring a lot of money), but another person may want to prevent that from happening regardless of the details of the behavior intended to achieve that end -- such as pointing a gun at the other person and demanding his money.
More commonly, it is one person's behavior rather than the intended effects of that behavior that another person wishes to change, because the behavior adversely affects the other person. When children play on a newly-seeded front lawn, the effect they are trying to create is the playing of the game, or just having fun. But a side-effect of their behavior is to ruin the lawn, which is a problem for the property owner. The property owner does not want the children to stop having fun, but to change their behavior in such a way that they can still have fun but without ruining the grass. At least that would be the solution if the home owner wanted to avoid a conflict.
There is a tendency among those who are interested in behavior modification to skip past the question of their right to change another person's behavior, or whether the change being sought is in the interest of the other person or is simply meant to remove an annoyance to the one trying to change the behavior. Appeals to "social norms" are sometimes made to sidestep this issue, but there is no way to avoid the question of whether, or why, one individual wants to enforce social norms violated by another person. This subject needs to be explored a little in your paper. When you read over your lists of how changes can be made or what changes are to be made, I think you will realize that this issue is simply not mentioned.
Best,
Bill P.
At 11:11 AM 6/11/2012, Richard H. Pfau wrote:
[Richard Pfau 2012.06.11 13:10 EST]
Colleagues,
Enclosed, for your information, is a paper that I had planned to present at the now cancelled CSG Conference of 2012, Boulder, Colorado.
From [Richard Pfau 2012.06.11 21:40 EST]
Regarding [Bill Powers Mon, Jun 11, 2012 2:41 pm]`
`
Bill,
``
Thank you for your suggestions and points raised. Your thoughts are helpful and will be carefully considered as I further develop ideas expressed in the paper.
``
With Regards,
Richard Pfau
Enclosed, for your information, is a paper that I had planned to
present at the now cancelled CSG Conference of 2012, Boulder, Colorado.
It’s an interesting exploration of the many different ways in which
some people attempt to alter the behavior of others, or even
themselves. Taken at face value it may well interest people who want
to develop better methods of controlling behavior in either case.
There are some points that need to be introduced. One, perhaps a
little too hard to make clear to the intended audience, is that
controlling behavior is not what most individuals are doing. They are
controlling perceived consequences of behavior, by varying the actual
behavioral actions so as to counteract disturbances and cause
repeatable indirect effects to appear. An example that seems to make
this clear is controlling driving behavior. A car driver does not try
to produce particular controlled movements of the steering wheel or
pedals; instead what is controlled is the speed, direction, and
position of the car on the road or relative to some particular
destination, consequences of the way the steering wheel and pedals
are used in the presence of disturbances.
The other main point that needs to be discussed is conflict. Since
behavior is, for any individual, only a variable means for achieving
some perceived result, any interference with that behavior may well
cause the person to fail to achieve the desired result. In fact, the
real issue in behavior change is quite likely to be not about the
behavior itself, but about the effects that the person desires. One
person want to generate a particular result of behavior (such a
acquiring a lot of money), but another person may want to prevent
that from happening regardless of the details of the behavior
intended to achieve that end – such as pointing a gun at the other
person and demanding his money.
More commonly, it is one person’s behavior rather than the intended
effects of that behavior that another person wishes to change,
because the behavior adversely affects the other person. When
children play on a newly-seeded front lawn, the effect they are
trying to create is the playing of the game, or just having fun. But
a side-effect of their behavior is to ruin the lawn, which is a
problem for the property owner. The property owner does not want the
children to stop having fun, but to change their behavior in such a
way that they can still have fun but without ruining the grass. At
least that would be the solution if the home owner wanted to avoid a conflict.
There is a tendency among those who are interested in behavior
modification to skip past the question of their right to change
another person’s behavior, or whether the change being sought is in
the interest of the other person or is simply meant to remove an
annoyance to the one trying to change the behavior. Appeals to
“social norms” are sometimes made to sidestep this issue, but there
is no way to avoid the question of whether, or why, one individual
wants to enforce social norms violated by another person. This
subject needs to be explored a little in your paper. When you read
over your lists of how changes can be made or what changes are to be
made, I think you will realize that this issue is simply not mentioned.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.13.1100)]
Richard Pfau (2012.06.11 21:40 EST) re: Bill Powers�(Mon, Jun 11, 2012 2:41 pm)
Thank you for your suggestions and points raised.��Your thoughts�are
helpful�and will be carefully considered as I further
develop�ideas�expressed in�the paper.
I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others. Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare. The problem is when this controlling is done
"arbitrarily", which means without taking into account the fact that
the controllee is a controller as well. You take that fact into
account by seeking mutual agreement. Once there is agreement then the
techniques of control described in your paper can be used to control
behavior without generating too much resistance in the controllee. But
even when controlling is done non-arbitrarily there is going to be
some conflict. I think this is a point you might make as well; even
when all parties to the controlling agree to the control, conflicts
are still bound to arise. PCT suggests ways to deal with these
conflicts (MOL, for example) that don't involve blowing someone's
head off.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From: Richard Pfau (2012.06.13 17:04 EST)]
Regarding: [Rick Marken (2012.06.13.1100)]
Rick,
Thank you for your suggestions and taking the time to read the paper and provide your feedback. Your points are well taken and will be carefully considered as my thinking and writing about behavior change continues.
With Regards,
Richard Pfau
`I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others. Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare. The problem is when this controlling is done
"arbitrarily", which means without taking into account the fact that
the controllee is a controller as well. You take that fact into
account by seeking mutual agreement. Once there is agreement then the
techniques of control described in your paper can be used to control
behavior without generating too much resistance in the controllee. But
even when controlling is done non-arbitrarily there is going to be
some conflict. I think this is a point you might make as well; even
when all parties to the controlling agree to the control, conflicts
are still bound to arise. PCT suggests ways to deal with these
conflicts (MOL, for example) that don't involve blowing someone's
head off.
Best
Rick
<details class='elided'>
<summary title='Show trimmed content'>···</summary>
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
[www.mindreadings.com](http://www.mindreadings.com/)
`
[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 14 0038 MDT]
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.13.1100)]
Richard Pfau (2012.06.11 21:40 EST) re: Bill Powers (Mon, Jun 11, 2012
2:41 pm)Thank you for your suggestions and points raised. Your thoughts are
helpful and will be carefully considered as I further
develop ideas expressed in the paper.I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others.
Are you overgeneralizing, in effect saying that all humans are
manipulating others? As social animals other humans are part of our
environment, and we control our own actions based partially upon our
expectations of the behavior of others, but we don't all necessarily
initiate actions intended to perturb the behavior of others, i.e.
manipulate others as a means to achieve the perceptions we are
controlling. A strategy of using others as a means to ones own ends may
be all too common, but is not necessarily universal.
-- Martin L
On 6/13/12 10:58 AM, "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:
Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare. The problem is when this controlling is done
"arbitrarily", which means without taking into account the fact that
the controllee is a controller as well. You take that fact into
account by seeking mutual agreement. Once there is agreement then the
techniques of control described in your paper can be used to control
behavior without generating too much resistance in the controllee. But
even when controlling is done non-arbitrarily there is going to be
some conflict. I think this is a point you might make as well; even
when all parties to the controlling agree to the control, conflicts
are still bound to arise. PCT suggests ways to deal with these
conflicts (MOL, for example) that don't involve blowing someone's
head off.Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Richard Pfau 2012.06.14 9:25 EST)
Regarding [Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 14 0038 MDT]
``
I think Rick is on target when stating ``>you might point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by others.<
``
Yes, it does seem that all humans are (to use your term) "manipulating" or at least trying to manipulate others -- from birth onwards (if you accept that a baby crying is sometimes trying to manipulate his or her milk supply).
``
Of course, if you like, Rick's general statement might be modified to something like "all of us try to control or influence others and others, in turn, try to control and influence us -- and often do." [with the understanding that "all of us" refers to 99% or more of the human population -- recognizing that a few extraordinary people may not do so in later life].
``
A relevant reading in this regard is Eli J. Finkel & Grainne M. Fitzsimons, "The Effects of Social Relationships on Self-Regulation," pp. 390-406, in Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister (Eds.), *Handbook of Self-Regulation: Research, Theory, and Applications*," New York: Guilford Press, 2011.
With Regards,
Richard Pfau
ML: Are you overgeneralizing, in effect saying that all humans are
manipulating others? As social animals other humans are part of our
environment, and we control our own actions based partially upon our
expectations of the behavior of others, but we don’t all necessarily
initiate actions intended to perturb the behavior of others, i.e.
manipulate others as a means to achieve the perceptions we are
controlling. A strategy of using others as a means to ones own ends may
be all too common, but is not necessarily universal.
– Martin L
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.14.09.09]
[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 14 0038 MDT]
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.13.1100)]
(To Richard Pfau)
.... I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by others.Are you overgeneralizing, in effect saying that all humans are
manipulating others? As social animals other humans are part of our
environment, and we control our own actions based partially upon our
expectations of the behavior of others, but we don't all necessarily
initiate actions intended to perturb the behavior of others, i.e.
manipulate others as a means to achieve the perceptions we are
controlling. A strategy of using others as a means to ones own ends may
be all too common, but is not necessarily universal.-- Martin L
Do you intend to imply that there are people who never say "Please pass the salt" but instead always lean across the table to grab it (without disturbing any perception controlled by their tablemates), or that never pass money to a cashier in a store, but instead simply take the goods off the shelf and walk out without having disturbed any controlled perceptions of anyone else in the store (including the cashier), or that never say "can I help" when they see someone failing to do something with which they could easily assist?
"Using others as a means to one's own ends" is the very nature of society, is it not? For the most part, people are very happy to be so used. One is likely to feel unwanted and isolated if nobody seems to want what one can do for them. To be used for other people's ends is usually a pleasure, allowing one to control for a reference to perceive other people as well-disposed toward one. Of course, sometimes action to compensate for a disturbance deliberately caused by another person involves conflict within oneself, in which case the pleasure is necessarily diminished or turned into displeasure. These are the cases that one notes and labels as "others using me as a means to their ends". But those unpleasant cases are far less common than the pleasant ones that equally deserve the same label.
In other words, though I have no proof they don't exist, I know of no hermits who never "initiate actions intended to [disturb the controlled perceptions] of others" (note the rewording). If such people do not exist, then "a strategy of using others as a means to ones own ends is [indeed] ... universal".
Martin T
On 6/13/12 10:58 AM, "Richard Marken"<rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.14.1110)]
Richard Pfau (2012.06.14 9:25 EST)--
Regarding�[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 14 0038 MDT]I think Rick is on target when stating >you might point out that we are
_always_ controlling and being controlled by others.<
I agree;-)
Of course, if you like, Rick's general statement�might be�modified�to
something like�"all of us�try to control or influence others and others, in
turn,�try to control and influence us -- and often do."� [with the
understanding that "all of us" refers to�99% or more of the human
population --�recognizing that a�few extraordinary people may not do so
in later life].
I think this misses the point which is the main point of PCT: people
(like all living systems) are controllers and among the things they
control is going to be the behavior of other controllers. Most of this
controlling is done cooperatively (cooperation being a phenomenon that
conservatives don't seem to understand -- or want to understand) so it
doesn't even seem like controlling because it is conflict free; there
is rarely any resistance to it. Martin Taylor made this point
(brilliantly, I thought) when he described one common example: paying
the cashier for a purchase. This is a case of mutual control; the
cashier controlling for getting paid for the product and the purchased
getting change (if necessary) and then walking out of the store with
the product unmolested. The fact that control is happening in this
situation is not evident until one party creates a disturbance to a
variable being controlled by the other, requiring corrective action.
For example, if I walk out of the store without paying that will be a
disturbance to what the cashier is controlling and the cashier will
take some kind of corrective action (like calling store security).
I think the ability to do very complex cooperative interpersonal
control is what has allowed we otherwise individually very weak humans
to survive. Cooperative control -- such as the complex cooperative
arctic walrus hunting I just saw in a recent documentary on the arctic
-- is what makes possible all the amazing accomplishments of humans;
the Eskimos could not survive is they could not coordinate this
complex hunt.
Yes, outstanding individual control is important too. But much of
this amazing individual control -- Newton's physical theories,
Beethoven's everything, Shakespeare's plays, Dylan's songs -- would
not have been possible without the support and leisure afforded to
these individuals by the cooperative controlling that provided the
food, shelter, and accoutrements needed for these individual geniuses
to do their thing. Individual accomplishments -- the only kind of
accomplishments admired by the likes of Ayn Rand -are premised on the
more mundane but far for essential accomplishments of cooperative
interpersonal control.
Since cooperative interpersonal control is rarely even recognized as
control, it's evil cousin, arbitrary interpersonal control, is what
people (especially conservatives) think of when they think of control.
Arbitrary interpersonal control is manipulative control and, unlike
cooperative control, it is not constructive -- at least not in the
long run.
So I think what we should learn from PCT is how to do our controlling
constructively, and when this controlling is interpersonal, that means
doing it cooperatively. And it's done cooperatively by doing it with
the consent of all involved. This takes trust because people are
allowing themselves to be controlled by others in order to achieve
better personal control.
Since conservatives typically trust no one but themselves, they tend
to be the enemies of cooperative control. So progress in society is
largely a matter of rising above the distrust of our conservative
natures (and cohorts) in order to get great things done cooperatively.
It can be done (as in Scandinavia) and it can be abused (as in third
world dictatorships). But it's always worth a try, I think. Maybe
that's what a liberal is: one who trusts one's fellows, even though
some of those fellows are clearly untrustworthy.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
Hi Rick,
I'm quite late in aksing some thoughts which I think I don't understand.
RM : I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others.
BH : Are you suggesting that social environment can always control individual
and individual can always control social enviroment ?
RM : Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare.
BH : What do you mean by "all this controlling" and what is "implicit or explicit agreement".
Which conflicts you have in mind ?
Best,
Boris
----- Original Message ----- From: "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM>
To: <CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU>
Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 7:58 PM
Subject: Re: Using PCT as a Framework for Behavior Change
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.13.1100)]
Richard Pfau (2012.06.11 21:40 EST) re: Bill Powers (Mon, Jun 11, 2012 2:41 pm)
Thank you for your suggestions and points raised. Your thoughts are
helpful and will be carefully considered as I further
develop ideas expressed in the paper.
I thought it was a pretty good paper, Richard. I agree with Bill's
suggestions. I would suggest a couple things as well. First, you might
point out that we are _always_ controlling and being controlled by
others. Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare. The problem is when this controlling is done
"arbitrarily", which means without taking into account the fact that
the controllee is a controller as well. You take that fact into
account by seeking mutual agreement. Once there is agreement then the
techniques of control described in your paper can be used to control
behavior without generating too much resistance in the controllee. But
even when controlling is done non-arbitrarily there is going to be
some conflict. I think this is a point you might make as well; even
when all parties to the controlling agree to the control, conflicts
are still bound to arise. PCT suggests ways to deal with these
conflicts (MOL, for example) that don't involve blowing someone's
head off.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 15 0454 MDT}
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.14.1110)]
Richard Pfau (2012.06.14 9:25 EST)--
Regarding [Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 14 0038 MDT]I think Rick is on target when stating >you might point out that we are
_always_ controlling and being controlled by others.<I agree;-)
Of course, if you like, Rick's general statement might be modified to
something like "all of us try to control or influence others and
others, in
turn, try to control and influence us -- and often do." [with the
understanding that "all of us" refers to 99% or more of the human
population -- recognizing that a few extraordinary people may not do so
in later life].
OK, I get the sense in which trying "to control or influence others" can
apply very generally. In the pass the salt please example. Is the person
passing the salt also attempting to control or influence others? What if
he is just someone generally helpful? The type of helpfullness I have in
mind for analysis, is not when one is helping a person to achieve that
person's goals not ones own. Does it become tautologically true that one
is controlling in any human social interaction?
I think this misses the point which is the main point of PCT: people
(like all living systems) are controllers and among the things they
control is going to be the behavior of other controllers. Most of this
controlling is done cooperatively (cooperation being a phenomenon that
conservatives don't seem to understand -- or want to understand) so it
doesn't even seem like controlling because it is conflict free; there
is rarely any resistance to it. Martin Taylor made this point
(brilliantly, I thought) when he described one common example: paying
the cashier for a purchase. This is a case of mutual control; the
cashier controlling for getting paid for the product and the purchased
getting change (if necessary) and then walking out of the store with
the product unmolested. The fact that control is happening in this
situation is not evident until one party creates a disturbance to a
variable being controlled by the other, requiring corrective action.
For example, if I walk out of the store without paying that will be a
disturbance to what the cashier is controlling and the cashier will
take some kind of corrective action (like calling store security).
"cooperation"? Both parties having reason to say "thankyou" in a
voluntary exchange is a conservative economic fundamental. Milton
Friedman's story of the pencil is one of market enabled cooperation across
cultural, geographical information and skill divides. Cooperation and
teamwork within corporations and with the supply chain and customers is
commonly a point of emphasis in corporate culture.
Of course, you didn't really mean your statement, you were just trying to
be cute. xxx
-- Martin L
On 6/14/12 12:12 PM, "Richard Marken" <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:
I think the ability to do very complex cooperative interpersonal
control is what has allowed we otherwise individually very weak humans
to survive. Cooperative control -- such as the complex cooperative
arctic walrus hunting I just saw in a recent documentary on the arctic
-- is what makes possible all the amazing accomplishments of humans;
the Eskimos could not survive is they could not coordinate this
complex hunt.Yes, outstanding individual control is important too. But much of
this amazing individual control -- Newton's physical theories,
Beethoven's everything, Shakespeare's plays, Dylan's songs -- would
not have been possible without the support and leisure afforded to
these individuals by the cooperative controlling that provided the
food, shelter, and accoutrements needed for these individual geniuses
to do their thing. Individual accomplishments -- the only kind of
accomplishments admired by the likes of Ayn Rand -are premised on the
more mundane but far for essential accomplishments of cooperative
interpersonal control.Since cooperative interpersonal control is rarely even recognized as
control, it's evil cousin, arbitrary interpersonal control, is what
people (especially conservatives) think of when they think of control.
Arbitrary interpersonal control is manipulative control and, unlike
cooperative control, it is not constructive -- at least not in the
long run.So I think what we should learn from PCT is how to do our controlling
constructively, and when this controlling is interpersonal, that means
doing it cooperatively. And it's done cooperatively by doing it with
the consent of all involved. This takes trust because people are
allowing themselves to be controlled by others in order to achieve
better personal control.Since conservatives typically trust no one but themselves, they tend
to be the enemies of cooperative control. So progress in society is
largely a matter of rising above the distrust of our conservative
natures (and cohorts) in order to get great things done cooperatively.
It can be done (as in Scandinavia) and it can be abused (as in third
world dictatorships). But it's always worth a try, I think. Maybe
that's what a liberal is: one who trusts one's fellows, even though
some of those fellows are clearly untrustworthy.Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.15.09.22]
[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 15 0454 MDT} (to Rick Marken)
OK, I get the sense in which trying "to control or influence others" can
apply very generally. In the pass the salt please example. Is the person
passing the salt also attempting to control or influence others? What if
he is just someone generally helpful? The type of helpfullness I have in
mind for analysis, is not when one is helping a person to achieve that
person's goals not ones own. Does it become tautologically true that one
is controlling in any human social interaction?
If you believe the basic principles of PCT to be correct, then ALL intentional actions are performed so as to influence some perception (short-form mantra "all behaviour is the control of perception"), then yes, it is tautological. If one is acting in a social interaction, one is controlling some perception(s). Among the perceptions one is controlling must be perceptions of the states or acts of the partner(s) in the interaction, because if that were not so, the interaction would not be social.
What does it mean, in PCT terms, to be "someone generally helpful"? I'm tempted to do as Bill P has often done, and say the answer is an exercise for the reader. But, controlling for perceiving myself as such a person, I'll give a hint that my own answer relates to reference values for a couple of high-level perceptions.
Yes, the person passing the salt is attempting to control his/her perception of at least something about the person receiving the salt, as well as possibly his/her perception something about some of the other people at the table.
Consider what s/he might perceive if s/he refused to pass the salt. The facial expressions and body postures of the other diners might change, leading the non-passer to perceive them as regarding him/her less favourably than before. If s/he is controlling for perceiving him/herself to be well thought of by the others, that is an increase in the error value for "perception of self by others". The act of passing the salt may not reduce existing error in control of that perception, since the error may be near zero already if this is a group of good friends, but if it is an arranged working dinner to try to reconcile a hostile relationship, the simple act of passing the salt to an enemy may allow the passer to percieve the enemy as becoming slightly less hostile. It's all control of ones OWN perceptions, not of the other's behaviour.
"cooperation"? Both parties having reason to say "thankyou" in a voluntary exchange is a conservative economic fundamental. Milton Friedman's story of the pencil is one of market enabled cooperation across cultural, geographical information and skill divides. Cooperation and teamwork within corporations and with the supply chain and customers is commonly a point of emphasis in corporate culture. -- Martin L
The real question isn't there, though I might well dispute the last sentence if I wanted to argue about it -- which at this point I don't. The real question is how this actually plays out over a complex web of interactions, when cooperation is treated as a PCT building block (error in some controlled perception of each party being reduced by the results of the transaction) within systems that control other perception, possibly perceptions whose control conflicts with the perceptions involved in the transaction. For example, WalMart's pressuring of suppliers to reduce costs with the alternative of not selling to WalMart results in a "cooperative" transaction if and only if the suppliers are unable to sell their wares to other retailers. There may be a conflict in the supplier between controlling for providing their workers with jobs at a living wage and controlling for selling their goods. If they sell to WalMart, they can't pay a living wage, and if they don't, they put their workers out of a job. Nasty conflict, but a cooperative transaction with WalMart in which both WalMart and the supplier say "thank you".
All (intentional) behaviour is the control of perception, but to control one perception may be to reduce control of another, even if the conflict is not so direct as in the hypothetical example. To pass the salt to one's enemy may decrease how well one is thought of by one's friend who is not controlling for a reduction in hostilities. We see that a lot in the US Republican party of today. Politicians who want to perceive themselves as being thought well of by other Republicans increase the error in control of that perception by agreeing with anything at all that is suggested by a Democrat, even if by agreeing with the Democrat they may be reducing the error in other perceptions they are controlling.
Cooperation and conflict go hand-in hand. To analyze one without the other is, I think, misguided.
Martin T
bob hintz 2012 June 15
I think it would be really helpful to notice that in the company of others we are trying to control our perceptions of our relationship with the others. We are not normally attempting to control the behavior of someone else, but we are attempting to elicit their assistance in controlling some variable that we cannot easily control ourselves. When I am sitting at a table with others and would like to control the salt shaker which is beyond my reach and I say “Please pass the salt”, someone might pick up the salt and pass it to the person next to them, who might pass it to a person next to them, who might pass it to me. I have merely provided some information for the people in my presence what I would like to have happen. Several people have heard what I said and each participated out of kindness (perhaps) in accomplishing the movement of the salt shaker to my hand. I made no attempt to designate who should do what. The first person could have simply tossed the salt shaker to me and in some groups that would have been perfectly acceptable.
Cooperation requires communication, if it is not accidental. Some of our outputs are intended to provide information about our own perceptions, preferences and intended future activity so that another can take us into account the same way that we would like them to. Similarly we pay attention to their messages so that we do not accidentally interfere with their control and/or can purposefully facilitate their control of their preferences.
PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to control variables that neither can control alone rather than attempts by one to control the behavior of another.
bob
On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 9:02 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.15.09.22]
[Martin Lewitt 2012 Jun 15 0454 MDT} (to Rick Marken)
OK, I get the sense in which trying “to control or influence others” can
apply very generally. In the pass the salt please example. Is the person
passing the salt also attempting to control or influence others? What if
he is just someone generally helpful? The type of helpfullness I have in
mind for analysis, is not when one is helping a person to achieve that
person’s goals not ones own. Does it become tautologically true that one
is controlling in any human social interaction?
If you believe the basic principles of PCT to be correct, then ALL intentional actions are performed so as to influence some perception (short-form mantra “all behaviour is the control of perception”), then yes, it is tautological. If one is acting in a social interaction, one is controlling some perception(s). Among the perceptions one is controlling must be perceptions of the states or acts of the partner(s) in the interaction, because if that were not so, the interaction would not be social.
What does it mean, in PCT terms, to be “someone generally helpful”? I’m tempted to do as Bill P has often done, and say the answer is an exercise for the reader. But, controlling for perceiving myself as such a person, I’ll give a hint that my own answer relates to reference values for a couple of high-level perceptions.
Yes, the person passing the salt is attempting to control his/her perception of at least something about the person receiving the salt, as well as possibly his/her perception something about some of the other people at the table.
Consider what s/he might perceive if s/he refused to pass the salt. The facial expressions and body postures of the other diners might change, leading the non-passer to perceive them as regarding him/her less favourably than before. If s/he is controlling for perceiving him/herself to be well thought of by the others, that is an increase in the error value for “perception of self by others”. The act of passing the salt may not reduce existing error in control of that perception, since the error may be near zero already if this is a group of good friends, but if it is an arranged working dinner to try to reconcile a hostile relationship, the simple act of passing the salt to an enemy may allow the passer to percieve the enemy as becoming slightly less hostile. It’s all control of ones OWN perceptions, not of the other’s behaviour.
“cooperation”? Both parties having reason to say “thankyou” in a voluntary exchange is a conservative economic fundamental. Milton Friedman’s story of the pencil is one of market enabled cooperation across cultural, geographical information and skill divides. Cooperation and teamwork within corporations and with the supply chain and customers is commonly a point of emphasis in corporate culture. – Martin L
The real question isn’t there, though I might well dispute the last sentence if I wanted to argue about it – which at this point I don’t. The real question is how this actually plays out over a complex web of interactions, when cooperation is treated as a PCT building block (error in some controlled perception of each party being reduced by the results of the transaction) within systems that control other perception, possibly perceptions whose control conflicts with the perceptions involved in the transaction. For example, WalMart’s pressuring of suppliers to reduce costs with the alternative of not selling to WalMart results in a “cooperative” transaction if and only if the suppliers are unable to sell their wares to other retailers. There may be a conflict in the supplier between controlling for providing their workers with jobs at a living wage and controlling for selling their goods. If they sell to WalMart, they can’t pay a living wage, and if they don’t, they put their workers out of a job. Nasty conflict, but a cooperative transaction with WalMart in which both WalMart and the supplier say “thank you”.
All (intentional) behaviour is the control of perception, but to control one perception may be to reduce control of another, even if the conflict is not so direct as in the hypothetical example. To pass the salt to one’s enemy may decrease how well one is thought of by one’s friend who is not controlling for a reduction in hostilities. We see that a lot in the US Republican party of today. Politicians who want to perceive themselves as being thought well of by other Republicans increase the error in control of that perception by agreeing with anything at all that is suggested by a Democrat, even if by agreeing with the Democrat they may be reducing the error in other perceptions they are controlling.
Cooperation and conflict go hand-in hand. To analyze one without the other is, I think, misguided.
Martin T
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1020)]
I'm going to leave my side of this thread to Martin Taylor because I'm
going to be busy with other stuff for the next couple days (my
daughter's graduation with a PhD from Standford mainly) and Martin
Taylor's view of social control is very pleasantly compatible with my
own. But I will just try to give a quick reply to:
bob hintz 2012 June 15
BH: Cooperation requires communication, if it is not accidental.
RM: Yes, serious cooperation requires very sophisticated communication
skills. Language surely is what allowed H. sapiens to survive as a
species and it now allows them (us) to do amazing feats of
cooperation, such as controlling for building a computer or
skyscraper.
BH: PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to
control variables that neither can control alone rather than attempts by one
to control the behavior of another.
RM: If you do a complete PCT analysis of this kind of cooperation --
as Martin Taylor is doing -- you will see that all parties to such
cooperation are, indeed, controlling each other's behavior (remember,
behavior is the control of perception so the information term
"behavior" refers both to observed actions as well as the controlled
consequences of those actions).
For example, take the case of lifting a potted tree, which could not
be lifted by just one person.
Unless two people suddenly decide to lift the plant at exactly the
same time, from different sides of the pot, and move it to exactly the
same spot (this would be an example of accidental cooperation) at
least two people will have to communicate with each other to get the
plant lifted and moved to the proper place.
Let's say person A is the one who wants to move the plant and can't do
it alone. She asks person B for help. Person B will help if he is
controlling for perceiving himself helping person A. If so, then A's
request is a disturbance to this controlled perception and B will
correct it by helping A. So A has controlled B by disturbing a
controlled variable; and B has controlled A (stopping A's pleas for
help by helping A).
In this case the cooperation resulted from the fact that both A and B
are controlling for variables that allow themselves to be controlled
by each other without conflict. And the result of the mutual control
is that A gets another variable controlled -- moving the plant -- that
she could not have controlled on her own. Of course, if B happened to
be a Republican such cooperation probably wouldn't have occurred
because B would not have the goal of helping A; indeed A's pleas for
help would be a disturbance to B's goal of preventing people from
entering a cycle of dependency and B would correct that disturbance by
telling A to get a job;-)
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.15.13.23]
On 2012/06/15 1:18 PM, Richard Marken wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1020)]
I'm going to leave my side of this thread to Martin Taylor because I'm
going to be busy with other stuff for the next couple days (my
daughter's graduation with a PhD from Standford mainly) and Martin
Taylor's view of social control is very pleasantly compatible with my
own.
Thanks for the vote of confidence, but I'm afraid you won't get much out of me for most of the next month, as I will be on a 3-week trip to Alaska starting Wednesday and I have a lot of other stuff to get out of the way before I leave. I don't know whether I will have e-mail connection for much of the time I am away.
Martin
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1055)]
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.15.13.23]
Thanks for the vote of confidence, but I'm afraid you won't get much out of
me for most of the next month, as I will be on a 3-week trip to Alaska
starting Wednesday and I have a lot of other stuff to get out of the way
before I leave. I don't know whether I will have e-mail connection for much
of the time I am away.
OK, have a great time! I can probably handle stuff from here; I'll be
staying near silicon valley and I hear that there might be some
internet connectivity up there.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Rick Marken (2012.06.15.1130)]
BH : Are you suggesting that social environment can always control
individual and individual can always control social enviroment ?
RM: If by "social environment" you mean "people" then what I mean is
that people are always controlling and often what the control is other
people. So people always are controlling but they are not always
successful. So in this sense they (we) can't always control
(successfully) but they (we) can (and are) always trying.
RM : Second, you might point out that all this controlling is
usually done by implicit or explicit agreement, so conflicts are
fairly rare.BH : What do you mean by "all this controlling" and what is "implicit or
explicit agreement". Which conflicts you have in mind ?
RM: "All this controlling" just means that people are always
controlling; people are control systems; to behave is to control;
behavior is the control of perception.
Some cooperative control is done implicitly in the sense that there is
no stated or written agreement (contract) involved. the example I gave
of helping a person move a heavy potted plant is what I would call
implicit cooperation because it works without an explicit contract; it
works because people have developed goals -- like helping others --
that allow for cooperative controlling. But in societies much
cooperative control is based on explicitly stated or written
contracts, like work agreements, labor contracts, government
constitutions and such. These contracts spell out the rules of that
people (or, at least most of them) have agreed to control for.
The conflicts I have in mind are those that arise when people don't
want to go along with the cooperative program. In the pot moving
example the person who is asked to help might by be controlling for
not helping and would thus push back against the solicitation for
help. There is often conflict even when there are explicit agreements
of cooperation, as in labor - management conflicts and government-
citizen conflicts. When mutual control is going on -- as it is in
these situations, for example, management is controlling for the
workers' labor and the worker's are controlling for the manager's pay
-- you are always on the edge of possible conflict, and it sometimes
goes over the edge and we get a strike or a revolution. There is no
way to eliminate the possibility of conflict when there is mutual
control and there is no way to eliminate mutual control and survive as
a species (let alone as a civilized society. PCT shows us, I believe,
that this is just the human situation and it suggest ways to minimize
the possibility and, certainly, the magnitude of the inevitable
conflicts that can occur.
Best
Rick
On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 3:42 AM, boris_upc <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.09.49]
bob hintz 2012 June 15
I think it would be really helpful to notice that in the company of others we are trying to control our perceptions of our relationship with the others.
That may well be true, but I don't think one can ever be assured of what anyone is actually controlling for without performing some version of "The Test" for the controlled variable. One can perhaps model what might happen if one is controlling this or that perception with such-and-such a reference value, and if the result matches observed behaviour, then the model is not excluded from possibly being correct.
Assuming that what you say is true, what do you think of when you say a "relationship with others"? Is it the direction of movement relative to the proximity of someone with whom you might collide? Is it seeing a smile apparently directed at you? There are dozens, if not thousands, of possibilities, and I would assume that among all the possible relationships with others in your company you are controlling perceptions of some possible relationships but not of others. And at the same time you are probably controlling hosts of other perceptions that do not involve relationships with other people.
We are not normally attempting to control the behavior of someone else, but we are attempting to elicit their assistance in controlling some variable that we cannot easily control ourselves. When I am sitting at a table with others and would like to control the salt shaker which is beyond my reach and I say "Please pass the salt", someone might pick up the salt and pass it to the person next to them, who might pass it to a person next to them, who might pass it to me.
A nice illustrative example. It deserves analysis, partially sketched below.
I have merely provided some information for the people in my presence what I would like to have happen.
In PCT terms, what did you say here?
Let's start with the PCT mantra "All behaviour is the control of perception". You acted, so you were controlling some perception. In your example, you hypothesise that the controlled perception is of having the salt in hand. How could this control be effected? Only by someone else's action. Why would they act? Only because your "provision of information" disturbed some perception they were controlling. What information did you provide? That you were experiencing error in a controlled perception of the location of the salt with a reference value of "at my hand". Why would their action serve to reduce the error in your perception? Because they controlled a perception of the level of error in variables you control, with a reference value of "low".
Several people have heard what I said and each participated out of kindness (perhaps) in accomplishing the movement of the salt shaker to my hand.
PCT translation provided above: "Why would their action serve to reduce the error in your perception? Because they controlled a perception of the level of error in variables you control, with a reference value of "low"."
I made no attempt to designate who should do what. The first person could have simply tossed the salt shaker to me and in some groups that would have been perfectly acceptable.
PCT language again: "in some groups would have been perfectly acceptable" implies that in other groups it would not. What does that mean? To me it means that in "other groups" the tosser might expect that others were controlling some perception of him for which the observation of tossing would have increased error. Additionally, the tosser would have been controlling his perception of the perception of him by the others, and the error in that controlled perception would have been increased by the act of tossing. In the "other groups". In the "other" groups, tossing involves a conflict that does not occur when the salt is passed hand-to-hand.
Cooperation requires communication, if it is not accidental. Some of our outputs are intended to provide information about our own perceptions, preferences and intended future activity so that another can take us into account the same way that we would like them to.
Exactly so. Going back to the PCT mantra, all our deliberate communication is to control our own perceptions, but by the nature of "communication" those perceptions involve perceptions of some properties of other people. If the communication is honest, which is likely to be the case if we perceive the other party as controlling a perception of our general error level in our controlled perceptions with a reference value of "low" (in everyday language "being kindly disposed"), then we expect that if they act with respect to the disturbance caused by our communication, it will not deliberately be to increase the error level in perceptions we control.
But remember that communication can be deceptive. "Information about our own perceptions, preferences and intended future activity" may be false, while still having the effect "that another can take us into account the same way that we would like them to." We can get enemies to act to lower our own error level (to behave as we would like them to), if we can correctly judge what actions they are likely to use to counter disturbances we can introduce to their controlled perceptions by well-chosen communications.
Similarly we pay attention to their messages so that we do not accidentally interfere with their control and/or can purposefully facilitate their control of their preferences.
If that is what we want to do. But we may want to do exactly the opposite.
PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to control variables that neither can control alone rather than attempts by one to control the behavior of another.
"Rather than" is inappropriate. I would substitute "by means of", as in "PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to control variables that neither can control alone by means of attempts by each to control the behavior of the other." But I'm not sure that I would use "social control" in that sense. I would be more likely to use it in the sense that most of us control for conforming to the cultural norms of the group with whom we are currently interacting, as discussed in the "tossing the salt" analysis above.
Martin T
bob hintz 2012 June 16
Just a quick note as I will be out of town most of today.
Whenever I take action related to any other human being (maybe any other independent control system), I do so in the context of my conception of the relationship that exists between us. It will always involve my use of cultural knowledge, if I am a competent member of the culture, so that even if we have never met, I will have some idea of what is appropriate between us. If we are acquainted, I will also have use of historical knowledge and a much more detailed conception of our relationship. I will also have knowledge regarding the particular situation that we currently find ourselves, i.e., a restaurant, a home, a baseball stadium, which also specifies what activities might be routinely acceptable by most participants most of the time. Whenever I do anything I necessarily test some part of all of this knowledge. If the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of view, I am not likely to become conscious of any of my taken for granted conceptions of reality. If it does not proceed in this fashion then I must begin to test specific possibilities, if I wish to correct the situation or my models.
It seems to me that I do the PCT test only when the flow of interaction is disrupted.
bob
On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 2:41 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.09.49]
bob hintz 2012 June 15
I think it would be really helpful to notice that in the company of others we are trying to control our perceptions of our relationship with the others.
That may well be true, but I don’t think one can ever be assured of what anyone is actually controlling for without performing some version of “The Test” for the controlled variable. One can perhaps model what might happen if one is controlling this or that perception with such-and-such a reference value, and if the result matches observed behaviour, then the model is not excluded from possibly being correct.
Assuming that what you say is true, what do you think of when you say a “relationship with others”? Is it the direction of movement relative to the proximity of someone with whom you might collide? Is it seeing a smile apparently directed at you? There are dozens, if not thousands, of possibilities, and I would assume that among all the possible relationships with others in your company you are controlling perceptions of some possible relationships but not of others. And at the same time you are probably controlling hosts of other perceptions that do not involve relationships with other people.
We are not normally attempting to control the behavior of someone else, but we are attempting to elicit their assistance in controlling some variable that we cannot easily control ourselves. When I am sitting at a table with others and would like to control the salt shaker which is beyond my reach and I say “Please pass the salt”, someone might pick up the salt and pass it to the person next to them, who might pass it to a person next to them, who might pass it to me.
A nice illustrative example. It deserves analysis, partially sketched below.
I have merely provided some information for the people in my presence what I would like to have happen.
In PCT terms, what did you say here?
Let’s start with the PCT mantra “All behaviour is the control of perception”. You acted, so you were controlling some perception. In your example, you hypothesise that the controlled perception is of having the salt in hand. How could this control be effected? Only by someone else’s action. Why would they act? Only because your “provision of information” disturbed some perception they were controlling. What information did you provide? That you were experiencing error in a controlled perception of the location of the salt with a reference value of “at my hand”. Why would their action serve to reduce the error in your perception? Because they controlled a perception of the level of error in variables you control, with a reference value of “low”.
Several people have heard what I said and each participated out of kindness (perhaps) in accomplishing the movement of the salt shaker to my hand.
PCT translation provided above: “Why would their action serve to reduce the error in your perception? Because they controlled a perception of the level of error in variables you control, with a reference value of “low”.”
I made no attempt to designate who should do what. The first person could have simply tossed the salt shaker to me and in some groups that would have been perfectly acceptable.
PCT language again: “in some groups would have been perfectly acceptable” implies that in other groups it would not. What does that mean? To me it means that in “other groups” the tosser might expect that others were controlling some perception of him for which the observation of tossing would have increased error. Additionally, the tosser would have been controlling his perception of the perception of him by the others, and the error in that controlled perception would have been increased by the act of tossing. In the “other groups”. In the “other” groups, tossing involves a conflict that does not occur when the salt is passed hand-to-hand.
Cooperation requires communication, if it is not accidental. Some of our outputs are intended to provide information about our own perceptions, preferences and intended future activity so that another can take us into account the same way that we would like them to.
Exactly so. Going back to the PCT mantra, all our deliberate communication is to control our own perceptions, but by the nature of “communication” those perceptions involve perceptions of some properties of other people. If the communication is honest, which is likely to be the case if we perceive the other party as controlling a perception of our general error level in our controlled perceptions with a reference value of “low” (in everyday language “being kindly disposed”), then we expect that if they act with respect to the disturbance caused by our communication, it will not deliberately be to increase the error level in perceptions we control.
But remember that communication can be deceptive. “Information about our own perceptions, preferences and intended future activity” may be false, while still having the effect “that another can take us into account the same way that we would like them to.” We can get enemies to act to lower our own error level (to behave as we would like them to), if we can correctly judge what actions they are likely to use to counter disturbances we can introduce to their controlled perceptions by well-chosen communications.
Similarly we pay attention to their messages so that we do not accidentally interfere with their control and/or can purposefully facilitate their control of their preferences.
If that is what we want to do. But we may want to do exactly the opposite.
PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to control variables that neither can control alone rather than attempts by one to control the behavior of another.
“Rather than” is inappropriate. I would substitute “by means of”, as in “PCT would define social control as two or more persons joining together to control variables that neither can control alone by means of attempts by each to control the behavior of the other.” But I’m not sure that I would use “social control” in that sense. I would be more likely to use it in the sense that most of us control for conforming to the cultural norms of the group with whom we are currently interacting, as discussed in the “tossing the salt” analysis above.
Martin T
[Martin Taylor 2012.06.16.13.25]
bob hintz 2012 June 16
Just a quick note as I will be out of town most of today.
Whenever I take action related to any other human being (maybe any other independent control system), I do so in the context of my conception of the relationship that exists between us. It will always involve my use of cultural knowledge, if I am a competent member of the culture, so that even if we have never met, I will have some idea of what is appropriate between us. If we are acquainted, I will also have use of historical knowledge and a much more detailed conception of our relationship. I will also have knowledge regarding the particular situation that we currently find ourselves, i.e., a restaurant, a home, a baseball stadium, which also specifies what activities might be routinely acceptable by most participants most of the time. Whenever I do anything I necessarily test some part of all of this knowledge. If the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of view, I am not likely to become conscious of any of my taken for granted conceptions of reality. If it does not proceed in this fashion then I must begin to test specific possibilities, if I wish to correct the situation or my models.
I agree with all that, but since this is a mailing list concerned with PCT, I would use different language. I would talk about reorganization in the cultural context leading to action mechanisms that are usually effective in the cultural context. I would consider that if we are well acquainted, both of us have reorganized so that our control mechanisms that involve control of perceptions of each other are "well oiled".
I would recognize that I am not usually conscious of my control in cases where "the interaction proceeds in a satisfactory fashion from my point of view" whether the interaction involves another biological entity or some part of the inanimate environment, but I do become aware of it if "it does not proceed in this fashion".
From a PCT viewpoint, there really isn't much difference between control of perceptions of the inanimate environment and an environment that contains other control systems. There's a practical difference, in that the physical laws that govern the inanimate environment change more slowly than the social norms that serve a similar purpose (as far as reorganization is concerned) in the cultural environment.
It seems to me that I do the PCT test only when the flow of interaction is disrupted.
Are you sure of that? Would you not say that you are conscious of performing The Test only when the control variable for which you are testing turns out not to be correct? Perhaps the person is unaware of your intended disturbance (isn't listening), or is not controlling the perception you are trying to disturb (doesn't care what you said). You perform The Test only by influencing the other person's environment, and maybe the person is controlling a perception that involves that aspect of the environment, but controls the perception by acting on a different part of the environment that also is involved in her controlled perception, in which case your Test failed because the controlled perception was not the one you tested for. But if The Test succeeds, all that happens is that your control of your own perception is easy -- the situation that so often means that the controlling is not conscious.
Martin T