Viewpoints and group behaviour (was Testing for Control In Experiments...)

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33]

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.08.02.1202 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.02.0505 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.08.02.0616 EDT) --

Just to get the ball rolling, here is an experiment done by Dan Ariely's group. A group of students were given instructions as to how to fold one of two origami figures. They were told they had to surrender the finished work to the experimenter. When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own works. Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than student passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of students were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by origami experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value on the pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own efforts).

How might this experiment have been performed differently if Ariely had been familiar with PCT? What might he have learned that he did not learn as a result of performing the experiment in the original way?

He might have learned why some students bid more and others less for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined one student at a time rather than for "students." MOL-type interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for their own work than some of the other students did, and why some passers-by bid more. I trust that the findings are the usual sort of psychological fact, which is not true of a substantial number of subjects. If not, I apologize for being pessimistic. Do you have the actual numbers? It would be interesting to see the breakdown of positive and negative instances of the group findings.

...

If your goal is to discover which perception a particular individual is controlling, PCT is the way to go. I suspect that is why MOL is so attractive. PCT is the science of individual behavior, not group behavior. As far as I can tell, PCT is more about how than about why. Nothing wrong with that, but it has limited the impact of PCT. We can learn that a system is controlling a variable by observing the way the system counters disturbances. Why the system is controlling that particular variable with that particular reference level, not so much.

I'd say PCT is more about "why" than about "how". The reference signal is "why" a control system acts. The control system's output system doesn't care how it influences the perception, only that it does, and does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference vale and the perceptual value. A PCT analyst may want to figure out just how this influence occurs, to determine its bandwidth, the loop gain and delay, and so forth, but the control unit has no access to that kind of information. "Why" the reference value is thus and so is that the perception being controlled is going to be used somewhere in some other control, whether higher in the hierarchy (HPCT) or because of its influence on some other variable through the environment.

PCT is indeed a science of group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every person in a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in the group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that action alters perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of those perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those perceptions involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other group members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out from some initial action that might have been to counter some physically caused disturbance. Some of those ripples feed back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of such feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while others will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity or the excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop limits the growth.

There's a whole PCT science in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For example, what is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT meaning -- a level of difference between the reference and the actual value of some controlled perception that is reported as "zero error" to the output function -- but its implication is the same as "tolerance" in everyday life. What is the influence of timing? If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual inputs of another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively different than if the communications are faster? How do those timings interact with the time-scales of control at the higher levels within individuals? Would the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or weeks for communications between institutions or between branches in different countries?

It is important to keep our viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has been called an "analysts viewpoint". The analyst can see (or is hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the perceptual and output functions and transmission pathways within the part of the individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions. In contrast, the "observer's viewpoint" is restricted to the external environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or hypothesise) the signal values and functions within the individual. (There are other viewpoints such as the "control unit's viewpoint" used above in talking about "why", but the analyst's and observer's are the important two for this discussion).

When you are dealing with a group, a similar separation of viewpoints seems appropriate. The "network ripples" that I mentioned above correspond to a group analyst's viewpoint, whether or not an analyst's viewpoint is also used in considering the individual group members. On the other hand, an "observer's viewpoint" leads to statements like "When such-and-so conditions apply, 60% of the groups suddenly become collections of battling individuals whereas 40% hang together and cooperate for each other's benefit."

It's the same kind of thing as with the Ariely experiment. An observer's viewpoint leads to:

"When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own works. Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than student passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of students were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by origami experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value on the pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own efforts)."

whereas an analyst's vewpoint leads to Bill Powers's:

"He might have learned why some students bid more and others less for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined one student at a time rather than for "students." MOL-type interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for their own work than some of the other students did, and why some passers-by bid more."

The viewpoints are not compatible except in the sense that the analyst's viewpoint will include all the observations available from the observer's viewpoint. Neither is wrong, but the analyst's viewpoint, if the analysis is correct, is more powerful. If the analysis can predict the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a post-hoc analysis can have some value.

Anyway, it's important to keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing observations, and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views of the same phenomenon.

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.08.03.1433 EDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33]

I'd say PCT is more about "why" than about "how". The reference signal is "why" a control system acts. The control system's output system doesn't care how it influences the perception, only that it does, and does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference vale and the perceptual value. A PCT analyst may want to figure out just how this influence occurs, to determine its bandwidth, the loop gain and delay, and so forth, but the control unit has no access to that kind of information. "Why" the reference value is thus and so is that the perception being controlled is going to be used somewhere in some other control, whether higher in the hierarchy (HPCT) or because of its influence on some other variable through the environment.

That "why" seems to me to be pretty empty. Or perhaps I should say that explains too much. No matter what I do, I do in order to satisfy some some control loop higher in the hierarchy or because of the influence of my actions on some other variable through the environment. That's rather like saying that any activity in the universe is the result of the interaction of quantum fields. O.K., now what?

Let's look at a simple experiment in behavioral economics. It has been found that a higher percentage of employees enroll in a retirement plan if they must opt out than if they must opt in. The lesson here is clear. If you want more of your employees to participate in a retirement plan, make it a requirement that they must opt out if they do not wish to participate. The simplest interpretation of these findings is that employees need a reason to act. Absent such a reason, the do not act by opting out. What, if anything, does PCT have to add to this story? I can't think of anything, but I am admittedly incompetent.

PCT is indeed a science of group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every person in a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in the group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that action alters perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of those perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those perceptions involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other group members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out from some initial action that might have been to counter some physically caused disturbance. Some of those ripples feed back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of such feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while others will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity or the excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop limits the growth.

BG: Agreed. But only the simplest models of these interactions exist. Considering what we think we know about social behavior, "Crowd" is a less than stunning addition to our understanding.

There's a whole PCT science in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For example, what is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT meaning -- a level of difference between the reference and the actual value of some controlled perception that is reported as "zero error" to the output function -- but its implication is the same as "tolerance" in everyday life.

BG: Really? Now if we only knew how to report zero-error to the output function, look how many of problems of the world would disappear. The Middle East mess would vanish. I can see myself explaining it to Netanyahu, "Look Ben (we are on a first-name basis), its all a matter of getting your systems to report a "zero error" to your output functions. I've explained this to the Palestinians and they are on board with the plan."

What is the influence of timing? If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual inputs of another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively different than if the communications are faster? How do those timings interact with the time-scales of control at the higher levels within individuals? Would the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or weeks for communications between institutions or between branches in different countries?

BG: The answer to your question is known even to those who do not understand PCT. If we reinstated the pony express financial collapses would take longer to develop. But develop they would: _This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly_ by Reinhart and Rogoff.

It is important to keep our viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has been called an "analysts viewpoint". The analyst can see (or is hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the perceptual and output functions and transmission pathways within the part of the individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions. In contrast, the "observer's viewpoint" is restricted to the external environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or hypothesise) the signal values and functions within the individual. (There are other viewpoints such as the "control unit's viewpoint" used above in talking about "why", but the analyst's and observer's are the important two for this discussion).

When you are dealing with a group, a similar separation of viewpoints seems appropriate. The "network ripples" that I mentioned above correspond to a group analyst's viewpoint, whether or not an analyst's viewpoint is also used in considering the individual group members. On the other hand, an "observer's viewpoint" leads to statements like "When such-and-so conditions apply, 60% of the groups suddenly become collections of battling individuals whereas 40% hang together and cooperate for each other's benefit."

It's the same kind of thing as with the Ariely experiment. An observer's viewpoint leads to:

"When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own works. Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than student passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of students were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by origami experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value on the pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own efforts)."

whereas an analyst's vewpoint leads to Bill Powers's:

"He might have learned why some students bid more and others less for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined one student at a time rather than for "students." MOL-type interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for their own work than some of the other students did, and why some passers-by bid more."

BG: I seems to me that MOL-type interviews are characterized by exactly the same sort of fuzziness that Bill deplores in conventional psychology. In fact studies demonstrate when they are led to believe that they chose an option that they did not express preference for, many subjects have no trouble justifying the choice they did not make. (Asked to choose between A and B, they indicated a preference for A but were given B. They later generated a variety of reasons why B was superior) We learn from the time we are young children the importance of justifying our actions. If I was you a series of "non-directive" questions, you will quickly learn what kinds of answers please me and provide them (if pleasing me is important). Despite Bill's enthusiasm for introspection, I know of no evidence that it is anything more than story-telling. I am confident that students will tell you why they made the bids they made. I have no confidence that their answers tell us anything more than that the students believe they are giving plausible reasons for their actions.

The viewpoints are not compatible except in the sense that the analyst's viewpoint will include all the observations available from the observer's viewpoint. Neither is wrong, but the analyst's viewpoint, if the analysis is correct, is more powerful. If the analysis can predict the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a post-hoc analysis can have some value.

BG: Unfortunately, I find this distinction of limited value in the real world. If a model does not predict, it can "explain" anything. I feel certain that those who favor "intelligent design" can provide a satisfying, to them at least, explanation of anything we can discover in the natural world. I guess I am just an observer rather than an analyst. I predict that if you give your employee's the option of opting out of your retirement program, more of them will join the program than if you require them to opt into the program. I would be impressed if your analytical approach identified which employees would enter the program before I asked them. After the fact, I fear I would have to agree with Pooh-Bah. "Merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."

Anyway, it's important to keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing observations, and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views of the same phenomenon.

BG: O.K. Put me down as an observer waiting to be convinced that the analyst has something more valuable to add to the story. (I will not dwell on the value added to the financial disaster by the quants of Wall Street.)

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1015 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33 –

MMT: I’d say PCT is more about
“why” than about “how”. The reference signal is
“why” a control system acts. The control system’s output system
doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it does, and
does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference
vale and the perceptual value.

BP: An output function doesn’t “care” about any of that. It
doesn’t know that it’s influencing a perception. It doesn’t know the
direction of its effects. It doesn’t know anything at all. Knowing is
what perceptual systems do, and even then there is no knowing unless
awareness is involved.

That’s how I use those words.

MMT: PCT is indeed a science of
group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every person in
a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in the
group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that action alters
perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of those
perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those perceptions
involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other group
members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out from some
initial action that might have been to counter some physically caused
disturbance.

BP: This paragraph contains a number of proposed statements of fact, none
of which has been verified. The first step is to show that these are true
statements, within the meaning of experimental truth. Until that is
established there is no point in going further.

I would say that there is no science of group behavior yet. Kent
McClelland is working on this, but just starting. And I don’t think that
in the end we will find that term defensible or useful. It’s not behavior
that we’re basically interested in, anyway, since that depends on the
nature of the current local environment and on both disturbances and
reference levels not in the group but in the individuals.

MMT: Some of those ripples feed
back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of such
feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative
feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while others
will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity or the
excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop limits the
growth.

BP: Fine, so let us pause and verify that this actually happens. Doing
that would vastly improve our understanding. If we’re going to build a
new science, we have to build it, not just imagine it. How would you
propose testing these statements experimentally?

MMT: There’s a whole PCT science
in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For example, what
is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT meaning – a
level of difference between the reference and the actual value of some
controlled perception that is reported as “zero error” to the
output function – but its implication is the same as
“tolerance” in everyday life. What is the influence of timing?
If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual inputs of
another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively different
than if the communications are faster? How do those timings interact with
the time-scales of control at the higher levels within individuals? Would
the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or weeks
for communications between institutions or between branches in different
countries?

BP: That’s all way in the future. We aren’t ready to handle such details
yet. First we have to make sure the foundations are built on rock and not
sand. I know that’s boring, at least to other people who want quick
answers to all questions, but if we don’t do it we won’t have a
science.

MMT: It is important to keep our
viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the
experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has been
called an “analysts viewpoint”. The analyst can see (or is
hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the perceptual and
output functions and transmission pathways within the part of the
individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions.

BP: The analyst can proposed such things in the form of a model, but then
it becomes the analyst’s duty to design and carry out the experiments
that will see if the model predicts what people will really do.

MMT: In contrast, the
“observer’s viewpoint” is restricted to the external
environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or hypothesise)
the signal values and functions within the individual. (There are other
viewpoints such as the “control unit’s viewpoint” used above in
talking about “why”, but the analyst’s and observer’s are the
important two for this discussion).

When you are dealing with a
group, a similar separation of viewpoints seems appropriate. The
“network ripples” that I mentioned above correspond to a group
analyst’s viewpoint, whether or not an analyst’s viewpoint is also used
in considering the individual group members. On the other hand, an
“observer’s viewpoint” leads to statements like “When
such-and-so conditions apply, 60% of the groups suddenly become
collections of battling individuals whereas 40% hang together and
cooperate for each other’s benefit.”

It’s the same kind of thing as with the Ariely experiment. An observer’s
viewpoint leads to:

“When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own works.
Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than student
passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of students
were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by origami
experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value on the
pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own
efforts).”

BP: The observer’s viewpoint is not accurately described by these words
unless the observer actually can’t see that these statements are untrue.
“Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it”
is a false report of what happened. There was no entity in the group
called “those” who did something called “tending” to
bid more. Each person bid what was bid; there were no
“tendencies.” The group average does not indicate some
behavior that all members of the group would have shown but for something
that prevented some of them from showing it. Some individuals bid more
for their own work than others did; some bid the same amount or less.
That is what a truthful observer would report. The same general statement
can’t apply both to those who bid more and those who bid
less. This language distorts the variety of behaviors in the
group so as to make it seem that there was some unified entity behaving
in some common way. The counterexamples are suppressed by this kind of
language, so it seems that they don’t need to be explained by the same
theory that explains the positive instances. I will argue vehemently
against allowing any statements of this kind to be used to describe any
PCT research results.

MMT: whereas an analyst’s
vewpoint leads to Bill Powers’s:

“He might have learned why some students bid more and others less
for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined one
student at a time rather than for “students.” MOL-type
interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for their own
work than some of the other students did, and why some passers-by bid
more.”

BP: This viewpoint far more accurately describes the real findings. The
“observer” you describe is far too naive or incompetent to be
taken as a source of information.

MMT: The viewpoints are not
compatible except in the sense that the analyst’s viewpoint will include
all the observations available from the observer’s viewpoint. Neither is
wrong, but the analyst’s viewpoint, if the analysis is correct, is more
powerful.

BP: I disagree. The observer’s viewpoint is incorrect, implying what is
not actually observed. It is not just “less powerful.” It
creates incorrect conclusions and falsehoods, and works directly against
correct understanding.

MMT: If the analysis can predict
the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a post-hoc
analysis can have some value.

BP:Predicting the observations correctly is the ONLY way the analysis can
have any value. That is the sine qua non. The analyst must predict
which subjects will bid more and which will bid less, with high accuracy.
If that can’t be done, we have to conclude that we can’t predict this
behavior, and might even conclude that it’s not very important to predict
it.

MMT: Anyway, it’s important to
keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing observations,
and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views of the
same phenomenon.

BP: You’re describing the conventional way of using group data to explain
individual behavior. I thought we on CSGnet had more or less agreed that
there is not any reliable relationship between group characteristics and
individual characteristics; Richard Kennaway proved, to my satisfaction
anyway, that there is not.

Long ago in this venue I issued a demand for higher standards in the
testing of proposed models. If we start building a science of psychology
around PCT, I will renew that demand. I’ll try to make allowances and be
nice about it, but I won’t accept using group characteristics as a way of
describing individual characteristics. Even if it’s you, my esteemed
friend, doing it.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Lewitt 2010 Aug 4, 1149 MDT]

Any science of group behavior must account for hazing, and for the

prevalence of that expensive and sorry excuse for a bib called a
necktie. Hmmm, perhaps sexual differences as well.

regards,

      Martin L
···

On 8/4/2010 11:42 AM, Bill Powers wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1015 MDT)]

  Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33 --
    MMT: I'd say PCT is more about

“why” than about “how”. The reference signal is
“why” a control system acts. The control system’s output system
doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it
does, and
does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the
reference
vale and the perceptual value.

  BP: An output function doesn't "care" about any of that. It

doesn’t know that it’s influencing a perception. It doesn’t know
the
direction of its effects. It doesn’t know anything at all. Knowing
is
what perceptual systems do, and even then there is no knowing
unless
awareness is involved.

  That's how I use those words.
    MMT: PCT is indeed a science of

group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every
person in
a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in
the
group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that
action alters
perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of
those
perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those
perceptions
involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other
group
members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out
from some
initial action that might have been to counter some physically
caused
disturbance.

  BP: This paragraph contains a number of proposed statements of

fact, none
of which has been verified. The first step is to show that these
are true
statements, within the meaning of experimental truth. Until that
is
established there is no point in going further.

  I would say that there is no science of group behavior yet. Kent

McClelland is working on this, but just starting. And I don’t
think that
in the end we will find that term defensible or useful. It’s not
behavior
that we’re basically interested in, anyway, since that depends on
the
nature of the current local environment and on both disturbances
and
reference levels not in the group but in the individuals.

    MMT: Some of those ripples feed

back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of
such
feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative
feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while
others
will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity
or the
excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop
limits the
growth.

  BP: Fine, so let us pause and verify that this actually happens.

Doing
that would vastly improve our understanding. If we’re going to
build a
new science, we have to build it, not just imagine it. How would
you
propose testing these statements experimentally?

    MMT: There's a whole PCT science

in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For
example, what
is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT
meaning – a
level of difference between the reference and the actual value
of some
controlled perception that is reported as “zero error” to the
output function – but its implication is the same as
“tolerance” in everyday life. What is the influence of timing?
If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual
inputs of
another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively
different
than if the communications are faster? How do those timings
interact with
the time-scales of control at the higher levels within
individuals? Would
the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or
weeks
for communications between institutions or between branches in
different
countries?

  BP: That's all way in the future. We aren't ready to handle such

details
yet. First we have to make sure the foundations are built on rock
and not
sand. I know that’s boring, at least to other people who want
quick
answers to all questions, but if we don’t do it we won’t have a
science.

    MMT: It is important to keep our

viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the
experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has
been
called an “analysts viewpoint”. The analyst can see (or is
hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the
perceptual and
output functions and transmission pathways within the part of
the
individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions.

  BP: The analyst can proposed such things in the form of a model,

but then
it becomes the analyst’s duty to design and carry out the
experiments
that will see if the model predicts what people will really do.

    MMT: In contrast, the

“observer’s viewpoint” is restricted to the external
environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or
hypothesise)
the signal values and functions within the individual. (There
are other
viewpoints such as the “control unit’s viewpoint” used above in
talking about “why”, but the analyst’s and observer’s are the
important two for this discussion).

    When you are dealing with a

group, a similar separation of viewpoints seems appropriate. The
“network ripples” that I mentioned above correspond to a group
analyst’s viewpoint, whether or not an analyst’s viewpoint is
also used
in considering the individual group members. On the other hand,
an
“observer’s viewpoint” leads to statements like “When
such-and-so conditions apply, 60% of the groups suddenly become
collections of battling individuals whereas 40% hang together
and
cooperate for each other’s benefit.”

    It's the same kind of thing as with the Ariely experiment. An

observer’s
viewpoint leads to:

    "When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own

works.
Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than
student
passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of
students
were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by
origami
experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value
on the
pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own
efforts)."

  BP: The observer's viewpoint is not accurately described by these

words
unless the observer actually can’t see that these statements are
untrue.
“Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it”
is a false report of what happened. There was no entity in the
group
called “those” who did something called “tending” to
bid more. Each person bid what was bid; there were no
“tendencies.” The group average does not indicate some
behavior that all members of the group would have shown but for
something
that prevented some of them from showing it. Some individuals bid
more
for their own work than others did; some bid the same amount or
less.
That is what a truthful observer would report. The same general
statement
can’t apply both to those who bid more and those who bid
less. This language distorts the variety of behaviors in the
group so as to make it seem that there was some unified entity
behaving
in some common way. The counterexamples are suppressed by this
kind of
language, so it seems that they don’t need to be explained by the
same
theory that explains the positive instances. I will argue
vehemently
against allowing any statements of this kind to be used to
describe any
PCT research results.

    MMT: whereas an analyst's

vewpoint leads to Bill Powers’s:

    "He might have learned why some students bid more and others

less
for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined
one
student at a time rather than for “students.” MOL-type
interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for
their own
work than some of the other students did, and why some
passers-by bid
more."

  BP: This viewpoint far more accurately describes the real

findings. The
“observer” you describe is far too naive or incompetent to be
taken as a source of information.

    MMT: The viewpoints are not

compatible except in the sense that the analyst’s viewpoint will
include
all the observations available from the observer’s viewpoint.
Neither is
wrong, but the analyst’s viewpoint, if the analysis is correct,
is more
powerful.

  BP: I disagree. The observer's viewpoint is incorrect, implying

what is
not actually observed. It is not just “less powerful.” It
creates incorrect conclusions and falsehoods, and works directly
against
correct understanding.

    MMT: If the analysis can predict

the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a
post-hoc
analysis can have some value.

  BP:Predicting the observations correctly is the ONLY way the

analysis can
have any value. That is the sine qua non. The analyst
must predict
which subjects will bid more and which will bid less, with high
accuracy.
If that can’t be done, we have to conclude that we can’t predict
this
behavior, and might even conclude that it’s not very important to
predict
it.

    MMT: Anyway, it's important to

keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing
observations,
and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views
of the
same phenomenon.

  BP: You're describing the conventional way of using group data to

explain
individual behavior. I thought we on CSGnet had more or less
agreed that
there is not any reliable relationship between group
characteristics and
individual characteristics; Richard Kennaway proved, to my
satisfaction
anyway, that there is not.

  Long ago in this venue I issued a demand for higher standards in

the
testing of proposed models. If we start building a science of
psychology
around PCT, I will renew that demand. I’ll try to make allowances
and be
nice about it, but I won’t accept using group characteristics as a
way of
describing individual characteristics. Even if it’s you, my
esteemed
friend, doing it.

  Best,



  Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.16.43]

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.08.03.1433 EDT)]
[Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33]

I'd say PCT is more about "why" than about "how". The reference signal is "why" a control system acts. The control system's output system doesn't care how it influences the perception, only that it does, and does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference vale and the perceptual value. A PCT analyst may want to figure out just how this influence occurs, to determine its bandwidth, the loop gain and delay, and so forth, but the control unit has no access to that kind of information. "Why" the reference value is thus and so is that the perception being controlled is going to be used somewhere in some other control, whether higher in the hierarchy (HPCT) or because of its influence on some other variable through the environment.
That "why" seems to me to be pretty empty. Or perhaps I should say that explains too much. No matter what I do, I do in order to satisfy some some control loop higher in the hierarchy or because of the influence of my actions on some other variable through the environment. That's rather like saying that any activity in the universe is the result of the interaction of quantum fields. O.K., now what?
Think of the child's hierarchy of questions "Q. Why is the sky blue"

“A. Because blue light scatters more from the air than does read or
green light” “Q. Why does that happen” “A. Because blue has a
shorter wavelength than red or green” “Q. Why does blue have a
shorter wavelength” “A. It’s the way our eyes work. We call it blue
when we see shorter wavelength light, and red when we see longer
wavelength light” “Q. Why do we call it those names” “A. It’s
convenient. We could call it anything we wanted, so long as other
people could understand us” “Q. Why …” (and so on). “Why” is
fundamental, and in PCT, the answer to “Q. Why do you do that” is
always the same as the everyday world answer “A. I do that in order
to achieve this”. The difference from the everyday answer is that
the PCT view always carries the implication of “could you achieve
this another way” and “by doing it this way, what side effects might
there be” (the “unintended consequences” of economics). And, in most
cases, the PCT view also suggests that the stopping point of the
“why” series is likely to be “because that’s what I believe to be
right” (a controlled perception at a rather high level in Bill’s
proposed hierarchy).

I don't buy your quantum analogy. A better one might come from

Newton’s laws of mechanics. For example: (Newton) To every action
there is an equal and opposite reaction; (PCT) A disturbance to a
controlled perception results in a compensating action. (Newton) A
body continues its state of motion unless affected by external
forces. (PCT) An undisturbed perception maintains its value unless
its reference value changes.

The point is that from almost trivially true elements, a complex set

of consequences can be derived by introducing specific boundary
conditions. The PCT “why” is indeed universal for living things, and
it is trivially simple. By itself, as you say, it doesn’t explain
too much. Even without PCT, people ask each other “Why did you do
that?” An understanding of PCT doesn’t change that any more than an
understanding of Newton’s laws change people’s understanding that if
you kick a stone it moves in the direction of the kick.
Understanding Newton’s laws allows you to consider the forces
involved in the kick. Understanding PCT induces one to ask “If this
is why you did that, could you have got as good a result by doing
something else?” In PCT-speak, one might ask what perceptions enter
into the one being controlled, and how the actions involved in
controlling those other perceptions might interact with (possibly
conflict with) the control of yet other perceptions being controlled
by yourself or by other people. In this sense, PCT formalizes the
kinds of questions you might ask.

Rick reduces the questions you might ask to just one: "What

perceptions are being controlled". I disagree with that limitation,
but I do think that it is useful to be able to categorize the kinds
of questions, and more importantly to be able to say what it would
mean to answer them. Looking at just the simple circuitry of a
single control unit, you can ask a question about each individual
component. Rick’s question turns into “what is the perceptual input
function”. To that question we can add others, of which the more
important might include “what is the reference value for that
perception”, “What influences would disturb that perception”, "What
are the loop characteristics (e.g. gain and transport lag), “what is
the environmental feedback path”, “What side effects might occur”
(which in part can be translated as “how efficient is the control”,
since if all the output energy is used only to influence the
controlled perception, none is left for side effects; of course,
that never happens in practice, but to set up that ideal leads to
consideration of how to control one’s perceptions cleanly, reducing
unexpected conflicts).

Let's look at a simple experiment in behavioral economics. It has been found that a higher percentage of employees enroll in a retirement plan if they must opt out than if they must opt in. The lesson here is clear. If you want more of your employees to participate in a retirement plan, make it a requirement that they must opt out if they do not wish to participate. The simplest interpretation of these findings is that employees need a reason to act. Absent such a reason, the do not act by opting out. What, if anything, does PCT have to add to this story? I can't think of anything, but I am admittedly incompetent.
I mentioned "tolerance", but I think you misunderstood...

There's a whole PCT science in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For example, what is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT meaning -- a level of difference between the reference and the actual value of some controlled perception that is reported as "zero error" to the output function -- but its implication is the same as "tolerance" in everyday life.
BG: Really? Now if we only knew how to report zero-error to the output function, look how many of problems of the world would disappear. The Middle East mess would vanish. I can see myself explaining it to Netanyahu, "Look Ben (we are on a first-name basis), its all a matter of getting your systems to report a "zero error" to your output functions. I've explained this to the Palestinians and they are on board with the plan."
I'm not sure in what way you misunderstood, but in everyday

language, if Netanyahu could tolerate more the presence of
Palestinians in association with Jews and perceived Palestinians as
tolerating more the existence and legitimacy of Israel, would not
conflict be reduced? That’s just an everyday intuitive statement.
The PCT concept would be best described in diagrams:

![tolerance.jpg|711x321](upload://dEHtvVF5ggxMN1W4flNlSsfcyc1.jpeg)

The left diagram shows the output from the comparator function as it

is usually considered (a simple subtractor), whereas the right one
shows the output from a comparator that reports zero error for small
deviations between reference and perception – a “tolerant”
comparator function. If a control system has such a comparator
function, it generates no change in output when its controlled
perception is slightly disturbed. If two such “tolerant” control
units are in apparent conflict, their conflict will not escalate
when either’s perception is disturbed by small extraneous
influences, whereas with “zero tolerance” control systems in
conflict, any extraneous disturbance, no matter how small, will
result in exponentially increasing output, each control unit’s
output being a disturbance to the other’s perception.


What is the influence of timing? If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual inputs of another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively different than if the communications are faster? How do those timings interact with the time-scales of control at the higher levels within individuals? Would the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or weeks for communications between institutions or between branches in different countries?
BG: The answer to your question is known even to those who do not understand PCT. If we reinstated the pony express financial collapses would take longer to develop. But develop they would: _This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly_ by Reinhart and Rogoff.
I've heard of the book, but not read it. Does it explain the cases

when financial collapses did not happen even though the conditions
might seems similar to those cases when they did? Remember that the
2008 collapse just might not have happened if Lehman Bros had been
bailed out that critical weekend. Since we can’t rerun the past, we
won’t know, but some people think we might have avoided or at least
mitigated the collapse.


BG: I seems to me that MOL-type interviews are characterized by exactly the same sort of fuzziness that Bill deplores in conventional psychology.
Interesting. Maybe you could describe what you understand to be an

MOL-type interview, and let Bill comment on the accuracy of your
description?

In fact studies demonstrate when they are led to believe that they chose an option that they did not express preference for, many subjects have no trouble justifying the choice they did not make. (Asked to choose between A and B, they indicated a preference for A but were given B. They later generated a variety of reasons why B was superior)
Yes, that's true. Quite interesting are the cases in which it is not

true. What’s different about those people, or is it just those
people in those specific situations?

My own PCT-type top-of-the-head suggested explanation for this

effect (Rick will disagree) is that one of the perceptions people
control for is self-image, a perception with many contributing
perceptions, among which may well be a perception of one’s own
competence. If that perception is controlled, then a perception that
choice A was in some way wrong acts as a disturbance, a disturbance
that can be countered in imagination by developing reasons
(perceptions of, among other things, environmental affordances) that
they would now choose B instead.

We learn from the time we are young children the importance of justifying our actions. If I was you a series of "non-directive" questions, you will quickly learn what kinds of answers please me and provide them (if pleasing me is important).
Yes. Reorganization will do that. In fact, it is the basis for my

theory of language and cultural acquisition that I presented at the
CSG conference in Durango, 1993.

Despite Bill's enthusiasm for introspection, I know of no evidence that it is anything more than story-telling.
I think Bill would probably agree with that, in the absence of

experimental data. He has often said that his hierarchical levels
are “story-telling” about his own introspections, and very recently
he said that one of his hopes for the future development of PCT
would be to test the very concept of levels, let alone the nature of
different levels. He certainly is quite free with the levels when
making his own models.

I am confident that students will tell you why they made the bids they made. I have no confidence that their answers tell us anything more than that the students believe they are giving plausible reasons for their actions.
Yes. But one might reasonably ask why they feel the need to do that.

What perception are they controlling in doing so? How might one
disturb that perception in a way that would not disturb some
plausible other candidate perception? In other words, could you
perform “The Test” to do so?

For some insight into this are of research, you might check out Dick

Robertson et al (et al includes Dave Goldstein on this list)
“Testing the Self as a control system: Theoretical and
Methodological Issues” in the PCT issue of the International Journal
of Human Computer Studies (1999, v50), or directly ask Roberston or
Goldstein on this list.


The viewpoints are not compatible except in the sense that the analyst's viewpoint will include all the observations available from the observer's viewpoint. Neither is wrong, but the analyst's viewpoint, if the analysis is correct, is more powerful. If the analysis can predict the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a post-hoc analysis can have some value.
BG: Unfortunately, I find this distinction of limited value in the real world. If a model does not predict, it can "explain" anything.
I would rephrase that to say that after the fact, it is always

possible to produce a model that will explain whatever was observed.
It is not true that a pre-formed model can explain all possible
data. With a pre-formed model, all you have to work with are the
model parameters. If you can fit the data by varying the parameters,
the data don’t disconfirm the model. It could have predicted if you
had known the correct parameters. But you can’t always fit data by
parameter variation within a model, and if you can’t then the model
is wrong. If you pre-set the parameters, you predict, but then if
the data don’t fit, you don’t know whether it’s the model that’s
wrong or the parameter values.

Only once in my professional life have I fit someone else's

experimental data using my model with parameter values from yet
other people’s experiments on different perceptions (Numerical
prediction of a simple figural aftereffect as a function of the
contrast of the inspection figure. Psychol. Rev., 1963, 70,
357-360). It’s quite satisfying, but very rare, to be able to do
that. PCT at least offers the prospect of being able to model the
control of one perception and then using some parameter of that
model in predicting the behaviour in controlling another perception.

I feel certain that those who favor "intelligent design" can provide a satisfying, to them at least, explanation of anything we can discover in the natural world.
They seem to have that ability, but it's not difficult, since their

model is universal and parameter-unbounded.

I guess I am just an observer rather than an analyst. I predict that if you give your employee's the option of opting out of your retirement program, more of them will join the program than if you require them to opt into the program.
Yes. That's a prediction you can get from the tolerance model

without needing numerical parameters. All it requires is that the
tolerance bound for a person with a reference not to be in the
program is greater than zero, since that would result in no
“opt-out” action if the error is small enough – as it might be for
some people. If the option is “opt-in” a zero-tolerance control
system would result in only those people with a reference to be in
the program acting, and a non-zero tolerance would result in fewer
of those acting. Either way, if the relevant control systems have
non–zero tolerance, you get the result you predict (from
intuition?).

I would be impressed if your analytical approach identified which employees would enter the program before I asked them.
I would not expect to identify all of them correctly, because I

don’t know of a way of assessing tolerance bounds (which might even
depend on whether the person had a good breakfast), but if one used
MOL to determine what perceptions entered into their perception of
the retirement program, and asked about their reference level for
(or if they controlled for) those perceptions, one might be able to
guess fairly well.

After the fact, I fear I would have to agree with Pooh-Bah. "Merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."
I think you have to use that approach more selectively than you seem

to do. Ask whether the explanation could have been available in
large part beforehand, whether what is not predicted is a matter of
parameter variation or model structure, and if parameter variation,
could the parameters have been estimated from other data gathered
independently of those needed to fit the model. The Pooh-Bah
approach is justified if you have to devise a new model to fit the
data, or if there is no way in principle to find the fitting
parameters other than by looking at the data to be fit.


Anyway, it's important to keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing observations, and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views of the same phenomenon.
BG: O.K. Put me down as an observer waiting to be convinced that the analyst has something more valuable to add to the story. (I will not dwell on the value added to the financial disaster by the quants of Wall Street.)
Fair enough. The observer's observations are always welcome, but

technical criticism (an analyst’s tool) is also welcome.

Martin

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.04.15.24]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1015 MDT)]

  Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33 --
    MMT: I'd say PCT is

more about
“why” than about “how”. The reference signal is
“why” a control system acts. The control system’s output system
doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it
does, and
does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the
reference
vale and the perceptual value.

  BP: An output function doesn't "care" about any of that. It

doesn’t know that it’s influencing a perception. It doesn’t know
the
direction of its effects. It doesn’t know anything at all. Knowing
is
what perceptual systems do, and even then there is no knowing
unless
awareness is involved.

  That's how I use those words.
I suppose there's some rhetorical point in repeating what I said

while wording it as though it was a criticism, but the point does
escape me.

I suppose that if I said "2+2=4" you would respond "No, II + II =

IV". Or maybe that I used the wrong font.

    MMT: PCT is indeed a

science of
group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every
person in
a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in
the
group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that
action alters
perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of
those
perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those
perceptions
involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other
group
members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out
from some
initial action that might have been to counter some physically
caused
disturbance.

  BP: This paragraph contains a number of proposed statements of

fact, none
of which has been verified. The first step is to show that these
are true
statements, within the meaning of experimental truth. Until that
is
established there is no point in going further.

OK. You are saying that it is doubtful that when a person acts,

another person’s perception is ever disturbed by that action? Every
man is indeed an island? I think you are clutching at very small
straws indeed!

  I would say that there is no science of group behavior yet.
My point.
  Kent

McClelland is working on this, but just starting. And I don’t
think that
in the end we will find that term defensible or useful. It’s not
behavior
that we’re basically interested in, anyway, since that depends on
the
nature of the current local environment and on both disturbances
and
reference levels not in the group but in the individuals.

My point, except that I think we ought to be interested in it, since

group behaviour is what results in problems like climate change and
ocean acidification, not to mention intercultural an international
conflicts.

    MMT: Some of those

ripples feed
back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of
such
feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative
feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while
others
will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity
or the
excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop
limits the
growth.

  BP: Fine, so let us pause and verify that this actually happens.

Doing
that would vastly improve our understanding. If we’re going to
build a
new science, we have to build it, not just imagine it. How would
you
propose testing these statements experimentally?

The issue isn't whether it actually happens (unless you subscribe to

“every man is an island”), but under what conditions the effects
damp out, under what conditions they stabilize, under what
conditions they lead to oscillations, exponential (until
self-limited) expansion, or chaos.

I don't see any of this a building a new science. It is exploring

the implications of PCT.

    MMT: There's a whole

PCT science
in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For
example, what
is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT
meaning – a
level of difference between the reference and the actual value
of some
controlled perception that is reported as “zero error” to the
output function – but its implication is the same as
“tolerance” in everyday life. What is the influence of timing?
If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual
inputs of
another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively
different
than if the communications are faster? How do those timings
interact with
the time-scales of control at the higher levels within
individuals? Would
the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or
weeks
for communications between institutions or between branches in
different
countries?

  BP: That's all way in the future. We aren't ready to handle such

details
yet. First we have to make sure the foundations are built on rock
and not
sand. I know that’s boring, at least to other people who want
quick
answers to all questions, but if we don’t do it we won’t have a
science.

What more solid could you get than that perceptions are controlled

by acting on the environment, and that effects in the environment
disturb possibly controlled perceptions? Yes, it would be nice to
have a network model of controlled perceptions within every
individual, but even a model for one individual would probably be
computationally infeasible. There are a few possible alternatives to
that. One can abstract, and treat only a few control loops out of
the many that are involved in controlling some one perception, as
you usually do when analyzing a cursor-tracking experiment. One can
combine the effects of many control systems, in the way that
thermodynamics combines the effects of the movements of myriads of
molecules, one can consider explicitly the interactions of a small
number of control systems, in the way nanoscale chemical simulations
are done (and they show that nanoscale systems often behave like
neither isolated atoms nor bulk materials, so we would have to watch
out for that possibility).

    MMT: It is important

to keep our
viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the
experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has
been
called an “analysts viewpoint”. The analyst can see (or is
hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the
perceptual and
output functions and transmission pathways within the part of
the
individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions.

  BP: The analyst can proposed such things in the form of a model,

but then
it becomes the analyst’s duty to design and carry out the
experiments
that will see if the model predicts what people will really do.

(A) That's irrelevant to my point.

(B) If the analyst is also a programmer he can program a model. If

the analyst is an experimenter and has a model and access to
experimental subjects, he can run experiments. Most commonly, in
other sciences, these functions are separate.

    MMT: In contrast, the

“observer’s viewpoint” is restricted to the external
environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or
hypothesise)
the signal values and functions within the individual. (There
are other
viewpoints such as the “control unit’s viewpoint” used above in
talking about “why”, but the analyst’s and observer’s are the
important two for this discussion).

    When you are dealing

with a
group, a similar separation of viewpoints seems appropriate. The
“network ripples” that I mentioned above correspond to a group
analyst’s viewpoint, whether or not an analyst’s viewpoint is
also used
in considering the individual group members. On the other hand,
an
“observer’s viewpoint” leads to statements like “When
such-and-so conditions apply, 60% of the groups suddenly become
collections of battling individuals whereas 40% hang together
and
cooperate for each other’s benefit.”

    It's the same kind of thing as with the Ariely experiment. An

observer’s
viewpoint leads to:

    "When they were done they were allowed to bid on their own

works.
Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it than
student
passerbys who had not folded the objects. When both groups of
students
were given the opportunity to bid on origami figures made by
origami
experts, the students to tended to place a similarly high value
on the
pieces (comparable to what the student folders bid on their own
efforts)."

  BP: The observer's viewpoint is not accurately described by these

words
unless the observer actually can’t see that these statements are
untrue.
“Those who created the object tended to bid much more for it”
is a false report of what happened. There was no entity in the
group
called “those” who did something called “tending” to
bid more. Each person bid what was bid; there were no
“tendencies.”

I know this is one of your hobbyhorses, but I think you should be

more selective in riding it. The quoted statement may be factually
true. What may not be true is the implication for any individual.

  The group average does not indicate some 

behavior that all members of the group would have shown but for
something
that prevented some of them from showing it. Some individuals bid
more
for their own work than others did; some bid the same amount or
less.
That is what a truthful observer would report.

Not having read the paper, I can't say what they reported. Assuming

that they were normally competent and that the paper was properly
reviewed, they would have reported exactly what you ask of them. My
quote was not from their paper, though it could be a fair
abstraction from the results they actually reported.

  The same general statement

can’t apply both to those who bid more and those who bid
less. This language distorts the variety of behaviors in the
group so as to make it seem that there was some unified entity
behaving
in some common way. The counterexamples are suppressed by this
kind of
language, so it seems that they don’t need to be explained by the
same
theory that explains the positive instances. I will argue
vehemently
against allowing any statements of this kind to be used to
describe any
PCT research results.

    MMT: whereas an

analyst’s
vewpoint leads to Bill Powers’s:

    "He might have learned why some students bid more and others

less
for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined
one
student at a time rather than for “students.” MOL-type
interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for
their own
work than some of the other students did, and why some
passers-by bid
more."

  BP: This viewpoint far more accurately describes the real

findings.

No it doesn't. Nobody did those interviews. You are imagining

things.

  The

“observer” you describe is far too naive or incompetent to be
taken as a source of information.

The observer you imagine might be naive or incompentent. My observer

sees whatever is available to be seen in the environment outside the
subjects.

    MMT: The viewpoints

are not
compatible except in the sense that the analyst’s viewpoint will
include
all the observations available from the observer’s viewpoint.
Neither is
wrong, but the analyst’s viewpoint, if the analysis is correct,
is more
powerful.

  BP: I disagree. The observer's viewpoint is incorrect, implying

what is
not actually observed. It is not just “less powerful.” It
creates incorrect conclusions and falsehoods, and works directly
against
correct understanding.

    MMT: If the analysis

can predict
the observations, the model becomes more credible, but even a
post-hoc
analysis can have some value.

  BP:Predicting the observations correctly is the ONLY way the

analysis can
have any value. That is the sine qua non. The analyst
must predict
which subjects will bid more and which will bid less, with high
accuracy.

I dispute that statement. I know you make it often, and usually the

disturbance is within my tolerance zone. But in this context, I
don’t want to let it pass uncontested.

Why do I dispute it? Because it's not the analyst's job. It's a

modeller’s job to create a model that takes into account ALL the
influences on ALL the perceptions involved, whether controlled or
not, as well as being able to generate ALL the reference values for
the controlled perceptions. The model must take into account whether
the subject had a good night’s sleep and a good breakfast, among a
few thousand other possible influences. The analyst can take that
model and see what parts of it can be elided without damaging the
data fit too much. Often, part of the model MUST be elided because
the data are not available or because the mechanisms in that part of
the model have not been studied sufficiently. All in all, while you
are correct that if we knew all the influences and had a correct
model for them, knowing all the reference values for all the
controlled perceptions, we could predict perfectly which subjects
would bid more and which would bid less, in any conceivable
practical situation, we simply can never expect to be able to do
that.

  If that can't be done, we have to conclude that we

can’t predict this
behavior, and might even conclude that it’s not very important to
predict
it.

Is the ability to predict an index of how important it is to predict

something?

    MMT: Anyway, it's

important to
keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing
observations,
and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views
of the
same phenomenon.

  BP: You're describing the conventional way of using group data to

explain
individual behavior.

I really can't figure out how you get that out of anything I wrote,

either in the message you are responding to or in any other message
of mine! If you are taking the observer’s viewpoint on group
behaviour you are looking at what you can see without considering
the individuals in the group. If you are taking the analyst’s
viewpont on group behaviour, you are considering the interactions
among individuals in the group. If you are taking the observer’s
viewpoint on individual behaviour you a looking at what you can see
from outside the individual, and finally, when you are taking the
analyst’s viewpoint on individual behaviour you are purporting to
look insider the individual.

How do you get from that to "You're describing the conventional way

of using group data to explain
individual behavior." I could take “You’re describing a way of using
individual data to explain group behaviour”, though it wouldn’t be
strictly accurate, but I can’t accept what you wrote.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1749 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33 –

MMT: I’d say PCT is more about
“why” than about “how”. The reference signal is
“why” a control system acts. The control system’s output system
doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it does, and
does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference
vale and the perceptual value.

BP: An output function doesn’t “care” about any of that. It
doesn’t know that it’s influencing a perception. It doesn’t know the
direction of its effects. It doesn’t know anything at all. Knowing is
what perceptual systems do, and even then there is no knowing unless
awareness is involved.

That’s how I use those words.

I suppose there’s some rhetorical point in repeating what I said while
wording it as though it was a criticism, but the point does escape
me.

Martin, you said that the control system’s output system (its output
function) doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it
does, and does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the
reference value and the perceptual value." I said an output function
doesn’t care about its effects at all, meaning it cares neither how it
influences the perception (agreeing with that part of your sentence) nor
does it care that it does so at all nor does it care whether the
direction reduces a discrepancy (disagreeing with the rest). How is that
repeating what you said? I asserted something that denies the part of
your sentence that says “only that it does, and does so in a
direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference value and the
perceptual value.” I’m saying it doesn’t care about that, either,
because it doesn’t “care” or even know about
anything.

Have I misread the meaning of what you said? Have you misread what I
said? This happens so often between us that it drives me nuts (ok,
I do my own driving). It’s almost as if you don’t read what you write to
see if it says what you intended. You hear/see what you intended to say
instead of what you actually say. Am I way off the track here? Do you
have this problem with other people, or am I the only one? What say
others monitorinbg all this? Did I just repeat what Martin said?

There’s a lot more in your post to talk about, but let’s see this part
can be settled before we go on.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.05.11.41]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1749 MDT)]

  Martin Taylor 2010.08.03.11.33 --
        MMT: I'd say PCT

is more about
“why” than about “how”. The reference signal is
“why” a control system acts. The control system’s output
system
doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that it
does, and
does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between the
reference
vale and the perceptual value.

      BP: An output function doesn't "care" about any of that. It

doesn’t know that it’s influencing a perception. It doesn’t
know the
direction of its effects. It doesn’t know anything at all.
Knowing is
what perceptual systems do, and even then there is no knowing
unless
awareness is involved.

      That's how I use those words.
    I suppose there's some rhetorical point in repeating what I said

while
wording it as though it was a criticism, but the point does
escape
me.

  Martin, you said that the control system's output system (its

output
function) doesn’t care how it influences the perception, only that
it
does, and does so in a direction to reduce the discrepancy between
the
reference value and the perceptual value." I said an output
function
doesn’t care about its effects at all, meaning it cares neither
how it
influences the perception (agreeing with that part of your
sentence) nor
does it care that it does so at all nor does it care whether the
direction reduces a discrepancy (disagreeing with the rest). How
is that
repeating what you said? I asserted something that denies the part
of
your sentence that says “only that it does, and does so in a
direction to reduce the discrepancy between the reference value
and the
perceptual value.” I’m saying it doesn’t care about that, either,
because it doesn’t “care” or even know about
anything.

Yes, I can see that my writing misrepresented what I had intended to

say, and you were quite right to correct it. I’m sorry I missed the
point of your correction. I can plead only that you restated what I
had intended, not what I said.

I conflated two ideas into one sentence, one being that the output

simply outputs and that’s all, the other being that if control has
been established by reorganization, the effect of the output will be
in a direction to reduce the error. I was wrong in linking both
those concepts to the output itself, when one of them is a property
of the environmental feedback pathway (which may include many lower
levels of control).

  There's a lot more in your post to talk about, but let's see this

part
can be settled before we go on.

I hope that does settle it.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.04.1106MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.05.11.41 –

MMT: I conflated two ideas into
one sentence, one being that the output simply outputs and that’s all,
the other being that if control has been established by reorganization,
the effect of the output will be in a direction to reduce the error. I
was wrong in linking both those concepts to the output itself, when one
of them is a property of the environmental feedback pathway (which may
include many lower levels of control).

I knew I could count on you. Thanks.

I’ll dig up the post and go on with it pretty soon.

Incidentally, I think this episode shows the importance of monitoring the
results of executing even the mostg carefully-planned outputs: mistakes
of all sorts can be made, as well as disturbances occurring. Of course
you have ilustrated very well that it’s definitely possible to emit the
output without the feedback. But my point has always been that this is
bad design and is likely to be revised after the results are
seen.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.06.0820 MDT)]

Going on with the post we spoke of yesterday…

Martin Taylor 2010.08.04.15.24 –

MMT: PCT is indeed a science of
group behaviour as much as of individual behaviour, since every person in
a group is a contributor to some perceptions in other people in the
group. When a person acts (counters some disturbance), that action alters
perceptions in some other members of the group, and some of those
perceptions may be being controlled. Control of those perceptions
involves actions, which may disturb perceptions in yet other group
members. And so it goes, the observable effects rippling out from some
initial action that might have been to counter some physically caused
disturbance.

BP: I think you misunderstood the context in which I was objecting to
using group characteristics to understand individual characteristics.
Before group behavior can be deduced from the characteristics of
individuals, the individual characteristics must be understood. This
can’t be done the other way around: given the group characteristics, you
can’t deduce the characteristics of any individuals or subgroups of
individuals. Given the behavior of individual molecules, you can deduce
the temperature, but given the temperature you can’t deduce the behavior
of individual molecules.

To put that another way, group behavior is emergent from collections of
interacting individuals. The reverse is not true.

BP earlier: This paragraph
contains a number of proposed statements of fact, none of which has been
verified. The first step is to show that these are true statements,
within the meaning of experimental truth. Until that is established there
is no point in going further.

MMT: OK. You are saying that it is doubtful that when a person acts,
another person’s perception is ever disturbed by that action? Every man
is indeed an island? I think you are clutching at very small straws
indeed!

BP: Again, either I fail to say what I mean or you’re missing my attempt.
I have no doubt that actions disturb perceptions, but that’s irrelevant.
I mean that to have a science, it isn’t sufficient to believe or to be
logical or reasonable or to deduce conclusions from premises. You must
actually, experimentally, demonstrate that what you say is true. You say
that when a person acts, other persons’ perceptions are disturbed by
those actions. Of course we all agree informally that this makes sense
and is probably true. But to get this PROPOSED fact into a science, you
must show that it is an OBSERVED fact. In a real science, every single
fact that is part of it must be demonstrated to be true, no matter how
obvious or self-evident that fact is. If that seems too tedious and picky
to anyone, that person simply doesn’t want to do science.

In physics 101, the teacher in the physics lab shows you a block and
tackle. He says that the force applied to the free end of the string is
multiplied by the number of complete loops of string. The bright student
thinks about it for a while, then says “Of course! I get it! That’s
neat. What shall we talk about next?” The teacher hands him a spring
scale and a box of weights and says “You’re not done. Show that it’s
true.”

BP earlier: I would say that
there is no science of group behavior yet.

MMT: My point.

I don’t remember where you said that. Did you?

BP earlier: Kent McClelland is
working on this, but just starting. And I don’t think that in the end we
will find that term defensible or useful. It’s not behavior that we’re
basically interested in, anyway, since that depends on the nature of the
current local environment and on both disturbances and reference levels
not in the group but in the individuals.

MMT: My point, except that I think we ought to be interested in it, since
group behaviour is what results in problems like climate change and ocean
acidification, not to mention intercultural an international conflicts.

BP: It’s not your point if you’re the only person who knows that it is.
And I don’t feel in the least guilty at being accused of ignoring
important environmental problems, a pretty cheap shot as well as being
snatched out of the blue and a different context.

OK, you’ve made your point to your own satisfaction, but what about my
point? Group behavior is emergent from the behavior of individuals. You
can’t study a groups without measuring the properties and behavior of
individuals first, and you can’t study individuals by throwing away
everything but group data.

MMT: Some of those ripples feed
back to an actor who contributed to their formation. Lots of such
feedback loops may exist, and some of them will exhibit negative
feedback, damping the effect of the initial disturbance, while others
will exhibit positive feedback, growing until some nonlinearity or the
excitation of a sufficiently strong negative feedback loop limits the
growth.

BP: That’s a lovely picture and it makes sense, but it’s all in your
imagination. That’s not good enough. I said that, but you didn’t get it,
apparently:

BP earlier: Fine, so let us
pause and verify that this actually happens. Doing that would vastly
improve our understanding. If we’re going to build a new science, we have
to build it, not just imagine it. How would you propose testing these
statements experimentally?

MMT: The issue isn’t whether it actually happens (unless you subscribe to
“every man is an island”), but under what conditions the
effects damp out, under what conditions they stabilize, under what
conditions they lead to oscillations, exponential (until self-limited)
expansion, or chaos.

BP: You see? You’re so intent on making your point that you don’t even
read what I’m saying. The issue is exactly whether it actually happens.
If you can’t demonstrate in a formal, systematic, and competent manner
that it actually does happen, you’re not doing science; you’re just
swapping opinions over a few beers.

MMT: I don’t see any of this a
building a new science. It is exploring the implications of
PCT.

BP: Exploring implications has two parts to it. The first part is working
out what the logical and mathematical implications are. The second part
is putting your logic to the test of experimentation and demonstration,
with the humble acknowledgement that nature may well disagree with your
logic and may not have told you everything you need to know. If you don’t
do both parts you’re not doing science.

MMT: There’s a whole PCT science
in just the analysis of this kind of group interaction. For example, what
is the influence of tolerance? Tolerance has a specific PCT meaning – a
level of difference between the reference and the actual value of some
controlled perception that is reported as “zero error” to the
output function – but its implication is the same as
“tolerance” in everyday life. What is the influence of timing?
If the effects of one action are slow to reach the perceptual inputs of
another group member, are the group-level effects qualitatively different
than if the communications are faster? How do those timings interact with
the time-scales of control at the higher levels within individuals? Would
the financial melt-down of 2008 have occurred if it took days or weeks
for communications between institutions or between branches in different
countries?

BP earlier: That’s all way in the future. We aren’t ready to handle such
details yet. First we have to make sure the foundations are built on rock
and not sand. I know that’s boring, at least to other people who want
quick answers to all questions, but if we don’t do it we won’t have a
science.

MMT: What more solid could you get than that perceptions are controlled
by acting on the environment, and that effects in the environment disturb
possibly controlled perceptions?

That’s not solid at all: it’s reasoning and imagining, which are useful,
but that’s not all there is to science. To knowing anything. Why do you
think I keep working on demonstrations? Every demonstration could fail.
It could, no matter how unlikely that may seem to someone who understands
the logic of the theory. It could still be wrong and we have to show that
in fact it is very probably right. You do that by sticking your neck out
and making a prediction, and letting nature decide. If you read LCS3 that
way, you’ll see that it is full of predictions, very risky
predictions, of what is going to happen when you run the interactive
demos, no matter who does the interacting. I don’t expect 100% success,
but anything less than 99% would disappoint me.

Yes, it would be nice to have a
network model of controlled perceptions within every individual, but even
a model for one individual would probably be computationally infeasible.
There are a few possible alternatives to that. One can abstract, and
treat only a few control loops out of the many that are involved in
controlling some one perception, as you usually do when analyzing a
cursor-tracking experiment. One can combine the effects of many control
systems, in the way that thermodynamics combines the effects of the
movements of myriads of molecules, one can consider explicitly the
interactions of a small number of control systems, in the way nanoscale
chemical simulations are done (and they show that nanoscale systems often
behave like neither isolated atoms nor bulk materials, so we would have
to watch out for that possibility).

BP: Instead of trying to think up enough possible difficulties to justify
not even trying to get somewhere with this problem, wny not just
take the first step, then the next, and keep going? With every step your
understanding of the problem will change, you will see new possibilities.
You will find things hard that you thought would easy, and things you
thought would be hard will yield to the first touch. Trying to understand
nature entirely by imagining things didn’t work for the ancient Greeks
and it still doesn’t work.

MMT: It is important to keep our
viewpoints straight. When we are dealing with PCT theory, or the
experimental modelling, of an individual, we are taking what has been
called an “analysts viewpoint”. The analyst can see (or is
hypothesising) all the signal values, as well as all the perceptual and
output functions and transmission pathways within the part of the
individual involved in controlling one or more perceptions.

BP: The analyst can proposed such things in the form of a model, but then
it becomes the analyst’s duty to design and carry out the experiments
that will see if the model predicts what people will really
do.

(A) That’s irrelevant to my point.

(B) If the analyst is also a programmer he can program a model. If the
analyst is an experimenter and has a model and access to experimental
subjects, he can run experiments. Most commonly, in other sciences, these
functions are separate.

BP: So you want to specialize on the easy parts and leave the hard stuff
to others? I don’t buy it. An analyst with no interest in experimental
data is useless. And for crissakes stop telling me that what I say is
irrelevant to your secret point which you never actually talk about. I
wouldn’t make a comment if I didn’t think it was relevant. The analyst
thinks he can see or hypothesize signal values but if everything he knows
is just a rumor picked up from someone else, how likely is he to say
anything helpful?

MMT: In contrast, the
“observer’s viewpoint” is restricted to the external
environment of the individual. The observer cannot see (or hypothesise)
the signal values and functions within the individual. (There are other
viewpoints such as the “control unit’s viewpoint” used above in
talking about “why”, but the analyst’s and observer’s are the
important two for this
discussion).

BP: NOBODY’s view include what goes on inside the observed system (unless
it will still function after being taken apart).

BP earlier: The observer’s
viewpoint is not accurately described by these words unless the observer
actually can’t see that these statements are untrue. “Those who
created the object tended to bid much more for it” is a false report
of what happened. There was no entity in the group called
“those” who did something called “tending” to bid
more. Each person bid what was bid; there were no “tendencies.”

MMT: I know this is one of your hobbyhorses, but I think you should be
more selective in riding it. The quoted statement may be factually true.
What may not be true is the implication for any
individual.

The quoted statement can be true only if those who created the object
tended to bid much more on it. Since there is no behavcior called
“tending to bid” the statement is nonsense to begin with, and
its claim to generality is flatly false. You’re not going to change that
by likening my considered opinion to a the prattling of a child riding a
hobbyhorse. I consider the statement to be incompetent, and because of
being constructed to hint that the characteristic is found in every
person who created an origami, it is underhanded and misleading as well.
To say “Subjects” behaved in a certain way is just a way of
making bad experiments look like good ones, unless they all, or very
nearly all, did.

BP earlier: The group average
does not indicate some behavior that all members of the group would
have shown but for something that prevented some of them from showing it.
Some individuals bid more for their own work than others did; some bid
the same amount or less. That is what a truthful observer would report.

MMT: Not having read the paper, I can’t say what they reported. Assuming
that they were normally competent and that the paper was properly
reviewed, they would have reported exactly what you ask of them. My quote
was not from their paper, though it could be a fair abstraction from the
results they actually reported.

What, you’re proposing that in fact every person bid much more for his
own origami than for others? Was the “tending to bid” idea
yours? Have I been lured into reacting to a misrepresentation of the
Arielly paper? Would someone who has actually read the paper please
comment on all this? Have I been wasting my time on an imaginary version
of the paper?

The same general statement can’t
apply both to those who bid more and those who bid less. This
language distorts the variety of behaviors in the group so as to make it
seem that there was some unified entity behaving in some common way. The
counterexamples are suppressed by this kind of language, so it seems that
they don’t need to be explained by the same theory that explains the
positive instances. I will argue vehemently against allowing any
statements of this kind to be used to describe any PCT research
results.

MMT: whereas an analyst’s
vewpoint leads to Bill Powers’s:

“He might have learned why some students bid more and others less
for the same items. Of course that would have to be determined one
student at a time rather than for “students.” MOL-type
interviews would reveal why some of the students bid less for their own
work than some of the other students did, and why some passers-by bid
more.”

BP: This viewpoint far more accurately describes the real
findings.

MMT: No it doesn’t. Nobody did those interviews. You are imagining
things.

BP: Yes, I was imagining that actually interviewing the people would
reveal why the students bid more for their own work. Not having done that
(it’s a little late to do it and not very practical) I have to say I
don’t know if interviews would have given this information. I was asked
what Arielly might have found if he’d used an approach like MOL. I was
trying to guess.

BP: earlier: The
“observer” you describe is far too naive or incompetent to be
taken as a source of information.

MMT: The observer you imagine might be naive or incompentent. My observer
sees whatever is available to be seen in the environment outside the
subjects.

BP: Are you saying that the observer actually observed subjects tending
to bid more for their own work?

BP earlier:Predicting the
observations correctly is the ONLY way the analysis can have any value.
That is the sine qua non. The analyst must predict which subjects
will bid more and which will bid less, with high accuracy.

MMT: I dispute that statement. I know you make it often, and usually the
disturbance is within my tolerance zone. But in this context, I don’t
want to let it pass uncontested.

Why do I dispute it? Because it’s not the analyst’s job. It’s a
modeller’s job to create a model that takes into account ALL the
influences on ALL the perceptions involved, whether controlled or not, as
well as being able to generate ALL the reference values for the
controlled perceptions. The model must take into account whether the
subject had a good night’s sleep and a good breakfast, among a few
thousand other possible influences. The analyst can take that model and
see what parts of it can be elided without damaging the data fit too
much. Often, part of the model MUST be elided because the data are not
available or because the mechanisms in that part of the model have not
been studied sufficiently. All in all, while you are correct that if we
knew all the influences and had a correct model for them, knowing all the
reference values for all the controlled perceptions, we could predict
perfectly which subjects would bid more and which would bid less, in any
conceivable practical situation, we simply can never expect to be able to
do that.

No, Martin. You’re borrowing trouble again. If a model consistently
accounts for 99% of the variance of an experimental variable, we can be
pretty sure that nothing important has been omitted, despite all the
things we can imagine to be important. That’s among the nice things
experimentation can do for you: it can tell you to stop worrying. Of
course it often tells you you’re nor worrying enough, but it’s pleasant
when the message is more friendly.

I’m burned out on this post. That’s enough. I think I’ll go for a nice
ride on my hobbyhorse.

Best,

Bill P.

···

If that can’t be done, we have
to conclude that we can’t predict this behavior, and might even conclude
that it’s not very important to predict it.

Is the ability to predict an index of how important it is to predict
something?

MMT: Anyway, it’s important to
keep track of what viewpoint you are using when discussing observations,
and the viewpoint can differ between group and individual views of the
same phenomenon.

BP: You’re describing the conventional way of using group data to explain
individual behavior.

I really can’t figure out how you get that out of anything I wrote,
either in the message you are responding to or in any other message of
mine! If you are taking the observer’s viewpoint on group behaviour you
are looking at what you can see without considering the individuals in
the group. If you are taking the analyst’s viewpont on group behaviour,
you are considering the interactions among individuals in the group. If
you are taking the observer’s viewpoint on individual behaviour you a
looking at what you can see from outside the individual, and finally,
when you are taking the analyst’s viewpoint on individual behaviour you
are purporting to look insider the individual.

How do you get from that to “You’re describing the conventional way
of using group data to explain individual behavior.” I could take
“You’re describing a way of using individual data to explain group
behaviour”, though it wouldn’t be strictly accurate, but I can’t
accept what you wrote.

Martin