[Vyv Huddy (2015.11.16.09:30GMT)]
Hello All,
I've been reading all your posts for several years without cause to post ... hope this is the correct format for a post .... and thanks for all the continued insights into PCT.
The reason for my post is I have been reading a Martin Seligman et al. paper contrasting two paradigms for making sense of behaviour. I've attached this for info and context, as my query concerns the section where "desire versus drive" is mentioned on p126. The bit that caught my interest as potentially relevant to PCT terms is this:
"Animals whose nutritional needs were met intragastrically retained a lively interest in eating (N. E. Miller & Kessen, 1952; Turner, Solo- mon, Stellar, & Wampler, 1975). Later, brain stimulation stud- ies showed whyelectrical brain stimulation producing eating is not aversive, as a drive concept would have it; it is a reward (Berridge, 2004). As everyone knows intuitively, eating is attractive to contemplatean object of desirequite unlike forcing ones hand into ice water to escape the pain of a burn."
The section is fairly vague but reminded me of my struggle grasp how the distinction between drive/desire or liking/wanting or anticipatory/consummatory pleasure is understood in PCT. Potentially worth thinking about because of the interest in cog neuroscience circles these days.
Bill's emotion chapter in B:CP (2005 ed) helps a bit but not much. For example, Bill explains how two comparators, one working with inverted signals, could detect too little or too much of something but again this seems to refer to discrepancy only. The combination of a emotion as a combination of a goal + feeling is helpful too. But not sufficient.
I found a post using the csgnet archive below, including some of Bandura's critique, but much not much else...
Can anyone help with a paper or view on this?
Thanks in advance.
from Greg Williams (930525)
Quoted from Edwin A. Locke (University of Maryland) and Gary P. Latham
(University of Washington), A THEORY OF GOAL SETTING & TASK PERFORMANCE,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1990, pp. 19-23. (Copyright 1990
by Prentice-Hall, Inc.)
According to the books index, there are no other comments on PCT besides
these.
As the influence of behaviorism has declined, a neo-behaviorist theory is
emerging to take its place. It is called control theory and can be viewed as a
combination or integration of behaviorism, machine-computer theory
(cybernetics), goal setting theory [championed by Locke and Latham], and, by
implication, drive-reduction theory. It is derived directly from Miller,
DevilsBibliography.pdf Threads from CSGnet 67
Galanter, and Pribrams TOTE model (1960). The major concepts of control
theory have been presented by Campion and Lord (1982), Carver and Scheier
(1982), Hyland (1988), Lord and Hanges (1987), Powers (1973), and others. In
brief, the theory asserts that there is INPUT (a stimulus), which is detected
by a SENSOR. If there is a deviation (also called a disturbance), a SIGNAL
is sent to an EFFECTOR, which generates modified OUTPUT (a response). This
output becomes input for the next cycle. In goal theory language, the input is
feedback from previous performance, the reference signal is the goal, the
comparator is the individuals conscious judgment, and the effector or
response is his or her subsequent action which works to reduce the discrepancy
between goal and performance.
While control theory acknowledges the importance of goal setting, there are
serious, if not irredeemable, flaws in the model. First, observe that the
major motive for action under control theory is to remove disturbances or
discrepancies between the goal and the input (feedback). The natural state of
the organism is seen to be one of motionlessness or rest. This is true of
machines, but not of living organisms which are naturally active. It is, in
fact, a mechanistic version of the long-discredited drive-reduction theory
(Cofer & Appley, 1967). Nuttin (1984 [J. Nuttin, MOTIVATION, PLANNING AND
ACTION, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey]) has observed that in this aspect,
control theory fundamentally misstates the actual source of motivation: The
behavioral process... does not begin with a test of the discrepancy between
the standard and the actual states of affairs. Instead, it begins with a
preliminary and fundamental operation, namely the construction of the standard
itself, which, as a goal, is at the origin of the action and directs its
further course (p. 145). Similarly, Bandura (in press [A. Bandura,
Reflections on Nonability Determinants of Competence, in J. Kolligan & R.
Sternberg, eds., COMPETENCE CONSIDERED: PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETENCE AND
INCOMPETENCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, Yale University Press, New Haven]) noted
that GOAL SETTING IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A DISCREPANCY CREATING PROCESS.
Control theory begins in the middle rather than at the beginning of the
motivational sequence.
To quote Bandura (in press):
Human self-motivation relies on both DISCREPANCY PRODUCTION and
DISCREPANCY REDUCTION. It requires FEEDFORWARD control as well as
FEEDBACK control. People initially motivate themselves through
feedforward control by setting themselves valued challenging standards
that create a state of disequilibrium and then mobilizing their effort on
the basis of anticipatory estimation of what it would take to reach them.
After people attain the standard they have been pursuing, they generally
set a higher standard for themselves. The adoption of further challenges
creates new motivating discrepancies to be mastered. Similarly,
surpassing a standard is more likely to raise aspiration than to lower
subsequent performance to conform to the surpassed standard. Self
motivation thus involves a dual cyclic process of disequilibrating
discrepancy production followed by equilibrating discrepancy reduction.
(p. 23 of preprint)
Figure 1-3 [not reproduced here] shows how little of the motivational
process control theory, in its core version, incorporates.
The above is important because if discrepancy reduction is the major
motive, as implied by control theory, then the most logical thing for an
individual to do would simply be to adapt his or her goal to the input. This
would guarantee that there would be no disturbance or discrepancy. Machines,
of course, cannot do this because the standard has been fixed by people at a
certain level (as in setting a thermostat). But people can and do change
standards that diverge from present performance. If the individuals major
motive were to remove disturbances, people would never do this. Control
theorists argue that lower-level goals are actually caused by goals at a
higher level in the individuals goal hierarchy (Carver & Scheier, 1982). But
this only pushes the problem back a step. Why should people set higher- level
goals if they only want to reduce tension? But in reality, people do set goals
and then act to attain them; they do not focus primarily on eliminating
disturbances. Removal of discrepancies and any associated tension is a
CORRELATE of goal-directed action, not its cause. The causal sequence begins
with setting the goal, not with removing deviations from it.
At a fundamental level, discrepancy reduction theories such as control
theory are inadequate because if people consistently acted in accordance with
them by trying to eliminate all disturbances, they would all commit suicide --
because it would be the only way to totally eliminate tension. If people chose
instead to stay alive but set no goals, they would soon die anyway. By the
time they were forced into action by desperate, unremitting hunger pangs, it
would be too late to grow and process the food they would need to survive.
In their major work, Carver and Scheier (1981) denied that discrepancy
reduction is motivated by a desire to reduce a drive or state of tension. But
their own explanation as to why people at to reduce discrepancies is quite
puzzling. The shift [of action in the direction of the goal or standard] is a
natural consequence of the engagement of a discrepancy-reducing feedback loop
(p. 145). This statement, of course, explains nothing. Why is discrepancy
reduction a natural consequence? According to goal theory, BOTH discrepancy
creation AND discrepancy reduction occur for the same reason: because people
need and desire to attain goals. Such actions are required for their survival,
happiness, and well-being.
A second problem with control theory is its very use of a machine as a
metaphor. The problem with such a metaphor is that it cannot be taken too
literally or it becomes highly misleading (e.g., see Saundelands, Glynn, &
Larson, 1988 [L.E. Sandelands, M.A. Glynn, & J.R. Larson, Task Performance
and the Control of Feedback, Columbia University, unpublished manuscript]).
For example, people do not operate within the deterministic, closed-loop
system that control theory suggests. In response to negative feedback,for
example, people can try harder or less hard. They can focus on the cause and
perhaps change their strategy. They can also lower the goal to match their
performance; in some cases they may raise their goal. Furthermore, they can
reinterpret the discrepancy as unimportant and ignore it or can even totally
deny it. They can also question the accuracy of the feedback. They can go
outside the system (by leaving the situation). They can attack the person they
hold responsible for the discrepancy. They can become paralyzed by self-doubt
and fear and do nothing. They can drink liquor to blot out the pain. In short,
they can do any number of things other than respond in machinelike fashion.
Furthermore, people can feel varying degrees of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction, develop varying degrees of commitment to goals, and assess
their confidence in being able to reach them (Bandura, 1986). These emotions,
decisions, and estimates affect what new goals they will set and how they will
respond to feedback indicative of deviations from the goal (Bandura, 1988).
Control theory, insofar as it stresses a mechanistic model, simply has no
place for these alternatives, which basically means that it has no place for
consciousness. Insofar as this is the case, the theory must fail for the same
reason behaviorism failed. Without studying and measuring psychological
processes, one cannot explain human action.
One might ask why control theory could not be expanded so as to accommodate
the ideas and processes noted above. Attempts have been made to do this, but
when it is done, the machine language may still be retained. Hyland (1988),
for example, described the effects of goal importance or commitment in terms
of error sensitivity, which is represented diagrammatically by a box called
an amplifier. Expectations and memory are represented as symbolic control
loops. Decision making is done not by a person but by a selector. What is
the benefit of translating relatively clear and well-accepted concepts that
apply to human beings into computer language that is virtually
incomprehensible when used to describe human cognition? The greater the number
of concepts referring to states or actions of consciousness that are relabeled
in terms of machine language, the more implausible and incomprehensible the
Perspectives on Psychological Science-2013-Seligman-119-41.pdf (881 KB)
···
Date: Tue May 25, 1993 5:31 am PST
Subject: Another Devils Bib. entry
whole enterprise becomes. Nuttin (1984, p. 148) wrote on this: When
behavioral phenomena are translated into cybernetic and computer language,
their motivational aspect is lost in the process. This occurs because
motivation is foreign to all machines.
On the other hand, if additional concepts are brought into control theory
and not all relabeled in machine language (e.g., Lord & Hanges, 1987), then
control theory loses its distinctive character as a machine metaphor and
becomes superfluous -- that is, a conglomeration of ideas borrowed from OTHER
theories. And if control theory does not make the needed changes and
expansions, it is inadequate to account for human action. Control theory,
therefore, seems to be caught in a triple bind from which there is no escape.
If it stays strictly mechanistic, it does not work. If it uses mechanistic
language to relabel concepts referring to consciousness, it is
incomprehensible. And if it uses nonmechanistic concepts, it is unoriginal. It
has been argued that control theory is useful because it provides a general
model into which numerous other theories can be integrated (Hyland, 1988).
However, a general model that is inadequate in itself cannot successfully
provide an account of the phenomena of other theories.
In their book, Carver and Scheier (1981) examined the effect of individual
differences in degree of internal focus versus external focus in action. While
this presentation is more plausible than the mechanistic versions of control
theory, most of it actually has little to do with control theory as it relates
to goal setting. For example, they discuss how expectancies and self-focus
affect performance but do not examine the goal-expectancy literature (as we do
in Chapter 3). And some of their conclusions (such as that self-efficacy does
not affect performance directly) contradict actual research findings. Only one
actual goal setting study (not in Carver and Scheiers book) has used the
self-focus measure. Hollenbeck and Williams (1987) found that self-focus only
affected performance as part of a triple interaction in which ability was not
controlled. Thus it remains to be seen how useful the measure is, either as a
moderator or as a mediator of goal setting effectiveness.
There is also a conceptual problem with the prediction that the relation
between goals and performance will be higher among those high in self-focus
than those low in self-focus. Goal attainment requires, over and above any
internal focus, an EXTERNAL focus; most goals refer to something one wants to
achieve in the external world. Thus the individual must monitor external
feedback that shows progress in relation to the goal in order to make progress
toward it. Individuals might focus internally as well (a) to remind ourselves
of what the goal is -- though this can also be done externally, as on a
feedback chart; (b) to retain commitment by reminding themselves of why the
goal is important; and (c) to assess self-efficacy. Furthermore, depending on
what is focused on, (e.g., self-encouraging thoughts or self-doubt), an
internal focus could either raise or lower goal-relevant effort. In sum, the
relation between where one is focused and goal-relevant performance seems
intuitively far more complex than is recognized by the cognitive version of
control theory.
Finally, some have argued that control theory is original because it deals
with the issue of goal change (e.g., Campion & Lord, 1982). However, goal
change was actually studied first by level-of-aspiration researchers in the
1930s and 1940s, so control theory can make no claim of originality here. Nor
can a mechanistic model hope to deal adequately with issues involving human
choice as noted above.
In sum, the present authors do not see what control theory has added to our
understanding of the process of goal setting; all it has done is to restate a
very limited aspect of goal theory in another language, just as was done by
behavior mod advocates. Worse, control theory, in its purest form, actually
obscures understanding by ignoring or inappropriately relabeling crucial
psychological processes that are involved in goal-directed action (these will
be discussed in subsequent chapters).
