what are the means of control?

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin 2019.07.26.08:42 ET]

An emotion is a perception. An emotion that we feel is genuine is involuntary. Does that mean that such perceptions cannot be controlled perceptions?

Emotions arise from the ‘snap judgements’ of the more interior parts of the brain, before evaluation by cortical functions: sukha/dukha, good/bad, friend/foe, if foe then fight/flight/freeze. This has been characterized as the ‘mammalian brain’ and the even more primitive ‘reptilian brain’. MacLean’s evolutionary metaphor has been diluted by more recent anatomical and paleoontological findings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triune_brain#Status_of_the_model

–for example, the ‘reptilian’ seems to be a rather older ‘vertebrate’ brain, and cortical functions are older than was thought in the 1960s–but it retains its relevance as an organizing principle for investigations.

Our attention and awareness is generally upon perceptions constructed and controlled at the higher, cortical levels, descending through the hierarchy to lower-level perceptions so as to regain control when routine means of control go awry. The more primitive inner functions are difficult for us to bring into awareness unless we particularly investigate, e.g. by certain meditation paths. As a consequence, perceptual signals sent thence to the cortical functions where our awareness usually rides seem to come out of nowhere.

These ‘snap judgements’ have the immediate effect of focusing the means of attention upon the perceptions that are being assessed and setting references that ready physiological systems for action appropriate to the ‘judgement’. These physiological changes are sensed, and all these perceptions–the environmental perceptions upon which the means of attention are involuntarily focused, together with interior sensations of physiological changes and states–evoke perceptual signals that are stored in memory.

(The mechanism of associative memory is poorly understood and plays a very important role in many control processes. Bill’s concept of a Category level is an attempt at one aspect.)

All these perceptual signals–those from the attention riveted involuntarily upon that which the lower brain dictates, those from physiological conditions that it is controlling, and those from associated memories of experiences when ‘the same’ category of experience ‘happened before’–all these signals are sent to cortical functions which organize them into higher-level perceptions more slowly. It is here that we put together the perceptions that we call emotions. It is their origination out of awareness that makes emotions involuntary.

Can these perceptions be controlled? Well, one approach is by deliberately remembering and then controlling in imagination (or in the environment) perceptual complexes of a sort that have associated with them emotions (and body conditions) which we wish to experience. This rather indirect is analogous to controlling the emotional state of a child by reframing (Oh, this kind doesn’t bite), by distracting to other available perceptions (Look how beautiful its shimmery wings are!).

MoL is another approach, but not one of controlling emotions, but rather of facilitating “perceptions constructed and controlled at the higher, cortical levels, descending through the hierarchy to lower-level perceptions so as to regain control when routine means of control go awry” when two higher-level perceptions are being controlled by common means.

···

/Bruc

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-07-26_17:33:14]

[Bruce Nevin 2019.07.26.08:42 ET]

BN: Emotions arise from the ‘snap judgements’ of the more interior parts of the brain, before evaluation by cortical functions: sukha/dukha, good/bad, friend/foe, if foe then fight/flight/freeze.

RM: This is not the PCT model of emotion. But in that model an emotion certainly is a perception. But I don’t think is really controllable. Emotions are presumably the perceived physiological side effects of the failure to control. So you can “control” those perceptions to the extent that you can regain control of the perceptions that are out of control. Not always an easy task;-)

BestÂ

Rick

···

This has been characterized as the ‘mammalian brain’ and the even more primitive ‘reptilian brain’. MacLean’s evolutionary metaphor has been diluted by more recent anatomical and paleoontological findings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triune_brain#Status_of_the_model

–for example, the ‘reptilian’ seems to be a rather older ‘vertebrate’ brain, and cortical functions are older than was thought in the 1960s–but it retains its relevance as an organizing principle for investigations.Â

Our attention and awareness is generally upon perceptions constructed and controlled at the higher, cortical levels, descending through the hierarchy to lower-level perceptions so as to regain control when routine means of control go awry. The more primitive inner functions are difficult for us to bring into awareness unless we particularly investigate, e.g. by certain meditation paths. As a consequence, perceptual signals sent thence to the cortical functions where our awareness usually rides seem to come out of nowhere.Â

These ‘snap judgements’ have the immediate effect of focusing the means of attention upon the perceptions that are being assessed and setting references that ready physiological systems for action appropriate to the ‘judgement’. These physiological changes are sensed, and all these perceptions–the environmental perceptions upon which the means of attention are involuntarily focused, together with interior sensations of physiological changes and states–evoke perceptual signals that are stored in memory.Â

(The mechanism of associative memory is poorly understood and plays a very important role in many control processes. Bill’s concept of a Category level is an attempt at one aspect.)

All these perceptual signals–those from the attention riveted involuntarily upon that which the lower brain dictates, those from physiological conditions that it is controlling, and those from associated memories of experiences when ‘the same’ category of experience ‘happened before’–all these signals are sent to cortical functions which organize them into higher-level perceptions more slowly. It is here that we put together the perceptions that we call emotions. It is their origination out of awareness that makes emotions involuntary.

Can these perceptions be controlled? Well, one approach is by deliberately remembering and then controlling in imagination (or in the environment) perceptual complexes of a sort that have associated with them emotions (and body conditions) which we wish to experience. This rather indirect is analogous to controlling the emotional state of a child by reframing (Oh, this kind doesn’t bite), by distracting to other available perceptions (Look how beautiful its shimmery wings are!).

MoL is another approach, but not one of controlling emotions, but rather of facilitating “perceptions constructed and controlled at the higher, cortical levels, descending through the hierarchy to lower-level perceptions so as to regain control when routine means of control go awry” when two higher-level perceptions are being controlled by common means.

/Bruc

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2019.07.26.23.28]

[Rick Marken 2019-07-26_17:33:14]

        RM: ... Emotions are presumably the perceived

physiological side effects of the failure to control. …

Even contented, happy, and joyous emotions? That all emotions depend

on failure to control is something that has always bothered me about
Bill’s Emotion chapter inserted into B:CP 2nd Edition.

Martin

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-07-27_12:01:05]

[Martin Taylor 2019.07.26.23.28]

        RM: ... Emotions are presumably the perceived

physiological side effects of the failure to control. …

MT: Even contented, happy, and joyous emotions?  That all emotions depend

on failure to control is something that has always bothered me about
Bill’s Emotion chapter inserted into B:CP 2nd Edition.

RM:I agree that the “positive” emotions are difficult for Bill’s theory. But I think it can be handled by the “cognitive” component of the theory. A basic assumption of the PCT theory of emotion is that the perception of the physiological consequences of error is the same the same for all control error. So whether those perceptions are called “anger”, “sadness” or "love"Â depends on what the person knows (or thinks they know) about why they are experiencing those perceptions.Â

RM: If the person experiences those perceptions at the sight of a bear on the trail then those perceptions are likely to be called “fear”; if those perceptions are experienced at a funeral then they are likely to be called “sadness” and if those perceptions are experienced when you see your true love comin’ your way they are likely to be called “love”. In the case of the “positive” love emotion, the error induced arousal presumably results from the fact that the loved one is never exactly what you want him or her to be but the error induced arousal – the same arousal you get with fear or sadness – is experienced as “good” because, well, it’s him or her and not a bear.Â

RM: This is all consistent with the results of Schachter’s classic experiment where he showed that a person’s interpretation of the perception of physiological arousal resulting from an injection of epinephrine depended on how they saw others apparently responding to it.Â

RM: But if you know of a better theory of emotion, I’d like to hear it.

BestÂ

Rick

···

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[_Erling_Jorgensen]

[From Erling Jorgensen (2019.07.28 11.38 EDT)]

Martin Taylor 2019.07.26.23.28

Rick Marken 2019-07-26_17:33:14

RM: ... Emotions are presumably the perceived physiological side effects of

the failure to control. ...

MT: Even contented, happy, and joyous emotions? That all emotions depend on

failure to control is something that has always bothered me about Bill's
Emotion chapter inserted into B:CP 2nd Edition.

EJ: Instead of “the failure to control,�? i.e. error itself, it seems to me
emotions may be related to both “the magnitude of error�? and “the change in
error.�? So then, a relatively low magnitude of error, or a negative slope in
how error is changing may both be experienced as what we consider positive
emotions.

EJ: In a similar way, a high sustained error (leading to depression?) or a
positive slope in the change of error (leading to anger?) seem to be related
to negative emotions. What I mean by “related to�? is what sort of readiness
is being prompted in the body, whose physiological side effects are then
perceived as emotions � as per Bill’s PCT concept of emotioons.

EJ: Magnitude and derivative are presumably functions that could be computed
or sensed by neural mechanisms. It seems that certain nuances of emotions
might even involve second derivatives of error, as when a panic attack is
experienced as runaway anxiety, or a rapidly increasing change in the slope of
the error. And, reversing the sign of the slope, joy or ecstasy may be
related to a rapid decrease in the rate of change of the error.

EJ: I have wondered whether the amygdala in the brain, if it were to receive
collateral copies of error signals, might be the site for working with these
magnitudes, derivatives, and second derivatives, to pass along what I consider
“readiness signals�? for the rest of the body.

All the best,
Erling

[Evadeh]

[From Eva de Hullu (2019.07.31 09.40 GMT+3)]

How emotions are described by PCT (and especially in the B:CP chapter on emotions) is one of the (many) ways PCT rings true for me.

If you look at emotions through the lens of gaining and losing control, they make more sense than in any other theory. Especially, it releases the emotions from the ‘positive and negative’ emotions frame, that always bothered me. For example, sadness would be framed as a negative emotion, for example when it’s involved with losing a loved one. The sadness shows that control is lost, on a certain level. But then, PCT shows us that from this sadness, one could look at the loss from another (level-up) perspective and see the sadness as a sign of love or beauty (or however you’d frame it in your own control system). Thus, sadness would have both negative and positive aspects: loss of control is associated with an opportunity to gain control.

The variety of emotions could be explained by the place of loss or gain in the control system (for example: surprise could be understood as loss of sequence control, depression as loss at the systems concept level). Also the context plays a role, in which we should understand that part of the cause is not in the external context (such as stimulus-response), but in the internal context: how we perceive the world in interaction with how we want to perceive the world. If I hear a sound downstairs while I’m sleeping, I could interpret it as dangerous (and feel fear, by loss of my controlled safety) or as benign (and feel relief, after thinking that it’s probably my cat and regaining control of safety). Â

I’d love to read more from a PCT perspective on this matter. I think there’s a lot to learn from it that might also really appeal to readers outside the PCT circle. For example, quite some people are fond of Spinoza’s philosophical views on emotion, that are suprisingly PCT-consistent (e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/mar/14/spinoza-understanding-emotions).

Best,

Eva

···

On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 5:44 AM “Erling Jorgensen” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2019.07.28 11.38 EDT)]

Martin Taylor 2019.07.26.23.28

Rick Marken 2019-07-26_17:33:14

RM: … Emotions are presumably the perceived physiological side effects of

the failure to control. …

MT:Â Even contented, happy, and joyous emotions? That all emotions depend on

failure to control is something that has always bothered me about Bill’s

Emotion chapter inserted into B:CP 2nd Edition.

EJ: Instead of “the failure to control,� i.e. error itself, it seems to me

emotions may be related to both “the magnitude of error� and “the change in

error.� So then, a relatively low magnitude of error, or a negative slope in

how error is changing may both be experienced as what we consider positive

emotions.

EJ:Â In a similar way, a high sustained error (leading to depression?) or a

positive slope in the change of error (leading to anger?) seem to be related

to negative emotions. What I mean by “related to� is what sort of readiness

is being prompted in the body, whose physiological side effects are then

perceived as emotions – as per Bill’s PCT concept of emotioons.

EJ:Â Magnitude and derivative are presumably functions that could be computed

or sensed by neural mechanisms. It seems that certain nuances of emotions

might even involve second derivatives of error, as when a panic attack is

experienced as runaway anxiety, or a rapidly increasing change in the slope of

the error. And, reversing the sign of the slope, joy or ecstasy may be

related to a rapid decrease in the rate of change of the error.

EJ:Â I have wondered whether the amygdala in the brain, if it were to receive

collateral copies of error signals, might be the site for working with these

magnitudes, derivatives, and second derivatives, to pass along what I consider

“readiness signals� for the rest of the body.

All the best,

Erling

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2019.07.31:09:13 ET)]

Sensed changes in the body which arise when control systems prepare to resist present or imagined (=anticipated) disturbances are the basis of emotions. An emotion is the brain’s opinion about those lower-level perceptions of conditions within the body. “Emotions are well-known to have two components, one thought-like and one sensation-like” (B:CP 252). (Quotes are from the expanded edition.)

Bill identifies ‘the feeling component of emotion’ with error signals in intrinsic variables (254) which are generally out of awareness but “when one does detect a feeling-state, reorganization is probably taking place” (255). He proposes that conditions in the body are sensed and those perceptions are controlled by a second, parallel control hierarchy, part neurological and part chemical, which operates almost entirely without our awareness.Â

The other component of emotions is a “mental state that gives character to the sensations of emotion” (255).

He does not clearly distinguish higher-level (cortical) perceptions that we label as emotions like disappointment, pity, trust, envy, and schadenfreude from the ‘fight-flight-freeze’ snap judgements of the subcortical systems that first control those body states which then are sensed both there and (more slowly) by cortical functions, relegating the latter to a less closely related discussion of esthetic judgement and subjective valuation of experience (260).

My discussion of this aims to go beyond simply identifying emotions with intrinsic error and reorganization, and to look more deeply into how this intrinsic error arises and is either amplified or damped. I have written elsewhere about one kind of damping: "There is a reciprocal relationship between the amygdala and the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC), such that talking about emotions increases activity in the RVLPFC and reduces activity in the amygdala (Lieberman et al. 2007). This is the basis of certain kinds of interventions in emotionally challenging situations, and is an inherent aspect of the Method of Levels."Â

Lieberman, Matthew D., Naomi I. Eisenberger, Molly J. Crockett, Sarina M. Tom, Jennifer H. Pfeifer, and Baldwin M. Way. 2007. “Putting feelings into words: Affect labeling disrupts amygdala activity in response to affective stimuli.� Psychological Science 18.5:421-428. [PDF: http://www.scn.ucla.edu/pdf/AL(2007).pdf]

The traffic between the amygdala and the RVLPFC is an example of reciprocal neural ‘signals’ that seem to amount to positive feedback until they become a sufficiently prominent part of perceptual experience, or result in sufficient disturbance of intrinsic variables and sensed ‘preparations for action’ for the person to become aware of them. They may then label them as emotions and talk about them, or they may take other action according to reference values arising from those prior judgements, of in coming to awareness of their state they may feel helpless because they feel out of control and unable to control, which naturally follows from their body states and their perceptions having reached their present condition unconsciously, that is, while they were not paying attention.

And that’s why paying attention to sensations in the body as they arise is a helpful practice. It gives us the opportunity to recognize and control associated perceptions instead of letting control processes that are out of awareness control actual and imagined perceptions, evoking memory of perceptions that were present when ‘this happened before’, which in turn are controlled in imagination, and so on, escalating until we unavoidably have to pay attention to the body states that these ignored control processes have brought about for their purposes.

···

/Bruce

On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 3:14 AM Eva de Hullu csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Eva de Hullu (2019.07.31 09.40 GMT+3)]

How emotions are described by PCT (and especially in the B:CP chapter on emotions) is one of the (many) ways PCT rings true for me.

If you look at emotions through the lens of gaining and losing control, they make more sense than in any other theory. Especially, it releases the emotions from the ‘positive and negative’ emotions frame, that always bothered me. For example, sadness would be framed as a negative emotion, for example when it’s involved with losing a loved one. The sadness shows that control is lost, on a certain level. But then, PCT shows us that from this sadness, one could look at the loss from another (level-up) perspective and see the sadness as a sign of love or beauty (or however you’d frame it in your own control system). Thus, sadness would have both negative and positive aspects: loss of control is associated with an opportunity to gain control.

The variety of emotions could be explained by the place of loss or gain in the control system (for example: surprise could be understood as loss of sequence control, depression as loss at the systems concept level). Also the context plays a role, in which we should understand that part of the cause is not in the external context (such as stimulus-response), but in the internal context: how we perceive the world in interaction with how we want to perceive the world. If I hear a sound downstairs while I’m sleeping, I could interpret it as dangerous (and feel fear, by loss of my controlled safety) or as benign (and feel relief, after thinking that it’s probably my cat and regaining control of safety). Â

I’d love to read more from a PCT perspective on this matter. I think there’s a lot to learn from it that might also really appeal to readers outside the PCT circle. For example, quite some people are fond of Spinoza’s philosophical views on emotion, that are suprisingly PCT-consistent (e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/mar/14/spinoza-understanding-emotions).

Best,

Eva

On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 5:44 AM “Erling Jorgensen” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2019.07.28 11.38 EDT)]

Martin Taylor 2019.07.26.23.28

Rick Marken 2019-07-26_17:33:14

RM: … Emotions are presumably the perceived physiological side effects of

the failure to control. …

MT:Â Even contented, happy, and joyous emotions? That all emotions depend on

failure to control is something that has always bothered me about Bill’s

Emotion chapter inserted into B:CP 2nd Edition.

EJ: Instead of “the failure to control,� i.e. error itself, it seems to me

emotions may be related to both “the magnitude of error� and “the change in

error.� So then, a relatively low magnitude of error, or a negative slope in

how error is changing may both be experienced as what we consider positive

emotions.

EJ:Â In a similar way, a high sustained error (leading to depression?) or a

positive slope in the change of error (leading to anger?) seem to be related

to negative emotions. What I mean by “related to� is what sort of readiness

is being prompted in the body, whose physiological side effects are then

perceived as emotions – as per Bill’s PCT concept of emotioons.

EJ:Â Magnitude and derivative are presumably functions that could be computed

or sensed by neural mechanisms. It seems that certain nuances of emotions

might even involve second derivatives of error, as when a panic attack is

experienced as runaway anxiety, or a rapidly increasing change in the slope of

the error. And, reversing the sign of the slope, joy or ecstasy may be

related to a rapid decrease in the rate of change of the error.

EJ:Â I have wondered whether the amygdala in the brain, if it were to receive

collateral copies of error signals, might be the site for working with these

magnitudes, derivatives, and second derivatives, to pass along what I consider

“readiness signals� for the rest of the body.

All the best,

Erling