What Is Qi? Method of Authority

[From Bruce Abbott (2017.02.26.1045 EST)]

      Rick Marken

(2017.02.25.1210) –

      RM: Qi need exist

as an input quantity only when there is an experimenter
present who is interested in discovering what the controller
is controlling. That is, when an experimenter is present doing
the TCV.

      RM: Qi is itself

the output of a perceptual function in the observer. If the
observer is a human it is unnecessary to know how it is
computed; the observer’s nervous system does it for him.

      RM: The observer

is not part of the description of how a control system works.

      I generally don’t like appeals to

authority,

image00263.jpg

image001172.jpg

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.26.1040)]

···

Bruce Abbott (2017.02.26.1045 EST)–

BA: I generally don’t like appeals to authority, but in this case Rick wants to establish that his position is Bill Powers’ position on the issue of what the input quantity (Qi) represents in the typical control-system diagram. So let’s see how Bill defines Qi and represents it in his diagrams. Rick bases his interpretation of Qi partly on a diagram found in Bill Powers’ (1973) Science article:

RM: No, Rick bases his interpretation of Qi on the fact that Qi is the fact that PCT explains; the fact that a variable, Qi, is maintained in a constant or variable reference state, protected from disturbance; the fact of control. I don’t base it on Figures so the rest of your post is not relevant to my argument.

RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me about this. You probably have already written papers that are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no illusions about convincing you the Qi = p. And it really doesn’t matter; my point about Qi being data accounted for by theory is only relevant to people who are doing research on PCT – research aimed at identifying controlled variables. Indeed, my point about Qi is not even an issue for these researchers (there are perhaps 2 of them in the world today;-) because they know that they are trying to identify the variables organisms control – the variables called Qi in the PCT diagrams – and then develop models to account for this control, models where the function that defines Qi will be used as the function that computes p.Â

RM: So I think we can call it quits on this discussion. I guess you’ll just go your way and I’ll go mine.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

The first thing to note in this diagram is that the input quantity (the large circle on the left) is present in this diagram illustrating the components of a control system. According to Bill’s caption for this figure, “The Sensor function creates an ongoing relationship between some set of environmental physical variables (v’s) and a Sensor signal inside the system, an internal analog of some external state of affairs.� Then, in the body of the article, Bill states that the control system “must sense the controlled quantity in each dimension in which the quantity is to be controlled (Sensor function in Fig. 1); this implies the presence of an inner representation of the quantity in the form of a signal or set of signals.�

Â

In so far as the Science paper is concerned, there is nothing here to suggest that the input quantity shown in the figure exists only in the mind of an observer. We need to look elsewhere.

Â

In the Appendix to Behavior: The Control of Perception, Bill presents the following figure:

Â

Here the input quantity is represented as a small circle with a plus-sign inside, indicating that it is a summing junction, adding together the inputs coming from the feedback function and the disturbance function. The output of the input quantity is shown entering the input function on the system side of the figure. Once again the input quantity is shown as a component of the control system, located in the system’s environment. Bill writes “The output quantity qo and the input quantity qi are expressed in physical units, whereas the signals . . . are neural events and must be expressed in signal-units (impulses per second).� There is no mention here of the input quantity consisting of little v’s. The reason for this lack of detail, I believe, is that this level of detail is unnecessary for Bill’s purpose, here in the Appendix, of describing the mathematical transformations within each of the control-system functions and showing, based on these functions, how one can compute the changes taking place in the system variables during the system’s operation. Once again, there is no mention of an observer.

Â

Although the input quantity is located in the system’s environment, it is defined by the system’s input function, which determines which environmental variable or variables are sensed and how their levels are to be transformed into an internal signal p. When there are multiple variables being input, there may be no single entity in the environment that corresponds to this perception. However, there will be some particular combination of variables there that corresponds to Qi, for example, one that produces the recognizable taste of lemonade. Qi is not a perception in the mind of an observer, but rather an objective, potentially observable combination of environmental variables.

Â

In neither case above has Bill found it necessary to introduce an observer into his discussion of how control systems are organized and work. He may have done so elsewhere (and if he did, I am sure Rick will be happy to point out where), but these examples make it clear that Qi can be defined and discussed without the added complication of an observer and the observer’s own input functions. If Bill finds that clarity of exposition is served by leaving the observer out when describing how a simple control system works, then why does Rick insist I am wrong to do so, and that his description (observer and all) is the only valid one?

Â

Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.02.26.13.52]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.26.1040)]

This seems to contradict Rick's next statement (and his recent ones)

that Qi is the perception. The foregoing says Qi is a variable in
the environment. What follows says it is inside the brain of a
controller. I suppose there is somewhere a branch of logic that
allows both statements to be true at the same time, but I am unaware
of it.

It would be easier to make a convincing argument if you refrained

from contradicting it. That kind of contradiction makes it even
harder to understand what your new version of PCT actually says, and
possibly to test it against Powers’s version.

Martin
···
                Bruce Abbott (2017.02.26.1045

EST)–

                BA: I generally don’t like

appeals to authority, but in this case Rick wants to
establish that his position is Bill Powers’ position
on the issue of what the input quantity (Qi)
represents in the typical control-system diagram.
So let’s see how Bill defines Qi and represents it
in his diagrams. Rick bases his interpretation of
Qi partly on a diagram found in Bill Powers’ (1973)
Science article:

          RM: No, Rick bases his interpretation of Qi on the fact

that Qi is the fact that PCT explains; the fact
that a variable, Qi, is maintained in a constant or
variable reference state, protected from disturbance; thefact of control . I don’t base it on Figures so the
rest of your post is not relevant to my argument.

          RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me

about this. You probably have already written papers that
are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no
illusions about convincing you the Qi = p.

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.26.1430)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.02.26.13.52)–

MT: This seems to contradict Rick's next statement (and his recent ones)

that Qi is the perception.

RM:I don’t see the contradiction.Â

Â

MT: The foregoing says Qi is a variable in

the environment.

RM: All I see is that it says that Qi is a fact. Facts are perceptions. So Qi is a perception. It is a perception of something being controlled in what is perceived as the environment of the control system (like the cursor in a tracking task. It’s all perception, remember.Â

Â

MT: What follows says it is inside the brain of a

controller…

RM: Right, in theory the variable Qi that we, as observers, see being controlled, is assumed to be equivalent to the perception, p, that the controller is controlling. This relationship between Qi and p – that Qi is the observer’s view of p – Â tacitly understood by people who do PCT research. A good example of such research is Powers’ Â “Feedback Model of Behavior” reprinted in LCS I.Â

RM: See Table 1 on p. 50 where Bill presents two hypotheses about what variable rats are controlling in this shock avoidance task. There are two hypotheses about the controlled variable, which here Bill calls q.i rather than Qi: the probability of getting shocked  (p.s) or the rate of getting shocked (r.s). These hypotheses about q.i are used as the perceptual variable in a control model of the rat’s behavior. Bill found that using p.s rather than r. s as the perceptual variable gave enough of a better fit to the data to conclude that p.s is a better estimate of q.i than r.s.

RM: Â This is an example of using modeling to do the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV). Another example is the research described in my paper “Testing for Controlled Variables: A Model Based Approach to Determining the Perceptual Basis of Behavior” reprinted in “Doing Research on Purpose” (https://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/).Â

MT: It would be easier to make a convincing argument if you refrained

from contradicting it. That kind of contradiction makes it even
harder to understand what your new version of PCT actually says, and
possibly to test it against Powers’s version.

RM: Actually, I’ve been using Powers’ version of PCT for quite some time. I know that that’s true, not only because I understand PCT and have done and published quite a bit of PCT research and modeling (which was rather highly regarded by Bill: see, for example, his way overly generous Foreword to Mind Readingshttps://www.amazon.com/Mind-Readings-Experimental-Studies-Purpose/dp/096241543X) but also because I have done much of this work with Bill and I have never seen evidence that he had any problem with my understanding of the relationship between Qi and p (to the extent that it ever even came up; as I said, when you actually do PCT research the fact that Qi is the researcher’s perspective on p is just tacitly understood). Â Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

                BA: Rick bases his interpretation of

Qi partly on a diagram found in Bill Powers’ (1973)
Science article:

          RM: No, Rick bases his interpretation of Qi on the fact

that Qi is the fact that PCT explains; the fact
that a variable, Qi, is maintained in a constant or
variable reference state, protected from disturbance; thefact of control. Â

          RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me

about this. You probably have already written papers that
are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no
illusions about convincing you the Qi = p.

[From Fred Nickols (2017.02.27.0714 ET)]

Okay, I’ve got a couple of questions having to do with p an Qi.

As I understand it, Qi is some variable, which means its value must be able to vary. Take a chair, for example. More specifically, consider the position of the chair. I don’t know that the chair itself is a variable but its position is. I can move a chair around; I can vary its position; I can control its position.

Now all I know of the chair or its position I know by way of my senses, what I perceive to be the chair and what I perceive to be its position.

I can feel the chair when I grasp it; I can sense its weight when I lift it; I can perceive it in relation to other perceived elements in the room; I can pick it up and move it from one place to another; I can feel the tension in my muscles as I lower it. I’m pretty sure I moved the chair from one place to another, which is to say I altered or controlled the position of the chair in relation to other elements in the room and, specifically, in relation to the position in which I want the chair to be.

The chair is an object. Its position is a variable.  Because its position is what I’m out to control its position is Qi.  My perception of its position is p.

Do I have Qi and p correct in this example?

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, February 26, 2017 1:41 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: What Is Qi? Method of Authority

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.26.1040)]

Bruce Abbott (2017.02.26.1045 EST)–

BA: I generally don’t like appeals to authority, but in this case Rick wants to establish that his position is Bill Powers’ position on the issue of what the input quantity (Qi) represents in the typical control-system diagram. So let’s see how Bill defines Qi and represents it in his diagrams. Rick bases his interpretation of Qi partly on a diagram found in Bill Powers’ (1973) Science article:

RM: No, Rick bases his interpretation of Qi on the fact that Qi is the fact that PCT explains; the fact that a variable, Qi, is maintained in a constant or variable reference state, protected from disturbance; the fact of control. I don’t base it on Figures so the rest of your post is not relevant to my argument.

RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me about this. You probably have already written papers that are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no illusions about convincing you the Qi = p. And it really doesn’t matter; my point about Qi being data accounted for by theory is only relevant to people who are doing research on PCT – research aimed at identifying controlled variables. Indeed, my point about Qi is not even an issue for these researchers (there are perhaps 2 of them in the world today;-) because they know that they are trying to identify the variables organisms control – the variables called Qi in the PCT diagrams – and then develop models to account for this control, models where the function that defines Qi will be used as the function that computes p.

RM: So I think we can call it quits on this discussion. I guess you’ll just go your way and I’ll go mine.

Best

Rick

The first thing to note in this diagram is that the input quantity (the large circle on the left) is present in this diagram illustrating the components of a control system. According to Bill’s caption for this figure, “The Sensor function creates an ongoing relationship between some set of environmental physical variables (v’s) and a Sensor signal inside the system, an internal analog of some external state of affairs.� Then, in the body of the article, Bill states that the control system “must sense the controlled quantity in each dimension in which the quantity is to be controlled (Sensor function in Fig. 1); this implies the presence of an inner representation of the quantity in the form of a signal or set of signals.�

In so far as the Science paper is concerned, there is nothing here to suggest that the input quantity shown in the figure exists only in the mind of an observer. We need to look elsewhere.

In the Appendix to Behavior: The Control of Perception, Bill presents the following figure:

Here the input quantity is represented as a small circle with a plus-sign inside, indicating that it is a summing junction, adding together the inputs coming from the feedback function and the disturbance function. The output of the input quantity is shown entering the input function on the system side of the figure. Once again the input quantity is shown as a component of the control system, located in the system’s environment. Bill writes “The output quantity qo and the input quantity qi are expressed in physical units, whereas the signals . . . are neural events and must be expressed in signal-units (impulses per second).� There is no mention here of the input quantity consisting of little v’s. The reason for this lack of detail, I believe, is that this level of detail is unnecessary for Bill’s purpose, here in the Appendix, of describing the mathematical transformations within each of the control-system functions and showing, based on these functions, how one can compute the changes taking place in the system variables during the system’s operation. Once again, there is no mention of an observer.

Although the input quantity is located in the system’s environment, it is defined by the system’s input function, which determines which environmental variable or variables are sensed and how their levels are to be transformed into an internal signal p. When there are multiple variables being input, there may be no single entity in the environment that corresponds to this perception. However, there will be some particular combination of variables there that corresponds to Qi, for example, one that produces the recognizable taste of lemonade. Qi is not a perception in the mind of an observer, but rather an objective, potentially observable combination of environmental variables.

In neither case above has Bill found it necessary to introduce an observer into his discussion of how control systems are organized and work. He may have done so elsewhere (and if he did, I am sure Rick will be happy to point out where), but these examples make it clear that Qi can be defined and discussed without the added complication of an observer and the observer’s own input functions. If Bill finds that clarity of exposition is served by leaving the observer out when describing how a simple control system works, then why does Rick insist I am wrong to do so, and that his description (observer and all) is the only valid one?

Bruce

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Bruce Abbott (2017.02.27.0940 EST)]

Fred Nickols (2017.02.27.0714 ET) –

FN: Okay, I’ve got a couple of questions having to do with p an Qi.

FN: As I understand it, Qi is some variable, which means its value must be able to vary. Take a chair, for example. More specifically, consider the position of the chair. I don’t know that the chair itself is a variable but its position is. I can move a chair around; I can vary its position; I can control its position.

FN: Now all I know of the chair or its position I know by way of my senses, what I perceive to be the chair and what I perceive to be its position.

FN: I can feel the chair when I grasp it; I can sense its weight when I lift it; I can perceive it in relation to other perceived elements in the room; I can pick it up and move it from one place to another; I can feel the tension in my muscles as I lower it. I’m pretty sure I moved the chair from one place to another, which is to say I altered or controlled the position of the chair in relation to other elements in the room and, specifically, in relation to the position in which I want the chair to be.

FN: The chair is an object. Its position is a variable. Because its position is what I’m out to control its position is Qi. My perception of its position is p.

FN: Do I have Qi and p correct in this example?

BA: Yes.

BA: As for the chair, yes also: As you say, all we can know of the chair or its position we know by way of our senses. We have no direct access to the reality that may (or may not) exist beyond our perceptions.  We usually don’t concern ourselves with that philosophical problem, but act as if our perceptions correspond reasonably well to a reality beyond our senses – the chairr of our perceptions is treated as a real object having real properties conveyed to us via our senses.

BA: What makes the existence of that chair so convincing is that our perceptions with respect to it are so consistent. When you reach out and touch the chair, the perception that your hand has contacted the chair is confirmed via both vision and touch.  When you lift it, you feel its weight and inertia through your proprioceptive senses.  When you sit on what you perceive to be the chair, you perceive yourself to be supported by it rather than falling through it to the floor.

BA: The chair seems real enough, but the chair of our perceptions is only a shadow of what we presume to be the underlying reality, a shadow constructed from the sensory/perceptual systems with which we are equipped. To me the chair looks green with red decorations but to a person with red-green color blindness it is all one color. Our perceptual realities differ somewhat although they arise from the same presumed object. Physicists will tell you that the chair has no color at all; that what you perceive to be the colors of the chair are particular wavelengths of light that are being reflected off the surface of the chair. The pigments in the chair’s paint absorb certain wavelengths of the light illuminating the chair and reflect those others. What we perceive as color is the brain’s interpretation of those wavelengths of light entering the eye.  What is out there that looks like color in reality presumably is only wavelengths of light energy, and what we perceive is based on only a narrow range of those wavelengths to which the photoreceptors of the human eye are sensitive.

BA: Our sensory/perceptual systems thus construct a version of reality based on what sensory receptors are stimulated and what computations are performed on that input by the perceptual mechanisms. As Martin Taylor and I have noted, the reality of our perceptions, although selective and incomplete relative to what is “reallyâ€? there, must match up with that reality well enough to make our survival in that reality possible. By waiting at the curb for a truck to pass before stepping into the street, we avoid what may otherwise be an intense perception of violence against our bodies, and presumably also avoid being mangled and perhaps killed by our impact with a real truck. We control our perception of our own position relative to that of the truck §, and thus keep the real distance between the two (Qi) from reaching zero.

Bruce

[Vyv Huddy(27.02.2017.1642)]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.26.1040)]

···

RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me about this. You probably have already written papers that are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no illusions about convincing you the Qi = p.

This seems to contradict B:CP and LCS III, which both include equations p = ki.qi ??

And it really doesn’t matter; my point about Qi being data accounted for by theory is only relevant to people who are doing research on PCT – research aimed at identifying controlled variables. Indeed, my point about Qi is not even an issue for these
researchers (there are perhaps 2 of them in the world today;-) because they know that they are trying to identify the variables organisms control – the variables called Qi in the PCT diagrams – and then develop models to account for this control, models
where the function that defines Qi will be used as the function that computes p.

RM: So I think we can call it quits on this discussion. I guess you’ll just go your way and I’ll go mine.

Best

Rick

The first thing to note in this diagram is that the input quantity (the large circle on the left) is present in this diagram illustrating the components of a control system. According to Bill’s caption for this figure, “The
Sensor function creates an ongoing relationship between some set of environmental physical variables (v’s) and a
Sensor signal inside the system, an internal analog of some external state of affairs.” Then, in the body of the article, Bill states that the control system “must sense the controlled quantity in each dimension in which the quantity is to be controlled
(Sensor function in Fig. 1); this implies the presence of an inner representation of the quantity in the form of a signal or set of signals.”

In so far as the Science paper is concerned, there is nothing here to suggest that the input quantity shown in the figure exists only in the mind of an observer. We need to look elsewhere.

In the Appendix to Behavior: The Control of Perception, Bill presents the following figure:

Here the input quantity is represented as a small circle with a plus-sign inside, indicating that it is a summing junction, adding together the inputs coming from the feedback function and the disturbance function. The output of the input quantity is shown
entering the input function on the system side of the figure. Once again the input quantity is shown as a component of the control system, located in the system’s environment. Bill writes “The output quantity qo and the input quantity qi
are expressed in physical units, whereas the signals . . . are neural events and must be expressed in signal-units (impulses per second).” There is no mention here of the input quantity consisting of little
v ’s. The reason for this lack of detail, I believe, is that this level of detail is unnecessary for Bill’s purpose, here in the Appendix, of describing the mathematical transformations within each of the control-system functions and showing, based on
these functions, how one can compute the changes taking place in the system variables during the system’s operation. Once again, there is no mention of an observer.

Although the input quantity is located in the system’s environment, it is
defined by the system’s input function, which determines which environmental variable or variables are sensed and how their levels are to be transformed into an internal signal p. When there are multiple variables being input, there may be no single
entity in the environment that corresponds to this perception. However, there will be some particular combination of variables there that corresponds to Qi, for example, one that produces the recognizable taste of lemonade. Qi is not a perception in the mind of an observer, but rather an objective, potentially observable combination
of environmental variables.

In neither case above has Bill found it necessary to introduce an observer into his discussion of how control systems are organized and work. He may have done so elsewhere (and if he did, I am sure Rick will be happy to point out where),
but these examples make it clear that Qi can be defined and discussed without the added complication of an observer and the observer’s own input functions. If Bill finds that clarity of exposition is served by leaving the observer out when describing how
a simple control system works, then why does Rick insist I am wrong to do so, and that his description (observer and all) is the only valid one?

Bruce


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.27.1200)]

···

Vyv Huddy(27.02.2017.1642)–

RM: This is done when the goal is to demonstrate the important features of control system behavior – important to a student of the behavior of living control systems. The important features of control system behavior, in algebraic form are:Â

RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me about this. You probably have already written papers that are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no illusions about convincing you the Qi = p.

VH: This seems to contradict B:CP and LCS III, which both include equations p = ki.qi ??

p ~ r                 (1)

q.o ~ r - 1/k.e(d) Â Â Â Â Â Â (2)

RM: (See equations 12 and 13 in the Appendix to B:CP). Equation (1) shows that the perceptual signal is kept nearly equal to the reference signal; a control system controls its perception. Equation (2) shows that the output of a control system. q.o, depends, not on the input variable, q.i, but on the reference signal and disturbance.Â

RM: By setting p = k.i*q.i Powers is also able to show that these equations account for the main observation to be accounted for: the fact that the environmental correlate of the perceptual signal, q.i, is maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance.

q.i ~ q*

RM: (See Equation 16 in the Appendix to B:CP). Powers is obviously using q.i to represent what may be a very complex function of environmental variables, v. The possible kinds of functions of environmental variables represented by q.i were described throughout B:CP as he described the different kinds of perceptions controlled at different levels of the proposed control hierarchy. Some q.i’s represent intensities of the sensory effects of environmental variables: these are the q.i’s that are probably closest to being directly proportional to physical variables. Other q.i’s represent sensations; vector sums of intensities. Still others represent configurations. And so on up to what must be the incredibly complex functions that produce system concept perceptions.Â

RM: So depending on the level of the hierarchy we are talking about, q.i can represent a simple function of physical variables, like q.i = kv. Or a more complex one, like q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)) (the function used to determine the controlled variable, q.i, in the "Feedback Model paper, p. 52, LCS I).Â

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would understand that q.i was a variable that represented a possibly very complex function of environmental variables and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would not be computed by the environment itself. For example, the equation above for q.i – q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) – computes the probability of getting shocked as a function of average bar press rate, r.p*. But the variable, q.i, is obviously not the input variable that the rat perceives as the probability of shock, p.s. That is, it is obviously not the case that p.s = k.iq.i. That would imply that the environment carried out the computation of q.i described by the equation int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)), and I think Bill believed no one would make the mistake of believing that the environment does that. Alas, it appears that this was one of the few times Bill was wrong.Â

RM: Anyway, it is clearly the perceptual function in the rat that would have to do the computations implied by the equation int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) resulting in the theoretical perceptual signal, p.s. That is, Bill’s control model of the rat in a shock avoidance task assumes that the perceptual function in the rat computes p.s in a way that is analogous to the way Bill (the observer) computes q.i, the variable that presumably corresponds to the perception the rat is controlling. The value of q.i and, presumably, p.s, is a function of a physical variable, r.p, response rate, and a physical constraint, N, the number of presses required within I minutes.Â

RM: Besides the absurdity of thinking that the function that defines q.i is computed in the environment, the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.02.27.16.11]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.27.1200)]…

In what way was Bill wrong?

Has anyone other than Rick Marken ever in the life of CSGnet and its

predecessors suggested that something in the external environment
acted as a processor that could extract from a controller’s internal
neural mechanism a function and then process that function using
data coming in through the organism’s sensor systems to produce
something new? I don’t think so. So why proclaim that Bill took it
for granted but was wrong to do so, unless your objective was to
annoy your readers?

The point that there's no such super-clairvoyant processor, and the

related statements in this message are a straw man made of very
flimsy straw, not worth a drowning person trying to cling onto.

Martin
···

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would
understand that q.i was a variable that represented a
possibly very complex function of environmental variables
and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would
not be computed by the environment itself. … I think Bill
believed no one would make the mistake of believing that the
environment does that. Alas, it appears that this was one of
the few times Bill was wrong.

[From Bruce Abbott (2017.02.27.1900 EST)]

Rick Marken (2017.02.27.1200) –

Vyv Huddy(27.02.2017.1642)–

RM: I know you guys are never going to agree with me about this. You probably have already written papers that are based on your idea that p = f( Qi). So I have no illusions about convincing you the Qi = p.

VH: This seems to contradict B:CP and LCS III, which both include equations p = ki.qi ??

BA: It doesn’t just seem to, it actually does!

RM: This is done when the goal is to demonstrate the important features of control system behavior – important to a student of the behavior of living control systems. The important features of control system behavior, in algebraic form are:

p ~ r (1)

q.o ~ r - 1/k.e(d) (2)

RM: (See equations 12 and 13 in the Appendix to B:CP). Equation (1) shows that the perceptual signal is kept nearly equal to the reference signal; a control system controls its perception. Equation (2) shows that the output of a control system. q.o, depends, not on the input variable, q.i, but on the reference signal and disturbance.

RM: By setting p = k.i*q.i Powers is also able to show that these equations account for the main observation to be accounted for: the fact that the environmental correlate of the perceptual signal, q.i, is maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance.

q.i ~ q*

RM: (See Equation 16 in the Appendix to B:CP). Powers is obviously using q.i to represent what may be a very complex function of environmental variables, v. The possible kinds of functions of environmental variables represented by q.i were described throughout B:CP as he described the different kinds of perceptions controlled at different levels of the proposed control hierarchy. Some q.i’s represent intensities of the sensory effects of environmental variables: these are the q.i’s that are probably closest to being directly proportional to physical variables. Other q.i’s represent sensations; vector sums of intensities. Still others represent configurations. And so on up to what must be the incredibly complex functions that produce system concept perceptions.

BA:Â Equation 16 gives the value of qi in the steady state during the operation of the control system, after the system has come to equilibrium. Â The equation given for the instantaneous value, given in equation 4, provides a clearer picture of how qi is determined on each passage around the loop:

qi = keqo + kdd

BA: This shows that the current value of qi is a joint function of feedback plus disturbance. It is the value of the environmental variable after it has been affected by feedback and disturbance. The output and disturbance quantities are not the environmental v’s that jointly determine a perceptual signal that is a complex function of these v’s.

RM: So depending on the level of the hierarchy we are talking about, q.i can represent a simple function of physical variables, like q.i = kv. Or a more complex one, like q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)) (the function used to determine the controlled variable, q.i, in the "Feedback Model paper, p. 52, LCS I).

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would understand that q.i was a variable that represented a possibly very complex function of environmental variables and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would not be computed by the environment itself. For example, the equation above for q.i – q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) – computes the probability of getting shocked as a function of average bar press rate, r.p*. But the variable, q.i, is obviously not the input variable that the rat perceives as the probability of shock, p.s. That is, it is obviously not the case that p.s = k.iq.i. That would imply that the environment carried out the computation of q.i described by the equation int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)), and I think Bill believed no one would make the mistake of believing that the environment does that. Alas, it appears that this was one of the few times Bill was wrong.

BA: No, Bill wasn’t wrong – nobody in this debate believes that the environment does thhat. The complex equation cited above gives the probability of shock delivery as a function of the average rate of lever-pressing. This equation combines the effect of disturbance (shock probability in the absence of responding) and the environmental feedback function (the reduction in shock probability as a function or average response rate). As in your previous example, it is not an equation combining the effects of several environmental input variables (v’s) to represent the environmental equivalent of the controlled variable. It is an equation representing how disturbance and feedback affect that variable. You are using the wrong equation to make your case!

RM: Anyway, it is clearly the perceptual function in the rat that would have to do the computations implied by the equation int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) resulting in the theoretical perceptual signal, p.s. That is, Bill’s control model of the rat in a shock avoidance task assumes that the perceptual function in the rat computes p.s in a way that is analogous to the way Bill (the observer) computes q.i, the variable that presumably corresponds to the perception the rat is controlling. The value of q.i and, presumably, p.s, is a function of a physical variable, r.p, response rate, and a physical constraint, N, the number of presses required within I minutes.

BA: Bill’s analytical solution involved computing a shock density distribution as a function average response rate.  This is a function of the environmental contingency set up by the experimenter. You are mistaking the formula for this analytical solution for the actual way in which shock rate is determined by the contingency set up by the experimenter between lever-pressing and shock delivery. The actual arrangement used by the apparatus to determine when a shock would be delivered is really quite simple: If the required number of responses has not been completed before the interval elapses, deliver a shock, reset the response counter to zero, and start timing a new interval. No complex equations are being “solved� by the environment.

BA: What the rat actually experiences is a series of irregularly spaced shocks. A perceptual input function that gives rise to a perception of shock probability would have to do something equivalent to computing the average shock rate over time, probably by means of a leaky integration of the inter-shock intervals. (This would weight the more recent intervals more heavily in determining current perceived shock probability.)

RM: Besides the absurdity of thinking that the function that defines q.i is computed in the environment,

BA:Â I have never made that claim; in fact I have been careful to acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function, and that therefore there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi.

RM: the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.

BA: But nobody has made that claim, except evidently in your imagination.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.27.2040)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.02.27.16.11)–

MT: In what way was Bill wrong.

MT: Has anyone other than Rick Marken ever in the life of CSGnet and its

predecessors suggested that something in the external environment
acted as a processor that could extract from a controller’s internal
neural mechanism a function and then process that function using
data coming in through the organism’s sensor systems to produce
something new?

RM: This is not what I have said. Read over my post and try again. What Bill got wrong was thinking that people would understand q.i to be a variable that corresponds to the perception controlled by the observer. If an observer sees someone controlling the area of a rectangle, then what the observer sees is area – q.i = h * w – being controlled. The observer then assumes that the perception being controlled is proportional to h * w: that is, p = k (h * w).Â

RM: You and others seem to think that the controller is perceiving and controlling q.i; that p = ki*q.i. If this were the case and q.i is the area of a rectangle then the calculation of area must have occurred before the perceptual process that converts q.i into p. That is, the calculation q.i = h * w must have occurred in the environment before entering the perceptual system. Â Â

RM: I will confess, by the way, Â that I have not been particularly scrupulous about my own use of q.i in my work. For example, here’s a segment of pseudo-code for a simple control simulation described in a paper in DRoP:

        RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would

understand that q.i was a variable that represented a
possibly very complex function of environmental variables
and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would
not be computed by the environment itself. … I think Bill
believed no one would make the mistake of believing that the
environment does that. Alas, it appears that this was one of
the few times Bill was wrong.

For i = 1 to NSamples

t : = d[i]

c : = q.o

q.i : = t – c

p : = k.i (q.i)

q.o : = q.o + (k.o (r - p) - q.o))/slow

Next i

RM: Note that I compute a variable called q.i and then compute the perceptual variable, p, as a function of q.i. The model works fine, of course, but the semantics are nonsense because they imply that q.i is an actual variable that exists in the environment; this is because q.i is calculated before it is converted into a perception. It is also implied that the calculation of the distance between target and cursor ( t-c) that produces q.i also occurs in the environment so that all that the perceptual system has to do is convert this distance measure into perceptual variable units (via the coefficient k). If perception were this easy, speech recognition would have been developed soon after the phonograph.Â

RM: A better way to write the code would have been to eliminate the step where q.i is computed and just have p = k (t-c) to show that it’s the perceptual function and not the environment that computes the distance between t and c. Indeed, that’s the way I wrote it earlier in the paper, where one hypothesis about the controlled perception was:Â

p1 = k (t - c)

RM: There was another hypothesis about the controlled perception that was also tested:Â

p2 = arcsine [(t-c)/s]

RM: And when this second function was placed in the program as the perceptual function it gave results that fit the data better that the first.Â

RM: So my unfortunate choice to include a computation of q.i in the model didn’t interfere with the goal of the research, which was to test to find the best definition of the perceptual variable controlled in this task. It didn’t create a problem because I knew that I was going after the best definition of the controlled variable, whether one thought of that variable as being called q.i (the observer’s view of the variable) or p (the controller’s view).Â

RM: So my own experience reminds me that the relationship between q.i and p can be a tough one to keep straight. But I believe that the only time the failure to keep this relationship straight creates a problem is when q.i is conceived of as an actual variable in the environment, like the distance from target to cursor (t-c), so that the important research question becomes how precisely q.i is transduced into a perceptual signal and, thus, how well q.i is controlled relative to p. That is a nonsense research question because q.i is p from the researcher’s perspective.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

I don't think so. So why proclaim that Bill took it

for granted but was wrong to do so, unless your objective was to
annoy your readers?

The point that there's no such super-clairvoyant processor, and the

related statements in this message are a straw man made of very
flimsy straw, not worth a drowning person trying to cling onto.

Martin


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.27.2140)]

···

Bruce Abbott (2017.02.27.1900 EST)

Â

BA: …The equation given for the instantaneous value, given in equation 4, provides a clearer picture of how qi is determined on each passage around the loop:

Â

qi = keqo + kdd

Â

BA: This shows that the current value of qi is a joint function of feedback plus disturbance. It is the value of the environmental variable after it has been affected by feedback and disturbance. The output and disturbance quantities are not the environmental v’s that jointly determine a perceptual signal that is a complex function of these v’s.

RM: But qo and d are environmental variables. So the equation implies that the controlled perceptual variable, p, which from the observer’s perspective is q.i, is just a weighted sum of these two variables.Â

 RM: So depending on the level of the hierarchy we are talking about, q.i can represent a simple function of physical variables, like q.i = kv. Or a more complex one, like q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)) (the function used to determine the controlled variable, q.i, in the "Feedback Model paper, p. 52, LCS I).Â

Â

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would understand that q.i was a variable that represented a possibly very complex function of environmental variables and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would not be computed by the environment itself…Â Alas, it appears that this was one of the few times Bill was wrong.Â

Â

BA: No, Bill wasn’t wrong – nobody in this debate believes that the environment dooes that.Â

 RM: Do you believe that q.i is an actual entity in the environment, an entity like distance or area or probability? If so, then it would seem that you would have to believe, perhaps unknowingly,  that q.i is calculated by the environment.Â

BA: The complex equation cited above gives the probability of shock delivery as a function of the average rate of lever-pressing. This equation combines the effect of disturbance (shock probability in the absence of responding) and the environmental feedback function (the reduction in shock probability as a function or average response rate). As in your previous example, it is not an equation combining the effects of several environmental input variables (v’s) to represent the environmental equivalent of the controlled variable. It is an equation representing how disturbance and feedback affect that variable. You are using the wrong equation to make your case!

RM: Â The complex equation cited above – int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) Â – is, as you say, a calculation of the probability of shock, the perceptual variable that the organism is presumed to be controlling. This calculation (or something similar) cannot be done by the environment; the shocks are just something that happens or doesn’t. So the equation is an approximation to the perceptual function that produces the perceptual variable p.s, the probability of a shock. The calculation of p.s that Bill did for the different shock intervals are the values of q.i, which are the values of p.s from the observer’s (Bill’s) perspective.Â

BA: Bill’s analytical solution involved computing a shock density distribution as a function average response rate. This is a function of the environmental contingency set up by the experimenter. You are mistaking the formula for this analytical solution for the actual way in which shock rate is determined by the contingency set up by the experimenter between lever-pressing and shock delivery. The actual arrangement used by the apparatus to determine when a shock would be delivered is really quite simple: If the required number of responses has not been completed before the interval elapses, deliver a shock, reset the response counter to zero, and start timing a new interval. No complex equations are being “solved� by the environment.

RM: Yes, the apparatus determines whether or not a shock is delivered based on the number of responses in a time interval. This and the rat’s response rate determine the probability (or rate) of shock. But in order to control the probability of getting shocked the rat has to perceive it; Bill’s equation is one version (probably more complex than it needs to be) of a calculation that will produce a perception of that probability; and at the same time the calculation produces a measure of p.s for the observer (Bill) which is q.i. Â

Â

BA: What the rat actually experiences is a series of irregularly spaced shocks. A perceptual input function that gives rise to a perception of shock probability would have to do something equivalent to computing the average shock rate over time, probably by means of a leaky integration of the inter-shock intervals. (This would weight the more recent intervals more heavily in determining current perceived shock probability.)

RM: Yes, that would have been a much simpler way to compute it; and it would have been nice if the observer (Verhave) had computed shock probability that way. Then Bill could have used Verhave’s observed measures of shock probability (q.i) as estimates of the rat’s perception of shock probability, p.s, and the whole exercise would have been much clearer. But, of course, Verhave had no idea that shock probability might be a controlled variable so he didn’t measure it at all. That’s why Bill had to use these fancy equations to calculate q.i and p.s.

Â

RM: Besides the absurdity of thinking that the function that defines q.i is computed in the environment,

Â

BA:Â I have never made that claim; in fact I have been careful to acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function, and that therefore there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi.

RM: It’s great that you acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function. That is absolutely correct!! But why does that mean that there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi?Â

Â

RM: the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.Â

Â

BA: But nobody has made that claim, except evidently in your imagination.

RM: Yes, it is in my imagination. I imagined that it is the only way that you can claim that the perceptual variable is a function of qi. If this is not the case, please write the pseudo code for a system that controls, say, the area of a circle and show me how q.i fits into that control loop. That would really help me understand what you’re talking about.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Bruce Abbott (2017.02.28.1115 EST)]

Rick Marken (2017.02.27.2140) –

Bruce Abbott (2017.02.27.1900 EST)

BA: …The equation given for the instantaneous value, given in equation 4, provides a clearer picture of how qi is determined on each passage around the loop:

qi = keqo + kdd

BA: This shows that the current value of qi is a joint function of feedback plus disturbance. It is the value of the environmental variable after it has been affected by feedback and disturbance. The output and disturbance quantities are not the environmental v’s that jointly determine a perceptual signal that is a complex function of these v’s.

RM: But qo and d are environmental variables. So the equation implies that the controlled perceptual variable, p, which from the observer’s perspective is q.i, is just a weighted sum of these two variables.

BA: In one definition (where Qi represents the environmental equivalent of the controlled perception), Qi is defined according to what environmental variables affect the input function. It is not defined by Qo or d. As issue is what defines Qi, not what inputs affect its value. You must know that. Therefore I can only conclude that your objective in introducing this red herring is to obfuscate and confuse the issue.

RM: So depending on the level of the hierarchy we are talking about, q.i can represent a simple function of physical variables, like q.i = kv. Or a more complex one, like q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)) (the function used to determine the controlled variable, q.i, in the "Feedback Model paper, p. 52, LCS I).

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would understand that q.i was a variable that represented a possibly very complex function of environmental variables and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would not be computed by the environment itself… Alas, it appears that this was one of the few times Bill was wrong.

BA: No, Bill wasn’t wrong – noobody in this debate believes that the environment does that.

RM: Do you believe that q.i is an actual entity in the environment, an entity like distance or area or probability? If so, then it would seem that you would have to believe, perhaps unknowingly, that q.i is calculated by the environment.

BA: I don’t believe that the environment calculates anything. A soap bubble is spherical because molecular forces tend to contract the soap film until the pressure inside the bubble becomes strong enough to resist any further contraction. I could use mathematical computations to model this process, but that does not mean I believe that the soap bubble is doing any calculating. That said, I do believe that there are actual entities in the environment, like distance or area or inter-shock interval. As an observer I might represent these mathematically in a model, but that is a very different thing from believing that the environment is computing these things.

BA: The complex equation cited above gives the probability of shock delivery as a function of the average rate of lever-pressing. This equation combines the effect of disturbance (shock probability in the absence of responding) and the environmental feedback function (the reduction in shock probability as a function or average response rate). As in your previous example, it is not an equation combining the effects of several environmental input variables (v’s) to represent the environmental equivalent of the controlled variable. It is an equation representing how disturbance and feedback affect that variable. You are using the wrong equation to make your case!

RM: The complex equation cited above – int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) – is, as you say, a calculation of the probability of shock, the perceptual variable that the organism is presumed to be controlling. This calculation (or something similar) cannot be done by the environment; the shocks are just something that happens or doesn’t. So the equation is an approximation to the perceptual function that produces the perceptual variable p.s, the probability of a shock. The calculation of p.s that Bill did for the different shock intervals are the values of q.i, which are the values of p.s from the observer’s (Bill’s) perspective.

BA: That’s not the issue. The issue is that the equation you cited gives us the effects of disturbance and output on Qi; it does not define Qi.  It’s the same red herring as in your previous example.

BA: Bill’s analytical solution involved computing a shock density distribution as a function average response rate. This is a function of the environmental contingency set up by the experimenter. You are mistaking the formula for this analytical solution for the actual way in which shock rate is determined by the contingency set up by the experimenter between lever-pressing and shock delivery. The actual arrangement used by the apparatus to determine when a shock would be delivered is really quite simple: If the required number of responses has not been completed before the interval elapses, deliver a shock, reset the response counter to zero, and start timing a new interval. No complex equations are being “solved� by the environment.

RM: Yes, the apparatus determines whether or not a shock is delivered based on the number of responses in a time interval. This and the rat’s response rate determine the probability (or rate) of shock. But in order to control the probability of getting shocked the rat has to perceive it; Bill’s equation is one version (probably more complex than it needs to be) of a calculation that will produce a perception of that probability; and at the same time the calculation produces a measure of p.s for the observer (Bill) which is q.i.

No, Bill’s formula provides a mathematical representation of the environmental feedback function: how the average rate of lever-pressing affects the probability of shock It has nothing to do with the rat’s perception of that probability.

BA: What the rat actually experiences is a series of irregularly spaced shocks. A perceptual input function that gives rise to a perception of shock probability would have to do something equivalent to computing the average shock rate over time, probably by means of a leaky integration of the inter-shock intervals. (This would weight the more recent intervals more heavily in determining current perceived shock probability.)

RM: Yes, that would have been a much simpler way to compute it; and it would have been nice if the observer (Verhave) had computed shock probability that way. Then Bill could have used Verhave’s observed measures of shock probability (q.i) as estimates of the rat’s perception of shock probability, p.s, and the whole exercise would have been much clearer. But, of course, Verhave had no idea that shock probability might be a controlled variable so he didn’t measure it at all. That’s why Bill had to use these fancy equations to calculate q.i and p.s.

BA: I did not present a “much simpler way to compute� the rat’s perception of shock probability, because Bill’s formula does not present the input function, it presents the environmental feedback function. Geez, Rick, this is control theory 101. I’m surprised that you are so confused about it.

RM: Besides the absurdity of thinking that the function that defines q.i is computed in the environment,

BA: I have never made that claim; in fact I have been careful to acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function, and that therefore there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi.

RM: It’s great that you acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function. That is absolutely correct!! But why does that mean that there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi?

BA: That the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function is the position I have always taken; I did not just “acknowledge� it as a result of your prompting. If you missed that fact then perhaps you should read more carefully. I don’t see how you can criticize someone’s position with any authority if you have not even bothered to understand that that position is. Or are you purposefully misrepresenting it in order to score debate points?

BA: As for my statement that “there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi,� I might have been clearer there.  In some cases there is a direct correspondence between a perception and a single environmental variable qi. In other cases p depends on more than one environmental variable, in which case there is no single entity in the environment corresponding to qi. Instead, qi represents a specific combination of environmental variables as determined by the input function. (Here I am defining qi and the environmental equivalent of p. I have previously demonstrated that Bill Powers defined qi this way on some occasions and as the individual environmental variables of which p is a function on other occasions.)

RM: the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.

BA: But nobody has made that claim, except evidently in your imagination.

RM: Yes, it is in my imagination. I imagined that it is the only way that you can claim that the perceptual variable is a function of qi.

BA: You didn’t need to resort to imagination as I have presented my position clearly enough in previous posts. All you had to do was read them and carefully follow the reasoning.  Why don’t you give it a try?

RM: If this is not the case, please write the pseudo code for a system that controls, say, the area of a circle and show me how q.i fits into that control loop. That would really help me understand what you’re talking about.

BA:Â OK, here it is:Â

p = f(qi), where f is the perceptual input function, p is the perception of the circle’s area, and qi is the actual area of the circle as objectively measured.

BA:  I really don’t need any more code than that. I don’t need to show how one might adjust or control that area, as the perceptual function works the same whether the circle’s area is being controlled or not. Note that p = f(qi), not p = qi as you have previously claimed.

Bruce

[Chad Green (2017.03.01.0857 EST)]

BA: No, Bill’s formula provides a mathematical representation of the environmental feedback function: how the average rate of lever-pressing affects the probability
of shock It has nothing to do with the rat’s perception of that probability.

CG: Speaking of rodents:

A Giant Neuron Has Been Found Wrapped Around the Entire Circumference of the Brain

http://www.sciencealert.com/a-giant-neuron-has-been-found-wrapped-around-the-entire-circumference-of-the-brain

Best,

Chad

···

Chad T. Green, PMP

Research Office

Loudoun County Public Schools

21000 Education Court

Ashburn, VA 20148

Voice: 571-252-1486

Fax: 571-252-1575

“To the humble, courageous, ‘great’ ones among us who exemplify how leadership is a choice, not a position.� - Stephen Covey (The 8th Habit)

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2017 11:15 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: What Is Qi? Method of Authority

[From Bruce Abbott (2017.02.28.1115 EST)]

Rick Marken (2017.02.27.2140) –

Bruce Abbott (2017.02.27.1900 EST)

BA: …The equation given for the instantaneous value, given in equation 4, provides a clearer picture of how qi is determined on each passage around the loop:

qi = keqo + kdd

BA: This shows that the current value of qi is a joint function of feedback plus disturbance. It is the value of the environmental variable
after it has been affected by feedback and disturbance. The output and disturbance quantities are
not the environmental v’s that jointly determine a perceptual signal that is a complex function of these v’s.

RM: But qo and d are environmental variables. So the equation implies that the controlled perceptual variable, p, which from the observer’s perspective is q.i, is just a weighted sum of these two variables.

BA: In one definition (where Qi represents the environmental equivalent of the controlled perception), Qi is defined according to what environmental variables affect the input function. It is not defined by
Qo or d. As issue is what defines Qi, not what inputs affect its value. You must know that. Therefore I can only conclude that your objective in introducing this red herring is to obfuscate and confuse the issue.

RM: So depending on the level of the hierarchy we are talking about, q.i can represent a simple function of physical variables, like q.i = kv. Or a more complex one, like q.i = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p)/N/r.p*)) (the function
used to determine the controlled variable, q.i, in the "Feedback Model paper, p. 52, LCS I).

RM: I think Bill took it for granted that people would understand that q.i was a variable that represented a possibly very complex function of environmental variables and , moreover, that they would understand that q.i would not be computed
by the environment itself… Alas, it appears that this was one of the few times Bill was wrong.

BA: No, Bill wasn’t wrong – nobody iin this debate believes that the environment does that.

RM: Do you believe that q.i is an actual entity in the environment, an entity like distance or area or probability? If so, then it would seem that you would have to believe, perhaps unknowingly, that q.i is calculated by the environment.

BA: I don’t believe that the environment calculates anything. A soap bubble is spherical because molecular forces tend to contract the soap film until the pressure inside the bubble becomes strong enough to
resist any further contraction. I could use mathematical computations to model this process, but that does not mean I believe that the soap bubble is doing any calculating. That said, I do believe that there are actual entities in the environment, like distance
or area or inter-shock interval. As an observer I might represent these mathematically in a model, but that is a very different thing from believing that the environment is computing these things.

BA: The complex equation cited above gives the probability of shock delivery as a function of the average rate of lever-pressing. This equation combines the effect of disturbance (shock probability in the absence of responding) and the
environmental feedback function (the reduction in shock probability as a function or average response rate). As in your previous example, it is not an equation combining the effects of several environmental input variables (v’s) to represent the environmental
equivalent of the controlled variable. It is an equation representing how disturbance and feedback affect that variable. You are using the wrong equation to make your case!

RM: The complex equation cited above – int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) – is, as you say, a calculation of the probability of shock, the perceptual variable that the organism is presumed to be controlling. This calculation
(or something similar) cannot be done by the environment; the shocks are just something that happens or doesn’t. So the equation is an approximation to the perceptual function that produces the perceptual variable p.s, the probability of a shock. The calculation
of p.s that Bill did for the different shock intervals are the values of q.i, which are the values of p.s from the observer’s (Bill’s) perspective.

BA: That’s not the issue. The issue is that the equation you cited gives us the effects of disturbance and output on Qi; it does not define Qi. It’s the same red herring as in your previous example.

BA: Bill’s analytical solution involved computing a shock density distribution as a function average response rate. This is a function of the environmental contingency set up by the experimenter. You are mistaking the formula for this
analytical solution for the actual way in which shock rate is determined by the contingency set up by the experimenter between lever-pressing and shock delivery. The actual arrangement used by the apparatus to determine when a shock would be delivered is really
quite simple: If the required number of responses has not been completed before the interval elapses, deliver a shock, reset the response counter to zero, and start timing a new interval. No complex equations are being “solved� by the environment.

RM: Yes, the apparatus determines whether or not a shock is delivered based on the number of responses in a time interval. This and the rat’s response rate determine the probability (or rate) of shock. But in order to control the probability
of getting shocked the rat has to perceive it; Bill’s equation is one version (probably more complex than it needs to be) of a calculation that will produce a perception of that probability; and at the same time the calculation produces a measure of p.s for
the observer (Bill) which is q.i.

No, Bill’s formula provides a mathematical representation of the environmental feedback function: how the average rate of lever-pressing affects the probability of shock It has nothing to do with the rat’s perception of that probability.

BA: What the rat actually experiences is a series of irregularly spaced shocks. A perceptual input function that gives rise to a perception of shock probability would have to do something equivalent to computing the average shock rate
over time, probably by means of a leaky integration of the inter-shock intervals. (This would weight the more recent intervals more heavily in determining current perceived shock probability.)

RM: Yes, that would have been a much simpler way to compute it; and it would have been nice if the observer (Verhave) had computed shock probability that way. Then Bill could have used Verhave’s observed measures of shock probability (q.i)
as estimates of the rat’s perception of shock probability, p.s, and the whole exercise would have been much clearer. But, of course, Verhave had no idea that shock probability might be a controlled variable so he didn’t measure it at all. That’s why Bill had
to use these fancy equations to calculate q.i and p.s.

BA: I did not present a “much simpler way to compute� the rat’s perception of shock probability, because Bill’s formula does not present the input function, it presents the environmental feedback function.
Geez, Rick, this is control theory 101. I’m surprised that you are so confused about it.

RM: Besides the absurdity of thinking that the function that defines q.i is computed in the environment,

BA: I have never made that claim; in fact I have been careful to acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function, and that therefore there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds
to qi.

RM: It’s great that you acknowledge that the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function. That is absolutely correct!! But why does that mean that there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to
qi?

BA: That the environmental equivalent of p is determined by the input function is the position I have always taken; I did not just “acknowledge� it as a result of your prompting. If you missed that fact then perhaps you should read more
carefully. I don’t see how you can criticize someone’s position with any authority if you have not even bothered to understand that that position is. Or are you purposefully misrepresenting it in order to score debate points?

BA: As for my statement that “there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi,� I might have been clearer there. In some cases there is a direct correspondence between a perception and
a single environmental variable qi. In other cases p depends on more than one environmental variable, in which case there is no single entity in the environment corresponding to qi. Instead, qi represents a specific combination of environmental variables
as determined by the input function. (Here I am defining qi and the environmental equivalent of p. I have previously demonstrated that Bill Powers defined qi this way on some occasions and as the individual environmental variables of which p is a function
on other occasions.)

RM: the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed
a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to
be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a
hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.

BA: But nobody has made that claim, except evidently in your imagination.

RM: Yes, it is in my imagination. I imagined that it is the only way that you can claim that the perceptual variable is a function of qi.

BA: You didn’t need to resort to imagination as I have presented my position clearly enough in previous posts. All you had to do was read them and carefully follow the reasoning. Why don’t you give it a try?

RM: If this is not the case, please write the pseudo code for a system that controls, say, the area of a circle and show me how q.i fits into that control loop. That would really help me understand what you’re talking about.

BA: OK, here it is:

p = f(qi), where f is the perceptual input function, p is the perception of the circle’s area, and qi is the actual area of the circle as objectively measured.

BA: I really don’t need any more code than that. I don’t need to show how one might adjust or control that area, as the perceptual function works the same whether the circle’s area is being controlled or not. Note that p = f(qi), not
p = qi as you have previously claimed.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.03.2125)]

···

 Bruce Abbott (2017.02.28.1115 EST)

BA: The complex equation cited above gives the probability of shock delivery as a function of the average rate of lever-pressing…It is an equation representing how disturbance and feedback affect that variable. You are using the wrong equation to make your case!

RM: Â The complex equation cited above – int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) Â – is, as you say, a calculation of the probability of shock, the perceptual variable that the organism is presumed to be controlling…Â

Â

BA: That’s not the issue. The issue is that the equation you cited gives us the effects of disturbance and output on Qi; it does not define Qi [emphasis mine: RM]*.* It’s the same red herring as in your previous example.Â

RM: Actually it does define q.i (or Qi, if you prefer). Bill uses the same “red herring”, as you call it. See Table 1, p. 50 of LCS I. Note in the upper left is the legend: “Hypothesis, q.i =”. Note that there are two possibilities listed: p.s and r.s (probability and rate of shock, respectively). These are two hypotheses about the controlled input quantity, q.i, which are hypotheses about the perceptual variable controlled by the rats.Â

RM: So q.i is defined as p.s = int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) (see p. 52). And q.i is also defined as r.s = p.s/I.Â

Â

BA: No, Bill’s formula provides a mathematical representation of the environmental feedback function: how the average rate of lever-pressing affects the probability of shock It has nothing to do with the rat’s perception of that probability.

RM: The formula does include a description of the feedback effects of pressing rate on the probability and rate of shock. But what is most important about these equations is that they provide definitions of controlled input quantities, q.i, which might correspond to the perceptual variable controlled by the rats. This is tested by using p.s and r.s as the controlled perceptual variable in the model of shock avoidance behavior to see which gives a better fit to the data (spoiler alert, it was p.s; see p. 58, para. 2).

RM: This is a model-based version of the test for the controlled variable, another version of which I describe in Chapter 4 of “Doing Research on Purpose” entitled: Testing for Controlled Variables: A Model-Based Approach to Determining the Perceptual Basis of Behavior

BA: What the rat actually experiences is a series of irregularly spaced shocks. A perceptual input function that gives rise to a perception of shock probability would have to do something equivalent to computing the average shock rate over time, probably by means of a leaky integration of the inter-shock intervals. (This would weight the more recent intervals more heavily in determining current perceived shock probability.)

RM: Right. The equations that define the possible values of q.i  – p.s= int(x=1 to infinity)(A((X-N/r.p*)/N/r.p*)) and r.s = p.s/I – are not models of the way the nervous system (the perceptual functions) of the rat actually computes these variables. They are just definitions of the hypothetical controlled input quantity, q.i, as either p.s or r.s.Â

BA: I did not present a “much simpler way to compute� the rat’s perception of shock probability, because Bill’s formula does not present the input function, it presents the environmental feedback function. Geez, Rick, this is control theory 101. I’m surprised that you are so confused about it.

RM: Â You are right that Bill’s formula does not represent the input function and if I said (or implied) that it does then I was wrong, But you are wrong to say that the formula is the environmental feedback function. It’s that and much more; it’s a definition of q.i as probability of shock, p.s, or rate of shock, r.s.Â

BA: As for my statement that “there may not be a single environmental variable that corresponds to qi,â€? I might have been clearer there. In some cases there is a direct correspondence between a perception and a single environmental variable qi. In other cases p depends on more than one environmental variable, in which case there is no single entity in the environment corresponding to qi. Instead, qi represents a specific combination of environmental variables as determined by the input function.Â

RM: This is exactly what I have been saying. I just think that the case where p depends on a single q.i, if it occurs at all, only occurs for the lowest level perceptual types – intensity and sensation. The kind of perceptions that are the basis of the most interesting things people do – perceptions of configurations, sequences, events, relationships, programs, principles, system concepts – obviously represent  (as you so nicely put it) specific combinations of environmental variables as determined by the input functions.Â

RM: Maybe we can leave this now on this nice note of agreement!

Best regards

Rick

RM: the idea of thinking that the perceptual signal is a function of – rather than equivalent to – q.i, suggests that Powers was proposing that the environment (not the living control system itself) has computed a hierarchy of q.i’s, from sensation q.i’s to system concept q.i’s, that are out there to be detected by our perceptual systems. That would mean that when we study the hierarchy of control we are studying how the environment arranges itself into things to be perceived rather than the perceptual functions of organisms that organize (construct) the environments into the perceptions in which we carry out our purposes. I’m sticking with the idea that Bill was proposing a hierarchy of perceptual functions, not a hierarchy of environmental variables of varying degrees of complexity.Â

BA: But nobody has made that claim, except evidently in your imagination.

RM: Yes, it is in my imagination. I imagined that it is the only way that you can claim that the perceptual variable is a function of qi.

Â

BA: You didn’t need to resort to imagination as I have presented my position clearly enough in previous posts. All you had to do was read them and carefully follow the reasoning. Why don’t you give it a try?

Â

RM: If this is not the case, please write the pseudo code for a system that controls, say, the area of a circle and show me how q.i fits into that control loop. That would really help me understand what you’re talking about.Â

Â

BA:Â OK, here it is:Â

Â

p = f(qi), where f is the perceptual input function, p is the perception of the circle’s area, and qi is the actual area of the circle as objectively measured.

Â

BA:  I really don’t need any more code than that. I don’t need to show how one might adjust or control that area, as the perceptual function works the same whether the circle’s area is being controlled or not. Note that p = f(qi), not p = qi as you have previously claimed.

Â

Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery