What is revolutionary about PCT?

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.09.19.1801 ET)]

···

Well argued, Martin.

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

On Sep 19, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

  [Martin Taylor

2017.09.14.13.11]

  reposted 2017.09.19.17.25




  PCT is revolutionary. Let's take that as a starting point. But

what makes it so is less easy to understand.

  One could look at the effects that might be expected if it was

widely accepted. Would anything change much? If a lot of things
would change drastically, then that would be a reason for calling
it revolutionary. But if just slipping it in “under the hood” as
it were, in the way one can change software modules without
changing their interface to the world, should it then be called
“revolutionary”? I can’t prove it, but my belief is that PCT is
revolutionary in this sense.

  Another approach might be to consider whether acceptance of PCT

would change ways of looking at problems in different domains that
are usually considered unrelated. The “Behavioural Illusion” might
flag this possibility. If effects are first examined as possibly
being caused by people controlling certain perceptions, then
approaches to solutions for problems created by those effects
might be quite different from the approaches that treat people as
pawns in a greater game. The “Behavioural illusion” is only one
indicator of this possibility. Maybe PCT could offer an approach
to solutions for problems that seem to have no solution. Then it
would be revolutionary. I believe PCT is indeed revolutionary in
this second sense, but again I can’t prove it other than by
pointing to a few examples, which really is no proof.

  A third approach (which merges into the fourth) is whether PCT

uses a different and simpler approach to explaining data than
comparative theories that claim to explain the same data.
Comparing, say, Predictive Coding Theory or “Ethogram Theory” with
PCT, the former start with the data and try to explain it,
deriving mechanism from the observations. PCT starts with a
mechanism and predicts the data, using the observations to fix
parameter values that are required by the mechanism. The
difference is like that between an observational science such as
astronomy, in which the objects of study cannot be influenced but
the researcher, and an experimental science like physics, where
the researcher’s main tool is to influence the objects of study.
On this ground also, I think PCT is revolutionary.

  A fourth approach (and the one that seems most persuasive to me)

is the Ockham’s Razor approach, which looks at the theory itself
rather than its influence on the conceptual world in which it
lives. I believe this one can be argued more rigorously as
demonstrating the revolutionary nature of PCT.

  Occam's Razor (Okham, Ogham, ... Nobody worried much about

spelling a few hundred years ago), is a basic scientific principle
that has been considered “a nice idea”, but that can be put on a
firm analytic footing. A 45-year-old working paper (which
prefigures Kolmogorov uncertainty) is at
mmtaylor.net/Academic/ockham.html . The modern form of the Razor
balances the range over which a theory claims to describe and
predict data, the precision with which it describes or predicts
the data it claims to do, and the complexity that is needed to
explain the theory beyond the background knowledge of the person
to whom it must be explained. This last, which links the
acceptance of a theory to the culture background of the person who
does or does not accept it, is often the most important, and it is
the basis for the familiar expression of the Razor — when two
theories explain the same data, the simpler is to be preferred.

  The word "simple" seems simple, as do its relatives. But they

really are not. What seems simple to me may not be simple to you,
or to a person brought up having to hunt for food. To the latter,
a trail may be simple, whereas to you and me it consists of a
complex pattern of bent grass, shifted sand grains, broken twigs,
and the like. A theory that depends on harmonic spectral analysis
would be simple for someone well versed in calculus, complex for a
student beginning to understand differentiation, and
incomprehensibly complicated to the hunter for food. Is the idea
that the perception of pitch is related to the placement of
spectral peaks on a frequency scale simple or complex? That
depends on who you are and what you have learned already. So
Ogham’s Razor is person-specific, and similarly specific to
numbers of people with similar cultural backgrounds.

  By itself, the surface simplicity of a theory is not enough to

make it a preferred theory. For example, the theory “That’s the
way God made it” fits well with the background knowledge of many
people, and has done so down through the millennia. It is indeed
very simple to almost everyone, and on that basis maybe it should
be preferred. But complexities emerge even in that “simple”
theory, at least if the theory is to be accepted outside a
well-delimited circle. For example, which God was it who made it
that way, and what is the scope of his/her power? For people
within the same circle, these are things they have already
learned, and the theory is simple, but for others, the explanation
of the correct God’s properties and prowess may be complicated,
and may directly contradict what the target person already
“knows”.

  Even in its simple form as understood by members of the

appropriate sect, “That’s the way God made it” does not describe
any data beyond what was actually observed, and predicts very few
if any future observations with any accuracy. Over the millennia
other theories perhaps less wide-ranging and requiring education
in order to make them simple, but that describe and predict data
beyond what was directly observed, have come to be preferred by
large numbers of people. For example, Newtonian or Einsteinian
gravity serve better than does a theory that imputes the fall of
an apple to “natural affinity” of the apple for the earth because
when the apple falls, it might generate a new tree. The affinity
of a thrown ball to the earth must have a separate kind of
rationale, such as that they are both round and have a natural
affinity for each other.

  So, what is a "revolution" in science? from the Occam's Razor

point of view I would argue that a theory is revolutionary if it
simultaneously has a wider range of claim than other theories that
explain some of the same data, is more precise in explaining at
least some of the data, and is at the same time simpler to
describe to a wider range of people than popular theories.

  I believe PCT is revolutionary in this sense, as it lays claim to

explain not only laboratory experiments but also the observed
actions of all living things, not only singly, but in groups of
interacting organisms – the sociosphere, the ecosphere, the
political sphere, and the like. It is easy to describe in terms
that people generally understand (“You act to make the world more
as you would like to see it”) and easily elaborated from that
simple statement to deal with specialized situations. Even the
simple basic statement is more precise than “That’s the way God
made it”, because once you know what someone wants the world to be
like, you can say something about what the person is likely and
unlikely to do if they actually do anything.

  If a theory has much generality, it requires various parameters to

explain the data observed in specific circumstances. If it is very
specific, it requires relatively few. In some area, specialized
theories may describe the data more precisely, but to do so, they
add complexity to their descriptions. You don’t have to read many
specialized books to get the basic idea of hierarchical perceptual
control, but you have to do a lot of study if you want to
understand how the brain might solve huge systems of simultaneous
equations on the fly when the person wants to pour and drink a cup
of coffee (as is proposed by some versions of predictive coding
theory). Overall, Ogham’s Razor suggests that PCT is a
revolutionary theory that ought to be considered as a basis for
matters that have to do with the behaviour of living organisms.

  I proposed four reasons, any one of which would be sufficient to

claim something to be revolutionary. I believe PCT satisfies all
four criteria, individually and collectively.

  Martin

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.14.13.11]
reposted 2017.09.19.17.25

PCT is revolutionary. Let's take that as a starting point. But what makes it so is less easy to understand.

One could look at the effects that might be expected if it was widely accepted. Would anything change much? If a lot of things would change drastically, then that would be a reason for calling it revolutionary. But if just slipping it in "under the hood" as it were, in the way one can change software modules without changing their interface to the world, should it then be called "revolutionary"? I can't prove it, but my belief is that PCT is revolutionary in this sense.

Another approach might be to consider whether acceptance of PCT would change ways of looking at problems in different domains that are usually considered unrelated. The "Behavioural Illusion" might flag this possibility. If effects are first examined as possibly being caused by people controlling certain perceptions, then approaches to solutions for problems created by those effects might be quite different from the approaches that treat people as pawns in a greater game. The "Behavioural illusion" is only one indicator of this possibility. Maybe PCT could offer an approach to solutions for problems that seem to have no solution. Then it would be revolutionary. I believe PCT is indeed revolutionary in this second sense, but again I can't prove it other than by pointing to a few examples, which really is no proof.

A third approach (which merges into the fourth) is whether PCT uses a different and simpler approach to explaining data than comparative theories that claim to explain the same data. Comparing, say, Predictive Coding Theory or "Ethogram Theory" with PCT, the former start with the data and try to explain it, deriving mechanism from the observations. PCT starts with a mechanism and predicts the data, using the observations to fix parameter values that are required by the mechanism. The difference is like that between an observational science such as astronomy, in which the objects of study cannot be influenced but the researcher, and an experimental science like physics, where the researcher's main tool is to influence the objects of study. On this ground also, I think PCT is revolutionary.

A fourth approach (and the one that seems most persuasive to me) is the Ockham's Razor approach, which looks at the theory itself rather than its influence on the conceptual world in which it lives. I believe this one can be argued more rigorously as demonstrating the revolutionary nature of PCT.

Occam's Razor (Okham, Ogham, ... Nobody worried much about spelling a few hundred years ago), is a basic scientific principle that has been considered "a nice idea", but that can be put on a firm analytic footing. A 45-year-old working paper (which prefigures Kolmogorov uncertainty) is at mmtaylor.net/Academic/ockham.html. The modern form of the Razor balances the range over which a theory claims to describe and predict data, the precision with which it describes or predicts the data it claims to do, and the complexity that is needed to explain the theory beyond the background knowledge of the person to whom it must be explained. This last, which links the acceptance of a theory to the culture background of the person who does or does not accept it, is often the most important, and it is the basis for the familiar expression of the Razor — when two theories explain the same data, the simpler is to be preferred.

The word "simple" seems simple, as do its relatives. But they really are not. What seems simple to me may not be simple to you, or to a person brought up having to hunt for food. To the latter, a trail may be simple, whereas to you and me it consists of a complex pattern of bent grass, shifted sand grains, broken twigs, and the like. A theory that depends on harmonic spectral analysis would be simple for someone well versed in calculus, complex for a student beginning to understand differentiation, and incomprehensibly complicated to the hunter for food. Is the idea that the perception of pitch is related to the placement of spectral peaks on a frequency scale simple or complex? That depends on who you are and what you have learned already. So Ogham's Razor is person-specific, and similarly specific to numbers of people with similar cultural backgrounds.

By itself, the surface simplicity of a theory is not enough to make it a preferred theory. For example, the theory "That's the way God made it" fits well with the background knowledge of many people, and has done so down through the millennia. It is indeed very simple to almost everyone, and on that basis maybe it should be preferred. But complexities emerge even in that "simple" theory, at least if the theory is to be accepted outside a well-delimited circle. For example, which God was it who made it that way, and what is the scope of his/her power? For people within the same circle, these are things they have already learned, and the theory is simple, but for others, the explanation of the correct God's properties and prowess may be complicated, and may directly contradict what the target person already "knows".

Even in its simple form as understood by members of the appropriate sect, "That's the way God made it" does not describe any data beyond what was actually observed, and predicts very few if any future observations with any accuracy. Over the millennia other theories perhaps less wide-ranging and requiring education in order to make them simple, but that describe and predict data beyond what was directly observed, have come to be preferred by large numbers of people. For example, Newtonian or Einsteinian gravity serve better than does a theory that imputes the fall of an apple to "natural affinity" of the apple for the earth because when the apple falls, it might generate a new tree. The affinity of a thrown ball to the earth must have a separate kind of rationale, such as that they are both round and have a natural affinity for each other.

So, what is a "revolution" in science? from the Occam's Razor point of view I would argue that a theory is revolutionary if it simultaneously has a wider range of claim than other theories that explain some of the same data, is more precise in explaining at least some of the data, and is at the same time simpler to describe to a wider range of people than popular theories.

I believe PCT is revolutionary in this sense, as it lays claim to explain not only laboratory experiments but also the observed actions of all living things, not only singly, but in groups of interacting organisms -- the sociosphere, the ecosphere, the political sphere, and the like. It is easy to describe in terms that people generally understand ("You act to make the world more as you would like to see it") and easily elaborated from that simple statement to deal with specialized situations. Even the simple basic statement is more precise than "That's the way God made it", because once you know what someone wants the world to be like, you can say something about what the person is likely and unlikely to do if they actually do anything.

If a theory has much generality, it requires various parameters to explain the data observed in specific circumstances. If it is very specific, it requires relatively few. In some area, specialized theories may describe the data more precisely, but to do so, they add complexity to their descriptions. You don't have to read many specialized books to get the basic idea of hierarchical perceptual control, but you have to do a lot of study if you want to understand how the brain might solve huge systems of simultaneous equations on the fly when the person wants to pour and drink a cup of coffee (as is proposed by some versions of predictive coding theory). Overall, Ogham's Razor suggests that PCT is a revolutionary theory that ought to be considered as a basis for matters that have to do with the behaviour of living organisms.

I proposed four reasons, any one of which would be sufficient to claim something to be revolutionary. I believe PCT satisfies all four criteria, individually and collectively.

Martin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.20.1205)]Â

I’m re-posting this brief reply to Martin’s post because because I posted it last night and it hasn’t shown up in the archive. So here goes again (with small corrections):

···

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

  [Martin Taylor

2017.09.14.13.11]

  reposted 2017.09.19.17.25



  MT: PCT is revolutionary. Let's take that as a starting point. But

what makes it so is less easy to understand…

RM: Congratulations on finally getting it posted. Since this was originally subtitled “Part 1” I assume that this is the first of two parts. Is that true? If so, I’ll wait to comment until after the second part is posted. If not, I won’t wait; I know that others on the net must be waiting for my comments on this with trembling anticipation. I know I am.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.20.15.11]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.20.1205)]

        I'm re-posting this brief reply to Martin's post because

because I posted it last night and it hasn’t shown up in the
archive. So here goes again (with small corrections):

I guess that means you didn't read either of the "Part 1" versions

you tried to repost for me. This is the whole thing, as I guess you
would have known if you had read it as far as the signature. I had
four separate reasons for considering PCT to be revolutionary, and
the message contains all four.

Martin

···

                              [Martin

Taylor 2017.09.14.13.11]

                              reposted 2017.09.19.17.25



                                                            MT: PCT is revolutionary. Let's

take that as a starting point. But what
makes it so is less easy to
understand…

                      RM: Congratulations on finally getting it

posted. Since this was originally subtitled
“Part 1” I assume that this is the first of
two parts. Is that true? If so, I’ll wait to
comment until after the second part is posted.
If not, I won’t wait; I know that others on
the net must be waiting for my comments on
this with trembling anticipation. I know I am.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.20.1245)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.20.15.11)–

MT: I guess that means you didn't read either of the "Part 1" versions

you tried to repost for me.

RM: No, it means that when I saw “Part 1” in the title of those early, unsuccessfully posted posts I thought there was  going to be another part coming. I did indeed read the whole post that was called Part 1, which is, indeed, the same as what you just posted (without the Part 1 in the subject line), so I will reply as soon as I can cobble something together since the revolutionary nature of PCT Is a topic that is quite dear to my heart.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

This is the whole thing, as I guess you

would have known if you had read it as far as the signature. I had
four separate reasons for considering PCT to be revolutionary, and
the message contains all four.

Martin

–

                      RM: Congratulations on finally getting it

posted. Since this was originally subtitled
“Part 1” I assume that this is the first of
two parts. Is that true? If so, I’ll wait to
comment until after the second part is posted.
If not, I won’t wait; I know that others on
the net must be waiting for my comments on
this with trembling anticipation. I know I am.

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.20.16.02]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.20.1245)]

That's weird. I posted a "Part 1" that included the first few

paragraphs of a three-approach version of the whole thing, and when
that didn’t work I posted a version with only the first two
paragraphs. I wonder where a “Part 1” that included a complete
version with all four approaches came from.

Anyway, I apologise for maligning you and assuming you hadn't read

all four approaches.

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.20.15.11)–

            MT: I guess that means you didn't read either of

the “Part 1” versions you tried to repost for me.

          RM: No, it means that when I saw "Part 1" in the title

of those early, unsuccessfully posted posts I thought
there was going to be another part coming. I did indeed
read the whole post that was called Part 1, which is,
indeed, the same as what you just posted (without the Part
1 in the subject line), so I will reply as soon as I can
cobble something together since the revolutionary nature
of PCT Is a topic that is quite dear to my heart.

                                    RM: Congratulations on

finally getting it posted. Since
this was originally subtitled
“Part 1” I assume that this is
the first of two parts. Is that
true? If so, I’ll wait to
comment until after the second
part is posted. If not, I won’t
wait; I know that others on the
net must be waiting for my
comments on this with trembling
anticipation. I know I am.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.22.1830)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.14.13.11)–

  reposted 2017.09.19.17.25



  MT: PCT is revolutionary. Let's take that as a starting point. But

what makes it so is less easy to understand.

RM: Actually, what makes it revolutionary is quite easy to understand once you have actually participated in the revolution; that is, when you have stood beside Powers and watched the hostility to his ideas expressed by his target audience: scientific psychologists. As Bill noted in his “World According to PCT” paper: “The massive opposition from some quarters and
the passive resistance from others came as a disappointing surprise, but
perhaps it shouldn’t have”. I’ve experienced the same massive opposition and passive resistance to my work as well and it’s pretty easy to see why it occurs. Bill explains why in that same essay:Â

BP: Scientists are not stupid. They can look at an idea and quickly work
out where it fits in with existing knowledge and where it doesn’t. **And scientists
are all too human: when they see that the new idea means their life’s work
could end up mostly in the trash-can, their second reaction is simply to think
“That idea is obviously wrong.”**Â [Emphasis mine]
Â

RM: So what makes PCT revolutionary is what makes anything revolutionary: it overthrows the established order, which in the case of PCT is the established order of the social and behavioral sciences in general and scientific psychology in particular. So people who have power and or prestige in that established order will actively or passively oppose the change.Â

RM: The reason why PCT overthrows the established order – the reason it is revolutionary – is described in my paper “You say you had a revolution”, reprinted in “Doing Research on Purpose” (https://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554) and available at:

 Â

https://www.dropbox.com/s/i22j56akb4btlu5/RevolutionPub.pdf?dl=0

RM: The established order is based on a causal model of behavior; PCT shows that the use of this model is based on a misunderstanding of an observation; the apparent causal relationship between the stimulus input to and motor output from an organism. There is, indeed, a relationship between these variables but PCT shows that it is not causal (that’s what Powers’ 1978 Psych Review paper is about); rather, this apparent causal relationship is part of a closed-loop control process that is aimed at maintaining a perceptual (controlled) variable in a reference state, protected from the effects of disturbance (stimulus) variables.Â

RM: The upshot of this apparently esoteric little fact is that many of the observations that are considered to be fundamental facts of behavior in “establishment” scientific psychology are neither fundamental nor facts; things like reinforcement, fixed action patterns, the power law of movement, invariant movement trajectories, the serial position curve, and so on (the task of filling up the list I’d rather leave to you). Clearly, there are many people who have a vested interest in one or another of these observations being fundamental facts so the idea that they are not is going to be considered a threat to be resisted forcefully. The result is that PCT is either rejected as “obviously wrong” or “passively resisted” in the sense that it is turned into something that doesn’t reject a favorite “fundamental fact”; I think “passive resistance” to a revolutionary idea is also called “co-opting”.Â

RM: So PCT is definitely revolutionary, which is what is best about it and what is worst about it. To paraphrase Dickens description of a different revolution: It is the best of theories, it is the worst of theories…

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.22.23.02]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.22.1830)]

I don't know if you intend to disagree with me, or are supporting

what I said by offering an example of how its revolutionary nature
plays out in the “hostile” reaction of people who have invested
their lives in doing things in ways on which PCT improves, just as
F=Gm₁m₂/r² improves on Ptolemaic
epicycles or even Keplerian ellipses.

PCT predicts that hostility, does it not? When people oppose a

disturbance by an identifiable person to a controlled perception,
“hostility” is not an unlikely perception from the viewpoint of the
disturber. It’s an effect of PCT being revolutionary, in any of my
first three senses. To put in a few words each of those first three
reasons: (1) Things change if you look at them through PCT
spectacles, (2) PCT changes the way to look at problems in a wide
range of domains, and (3) PCT throws out basing mechanism on a need
to fit data. All together, these three reasons say, to quote Rick: “* RM: So what makes PCT
revolutionary is what makes anything revolutionary: it
overthrows the established order*.” Yes, indeed.

I understand both of his perceptions, having felt them myself on

CSGnet. And no, it shouldn’t have.

Oh, I think it is wider-ranging than that.

It's very misleading to say that PCT isn't.

To say so immediately puts PCT into the realm of non-physical magic,

and therefore not worth investigating further. When someone who
might otherwise be interested reads that PCT is non-causal, why
would they want to look into it any further? PCT is most definitely
physical. The basic concepts and analyses are derived from
engineering. Every single link in a control loop is causal. PCT is a
definitely causal model of behaviour, and as such is fully within
the realm of normal science.

The real point is that control is an *emergent property* of

the loop structure, not available to any of its components. It’s
that emergent property that is unavailable to “that established
order”, and that gives PCT its wide range of power and simplicity of
description (my fourth reason for considering it “revolutionary”).
Another reason for hostility is the reliance of PCT on a property
that cannot emerge from the “established models”, and that therefore
might seem to be Arthur-Clarkian (?) “magic”.

Yes, it is. It is completely determined by causal processes. The

Psych Review paper is not about proclaiming PCT to be magic. It’s
about explaining what might otherwise seem to be magic.

Exactly. A closed loop is totally causal. You are barking up the

wrong tree.

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.14.13.11)–

                reposted 2017.09.19.17.25



                MT: PCT is revolutionary. Let's take that as a

starting point. But what makes it so is less easy to
understand.

          RM: Actually, what makes it revolutionary is quite easy

to understand once you have actually participated in the
revolution; that is, when you have stood beside Powers and
watched the hostility to his ideas expressed by his target
audience: scientific psychologists.

As Bill noted in his “World According to PCT” paper: " The massive
opposition from some quarters and
the passive resistance from others came as a
disappointing surprise, but
perhaps it shouldn’t have".

…
RM: So what makes
PCT revolutionary is what makes anything
revolutionary: it overthrows the established order,
which in the case of PCT is the established order of
the social and behavioral sciences in general and
scientific psychology in particular. So people who
have power and or prestige in that established order
will actively or passively oppose the change.

…
RM: The
established order is based on a causal model of
behavior;

              PCT shows that

the use of this model is based on a misunderstanding
of an observation; the apparent causal relationship
between the stimulus input to and motor output from an
organism. There is, indeed, a relationship between
these variables but PCT shows that it is not causal
(that’s what Powers’ 1978 Psych Review paper is
about);

rather, this
apparent causal relationship is part of a closed-loop
control process that is aimed at maintaining a
perceptual (controlled) variable in a reference state,
protected from the effects of disturbance (stimulus)
variables.

[DagArchive]

[From Dag Forssell (2017.09.23.1015 PDT)]

[Rick Marken (2017.09.22.1830)]

...

observations that are considered to be fundamental facts of behavior in "establishment" scientific psychology are neither fundamental nor facts; things like reinforcement, fixed action patterns, the power law of movement, invariant movement trajectories, the serial position curve, and so on

For purposes of discussing this with normal people, surely we can put together a list that tells the story...

Reinforcement, Behavior modification, Affordances, ...

Where in the PCT literature has this already been discussed?

Best, Dag

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.23.1145)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.22.23.02)-

MT: I don't know if you intend to disagree with me, or are supporting

what I said by offering an example of how its revolutionary nature
plays out in the “hostile” reaction of people who have invested
their lives in doing things in ways on which PCT improves, just as
F=Gm₁m₂/r² improves on Ptolemaic
epicycles or even Keplerian ellipses.

RM: I was just offering my interpretation of what makes PCT revolutionary, and it’s certainly not because PCT provides an improved explanation of the phenomena people have invested their lives in trying to explain. It’s because PCT shows that many of these phenomena are actually irrelevant (or illusory) side-effects of a phenomenon the these people don’t even know exists: the phenomenon of control.Â

MT: PCT predicts that hostility, does it not?

RM: It sure does.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

When people oppose a

disturbance by an identifiable person to a controlled perception,
“hostility” is not an unlikely perception from the viewpoint of the
disturber. It’s an effect of PCT being revolutionary, in any of my
first three senses. To put in a few words each of those first three
reasons: (1) Things change if you look at them through PCT
spectacles, (2) PCT changes the way to look at problems in a wide
range of domains, and (3) PCT throws out basing mechanism on a need
to fit data. All together, these three reasons say, to quote Rick: “* RM: So what makes PCT
revolutionary is what makes anything revolutionary: it
overthrows the established order*.” Yes, indeed.

I understand both of his perceptions, having felt them myself on

CSGnet. And no, it shouldn’t have.

Oh, I think it is wider-ranging than that.

It's very misleading to say that PCT isn't.

To say so immediately puts PCT into the realm of non-physical magic,

and therefore not worth investigating further. When someone who
might otherwise be interested reads that PCT is non-causal, why
would they want to look into it any further? PCT is most definitely
physical. The basic concepts and analyses are derived from
engineering. Every single link in a control loop is causal. PCT is a
definitely causal model of behaviour, and as such is fully within
the realm of normal science.

The real point is that control is an *emergent property* of

the loop structure, not available to any of its components. It’s
that emergent property that is unavailable to “that established
order”, and that gives PCT its wide range of power and simplicity of
description (my fourth reason for considering it “revolutionary”).
Another reason for hostility is the reliance of PCT on a property
that cannot emerge from the “established models”, and that therefore
might seem to be Arthur-Clarkian (?) “magic”.

Yes, it is. It is completely determined by causal processes. The

Psych Review paper is not about proclaiming PCT to be magic. It’s
about explaining what might otherwise seem to be magic.

Exactly. A closed loop is totally causal. You are barking up the

wrong tree.

Martin

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: Actually, what makes it revolutionary is quite easy

to understand once you have actually participated in the
revolution; that is, when you have stood beside Powers and
watched the hostility to his ideas expressed by his target
audience: scientific psychologists.

As Bill noted in his “World According to PCT” paper: " The massive
opposition from some quarters and
the passive resistance from others came as a
disappointing surprise, but
perhaps it shouldn’t have".

…
RM: So what makes
PCT revolutionary is what makes anything
revolutionary: it overthrows the established order,
which in the case of PCT is the established order of
the social and behavioral sciences in general and
scientific psychology in particular. So people who
have power and or prestige in that established order
will actively or passively oppose the change.

…
RM: The
established order is based on a causal model of
behavior;

              PCT shows that

the use of this model is based on a misunderstanding
of an observation; the apparent causal relationship
between the stimulus input to and motor output from an
organism. There is, indeed, a relationship between
these variables but PCT shows that it is not causal
(that’s what Powers’ 1978 Psych Review paper is
about);

rather, this
apparent causal relationship is part of a closed-loop
control process that is aimed at maintaining a
perceptual (controlled) variable in a reference state,
protected from the effects of disturbance (stimulus)
variables.Â

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.23.1155)]

···

Dag Forssell (2017.09.23.1015 PDT)–

RM: observations that are considered to be fundamental facts of behavior in “establishment” scientific psychology are neither fundamental nor facts; things like reinforcement, fixed action patterns, the power law of movement, invariant movement trajectories, the serial position curve, and so on
…

DF: For purposes of discussing this with normal people, surely we can put together a list that tells the story…

RM: Yes indeed. It would be great if people on CSGNet could contribute to that list and we could discuss why each suggestions should or should not be on the list.

DF: Reinforcement, Behavior modification, Affordances, …

DF: Where in the PCT literature has this already been discussed?

RM: I think a search through the csgnet archives should turn up some great stuff. Let’s get that list going!

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.23.14.52]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.23.1145)]

Why does what other people do or don't know influence what PCT can

or cannot explain? If the observations of these illusory phenomena
are consistent, PCT should be able to explain why, what is being
controlled for which they are side-effects, what about the
environment makes these side-effects happen so consistently, and so
forth. If their non-PCT explanations explain the phenomena to their
satisfaction, and PCT doesn’t, they and those they teach will not
perceive PCT to be the better theory. If PCT is confronted with a
consistently observed phenomenon that seems related to behaviour and
PCT cannot account for it, that makes PCT seem less likely to be a
valid theory. To blow it off and say “it’s just a side-effect” or
“an illusion” doesn’t make matters any better, especially if a
competing theory presents reasons why these observations occur the
way they do.

I suspect all scientists believe that all current theories are

deficient, and could be improved as approximations to the unknowable
truth of the way the world works. I believe Ockham’s Razor is our
best tool for judging how good a theory is. But in the end, Ockham’s
razor itself depends on what a person already knows. To convince
someone who understands, say, reinforcement theory, that
reinforcement simply does not occur, you have to offer some
fundamentals that are simple in terms of that person’s background
and that then let PCT seem as simple as what they already “knew” in
explaining the observations on which their belief in reinforcement
are based.

It's not good enough to say "You are wrong, because ***I***
know the way the world works, and it isn't what ***you***
think."

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.22.23.02)-

                            MT: I don't know if you intend to disagree with

me, or are supporting what I said by offering an example
of how its revolutionary nature plays out in the
“hostile” reaction of people who have invested their
lives in doing things in ways on which PCT improves,
just as F=Gm₁m₂/r²
improves on Ptolemaic epicycles or even Keplerian
ellipses.

          RM: I was just offering my interpretation of what makes

PCT revolutionary, and it’s certainly not because PCT
provides an improved explanation of the phenomena people
have invested their lives in trying to explain. It’s
because PCT shows that many of these phenomena are
actually irrelevant (or illusory) side-effects of a
phenomenon the these people don’t even know exists: the
phenomenon of control.

                        RM: Actually, what makes it revolutionary

is quite easy to understand once you have
actually participated in the revolution;
that is, when you have stood beside Powers
and watched the hostility to his ideas
expressed by his target audience: scientific
psychologists.

            MT: PCT predicts that hostility, does it not?

RM: It sure does.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

            When people oppose a

disturbance by an identifiable person to a controlled
perception, “hostility” is not an unlikely perception
from the viewpoint of the disturber. It’s an effect of
PCT being revolutionary, in any of my first three
senses. To put in a few words each of those first three
reasons: (1) Things change if you look at them through
PCT spectacles, (2) PCT changes the way to look at
problems in a wide range of domains, and (3) PCT throws
out basing mechanism on a need to fit data. All
together, these three reasons say, to quote Rick: “* RM: So what
makes PCT revolutionary is what makes anything
revolutionary: it overthrows the established order* .”
Yes, indeed.

             I understand both of his perceptions, having

felt them myself on CSGnet. And no, it shouldn’t have.

            Oh, I think it is wider-ranging than that.

            It's very misleading to say that PCT isn't.

            To say so immediately puts PCT into the realm of

non-physical magic, and therefore not worth
investigating further. When someone who might otherwise
be interested reads that PCT is non-causal, why would
they want to look into it any further? PCT is most
definitely physical. The basic concepts and analyses are
derived from engineering. Every single link in a control
loop is causal. PCT is a definitely causal model of
behaviour, and as such is fully within the realm of
normal science.

            The real point is that control is an *                  emergent

property* of the loop structure, not available to
any of its components. It’s that emergent property that
is unavailable to “that established order”, and that
gives PCT its wide range of power and simplicity of
description (my fourth reason for considering it
“revolutionary”). Another reason for hostility is the
reliance of PCT on a property that cannot emerge from
the “established models”, and that therefore might seem
to be Arthur-Clarkian (?) “magic”.

             Yes, it is. It is completely determined by

causal processes. The Psych Review paper is not about
proclaiming PCT to be magic. It’s about explaining what
might otherwise seem to be magic.

            Exactly. A closed loop is totally causal. You

are barking up the wrong tree.

                Martin

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                  "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
  Â
            Â
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

                        As Bill noted in his "World According to

PCT" paper: " The
massive opposition from some quarters and
the passive resistance from others came as
a disappointing surprise, but perhaps it
shouldn’t have".

…
RM:
So what makes PCT revolutionary is what
makes anything revolutionary: it
overthrows the established order, which
in the case of PCT is the established
order of the social and behavioral
sciences in general and scientific
psychology in particular. So people who
have power and or prestige in that
established order will actively or
passively oppose the change.

…
RM:
The established order is based on a
causal model of behavior;

                            PCT

shows that the use of this model is
based on a misunderstanding of an
observation; the apparent causal
relationship between the stimulus input
to and motor output from an organism.
There is, indeed, a relationship between
these variables but PCT shows that it is
not causal (that’s what Powers’ 1978
Psych Review paper is about);

                            rather, this apparent causal

relationship is part of a closed-loop
control process that is aimed at
maintaining a perceptual (controlled)
variable in a reference state, protected
from the effects of disturbance
(stimulus) variables.Â

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.24.1135)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.23.14.52)–

MT: Why does what other people do or don't know influence what PCT can

or cannot explain? If the observations of these illusory phenomena
are consistent, PCT should be able to explain why, what is being
controlled for which they are side-effects, what about the
environment makes these side-effects happen so consistently, and so
forth.

RM: PCT does explain it. It explains why we see things as being reinforcing, or as a caused output, or as a power law relationship between velocity and curvature of movement, etc. PCT shows that these phenomena are side-effects of control. So PCT shows what is being controlled, what it is about the environment that makes these side-effects happen (if it’s the environment that is involved), and so forth. Read the modeling section of my power law paper to see what I mean.Â

MT: If their non-PCT explanations explain the phenomena to their

satisfaction, and PCT doesn’t, they and those they teach will not
perceive PCT to be the better theory.

RM: Of course PCT doesn’t explain the phenomena to their satisfaction. Their explanations are based on the assumption that these phenomena reflect something important about how living systems work while PCT says that these phenomena are side-effects what is most important about how living systems work: they control.Â

Â

MT: If PCT is confronted with a

consistently observed phenomenon that seems related to behaviour and
PCT cannot account for it, that makes PCT seem less likely to be a
valid theory.

RM: I agree. But so far, to my knowledge, that has never occurred. Â

Â

MT: To blow it off and say "it's just a side-effect" or

“an illusion” doesn’t make matters any better, especially if a
competing theory presents reasons why these observations occur the
way they do.

RM: It’s not “blowing it off” when it can be clearly shown that the phenomenon is a side-effect or an illusion. And if you are talking about the power law of movement the only competing theories I have seen that account for this phenomenon are open loop models that are easily shown to be wrong by introducing disturbances while the movement is being produced.

MT: I suspect all scientists believe that all current theories are

deficient, and could be improved as approximations to the unknowable
truth of the way the world

RM: PCT is a revolutionary theory, not because it is a better theory than existing theories but because it is a true paradigm shift, in the Kuhnian sense. It is a shift from viewing behavior in cause-effect (or, if you prefer, input-output) terms to viewing it as a control process. This change in paradigm means that many of what are considered the fundamental observations of scientific psychology are actually side-effects of control (see Powers, 1978).

RM: Finding better theories is not a revolutionary process; it’s a fundamental part of the way science is done. The effort to find improved theories will happen in the PCT paradigm just as it has in the  input-output paradigm. But the theories in the PCT paradigm will explain phenomena that don’t even exist in the input-output paradigm (like controlled variables and the reference states thereof). And it will explain many of the phenomena held dear in the input-output paradigm as side-effect of the process of control.Â

MT: It’s not good enough to say “You are wrong, because I
know the way the world works, and it isn’t what you
think.”

RM: Which is why I never say that; I just demonstrate it.

BestÂ

RickÂ

Martin

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: I was just offering my interpretation of what makes

PCT revolutionary, and it’s certainly not because PCT
provides an improved explanation of the phenomena people
have invested their lives in trying to explain. It’s
because PCT shows that many of these phenomena are
actually irrelevant (or illusory) side-effects of a
phenomenon the these people don’t even know exists: the
phenomenon of control.

            MT: PCT predicts that hostility, does it not?

RM: It sure does.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

            When people oppose a

disturbance by an identifiable person to a controlled
perception, “hostility” is not an unlikely perception
from the viewpoint of the disturber. It’s an effect of
PCT being revolutionary, in any of my first three
senses. To put in a few words each of those first three
reasons: (1) Things change if you look at them through
PCT spectacles, (2) PCT changes the way to look at
problems in a wide range of domains, and (3) PCT throws
out basing mechanism on a need to fit data. All
together, these three reasons say, to quote Rick: “* RM: So what
makes PCT revolutionary is what makes anything
revolutionary: it overthrows the established order* .”
Yes, indeed.

             I understand both of his perceptions, having

felt them myself on CSGnet. And no, it shouldn’t have.

            Oh, I think it is wider-ranging than that.

            It's very misleading to say that PCT isn't.

            To say so immediately puts PCT into the realm of

non-physical magic, and therefore not worth
investigating further. When someone who might otherwise
be interested reads that PCT is non-causal, why would
they want to look into it any further? PCT is most
definitely physical. The basic concepts and analyses are
derived from engineering. Every single link in a control
loop is causal. PCT is a definitely causal model of
behaviour, and as such is fully within the realm of
normal science.

            The real point is that control is an *                  emergent

property* of the loop structure, not available to
any of its components. It’s that emergent property that
is unavailable to “that established order”, and that
gives PCT its wide range of power and simplicity of
description (my fourth reason for considering it
“revolutionary”). Another reason for hostility is the
reliance of PCT on a property that cannot emerge from
the “established models”, and that therefore might seem
to be Arthur-Clarkian (?) “magic”.

             Yes, it is. It is completely determined by

causal processes. The Psych Review paper is not about
proclaiming PCT to be magic. It’s about explaining what
might otherwise seem to be magic.

            Exactly. A closed loop is totally causal. You

are barking up the wrong tree.

                Martin

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                  "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
  Â
            Â
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

                        As Bill noted in his "World According to

PCT" paper: " The
massive opposition from some quarters and
the passive resistance from others came as
a disappointing surprise, but perhaps it
shouldn’t have".

…
RM:
So what makes PCT revolutionary is what
makes anything revolutionary: it
overthrows the established order, which
in the case of PCT is the established
order of the social and behavioral
sciences in general and scientific
psychology in particular. So people who
have power and or prestige in that
established order will actively or
passively oppose the change.

…
RM:
The established order is based on a
causal model of behavior;

                            PCT

shows that the use of this model is
based on a misunderstanding of an
observation; the apparent causal
relationship between the stimulus input
to and motor output from an organism.
There is, indeed, a relationship between
these variables but PCT shows that it is
not causal (that’s what Powers’ 1978
Psych Review paper is about);

                            rather, this apparent causal

relationship is part of a closed-loop
control process that is aimed at
maintaining a perceptual (controlled)
variable in a reference state, protected
from the effects of disturbance
(stimulus) variables.Â

[_Boris_Hartman]

Down

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 23, 2017 3:29 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: What is revolutionary about PCT?

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.22.1830)]

Martin Taylor (2017.09.14.13.11)–
reposted 2017.09.19.17.25

MT: PCT is revolutionary. Let’s take that as a starting point. But what makes it so is less easy to understand.

RM: Actually, what makes it revolutionary is quite easy to understand once you have actually participated in the revolution; that is, when you have stood beside Powers and watched the hostility to his ideas expressed by his target audience: scientific psychologists.

HB : Now you can imagine how hard work I had persuading you as psychologist that PCT is right way not RCT. It’s hard to persuade somebody that has formed oppinion about how Living World function.

Boris

As Bill noted in his “World According to PCT” paper: “The massive opposition from some quarters and the passive resistance from others came as a disappointing surprise, but perhaps it shouldn’t have”. I’ve experienced the same massive opposition and passive resistance to my work as well and it’s pretty easy to see why it occurs. Bill explains why in that same essay:

BP: Scientists are not stupid. They can look at an idea and quickly work out where it fits in with existing knowledge and where it doesn’t. And scientists are all too human: when they see that the new idea means their life’s work could end up mostly in the trash-can, their second reaction is simply to think “That idea is obviously wrong.” [Emphasis mine]

RM: So what makes PCT revolutionary is what makes anything revolutionary: it overthrows the established order, which in the case of PCT is the established order of the social and behavioral sciences in general and scientific psychology in particular. So people who have power and or prestige in that established order will actively or passively oppose the change.

RM: The reason why PCT overthrows the established order – the reason it is revolutionary – is described in my paper “You say you had a revolution”, reprinted in “Doing Research on Purpose” (https://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554) and available at:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/i22j56akb4btlu5/RevolutionPub.pdf?dl=0

RM: The established order is based on a causal model of behavior; PCT shows that the use of this model is based on a misunderstanding of an observation; the apparent causal relationship between the stimulus input to and motor output from an organism. There is, indeed, a relationship between these variables but PCT shows that it is not causal (that’s what Powers’ 1978 Psych Review paper is about); rather, this apparent causal relationship is part of a closed-loop control process that is aimed at maintaining a perceptual (controlled) variable in a reference state, protected from the effects of disturbance (stimulus) variables.

RM: The upshot of this apparently esoteric little fact is that many of the observations that are considered to be fundamental facts of behavior in “establishment” scientific psychology are neither fundamental nor facts; things like reinforcement, fixed action patterns, the power law of movement, invariant movement trajectories, the serial position curve, and so on (the task of filling up the list I’d rather leave to you). Clearly, there are many people who have a vested interest in one or another of these observations being fundamental facts so the idea that they are not is going to be considered a threat to be resisted forcefully. The result is that PCT is either rejected as “obviously wrong” or “passively resisted” in the sense that it is turned into something that doesn’t reject a favorite “fundamental fact”; I think “passive resistance” to a revolutionary idea is also called “co-opting”.

RM: So PCT is definitely revolutionary, which is what is best about it and what is worst about it. To paraphrase Dickens description of a different revolution: It is the best of theories, it is the worst of theories…

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[DagArchive]

[From Dag Forssell (2017.09.28.16:10 PDT)]

I have formatted Martin's short essay (slightly edited by Martin for clarity and to remove typos) here:

http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/intro_papers/other_pct.html

Best, Dag

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.28.2200)]

···

Dag Forssell (2017.09.28.16:10 PDT)

I have formatted Martin’s short essay (slightly edited by Martin for clarity and to remove typos) here:

http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/intro_papers/other_pct.htm

RM: In that paper Martin says:Â

MT: So, what is a “revolutionâ€? in science? From the
Occam’s Razor point of view I would argue that a
theory is revolutionary if it simultaneously has a
wider range of claim than other theories that explain
some of the same data, is more precise in predicting
at least some of the data…

RM: So all a theory has to do to be revolutionary is “claim” these things? I think you must mean that a theory is revolutionary if it can be shown that the theory can explain a wider range of existing data more precisely (and, I presume, more parsimoniously)  than can existing theories. I think it would strengthen your argument if you could give some detailed examples of PCT explaining existing data more parsimoniously than the current theories that account for that data.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.29.12.47]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.28.2200)]

I suggest you read the message again, to see what is actually the

claim. For example, predictive coding theory does not claim to say
anything about trees and bacteria, whereas PCT claims to do so.

If the brief summary of Occam's Razor was inadequate (as it probably

was), you could get a more complete explanation by checking out the
link. There you will find just how parsimony, precision, and breadth
of claim work together as one in producing an Ockham’s Razor
criterion for the relative validity of theories in some person’s
mind.

There you hit on the propaganda problem. As I guess you already

know, since you have read the message, and perhaps the linked
working paper, what is parsimonious for one person could be very
complex for another, so you have to have three things in any
example: What are the observations, what is the competing
explanation (along with its range of claim), and who are you talking
to. There’s no absolute about this. The “revolution” ( really don’t
much like that word) occurs when a lot of people change their mind
about whether theory A is better then theory B from an Occam’s Razor
point of view. PCT seems parsimonious because it is built on
numerous replications of the same structure, put together in a
moderately well-defined way that is independent of what kind of data
or what kind of organism you are talking about, where most competing
theories either have a restricted range of claim about what data
they propose to explain or about what organisms they expect the
theory to work with.

Parsimony isn't about one dataset, unless that dataset encompasses

the whole range of claim of all the competing theories. It’s about
not having to make special provision when you are trying to explain
datasets that might to other theories seem unrelated. As you already
know, I guess, since you appear to have read the message quoted by
Dag, and maybe the working paper linked therein.

Martin

···

Dag Forssell (2017.09.28.16 :10
PDT)

          I have formatted Martin's short essay (slightly edited by

Martin for clarity and to remove typos) here:

          [http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/intro_papers/other_pct.htm](http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/intro_papers/other_pct.html)

RM: In that paper Martin says:Â

          MT: So, what is a

“revolution� in science? From the
Occam’s Razor point of view I would argue that a
theory is revolutionary if it simultaneously has a
wider range of claim than other theories that explain
some of the same data, is more precise in predicting
at least some of the data…

          RM: So all a theory has to do to be revolutionary is

“claim” these things?

          I think you must mean that a theory is revolutionary if

it can be shown  that the theory can explain a
wider range of existing data more precisely (and, I
presume, more parsimoniously)Â Â than can existing theories.

          I think it would strengthen your argument if you could

give some detailed examples of PCT explaining existing
data more parsimoniously than the current theories that
account for that data.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                  "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
  Â
            Â
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.29.1255)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.29.12.47)–

MT: I suggest you read the message again, to see what is actually the

claim.

RM: What I question is not what is claimed but the idea that “claiming”, in itself, is all a theory has to do to be revolutionary.Â

MT: If the brief summary of Occam's Razor was inadequate (as it probably

was), you could get a more complete explanation by checking out the
link. There you will find just how parsimony, precision, and breadth
of claim work together as one in producing an Ockham’s Razor
criterion for the relative validity of theories in some person’s
mind.

RM:Â No, your summary Occam’s Razor was perfectly adequate. Again, what I question is not what ican be claimed based on Occam’s Razor but, rather, the idea that claiming alone can make a theory revolutionary.Â

MT: There you hit on the propaganda problem. As I guess you already

know, since you have read the message, and perhaps the linked
working paper, what is parsimonious for one person could be very
complex for another, so you have to have three things in any
example: What are the observations, what is the competing
explanation (along with its range of claim), and who are you talking
to. There’s no absolute about this. The “revolution” ( really don’t
much like that word) occurs when a lot of people change their mind
about whether theory A is better then theory B from an Occam’s Razor
point of view. PCT seems parsimonious because it is built on
numerous replications of the same structure, put together in a
moderately well-defined way that is independent of what kind of data
or what kind of organism you are talking about, where most competing
theories either have a restricted range of claim about what data
they propose to explain or about what organisms they expect the
theory to work with.

MT: Parsimony isn't about one dataset, unless that dataset encompasses

the whole range of claim of all the competing theories. It’s about
not having to make special provision when you are trying to explain
datasets that might to other theories seem unrelated. As you already
know, I guess, since you appear to have read the message quoted by
Dag, and maybe the working paper linked therein.

RM: But I thought you said that you find PCT to be revolutionary. So what I would like to know is what did you find PCT to explain more parsimoniously than other theories. What, in other words, convinced you that PCT is revolutionary? Just one or two examples will do.Â

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          MT: So, what is a

“revolutionâ€? in science? From the
Occam’s Razor point of view I would argue that a
theory is revolutionary if it simultaneously has a
wider range of claim than other theories that explain
some of the same data, is more precise in predicting
at least some of the data…

          RM: So all a theory has to do to be revolutionary is

“claim” these things?

          RM: I think you must mean that a theory is revolutionary if

it can be shown  that the theory can explain a
wider range of existing data more precisely (and, I
presume, more parsimoniously)Â Â than can existing theories.

          RM: I think it would strengthen your argument if you could

give some detailed examples of PCT explaining existing
data more parsimoniously than the current theories that
account for that data.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.09.29.17.28]

[From Rick Marken (2017.09.29.1255)]

Siiighhh...

Where on earth did you get that idea? I guess it must be stuck in

your head, like your nonsense idea about the power law, and nothing
is going to dislodge it. Given prior history, I don’t see any point
in continuing this discussion until you do in fact read what you say
you have read.

(1) That tracking a cursor on a screen and successful psychotherapy

can have the same explanation.

(2) That this very same explanation deals with the intricacies of

conversation, the design of human-computer interfaces, and with the
reasons for formal rituals.

That's two (or five, if you prefer). One explanation, where at least

five different theories with different intellectual backgrounds
would otherwise be used. OK?

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.29.12.47)–

            MT: I suggest you read the message again, to see

what is actually the claim.

RM: What I question is not what is claimed but
the idea that “claiming”, in itself, is all a theory has
to do to be revolutionary.

                        MT: So,

what is a “revolution� in science? From the
Occam’s Razor point of view I would argue
that a theory is revolutionary if it
simultaneously has a wider range of claim
than other theories that explain some of the
same data, is more precise in predicting at
least some of the data…

                        RM: So all a theory has to do to be

revolutionary is “claim” these things?

…

          RM: But I thought you said that you find PCT to be

revolutionary. So what I would like to know is what did
you find PCT to explain more parsimoniously than other
theories. What, in other words, convinced you that PCT is
revolutionary? Just one or two examples will do.Â

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.10.01.1220)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.09.29.17.28]

MT: Where on earth did you get that idea?

RM: from this:Â

RM: What I question is not what is claimed but
the idea that “claiming”, in itself, is all a theory has
to do to be revolutionary.Â

MT:…a theory is revolutionary if it simultaneously has a wider range of claim than other theories that explain some of the same data… [Emphasis mine]
Â

MT: I guess it must be stuck in

your head, like your nonsense idea about the power law,

RM: My nonsense idea about the power law is simply that it is an obvious side-effect of control (obvious to anyone who understands PCT). The mathematics in my (and Dennis Shaffer’s) paper on the power law (Marken, R. and Shaffer, D. (2017)
The Power Law of Movement: An Example of a Behavioral Illusion, Experimental Brain Research, 235,
1835–1842) explain why this power law is consistently found using rregression analysis. By the way, I have not heard back from anyone regarding the letter you wrote to the editors of Experimental Brain Research purporting to explain why our analysis was wrong. So I will apparently not get an opportunity to publicly rebut your critique. If I don’t hear from the journal editors before the end of the this month I’ll post my rebuttal to CSGNet. But I’d rather publish my rebuttal in the journal so I’d appreciate it if you could nudge the editors about getting your criticism of our paper published.Â

MT: (1) That tracking a cursor on a screen and successful psychotherapy

can have the same explanation.

RM: Behaviorists think that pressing a bar in a Skinner box and psychotherapy (in the form of behavior modification) have the same explanation. Doesn’t that make behaviorism revolutionary in your book as well.

Â

MT: (2) That this very same explanation deals with the intricacies of

conversation, the design of human-computer interfaces, and with the
reasons for formal rituals.

RM: Cognitive psychologists think that information processing models of mind/behavior explain the intricacies of conversation, the design of human/computer interfaces (see Don Norman) and the reasons for formal rituals. By your criteria, the cognitive revolution really was indeed a revolution, contrary to my argument in the “Revolution” paper I posted (Marken,
R. S. (2009) You Say You Had a Revolution: Methodological Foundations of
Closed-Loop Psychology, *Review of General
Psychology,*13, 137-145).

RM: I think your reasons for seeing PCT as revolutionary are just ways to keep it from being truly revolutionary. I think PCT is revolutionary for the same reason Powers thought it was; PCT is revolutionary because, as Powers says in the following quote, it shows that “…the very basis of experimental psychology breaks down…”

Â

"The correlation between a controlled quantity and either its
associated disturbance or the handle position is normally lower than .1; a
well-practiced subject will frequently produce a correlation of zero to two
significant figures. At the same time, the correlation between magnitude of
disturbance and handle position is normally higher than .99 (I can often reach .998
in the simpler experiments). To appreciate the meaning of these figures, one
has to remember that the subject cannot sense any of the disturbances except
through their effects on the input quantities, the cursor positions.
Â

If the controlled input quantity shows a correlation of
essentially zero with the behavior, any standard experimental design would
reject it as contributing nothing to the variance of behavior. But the
disturbance that contributes essentially 100% of the variance of the behavior
can act on the organism only via the variable that shows no significant
correlation with behavior. Not only the old cause-effect model breaks down when
one is dealing with an N system, the very basis of experimental psychology
breaks down also." [emphasis mine]Â (Powers, W. T. (1978) Quantitative analysis of purposive systems: Some spadework at the foundations of experimental psychology, Psychological Review, 417-435).Â

RM: I think it is the fact that you have never been able (or, perhaps, never wanted) to see the revolutionary nature of PCT in these terms that leads you to say things like my idea about the power law is nonsense. That’s the way the establishment views all revolutionary scientific ideas. As nonsense. Plate tectonics anyone? You’re old road is rapidly fadin’. Get out of the new one if you can’t lend a hand.

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: But I thought you said that you find PCT to be

revolutionary. So what I would like to know is what did
you find PCT to explain more parsimoniously than other
theories. What, in other words, convinced you that PCT is
revolutionary? Just one or two examples will do.Â