What's perception got to do, got to do, with it?

CSGnet Archive CSG2015
1

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control, then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular). That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled. You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

···

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

2

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

3

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0935)]

···

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:13 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output).

RM: Well, at least you read and replied to it. So good on ya, Boris. But if you have time I would be interested to hear what you think is an example of behavior (output) that does not involve a reference.

Best

Rick

»Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

4

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.12.08:20 ET)]

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

The sticking point here appears to be the word "objectively".
The only workable definition of objectivity that I know is intersubjective agreement. The Test for the controlled variable (TCV) establishes intersubjective agreement between the observer and the subject. This does not 'prove' that anything is objectively so in Reality. It is only an approximation; the closest approximation to doing so that I know of.

The TCV is related to collective control. The TCV depends upon a slight degree of conflict as the investigator disturbs a variable that the subject is controlling. If the conflict were to persist, with the investigator controlling a particular value, one outcome could be that the state of the variable would become stabilized at a value intermediate between the subject's reference value and the investigator's reference value. This is one way that collective control establishes stabilities about which there is intersubjective agreement. Of course, in the TCV the disturbance persists only long enough for the investigator to establish intersubjective agreement with the subject as to the subject's reference value for the controlled perception. The subject 'knows' what value is desired (though this is not necessarily conscious knowledge), and now the investigator does too (consciously).
In Rick's example, he said that the video data are 'objective'. This means that they are accessible to intersubjective agreement, because anyone can look at the video and the screen captures from the video and measure the pixel distances between the knot and the target. This depends in turn upon a number of collectively controlled perceptions that establish common knowledge about what video cameras are, how they make video images, etc. These in turn depend upon a vast interconnected web of other collectively controlled perceptions--all of human culture--including in particular the collectively controlled perceptions that constitute the language with which we are talking about this.
We could be all fooling one another. We have no way of 'proving' the ultimate Reality of any of it. We rely upon the stability of such perceptions because, in order to get on with living, we must. We especially must rely upon the stability of such perceptions in order to live with one another.

···

/Bruce

5

[From Bruce Nevin (2015.11.12.17:05 ET)]

Rick Marken (2015.11.12.1315) –

BN: The Test for the controlled variable (TCV) establishes intersubjective agreement between the observer and the subject.

RM: Actually it’s intersubjective agreement between the observer and another observer.

Both, if there’s a second observer, or if the subject is also observing. (It could be a way of becoming aware of your own CV.) But my point is the intersubjective agreement between the Tester and the subject. More explicitly, on one side are the subject’s controlled perception & reference value for it, and on the other side are the Tester’s imagined perceptions of what the subject’s controlled perception & reference value are from the subject’s point of view. These imagined perceptions are inferred from the Tester’s real-time (not imagined) perceptions from the Tester’s point of view.

···

On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 4:16 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.12.1315)]

RM: Right! That’s the one I use.

RM: Actually it’s intersubjective agreement between the observer and another observer.

RM: Good point! That’s why an important (though rarely mentioned) aspect of The Test is to use disturbances that are not overwhelming. That is, don’t “win” the conflict. When you do, the subject loses control so there is no controlled variable to discover;-)

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Bruce Nevin (2015.11.12.08:20 ET)

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

BN: The sticking point here appears to be the word “objectively”.

BN: The only workable definition of objectivity that I know is intersubjective agreement.

BN: The Test for the controlled variable (TCV) establishes intersubjective agreement between the observer and the subject.

BN: The TCV is related to collective control. The TCV depends upon a slight degree of conflict as the investigator disturbs a variable that the subject is controlling.

In Rick’s example, he said that the video data are ‘objective’. This means that they are accessible to intersubjective agreement, because anyone can look at the video and the screen captures from the video and measure the pixel distances between the knot and the target. This depends in turn upon a number of collectively controlled perceptions that establish common knowledge about what video cameras are, how they make video images, etc. These in turn depend upon a vast interconnected web of other collectively controlled perceptions–all of human culture–including in particular the collectively controlled perceptions that constitute the language with which we are talking about this.

We could be all fooling one another. We have no way of ‘proving’ the ultimate Reality of any of it. We rely upon the stability of such perceptions because, in order to get on with living, we must. We especially must rely upon the stability of such perceptions in order to live with one another.

/Bruce

6

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.12.1315)]

···

RM: Right! That’s the one I use.

RM: Actually it’s intersubjective agreement between the observer and another observer.

RM: Good point! That’s why an important (though rarely mentioned) aspect of The Test is to use disturbances that are not overwhelming. That is, don’t “win” the conflict. When you do, the subject loses control so there is no controlled variable to discover;-)

Best

Rick

–

Bruce Nevin (2015.11.12.08:20 ET)

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

BN: The sticking point here appears to be the word “objectively”.

BN: The only workable definition of objectivity that I know is intersubjective agreement.

BN: The Test for the controlled variable (TCV) establishes intersubjective agreement between the observer and the subject.

BN: The TCV is related to collective control. The TCV depends upon a slight degree of conflict as the investigator disturbs a variable that the subject is controlling.

In Rick’s example, he said that the video data are ‘objective’. This means that they are accessible to intersubjective agreement, because anyone can look at the video and the screen captures from the video and measure the pixel distances between the knot and the target. This depends in turn upon a number of collectively controlled perceptions that establish common knowledge about what video cameras are, how they make video images, etc. These in turn depend upon a vast interconnected web of other collectively controlled perceptions–all of human culture–including in particular the collectively controlled perceptions that constitute the language with which we are talking about this.

We could be all fooling one another. We have no way of ‘proving’ the ultimate Reality of any of it. We rely upon the stability of such perceptions because, in order to get on with living, we must. We especially must rely upon the stability of such perceptions in order to live with one another.

/Bruce

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

7

[Martin Taylor 2015.11.12.23.21]

Here you get into an infinite recursion. Objectively (!) how can

anyone determine that there exists agreement between one observer
and another? Or any other intersubjective agreement? All that anyone
involved in the agreement can determine is that so far as they can
see, the other person appears to agree with them. There’s no way to
determine (in a finite time) that they are correct. The situation is
even worse for a third-party. It’s the old problem of “real
reality”. The best one can do is determine that when one controls a
perception successfully, the world is acting as though it were as it
is perceived to be.
When the perception is not of a complex property of an inanimate
world, but of the inside of another complicated control structure,
the problem is MUCH worse. “Intersubjective agreement” is just one
of those nice words that apply to idyllic logical structures that
only approximate what the world of perception seems to be, not
something that can be observed or experienced, except as a crude and
possibly completely misleading approximation.
The TCV may, but collective control does not.
True.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.12.1315)]

              Bruce Nevin (2015.11.12.08:20

ET)

                      HB

: How can anything be »objectivelly«
determined through someones perception. Is
this again one of yours »thought construct« ?
So are you saying that you can »see« reality
directly ?

              BN: The sticking point here

appears to be the word “objectively”.

              BN: The only workable

definition of objectivity that I know is
intersubjective agreement.

RM: Right! That’s the one I use.

              BN: The Test for the controlled

variable (TCV) establishes intersubjective agreement
between the observer and the subject.

          RM: Actually it's intersubjective agreement between the

observer and another observer.

              BN: The TCV is related to

collective control. The TCV depends upon a slight
degree of conflict as the investigator disturbs a
variable that the subject is controlling.

          RM: Good point! That's why an important (though rarely

mentioned) aspect of The Test is to use disturbances that
are not overwhelming. That is, don’t “win” the conflict.
When you do, the subject loses control so there is no
controlled variable to discover;-)

8

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1430)]

···

Martin Taylor 2015.11.12.23.21]

MT: Here you get into an infinite recursion. Objectively (!) how can

anyone determine that there exists agreement between one observer
and another?

RM: I do it by asking if they agree with me. But I presume you mean how can you be sure that when we both agree that,say, the book cover is “red” that we are both having the same experience of color. And you can’t know you are agreeing on that. But I don’t really care about that. It doesn’t really matter if you see what I would call “blue” when I see “red” as long as we consistently agree that we are seeing the same thing.

Best

Rick

Or any other intersubjective agreement? All that anyone

involved in the agreement can determine is that so far as they can
see, the other person appears to agree with them. There’s no way to
determine (in a finite time) that they are correct. The situation is
even worse for a third-party. It’s the old problem of “real
reality”. The best one can do is determine that when one controls a
perception successfully, the world is acting as though it were as it
is perceived to be.

When the perception is not of a complex property of an inanimate

world, but of the inside of another complicated control structure,
the problem is MUCH worse. “Intersubjective agreement” is just one
of those nice words that apply to idyllic logical structures that
only approximate what the world of perception seems to be, not
something that can be observed or experienced, except as a crude and
possibly completely misleading approximation.

The TCV may, but collective control does not.

True.



Martin

–

          RM: Actually it's intersubjective agreement between the

observer and another observer.

              BN: The TCV is related to

collective control. The TCV depends upon a slight
degree of conflict as the investigator disturbs a
variable that the subject is controlling.

          RM: Good point! That's why an important (though rarely

mentioned) aspect of The Test is to use disturbances that
are not overwhelming. That is, don’t “win” the conflict.
When you do, the subject loses control so there is no
controlled variable to discover;-)

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble