That is the set of connections in one small part of the world. Nothing in
the connections specifies everything that will happen when one or two
persons use the handles.
ยทยทยท
========================================
[Rick]
I was trying to read Hans as saying that a controlled variable
could be the cooperative result of controlling by 2 or more
control systems. I think that's what is happening in Tom's
experiment -- is it not? The pattern of the three lines is, indeed,
a controlled variable, and control of that variable requires that
the two parties involved control -- and control a particular
variable each. So there is a controlled variable that is the result
of collective action. Of course, the two people don't become a
control system, but their individual controlling controls the
position of the three lines.
[Tom]
Yes, and they can select another pattern of the three lines, in which case
each person will necessarily adopt a different reference perception for part
of the new intended pattern.
[Rick]
I was thinking that, by my definition of flockess as the set of between
individual distances, flockness is, indeed, controlled. The set of
distances are controlled, and they are controlled at values which
depend on the controlling done by each individual.
[Tom]
But, unlike my people, who KNOW they are "making a pattern of three lines,"
members of a flock need not have such an awareness or intention concerning
"being in a flock."
[Rick]
This is where I might be wrong; maybe by that definition "flocking" is
still emergent.
[Tom]
See above.
[Rick]
... Is the line pattern in Tom's experiment a controlled
variable? Does control of that variable depend on the controlling done
by a collective? Is flocking a controlled variable by my definition?
[Tom]
What if I do the task with my own two hands? Or what if I use a moused
version of the task and do it with one hand? Or a mouse-on-a-stick (I
intend to patent and franchise!) and do it with one joint (this is starting
to sound REALLY good!)? Is the line still controlled? Can we draw a line
(a division) between any of these permutations and the two-person
cooperative task?
In all of the one-person variations, there is no doubt the line is
controlled. In the two-person runs, my two people have always known the
"superordinate" goal. But what if one person knew the big picture and only
told the second person, "just keep this line even with that one." Would the
second person be participating in "keeping three lines in a row?"
The REAL social factors begin to pop out, for me, when I think of the
*entire set* of permutations. Some are social, some are not. In some, the
big picture is controlled, in others, not so for all participants.
=================================
Back to the present:
Whether three-in-a-row is a controlled variable, or an unintended
by-product of control of other variables, depends on the intentions and
perceptions of the control systems. This seemingly innocuous task is rich
with implications for several presumably independent areas of study,
ranging from social science on one extreme to neuroscience on another.
When one person performs (say the person is me -- TB) "I" control the three
lines and keep them in a row - - -, or in some other pattern of "my"
chosing: _
_ _ _ _
_ or _ _ or _ ...
My actions control two different relationships (middle re right; and middle
re left) that are necessary to the production of the "big" pattern. But
where do "I" fit in to the picture? Where am I, neurologically? "I" have a
clear understanding of what I intend, and of whether I see what I intend. I
know that I can achieve the intended result by moving the handles, or the
mouse, depending on the version of the program that is running. But by
conventional neurological theory, the brain areas responsible for producing
the appropriate movements differ across the various one-person
implementations mentioned in the post to Rick. Two completely
independent control systems can achieve the same results that "I" achieve --
two simple single-loop PCT models can do it. What, and where, "I" am becomes
less and less clear to me when I think about these demonstrations. (Hans, I
usually go out of my way to say that a person can be represented by two
independent PCT models, not that a person is two such systems. The same
style applies when there are two people, and two models. The people can be
modeled by, or as if they were, two exceedingly simple PCT systems.)
When two people perform the task, the results can be identical to those
produced by one person, but for different reasons. Each person controls
the relationship between two of the lines, and each might know and try to
control a perception of the three lines in a particular relationship. Or
each might control only the relationship between two of the lines and neither
know or care about the relationship among all three. Or one person might
know and control the relationship among the three lines, by directly
controlling the relationship between two, and by telling the other person to
control the relationship between two -- the second person remaining ignorant
of the first person's overall goal.
Only when a person who acts alone, or at least one of two people who act
together, perceives and adopts an intended value for
three-lines-in-a-particular-configuration does line-ness become a controlled
variable. In all other cases, it is an unintended, perhaps unperceived, side
effect of the control of other variables.
The same is true of flockness.
Of course, given an organism, or model, or artificial control device with
sufficiently complex perceptual functions, a previously uncontrolled
variable can be made the object of control. Similarly, given an assemblage
of such systems or organisms, a peviously uncontrolled (incidentally
affected) variable might become the object of collective control. (Hans, if
you want to study the individual, social, and evolutionary
development of control systems, I suggest this simple cooperative tracking
task to you. When you can explain all of its permutations and
implications, you should have gone a long way toward your intended end.
And along the way, non-engineer PCTers might be able to pick the brains of
a control engineer.)
I can offer an example of "emergent" collective control. A few years ago,
during a meeting of the American Society for Cybernetics, a group of CSTers
(the earlier name for PCTers) crowded together in an elevator, on the way to
dinner. Never before had so many CST-PCTers been assembled in any place,
much less one so small as the elevator. Someone (Mary Powers, I believe) in
the group (the gaggle? the flock?) remarked about how many of us there were.
Everyone else agreed -- never before had there been enough of us to fill an
elevator. Not long after that, we began to talk about having our own
meetings. We did, and CSG was born. And CSG begat CSG-L. And here we are.
Identifying our flockness turned it into a controlled variable, for each of
us. From something that had never been a controlled variable, we created
one. We continue to do so, in spite of difficulties or complications
that might otherwise disturb our individual perceptions of
CSG-all-in-one-place. But when it happens, it happens one of us at a
time. There is no CSG-in-the-sky that uses each of us to create the
perception of the CSG flock, the way any one of us can set the reference
signals for the characters in CROWD-GATHER and control our perceptions of
characters in a gaggle. (Not unless Bill has installed some pretty
interesting equipment on his hill in Colorado! Maybe he uses the net to
reset the references every year around this time.) In a few weeks, we will
make it happen again. Hans, why don't you come and see it happen?
[Rick]
So Hans' and my idea that "flockness" is under control (a "collective
controlled variable" by my terminology -- ie. a variable that is
controlled by the collective but not by any individual) is incorrect unless
there is a control system present that is perceiving and acting to influence
this variable.
I second you on this. This is one of the points I made to Hans in my post
(939618.0958) when I said Hans, but not the heating system, controls "a
nice temperature" and that Hans, but not the characters in GATHER-CROWD,
controls a perception of "flockness." And now when individual CSG people
create their own perceptions of the meeting.
[Rick]
Where are the sociologists during this discussion of social control, by
the way? This is where PCT meets sociology. ...
I have been wondering the same thing. Has everyone gone on vacation?
Until later,
Tom Bourbon