Where Do We Go From Here? / Summary

[Erling_O_Jorgensen]

Re: Where Do We Go From Here?
(at least the portions dealing with "keeping a commitment")

[From Erling Jorgensen (991212.0100)]

This is my attempt at condensing the more relevant points that
I think are coming out of this discussion. It is my own
ideosyncratic version, and not a full and fair "summary" of the
thread, as some have hoped would occur from time to time
with complicated threads.

I�ll reference a variety of posts from different participants
in highlighting what I consider helpful insights.

By way of introduction --

Rick Marken (991210.1030)
I like to teach PCT and I continue to imagine that there may
be _someone_ out there who wants to learn this stuff.
...
Don't worry. I'm not flustered by the gaming. I enjoy teaching
to my imaginary audience and I get all my other work done too.

There _are_ those of us who are listening, to *both* sides,
thinking hard about the issues, and learning in the process.
Unfortunately, responding and joining the discussion does not
always allow getting all _my_ other work done too.

Well, into the fray --

Bruce Nevin (991210.1640 EST)--

Rick Marken (991210.1500)

As means of controlling a self-concept, a principle of
keeping commitments or maintaining the reciprocity of reliable
social relationships is controlled by means of some particular
interaction with other people.

And I agree. Commitments are principle perceptions. And, as you
note, we control commitments _as the means_ of controlling
system (social) type perceptions, like "being an American".

I think I would say (with Bruce) that *keeping commitments* is
the principle perception. I believe any given commitment
is closer to a _program_ perception, that says "under this set of
circumstances [I will] do X." Whether I do so "consistently"
or "faithfully" is the principle perception of *keeping my
commitments*.

Just to be clear, the program-commitment that I am thinking
of here is not the one Bjoern raises -- [Bjoern Simonsen
(991211.10:15 EU-time)] -- about going to the RTC if I
disrupt, but the earlier and more basic commitment that
"when other students are trying to learn, I will not disrupt."

But if it is fair to say a given commitment is a particular path of
a program (i.e., "under this set of circumstances [I will] do X"),
I believe (with Rick) that it is well modeled by a spreadsheet
simulation that introduces a constant into a particular control
loop. *Making a commitment* is communicating (at least to
myself, perhaps to others) that that path will be followed in
those circumstances.

This is what Rick mentioned in --

Rick Marken (991208.2130)
I understand "keeping a commitment" to mean keeping a
perceptual variable in some agreed to state. A child who is
keeping a commitment to be quiet in class, say, is
maintaining a perception of his own noise level in an agreed
to state of "quiet". A child who keeps such a commitment
is doing the equivalent of setting the reference value for
one of the intermediate level perceptual variables in my
spreadsheet hierarchy to a constant."

As a side issue, Rick�s particular 3-level spreadsheet doesn�t
quite capture it, because there it is a sensation perception and
not a program perception that is held constant. I agree that
the sensation of voice loudness is part of the implementation
of the commitment, but the commitment itself has to do with
under what circumstances I will do so, and thus a program
perception. Moreover, in Rick�s simulation there are no
input functions or control loops corresponding to principles,
and presumably those would provide the constant reference
signal for the program-commitment. But his demo does
demonstrate the concept of a fixed reference signal, and
how other control loops (especially those above) must then
work around that control loop. That is a useful way to
conceive of "commitments" (IMHO.)

I believe, however, that Bruce N. makes a crucial point that
the "What are you doing?" dialog of RTP, with a potential
follow up dialog of "I see you have chosen..." etc., involves
(or attempts to) the phenomenon we call *going-up-a-level*.

I am not sure if he has made that assertion in so many words,
but that is how I interpret several of his statements. I first got
that sense from the following post:

Bruce Nevin (991201.2343 EST)
The teacher is not watching behavior and inferring intentions,
the teacher is watching a disturbed variable (interference with
students' learning) and referring to a mutual commitment, on
the part of all present, to control that variable. Referring, not
inferring.

The key words for me here are "referring to a mutual [prior
implied] commitment". My understanding is that when the
"rules" are first laid out in a RTP classroom, they are
presented in the context of a "standard" (which I see as a
principle in this setting) that everyone has a right to learn
free from undue disruption. I also thought (though I may be
wrong) that there was an attempt to get everyone to "sign on"
to that principle, as a fair way to run a classroom.

Bruce N. continued in the same post --

One purpose is to teach the students to control the variable
"no disruptions to other students' learning" and to control the
rule "second disruption, then go the the RTC to figure out
how to be in class without disruption." I think the reason for
the verb "choose" was to re-frame "misbehavior" (the disruptions)
as the first step of a constructive program. In this way of
construing events, the student is in charge of carrying out
this program and has taken the first step in doing so.

If each student has already established a (principle-level)
control system capable of perceiving and controling for what
would make a fair classroom, namely, that each student is
free to learn without undue disruption, then the point of the
"What are you doing?" etc. dialogs are to help the student
move up to that level. Once there, then programs other than
disrupting antics can be chosen -- the program level as a
whole is free to vary. This would include *choosing* the
previously established program path "in this learning setting,
do not disrupt," which probably _every_ student is controling
to some degree. [See Bill P.�s point about gain in the thread,
"Purposeful conflict" -- Bill Powers (991201.0933 MDT);
for instance: "It's too easy to think of control either existing
or not existing. Actually, it exists on a continuous scale from
none to perfect." ]

I think this matter of existing control systems in each student
is what Bruce N. is getting at in a later post --

Bruce Nevin (991207.1858 EST)
The intent, as I see it, is to frame events in terms of this
conflict within the child. This conflict is the basis for a
choice. The child resolved the conflict by lowering the gain on
control of "no distractions". The reason for the verb "choose"
is to affirm the child's responsibility for controlling both sides
of the conflict, not just the side that resulted in distracting
someone.

While it may not be the best wording, "I see you have chosen
..." can still lead to the student�s going up a level -- [at least
in an imagination-mode scenario I can think of ].
Teacher: I see you have chosen to go to the RTC room.
Student: No, I haven�t!
Teacher: Haven�t you?? I thought you had agreed not to
disrupt.
Student: Well, ...
Teacher: I�m simply expecting that you�ll keep your word,
either by staying here without disrupting, or by going to the
RTC room so others can learn.

This is also why I think Rick�s point about the fixed reference
is important. The teacher is explicitly asking that the student
maintain that prior commitment at its previously established
level, and find other ways to achieve his/her other goals.

Where I disagree with Rick is in this matter of other available
degrees of freedom, which are not present in the streamlined
teaching tool of his spreadsheet model. I believe this was the
point Bruce Abbott was making --

Bruce Abbott (991210.1450 EST)
A control system employs variable means to achieve a
single end. Example: If the child wants to have Sally laugh
at his joke he can opt to tell the joke to Sally after class
rather than during it. This may accomplish the same end
(if Sally is amused by the joke) while allowing the child to
keep his commitment not to disrupt the class. So a model
of this would just do what control systems always do --
if one means doesn't achieve the end, use another.

Getting back to Bruce N.�s assertion that an up-a-level
phenomenon is involved for the student (or at least attempted
and promoted by the teacher). This is the part that I believe
addresses Rick�s recent question --

Rick Marken (991210.1940)
For example, what
was it about the PCT model that led the developers of RTP to
decide that an important part of the program would be getting
a child to keep a commitment?

I know Ed Ford came the Glasser route. But from hearing
and talking with Ed at either the 1993 or 1994 CSG meeting
in Durango (or both), I believe Ed and other developers /
implementers of RTP realized that the child�s own goals had
to be an essential part of the program. That led (as I understand
it) to the importance of having at least implicit agreement on a
key premise, namely, that students in school have a right to
learn without undue disruptions from other students. I believe
when first implementing the program there is extensive
discussion with students, with a view to committing to that
as a fair principle.

That is the "reorganization process", as I understand it, that
establishes in each student a control system capable of
monitoring (i.e., perceiving and controling) such a principle,
and program control systems *committed* (i.e., locked in,
at least in theory) to �avoiding being a disruption�.

If such does occur, then a process of questions and/or
statements designed to help a student go up a level and
utilize all those control systems, would seem a fair procedure
in a program labelled "Responsible Thinking."

As I said at the beginning, this is a selective sampling and
response to a number of important points that have been
made in this thread, and is simply how I am currently
combining all the pieces.

Thanks to all the contributors. Best to all.
        Erling

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991212.0835 EST)]

Erling Jorgensen (991212.0100) --

This is my attempt at condensing the more relevant points that
I think are coming out of this discussion. It is my own
ideosyncratic version, and not a full and fair "summary" of the
thread, as some have hoped would occur from time to time
with complicated threads.

Thanks Erling -- clear and compelling.

Regards,

Bruce A.

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991212.0809 MDT)]

Erling Jorgensen (991212.0100)--

Ah, the voice of reason enters the discussion, from one who has been there
(up a few levels).

There is a simple question that remains unanswered. Suppose a child has
committed to being quiet so others can learn. If he or she has really
adopted that reference condition, how is it even _possible_ for the child
to be noisy and disrupt the learning of others? Even starting to do so
would cause an immediate error in the child, which would be immediately
corrected -- unless that control system had come into conflict with another
one in the same child that required being noisy to achieve its own ends.
Or, of course, if the committment had never actually been made.

If you think a child has made a committment (as we interpret it in PCT) to
being quiet, then the first time the child becomes noisy you have to revise
your belief, because it has just been disproven. Either the child made no
such committment (despite saying the right words), or there is something
else the child feels is just as important that requires being noisy. In
neither case is it appropriate to reproach the child in any way. This
situation may well call for removing the child to a place where such
problems can be addressed with the help of a counsellor, leaving the
teacher free to go on with his or her job. But it does not call for trying
to make the child feel ashamed for having done something wrong.

The basic problem is to find a level at which the child is not just willing
but eager to agree to a reference condition. Perhaps you could ask, "Would
you like to be able to get along with me, other teachers, and other kids
without being angry or afraid? Would you like us all to be friends?"
Somewhere in there there must be a reference condition already present, or
easily accepted, on which or under which to build a structure that is
socially viable.

Once you and the child agree on what goal the child considers to be at the
highest level (and it may take some work to find out what that is for that
child at that age), the nature of the discipline problem changes
completely. For the child it is no longer a matter of keeping your word
(for reasons only vaguely understood), but of achieving what you really
want. For the teacher or counseller, it is no longer a matter of forcing a
verbal committment out of a child and then holding him or her to it, but of
helping the child see how his actions are going against the highest goal
the child knows about. "Do you still think you would like being friends
with all of us? Well, does hitting Pete help you to be friends with him?"
Of course I don't know what the actual course of counselling would be --
people are different, and you can't use a simple formula to solve all
problems.

Keeping your word just for the same of keeping your word, and obeying rules
just for the sake of obeying rules, are not the point of life. There has to
be a higher reason. And when you find the higher reason, keeping your word
and obeying the rules are no longer of paramount importance. If you think
that loving and being loved by others, helping and being helped by others,
achieving glorious ends together with others, working with others in
synchrony and harmony -- if these things and others like them have a
powerful appeal to you, then you will realize that sticking stubbornly to
your word and slavishly obeying rules can sometimes work directly against
your highest goals. You would not want to do anything to a child that would
make it difficult to choose when and how to obey rules and keep your word.
That would be like sending the child off into the world with one hand tied
behind his back.

Thanks for your summing-up, Erling. It helps.

Best,

Bill P.

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)]

Bill Powers (991212.0809 MDT) --

Erling Jorgensen (991212.0100)

Ah, the voice of reason enters the discussion, from one who has been there
(up a few levels).

How odd to say that. Voices of reason have been in this discussion all
along, you just haven't been listening to them.

If you think a child has made a committment (as we interpret it in PCT) to
being quiet, then the first time the child becomes noisy you have to revise
your belief, because it has just been disproven. Either the child made no
such committment (despite saying the right words), or there is something
else the child feels is just as important that requires being noisy. In
neither case is it appropriate to reproach the child in any way. This
situation may well call for removing the child to a place where such
problems can be addressed with the help of a counsellor, leaving the
teacher free to go on with his or her job. But it does not call for trying
to make the child feel ashamed for having done something wrong.

There is another possibility, Bill. The child, having the best intensions
to keep the commitment, may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of the
moment. Children tend to be impulsive -- for example, running into the
street after a loose ball without looking to see whether a car is coming.
The child may know what to do (check for cars) and why it is important to do
so (avoid being run over) and yet get so focused on retrieving the ball that
these never enter the child's mind. Those for whom the RTP is most needed
are probably those who behave the most impulsively. They will eventually
learn to stop and think first before acting, when each disruption gets
immediately followed by the teacher's reminders. Such reminders are not
designed to "make the child feel ashamed for having done something wrong,"
they are designed to remind the child of the rule (literally, to bring it to
mind) and of what will happen if the child breaks it a second time. After
some repetition of this, the child will begin to remember the rule before
acting, and succeed more often in controlling for not being disruptive.

Regards,

Bruce A.

[Sand_Dollars]

[From Shannon Williams (991212.10:55)

[From Erling Jorgensen (991212.0100)]

Great summary! I would add one comment though-

While it may not be the best wording, "I see you have chosen
..." can still lead to the student�s going up a level -- [at least
in an imagination-mode scenario I can think of ].
Teacher: I see you have chosen to go to the RTC room.
Student: No, I haven�t!

I agree with the student that he has not necessarilychoosen to go to the
RTC room. What may have
happened is that his reference variables for the environment
"kids can learn" is different than the teacher's, and/or he
does not recognize that the current variable that he is
controlling for is disrupting the teacher's version
of the "kid can learn" variable.

I think that it would be more accurate for the teacher
to draw attention to her own discomfort, and then let
the student choose how he will discontinue aggravating
her:

Teacher: How am I suppose to teach if you are
              doing [what you are doing]?
Student: [Silence] or "OK I will sit down"

Shannon

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991212.1117 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)--

There is another possibility, Bill. The child, having the best intensions
to keep the commitment, may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of the
moment.

I don't follow this explanation. What does remembering or forgetting the
comittment mean in terms of a model (any model)? As far as I'm concerned,
the role of consciousness in control processes is unknown. You have emitted
a bunch of words, but I don't know what they mean. What does it mean to
"have" the best intentions if they do not result in perceptions being
brought to the corresponding reference levels? What do you mean by
"temporarily forgetting" the intentions? Is this a mode of brain operation
that needs to be put into the model, or is it there already?

Children tend to be impulsive -- for example, running into the
street after a loose ball without looking to see whether a car is coming.

How does "impulsive" explain why the child runs into the street without
looking? How is this statement different from just saying that children run
into the street without looking? Do they do this because of something in
them called "impulsiveness?" Or does saying they are impulsive just repeat
the statement that they run into the street without looking (for unknown
reasons)?

The child may know what to do (check for cars) and why it is important to do
so (avoid being run over) and yet get so focused on retrieving the ball that
these never enter the child's mind.

What does being "focused on retrieving the ball" mean in terms of a model?
What is that operation? Again, is this something we need to add to the
model? What does "entering the child's mind" mean? Your sentence sounds
like an explanation, but when you get past the sounds of the words, it
doesn't seem to explain anything at all.

Those for whom the RTP is most needed
are probably those who behave the most impulsively. They will eventually
learn to stop and think first before acting, when each disruption gets
immediately followed by the teacher's reminders. Such reminders are not
designed to "make the child feel ashamed for having done something wrong,"
they are designed to remind the child of the rule (literally, to bring it to
mind) and of what will happen if the child breaks it a second time. After
some repetition of this, the child will begin to remember the rule before
acting, and succeed more often in controlling for not being disruptive.

Bruce, don't you see how empty all these statement are? They have no
theoretical value; they're just saying the same thing over again in
different words. If you try to _understand_ this explanation, it dissolves
into a froth of fuzzy words. Where is "mind" such that a rule can be
brought to it? What is a rule, that it can be brought to a mind? How do a
teacher's words do this bringing? What effect does it have on the child's
behavior for a rule to be remembered? What does repetition have to do with
remembering a rule before acting (for example, how does the child know when
an act is about to occur)? You make it all sound so simple, and it is --
until you ask what all these words mean.

It's fine to use communicative common language to describe a situation. But
the next step has to be to reduce that language to a form that gives us a
lead to a theoretical explanation of a kind that could conceivably be
tested. I don't see how to do that with what you've said in this post. If
you can't convert to a technical language, what good are the loose terms of
common conversation?

Best,

Bill P.

[Bruce_Gregory8]

[From Bruce Gregory (991212.1622 EST)]

Bill Powers (991212.1117 MDT)

Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)--

>There is another possibility, Bill. The child, having the best

intensions

>to keep the commitment, may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of

the

>moment.

I don't follow this explanation. What does remembering or forgetting the
comittment mean in terms of a model (any model)? As far as I'm concerned,
the role of consciousness in control processes is unknown.

You know, Bill. It's just like the threat of coercion lurking in the
background.

Bruce Gregory

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991213.1125 EST)]

Bill Powers (991212.1117 MDT) --

Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)

There is another possibility, Bill. The child, having the best intensions
to keep the commitment, may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of the
moment.

I don't follow this explanation. What does remembering or forgetting the
comittment mean in terms of a model (any model)? As far as I'm concerned,
the role of consciousness in control processes is unknown.

I think you know perfectly well what I mean. You make an appointment to see
the doctor, with every intention of going. But two hours after the day and
time of your appointment, you suddenly remember it, too late to go. Do I
need a detailed model of the mechanism before you will admit that people
experience such things?

You have emitted
a bunch of words, but I don't know what they mean. What does it mean to
"have" the best intentions if they do not result in perceptions being
brought to the corresponding reference levels?

To have an intention -- setting a reference for it, e.g., for being at the
doctor's office at 9 am on Thursday, or to be more specific, coming up with
a plan (involving a series of control actions) to be executed at the
appropriate time (Thursday morning).

What do you mean by
"temporarily forgetting" the intentions? Is this a mode of brain operation
that needs to be put into the model, or is it there already?

Temporarily forgetting -- failing to recall the commitment now, but able to
remember it later. This is a common occurrence. Do I need to model it
before you will admit that it happens? Is it in the model? You tell me --
how does HPCT account for it? Or doesn't it?

Children tend to be impulsive -- for example, running into the
street after a loose ball without looking to see whether a car is coming.

How does "impulsive" explain why the child runs into the street without
looking? How is this statement different from just saying that children run
into the street without looking? Do they do this because of something in
them called "impulsiveness?" Or does saying they are impulsive just repeat
the statement that they run into the street without looking (for unknown
reasons)?

"Impulsive" is simply a category name for this sort of behavior. It is not
an explanation. To behave impulsively is to act immediately, without
pausing for due consideration of the situation and possible consequences.

The child may know what to do (check for cars) and why it is important to do
so (avoid being run over) and yet get so focused on retrieving the ball that
these never enter the child's mind.

What does being "focused on retrieving the ball" mean in terms of a model?

The child's limited processing resources are committed to controlling for
retrieving the ball, to the exclusion of certain other high-level processes,
such as controlling for not being run over by a car.

What is that operation? Again, is this something we need to add to the
model?

I think the answer is probably "yes" -- once we have enough data to suggest how.

What does "entering the child's mind" mean?

Coming to conscious attention. Are you saying that in your subjective
experience, you are always aware of everything?

Your sentence sounds
like an explanation, but when you get past the sounds of the words, it
doesn't seem to explain anything at all.

The explanation is framed in terms of common experience, and refers to
well-known phenomena or processes that have been observed subjectively and
whose consequences have been observed objectively. Their physical basis in
the brain remains to be worked out (that is, I can't yet create a physical
model that behaves like this), but that does not make the observed
phenomena/processes any less real.

Those for whom the RTP is most needed
are probably those who behave the most impulsively. They will eventually
learn to stop and think first before acting, when each disruption gets
immediately followed by the teacher's reminders. Such reminders are not
designed to "make the child feel ashamed for having done something wrong,"
they are designed to remind the child of the rule (literally, to bring it to
mind) and of what will happen if the child breaks it a second time. After
some repetition of this, the child will begin to remember the rule before
acting, and succeed more often in controlling for not being disruptive.

Bruce, don't you see how empty all these statement are? They have no
theoretical value; they're just saying the same thing over again in
different words. If you try to _understand_ this explanation, it dissolves
into a froth of fuzzy words. Where is "mind" such that a rule can be
brought to it? What is a rule, that it can be brought to a mind? How do a
teacher's words do this bringing? What effect does it have on the child's
behavior for a rule to be remembered? What does repetition have to do with
remembering a rule before acting (for example, how does the child know when
an act is about to occur)? You make it all sound so simple, and it is --
until you ask what all these words mean.

Those words are grounded in subjective and objective observation, and can be
given precise definitions, as I have tried to do above. The alternative
explanation I offer for the child's failure to successfully control for not
disrupting the class is couched in terms of those well-known phenomena
(e.g., forgetting, attention), for which we are currently lacking a good
physical model. Certainly these processes are not simple, and will require
elaborate models if the phenomena to which they refer are to be successfully
explained. If HPCT does not offer an account of them, then clearly a future
version of HPCT will need to be elaborated to do so.

It's fine to use communicative common language to describe a situation. But
the next step has to be to reduce that language to a form that gives us a
lead to a theoretical explanation of a kind that could conceivably be
tested. I don't see how to do that with what you've said in this post. If
you can't convert to a technical language, what good are the loose terms of
common conversation?

I agree in principle, but that's another issue entirely. Let's not forget
the purpose of my suggestion. It was not to offer a detailed, generative
model that could duplicate the phenomena referenced in my account of the
child's behavior. (If it were, then your criticism would have force, but it
was not.) It was offered to provide a reasonable scenario (consistent with
common subjective experience) whereby the child could fail to control for
not disrupting the class even though he or she intended not to do so. It is
simply not true that the two explanations you offered for the child's
failure to keep a commitment are the only ones possible, and your argument
that one must accept either one or the other fails on that account.

Regards,

Bruce A.

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991213.1400 MDT)]

I think you know perfectly well what I mean. You make an appointment to see
the doctor, with every intention of going. But two hours after the day and
time of your appointment, you suddenly remember it, too late to go. Do I
need a detailed model of the mechanism before you will admit that people
experience such things?

I'm perfectly happy to acknowledge that people experience such things and
describe them as you do. But that's not an explanation or a model of what
is happening. I don't know how an intention can exist but not have any
effect, and then perhaps suddenly start having an effect. Nothing you said
makes that any easier to understand.

Temporarily forgetting -- failing to recall the commitment now, but able to
remember it later. This is a common occurrence. Do I need to model it
before you will admit that it happens? Is it in the model? You tell me --
how does HPCT account for it? Or doesn't it?

Have you tried any models to see if they look plausible? Can you account
for it in _any_ way? Are you sure you're even describing it in the
appropriate terms?

"Impulsive" is simply a category name for this sort of behavior. It is not
an explanation. To behave impulsively is to act immediately, without
pausing for due consideration of the situation and possible consequences.

Well, it's to act immediately -- I don't know how you establish the
"without pausing for due consideration" part.

What does being "focused on retrieving the ball" mean in terms of a model?

The child's limited processing resources are committed to controlling for
retrieving the ball, to the exclusion of certain other high-level processes,
such as controlling for not being run over by a car.

How do you know there are limited processing resources? Isn't that
explanation completely made-up? It's just an extrapolation from digital
computer programming considerations.

What is that operation? Again, is this something we need to add to the
model?

Coming to conscious attention. Are you saying that in your subjective
experience, you are always aware of everything?

I can see we're getting nowhere here. Every time I ask you what the terms
in one description mean, you give me a description of something else. This
is not going to lead to any kind of model. It's just going around and
around in a network of verbal descriptions. I'm not interested in that.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bruce_Gregory]

[From Bruce Gregory (991213.1651 EST)]

Bill Powers (991213.1400 MDT)

I'm perfectly happy to acknowledge that people experience
such things and
describe them as you do. But that's not an explanation or a
model of what
is happening. I don't know how an intention can exist but not have any
effect, and then perhaps suddenly start having an effect.
Nothing you said
makes that any easier to understand.

The fact that you can't model this phenomenon confirms what Marc Abrams
has been saying for a long time. The HPCT model provides no way to
understand how we switch from controlling one variable to controlling
another. This might be a mechanism worth thinking about since without
such a mechanism HPCT will never be of much interest to those dealing
with behavior any more complicated than tracking tasks.

I can see we're getting nowhere here. Every time I ask you
what the terms
in one description mean, you give me a description of
something else. This
is not going to lead to any kind of model. It's just going around and
around in a network of verbal descriptions. I'm not
interested in that.

I think I finally understand why you and Rick are so enamored of
extremely simple models. It's that old hammer and nail story.

Bruce Gregory

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991213.2125 EST)]

Bill Powers (991213.1400 MDT) --

I think you know perfectly well what I mean. You make an appointment to see
the doctor, with every intention of going. But two hours after the day and
time of your appointment, you suddenly remember it, too late to go. Do I
need a detailed model of the mechanism before you will admit that people
experience such things?

I'm perfectly happy to acknowledge that people experience such things and
describe them as you do. But that's not an explanation or a model of what
is happening. I don't know how an intention can exist but not have any
effect, and then perhaps suddenly start having an effect. Nothing you said
makes that any easier to understand.

Nothing you have said does either. But for this limited purpose we don't
need such an explanation. It is sufficient to note that such things do
happen with human beings, and therefore, it may have happened with the
child, especially if we know through other observations that such a thing is
highly likely to occur under conditions like those I described.

Temporarily forgetting -- failing to recall the commitment now, but able to
remember it later. This is a common occurrence. Do I need to model it
before you will admit that it happens? Is it in the model? You tell me --
how does HPCT account for it? Or doesn't it?

Have you tried any models to see if they look plausible? Can you account
for it in _any_ way? Are you sure you're even describing it in the
appropriate terms?

Well, yes. Remember your discussion of content-addressable memory in B:CP?
In the absence of appropriate inputs ("keys") that will activate the
necessary traces, the person will fail to remember even though later, when
such a key is provided (e.g., a "reminder"), the person will then remember.

"Impulsive" is simply a category name for this sort of behavior. It is not
an explanation. To behave impulsively is to act immediately, without
pausing for due consideration of the situation and possible consequences.

Well, it's to act immediately -- I don't know how you establish the
"without pausing for due consideration" part.

I can think of some ways. One way might to ask the child whether it thought
about the possible consequences of its actions, beyond the immediate one of
accomplishing the goal being pursued. Signs of surprise at the outcome,
such as a startle response, might also be employed. I'll bet you can think
of others.

I can see we're getting nowhere here.

That depends on how you define "nowhere." I've established the validity of
my point that the child might simply forget his or her commitment (you have
agreed that such things happen), even if I can't yet model the process that
results in this. That's all I needed to do. So from my point of view we
are making progress -- getting _somewhere_. (Perhaps the problem is that it
is somewhere you do not wish to go.)

Every time I ask you what the terms
in one description mean, you give me a description of something else. This
is not going to lead to any kind of model. It's just going around and
around in a network of verbal descriptions. I'm not interested in that.

So you are just going to ignore the fact that having a detailed model of
this is not necessary to establish the point I was making, and continue to
pretend that it is.

Bill, you've lost the argument; why not admit it? This stonewalling isn't
fooling anybody.

Regards,

Bruce

[Erling_O_Jorgensen]

[From Erling Jorgensen (991213.2030 CST)]

There is an aspect that I have not seen addressed very
much in this discussion. That is the matter of how
RTP commitments and their reasons come to be formed.
I do not mean here the specifics of implementation in
a school or with a group of students. Chuck Tucker
(991201b) has quoted some of the relevant portions of
Ed Ford's writings that pertain to that. I also do not mean
a generalized reference to reorganization. Bruce Abbott
is right that reorganization is involved, both for setting
up commitment control systems and perhaps for
enabling other control systems to maneuver around
the fixed references of those commitments and thus
reestablish their own control. But Bill P. is also right
that if you speak of reorganization, there is no
guarantee for what structure of control emerges.

I am thinking of something different, but I may be
climbing into a can of worms here -- (how's that for
an image!) I believe both Rick and Bill have questioned
the privileged place given to making and keeping
commitments in the RTP program. And I also hear
them focusing on the reasons for making commitments,
and if that is the more important level, then the
commitments themselves must be free to vary.

My question is, how do such reasons come about?
Presumably we are talking here of something like
principles or system concepts. And I do hear Bill
referring to discovering the _existing_ system concepts
of the child, although that may be easier said than done
with a room full of children of whatever age. But at
_some_ age system concepts must be constructed in
the first place, and at various ages new system concepts
are added. So how do those higher levels come about?
[I know, the worms are already starting to gather (8-o).
I did not think this would get so speculative quite this
quickly.]

Let me try to get to the heart of it, and then we can
drop it if it is *only* speculative. Aren't principles
and/or system concepts going to be *constructed*
out of things like commitments, rules, programs, and
other predictable ways of organizing things?? So
doesn't learning how to #1) perceive and #2) control
such things have to *precede* the reasons that will
(later) give them their raison d'etre??

If that is the case, then teaching *how* to a) make
and b) keep a commitment is not such an awful
thing -- despite Rick's protestations to the contrary.
It is the *capability* that is being taught! And, yes,
that never occurs in a vacuum with just some
imaginary commitment. Remember, perceptions
that are only controlled in the imagination mode do
not have the reality check of the environmental
feedback path, to see if there really is control.
Genuine commitment control systems must plug in
some actual commitment, to get established at all.

from that perspective, I do not think it is a bad thing
to use the particular rule, "in this learning setting, do
not disrupt other students." To my way of thinking
this is functionally equivalent to a path segment in a
program: "in this environment or under these
circumstances, [do not] do X." Perceiving whether
the circumstances hold is the job of another control
system, (I'm not sure at what level.)

My point is that there has to be some specific rule --
(Which one? Pick one.) -- in order to learn how
to control _any_ rule. And while we have not
talked much about it, I believe it is an implication
of "reorganizational hierarchical perceptual control
theory" that lower level perceptions are used to
_construct_ the higher level perceptions in the first
place. The only way to get there is from below!
That is the only stuff to work with.

As I currently conceive of the building of control
systems, three dynamics are brought together,
embodied in what we are calling 1) reorganization,
2) a hierarchical ordering of perceptions, and 3)
intrinsic references. If you want a control system,
1) keep changing until something works, 2) use the
stuff you already got, and 3) all of this is for a deeper
reason (i.e., minor things like a non-toxic inter-cellular
environment). All of these are in the service of a
sine qua non -- the feedback has to end up negative,
or none of it is going to work. That is to say, you have
to have a way to monitor (and change if necessary)
your results, or you will probably die (worst case
scenario) before you get where you want to be.

I am not sure what all of this says in a practical sense
about the program for teaching responsible thinking.
But something in me said it needed to be raised, to
broaden the picture of what we are talking about.
Take it (or leave it) for whatever it is worth.

Best to all,
        Erling

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (991214.1100)]

Erling Jorgensen (991213.2030 CST)--

There is an aspect that I have not seen addressed very
much in this discussion. That is the matter of how
RTP commitments and their reasons come to be formed.

I would prefer to say that the kids make _agreements_ rather
than _commitments_. We have people make commitments for
_our_ sake, not theirs. We can _say_ that the commitment is
also for their sake but we really don't know that and it
seems rather condescending to assume that that's the case.
If our goal is to have people make commitments that are
consistent with what we want _and_ with what they want, then
I think it's clearer if we say we are seeking _agreements_
rather than _commitments_.

Let me try to get to the heart of it, and then we can
drop it if it is *only* speculative. Aren't principles
and/or system concepts going to be *constructed*
out of things like commitments, rules, programs, and
other predictable ways of organizing things?? So
doesn't learning how to #1) perceive and #2) control
such things have to *precede* the reasons that will
(later) give them their raison d'etre??

Yes.

If that is the case, then teaching *how* to a) make
and b) keep a commitment is not such an awful
thing -- despite Rick's protestations to the contrary.

If "commitment" means "rule" then I don't protest; we
have to learn how to control for rules at a particular
reference level before we can learn to vary the rules for
higher level reasons. What I "protest" is "teaching commitment"
in the sense of teaching a person to maintain a fixed
reference for _any_ perception. This kind of commitment
is not "awful"; it's just likely to be dysfunctional for
the person who makes the commitment (as shown in the
spreadsheet demo) and it is also an annoying (to me)
way of concealing the coercive goals of the person who
wants the commitment made.

What you seem to be saying is that RTP views disruptive
kids as kids who have not yet learned how to control for
following rules. This fits in with you discussion of gain;
a kid has not learned how to control for following rules
is like a very low gain rule control system. I have no
problem with this way of looking at the situation, though
in my experience kids (and adults) who don't follow rules
are rarely having problems controlling for rules; they are
just controlling for a different set of rules than the
ones we would like them to be following.

I think that most disruptive kids disrupt because they
are not interested in controlling for being non-disruptive;
they are controlling for perceptions (including rules like
the rules of their gang) that lead them to be disruptive
(as an intended or as an unintended result of this controlling).
I think RTP deals with these kids in exactly the right way
(assuming you have to keep these kids in school); they are
gently removed from the classroom. Once out of the classroom,
an RTC person can work with these kids to see if the kids
themselves can figure out how to be non-disruptive in a way
that is consistent with their existing hierarchy of wants.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (991214.1310)]

Bruce Nevin (991214.1453 EST) --

Rick, are you saying that a commitment is something that
one person coercively exacts from another?

Sure. It often is. Or it is something that we coercively
exact from ourselves, like making a commitment to not
do X or to do Y. New Year's resolutions (at least the
resolutions to do what you don't _want_ to do) are
examples of self-coercive commitments.

I think that making a commitment is just assigning a high
priority, what is sometimes referred to as a firm resolve.

Sure. But why do you require someone else to assign a high
priority to control of a particular perception? It's because
you want to be sure that the person will control it _for
your sake_. You want your wife to commit to fidelity because
it matters _to you_. My point isn't that there is anything
wrong with what you want the person to be committed to (I'm a
fan of fidelity myself). My point is that you want this
commitment _for your own sake_; you are usually not taking the
other person's structure of wants into account when you ask
for the commitment. If you _do_ take the other person's structure
of wants into account -- for example, if you ask your wife whether
there is anything she wants, such as your best friend, that would
prevent her from making such a commitment -- then I think it's
better to call the person's acceptance of the commitment (_if_
the person accepts) an _agreement_.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991214.0814 MDT)]

The fact that you can't model this phenomenon confirms what Marc Abrams
has been saying for a long time. The HPCT model provides no way to
understand how we switch from controlling one variable to controlling
another. This might be a mechanism worth thinking about since without
such a mechanism HPCT will never be of much interest to those dealing
with behavior any more complicated than tracking tasks.

I'm afraid you misconstrue what I mean by saying I can't model this
process. At the moment, I can't simulated the physics of a
four-degree-of-freedom (or 27-degree-of-freedom) arm, either. This doesn't
mean that differential equations are incapable of representing the physics
of such complex objects. It just means that I don't yet know how, mostly
because of being involved in other developments, but also because of not
being smart enough.

HPCT has all the building blocks required to model switching from one lower
goal to another. But somebody has to sit down and do it. Basically all you
need is a higher control system that controls its perception by sending a
reference signal to one lower system rather than to another, a process that
sounds as though it would involve logic circuits. Maybe it's not obvious to
you, but it is to me, that an actual model of such processes is perfectly
feasible given the components of HPCT. But I'm not going to start waving my
arms and conjecturing about such a model just because somebody else has got
ants in his pants. If you and Marc are so eager to have such a model, why
don't you commit some time, like six months or a year, to working out the
principles and checking to see that your ideas actually work? I'm not
running a complaint window.

Best,

Bill P.

···

I can see we're getting nowhere here. Every time I ask you
what the terms
in one description mean, you give me a description of
something else. This
is not going to lead to any kind of model. It's just going around and
around in a network of verbal descriptions. I'm not
interested in that.

I think I finally understand why you and Rick are so enamored of
extremely simple models. It's that old hammer and nail story.

Bruce Gregory

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991214.0835 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (991213.2125 EST)--

Bill, you've lost the argument; why not admit it? This stonewalling isn't
fooling anybody.

OK, I've lost the argument.

Best,

Bill P.

[Abbott_Bruce]

[From Bruce Abbott (991214.1210 EST)]

Bill Powers (991214.0835 MDT) --

Bruce Abbott (991213.2125 EST)

Bill, you've lost the argument; why not admit it? This stonewalling isn't
fooling anybody.

OK, I've lost the argument.

Well, they say that you should be careful what you ask for, because you just
may get it. I was _actually_ looking for an admission from you that your
original assertion was incorrect.

In case we've all forgotten what that was by now, you had stated that if the
child failed to act so as to prevent himself from disrupting the class, it
followed necessarily that he or she either (a) never really made a
commitment not to disrupt or (b) had disavowed that commitment.

I don't really care that much about this specific argument. This is not
about who is right or wrong, it's about process. What's the point of
discussing anything if you can never grant the validity of the other guy's
suggestions, when that is warranted? Unless of course you care more about
maintaining your position than about arriving at valid conclusions.

To my mind, this is the way this discussion _should_ have gone:

(a) You make your assertion as described above.

(b) I note, appealing to common, everyday observation, that there is another
    logical possibility that rules out having necessarily to accept either one
    of the two conclusions.

(c) You reply something as follows: Point well taken: I hadn't considered that.

At that point we could have moved on to the implications of this for our
positions.

I think we would make better progress toward agreement on some of these
issues if you didn't act as though you believe that you can never admit to
the validity of anyone else's position, even when it's obviously correct.

Regards,

Bruce A.

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (991214.1453 EST)]

Rick Marken (991214.1100)

I would prefer to say that the kids make _agreements_ rather
than _commitments_. We have people make commitments for
_our_ sake, not theirs. We can _say_ that the commitment is
also for their sake but we really don't know that and it
seems rather condescending to assume that that's the case.
If our goal is to have people make commitments that are
consistent with what we want _and_ with what they want, then
I think it's clearer if we say we are seeking _agreements_
rather than _commitments_.

Rick, are you saying that a commitment is something that one person
coercively exacts from another? This doesn't make sense to me.

I think that making a commitment is just assigning a high priority, what is
sometimes referred to as a firm resolve. That is, in case an internal
conflict arises between controlling A and controlling B, and you go through
some process that results in your resolving the conflict and controlling
one rather than the other, the one to which you are more committed wins.

The child's commitment (a notion which I introduced in my interpretation of
RTP) is no more than an agreement to control "distracting from learning" at
zero with high priority and reasonable gain (i.e. unavoidable disruptions
are not an issue).

  Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:00 AM 12/14/1999 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (991214.1648 EST)]

Rick Marken (991214.1310)

Bruce Nevin (991214.1453 EST) --

Rick, are you saying that a commitment is something that
one person coercively exacts from another?

Sure. It often is. Or it is something that we coercively
exact from ourselves [...]

So you are saying that assigning a high priority or importance is often
coercive. The flip side of "often" is that sometimes it is not. So it is
possible that in the context of RTP it is not. From Ed's writings and the
other materials on the respthink web site, it is clear that the design
intention of RTP is that it not be coercive. All that remains to discuss is
the implementation of RTP. There is ample discussion of what succeeds and
what fails, and why, in those sources. Failure is frequently (always?)
attributed to falling back to coercive practices.

[...] why do you require someone else to assign a high
priority to control of a particular perception? It's because
you want to be sure that the person will control it _for
your sake_.

It's a mutual agreement. This agreement comes out of discussion of what
they are there for, and what the classroom is about. Each kid doesn't want
to be distracted when they're trying to learn. It's an agreement that's
sometimes hard to carry out, but they do agree about that. This is one of
the things that is remarkably different about RTP. The process of
discussing the purposes of school and reaching agreement is of course not
unique to RTP, and Summerhill is not the only other example.

You want your wife to commit to fidelity because
it matters _to you_.

Actually, I want my wife to be faithful because it matters to her. If
fidelity is something that I impose coercively it doesn't mean squat. And
this is something that was plain to me before she and I met, and long
before I encountered PCT.

So it is with the RTP teacher. If the kids are being coerced then by
definition it is not RTP, and RTP is failing to be applied in that classroom.

[...] you are usually not taking the
other person's structure of wants into account when you ask
for the commitment.

In RTP the teacher is taking the other person's structure of wants into
account.

If you _do_ take the other person's structure
of wants into account -- for example, if you ask your wife whether
there is anything she wants, such as your best friend, that would
prevent her from making such a commitment -- then I think it's
better to call the person's acceptance of the commitment (_if_
the person accepts) an _agreement_.

I don't think it will be fruitful to try to dice and slice word meanings
too much. The word commitment can refer to just raising the priority on
control of a variable (your new year's resolutions) or it can refer to an
agreement with others to control with high priority.

The children agree with each other to control "distracting from learning"
at a high priority and with reasonable gain; that is what I mean by making
a commitment. High priority: if there is conflict, and the child resolves
the conflict by choosing, then the one with highest priority wins.
Reasonable gain: unavoidable distractions/disruptions are not an issue. The
agreement with one another and with the teacher is to make that commitment.

  Bruce Nevin

···

At 05:08 AM 12/14/1999 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (991214.1522 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (991214.1210 EST)--

Well, they say that you should be careful what you ask for, because you just
may get it. I was _actually_ looking for an admission from you that your
original assertion was incorrect.

In case we've all forgotten what that was by now, you had stated that if the
child failed to act so as to prevent himself from disrupting the class, it
followed necessarily that he or she either (a) never really made a
commitment not to disrupt or (b) had disavowed that commitment.

I think I included a third possibility, which was conflict.

I think we would make better progress toward agreement on some of these
issues if you didn't act as though you believe that you can never admit to
the validity of anyone else's position, even when it's obviously correct.

I really don't think it's very important whether we agree about this or
not. Neither of us is talking about data, or even about worked-out models.
It's the sort of conversation one would expect to have over a few beers
(the later few) if one were still consuming that delightful beverage.

Best,

Bill P.