[From Rick Marken (2003.07.02.0830)]
I made a small error in my previous post that could produce large confusion. I said:
Rick Marken (2003.07.02.0810)--
So choosing seems to be done
arbitrarily, as when I choose to point at the picture on my desk.
What I meant to type was: _Some_ choosing seems to be done arbitrarily...
The point is that the word "choosing" refers to two different phenomenon: the
familiar variation of lower order references by higher level systems (such as varying
one's running path in order to catch a fly ball) and the more mysterious, _arbitrary_
variation of any references in the hierarchy by a system outside of the hierarchy
(such as pointing at a picture in order to do nothing other than point at the
picture).
Best regards
Rick
···
---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org
[From Rick Marken (2003.07.02.0925)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.0702.1159)--
I must be denser than usual because I don't see any difference between
these two examples. We don't normally point at things spontaneously. We
point at a picture in order to make a point (even if the point is that
there is no reason to be pointing at the picture). I assume in both
cases that the reference is specified by a higher order system (look
good on the baseball field; look good in the discussion of 'free will').
I suppose this could be. The distinction is based on my own subjective
experience. The main subjective demonstration of this (for me) is that the same
behavior, such as typing the letter "p" seems non-volitional when it is done for a
higher level reason (as it was earlier in the sentence when I typed the word
"typing") and volitional when, like now, I do it "on purpose" by just pressing the
"p" key. But I suppose the latter case could be seen as a high level "look good in
discussion" perception controller hitting the "p" key to make a point. But it
still seems like the selection of the action (hitting "p" rather than any other
key, pointing at the picture, etc.) that is presumably being used to make me look
good is selected arbitrarily. But this consciousness stuff is way above my pay
grade.
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0702.1159)]
Rick Marken (2003.07.02.0830)]
I made a small error in my previous post that could produce large
confusion. I said:
Rick Marken (2003.07.02.0810)--
So choosing seems to be done
arbitrarily, as when I choose to point at the picture on my desk.
What I meant to type was: _Some_ choosing seems to be done
arbitrarily...
The point is that the word "choosing" refers to two different
phenomenon: the
familiar variation of lower order references by higher level systems
(such as varying
one's running path in order to catch a fly ball) and the more
mysterious, _arbitrary_
variation of any references in the hierarchy by a system outside of
the hierarchy
(such as pointing at a picture in order to do nothing other than point
at the
picture).
I must be denser than usual because I don't see any difference between
these two examples. We don't normally point at things spontaneously. We
point at a picture in order to make a point (even if the point is that
there is no reason to be pointing at the picture). I assume in both
cases that the reference is specified by a higher order system (look
good on the baseball field; look good in the discussion of 'free will').