[Martin Taylor 2008.09.21.10.33]
>>From Jim Wuwert 2008.09.20.1819EST
> (Martin) It does look, also, as though this induced
reorganization has a
> similar "e-coli" quality as does the reorganization that depends on
> an inability to influence a perception one wants to control.
As far as my model is concerned, reorganization arises from error,
nothing else, not even what the error is about. Reorganization is not
a cognitive function.
>>If reorganization is not a cognitive function--what is it? Is it
multifunctional with cognition being one part? What kind of
function is it within a person?
The details of reorganization are ill-defined. I don't believe that the concept is itself well-defined; at least it seems to be used in more than one sense in CSGnet discussions. There may be one way it happens or many, or maybe the different kinds of thing that have been labelled "reorganization" are distinct only in that they happen by different mechanisms. Bill P has praised my explanation of the "PCT-conventional" view of reorganization at <http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Mutuality/intrinsic.html>\.
In that view, there is one mechanism, and it is very far from being a cognitive function. I will let him speak to that one, but a brief synopsis is that we all (every person, animal, bacterium) inherit a set of internal states necessary for survival. for humans, these states are perhaps things like the level in the blood of CO2 or sugar or various hormones etc. etc. Those states have ranges of level that are optimally compatible with survival. These optimal levels are analogous to reference levels in the perceptual control hierarchy, and when the corresponding variables are close to their reference levels we feel healthy and content. When they are not, we feel different -- perhaps ill, perhaps annoyed, perhaps stiff in the muscles, or whatever. Using PCT-language, there is error in the intrinsic variable.
In a complex organism, there must be a complicated network of intrinsic variables, a lot of which is known, but probably most of which is as yet unknown to biophysiologists. This complexity doesn't matter to PCT, but it should be kept in mind. For PCT, what matters is that the side-effects of controlling some perception may well affect the value of an intrinisic variable. When such a perception is controlled toward its reference value, the effect on the intrinsic variable may be to bring it closer to its reference. If that happens consistently, the organism is more likely to survive.
There is no necessary connection between the controlled perception and the intrinsic variable(s) affected by the actions used to control it, nor between the controlled perception itself and any intrinsic variable. However, they cannot be completely independent, because if they were, then the actions used to control the perception would not have a consistent effect on any intrinsic variable when the environment changes.
"Classic" reorganization occurs when some intrinsic variable(s) have persistent error. Reorganization in this case means changing the mechanisms used to control perceptual variables, or perhaps changing which perceptions are available for control. In everyday language, you might act differently to get what you want, or you might see things differently and therefore change what you want. There is no obvious way for the possible changes in the organization of the perceptual control hierarchy to be related to changes in the effects on intrinsic variables other than trying them out. Bill has shown in simulations that a technique colloquially called "e-coli" can do this quite effectively even for considerable numbers of variables.
Reorganization in this sense is not a cognitive function, nor is it perceptible other than that a reorganized person might say to themselves "what was I thinking" when contemplating their pre-reorganized self.
Having said that, we can add another concept into the mix, which will contradict the above quote from Bill P.
On CSGnet, it is often assumed (and it is no more than an assumption) that the ability to control one or more perceptions is itself an intrinsic variable, and that persistent inability to control represents error in this intrinsic variable. Persistent error in an intrinsic variable leads to reorganization, and so, if one finds one cannot control something of importance, one is likely to change either one's actions in attempting that control, or change how one perceives the situation.
If the variable that cannot be controlled is at a high level in the perceptual control hierarchy (still thinking "Classic" HPCT), we might call it "cognitive", especially if it is one that is available in conscious awareness. Now we come to ideas that are mine, that do not necessarily conform to "Classic" PCT.
An ill-determined aspect of PCT is the nature of conscious awareness; my own thoughts on this suggest that we tend to be conscious more of what we have difficulty controlling than of what we control easily. If this is so, the fact that we are aware of something being not what we want it to be is in itself a signal of possible ongoing or pending reorganization. We cast around (in imagination, which is conscious) for means to alter the bad situation. This seems to me to be "reorganization in imagination" and to imply the possibility of cognitive control of reorganization at that level.
If this happens, it is a different kind of reorganization from what I described above. It is real-time dynamic, and can involve consideration of side-effects that influence other controlled variables. The standard kind of reorganization involves no such possibility. The standard kind just happens, and if it works, the result isn't changed further. If it doesn't work, more reorganization happens. At this high "cognitive" level, however, the reorganization can be tried out in imagination and when the imagined result is implemented, the conceived organization can be imposed on the control structure, or at least on part of it. We plan how to achieve our goals and then try to do what we planned to do (which may, of course, not work even if we do what we planned).
In this kind of "reorganization in imagination" (a.k.a.planning), one can perceive approaches to improved control and can see holes in the plan where some effect is needed that would not be achieved. Those consciously perceived holes can themselves become the object of "reorganization in imagination", until the planner perceives (in imagination) that the plan would reduce error in the controlled variable that was the one with the error that initiated the planning process (the "reorganization in imagination").
All of this is similar in kind (the "e-coli" method) to "classic" reorganization, but sufficiently different that I think it better not to use the same word to refer indiscriminately to both reorganization that occurs when intrinsic variables show error and reorganization in imagination that can be done when a high-level controlled perception with error becomes conscious.
There are other possible ways of learning not encompassed by either kind of reorganization: Hebbian learning is one possibiity (in its simplest form the strengthening of synapses athat are used and the weakening of ones that aren't); gradient search (hill climbing) is another. Both achieve good results in connectionist simulations. So, when one is thinking about how complex organisms learn, reorganization is the mode specific to PCT, but the others may well also apply.
>>If reorganization is not a cognitive function--what is it? Is it multifunctional with cognition being one part? What kind of function is it within a person?
I don't know if the above is any kind of an answer. If it isn't, you won't get any more from me for a while, and even if it is, I have no doubt Bill will have his own answer, and that Bill's answer will be different in some respects, while being the same in others.
Martin