William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.23.01]

Bruce, I have the feeling we are talking at cross purposes. Perhaps

we should look at underlying assumptions that may differ, before
arguing about text, but I don’t at the moment see where those are,
so I will work with the text. Maybe the problem will become apparent
in time.

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.15.53 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42 –

          as Dag applies a

counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose Dag’s
force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an
accident).

        This is a nice illustration

of how and why the disturbance is purposeful and transient
because control at a higher level terminates it after
observing the effect (or lack of expectable effect if it is
resisted).

        (It wasn't Dag driving,

IIRC, but no matter.)

        Dag is controlling the

position of the car in the lane by means of varying rotary
force on the steering wheel. Bill is disturbing the position
of the car in the lane by means of briefly applying rotary
force to the steering wheel. Dag resists the disturbance by
the same means.

        If the disturbance did not

affect the heading of the car Dag would not resist it,
unless because it disturbed a different higher-level
perception, such as a perception of who should properly be
in control of the car.

So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not be transient.

Bill could have continued his force on the steering wheel for
minutes or hours while Dag continued to keep the car in its lane.

        In both cases, the

disturbance is to the higher level perception (the heading
of the car in the lane).

Yes.
        This is shown in a scenario

where , unbeknownst to
Dag, there are dual
controls (as for driver education) or he is in a
‘self-driving’ car, and another agent has taken over keeping
the car properly aligned in the lane. When he feels the
wheel moving appropriately without his effort he may be
startled and take action from higher levels of control
(“Hey, what’s going on here?”) but he won’t resist the
movements of the wheel because the input perception of the
heading of the car in the lane still matches the reference.
Externally applied force on the wheel is not a disturbance
unless it causes a disturbance at the higher level; which is
as much as saying that Bill’s externally applied force on
the wheel is a disturbance at the higher level controlling
the heading of the car in the lane.

Yes, that's the point of Bill applying his force to the steering

wheel without controlling the direction of the car, as I said
originally: " * Dag is controlling for keeping the car in its
proper lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test
whether Dag is controlling that hypothesized variable*."

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –

              In the Test, the experimenter has

no reference value for the hypothesized variable the subject
is controlling, and does not control it. The experimenter does
disturb it, and controls for a perception that the disturbing
action did influence the hypothesized variable, but thereafter
does not further influence it.

              Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –
How do you control a
perception that the disturbing action influences the
variable without controlling the state of that variable?

I thought my message was an answer to that question (which I

apparently received 10 hours before you sent it), using as an
example a situation Bill had described on CSGnet in order to explain
the same point. A simpler way of answering is “You don’t control
everything you perceive”.

The Tester cannot Test if the Tester sets up a conflict in the

“classical” sense of both Tester and Subject trying to control the
same variable to different values (which I how I interpret what you
are suggesting). The result would be a case of conflictive
collective control. Instead, the Tester has to disturb some variable
that is an argument of the perceptual function that creates the
perception the Tester hypothesises as being controlled by the
Subject. (Or, I suppose, change the subject’s influence on one of
those variables, though I’ve never seen or heard of the Test being
done on the output side of the environmental feedback pathway).

In a possibly vain hope of teasing out differences of assumption,

may I offer the suggestion that we may have different views on the
meaning of “control”. For me, to control something you have to be
acting to counter disturbances so as to bring the controlled
variable close to the reference value and keep it there as
disturbances (and reference values) change. In the case of the car,
Bill never controlled the aiming direction of the car, but did
disturb it. He did control his force, and Dag countered that change.
(By the way, Dag says it was him).

The existence of a reference value is essential, whether it is fixed

(as is hypothesized to be the case at the highest level of the
hierarchy) or variable because of outputs from levels above the one
in question. No reference value against which to compare the
controlled variable, no control.

Martin

Down …

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2017 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.09.1250)]

Martin Taylor (2017.06.07.22.48)

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist in the environment.

RM: Ignoring the fact that I know that controlled variables are not in the environment, what would be so bad about a reader concluding that they are variables in the environment?

RM: I don’t know if you saw this before, Martin; it ended up being posted in a different thread for some reason. But I would really appreciate hearing your answer to this question.

HB :

Martin already answered on Ricks question above and I perfectly agree with his answer. I hope that he will not mind if I add some sentences.

The problem is not if reader beleives that there are variables in environment but whether there are »controlled variables« in environment or not. The problem is that you are not ignoring this »fact« but that you are »double« personality. It’s yours instability Rick that is causing so much confussion here on CSGnet.

We are just talking about your irrisposibility to be on side of PCT where the only »controlled variable« is not in environment but inside the controlling system. It’s called perceptual signal. Hence Bills theory about »Control of perception«.

Ashby was taking quite different approcah preventing such a mish-mash in meanings. Variables in his »ultrastability« theory were inside organism and parameters were outside. So even in the case of control there was inpossible to miss the position of variabel. It was inside.

In the case of PCT everything are variables so it’s sometimes qiute difficult to understand why variables inside system are controlled and outisde system are not. But Bill did solve this problem and you Rick don’t understand how, so once you are writing in PCT manner and once in RCT. In this way you make confussion even greater, as you are hiding your RCT theory behind PCT.

We are not ignoring the »fact« that you once understand that »controlled variables« are not in the environment and once you don’t. You can check it on CSGnet archives about your »double« personality, which is confusing all around you including Alison Powers, who really showed very high understanding of PCT, much higher then you did.

Mostly you don’t use your understanding that »controlled variable« is not in the environment. Your demos show this clearly. The same is with your books and articles.

Because you are so unreliable (all your demos mostly show »controlled variable« in environment«) starting with »distance«, I made just for you a control loop where »controlled variable« is in environment, Then it’s clear how »control loop« should look like if you control »controlled variable« with behavior as there are no other means that make sense except if you want to introduce Telekinesis and Telephaty to show how yu can control inside and in the same time outside.

Beside »control« in outer in environment you perceive that control with »Controled Perceptual Variable« or as you called it CPV what is close to Gavins’ PCV.

So control loop which has your elements looks like this :

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping some »controlled variable (aspect of outer environment) in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  2.   OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
    
  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

We see that in RCT the »only« problem is comparator. Although everything is problematic, only for comparator Rick has never explicitly defined how it works.

I think that Rick can’t define it, because comparators are ususally not in environment where by Rick’s persuasion control is done. And there are some others who beleive the same.

So in RCT case (Ricks Control Theory) where control is done in environment he has to put »comparator« into environment if he want to prove that something is controlled in environment. The only place in control loop where control is done is »comparator«. So it has to be somewhere in environment if control is done in environmnet. Something has to be matched to reference so that we get control in environment. Ups but where are references in environment ???  That was also mostly msitake of engeeners as Henry Yin pointed out.

HY : … reference is placed outside of the organism, where the engineer designing the system also performs comparison function. Thus for decades such control systems have been treated as stimulus-respons or input-output devices : error in, behavior out. The tendency to resort to linear causation is so strong that even closed loop controllers have been treated as devices that receive error signals and generate behaviors.

HB : Does it look familiar to you ? How we should call your »comparator« in environment ?

RM in other post : The variables that we see being controlled are the data that are to be explained by theory.

HB : Maybe »Controlled variable« where »mis-match« between effets of output and references are taking place and »error« is calculated and perceived by organism in the form of »Controlled Perceptual variable« or CPV as you called it.

HB : Rick sorry to say, but term »Controlled Perceptual Variable« is your pure invention as this term was never used in PCT literature, nor by Bill nor by Mary Powers nor by Henry Yin. It’s stimulating thinking that control comes form environment into controlling system and that is »input-ouput« system as Henry Yin pointed out.

Where did you get this term Rick. Maybe you are »double« agent and you are working also for Carver who is also producing all kinds of new self-regulation terms.Â

Do you remember using all these terms ? Well if you don’t they are safe in CSGnet archive. You can never escape from nonsense you wrote. You should be carefull what you are writing arroung CSGnet as every word is »recorded« and saved.Â

Do you understand where your problem is ?Â

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Dear Eetu…

···

From: Eetu Pikkarainen [mailto:eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi]
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 7:28 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

HB : Exactly Eetu. There is no »comparator« in outer environment and thus no »error« signal« and of course no control.

Boris

Eetu

(Lähetetty kännykästä / Sent from mobile)

Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com kirjoitti 9.6.2017 kello 19.24:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.09.12:23 ET)]

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2 –

Except for imagination, the environment is necessary in order to have a closed loop. Think about that.

/Bruce

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 5:28 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2]

EP: Bruce, again I agree largely, but I think you understood me wrong. I was not talking about knowledge (I intended to resume to it sometimes later…) but only about the concept of control. What you write here about the reality of our environment and the possibility of the reliability of our knowledge about it and especially the truthfulness of scientific knowledge is quite OK. But that was not the issue.

EP: The issue was just the concept of control. And it comes up also below: “[Science] gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment. [italics by EP]”

EP: From the next possible facts:

  • a person perceives something in the environment
  • there really is something in the environment “causing” just that perception (not a hallucination or error)
  • the person has a reference value for that perception
  • there is a difference between perceptual and reference values causing error and output
  • the output manages to cause certain kind of changes to that something in the environment
  • as a consequence of those changes the person’s perception changes to the refence value

it does NOT follow that the person controls that something in the environment. It follows only that she controls her perception (of that something). As an everyday experience this seems and sounds like the person were controlling that something in the environment. But just the beauty of the PCT is that we can make the differentiation and understand that all we can ever control is our perceptions.

EP: In everyday life we cannot help saying that someone controls the temperature of the room or that someone did a controlled somersault. But here is theoretical / scientific PCT discussions this either unjustified assumption or unjustified incoherence causes endless confusion.

EP: We don’t control our environment by controlling our perceptions because strictly speaking there are two different kind of processes which do not both justify the use of the term “control”. Neither do we control our perceptions by controlling our environment. What we do is that we control our perceptions by affecting some aspect of our environment and as a consequence of that the aspect of environment (usually) becomes stabilized somehow (in a certain way).

Eetu

Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)–

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08–

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception”.

I believe that you are convinced that this settles the matter.

The most direct evidence of the reality of that which is perceived is that the environment pushes back and sometimes even bites. To perceive as we wish to perceive requires control; that control often requires effort (against what?); that control is often disturbed by unforeseen and even unperceived disturbances (whence?); that control often has unintended consequences (arising from what?). John Kirkland’s post in this thread alludes to unintended consequences of that complex of controlled variables called “industrialization since 1800”.

It would be most peculiar to say that to be scientific we must deny that our experiments, models, and theory give us knowledge of reality. An essential point about PCT is that if the performance of a model conforms very closely to that of a living subject then the structure of the model informs us about what must necessarily be structures in the living subject.

Look at the fundamental first methodological steps of PCT, the Test for the Controlled Variable. When the experimenter E succeeds in determining what perception (perceptual variable) the subject S is controlling, E is justified in saying that S really has that perception and is controlling it. This is because E is controlling what E perceives to be the same variable in such a way as to disturb S’s control of it.

To do this, E imagines a transform or translation of a perception that E is controlling. To identify what perception to control, E guesses what S is controlling. The transformation is from E’s point of view to S’s point of view. Point of view upon what? Upon that which E presumes to be a real variable in the environment which E and S are perceiving from their respective points of view. It is not obvious how one might make sense of the Test, much less carry it out, without this presumption of reality.

Another way to put the conundrum, coming at it from the other direction, is the truism that science never proves anything. Proof is possible only for mathematics and logic.

What science yields us is a succession of provisional and serviceable models of reality (that is, of that aspect of reality of which the particular field of science treats). In other words, it gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment.

When I say provisional and serviceable, I mean that we make do with the best theory that is still standing when the dust of argument settles, or (as in the case of Newtonian vs. relativistic vs. quantum physics) the best theory for the purposes at hand–or to pick another familiar example, sometimes waves are a more useful model of light, sometimes particles are.

In short, the conclusions of science are high-level perceptions that enable us to control lower-level perceptions better and more reliably than non-science and nonsense conclusions do. And they do so precisely because they (apparently) correspond better to whatever it is that is really real, independent of our perceptions. They better equip us to identify and control variables that matter to us, to resist disturbances to our control, and maybe even to avoid unintended side effects, or at least recognize them in time to bring them, too, under control.

Conversely, our perception that we are better able to control under system concepts and principles of science than we are with non-science or nonsense system concepts and principles is our justification for taking the system concepts and principles of science to be true–that is, taking them to be realities. The argument is circular, but it appears to have been a virtuous circle so far.

/Bruce

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08]

Bruce, I largely agree. Some comments though:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)]

Begin with some PCT truisms.

All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it.

(Not sure about this, but I will turn to it sometimes later – it depends on definitions. I agree that all our knowledge is based on perceptions.)

All that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it.

That is funny and fuzzy saying, at least for me: sounds like our perceptions were in the environment. I would say that we cannot control anything in the environment but only our perceptions of it.

I control many perceptions of our environment without exerting the actions that maintain them under control. Other people, or other agents, exert the actions that maintain them under control.

Or they just happen to be (temporarily) so that our perceptions of them remain near the reference.

Among the evidence that I control such perceptions is the observation that, should control of them lapse, I act in such a way that other people or agents resist the disturbance and re-establish control of them.

A recent example: the street signs for Pinehurst Avenue and Chase Road were swapped, so that each designated the other road. My wife called my attention to it. We contacted the Public Works Department. They fixed it.

What’s the point of this? All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it, and we presume that our perceptions are the realities that we perceive. (We presume this even though we know that our perceptions are selective and omit infinitely many aspects of the environment, some of which we know about because we or others have extended the senses with scientific instruments.) This presumption is justified by our success controlling in the environment and by the like success of all our human and pre-human ancestors without whose survival we would not be here.

That is extremely important. Our success in control of our perceptions is highly depending on other people and other actors – and finally on the objects or our perceptions.

By this justified presumption, we project the universe of our perceptions into the otherwise unknowable universe of our environment.

That justified presumption extends to the fact that all that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it. We are justified in the presumption that the controlled variable is in the environment. Every time two or more of us control what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment we obtain further justification of that presumption. Examples of two or more of us controlling what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment are conflict, collective control, and the Test for the Controlled Variable.

Here I disagree. This is a natural presumption of our everyday life. But I think that PCT just makes us abandon that presumption at least in theoretical i.e. scientific context. In everyday talk and thinking we may say that we control something in the environment and that something is possibly controlled also by some other person. But we should know better that we and those other persons are controlling only our or their own perceptions and nothing in environment. That object or something in the environment OF which our perception is may be the same OF which the other persons’ perceptions are. But we do not control that object or whatever there is in the environment but just our own perceptions.

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception”.

It is impossible to argue whether or not the controlled variable is in the environment without forgetting that we make this presumption, and that it is a presumption. If we accept the justification (which we must, in order to do things together, including arguing, and which we routinely do to survive) then we thereby assert that it is in the environment. But when we wish to identify things in a control theory diagram as a tool of analysis, we remember that this is a presumption, merely the projection of our perceptions onto the otherwise unknowable environment, and we must acknowledge that it is in the perceived environment, the universe of perception, which we perceive to be shared between and among us, and really out there, largely because of the routine successes of collective control.

Yes that is right, I agree with this.

I know of no way out of the conundrum other than to acknowledge it. I believe it is foolish to argue about it.

The only way out perhaps is staying strict and careful with our concepts. We must tell when we use every day “control” and when PCT “Control”.

Eetu Pikkarainen

PhD (Ed.), Dos., University Lecturer (in Education)

Faculty of Education, University of Oulu, Finland

Schools in Transition: Linking Past, Present, and Future in Educational Practice

Edited by Pauli Siljander, Kimmo Kontio and Eetu Pikkarainen
[https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/other-books/schools-in-transition/](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.sensepublishers.com_catalogs_bookseries_other-2Dbooks_schools-2Din-2Dtransition_&d=DwMGaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=0nhfyP3k5-Wr6mhZrUnj5mPm1NDoqG-YillmP7AEVms&s=0r7kgNNHJhKIUPUNRy_M4-6gMGtyCTrV7vOjwub4cW4&e=)
                         /Bruce

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.07.22.48]

On 2017/06/7 8:25 PM, Alison Powers wrote:

Martin - I am confused because you say:

MT: Rick says the controlled variable is in the environment, which I say cannot be true, because in the environment there exists no independent reference variables nor sources from which they can be determined independently of observation of the moment-by-moment values of the environmental variable itself.

But then Rick responded to me in the PCT Research thread:

RM: The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

I construed that sentence from Rick to be a shot in a different long-standing and apparently irresolvable argument, which I had intended to ignore. I realize there’s no point in reiterating the fact that the result of applying a function to a bunch of variables is itself a variable, but that’s the nub of the argument in which that sentence was a shot. Rick disagrees – it’s mathematics and therefore just an opinion open to contradiction.

However, to me he certainly suggests in that sentence that the controlled variable is in the environment, whether it is a function of other variables in the environment (presumably controlled ones) or should be treated as the result of that function. Certainly the function that defines the CEV is the perceptual function. We have never had any disagreement about that. The question is whether the arguments to that function are in the environment as he explicitly says they are.

But consider instead Rick’s recent statements about “behaviour”, which provide the context for interpreting the sentence you quote [From Rick Marken (2017.06.06.1225). I have highlighted a few phrases and sentences. I don’t think I need more than this, though I could go back into the archives and find interactions between us when Rick has argued against me that the controlled variable IS in the environment, quite explicitly. Yesterday’s message should be enough to make the point:


RM: Saying that “behavior is control” simply calls attention to the fact what we call “behaviors” are both actions and results; in PCT lingo, behaviors are both outputs and the variables controlled by those outputs – controlled variables. So the behavior called “tying shoelaces” points to a control process where the controlled variable is the state of the laces, the reference state of this variable is “tied” and the outputs that produce this result are the hand movements the get the laces tied. Moreover, what we see as the output component of a behavior are typically controlled variables themselves and what we see as the controlled variable component of behavior is typically an output itself. For example, the movements (outputs) used to produce the reference state of a controlled variable (tied laces) are themselves a controlled variable; their speed and direction are the controlled result of muscle forces. And the tied laces (the controlled variable) that result from those outputs (movements) are themselves outputs that are the means of controlling another variable, the “onness” of the shoes.

RM: So “control” is just a more precise definition of the informal term “behavior”. “Control” refers to the observation of a variable being maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. And this is what we can see is what is going on with the things we call “behaviors”. “Tying shoelaces”, for example, refers to the observation that a variable (the state of the laces) is maintained in a reference state (consistently brought to the state “tied”) protected from disturbance (the different initial state of the laces, variations in the forces the affect the laces, etc). When you are able to see behavior – any named behavior – as being both output that affects the state of a controlled variable and a controlled variable itself – you have learned to see behavior through control theory glasses. By the way, this is all discussed in the first 2 chapters of “Controlling People”.


MT. In all of that is there any suggestion that a controlled variable might be a perception? I think not. Everything refers to the controlled variable being a state of the environment that can be observed by another person. In those two paragraphs, the only reference to perception is in the “P” of “PCT” up front. If Rick had said, for example, in the second highlighted clause “the controlled variable is the [perceived] state of the laces”, I would have no problem. But he didn’t, and any casual reader might think he meant (and maybe he did mean) the actual state of the laces in the environment.

MT. We all know the form of the control loop, at least in its simplest “canonical” form. We also know that real organisms have limitations such as sensory thresholds, which mean that any particular value of an external variable gives rise to an uncertain value of the perceptual variable that is produced by its perceptual function (actually a hierarchy of perceptual functions), and we know that neural firings are actually not a continuous smooth “neural current”. What we also know is that the reference value for a perceptual signal is generated from within the organism, and does not exist in the environment (contrary to what Rick seems to imply in the fourth line of each paragraph). Control of a perception may not even correspond to control of anything another observer could perceive in the environment, if the perception includes any component from imagination.

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist in the environment. I would like to keep clear that however well the perception corresponds to a state of the environment, it is not the state of the environment, though it is the state that is controlled. To confuse the two is…confusing.

Martin

Hi all…Â

unnamed.jpg

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 10:41 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)]

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

HB : So we agree that PCT is about control of perception or about »Control of input«. We also agree that when »Control of input« is realized also some aspect of the world is »stabilized«. Now the question is not whether outside world is stabilized or not because everyone can perceive more stable perception of the environment when it is stabilized by other people. Kent solved already this question succesfully, so you don’t need to invent hot water, as Rick is oing some times. The question is HOW the external environment is stabilized ? Â

We have two possibilities. One is with »Control of behavior« or RCT what Rick is proposing, and the other is with »Control of perception« as Bill is proposing in his PCT. Both concepts have very different control loops. So Bruce N. If we agree that outer environment is stabilized what Kent already worked out very succesfully, the question is for which »control loop« you will decide to explain HOW outer environment is stabilized.

Decide once fro all, which »control loop« you prefer for explaining how outer environment is stabilized. No phylosophy…

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

Bills’ PCT (Perceptual Control Theory) defitnion of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…

&nbssp;

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box representss the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

BN : If there is a contradiction between common sense and strict PCT definition, it can be an impediment to communication.

HB : See above. There are always problem in communication, But the main problem is just about how individuals understand »Control of perception« and stability of outer environment how is achieved.

BN : But what harm is done if we acknowledge that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we perceive that we are stabilizing that aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input?

HB : See above. There is no harm if we think about »stability of environment«. Kent si using succesfully this term for along time. The harm is if you think that you stabilize environment with »Control of behavior«. So that you are not stabilizing environment, but controlling in the environment. This is harmfull for PCT. In the case of control in environment you’ll have to prove with what you are controlling in environment ??? In the case of stabilizing outer environment everything is clear (See Kent).

BN : The caveat is that perceptions are the only possible evidence for this. So what? Perceptions are our only possible evidence for any conclusion, and the conclusions themselves are perceptions. We do not deny on that account the existence of that which we perceive. We just acknowledge our limitations.

HB : I agree.

BN : Our canonical diagram is solipsistic. Spend a little time, if you will, thinking about collective control, when two or more individuals are controlling “the same thing”.

BN : You are contradicting yourself. See my answer to your post in the past. I never thought that you will be so persistant so that I’ll have to answer to your first post. But here it is what it is. I think that main victim will be Rick again and probably he will start crying with Powers ladies why do we all have to attack him. Smrk, smrk, poor Ricky…

BN : A while back I posted a diagram of the Test for the Controlled Variable as an example of two individuals controlling the “same variable”. Necessarily, there is some topological rearrangement in the part of the diagram that describes one of the individuals.

HB : I hoped you will not do this. But it’s your choice. Nobody can control you.

Inline image 1

BN : During active intervention part of the TCV, the behavioral outputs of the observer-experimenter are disturbances to the variable that the subject is controlling.

BN : Assume that you are the experimenter-observer. By virtue of careful performance of the Test for the Controlled Variable you determine that the subject S is controlling a variable that you perceive, represented in the diagram as the green rectangle between the two control systems.

BN : Your perception of that variable is labeled S.o in the diagram, and the subject’s perception of it is labeled S.s.

HB : So you see they are not observing »the same thing« There are different perceptual signals that have to be controlled. And of course they will be differetnly controlled as you pointed out in post to me.

BN : You successfully perform the Test, and thereby demonstrate that your perception is equivalent to the subject’s perception.

HB : You are contradicting yourself again. You just pointed out that there are S.o. and S.s. perception. That’s also what was your conclusion in post to me. See my answer.

BN : (Or you might prefer to say that your [imagined] perception of the subject’s perception, based on your perception of the variable, is accurate.) That equivalence touches on the root of the problem under discussion.

HB : It’s your root of the problem. You’ll have to deal with it because you are contradicting yourself.

BN : The variable is controlled, protected from disturbances.

HB : Wrong definition of control

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Hb : I doubt that LCS can be protected from disturbances. If you’ll allow me to hit you on your nose, you’ll see clearly that you are not protected from disturbances. And I assume that you control. Disturbances have always to take some effect so that organism can counteract or cancel or adjust the effect. First effect of disturbances then »reaction« of organism.

You can beleive me that you are not protected from disturbances as Rick concluded right that Living control system developed in environment full of disturbances which had to be counteracted (after they took effect). That’s the logic of survival and forming of LCS. That’s what Ashby’s »Law of Requisite variety« is about. If LCS has enough control units to counteract all disturbances that affect it’s control it will survive. Otherwise we wouldn’t be here.

In short. Disturbances have to have effect on contol so that organism will control, counteract, cancel adjust, etc. the effects of disturbances. Control in PCT is happening just in organism, not outside. Aagin :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

BN : During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your perception S.o at its reference value

HB : What an imagination ? Subject acted to maintain experimenters perception near reference value ??? Do I understand right ? Subject acted to maintain his own perception at his reference value, which is constructed inside subjects organism. That’s all what subject can control. His perception near his references. That’s what you were promoting in other post. Where did you get this idea ? Bruce N. you are sitting to much behind of computer dreaming. Stop. Go a little out and take a fresh breath or go joging J.

BN : …despite your ddisturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude (justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s = S.o.

HB : Never S.s and S.o. will be the same. You are contradicting yourself. See your post and my answer to it.

BN : Notice that, by this demonstrated equivalence, the subject S is now controlling your perceptual input S.o by controlling his perceptual input S.s.

Hb : As I said before Bruce. You are imagining to much and you are contradicting yourself. Are you saying that »people can control other people«. Is it the same as Rick was stating that »people can control other people all the time«. I thought you were smarter…

BN : Would it be simpler to say that S is controlling that aspect of the environment which you perceive as S.o (the green rectangle in the diagram) by controlling his perception S.s of that aspect of the environment?

HB : Right. Exactly this is what PCT is about. This is how generally we can explain every behavior or and collective control. You can’t get general diagrma on the basis of one experiment. It’s far from being scientific. See how Bill did it in B:CP.

And see Kent how he did »collective control« experiments and succesfully used stability concept. Amasing. I don’t understand why you and Rick try to invent »hot water«.

BN : When we include other agents in the control system diagram, does Martin’s CEV (the green rectangle above) make for a simpler and more intuitively satisfying account?

HB : I still don’t get it how Martin is momentally defining CEV. But the last definition I know was not about what you are talking about.

Boris

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

Eetu

(Lähetetty kännykästä / Sent from mobile)

Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com kirjoitti 9.6.2017 kello 19.24:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.09.12:23 ET)]

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2 –

Except for imagination, the environment is necessary in order to have a closed loop. Think about that.

/Bruce

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 5:28 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2]

EP: Bruce, again I agree largely, but I think you understood me wrong. I was not talking about knowledge (I intended to resume to it sometimes later…) but only about the cooncept of control. What you write here about the reality of our environment and the possibility of the reliability of our knowledge about it and especially the truthfulness of scientific knowledge is quite OK. But that was not the issue.

EP: The issue was just the concept of control. And it comes up also below: “[Science] gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment. [italics by EP]�

EP: From the next possible facts:

  • a person perceives something in the environment
  • there really is something in the environment “causingâ€? just that perception (not a hallucination or error)
  • the person has a reference value for that perception
  • there is a difference between perceptual and reference values causing error and output
  • the output manages to cause certain kind of changes to that something in the environment
  • as a consequence of those changes the person’s perception changes to the refence value

it does NOT follow that the person controls that something in the environment. It follows only that she controls her perception (of that something). As an everyday experience this seems and sounds like the person were controlling that something in the environment. But just the beauty of the PCT is that we can make the differentiation and understand that all we can ever control is our perceptions.

EP: In everyday life we cannot help saying that someone controls the temperature of the room or that someone did a controlled somersault. But here is theoretical / scientific PCT discussions this either unjustified assumption or unjustified incoherence causes endless confusion.

EP: We don’t control our environment by controlling our perceptions because strictly speaking there are two different kind of processes which do not both justify the use of the term “control�. Neither do we control our perceptions by controlling our environment. What we do is that we control our perceptions by affecting some aspect of our environment and as a consequence of that the aspect of environment (usually) becomes stabilized somehow (in a certain way).

Eetu

Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)–

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08–

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

I believe that you are convinced that this settles the matter.

The most direct evidence of the reality of that which is perceived is that the environment pushes back and sometimes even bites. To perceive as we wish to perceive requires control; that control often requires effort (against what?); that control is often disturbed by unforeseen and even unperceived disturbances (whence?); that control often has unintended consequences (arising from what?). John Kirkland’s post in this thread alludes to unintended consequences of that complex of controlled variables called “industrialization since 1800”.

It would be most peculiar to say that to be scientific we must deny that our experiments, models, and theory give us knowledge of reality. An essential point about PCT is that if the performance of a model conforms very closely to that of a living subject then the structure of the model informs us about what must necessarily be structures in the living subject.

Look at the fundamental first methodological steps of PCT, the Test for the Controlled Variable. When the experimenter E succeeds in determining what perception (perceptual variable) the subject S is controlling, E is justified in saying that S really has that perception and is controlling it. This is because E is controlling what E perceives to be the same variable in such a way as to disturb S’s control of it.

To do this, E imagines a transform or translation of a perception that E is controlling. To identify what perception to control, E guesses what S is controlling. The transformation is from E’s point of view to S’s point of view. Point of view upon what? Upon that which E presumes to be a real variable in the environment which E and S are perceiving from their respective points of view. It is not obvious how one might make sense of the Test, much less carry it out, without this presumption of reality.

Another way to put the conundrum, coming at it from the other direction, is the truism that science never proves anything. Proof is possible only for mathematics and logic.

What science yields us is a succession of provisional and serviceable models of reality (that is, of that aspect of reality of which the particular field of science treats). In other words, it gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment.

When I say provisional and serviceable, I mean that we make do with the best theory that is still standing when the dust of argument settles, or (as in the case of Newtonian vs. relativistic vs. quantum physics) the best theory for the purposes at hand–or to pick another familiar example, sometimes waves are a more useful model of light, sometimes particles are.

In short, the conclusions of science are high-level perceptions that enable us to control lower-level perceptions better and more reliably than non-science and nonsense conclusions do. And they do so precisely because they (apparently) correspond better to whatever it is that is really real, independent of our perceptions. They better equip us to identify and control variables that matter to us, to resist disturbances to our control, and maybe even to avoid unintended side effects, or at least recognize them in time to bring them, too, under control.

Conversely, our perception that we are better able to control under system concepts and principles of science than we are with non-science or nonsense system concepts and principles is our justification for taking the system concepts and principles of science to be true–that is, taking them to be realities. The argument is circular, but it appears to have been a virtuous circle so far.

/Bruce

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08]

Bruce, I largely agree. Some comments though:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)]

Begin with some PCT truisms.

All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it.

(Not sure about this, but I will turn to it sometimes later – it depends on definitions. I agree that all our knowledgee is based on perceptions.)

All that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it.

That is funny and fuzzy saying, at least for me: sounds like our perceptions were in the environment. I would say that we cannot control anything in the environment but only our perceptions of it.

I control many perceptions of our environment without exerting the actions that maintain them under control. Other people, or other agents, exert the actions that maintain them under control.

Or they just happen to be (temporarily) so that our perceptions of them remain near the reference.

Among the evidence that I control such perceptions is the observation that, should control of them lapse, I act in such a way that other people or agents resist the disturbance and re-establish control of them.

A recent example: the street signs for Pinehurst Avenue and Chase Road were swapped, so that each designated the other road. My wife called my attention to it. We contacted the Public Works Department. They fixed it.

What’s the point of this? All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it, and we presume that our perceptions are the realities that we perceive. (We presume this even though we know that our perceptions are selective and omit infinitely many aspects of the environment, some of which we know about because we or others have extended the senses with scientific instruments.) This presumption is justified by our success controlling in the environment and by the like success of all our human and pre-human ancestors without whose survival we would not be here.

That is extremely important. Our success in control of our perceptions is highly depending on other people and other actors – and finally on the objects or our perceptions.

By this justified presumption, we project the universe of our perceptions into the otherwise unknowable universe of our environment.

That justified presumption extends to the fact that all that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it. We are justified in the presumption that the controlled variable is in the environment. Every time two or more of us control what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment we obtain further justification of that presumption. Examples of two or more of us controlling what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment are conflict, collective control, and the Test for the Controlled Variable.

Here I disagree. This is a natural presumption of our everyday life. But I think that PCT just makes us abandon that presumption at least in theoretical i.e. scientific context. In everyday talk and thinking we may say that we control something in the environment and that something is possibly controlled also by some other person. But we should know better that we and those other persons are controlling only our or their own perceptions and nothing in environment. That object or something in the environment OF which our perception is may be the same OF which the other persons’ perceptions are. But we do not control that object or whatever there is in the environment but just our own perceptions.

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

It is impossible to argue whether or not the controlled variable is in the environment without forgetting that we make this presumption, and that it is a presumption. If we accept the justification (which we must, in order to do things together, including arguing, and which we routinely do to survive) then we thereby assert that it is in the environment. But when we wish to identify things in a control theory diagram as a tool of analysis, we remember that this is a presumption, merely the projection of our perceptions onto the otherwise unknowable environment, and we must acknowledge that it is in the perceived environment, the universe of perception, which we perceive to be shared between and among us, and really out there, largely because of the routine successes of collective control.

Yes that is right, I agree with this.

I know of no way out of the conundrum other than to acknowledge it. I believe it is foolish to argue about it.

The only way out perhaps is staying strict and careful with our concepts. We must tell when we use every day “control� and when PCT “Control�.

Eetu Pikkarainen

PhD (Ed.), Dos., University Lecturer (in Education)

Faculty of Education, University of Oulu, Finland

Schools in Transition: Linking Past, Present, and Future in Educational Practice

Edited by Pauli Siljander, Kimmo Kontio and Eetu Pikkarainen
[https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/other-books/schools-in-transition/](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.sensepublishers.com_catalogs_bookseries_other-2Dbooks_schools-2Din-2Dtransition_&d=DwMGaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=0nhfyP3k5-Wr6mhZrUnj5mPm1NDoqG-YillmP7AEVms&s=0r7kgNNHJhKIUPUNRy_M4-6gMGtyCTrV7vOjwub4cW4&e=)
                         /Bruce

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.07.22.48]

On 2017/06/7 8:25 PM, Alison Powers wrote:

Martin - I am confused because you say:

MT: Rick says the controlled variable is in the environment, which I say cannot be true, because in the environment there exists no independent reference variables nor sources from which they can be determined independently of observation of the moment-by-moment values of the environmental variable itself.

But then Rick responded to me in the PCT Research thread:

RM: The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

I construed that sentence from Rick to be a shot in a different long-standing and apparently irresolvable argument, which I had intended to ignore. I realize there’s no point in reiterating the fact that the result of applying a function to a bunch of variables is itself a variable, but that’s the nub of the argument in which that sentence was a shot. Rick disagrees – it’s mathematics and therefore just an opinion open to contradiction.

However, to me he certainly suggests in that sentence that the controlled variable is in the environment, whether it is a function of other variables in the environment (presumably controlled ones) or should be treated as the result of that function. Certainly the function that defines the CEV is the perceptual function. We have never had any disagreement about that. The question is whether the arguments to that function are in the environment as he explicitly says they are.

But consider instead Rick’s recent statements about “behaviour”, which provide the context for interpreting the sentence you quote [From Rick Marken (2017.06.06.1225). I have highlighted a few phrases and sentences. I don’t think I need more than this, though I could go back into the archives and find interactions between us when Rick has argued against me that the controlled variable IS in the environment, quite explicitly. Yesterday’s message should be enough to make the point:


RM: Saying that “behavior is control” simply calls attention to the fact what we call “behaviors” are both actions and results; in PCT lingo, behaviors are both outputs and the variables controlled by those outputs – controlled variables. So the behavior called “tying shoelaces” points to a control process where the controlled variable is the state of the laces, the reference state of this variable is “tied” and the outputs that produce this result are the hand movements the get the laces tied. Moreover, what we see as the output component of a behavior are typically controlled variables themselves and what we see as the controlled variable component of behavior is typically an output itself. For example, the movements (outputs) used to produce the reference state of a controlled variable (tied laces) are themselves a controlled variable; their speed and direction are the controlled result of muscle forces. And the tied laces (the controlled variable) that result from those outputs (movements) are themselves outputs that are the means of controlling another variable, the “onness” of the shoes.

RM: So “control” is just a more precise definition of the informal term “behavior”. “Control” refers to the observation of a variable being maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. And this is what we can see is what is going on with the things we call “behaviors”. “Tying shoelaces”, for example, refers to the observation that a variable (the state of the laces) is maintained in a reference state (consistently brought to the state “tied”) protected from disturbance (the different initial state of the laces, variations in the forces the affect the laces, etc). When you are able to see behavior – any named behavior – as being both output that affects the state of a controlled variable and a controlled variable itself – you have learned to see behavior through control theory glasses. By the way, this is all discussed in the first 2 chapters of “Controlling People”.


MT. In all of that is there any suggestion that a controlled variable might be a perception? I think not. Everything refers to the controlled variable being a state of the environment that can be observed by another person. In those two paragraphs, the only reference to perception is in the “P” of “PCT” up front. If Rick had said, for example, in the second highlighted clause “the controlled variable is the [perceived] state of the laces”, I would have no problem. But he didn’t, and any casual reader might think he meant (and maybe he did mean) the actual state of the laces in the environment.

MT. We all know the form of the control loop, at least in its simplest “canonical” form. We also know that real organisms have limitations such as sensory thresholds, which mean that any particular value of an external variable gives rise to an uncertain value of the perceptual variable that is produced by its perceptual function (actually a hierarchy of perceptual functions), and we know that neural firings are actually not a continuous smooth “neural current”. What we also know is that the reference value for a perceptual signal is generated from within the organism, and does not exist in the environment (contrary to what Rick seems to imply in the fourth line of each paragraph). Control of a perception may not even correspond to control of anything another observer could perceive in the environment, if the perception includes any component from imagination.

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist in the environment. I would like to keep clear that however well the perception corresponds to a state of the environment, it is not the state of the environment, though it is the state that is controlled. To confuse the two is…confusing.

Martin

Down…

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 9:41 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1240)]

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

EP: Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

RM: This is simply not true.

HB : You’ll not beleive it. It’s exactly true. You have to understand PCT before you criticize others.

RM:Â See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other than the person doing the controlling to know this.

HB : People are controlling their perception and by doing that they are also stabilizing their environment. The question is HOWÂ Â or as Eetu pointed out …

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables. It is an “objective” definition in the sense that others besides the observer can confirm the observation. The definition of control in PCT is: maintenance of a variable in a reference state, protected from disturbance.

HB : Will you stop bullshitting Rick and present a real definition of control in PCT :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : Stop lying and misleading members Rick !!!

RM : “Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon.

HB : Right. But which definition of control. Yours or Bills ?

Yours defitnion of control is done in outer environment and Bills defitnion of control is done in organism. So here are two control loops that derive from different conception of control and totaly different »control loops«. One is »Control of behavior« and one is »Control of perception«. Why do I have to copy paste it so many times.

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

This a big fake…

And now again Ladies and Gentlemen real PCT control loop from inventor of PCT and founder of this forum to whom most of writings could be dedicated and with more respect :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Who don’t see the fatal difference ??? Rick ???

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1250)]

···

Eetu Pikkarainen (2017-06-12)-

Â

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

Â

RM: This is simply not true. See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other than the person doing the controlling to know this.Â

Â

EP: I think you partly replied on behalf of in your message
[From Rick Marken (2017.06.11.1640)] but only partly. You wrote:

Â

RM: “a controlled perception is an inference based on observation of the fact that certain variables in what is perceived by an observer as the subject’s environment are controlled (maintained in reference states,
protected from disturbance).â€?Â

Â

EP: This means that an observer sees something special happen in the environment and from that s/he
infers that the subject is controlling some perception.

RM: Right. The “special” thing that is seen in the environment is that a variable is being controlled (maintained in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance). For example, we can see that people are controlling for being upright as they walk over irregular terrain (the disturbances). We infer that they are doing this by controlling (among other things) a perception of the location of their center of gravity)

EP: As part of that inference the observer can do tests and try to disturb the subject’s controlling.

RM: Â I would say that the inference is the theory of how this control occurs: PCT. The testing that then occurs involves determining what perceptions that are being controlled that are the basis of this observed control: is it perceived center of gravity, perceived visual orientation with respect to the ground, etc.Â

Â

EP: What the observer is seeing is not control, but stabilization, see below…

RM: No, if they see a variable being maintained in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance, then they are seeing control. Stabilization is not control. In stabilization (as in a mass-spring system) there is a stable (“equilibrium”) state of a variable that could be seen as a reference state but the variable is not protected from disturbance when it is in this state.Â

Â

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

Â

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables…“Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon. Â

Â

EP: Perception may not be a part of the definition, but the reference is.

RM: Yes, the reference state is part of the definition of control. The reference state is an observable state of the variable. The reference signal in the PCT model accounts for the constant or variable reference state of the variable that is observed.Â

Â

EP: Like perception, also the reference is only inside the subject / organism.

RM: The reference signal is inside the organism; the reference state is outside the system.

EP: Â So the definition of control (in PCT) cannot be defined
completely in terms of observable variables.

RM: Â Again, this is “plain and simple” untrue not a lie because I"m sure the error is unintentional).

EP: When you see (the fact) that something is (in a certain way and conditions) stabilized in the environment of the subject, you can infer from that to (the fact of) control. It is like all science a hypothetical and
fallible inference, but by experience a more reliable inference than many everyday alternatives. That is just the glory of science: you can know something what you have not (immediately) perceived.

RM: I appreciate your enthusiasm for PCT, Etau, but I think, at this point in your PCT learning curve, it would be wise for you to take the advice of our recent American winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature and “know your song well before you start singin’”.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.12.17:23 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.23.01–

I apparently received [your post] 10 hours before you sent it

Yes, a typo, 23 hours instead of 13 hours. I wonder if the advancing cataract in my right eye is distracting. Should address it.

MMT

So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not be transient. Bill could have continued his force on the steering wheel for minutes or hours while Dag continued to keep the car in its lane.

Yes, Bill could have persisted in his conflict with Dag. But then we would no longer be talking about the Test.

I remember a parallel to the peculiarity of this conflict, that Bill is purposely limiting his output so as not to overwhelm Dag’s ability to control. I was visiting a friend in Sebastopol for her birthday. A mutual friend, who I had not seen for over 40 years, had been a body builder and was still quite strong, though you wouldn’t guess it looking at her petite frame. The several of us went to a standup comedy show. The lead act was a tall, athletic blonde woman, lesbian like most of her audience. Somehow her schtick got around to inviting someone to arm-wrestle her, and my friend took her up on it. She’s about 4/5 the height, with proportionally disparate arm lengths. Contrary to expectation, she holds their hands in the vertical position. Then her arm is bent back her way a few degrees, The bigger woman’s hand is flexed, overtopping, she’s clearly pushing all she’s got, but the hands come back to vertical. Finally, she calls a draw. Afterward, my friend admits she could have put her down, but she didn’t want to show her up. “It’s her show.” But there can be no doubt that it was a conflict.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –

How do you control a perception that the disturbing action influences the variable without controlling the state of that variable?

A simpler way of answering is “You don’t control everything you perceive”.

What criteria do you you to determine which perceptions are controlled and which are not? For example, I recall Bill proposing that we control the perception of the sun rising in the east, as evidenced by what we would do if it rose somewhere else. Some controlled perceptions are what we call expectations.

To be more fair about the unusual circumstance, Bill demonstrating the Test to Dag, we might suppose that (b) Bill was controlling a perception of Dag resisting his disturbance to the steering of the car; this in turn being the means of (a) controlling a perception of Dag better understanding the Test. But his means for (b), knowing that Dag was controlling the heading of the car by means of controlling the rotational position of the steering wheel, was (c) to change the rotational position of the steering wheel by means of (d) applying pressure that would rotate the wheel if Dag were not controlling its position. Summarizing the perceptions that I imagine Bill was controlling:

a) Dag better understands the Test

b) Dag resists a disturbance to his control of the rotational position of the steering wheel

c) the rotational position of the wheel

d) rotational pressure on the wheel

I agree with you that Bill does not need to control the rotational position of the steering wheel (which Dag is also doing, hence the conflict) if all that he is doing is applying pressure on the wheel. But that is not all that he is doing. He is (d) applying pressure on the wheel for a purpose (c) of changing the rotational position of the wheel. He is doing that for a purpose, knowing that Dag is also controlling that variable and that this pressure would be a disturbance to Dag’s control of it, so that Bill is thus by that means controlling a perception of (b) Dag resisting the disturbance. The yet further purpose of this was, I assume, not for Bill to verify that Dag was indeed controlling as expected, but rather to demonstrate control (and the Test) to Dag in a memorable way.

I don’t think there are any hidden assumptions here.

/Bruce
···

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 11:35 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.23.01]

Bruce, I have the feeling we are talking at cross purposes. Perhaps

we should look at underlying assumptions that may differ, before
arguing about text, but I don’t at the moment see where those are,
so I will work with the text. Maybe the problem will become apparent
in time.

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.15.53 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42 –

          as Dag applies a

counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose Dag’s
force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an
accident).

        This is a nice illustration

of how and why the disturbance is purposeful and transient
because control at a higher level terminates it after
observing the effect (or lack of expectable effect if it is
resisted).

        (It wasn't Dag driving,

IIRC, but no matter.)

        Dag is controlling the

position of the car in the lane by means of varying rotary
force on the steering wheel. Bill is disturbing the position
of the car in the lane by means of briefly applying rotary
force to the steering wheel. Dag resists the disturbance by
the same means.

        If the disturbance did not

affect the heading of the car Dag would not resist it,
unless because it disturbed a different higher-level
perception, such as a perception of who should properly be
in control of the car.

So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not be transient.

Bill could have continued his force on the steering wheel for
minutes or hours while Dag continued to keep the car in its lane.

        In both cases, the

disturbance is to the higher level perception (the heading
of the car in the lane).

Yes.
        This is shown in a scenario

where , unbeknownst to
Dag, there are dual
controls (as for driver education) or he is in a
‘self-driving’ car, and another agent has taken over keeping
the car properly aligned in the lane. When he feels the
wheel moving appropriately without his effort he may be
startled and take action from higher levels of control
(“Hey, what’s going on here?”) but he won’t resist the
movements of the wheel because the input perception of the
heading of the car in the lane still matches the reference.
Externally applied force on the wheel is not a disturbance
unless it causes a disturbance at the higher level; which is
as much as saying that Bill’s externally applied force on
the wheel is a disturbance at the higher level controlling
the heading of the car in the lane.

Yes, that's the point of Bill applying his force to the steering

wheel without controlling the direction of the car, as I said
originally: " * Dag is controlling for keeping the car in its
proper lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test
whether Dag is controlling that hypothesized variable*."

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –

              In the Test, the experimenter has

no reference value for the hypothesized variable the subject
is controlling, and does not control it. The experimenter does
disturb it, and controls for a perception that the disturbing
action did influence the hypothesized variable, but thereafter
does not further influence it.

              Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –
How do you control a
perception that the disturbing action influences the
variable without controlling the state of that variable?

I thought my message was an answer to that question (which I

apparently received 10 hours before you sent it), using as an
example a situation Bill had described on CSGnet in order to explain
the same point. A simpler way of answering is “You don’t control
everything you perceive”.

The Tester cannot Test if the Tester sets up a conflict in the

“classical” sense of both Tester and Subject trying to control the
same variable to different values (which I how I interpret what you
are suggesting). The result would be a case of conflictive
collective control. Instead, the Tester has to disturb some variable
that is an argument of the perceptual function that creates the
perception the Tester hypothesises as being controlled by the
Subject. (Or, I suppose, change the subject’s influence on one of
those variables, though I’ve never seen or heard of the Test being
done on the output side of the environmental feedback pathway).

In a possibly vain hope of teasing out differences of assumption,

may I offer the suggestion that we may have different views on the
meaning of “control”. For me, to control something you have to be
acting to counter disturbances so as to bring the controlled
variable close to the reference value and keep it there as
disturbances (and reference values) change. In the case of the car,
Bill never controlled the aiming direction of the car, but did
disturb it. He did control his force, and Dag countered that change.
(By the way, Dag says it was him).

The existence of a reference value is essential, whether it is fixed

(as is hypothesized to be the case at the highest level of the
hierarchy) or variable because of outputs from levels above the one
in question. No reference value against which to compare the
controlled variable, no control.

Martin

Boris, discussions of PCT theory and PCT research can and often
do lead to significant confusion.

  I am going to make a couple of bold assertions here!  When

discussing ONLY the subject of what the theory of PCT is; Rick,
Martin, Bruce, Dag (and the list goes on) almost never make any
sort of error or contradiction of what Bill Powers taught. When
such errors do (rarely) occur they (including Rick) are quick to
correct the error (of even without someone else having pointed out
the error).

  Remaining with the theoretical perspective...  The property of

control can not exist without a comparator. Of course it also can
not exist with a reference value, a sensor input, an output
effector, something to be sensed, something to be acted upon by
the output effector, and a relationship between the acted upon
‘thing’ and the sensed 'thing.'Â That is to say that control is a
continuous functioning process and not a 'thing.'Â You can have
all of these ‘things’ and not have a control system. It is only
when they are all connected to each other in a certain way that a
control system is possible.

  I'm not sure if this fits in with Bill Powers thinking but I also

believe that the “acted upon ‘thing,’” the “sensed ‘thing,’” and
the “relationship between them’” do not necessarily have to be
what we would call physical objects. Einstein’s work on the
theories of relativity would be examples of the use of a control
process in solving a theoretical problem.

  Personally I think that your difficulties with Rick exist because

your view of the approach that Rick is using in APPLYING the PCT
theory to actual observed behavior (actual or theoretical
behavior) is that his approach is flawed.

  As soon as you leave discussion of the theory of PCT itself and

begin discussing the implication of PCT to behavior, one is, for
very practical reasons, forced to make many assumptions. Many of
these assumptions have recently been discussed in some detail and
with great clarity by a number of different CSGnet members.

  A very simple example of such an assumption:Â  If I as an

observer/researcher have a perception that an object in the
environment that I am watching closely at moves to the left and
the subject individual is also watching that same object, the
subject will have essentially the same perception that the object
moved to the left as did I. An absolutely VITAL aspect of this
assumption is that the two perceptual input functions (even though
they are in two different and independent beings) are both linking
the observed properties of the object being observed.

  If the subject corrects the leftward movement (and all others

disturbances to the position or maybe trajectory) of the observed
object then the researcher, as a result of understanding the
theory of PCT can conclude that their own perception of the effect
of the behavior of the subject on the object then they can
conclude that they have properly identified the subject’s
perception that is being controlled.

  Because, at least those of us that do believe that science and

scientific principles are valid (and of course I believe that to
be a true situation for everyone on this forum), then it is NOT
improper to state a PROPERTY OF THE OBSERVED OBJECT is being
control by the subject even though we know that the subject can
only control their PERCEPTION of that property.

  I believe that Rick (and others of course) accept that what I

just stated it the preceding paragraph is a perfectly reasonable
way to talk about real world application of PCT but that you do
not agree. And thus your dispute with Rick (and again no doubt
others) is founded on this single difference in opinion.

Best, Bill

···

On 06/12/2017 08:10 AM, Boris Hartman
wrote:

        Down

Â

From:
Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com ]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2017 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live
William T. Powers

Â

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.09.1250)]

Martin Taylor (2017.06.07.22.48)Â

Â

                        MT.

It seems to me that regardless of what may
be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the
other day about Behaviour being the control
of perception), the words he uses can easily
lead a reader to conclude that controlled
variables exist in the environment.

Â

                        RM: Ignoring the

fact that I know  that controlled
variables are not in the environment, what
would be so bad about a reader concluding
that they are variables in the environment?Â

            RM: I don't know if you saw this before, Martin; it

ended up being posted in a different thread for some
reason. But I would really appreciate hearing your
answer to this question.Â

Â

              HB

:

              Martin

already answered on Ricks question above and I
perfectly agree with his answer. I hope that he will
not mind if I add some sentences.

Â

              The

problem is not if reader beleives that there are
variables in environment but whether there are
»controlled variables« in environment or not. The
problem is that you are not ignoring this »fact« but
that you are »double« personality. It’s yours
instability Rick that is causing so much confussion
here on CSGnet.

              We

are just talking about your irrisposibility to be on
side of PCT where the only »controlled variable« is
not in environment but inside the controlling system.
It’s called perceptual signal. Hence Bills theory
about »Control of perception«.

              Ashby

was taking quite different approcah preventing such a
mish-mash in meanings. Variables in his
»ultrastability« theory were inside organism and
parameters were outside. So even in the case of
control there was inpossible to miss the position of
variabel. It was inside.

              In

the case of PCT everything are variables so it’s
sometimes qiute difficult to understand why variables
inside system are controlled and outisde system are
not. But Bill did solve this problem and you Rick
don’t understand how, so once you are writing in PCT
manner and once in RCT. In this way you make
confussion even greater, as you are hiding your RCT
theory behind PCT.

              We

are not ignoring the »fact« that you once understand
that »controlled variables« are not in the environment
and once you don’t. You can check it on CSGnet
archives about your »double« personality, which is
confusing all around you including Alison Powers, who
really showed very high understanding of PCT, much
higher then you did.

              Mostly

you don’t use your understanding that »controlled
variable« is not in the environment. Your demos show
this clearly. The same is with your books and
articles.

              Because

you are so unreliable (all your demos mostly show
»controlled variable« in environment«) starting with
»distance«, I made just for you a control loop where
»controlled variable« is in environment, Then it’s
clear how »control loop« should look like if you
control »controlled variable« with behavior as there
are no other means that make sense except if you want
to introduce Telekinesis and Telephaty to show how yu
can control inside and in the same time outside.

              Beside

»control« in outer in environment you perceive that
control with »Controled Perceptual Variable« or as you
called it CPV what is close to Gavins’ PCV.

              So

control loop which has your elements looks like this :

1.      CONTROL
: Keeping some »controlled variable (aspect of outer
environment) in reference state, protected (defended)
from disturbances.

2.      OUTPUT
FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to
outer environment so to keep some »controlled
variable« in reference state

3.      FEED-BACK
FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer
environment« in reference state.

4.      INPUT
FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or
»Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of
»controlled q.i.«

5.      COMPARATOR
: ???

Â

              We

see that in RCT the »only« problem is comparator.
Although everything is problematic, only for
comparator Rick has never explicitly defined how it
works.

              I

think that Rick can’t define it, because comparators
are ususally not in environment where by Rick’s
persuasion control is done. And there are some others
who beleive the same.

              So

in RCT case (Ricks Control Theory) where control is
done in environment he has to put »comparator« into
environment if he want to prove that something is
controlled in environment. The only place in control
loop where control is done is »comparator«. So it has
to be somewhere in environment if control is done in
environmnet. Something has to be matched to reference
so that we get control in environment. Ups but where
are references in environment ??? Â That was also
mostly msitake of engeeners as Henry
Yin pointed out.

              HY

: … reference is placed outside of the organism, where
the engineer designing the system also performs
comparison function. Thus for decades such control
systems have been treated as stimulus-respons or
input-output devices : error in, behavior out. The
tendency to resort to linear causation is so strong
that even closed loop controllers have been treated as
devices that receive error signals and generate
behaviors.

              HB

: Does it look familiar to you ? How we should call
your »comparator« in environment ?

            RM in other post : The variables that

we see being controlled are the data that are to be
explained by theory.

Â

HB : Maybe
»Controlled variable« where »mis-match« between effets
of output and references are taking place and »error«
is calculated and perceived by organism in the form of
»Controlled Perceptual variable« or CPV as you called
it.

Â

              HB

: Rick sorry to say, but term »Controlled Perceptual
Variable« is your pure invention as this term was
never used in PCT literature, nor by Bill nor by Mary
Powers nor by Henry Yin. It’s stimulating thinking
that control comes form environment into controlling
system and that is »input-ouput« system as Henry Yin
pointed out.

Â

              Where

did you get this term Rick. Maybe you are »double«
agent and you are working also for Carver who is also
producing all kinds of new self-regulation terms.Â

              Do

you remember using all these terms ? Well if you don’t
they are safe in CSGnet archive. You can never escape
from nonsense you wrote. You should be carefull what
you are writing arroung CSGnet as every word is
»recorded« and saved.Â

              Do

you understand where your problem is ?Â

Best,

Boris

Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

                                    Richard S.

MarkenÂ

                                      "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when
you

                                      have nothing left to take

away.�

                                      Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â 

 --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.12.17:23 ET)]

          Martin Taylor

2017.06.11.23.01–

         I

apparently received [your post] 10 hours before you sent it

        Yes, a typo, 23 hours

instead of 13 hours. I wonder if the advancing cataract in
my right eye is distracting. Should address it.

MMT

          So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not

be transient. Bill could have continued his force on the
steering wheel for minutes or hours while Dag continued to
keep the car in its lane.

        Yes, Bill could have persisted in his conflict with Dag.

But then we would no longer be talking about the Test.

There was no conflict at any time in the episode. Let's analyse the

situation more closely than heretofore.

In the standard version of a conflict, the two antagonists are each

controlling their perceptions of some environmental variable but at
a different reference value. Let’s ask what Bill was controlling,
and then whether Dag was controlling his perception of “the same”
variable. I choose to take Bill at his word.

1. Was Bill controlling the rotation angle of the steering wheel?

No. Why do I say that? Because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning
the wheel to a position that corrected for any lane deviation cause
initially by Bill’s applied force. Conclusion: there was no conflict
over the rotation angle of the steering wheel.

2. Was Bill controlling the net force applied to the wheel (assuming

he could perceive it). No, for the same reason.

Conclusion: There was no conflict over the net force being applied

to the wheel.

3. Was Bill controlling the force he applied to the wheel? Yes, or

so we can assume, because his action was intentional.

    3a. So we ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied

to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the
wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel,
which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict
over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

4. Since Dag was controlling the force he applied to the wheel, was

Bill controlling the force Dag applied to the wheel? No, he did not
interfere in any way with Dag’s ability to produce the force he
wanted to produce. Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force
Dag applied to the wheel.

What is left? All I can see without going higher into interpersonal

interactions (e.g., the possibility of Dag getting annoyed with Bill
for putting them both into danger as perceived by Dag) is the
variable Bill was testing:

6. Was Dag controlling the position of the car in its lane? Your

assertion was that if Bill was testing that hypothesis, Bill must
have been controlling for the car’s position in the lane to be
different from Dag’s reference for it. was this the case? No,
because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning the car to his (Dag’s)
reference for his perception of the car’s place in the lane.
Conclusion: There was no conflict over the position of the car in
its lane.

My conclusion: Nowhere in this episode was there any conflict of any

kind, but Bill did determine that Dag was controlling his perception
of the position of the car in its lane.

        I remember a parallel to the peculiarity of this

conflict, that Bill is purposely limiting his output so as
not to overwhelm Dag’s ability to control.

 It's hardly a peculiarity. The force he was applying was the only

thing Bill was controlling, and controlling means keeping its
perception at or near its reference value.

        I was visiting a friend in Sebastopol for her birthday.

A mutual friend, who I had not seen for over 40 years, had
been a body builder and was still quite strong, though you
wouldn’t guess it looking at her petite frame. The several
of us went to a standup comedy show. The lead act was a
tall, athletic blonde woman, lesbian like most of her
audience. Somehow her schtick got around to inviting someone
to arm-wrestle her, and my friend took her up on it. She’s
about 4/5 the height, with proportionally disparate arm
lengths. Contrary to expectation, she holds their hands in
the vertical position. Then her arm is bent back her way a
few degrees, The bigger woman’s hand is flexed, overtopping,
she’s clearly pushing all she’s got, but the hands come back
to vertical. Finally, she calls a draw. Afterward, my friend
admits she could have put her down, but she didn’t want to
show her up. “It’s her show.” But there can be no doubt that
it was a conflict.

Yes, but in what way is this relevant? Your friend presumable was

controlling the position of the hands with a reference value of
“vertical”, while the opponent’s reference value for the position of
the hands was for your friend’s hand to be on the table. Two
controllers trying to set an environmental variable to two different
reference values, a classical conflict.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –

          How do you control a perception that the disturbing

action influences the variable without controlling the
state of that variable?

          A simpler way of answering is "You don't control

everything you perceive".

          What criteria do you you to determine which perceptions

are controlled and which are not? For example, I recall
Bill proposing that we control the perception of the sun
rising in the east, as evidenced by what we would do if it
rose somewhere else. Some controlled perceptions are what
we call expectations.

That's a different area of investigation, one on which we may differ

(or not) but one that has only tangential relevance to the question
you asked above. I think the Dag-driving episode is a good example
of how you “control a perception that the disturbing action
influences the variable without controlling the state of that
variable?” Rick
[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1045)] gave the rubber-band demo as
another example.

          To be more fair about the unusual circumstance, Bill

demonstrating the Test to Dag, we might suppose that (b)
Bill was controlling a perception of Dag resisting his
disturbance to the steering of the car; this in turn being
the means of (a) controlling a perception of Dag better
understanding the Test. But his means for (b), knowing
that Dag was controlling the heading of the car by means
of controlling the rotational position of the steering
wheel, was (c) to change the rotational position of the
steering wheel by means of (d) applying pressure that
would rotate the wheel if Dag were not controlling its
position. Summarizing the perceptions that I imagine Bill
was controlling:

a) Dag better understands the Test

Yes.

          b) Dag resists a disturbance to his control of the

rotational position of the steering wheel

Bill did not control that. He observed it (as he expected he would).

c) the rotational position of the wheel

Bill did not control that… see above.

d) rotational pressure on the wheel

Bill did not control that, whether you mean Dag's applied force or

the total applied force. Bill did control his own applied force.

          I agree with you that Bill does not need to control the

rotational position of the steering wheel (which Dag is
also doing, hence the conflict) if all that he is doing is
applying pressure on the wheel. But that is not all that
he is doing. He is (d) applying pressure on the wheel for
a purpose (c) of changing the rotational position of the
wheel.

For a purpose of changing, yes. For a purpose of changing it to a

position in which he wants to keep it, no. The controlled perception
(which is not required for the test) is that there is (as opposed to
“is not”) a perceptible immediate change in the rotation angle of
the steering wheel.

          He is doing that for a purpose, knowing that Dag is

also controlling that variable and that this pressure
would be a disturbance to Dag’s control of it, so that
Bill is thus by that means controlling a perception of (b)
Dag resisting the disturbance.

One may assume that, yes, but it goes beyond the issue under

discussion, which is whether in the Test for the Controlled Variable
the Tester must, must not, or may control the variable that the
Tester hypothesizes the Subject to be controlling.

          The yet further purpose of this was, I assume, not for

Bill to verify that Dag was indeed controlling as
expected, but rather to demonstrate control (and the Test)
to Dag in a memorable way.

That is as Dag confirmed in this thread [Dag Forssell

2017.06.11.18.20 PDT].

I don’t think there are any hidden assumptions here.

I see one, which can be expressed in two ways: (1) that control can

exist without any reference value for the variable being controlled,
or (2) control can exist without the controller altering output in
any way that is related to the disturbance. Your argument seem to
hinge on this one hidden assumption.

Martin

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.13.11:03 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36 –

Bill pushes with an effort that would turn the steering wheel if Dag were not controlling the movement of the steering wheel and consequently pushing back against Bill’s effort just enough to maintain is control. You say that this is not conflict. As a reason for denying that this is a conflict you assert that they are not controlling the same perception.

[W]e ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel, which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction and Dag pushed on it in the opposite direction but you say this is not a conflict. Put this way, this seems absurd on the face of it.

They were both applying force in opposing directions to the same perceived variable, the steering wheel. They had different purposes for this, but their control came down to force applied to the same variable.

For Dag, the purpose was to maintain control of the heading of the car. The lesson of the experience, presumably, was how instantly, precisely, and without thought the higher-level systems increased wheel-turning force in opposition to the wheel-turning force that Bill was exerting. For Bill, the purpose was to elicit this opposition by exerting wheel-turning force. Nonetheless, he did exert wheel-turning force. That is the only way that he could elicit wheel-turning opposing force.

Was Bill controlling the rotation angle of the steering wheel? No. Why do I say that? Because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning the wheel to a position that corrected for any lane deviation cause initially by Bill’s applied force. Conclusion: there was no conflict over the rotation angle of the steering wheel.

I disagree. Bill did oppose Dag’s maintaining the wheel at its reference position. Dag said there was no effect, but that means only that his opposing control was successful. You seem to be saying that if control does not achieve its purpose it is not control.

  1. Was Bill controlling the force he applied to the wheel? Yes, or so we can assume, because his action was intentional.

3a. So we ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel, which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

To quote Niels Bohr, you’re not thinking, you’re just being logical. They each are applying force to the same object (perception, environmental variable), the steering wheel, and those forces are diametrically opposed. That they are doing so for disparate purposes is typical of a conflict. That the two forces are equal and the effect null in this particular conflict is a product of Bill controlling his demonstration to Dag and Dag controlling the heading of the car (in each case with the several intervening levels of controlled perceptions by which that is effected). For Bill, this is a limited conflict, and the limitation is a perception that he is controlling (“just enough for Dag to observe his resistance to the disturbance”).

As generally happens when opposing control forces are equal and the effect null, a higher level of control in one of the controllers (or sometimes both) ceases using that particular means and begins using alternative means to achieve its purpose. S gives up on pushing an immovable object and instead tries a different door, or knocks and calls, etc. Bill does not give up (the object is not immovable), but rather the control loop that is imposing the limitation on force begins controlling a verbal conversation with Dag about what just happened. This is probably a continuation of a conversation that led up to the demonstration.

···

On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.12.17:23 ET)]

          Martin Taylor

2017.06.11.23.01–

         I

apparently received [your post] 10 hours before you sent it

        Yes, a typo, 23 hours

instead of 13 hours. I wonder if the advancing cataract in
my right eye is distracting. Should address it.

MMT

          So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not

be transient. Bill could have continued his force on the
steering wheel for minutes or hours while Dag continued to
keep the car in its lane.

        Yes, Bill could have persisted in his conflict with Dag.

But then we would no longer be talking about the Test.

There was no conflict at any time in the episode. Let's analyse the

situation more closely than heretofore.

In the standard version of a conflict, the two antagonists are each

controlling their perceptions of some environmental variable but at
a different reference value. Let’s ask what Bill was controlling,
and then whether Dag was controlling his perception of “the same”
variable. I choose to take Bill at his word.

1. Was Bill controlling the rotation angle of the steering wheel?

No. Why do I say that? Because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning
the wheel to a position that corrected for any lane deviation cause
initially by Bill’s applied force. Conclusion: there was no conflict
over the rotation angle of the steering wheel.

2. Was Bill controlling the net force applied to the wheel (assuming

he could perceive it). No, for the same reason.

Conclusion: There was no conflict over the net force being applied

to the wheel.

3. Was Bill controlling the force he applied to the wheel? Yes, or

so we can assume, because his action was intentional.

    3a. So we ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied

to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the
wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel,
which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict
over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

4. Since Dag was controlling the force he applied to the wheel, was

Bill controlling the force Dag applied to the wheel? No, he did not
interfere in any way with Dag’s ability to produce the force he
wanted to produce. Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force
Dag applied to the wheel.

What is left? All I can see without going higher into interpersonal

interactions (e.g., the possibility of Dag getting annoyed with Bill
for putting them both into danger as perceived by Dag) is the
variable Bill was testing:

6. Was Dag controlling the position of the car in its lane? Your

assertion was that if Bill was testing that hypothesis, Bill must
have been controlling for the car’s position in the lane to be
different from Dag’s reference for it. was this the case? No,
because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning the car to his (Dag’s)
reference for his perception of the car’s place in the lane.
Conclusion: There was no conflict over the position of the car in
its lane.

My conclusion: Nowhere in this episode was there any conflict of any

kind, but Bill did determine that Dag was controlling his perception
of the position of the car in its lane.

        I remember a parallel to the peculiarity of this

conflict, that Bill is purposely limiting his output so as
not to overwhelm Dag’s ability to control.

 It's hardly a peculiarity. The force he was applying was the only

thing Bill was controlling, and controlling means keeping its
perception at or near its reference value.

        I was visiting a friend in Sebastopol for her birthday.

A mutual friend, who I had not seen for over 40 years, had
been a body builder and was still quite strong, though you
wouldn’t guess it looking at her petite frame. The several
of us went to a standup comedy show. The lead act was a
tall, athletic blonde woman, lesbian like most of her
audience. Somehow her schtick got around to inviting someone
to arm-wrestle her, and my friend took her up on it. She’s
about 4/5 the height, with proportionally disparate arm
lengths. Contrary to expectation, she holds their hands in
the vertical position. Then her arm is bent back her way a
few degrees, The bigger woman’s hand is flexed, overtopping,
she’s clearly pushing all she’s got, but the hands come back
to vertical. Finally, she calls a draw. Afterward, my friend
admits she could have put her down, but she didn’t want to
show her up. “It’s her show.” But there can be no doubt that
it was a conflict.

Yes, but in what way is this relevant? Your friend presumable was

controlling the position of the hands with a reference value of
“vertical”, while the opponent’s reference value for the position of
the hands was for your friend’s hand to be on the table. Two
controllers trying to set an environmental variable to two different
reference values, a classical conflict.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –

          How do you control a perception that the disturbing

action influences the variable without controlling the
state of that variable?

          A simpler way of answering is "You don't control

everything you perceive".

          What criteria do you you to determine which perceptions

are controlled and which are not? For example, I recall
Bill proposing that we control the perception of the sun
rising in the east, as evidenced by what we would do if it
rose somewhere else. Some controlled perceptions are what
we call expectations.

That's a different area of investigation, one on which we may differ

(or not) but one that has only tangential relevance to the question
you asked above. I think the Dag-driving episode is a good example
of how you “control a perception that the disturbing action
influences the variable without controlling the state of that
variable?” Rick
[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1045)] gave the rubber-band demo as
another example.

          To be more fair about the unusual circumstance, Bill

demonstrating the Test to Dag, we might suppose that (b)
Bill was controlling a perception of Dag resisting his
disturbance to the steering of the car; this in turn being
the means of (a) controlling a perception of Dag better
understanding the Test. But his means for (b), knowing
that Dag was controlling the heading of the car by means
of controlling the rotational position of the steering
wheel, was (c) to change the rotational position of the
steering wheel by means of (d) applying pressure that
would rotate the wheel if Dag were not controlling its
position. Summarizing the perceptions that I imagine Bill
was controlling:

a) Dag better understands the Test

Yes.

          b) Dag resists a disturbance to his control of the

rotational position of the steering wheel

Bill did not control that. He observed it (as he expected he would).

c) the rotational position of the wheel

Bill did not control that… see above.

d) rotational pressure on the wheel

Bill did not control that, whether you mean Dag's applied force or

the total applied force. Bill did control his own applied force.

          I agree with you that Bill does not need to control the

rotational position of the steering wheel (which Dag is
also doing, hence the conflict) if all that he is doing is
applying pressure on the wheel. But that is not all that
he is doing. He is (d) applying pressure on the wheel for
a purpose (c) of changing the rotational position of the
wheel.

For a purpose of changing, yes. For a purpose of changing it to a

position in which he wants to keep it, no. The controlled perception
(which is not required for the test) is that there is (as opposed to
“is not”) a perceptible immediate change in the rotation angle of
the steering wheel.

          He is doing that for a purpose, knowing that Dag is

also controlling that variable and that this pressure
would be a disturbance to Dag’s control of it, so that
Bill is thus by that means controlling a perception of (b)
Dag resisting the disturbance.

One may assume that, yes, but it goes beyond the issue under

discussion, which is whether in the Test for the Controlled Variable
the Tester must, must not, or may control the variable that the
Tester hypothesizes the Subject to be controlling.

          The yet further purpose of this was, I assume, not for

Bill to verify that Dag was indeed controlling as
expected, but rather to demonstrate control (and the Test)
to Dag in a memorable way.

That is as Dag confirmed in this thread [Dag Forssell

2017.06.11.18.20 PDT].

I don’t think there are any hidden assumptions here.

I see one, which can be expressed in two ways: (1) that control can

exist without any reference value for the variable being controlled,
or (2) control can exist without the controller altering output in
any way that is related to the disturbance. Your argument seem to
hinge on this one hidden assumption.

Martin

Martin,

On reflection, please forgive the Bohr quote, gratuitous and uncalled-for.

···

On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:06 AM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.13.11:03 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36 –

Bill pushes with an effort that would turn the steering wheel if Dag were not controlling the movement of the steering wheel and consequently pushing back against Bill’s effort just enough to maintain is control. You say that this is not conflict. As a reason for denying that this is a conflict you assert that they are not controlling the same perception.

MMT>

[W]e ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel, which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction and Dag pushed on it in the opposite direction but you say this is not a conflict. Put this way, this seems absurd on the face of it.

They were both applying force in opposing directions to the same perceived variable, the steering wheel. They had different purposes for this, but their control came down to force applied to the same variable.

For Dag, the purpose was to maintain control of the heading of the car. The lesson of the experience, presumably, was how instantly, precisely, and without thought the higher-level systems increased wheel-turning force in opposition to the wheel-turning force that Bill was exerting. For Bill, the purpose was to elicit this opposition by exerting wheel-turning force. Nonetheless, he did exert wheel-turning force. That is the only way that he could elicit wheel-turning opposing force.

MMT>

Was Bill controlling the rotation angle of the steering wheel? No. Why do I say that? Because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning the wheel to a position that corrected for any lane deviation cause initially by Bill’s applied force. Conclusion: there was no conflict over the rotation angle of the steering wheel.

I disagree. Bill did oppose Dag’s maintaining the wheel at its reference position. Dag said there was no effect, but that means only that his opposing control was successful. You seem to be saying that if control does not achieve its purpose it is not control.

MMT>

  1. Was Bill controlling the force he applied to the wheel? Yes, or so we can assume, because his action was intentional.

3a. So we ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel, which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

To quote Niels Bohr, you’re not thinking, you’re just being logical. They each are applying force to the same object (perception, environmental variable), the steering wheel, and those forces are diametrically opposed. That they are doing so for disparate purposes is typical of a conflict. That the two forces are equal and the effect null in this particular conflict is a product of Bill controlling his demonstration to Dag and Dag controlling the heading of the car (in each case with the several intervening levels of controlled perceptions by which that is effected). For Bill, this is a limited conflict, and the limitation is a perception that he is controlling (“just enough for Dag to observe his resistance to the disturbance”).

As generally happens when opposing control forces are equal and the effect null, a higher level of control in one of the controllers (or sometimes both) ceases using that particular means and begins using alternative means to achieve its purpose. S gives up on pushing an immovable object and instead tries a different door, or knocks and calls, etc. Bill does not give up (the object is not immovable), but rather the control loop that is imposing the limitation on force begins controlling a verbal conversation with Dag about what just happened. This is probably a continuation of a conversation that led up to the demonstration.

/Bruce

On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.12.17:23 ET)]

          Martin Taylor

2017.06.11.23.01–

         I

apparently received [your post] 10 hours before you sent it

        Yes, a typo, 23 hours

instead of 13 hours. I wonder if the advancing cataract in
my right eye is distracting. Should address it.

MMT

          So far, so good, except that the disturbance need not

be transient. Bill could have continued his force on the
steering wheel for minutes or hours while Dag continued to
keep the car in its lane.

        Yes, Bill could have persisted in his conflict with Dag.

But then we would no longer be talking about the Test.

There was no conflict at any time in the episode. Let's analyse the

situation more closely than heretofore.

In the standard version of a conflict, the two antagonists are each

controlling their perceptions of some environmental variable but at
a different reference value. Let’s ask what Bill was controlling,
and then whether Dag was controlling his perception of “the same”
variable. I choose to take Bill at his word.

1. Was Bill controlling the rotation angle of the steering wheel?

No. Why do I say that? Because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning
the wheel to a position that corrected for any lane deviation cause
initially by Bill’s applied force. Conclusion: there was no conflict
over the rotation angle of the steering wheel.

2. Was Bill controlling the net force applied to the wheel (assuming

he could perceive it). No, for the same reason.

Conclusion: There was no conflict over the net force being applied

to the wheel.

3. Was Bill controlling the force he applied to the wheel? Yes, or

so we can assume, because his action was intentional.

    3a. So we ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill applied

to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he applied to the
wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation angle of the wheel,
which Bill was not controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict
over the force Bill was applying to the wheel.

4. Since Dag was controlling the force he applied to the wheel, was

Bill controlling the force Dag applied to the wheel? No, he did not
interfere in any way with Dag’s ability to produce the force he
wanted to produce. Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force
Dag applied to the wheel.

What is left? All I can see without going higher into interpersonal

interactions (e.g., the possibility of Dag getting annoyed with Bill
for putting them both into danger as perceived by Dag) is the
variable Bill was testing:

6. Was Dag controlling the position of the car in its lane? Your

assertion was that if Bill was testing that hypothesis, Bill must
have been controlling for the car’s position in the lane to be
different from Dag’s reference for it. was this the case? No,
because Bill did not oppose Dag’s returning the car to his (Dag’s)
reference for his perception of the car’s place in the lane.
Conclusion: There was no conflict over the position of the car in
its lane.

My conclusion: Nowhere in this episode was there any conflict of any

kind, but Bill did determine that Dag was controlling his perception
of the position of the car in its lane.

        I remember a parallel to the peculiarity of this

conflict, that Bill is purposely limiting his output so as
not to overwhelm Dag’s ability to control.

 It's hardly a peculiarity. The force he was applying was the only

thing Bill was controlling, and controlling means keeping its
perception at or near its reference value.

        I was visiting a friend in Sebastopol for her birthday.

A mutual friend, who I had not seen for over 40 years, had
been a body builder and was still quite strong, though you
wouldn’t guess it looking at her petite frame. The several
of us went to a standup comedy show. The lead act was a
tall, athletic blonde woman, lesbian like most of her
audience. Somehow her schtick got around to inviting someone
to arm-wrestle her, and my friend took her up on it. She’s
about 4/5 the height, with proportionally disparate arm
lengths. Contrary to expectation, she holds their hands in
the vertical position. Then her arm is bent back her way a
few degrees, The bigger woman’s hand is flexed, overtopping,
she’s clearly pushing all she’s got, but the hands come back
to vertical. Finally, she calls a draw. Afterward, my friend
admits she could have put her down, but she didn’t want to
show her up. “It’s her show.” But there can be no doubt that
it was a conflict.

Yes, but in what way is this relevant? Your friend presumable was

controlling the position of the hands with a reference value of
“vertical”, while the opponent’s reference value for the position of
the hands was for your friend’s hand to be on the table. Two
controllers trying to set an environmental variable to two different
reference values, a classical conflict.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –

          How do you control a perception that the disturbing

action influences the variable without controlling the
state of that variable?

          A simpler way of answering is "You don't control

everything you perceive".

          What criteria do you you to determine which perceptions

are controlled and which are not? For example, I recall
Bill proposing that we control the perception of the sun
rising in the east, as evidenced by what we would do if it
rose somewhere else. Some controlled perceptions are what
we call expectations.

That's a different area of investigation, one on which we may differ

(or not) but one that has only tangential relevance to the question
you asked above. I think the Dag-driving episode is a good example
of how you “control a perception that the disturbing action
influences the variable without controlling the state of that
variable?” Rick
[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1045)] gave the rubber-band demo as
another example.

          To be more fair about the unusual circumstance, Bill

demonstrating the Test to Dag, we might suppose that (b)
Bill was controlling a perception of Dag resisting his
disturbance to the steering of the car; this in turn being
the means of (a) controlling a perception of Dag better
understanding the Test. But his means for (b), knowing
that Dag was controlling the heading of the car by means
of controlling the rotational position of the steering
wheel, was (c) to change the rotational position of the
steering wheel by means of (d) applying pressure that
would rotate the wheel if Dag were not controlling its
position. Summarizing the perceptions that I imagine Bill
was controlling:

a) Dag better understands the Test

Yes.

          b) Dag resists a disturbance to his control of the

rotational position of the steering wheel

Bill did not control that. He observed it (as he expected he would).

c) the rotational position of the wheel

Bill did not control that… see above.

d) rotational pressure on the wheel

Bill did not control that, whether you mean Dag's applied force or

the total applied force. Bill did control his own applied force.

          I agree with you that Bill does not need to control the

rotational position of the steering wheel (which Dag is
also doing, hence the conflict) if all that he is doing is
applying pressure on the wheel. But that is not all that
he is doing. He is (d) applying pressure on the wheel for
a purpose (c) of changing the rotational position of the
wheel.

For a purpose of changing, yes. For a purpose of changing it to a

position in which he wants to keep it, no. The controlled perception
(which is not required for the test) is that there is (as opposed to
“is not”) a perceptible immediate change in the rotation angle of
the steering wheel.

          He is doing that for a purpose, knowing that Dag is

also controlling that variable and that this pressure
would be a disturbance to Dag’s control of it, so that
Bill is thus by that means controlling a perception of (b)
Dag resisting the disturbance.

One may assume that, yes, but it goes beyond the issue under

discussion, which is whether in the Test for the Controlled Variable
the Tester must, must not, or may control the variable that the
Tester hypothesizes the Subject to be controlling.

          The yet further purpose of this was, I assume, not for

Bill to verify that Dag was indeed controlling as
expected, but rather to demonstrate control (and the Test)
to Dag in a memorable way.

That is as Dag confirmed in this thread [Dag Forssell

2017.06.11.18.20 PDT].

I don’t think there are any hidden assumptions here.

I see one, which can be expressed in two ways: (1) that control can

exist without any reference value for the variable being controlled,
or (2) control can exist without the controller altering output in
any way that is related to the disturbance. Your argument seem to
hinge on this one hidden assumption.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.13.1050)]

···

:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-13 3]

Â

EP: Rick, the end of your message sounds somewhat like ad hominem.

RM: Sorry about that. I didn’t mean to attack you personally but it was probably an unnecessarily rude way to express my irritation at your efforts to teach me PCT. But I suppose now that Bill is gone everyone is an expert on PCT and there are no students so I apologize if I offended you. Â

Â

EP: But never mind, it is true that I am studying to understand PCT and you make it hard by using concepts somewhat inconsistently
or at least strangely.

RM: Sorry. I try my best. But if you really want to understand PCT I suggest that a better way to deal with what you see as my poor explanations of PCT is to ask questions rather than tell me what PCT actually says.Â

EP: Differentiation between reference state and reference signal is of course reasonable, but the core point is the reference
value and it is only in the reference signal.

RM: See, this is where a question might have been better than an answer. All variables have values. So both the reference state and the reference signal have values. The value of the reference state of a CV is the observed value of the CV; the value of the reference signal is the value it takes on in the model.Â

Â

EP: I think state and value are in this kind of situation synonyms and so you seem to claim that the same reference value is both inside the subject and in the environment.

RM: The reference state has its value(s) and the reference signal has its value(s). They are the values of two different variables, one an observed variable (the CV) and the other a theoretical variable (the reference signal).

Â

EP: What you see in the environment is
not any reference value/state but rather some value/state which you infer (possibly by using some kind of TCV) to be constrained by a subject who is controlling its/his/her perceptions.

RM: See, this is what irritates me. Instead of asking me to clarify the concept of reference state you are telling me something about it as though you are the expert in PCT and I am the student. And what you are telling me is wrong, “plain and simple”. When you do this it seems to belie your intention to learn PCT; apparently you believe you already have learned it and would now like to teach it to me. You can see how that might be irritating.Â

RM: The fact is that your statement that " What you see in the environment is not any reference value/state" is just the opposite of what is true. In fact, what you see in the environment is the reference state of the CV. This is one of the most fundamental and important things to understand about PCT. If you don’t like it coming from me, here it is from Bill Powers again:Â

EP: For the conceptual clarity I suggest that the state in the environment which you call confusingly
reference state should be called (by Fred) target state/value. Its definition is: “such a state in the environment which the controlling subject perceives with minimal error�.

RM: This is the theoretical explanation of the existence of reference states. But as you can see from what Powers says above, the reference state of a variable can be shown to exist without any reference to theory. Indeed, it is the objective existence of the reference states of controlled variables that is the reason Bill developed PCT.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Â

Â

Eetu

Â

Lähettäjä: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Lähetetty: 12. kesäkuutata 2017 22:53
Vastaanottaja: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Aihe: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

Â

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1250)]

Â

Eetu Pikkarainen (2017-06-12)-

Â

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

Â

RM: This is simply not true. See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other
than the person doing the controlling to know this.Â

Â

EP: I think you partly replied on behalf of in your message [From Rick Marken (2017.06.11.1640)] but only partly. You wrote:

Â

RM: “a controlled perception is an
inference based on observation of the fact that certain variables in what is perceived by an observer as the subject’s environment are controlled (maintained in reference states, protected from disturbance).â€?Â

Â

EP: This means that an observer sees something special happen in the environment and from that s/he
infers that the subject is controlling some perception.

Â

RM: Right. The “special” thing that is seen in the environment is that a variable is being controlled (maintained in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance). For example, we can see that people are controlling for
being upright as they walk over irregular terrain (the disturbances). We infer that they are doing this by controlling (among other things) a perception of the location of their center of gravity)

Â

EP: As part of that inference the observer can do tests and try to disturb the subject’s controlling.

Â

RM: Â I would say that the inference is the theory of how this control occurs: PCT. The testing that then occurs involves determining what perceptions that are being controlled that are the basis of this observed control: is it perceived
center of gravity, perceived visual orientation with respect to the ground, etc.Â

Â

EP: What the observer is seeing is not control, but stabilization, see below…>

Â

RM: No, if they see a variable being maintained in a fixed or variable reference state,
protected from disturbance , then they are seeing control. Stabilization is not control. In stabilization (as in a mass-spring system) there is a stable (“equilibrium”) state of a variable that could be seen as a reference state but the variable is not
protected from disturbance when it is in this state.Â

Â

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

Â

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables…“Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that
accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon. Â

Â

EP: Perception may not be a part of the definition, but the reference is.

Â

RM: Yes, the reference state is part of the definition of control. The reference state is an observable state of the variable. The reference signal in the PCT model accounts for the constant or variable reference
state of the variable that is observed.Â

Â

EP: Like perception, also the reference is only inside the subject / organism.

Â

RM: The reference signal is inside the organism; the reference
state is outside the system.

Â

EP: Â So the definition of control (in PCT) cannot be defined completely in terms of observable variables.

Â

RM: Â Again, this is “plain and simple” untrue not a lie because I"m sure the error is unintentional).

Â

EP: When you see (the fact) that something is (in a certain way and conditions) stabilized in the environment of the subject, you can infer from that to (the
fact of) control. It is like all science a hypothetical and fallible inference, but by experience a more reliable inference than many everyday alternatives. That is just the glory of science: you can know something what you have not (immediately) perceived.

RM: I appreciate your enthusiasm for PCT, Etau, but I think, at this point in your PCT learning curve, it would be wise for you to take the advice of our recent American winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature and “know your song well
before you start singin’”.Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.13.17.52]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.13.11:03 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36 –

      Bill pushes with an effort that would turn the steering

wheel if Dag were not controlling the movement of the steering
wheel and consequently pushing back against Bill’s effort just
enough to maintain is control. You say that this is not
conflict. As a reason for denying that this is a conflict you
assert that they are not controlling the same perception.

Correct.
        [Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

      The

standard definition of conflict in PCT as I recall involves
two control systems controlling the same variable with
different reference values.

They are not controlling perceptions of the same environmental

variable, let alone not controlling those perceptions to different
reference levels.

        [W]e ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill

applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he
applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the rotation
angle of the wheel, which Bill was not controlling).
Conclusion: There was no conflict over the force Bill was
applying to the wheel.

      Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction and Dag pushed on

it in the opposite direction but you say this is not a
conflict. Put this way, this seems absurd on the face of it.

I guess we have a new definition of "conflict" that is neither mine

nor the “standard definition”. Now conflict involves a control
system resisting a disturbance if the disturbance source is another
organism (person, perhaps?).

To say that what control systems do is oppose changes in the 

disturbance is hardly “absurd on the face of it”. I’d prefer to say
“* Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction creating a disturbance
to Dag’s perception of the wheel direction, and Dag pushed on it
in the opposite direction, showing that Dag probably was
controlling the wheel direction*”.

I think if you apply your earlier "standard definition" of conflict

to your analysis of my message, you might draw different
conclusions.

Martin

Bruce, I really think that Martin already tried (I thought
brilliantly) what I am going to say here but…

  Bill's very high level goal was likely something like

“demonstrate in with a concrete example one of the most
fundamental principles of PCT by applying a disturbance that Dag
will act to correct.”

  Neither Dag NOR Bill were controlling for the position of the

steering wheel:
At a lower level Dag was controlling the position of the wheel but
only because the position of the wheel effected the position of
the car in the lane. As to what actual steering wheel position
was required was irrelevant to Dag.
Bill certainly did not care about the position of the steering
wheel. As “conflict” would have existed in Bill if Dag had NOT
countered Bill’s disturbance. The fact that Dag did counter the
disturbance that Bill had applied satisfied exactly what Bill was
controlling for, thus no conflict.

  Dag experienced no conflict either since Bill told him that Bill

wanted to do an experiment, so while Dag probably did not know
what Bill going to do, he did know that Bill was going to do
something. Because Dag easily compensated for the force that Bill
applied to the steering wheel and thus maintained the control that
he desired then by definition there was no conflict for Dag
either.

  Since Bill neither applied the force so rapidly that Dag's

response time was a factor, nor did Bill try to apply sufficient
force to overwhelm Dag then there were not even other perceptions
that could have been disturbed.

Best, Bill

···

On 06/13/2017 04:04 PM, Martin Taylor
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.13.17.52]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.13.11:03 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.12.17.36 –

        Bill pushes with an effort that would turn the steering

wheel if Dag were not controlling the movement of the
steering wheel and consequently pushing back against Bill’s
effort just enough to maintain is control. You say that this
is not conflict. As a reason for denying that this is a
conflict you assert that they are not controlling the same
perception.

  Correct.
          [Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

        The

standard definition of conflict in PCT as I recall involves
two control systems controlling the same variable with
different reference values.

  They are not controlling perceptions of the same environmental

variable, let alone not controlling those perceptions to different
reference levels.

MMT>

          [W]e ask whether Dag was controlling the force Bill

applied to the wheel. No, he was controlling the force he
applied to the wheel (as a means of controlling the
rotation angle of the wheel, which Bill was not
controlling). Conclusion: There was no conflict over the
force Bill was applying to the wheel.

        Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction and Dag pushed

on it in the opposite direction but you say this is not a
conflict. Put this way, this seems absurd on the face of it.

  I guess we have a new definition of "conflict" that is neither

mine nor the “standard definition”. Now conflict involves a
control system resisting a disturbance if the disturbance source
is another organism (person, perhaps?).

  To say that what control systems do is oppose changes in the 

disturbance is hardly “absurd on the face of it”. I’d prefer to
say “* Bill pushed on the wheel in one direction creating a
disturbance to Dag’s perception of the wheel direction, and Dag
pushed on it in the opposite direction, showing that Dag
probably was controlling the wheel direction*”.

  I think if you apply your earlier "standard definition" of

conflict to your analysis of my message, you might draw different
conclusions.

  Martin

Hi Bill, nice to hear from you. I chime with you totally on this response and you say much more clearly about the (minor) differences in approach what I have been trying to say for a while!

All the best,

Warren

···

On 06/12/2017 08:10 AM, Boris Hartman
wrote:

        Down

From:
Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com ]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2017 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live
William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.09.1250)]

Martin Taylor (2017.06.07.22.48)

                        MT.

It seems to me that regardless of what may
be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the
other day about Behaviour being the control
of perception), the words he uses can easily
lead a reader to conclude that controlled
variables exist in the environment.

                        RM: Ignoring the

fact that I know that controlled
variables are not in the environment, what
would be so bad about a reader concluding
that they are variables in the environment?

            RM: I don't know if you saw this before, Martin; it

ended up being posted in a different thread for some
reason. But I would really appreciate hearing your
answer to this question.

              HB

:

              Martin

already answered on Ricks question above and I
perfectly agree with his answer. I hope that he will
not mind if I add some sentences.

              The

problem is not if reader beleives that there are
variables in environment but whether there are
»controlled variables« in environment or not. The
problem is that you are not ignoring this »fact« but
that you are »double« personality. It’s yours
instability Rick that is causing so much confussion
here on CSGnet.

              We

are just talking about your irrisposibility to be on
side of PCT where the only »controlled variable« is
not in environment but inside the controlling system.
It’s called perceptual signal. Hence Bills theory
about »Control of perception«.

              Ashby

was taking quite different approcah preventing such a
mish-mash in meanings. Variables in his
»ultrastability« theory were inside organism and
parameters were outside. So even in the case of
control there was inpossible to miss the position of
variabel. It was inside.

              In

the case of PCT everything are variables so it’s
sometimes qiute difficult to understand why variables
inside system are controlled and outisde system are
not. But Bill did solve this problem and you Rick
don’t understand how, so once you are writing in PCT
manner and once in RCT. In this way you make
confussion even greater, as you are hiding your RCT
theory behind PCT.

              We

are not ignoring the »fact« that you once understand
that »controlled variables« are not in the environment
and once you don’t. You can check it on CSGnet
archives about your »double« personality, which is
confusing all around you including Alison Powers, who
really showed very high understanding of PCT, much
higher then you did.

              Mostly

you don’t use your understanding that »controlled
variable« is not in the environment. Your demos show
this clearly. The same is with your books and
articles.

              Because

you are so unreliable (all your demos mostly show
»controlled variable« in environment«) starting with
»distance«, I made just for you a control loop where
»controlled variable« is in environment, Then it’s
clear how »control loop« should look like if you
control »controlled variable« with behavior as there
are no other means that make sense except if you want
to introduce Telekinesis and Telephaty to show how yu
can control inside and in the same time outside.

              Beside

»control« in outer in environment you perceive that
control with »Controled Perceptual Variable« or as you
called it CPV what is close to Gavins’ PCV.

              So

control loop which has your elements looks like this :

  1.                     CONTROL
    

: Keeping some »controlled variable (aspect of outer
environment) in reference state, protected (defended)
from disturbances.

  1.                     OUTPUT
    

FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to
outer environment so to keep some »controlled
variable« in reference state

  1.                     FEED-BACK
    

FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer
environment« in reference state.

  1.                     INPUT
    

FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or
»Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of
»controlled q.i.«

  1.                     COMPARATOR
    

: ???

              We

see that in RCT the »only« problem is comparator.
Although everything is problematic, only for
comparator Rick has never explicitly defined how it
works.

              I

think that Rick can’t define it, because comparators
are ususally not in environment where by Rick’s
persuasion control is done. And there are some others
who beleive the same.

              So

in RCT case (Ricks Control Theory) where control is
done in environment he has to put »comparator« into
environment if he want to prove that something is
controlled in environment. The only place in control
loop where control is done is »comparator«. So it has
to be somewhere in environment if control is done in
environmnet. Something has to be matched to reference
so that we get control in environment. Ups but where
are references in environment ??? That was also
mostly msitake of engeeners as Henry
Yin pointed out.

              HY

: … reference is placed outside of the organism, where
the engineer designing the system also performs
comparison function. Thus for decades such control
systems have been treated as stimulus-respons or
input-output devices : error in, behavior out. The
tendency to resort to linear causation is so strong
that even closed loop controllers have been treated as
devices that receive error signals and generate
behaviors.

              HB

: Does it look familiar to you ? How we should call
your »comparator« in environment ?

            RM in other post : The variables that

we see being controlled are the data that are to be
explained by theory.

HB : Maybe
»Controlled variable« where »mis-match« between effets
of output and references are taking place and »error«
is calculated and perceived by organism in the form of
»Controlled Perceptual variable« or CPV as you called
it.

              HB

: Rick sorry to say, but term »Controlled Perceptual
Variable« is your pure invention as this term was
never used in PCT literature, nor by Bill nor by Mary
Powers nor by Henry Yin. It’s stimulating thinking
that control comes form environment into controlling
system and that is »input-ouput« system as Henry Yin
pointed out.

              Where

did you get this term Rick. Maybe you are »double«
agent and you are working also for Carver who is also
producing all kinds of new self-regulation terms.

              Do

you remember using all these terms ? Well if you don’t
they are safe in CSGnet archive. You can never escape
from nonsense you wrote. You should be carefull what
you are writing arroung CSGnet as every word is
»recorded« and saved.

              Do

you understand where your problem is ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

                                    Richard S.

Marken

                                      "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when
you

                                      have nothing left to take

away.�

–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Thanks Warren,

  With all of the haggling that was going over this perspective

issue, it was your postings that prompted me to try to maybe use a
little different approach to say just what I felt that you were
already saying.

Best, Bill

···

On 06/14/2017 12:48 AM, Warren Mansell
wrote:

    Hi Bill, nice to hear from you. I chime with you totally on

this response and you say much more clearly about the (minor)
differences in approach what I have been trying to say for a
while!

All the best,

Warren

    On 13 Jun 2017, at 01:01, Bill Leach <wrleach@cableone.net        >

wrote:

        Boris, discussions of PCT theory and PCT research can and

often do lead to significant confusion.

        I am going to make a couple of bold assertions here!  When

discussing ONLY the subject of what the theory of PCT is;
Rick, Martin, Bruce, Dag (and the list goes on) almost never
make any sort of error or contradiction of what Bill Powers
taught. When such errors do (rarely) occur they (including
Rick) are quick to correct the error (of even without
someone else having pointed out the error).

        Remaining with the theoretical perspective...  The property

of control can not exist without a comparator. Of course it
also can not exist with a reference value, a sensor input,
an output effector, something to be sensed, something to be
acted upon by the output effector, and a relationship
between the acted upon ‘thing’ and the sensed 'thing.'Â That
is to say that control is a continuous functioning process
and not a 'thing.'Â You can have all of these ‘things’ and
not have a control system. It is only when they are all
connected to each other in a certain way that a control
system is possible.

        I'm not sure if this fits in with Bill Powers thinking but

I also believe that the “acted upon ‘thing,’” the “sensed
‘thing,’” and the “relationship between them’” do not
necessarily have to be what we would call physical objects.Â
Einstein’s work on the theories of relativity would be
examples of the use of a control process in solving a
theoretical problem.

        Personally I think that your difficulties with Rick exist

because your view of the approach that Rick is using in
APPLYING the PCT theory to actual observed behavior (actual
or theoretical behavior) is that his approach is flawed.

        As soon as you leave discussion of the theory of PCT itself

and begin discussing the implication of PCT to behavior, one
is, for very practical reasons, forced to make many
assumptions. Many of these assumptions have recently been
discussed in some detail and with great clarity by a number
of different CSGnet members.

        A very simple example of such an assumption:Â  If I as an

observer/researcher have a perception that an object in the
environment that I am watching closely at moves to the left
and the subject individual is also watching that same
object, the subject will have essentially the same
perception that the object moved to the left as did I. An
absolutely VITAL aspect of this assumption is that the two
perceptual input functions (even though they are in two
different and independent beings) are both linking the
observed properties of the object being observed.

        If the subject corrects the leftward movement (and all

others disturbances to the position or maybe trajectory) of
the observed object then the researcher, as a result of
understanding the theory of PCT can conclude that their own
perception of the effect of the behavior of the subject on
the object then they can conclude that they have properly
identified the subject’s perception that is being
controlled.

        Because, at least those of us that do believe that science

and scientific principles are valid (and of course I believe
that to be a true situation for everyone on this forum),
then it is NOT improper to state a PROPERTY OF THE OBSERVED
OBJECT is being control by the subject even though we know
that the subject can only control their PERCEPTION of that
property.

        I believe that Rick (and others of course) accept that what

I just stated it the preceding paragraph is a perfectly
reasonable way to talk about real world application of PCT
but that you do not agree. And thus your dispute with Rick
(and again no doubt others) is founded on this single
difference in opinion.

Best, Bill

        On 06/12/2017 08:10 AM, Boris

Hartman wrote:

              Down

Â

From:
Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com ]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2017 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long
live William T. Powers

Â

              [From Rick Marken

(2017.06.09.1250)]

Martin Taylor (2017.06.07.22.48)Â

Â

                              MT.

It seems to me that regardless of what
may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed
with me the other day about Behaviour
being the control of perception), the
words he uses can easily lead a reader
to conclude that controlled variables
exist in the environment.

Â

                              RM: Ignoring

the fact that I know  that
controlled variables are not in the
environment, what would be so bad
about a reader concluding that they
are variables in the environment?Â

                  RM: I don't know if you saw this before, Martin;

it ended up being posted in a different thread for
some reason. But I would really appreciate hearing
your answer to this question.Â

Â

                    HB

:

                    Martin

already answered on Ricks question above and I
perfectly agree with his answer. I hope that he
will not mind if I add some sentences.

Â

                    The

problem is not if reader beleives that there are
variables in environment but whether there are
»controlled variables« in environment or not.
The problem is that you are not ignoring this
»fact« but that you are »double« personality.
It’s yours instability Rick that is causing so
much confussion here on CSGnet.

                    We

are just talking about your irrisposibility to
be on side of PCT where the only »controlled
variable« is not in environment but inside the
controlling system. It’s called perceptual
signal. Hence Bills theory about »Control of
perception«.

                    Ashby

was taking quite different approcah preventing
such a mish-mash in meanings. Variables in his
»ultrastability« theory were inside organism and
parameters were outside. So even in the case of
control there was inpossible to miss the
position of variabel. It was inside.

                    In

the case of PCT everything are variables so it’s
sometimes qiute difficult to understand why
variables inside system are controlled and
outisde system are not. But Bill did solve this
problem and you Rick don’t understand how, so
once you are writing in PCT manner and once in
RCT. In this way you make confussion even
greater, as you are hiding your RCT theory
behind PCT.

                    We

are not ignoring the »fact« that you once
understand that »controlled variables« are not
in the environment and once you don’t. You can
check it on CSGnet archives about your »double«
personality, which is confusing all around you
including Alison Powers, who really showed very
high understanding of PCT, much higher then you
did.

                    Mostly

you don’t use your understanding that
»controlled variable« is not in the environment.
Your demos show this clearly. The same is with
your books and articles.

                    Because

you are so unreliable (all your demos mostly
show »controlled variable« in environment«)
starting with »distance«, I made just for youÂ
a control loop where »controlled variable« is in
environment, Then it’s clear how »control loop«
should look like if you control »controlled
variable« with behavior as there are no other
means that make sense except if you want to
introduce Telekinesis and Telephaty to show how
yu can control inside and in the same time
outside.

                    Beside

»control« in outer in environment you perceive
that control with »Controled Perceptual
Variable« or as you called it CPV what is close
to Gavins’ PCV.

                    So

control loop which has your elements looks like
this :

1.      CONTROL
: Keeping some »controlled variable (aspect of
outer environment) in reference state, protected
(defended) from disturbances.

2.      OUTPUT
FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of
behavior) to outer environment so to keep some
»controlled variable« in reference state

3.      FEED-BACK
FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer
environment« in reference state.

4.      INPUT
FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual
Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the
perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

5.      COMPARATOR
: ???

Â

                    We

see that in RCT the »only« problem is
comparator. Although everything is problematic,
only for comparator Rick has never explicitly
defined how it works.

                    I

think that Rick can’t define it, because
comparators are ususally not in environment
where by Rick’s persuasion control is done. And
there are some others who beleive the same.

                    So

in RCT case (Ricks Control Theory) where control
is done in environment he has to put
»comparator« into environment if he want to
prove that something is controlled in
environment. The only place in control loop
where control is done is »comparator«. So it has
to be somewhere in environment if control is
done in environmnet. Something has to be matched
to reference so that we get control in
environment. Ups but where are references in
environment ??? Â That was also mostly msitake of
engeeners as Henry
Yin pointed out.

                    HY

: … reference is placed outside of the organism,
where the engineer designing the system also
performs comparison function. Thus for decades
such control systems have been treated as
stimulus-respons or input-output devices : error
in, behavior out. The tendency to resort to
linear causation is so strong that even closed
loop controllers have been treated as devices
that receive error signals and generate
behaviors.

                    HB

: Does it look familiar to you ? How we should
call your »comparator« in environment ?

                  RM in other post : The

variables that we see being controlled are the
data that are to be explained by theory.

Â

                    HB

: Maybe
»Controlled variable« where »mis-match« between
effets of output and references are taking place
and »error« is calculated and perceived by
organism in the form of »Controlled Perceptual
variable« or CPV as you called it.

Â

                    HB

: Rick sorry to say, but term »Controlled
Perceptual Variable« is your pure invention as
this term was never used in PCT literature, nor
by Bill nor by Mary Powers nor by Henry Yin.
It’s stimulating thinking that control comes
form environment into controlling system and
that is »input-ouput« system as Henry Yin
pointed out.

Â

                    Where

did you get this term Rick. Maybe you are
»double« agent and you are working also for
Carver who is also producing all kinds of new
self-regulation terms.Â

                    Do

you remember using all these terms ? Well if you
don’t they are safe in CSGnet archive. You can
never escape from nonsense you wrote. You should
be carefull what you are writing arroung CSGnet
as every word is »recorded« and saved.Â

                    Do

you understand where your problem is ?Â

Best,

Boris

Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

                                          Richard

S. MarkenÂ

                                            "Perfection

is achieved not when you
have nothing more to
add, but when you

                                            have nothing left to

take away.�

                                            Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â 

    --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.15.0925)]

image00289.png

···

Eetu Pikkarainen (2017-06-15)–

EP: I you are used to use the term reference state under the authority of BP then let it be so,

EP: The term “reference state” refers to an actual, observable phenomenon: the observed state of a controlled variable. As I noted in my recent reply to Bill Leach (Rick Marken (2017.06.15.0810)), what  the term “reference state” refers to can be seen in my Mind Reading demo ((www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) in the form variations in the position of the intentionally moved characters from the Simpson (one of the truly great TV shows; hope they have it in Finland). So it’s not really Bill Powers’ authority under which I use the term. It’s under the authority of my own experience: I see reference states.Â

EP: but it is anyway confusing because there is only one real reference value and just like the
output also the “reference state� is a consequence of it.

RM: I don’t think it needs to be confusing. Just keep in mind that “reference state” refers to the value of an observable variable (like the position of the controlled avatar in the Mind Reading demo) while “the value of the reference signal” refers to the value of the theoretical entity that accounts for the reference state of the observed variable.Â

RM: As far as which is more real, the observed variations in the reference state of a controlled variable or the theoretical variations in the reference signal that explains these variations, I personally would call the former the more real.Â

Best

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…Â

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 9:41 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1240)]

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

EP: Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

RM: This is simply not true. See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other than the person doing the controlling to know this.

HB : This is the biggest nonsense I’ve ever heard. What could they do anything else but »Control perception« ?

All people control also their perception of other people and what other people are doing speaking. And mostly what they do, they conclude on bases of introspection what could be happening in other people. There is also a lot of sharing information (communication). Everything runs perfecty with »Control of perception« as PCT predicts. There is nothing else but »Control of perception«.

So in short. Problem is not whether there is also outer environment stabilized as that was already explained by Kent, but whether the outer environment is stabilized with »Control of behavior« or »Control of perception«. Do you understand Rick where the problem is ?

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables.

HB : You are not perceiving »objective« world but you model it inside organism in accordance to inisde control. It’s always a little difference in what people observe, because interpretation is always subjective (more or less imaginative). Observable variables can be modeled differently in different people and of course terms for »observed« variables are different. But in PCT we have to citate author when we speak about definition of control in PCT. But you can make your definition of control and of course your theory.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : In PCT definition you can’t observe »predefined state« but you can make better or worse conclussions about it and give different terms. Somebody call it genetically defined state, somebody homeostasis….

RM : It is an “objective” definition in the sense that others besides the observer can confirm the observation.

HB : This could go through. So it’s not just fact what Rick see as »fact«.

RM : The definition of control in PCT is: maintenance of a variable in a reference state, protected from disturbance.

HB : No. This is pure lie. It can be confirmed by Bills’ literature (perceptions of other people). This is your definition that can’t be confirmed by others. And it’s misleading. This is definition in RCT (Ricks Control Theory). So again, PCT definition of control is :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : So you are lying Rick. Your definition significantly deviate from reference PCT explanation.

RM : “Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon.

HB : Well »objectivelly« observed phanomenon ? In which sense ? You wrote above that »objectivelly« means that others can confirm observation.Â

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…Â

image0083.png

image00291.png

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2017 7:54 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.13.1050)]

:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-13 3]

EP: Rick, the end of your message sounds somewhat like ad hominem.

RM: Sorry about that. I didn’t mean to attack you personally but it was probably an unnecessarily rude way to express my irritation at your efforts to teach me PCT.

HB : You should be teached many more things not just PCT. By my oppinion Eetu should be teaching you PCT becasue he understands PCT and you don’t. See walking case.

RM : But I suppose now that Bill is gone everyone is an expert on PCT

HB : Not everyone. You and some members are exception. You don’t understand what PCT is about. Some others understand.

RM : … and there are no students so I apologize if I offended you. &nbbsp;

EP: But never mind, it is true that I am studying to understand PCT and you make it hard by using concepts somewhat inconsistently or at least strangely.

RM: Sorry. I try my best. But if you really want to understand PCT

HB : There is no doubt that you don’t understand PCT and Eetu understands. But you are trying to confuse him as you are doing this all the time here om CSGnet. You are confussion maker. It seems that you have these characteristics in genetics (your reference states).

RM : I suggest that a better way to deal with what you see as my poor explanations of PCT

HB : There is no better way. Your explanations are not just poor but are confussing, misleading.

RM : …is to ask questions rather tthan tell me what PCT actually says.

HB : You should remember what PCT usually says as this is GENERAL BASES FOR UNDERSTANDING PCT.

And what would you explain to Eetu about PCT.

Members on CSGnet should be asking you Rick about what is RCT (Ricks Control Theory) not PCT ? It’s obviously that you don’t understand PCT so it’s also clear that you shouldn’ be asked anything about PCT because you just make confussions.

Confussions you made are (see CSgnet archives) :

  1.  That »Behavior is control«,
    
  2.  that there is some »Controlled variable in environment,
    
  3.  that control is going into organism from environment through »Controlled Perceptual Variable«. Did I miss something ???
    
  4.  That everything in control loop happens at the same time
    
  5.  That there is some »Telekinesis«
    
  6.  That there exists some »Third eye«
    
  7.  That there is come extrasensory perception
    
  8.  That there is telepathy in controlling people
    

You turned a serious scientific PCT forum into Parapsychology and Occultims.

And maybe you’ll really manage to destroy it one day just because you don’t follow diagrams and Bills’ evidences about PCT. You just have to explain what Bill GENERALLY WROTE ABOUT PCT and you have to explain us what diagram LCS III is about. Is that so difficult ?

EP: Differentiation between reference state and reference signal is of course reasonable, but the core point is the reference value and it is only in the reference signal.

RM: See, this is where a question might have been better than an answer. All variables have values. So both the reference state and the reference signal have values.

RM : The value of the reference state of a CV is the observed value of the CV; the value of the reference signal is the value it takes on in the model.

HB : There is no »Controlled variable« or CV in environment and there is no »reference state« in environment too. And there is no comparator in environment, because simply behavior is not controlled so it doesn’t wear »references« and any other control characteristics. But from the effects of organisms internal control into environment you can make better or worse gues what is controlled in organism and what references in organisms are. But you can never observe »reference state« in environment. It’s only inside controlling system. But you can oberve the effects of control (reference states in orgsnims). Henry Yin put it well.

HY :

As a result of these conceptual confusions, in traditional models negative feedback is always misunderstood. Placing the comparator outside the organism has the unintended effect of inverting the inside and outside of the system (Figure 5).What should be part of the organism is considered To be a part of the environment, and what should be part of the environment, namely, the feedback function, is considered a part of the organism. Consequently, the equations that describe how forces act on loads and accelerations and decelerations of the loads are assumed to be computed by the nervous system [50]. These conceptual confusions have largely prevented any progress in the study of behavior for many decades.

HB : I know that you don’t understand the PCT mechanism how effects of control are transffered to environment. Your explanation is Telekinetic as you didn’t explain how behavior is controlled and how »control« enters environment.

Once you think right that there is no »controlled variable« in environment and once you think wrong that there is »controlled variable« in environment.

RM earler : The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

RM earlier : Ignoring the fact that I know that controlled variables are not in the environment,…

HB : What a confussion maker you are Rick. Contradictions, insinuations, imagination… These are you tools for connfussion making. When will you present some evidences that »behavior« can be controlled, and that there is some »Controlled Perceptual variable« ???

EP: I think state and value are in this kind of situation synonyms and so you seem to claim that the same reference value is both inside the subject and in the environment.

RM: The reference state has its value(s) and the reference signal has its value(s).

HB : Reference states are genetically defined in organism and can be seen in environment through effects of behavior on environment. The question is how. Is it with »Control of behavior« or with »Control of perception«.

Reference signal derives from reference state. It’s happening inside nervous system and control in organism.

Bill P :

REFERENCE SIGNAL : A signal inside a control system that specifies the state of zero error…

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

HB : Intrinsic physiological variables are kept in genetically defined reference states (see diagram on p. 191 B:CP, 2005). If you Rick would stick to this explanation of »sleeping behavior« you wouldn’t have any problems in explaining how people control 24/7.

RM : They are the values of two different variables, one an observed variable (the CV) and the other a theoretical variable (the reference signal).

HB : Reference signal is not just theoretical variable, it’s a nerv signal which exist in central nervous system.Â

You can »observe nerv signal« through instruments or measure it through nerv currents. There are methods today.

You can’t observe reference states in environment. You can’t see »reference states inside organism, but you can try to conclude from behavior (efects to environment) what could be reference states in organism mostly on yourself perceptual experiences and observing the effects of control in environment through actions that affect environment.

EP: What you see in the environment is not any reference value/state but rather some value/state which you infer (possibly by using some kind of TCV) to be constrained by a subject who is controlling its/his/her perceptions.

RM: See, this is what irritates me. Instead of asking me to clarify the concept of reference state you are telling me something about it as though you are the expert in PCT and I am the student.

HB : Eetu gave the exact relation. You are a student and he is PCT expert. At least he was until he get into discussion with you.

And what irritates me is that you are still confussing people with your RCT, where »behavior is control«, where there is some »controlled variable« in environment, where there is some »Perceptual Controlled Variable«. You understand what irritates me ??? You didn’t give any evidence that what you are saying is rellay PCT.

RM : And what you are telling me is wrong, “plain and simple”.

HB : No it’s just opposite. What you are telling is wrong, »plain and simple«

RM : When you do this it seems to belie your intention to learn PCT; apparently you believe you already have learned it and would now like to teach it to me. You can see how that might be irritating.

HB : I must say Eetu understands PCT and you don’t. At least you didn’t show any evidence that you understand it. He did.

RM: The fact is that your statement that " What you see in the environment is not any reference value/state" is just the opposite of what is true.

HB : Vauuu and what is true will now tell us master of RCT, because he is the only one who can see what is true in reality. Stop bullshitting Rick. What we see in environment is not any »reference value/state« but we can conclude what »reference values« are in orgsnism.Â

RM : In fact, what you see in the environment is the reference state of the CV.

HB : Vauu what a construct. What a statement which you already denied. There is no »controlled variable« in environment so it can’t be any reference value :

RM earler : The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

RM earlier : Ignoring the fact that I know that controlled variables are not in the environment,…

HB : How can be genetically determined values of reference states in organism transffered into environment ? Through »Control of behavior« or through Telekinesis ???

RM : This is one of the most fundamental and important things to understand about PCT.

HB : You mean the most fundamental and important things in RCT (Rikcs Control Theory) where outer environment is controlled to some reference state and there is no control ininside organism. I’m wondering how organisms manage to survive just with control of external environment ?

If you don’t like it coming from me, here it is from Bill Powers again:

Inline image 1

HB : It’s taken from the context. But anyway here is not clear where these reference states are. They are always in organism. But they can be discovered experimentally. These »reference states« in organism always exist as organisms survives not matter of any theory.

cid:image008.png@01D2E4DD.18598130

You should read further text. You many times proved that you manipulate with Bills’ text and that you don’t understand what you were reading.

But from further Bills’ explanation we can understand the existance of reference states.

Where do you see Bill mentioning that »reference states« exist in outer environment ? I can hardly beleive that Bill would contradict himself in relation to PCT definitions and diagrams.

His intentions were to prove existance of »reference states« in general to be in organism. The intention of the driver is to open the door as much as he pleased not to some specific angle (reference state). People don’t wear »protractors« to measure the angle of how much they will open the door.

Once behavior which is produced in organism can be defined in some disturbed internal variable (error signal), reference states can be recognized in organism. References (intentions) produce behavior not vica verse. Behaviors can’t produce »reference states« in environment. But through effects of behavior through environment we can conclude what these »reference states« in organism can be.

Behavior (output) is not controlled. It doesn’t carry any information about »control« or references into outer environment from organism but from »summed effects« we can conclude.

You have to prove that »Behavior is control«, but you didn’t till now.

I think that Bill only wanted to emphasize that we can conclude form observable relationships between behavior and control in organism that »reference states« exist and are of course in organism what follows form his all theory. Your interpretations shows high level of misunderstanding basic concepts of PCT.

Mostly other authors use »goal states« to describe »outer« states to which »Control of behavior« is tending. You are one of them. The concept of »goal states« is quite different from concept of »control« in relation to inner reference states in PCT. Outside goal states are mostly meant as states to which »controlled behavior« is directed. It’s behavioristic terminology and tendency.

But this is not the case in PCT. Gentically defined reference states are only in organism and can be identified with relationship to observed behavior and of course to our »knowledge« and experiences to what could be happening.Â

HB : Again. Your explanation of »sleeping behavior« is perfectly fitting into PCT diagrams and theory as its’ showing how reference states in the controlling system are present. So if you can succesfully explain 6-10 hours a day how they are controlling why you just don’t stick to it and explain all behaviors (generally) with Bills’ diagrams.

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

This desciption is in accordance to PCT. Everything what is concerned about PCT has to be in accordance with definitions and diagrams in PCT. Maybe somewhere in Bills’ literature it can be found some contradictions because Bill admitted that he changed his mind sometimes. See through CSGnet archives.

But in any of Bills’ diagram there is no »controlled variable« in environment so there is no control, no comparator, so there can be any »reference states« outside and no »Controlled Perceptual Variable« (CPV). In PCT theory generally speaking. Is just »Control of perception« and »actions« (behavior) that tend to alter perceptions.

Reference state can be doubtfull if we neglect the »fact« that in PCT »references« can be produced only inside controlling system. Behavior is not controlled and can’t produce references outside. It’s vica verse. References produce behavior with support of perception.

Whatever is happening in environment of the system can be supportable to control inside organism or not. So the organism will survive (managing to keep genetically defined reference state) or not. It depends also from what is happening in environment. That’s also what definition of control in PCT is about.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : So how behaving system approach always to »the same state« or »homeostasis« under variety of unpredictable conditions to survive ? How orgnisms function to achieve and maintain predefined state (geneticall defined reference states). That is how LCS survive with of course support of behavior (ouptut) which also cancel the effects of disturbances. This is definition of control in PCT. The main process of control (achievement and maintainance of predefined state) is happening inside organism not outside. But from effects of output on environment observer can sometimes conclude what »references« for behavior could be. You can’t know all the time what people think and feel from just analysing behvavior. But you can gues sometimes, mostly on your experiences.Â

I’ve already proved to you Rick that Bill explained on the end of the chapter what control of openning the car door is about (see CSGnet archives). But no. Rick is trying to make confussion again. And it’s obvious why. If he keeps confussion on CSGnet his worthless articels and books will be maybe sold. He don’t care about PCT. He cares only about his »ass« what really good LCS with high gain should be doing. I understand him but I have to use PCT not RCT to understand his egoistic tendencies.

EP: For the conceptual clarity I suggest that the state in the environment which you call confusingly reference state should be called (by Fred) target state/value. Its definition is: “such a state in the environment which the controlling subject perceives with minimal error�.

HB : Dear Eetu. There is no »target« value in environment. Show me in any PCT diagram where you see GENERALLY »target« (controlled variable) in environment ??? Or even reference state in environment ?

We need general theory, and in general PCT theory is just »feed-back« in environment – effects of output on input (see waalking case). Walking case or openning the car can be clearly explained by diagram LCS III but it can’t be explained by RCT.

cid:image003.jpg@01D23694.7341FD90

HB : There is control only in organism to some genetically defined reference state and behavior that is supporting this control through »feed-back« as openning the car door and walking case is showing and mayn other cases.Â

RM: This is the theoretical explanation of the existence of reference states.

HB : It’s not just theoretical explanation. It is backed up by physiological evidences Bill offered. You just need to learn to read right.

So I see your attempts Rick as a little arranged so to make more confussion on CSGnet. You are just confussion maker Rick. You will never understand the essence of PCT and many other members also not because they are listening to you. But I can understand where your confussion is »springing«. Bill didn’t finnish diagram on p. 191. (B:CP, 2005). So I think that when that diagram is finnished you will undertsand everything more clear.

RM: But as you can see from what Powers says above, the reference state of a variable can be shown to exist without any reference to theory.

HB : Of course reference states in the controlling system exist without any theory because in this way organisms survive as reference states are genetically determined and without them there would be no organism and not control. Remember that control comes from genetic control systems.

Organisms would not survive with »reference states« in environment. See your sleeping case. Organisms survive for hours because they are controlling inisde to some reference states not outside. There is no reference states in environment.

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

HB : This is PCT explanation. And it’s general. So all you have to do is to transfer this defitniton to other behaviors and you are done. In this way you can prove that organisms can control 24/7 and stay alive.

You have to be precise in terms. Organisms survive only with achievement and maintainance of »reference states« which are genetically defined in the controlling system not outside.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

RM : Indeed, it is the objective existence of the reference states of controlled variables that is the reason Bill developed PCT.

HB : Bill proved and that’s what PCT is about that reference states objectivelly exist in organisms not outside. You are so good at manipulating with words, that I’m not surprised how some members can »buy« your bullshitt. The reason why PCT was developed is to make a general theory :

Bill P. at all (50th Anniversary, 2011) :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.

HB : You agreed with it. Don’t contradict yourself.

Best

Rick

Eetu

Lähettäjä: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Lähetetty: 12. kesäkuutata 2017 22:53
Vastaanottaja: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Aihe: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.12.1250)]

Eetu Pikkarainen (2017-06-12)-

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

RM: This is simply not true. See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other than the person doing the controlling to know this.

EP: I think you partly replied on behalf of in your message [From Rick Marken (2017.06.11.1640)] but only partly. You wrote:

RM: “a controlled perception is an inference based on observation of the fact that certain variables in what is perceived by an observer as the subject’s environment are controlled (maintained in reference states, protected from disturbance).â€?

EP: This means that an observer sees something special happen in the environment and from that s/he infers that the subject is controlling some perception.

RM: Right. The “special” thing that is seen in the environment is that a variable is being controlled (maintained in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance). For example, we can see that people are controlling for being upright as they walk over irregular terrain (the disturbances). We infer that they are doing this by controlling (among other things) a perception of the location of their center of gravity)

EP: As part of that inference the observer can do tests and try to disturb the subject’s controlling.

RM: I would say that the inference is the theory of how this control occurs: PCT. The testing that then occurs involves determining what perceptions that are being controlled that are the basis of this observed control: is it perceived center of gravity, perceived visual orientation with respect to the ground, etc.

EP: What the observer is seeing is not control, but stabilization, see below…

RM: No, if they see a variable being maintained in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance, then they are seeing control. Stabilization is not control. In stabilization (as in a mass-spring system) there is a stable (“equilibrium”) state of a variable that could be seen as a reference state but the variable is not protected from disturbance when it is in this state.

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables…“Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon.

EP: Perception may not be a part of the definition, but the reference is.

RM: Yes, the reference state is part of the definition of control. The reference state is an observable state of the variable. The reference signal in the PCT model accounts for the constant or variable reference state of the variable that is observed.

EP: Like perception, also the reference is only inside the subject / organism.

RM: The reference signal is inside the organism; the reference state is outside the system.

EP: So the definition of control (in PCT) cannot be defined completely in terms of observable variables.

RM: Again, this is “plain and simple” untrue not a lie because I"m sure the error is unintentional).

EP: When you see (the fact) that something is (in a certain way and conditions) stabilized in the environment of the subject, you can infer from that to (the fact of) control. It is like all science a hypothetical and fallible inference, but by experience a more reliable inference than many everyday alternatives. That is just the glory of science: you can know something what you have not (immediately) perceived.

RM: I appreciate your enthusiasm for PCT, Etau, but I think, at this point in your PCT learning curve, it would be wise for you to take the advice of our recent American winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature and “know your song well before you start singin’”.

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Hi BillÂ

···

On 13 Jun 2017, at 01:01, Bill Leach wrleach@cableone.net wrote:

Boris, discussions of PCT theory and PCT research can and often do lead to significant confusion.

HB : You are absolutelly right. Confussion about PCT can be the result of bad reading of Bills’ books or by listening to Rick who is selling behavioristic and self-regulation ideas over CSGnet. Problem is in his tendency to prove that GENERALLY there is »controlled variable« outside and it is »Controlled by behavior« and of course the result which is »Controlled Perceptual Variable«. This is wrong control loop.

I proved many times that PCT is about »Control of Perception« and behavior (output) being just effects to environment which can be recognized as support to organisms control. But control is alsways done in organism not outside.

BL : I am going to make a couple of bold assertions here! When discussing ONLY the subject of what the theory of PCT is; Rick, Martin, Bruce, Dag (and the list goes on) almost never make any sort of error or contradiction of what Bill Powers taught.

HB : What exactly do you think Bill thought with PCT ? Can you explain to me how diagram LCS III, or diagram in B:CP p. 191 (2005) ? And Bill sorry to say, but you didn’t prove yet how »behavior can be controlled« ?

BL earlier : I’m sorry Boris, but behavior IS controlled,

HB : So where are evidences that behavior (output) can be controlled ???

HB : Rick nd Martin has quite opposite standings about PCT.

Martin is getting along with PCT and me and Kent and Rupert and Bruce A. etc. that there is no »controlled variable« in environment« of LCS. That the only »controlled variable« in the control loop is »perceptual signal«. That was Bills’ initial idea that is shown in all his diagrams. Find one Bills’ diagram where there is »controlled variable« in environment and more : where is »reference controlled variable« in outer environment ? What an imagination Rick has. He made such a confussion that I don’t beleive CSGnet forum will ever recover from all the nonsense he wrote.

Rick is now standing on a position that there is »reference controlled variable« in outer environment, that is »controlled« by »controlled behavior« and that it is producing »Controlled Perceptual Variable«. JUST OPPOSITE TO WHAT me, Kent, Martin, Rupert, Bruce A. etc. think.

Do you understand where the problem is ???

I proved hundred times with Bills diagrams and with Bill’s evidences in B:CP, with physiological evidences that Rick is WRONGLY GENERALIZING PCT. And by his latest discussions he put GENERALLY organisms »reference states« which are genetically defined in organism into environment of the controlling system, what made just more confussion. I don’t say that PCT does not needS UPGRADE and IMPROVEMENT. But by »exporting« reference states into environment of LCS, Rick obviously violeted all possible. That’s happening if somebody is playing »games« behind computer like Rick is. He is missing the GENERAL POINT OF PCT.

BL : When such errors do (rarely) occur they (including Rick) are quick to correct the error (of even without someone else having pointed out the error).

HB : »Errors« all te time happen in Ricks writings. And he didn’t correct anything. His »errors« are at least 5 year old. O.K. he sometimes corrected it :

RM earlier : In my rush to show that this is not the case I came up with what has to be the dumbest rebuttal of all time – outdoing even myself in stupidity;-) I claimed that it was q.i*g rather than q.i that is the Input Quantity in the LiveBlock demo. This was simply, utterly wrong.

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment.

RM earlier : At the risk of further reinforcing Boris’ already rather low opinion of me I feel compelled to admit to having made a rather big mistake in my discussion with Rupert regarding the relationship between the environment and perception.

HB : You see that Rick himself admitted that he can produce extremly stupid statements. And he is just going on. He didn’t learn anything.Â

So »errors« in Ricks’ writings are usually not corrected but they are escalating to »positive feed-back«.

Rick made such a confussion on CSGnet that I doubt that CSGnet could solve it. Ricks’ friends should express their oppinion but it seems that they don’t want to offened him. But as I said many times before. Friendship and science are not going »hand in hand«. Ricks’ friends aren’t doing Rick any favour.

BL : Remaining with the theoretical perspective… The property of control can not exist without a comparator. Of course it also can not exist with a reference value,

HB : You mean it can’t exist without reference value and so on….

BL : …a sensor input, an output effector, something to be sensed, somethhing to be acted upon by the output effector, and a relationship between the acted upon ‘thing’ and the sensed ‘thing.’

HB : There is no relationship »between the acted upon ‘thing’ and the sensed 'thing.'« in PCT. There is just »feed-back« in environment of the controlling system what means :

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

HB : So there is no acting upon »things« in environment in PCT. There is no »controlled variable« in outer environment. It’s just »effects of output on input«. Do you understand what is wrong with your thinking ? It’s not in accordance with PCT. Here is PCT diagram where you can see that there is no »things that are acted upon« in environment :

cid:image002.jpg@01D2E396.F40C1DC0

HB : For example what is »sleeping behavior« acting upon in environment. And what is sunshining behavior acting upon in environment ?

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

HB : You can see clearly that Rick can understand that there is no »controlled variable« outside of LCS. The only »controlled variables« are »perceptual signals« or »sensed things«. And control is done in organism not outside. Nothing else. GENERALLY SPEAKING.

Even if there would be »an acted upon and sensed thing« in enviroment, that behaviors (actions) would affect, that is not GENERAL DEFINITION. General definition is in Bills’ theory which he proved with various evidences. You just have to read it right and you’ll understand. Bills’ model (diagram LCS III) is general model that should explain any behavior not just some of them.

If you read and underdstand carefully PCT you’ll understand that there is just »feed-back« in outer environment and »effects of output on input«. That’s all there is in outer environment. We just have to explain how diagram »GENERALLY« function and we are explaining PCT.

PCT is joint in diagram in LCS III. Do you understand LCS III diagram ? Can you explain it to me ? How do you understand the diagram ? That there is some »controlled variable« in environment of controlling system ? Understanding of PCT can be by my oppinion measured with understanding of Bills’ diagrams and of course other evidences for his control theroy.

It’s not the problem that we can see effects of control in the environment of organisms, the problem is how that happens. And PCT says it’s with »Control of perception«. And Rick says with »Control of behavior«.

BL : That is to say that control is a continuous functioning process and not a ‘thing.’ You can have all of these ‘things’ and not have a control system. It is only when they are all connected to each other in a certain way that a control system is possible.

HB : Right. Once again can you please explain how »control loop« in LCS III diagram works so that we’ll see that you understand how »these things« are »connected« to form »control unit« ? See Bills’ diagram ?

BL : I am not sure if this fits in with Bill Powers thinking but I also believe that the “acted upon ‘thing,’” the “sensed ‘thing,’” and the “relationship between them’” do not necessarily have to be what we would call physical objects.

HB : This doesn’t fit into Bill Powers PCT. There is no »acted upon« controlled variable in environment of the control system. There is only »acting upon« input in PCT. »Acted upon things in environment in control sense« and »sense acting upon things« is just imagination part of RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory).

BL : Einstein’s work on the theories of relativity would be examples of the use of a control process in solving a theoretical problem.

BL : Personally I think that your difficulties with Rick exist because your view of the approach that Rick is using in APPLYING the PCT theory to actual observed behavior (actual or theoretical behavior) is that his approach is flawed.

HB : I don’t think it is »flawed«. It’s contradicting Bills’ work, mein, Kents’, Martins’, Ruperts’, Bruce A., etc oppinions that there is no »controlled variable« in outer environment and there is no »Control of behavior« but there is »Control of perception« and the only »controlled variable« in control loop is »perceptual signal«. Do we understand what I wanted to say. Rick is wrong with his RCT (Rikcs’ Control Theory) and wrong control loop. He is confussion maker.

BL : As soon as you leave discussion of the theory of PCT itself and begin discussing the implication of PCT to behavior, one is, for very practical reasons, forced to make many assumptions. Many of these assumptions have recently been discussed in some detail and with great clarity by a number of different CSGnet members.

HB : This is normal what people were doing for milions of years. They were implicating behavior to real life and thought that they »control« everything with behavior. Bill Powers broke that tradition with proving that what we control is not behavior but perception. See Bills’ and Mary Thesis about PCT.

BL : A very simple example of such an assumption: If I as an observer/researcher have a perception that an object in the environment that I am watching closely at moves to the left and the subject individual is also watching that same object, the subject will have essentially the same perception that the object moved to the left as did I.

HB : This is too simple example to understand the essence ot PCT. It’s not the same perception in both controllers. See my discussion with Bruce Nevin, where he gave a very right desctiption of what experimenter and subject perceive. The problem was that he didn’t stick to his own definitions or statements about different perceptions. What is crucial if we want to understand generaly what is being controlled.

BL : An absolutely VITAL aspect of this assumption is that the two perceptual input functions (even though they are in two different and independent beings) are both linking the observed properties of the object being observed.

HB : It is linking both observers, but the question is how. It’s not the same p (perceptual signal) and it’s not with »Control of behavior«. If you see the observers perceive »properties of the object« with different perceptual signals you will notice that most of the time peole don’t agree abuout the »same perceivings« of the outer environment. That’s speccialy valid for all maybe not so »exact« observations.

Consider a situation where observers are not in accordance with what color some objects are ? Or when observers watched the same accident and they have different »stories«. People don’t see the »objects« the same, speccially when they are complex. We all on CSGnet read differently the same Bills’ books and of course understand them differently. Obciously what we perceive and control is far from being the same. That’s because people form »perceptual models« in their minds not »objective pictures of the world«. PCT works in every life situation, so it can be applyed to any life case not just to some simple experiments. It’s general theory about how organisms function.

Bill P. at all (50th Anniversary, 2011) :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.

HB : So what you described can be maybe one case in possible cases of people observations. But it has to be incorporated into general PCT theory and must feet in PCT diagrams. And there is no PCT diagram with »controlled variable« in environment that can be observed the same by all observers.

BL : If the subject corrects the leftward movement (and all others disturbances to the position or maybe trajectory) of the observed object then the researcher, as a result of understanding the theory of PCT can conclude that their own perception of the effect of the behavior of the subject on the object then they can conclude that they have properly identified the subject’s perception that is being controlled.

HB : As I said this is very simple experiment where »obvious« can be concluded. Try with more complex experiments. Rick himself admitted that this sort of experiment will not work.

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables…¦.

But in any case. From behavior we can more or less precise conclude what other people are controlling or we can’t guess (when we for ex. ask people what they are doing). But is always just a guess. You can not precisely define what kind of perception is being controlled. See the reason in Bruce Nevins’ explanation of differences in perceptual signal.

BL : Because, at least those of us that do believe that science and scientific principles are valid (and of course I believe that to be a true situation for everyone on this forum), then it is NOT improper to state a PROPERTY OF THE OBSERVED OBJECT is being control by the subject even though we know that the subject can only control their PERCEPTION of that property.

HB : Bill. You are contradicting yourself. You can’t make two »excluding« statements in one sentence. If subject can only control perception there is no other possiblities.

If you beleive in scientific principles, it can’t be that at the same time when we know that only perception is controlled, is also something else controlled in environment . This is Ricks position and only thing I’m asking you here is to prove that you can control something outside, that you can »control property of the oberved object« ? We need evidence that you can »control your behavior (output)« ? Be scientific and get the evidence ?

Rick is singing and repeating what you are saying like a parrot all the time. But when you »control perception« in comparator you have to prove how control goes through »error« signal into muscle tension and effects to environment so that control can be transffered into outer environment into some »controlled variable« ? This is not part of PCT. It’s different mechanism which PCT is trying to show.

You can beleive that you can control something in outer environment, but then you are talking about some other theory. In this case about RCT (Ricks’ Control theory. Bills’ PCT is quite different from theories. It »thinks« that behavior can’t be controlled :

Bill P :

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – wwhen we make the perception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

HB : Bill proved that muscle tension (output) of organisms can’t be controlled. Go read B:CP.

If you think that you can control something outside and that is not behavior, it can mean that the only other way we can imagine that you can »control« properties of the observed object is to transfer control into outer environment with Telekinesis. And that is not scientific method.

If you don’t want me to think that you aprove Telekinesis, then you’ll have to get evidence that you can control behavior (output). And please don’t answer if you’ll have no proofs. I’d advise you to read B:CP carefully first and be sure that you understand it.

BL : I believe that Rick (and others of course) accept that what I just stated it the preceding paragraph is a perfectly reasonable way to talk about real world application of PCT but that you do not agree.

HB : Who agree with you ? These are your beleives but I know that Martin don’t agree, Rupert don’t agree, Kent don’t agree that »Behavior is Control«, that there is some » Controlled varuable« in environment and that there is some »Controlled Perceptual Variable«.

Do you have their agreements ? Where ? But I can show their statements where they clearly don’t agree with what you are saying : that you can control behavior (ouptut) and some »controled variable« in environment.

Please show me Bills’ one real world aplication of PCT that you made. First you could maybe go and drive car in the wind. I’m sure you’ll get it immediatelly that control loop is not happening at the same time as Rick made a statement. And then go to the real world and say strange people »hello«. It will become clear to you that you »can’t control other people all the time« as Rick is stating. People will act differently to your »hello« not as you will expect or want them to act. Do you understand what I’m talking about ? People don’t behave as we want them to. They behave as they want. Or as Alison Powers wrote :

AP : One of the best things about the psychological aspect of PCT is that it teaches people not only to own and be responsible for their own thoughts and actions but to understand that it is not the environment that drives our thoughts and actions but a series of goals that we have developed within each of us based upon each of our own experiences, our own needs and desires.

BL : And thus your dispute with Rick (and again no doubt others) is founded on this single difference in opinion.

HB : No doubt of others ??? Who are those others ? Did you get their oppinion or you are just »shooting in the fog« like Rick is.

Difference in oppinions between PCT (as I represent PCT, you can watch my PCT evidences) and RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) is so huge that it can be more. Rick is behavioristic, self-regulation thinker and I’m PCT thinker. Rick doesn’t support his statements with PCT diagrams and I support every my statement with diagram or some other source of evidences (what is by the way scientific). Do you see what is science and what is »quackery« ?

Rick never explained or give any evidences :

  1.  how diagram in LCS III function.
    
  1.  how diagram on p. 191 B:CP (2005) function
    
  1.  how behavior (output) can be »controlled«
    
  1.  how »controlled variable« in environment is controlled
    
  1.  how everything in control loop happen at the same time
    
  1.  how people can control people other people all the time
    
  1.  how people can persue helicopter with »Third eye«
    
  1.  how »extrasensory« perception is realized
    

These are all biggest nonsense Rick wrote on CSGnet with no scientific explanations. You can check in CSGnet archives.

Mostly Ricks’ theory is based on Occultism and Parapsychology. Or he can persuade me with showing evidences for his statements.

Rick also never wrote that he agree with Bills’ and Mary Thesis about PCT.Â

Do you agree with their Thesis or you think that they should be changed in accordance with what you exposed in your post ?

Do you understand what is difference between me and Rick and your oppinion about PCT ?

Best,

Boris

Best, Bill

On 06/12/2017 08:10 AM, Boris Hartman wrote:

Down …

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2017 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.09.1250)]

Martin Taylor (2017.06.07.22.48)

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist in the environment.

RM: Ignoring the fact that I know that controlled variables are not in the environment, what would be so bad about a reader concluding that they are variables in the environment?

RM: I don’t know if you saw this before, Martin; it ended up being posted in a different thread for some reason. But I would really appreciate hearing your answer to this question.

HB :

Martin already answered on Ricks question above and I perfectly agree with his answer. I hope that he will not mind if I add some sentences.

The problem is not if reader beleives that there are variables in environment but whether there are »controlled variables« in environment or not. The problem is that you are not ignoring this »fact« but that you are »double« personality. It’s yours instability Rick that is causing so much confussion here on CSGnet.

We are just talking about your irrisposibility to be on side of PCT where the only »controlled variable« is not in environment but inside the controlling system. It’s called perceptual signal. Hence Bills theory about »Control of perception«.

Ashby was taking quite different approcah preventing such a mish-mash in meanings. Variables in his »ultrastability« theory were inside organism and parameters were outside. So even in the case of control there was inpossible to miss the position of variabel. It was inside.

In the case of PCT everything are variables so it’s sometimes qiute difficult to understand why variables inside system are controlled and outisde system are not. But Bill did solve this problem and you Rick don’t understand how, so once you are writing in PCT manner and once in RCT. In this way you make confussion even greater, as you are hiding your RCT theory behind PCT.

We are not ignoring the »fact« that you once understand that »controlled variables« are not in the environment and once you don’t. You can check it on CSGnet archives about your »double« personality, which is confusing all around you including Alison Powers, who really showed very high understanding of PCT, much higher then you did.

Mostly you don’t use your understanding that »controlled variable« is not in the environment. Your demos show this clearly. The same is with your books and articles.

Because you are so unreliable (all your demos mostly show »controlled variable« in environment«) starting with »distance«, I made just for you a control loop where »controlled variable« is in environment, Then it’s clear how »control loop« should look like if you control »controlled variable« with behavior as there are no other means that make sense except if you want to introduce Telekinesis and Telephaty to show how yu can control inside and in the same time outside.

Beside »control« in outer in environment you perceive that control with »Controled Perceptual Variable« or as you called it CPV what is close to Gavins’ PCV.

So control loop which has your elements looks like this :

  1.  CONTROL : Keeping some »controlled variable (aspect of outer environment) in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  1.  OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
    
  1.  FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  1.  INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  1.  COMPARATOR : ????
    

We see that in RCT the »only« problem is comparator. Although everything is problematic, only for comparator Rick has never explicitly defined how it works.

I think that Rick can’t define it, because comparators are ususally not in environment where by Rick’s persuasion control is done. And there are some others who beleive the same.

So in RCT case (Ricks Control Theory) where control is done in environment he has to put »comparator« into environment if he want to prove that something is controlled in environment. The only place in control loop where control is done is »comparator«. So it has to be somewhere in environment if control is done in environmnet. Something has to be matched to reference so that we get control in environment. Ups but where are references in environment ??? That was also mostly msitake of engeeners as Henry Yin pointed out.

HY : … reference iss placed outside of the organism, where the engineer designing the system also performs comparison function. Thus for decades such control systems have been treated as stimulus-respons or input-output devices : error in, behavior out. The tendency to resort to linear causation is so strong that even closed loop controllers have been treated as devices that receive error signals and generate behaviors.

HB : Does it look familiar to you ? How we should call your »comparator« in environment ?

RM in other post : The variables that we see being controlled are the data that are to be explained by theory.

HB : Maybe »Controlled variable« where »mis-match« between effets of output and references are taking place and »error« is calculated and perceived by organism in the form of »Controlled Perceptual variable« or CPV as you called it.

HB : Rick sorry to say, but term »Controlled Perceptual Variable« is your pure invention as this term was never used in PCT literature, nor by Bill nor by Mary Powers nor by Henry Yin. It’s stimulating thinking that control comes form environment into controlling system and that is »input-ouput« system as Henry Yin pointed out.

Where did you get this term Rick. Maybe you are »double« agent and you are working also for Carver who is also producing all kinds of new self-regulation terms.

Do you remember using all these terms ? Well if you don’t they are safe in CSGnet archive. You can never escape from nonsense you wrote. You should be carefull what you are writing arroung CSGnet as every word is »recorded« and saved.

Do you understand where your problem is ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery