William T. Powers is dead - long live William T. Powers

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1230)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.06.09.16.34)–

MT: I am tempted to echo Eetu, and say "Are you serious?" The

possibility never occurred to me that you might be asking a real
question. Why did Bill title his book :… control of perception" if
it was not to emphasize that perception inside the organism, not
something in the environment is the controlled variable in EVERY
case?

RM: It’s important to keep in mind that Bill wrote the book for an audience of scientific psychologists. So I’m pretty sure Bill selected the title Behavior: The Control of Perception to emphasize the fact that the view of behavior described in the book was the exact opposite of the “conventional” view held by most scientific psychologists. The conventional view of behavior was, and still is, that perception is ultimately the cause of behavior. Since psychologists tend to use “cause” and “control” interchangeably, I think Powers knew that calling his book Behavior: The Control of Perception would be a huge disturbance to psychologists would were controlling for the idea that “perception is the control (cause) of behavior”. Â

RM:  So I’m certain that Bill didn’t use the phrase “control of perception” in order to emphasize that perception is “inside the organism, not something in the environment”. This fact didn’t need emphasizing since scientific psychologists already assumed that it was perception, not the environment itself, that was the start of the imagined causal chain that ended with behavior. In fact, Bill used “perception” in the title in the same way scientific psychologists use it: as a synonym for “input”. Evidence for this is the final, beautiful sentence in Bill’s 1978 Psych Review paper:Â

BP: For a thousand unconnected empirical generalizations based on superficial similarities among stimuli, I here substitute one general underlying principle: control of input. [emphasis mine]

RM: I’m quite sure that Bill selected the phrase “control of perception” for the title of his most important book because it reflected this principle: that behavior involves the control of input, not, as was the prevailing view, control of output.Â

MT: Of course (a dangerous phrase when communicating with you), if the

perception is truly a relatively noise-free representation of
something in the environment on which the control system is acting,
then a reader could buy into the all too seductive illusion that
some environmental variable is being controlled.

RM: So is a control engineer making a bad mistake in seeing the home thermostat as controlling the air temperature near the sensor? Was Bill Powers making a bad mistake in seeing the subject in the coin game controlling the arrangement of the coins on the table? How do you even know that a perception is being controlled if you don’t see something in the controller’s environment being controlled?

Â

MT: And again "of

course", the effectiveness of controlling a perception on the
organism’s welfare depends almost entirely on the perception being
of something really in the environment.

RM: I disagree. We control many perceptions that contribute to our welfare yet correspond to nothing that is really in the environment – things like the taste of lemonade and the rules of algebra. There are perceptions that are functions of environmental variables. When you control them you are controlling those functions of environmental variables but there is no entity in the environment that corresponds to those perceptions.

MT: The corresponding property

or variable in the environment is made to do what a controlled
variable would do. But that doesn’t mean that the controller uses
some telekinetic and telepathic connection to the environment
instead of sensory input to create a controlled variable and
influence it. Using the environment by controlling perception is
what PCT is all about. Controlling variables in the environment is
not.

RM: If you eliminate “or variable in” from this paragraph and substitute the word “of” then it corresponds  to the PCT view of control of perception. A “property of” the environment is a function of environmental variables (the physical variables that make up the environment according to the models of chemistry and physics). And that is, indeed, what we control: properties (or aspects) of the environment. Â

Â

MT: If that reader is just a passer-by with no special interest in PCT

as a theory, who cares? But if that observer is interested in
learning PCT or refining her appreciation of PCT, then it matters a
lot (to that person, not necessarily to anyone else). That’s why I
was surprised to read that you had actually asked this as a real
question – but I think not a serious one, because at best it is
only a trick question.

RM: Â I think the first thing a person interested in PCT should learn is how to see control when it’s happening. In many cases, what is seen will appear to be control of something in the environment. For example, in the compensatory tracking task it looks like the person is controlling the distance between two lines out in the environment. In catching baseballs it looks like the fielder is controlling for being under the ball that is out in the environment. In driving a car it looks like the driver is controlling for keeping the car in its lane, both of which are in the environment. Â

                                                MT.

It seems to me that regardless of what may
be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the
other day about Behaviour being the control
of perception), the words he uses can easily
lead a reader to conclude that controlled
variables exist in the environment.

                    RM: Ignoring the

fact that I know  that controlled
variables are not in the environment, what would
be so bad about a reader concluding that they
are variables in the environment?Â

RM: Once the person has grasped the concept of behavior as control – once the person can see behavior through control theory glasses – then it’s appropriate to introduce the theory that accounts for this controlling: PCT. The theory says that what is actually being controlled is a perceptual variable – the variable that the observer sees being controlled, but from the controller’s point of view. So the person doing the tracking is controlling the distance between lines from his or her perspective: controlling his or her perception. Same for the fielder controlling for getting under the ball and the driver controlling for keeping the car in it’s lane.Â

RM: So seeing behavior as the control of variables in the environment is really the first step in understanding behavior. If you just stopped there this view of behavior would indeed be a mistake. But the person interested in PCT would learn that the next step in understanding behavior is to try to see the controlling from the point of view of the behaving system. That is, the person would learn how to test to determine the the perceptual variables that are actually being controlled using the Test for Controlled Variables.Â

RM: The real mistake is imagining that controlled variables exist only as perceptions inside the organism. If this were true, there would be no way for anyone, other than their possessors, to know about them. But, fortunately, there is evidence for their existence in the observable behavior of organisms. You just have to know how to see what appears to be control of variables in controller’s environment from the controller’s perspective.Â

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1240)]

···

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

EP: Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.Â

EP: The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment.

RM: This is simply not true. See my recent post to Martin. I’ll just repeat my last point: If people controlled only their perceptions then there would be no way for anyone other than the person doing the controlling to know this.Â

Â

EP: Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

RM: The definition of control in PCT is completely in terms of observable variables. It is an “objective” definition in the sense that others besides the observer can confirm the observation. The definition of control in PCT is: maintenance of a variable in a reference state, protected from disturbance. “Perception” is not part of this definition; perception is a component of the theory that accounts for this objectively observable phenomenon. Â

BestÂ

Rick

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[bleach]

Do I understand all of this correctly?:

[Of course I use 'actually exist in the environment' or similar

statements in the manner that I believe Bruce was pointing out.
That is, that while we can not really know exactly what does and
does not constitute the full nature of what does exist in the
environment the failure to believe such an environment exists,
and/or that we can’t determine some of the laws of such environment,
completely nullifies the concept of scientific method]

The section on what I believe is Martin's position:

1.     The complex environmental variable (CEV) is something that is
   

perceived to exist in the environment that is perceived by the
researcher. [Unless stated otherwise the definition of the CEV
is always intended to be the researcher’s definition for the
rest of this discussion]

1.     The first exception to the statement given above is that some
   

of the involved individuals may have a perception that a CEV (as
opposed to a single environmental variable) may be involved.
However this or these perceptions may or may not correspond with
the researchers definition of the CEV. There are conflict
resolution situations where the existence of this perception by
one or more of the involved individuals could prove to be
important to the analyst trying to resolve a conflict.

1.     A CEV has more than one element [element may not be the term
   

that Martin likes for this property, my apologies if that is the
case]

1.     These elements of the CEV are also perceptions that are
   

perceived by the researcher. Indeed, it is important for the
researcher to identify what elements are involved.

1.     Some element or elements of the CEV are the subject of control
   

by each involved control system.

1.     Conflict may exist because because some control systems are
   

attempting to control a single element to reference values that
are not compatible. [A concept that I view as a direct conflict
and a problem that even I remember Bill Powers discussing in
some detail]

1.     Conflict may exist because control systems have are attempting
   

to control different elements of a CEV to reference levels that
results in conflict caused by interaction in the environment
between the different elements that precludes achieving control
of one of these elements or possibly another element of the CEV
that is also controlled by one or more these system.

1.     Especially for complex situations it does not always follow
   

that such interference between elements of a CEV is necessarily
due to an immutable physical law stating an unchangeable
relationship between the elements.

1.     Different elements of a CEV may be related to each other by an
   

immutable physical relationship.

1.     Different elements of a CEV may be related to each other by a
   

relationship that can be altered.

1.     An alterable relationship can be caused by the relationship
   

itself be a controlled perception of other control system. [I realize that my listing of the element relationships is likely to be neither all inclusive nor necessarily a even good description of the ones that I have described]

1.     The CEV concept is particularly useful to those analyzing such
   

complex environmental relationships with an ‘eye’ to solving the
conflict.

1.       The identification of the CEV is particularly useful for
   

such work in PCT because it automatically suggest three means
for conflict resolution to the researcher: (1) Attempt to
induce changes to reference values within individual beings,
(2) attempt to make changes to the how the relationships
between elements of the CEV function (obviously impossible in
some but certainly not all instances), or (3) attempt a bit of
both.

1.       The CEV concept recognizes both the importance of
   

understanding the control phenomenon with respects to elements
of a CEV, physical laws that effect or determine the
relationship between such elements and perceptions of
relationships that may not have actual corresponding physical
causes.

1.       The CEV is a potentially valuable term for PCT precisely
   

because it does explicitly recognize that in complex
situations understanding the difference between control driven
conflict that can only be resolved by somehow altering the
reference values within one or more of the conflicted control
loops AND environmental part of the functional relationships
between elements of a CEV that might be altered with or
without requiring either minor or no reference value changes
in the involved control loops provides more potential solution
sets and a higher probability of implementing a successful
resolution.

1.     In any given complex control situation where conflict has been
   

identified as a problem, thorough and careful analysis of the
CEV itself should result in both identifying elements that are
involved, identifying elements that do exist but are not
involved in the conflict but need to be understood so that their
possible involvement in a solution can be recognized or so that
understanding how various solutions might alter them can be
understood and evaluated. Identifying and describing the
functional relationships between the various elements is
essential.

1.     While the CEV analysis process for complex (and no doubt for
   

some that are thought to be simple) situations is surely
iterative, recognition of the CEV analysis process should always
result in permitting the generation of a richer and more
inventive set of solutions than might otherwise be achieved. In
particular this approach is far more likely to determine
solutions that can be effectively implemented that do not
necessitate changes to control efforts by the individuals
directly involved.

1.     The term CEV should be included as part of the formal PCT
   

lexicon.
The section on what I believe is Rick’s position:

1.     The controlled variable (CV) is in the subject being studied,
   

that is the CV is definitely NOT something that is actually in
the environment. But, the CV is some (usually unspecified
beyond being a neurological signal?) function of a variable or
variables that actually do exist in the environment.

1.     The term CEV is NOT a flawed concept. That is grouping related
   

environmental variables under another variable name (referred to
as a CEV) is not in and of itself a ‘wrong headed idea.’

1.     However, the term CEV would not be a useful addition to the
   

PCT lexicon. [My apologies to Rick are in order here as I do
not remember any of the reasons he stated for his position.
Though I do believe that he did state that the term CEV would
add confusing complexity to the (beautifully simple) concept of
PCT]
The reason(s) for Rick’s position stated (essentially unstated here)
in Item R3 might well also be sources for conflict between Rick and
Martin on this issue.

While I invite anyone, especially Martin or Rick to challenge or

correct anything that I say here, I really do believe (from my
reading of what I have read of both of their postings on this
subject) that the only conflict between the two of them is with
their respective positions on Items M15 and R3 above.

Further, I imagine that if each of them rewrote both sections above

in their own words making corrections to what I wrote, what would
result is two presentations worded in different fashion having
essentially identical meaning!

If most of the above is indeed correct then I sit here in as much

amazement at the often acrimonious debate between Rick and Martin as
it appears (to me anyway) that Alison was pointing out.

Best, Bill

<snip>

···

On 2017/06/7 8:25 PM, Alison Powers wrote:

Martin - I am confused because you say:

  MT: Rick says the controlled variable is in the environment, which

I say cannot be true, because in the environment there exists no
independent reference variables nor sources from which they can be
determined independently of observation of the moment-by-moment
values of the environmental variable itself.

But then Rick responded to me in the PCT Research thread:

  RM: The controlled variable is not in the outer environment;

rather it is a function of physical variables that are in
the outer environment; the function is called a * perceptual
function*.

  <snip>

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)]

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.Â

If there is a contradiction between common sense and strict PCT definition, it can be an impediment to communication.

But what harm is done if we acknowledge that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we perceive that we are stabilizing that aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input? The caveat is that perceptions are the only possible evidence for this. So what? Perceptions are our only possible evidence for any conclusion, and the conclusions themselves are perceptions. We do not deny on that account the existence of that which we perceive. We just acknowledge our limitations.

Our canonical diagram is solipsistic. Spend a little time, if you will, thinking about collective control, when two or more individuals are controlling “the same thing”. A while back I posted a diagram of the Test for the Controlled Variable as an example of two individuals controlling the “same variable”. Necessarily, there is some topological rearrangement in the part of the diagram that describes one of the individuals.

During active intervention part of the TCV, the behavioral outputs of the observer-experimenter are disturbances to the variable that the subject is controlling.

Assume that you are the experimenter-observer. By virtue of careful performance of the Test for the Controlled Variable you determine that the subject S is controlling a variable that you perceive, represented in the diagram as the green rectangle between the two control systems.

Your perception of that variable is labeled S.o in the diagram, and the subject’s perception of it is labeled S.s. You successfully perform the Test, and thereby demonstrate that your perception is equivalent to the subject’s perception. (Or you might prefer to say that your [imagined] perception of the subject’s perception, based on your perception of the variable, is accurate.) That equivalence touches on the root of the problem under discussion.

The variable is controlled, protected from disturbances. During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your perception S.o at its reference value despite your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude (justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s = S.o.

Notice that, by this demonstrated equivalence, the subject S is now controlling your perceptual input S.o by controlling his perceptual input S.s.

Would it be simpler to say that S is controlling that aspect of the environment which you perceive as S.o (the green rectangle in the diagram) by controlling his perception S.s of that aspect of the environment? When we include other agents in the control system diagram, does Martin’s CEV (the green rectangle above) make for a simpler and more intuitively satisfying account?

···

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.Â

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

Eetu
(Lähetetty kännykästä / Sent from mobile)

Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com kirjoitti 9.6.2017 kello 19.24:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.09.12:23 ET)]

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2 –

Except for imagination, the environment is necessary in order to have a closed loop. Think about that.Â

/Bruce

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 5:28 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen
eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2]

Â

EP: Bruce, again I agree largely, but I think you understood me wrong. I was not talking about knowledge (I intended to resume to it sometimes later…) but only about the conncept of control. What you write here about the
reality of our environment and the possibility of the reliability of our knowledge about it and especially the truthfulness of scientific knowledge is quite OK. But that was not the issue.

Â

EP: The issue was just the concept of control. And it comes up also below: “[Science]
gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that
when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment. [italics by EP]�

Â

EP: From the next possible facts:

• a person perceives something in the environment
• there really is something in the environment “causingâ€? just that perception (not a hallucination or error)
• the person has a reference value for that perception
• there is a difference between perceptual and reference values causing error and output
• the output manages to cause certain kind of changes to that something in the environment
• as a consequence of those changes the person’s perception changes to the refence value
  it does NOT follow that the person controls that something in the environment. It follows only that she controls her perception (of that something). As an everyday experience this seems and sounds like the person were
  controlling that something in the environment. But just the beauty of the PCT is that we can make the differentiation and understand that all we can ever control is our perceptions.

Â

EP: In everyday life we cannot help saying that someone controls the temperature of the room or that someone did a controlled somersault. But here is theoretical / scientific PCT discussions this either unjustified assumption
or unjustified incoherence causes endless confusion.

Â

EP: We don’t control our environment by controlling our perceptions because strictly speaking there are two different kind of processes which do not both justify the use of the term “control�. Neither do we control our
perceptions by controlling our environment. What we do is that we control our perceptions by affecting some aspect of our environment and as a consequence of that the aspect of environment (usually) becomes stabilized somehow (in a certain way). Â Â

Â

Eetu

–

 Please, regard all my statements as questions,

 no matter how they are formulated.

Â

Â

Â

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)–

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

Â

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08–

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

Â

I believe that you are convinced that this settles the matter.

Â

The most direct evidence of the reality of that which is perceived is that the environment pushes back and sometimes even bites. To perceive as we wish to perceive requires control; that control often requires effort (against what?);
that control is often disturbed by unforeseen and even unperceived disturbances (whence?); that control often has unintended consequences (arising from what?). John Kirkland’s post in this thread alludes to unintended consequences of that complex of controlled
variables called “industrialization since 1800”.

Â

It would be most peculiar to say that to be scientific  we must deny that our experiments, models, and theory give us knowledge of reality. An essential point about PCT is that if the performance of a model conforms very closely to that of a living subject
then the structure of the model informs us about what must necessarily be structures in the living subject.Â

Â

Look at the fundamental first methodological steps of PCT, the Test for the Controlled Variable. When the experimenter E succeeds in determining what perception (perceptual variable) the subject S is controlling, E is justified in saying that S really has that
perception and is controlling it. This is because E is controlling what E perceives to be the same variable in such a way as to disturb S’s control of it.Â

Â

To do this, E imagines a transform or translation of a perception that E is controlling. To identify what perception to control, E guesses what S is controlling. The transformation is from E’s point of view to S’s point of view. Point of view upon what? Upon
that which E presumes to be a real variable in the environment which E and S are perceiving from their respective points of view. It is not obvious how one might make sense of the Test, much less carry it out, without this presumption of reality.Â

Â

Another way to put the conundrum, coming at it from the other direction, is the truism that science never proves anything. Proof is possible only for mathematics and logic.Â

Â

What science yields us is a succession of provisional and serviceable models of reality (that is, of that aspect of reality of which the particular field of science treats). In other words, it gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming
that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment.

Â

When I say provisional and serviceable, I mean that we make do with the best theory that is still standing when the dust of argument settles, or (as in the case of Newtonian vs. relativistic vs. quantum physics) the best theory for the purposes at hand–or
to pick another familiar example, sometimes waves are a more useful model of light, sometimes particles are.Â

Â

In short, the conclusions of science are high-level perceptions that enable us to control lower-level perceptions better and more reliably than non-science and nonsense conclusions do. And they do so precisely because they (apparently) correspond better to
whatever it is that is really real, independent of our perceptions. They better equip us to identify and control variables that matter to us, to resist disturbances to our control, and maybe even to avoid unintended side effects, or at least recognize them
in time to bring them, too, under control.Â

Â

Conversely, our perception that we are better able to control under system concepts and principles of science than we are with non-science or nonsense system concepts and principles is our justification for taking the system concepts and principles of science
to be true–that is, taking them to be realities. The argument is circular, but it appears to have been a virtuous circle so far.

Â

/Bruce

Â

Â

Â

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08]

Â

Bruce, I largely agree. Some comments though:

Â

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)]

Begin with some PCT truisms.

All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it.

Â

(Not sure about this, but I will turn to it sometimes later – it depends on definitions. I agree that all our knowledge iis based on perceptions.)

Â

All that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it.

Â

That is funny and fuzzy saying, at least for me: sounds like our perceptions were in the environment. I would say that we cannot control anything in the environment but only our perceptions of it.

Â

I control many perceptions of our environment without exerting the actions that maintain them under control. Other people, or other agents, exert the actions that maintain them under control.Â

Â

Or they just happen to be (temporarily) so that our perceptions of them remain near the reference.

Â

Among the evidence that I control such perceptions is the observation that, should control of them lapse, I act in such a way that other people or agents resist the disturbance and re-establish control of them.

A recent example: the street signs for Pinehurst Avenue and Chase Road were swapped, so that each designated the other road. My wife called my attention to it. We contacted the Public Works Department. They fixed it.

What’s the point of this? All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it, and we presume that our perceptions are the realities that we perceive. (We presume this even though we know that our perceptions are selective and
omit infinitely many aspects of the environment, some of which we know about because we or others have extended the senses with scientific instruments.) This presumption is justified by our success controlling in the environment and by the like success of
all our human and pre-human ancestors without whose survival we would not be here.

Â

That is extremely important. Our success in control of our perceptions is highly depending on other people and other actors – and finally on the objects or our perceptions.

Â

By this justified presumption, we project the universe of our perceptions into the otherwise unknowable universe of our environment.

Â

That justified presumption extends to the fact that all that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it. We are justified in the presumption that the controlled variable is in the environment. Every time two or more of us
control what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment we obtain further justification of that presumption. Examples of two or more of us controlling what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment are conflict, collective control,
and the Test for the Controlled Variable.

Â

Here I disagree. This is a natural presumption of our everyday life. But I think that PCT just makes us abandon that presumption at least in theoretical i.e. scientific context. In everyday talk and thinking we may say that we control something
in the environment and that something is possibly controlled also by some other person. But we should know better that we and those other persons are controlling only our or their own perceptions and nothing in environment. That object or something in the
environment OF which our perception is may be the same OF which the other persons’ perceptions are. But we do not control that object or whatever there is in the environment but just our own perceptions.

Â

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

Â

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

Â

It is impossible to argue whether or not the controlled variable is in the environment without forgetting that we make this presumption, and that it is a presumption. If we accept the justification (which we must, in order to do things together,
including arguing, and which we routinely do to survive) then we thereby assert that it is in the environment. But when we wish to identify things in a control theory diagram as a tool of analysis, we remember that this is a presumption, merely the projection
of our perceptions onto the otherwise unknowable environment, and we must acknowledge that it is in the perceived environment, the universe of perception, which we perceive to be shared between and among us, and really out there, largely because of the routine
successes of collective control.

Â

Yes that is right, I agree with this.

Â

I know of no way out of the conundrum other than to acknowledge it. I believe it is foolish to argue about it.

Â

The only way out perhaps is staying strict and careful with our concepts. We must tell when we use every day “control� and when PCT “Control�.

Â

Â

–

Eetu Pikkarainen

PhD (Ed.), Dos., University Lecturer (in Education)

Faculty of Education, University of Oulu, Finland

Â

Schools in Transition: Linking Past, Present, and Future in Educational Practice

   Edited by Pauli Siljander, Kimmo Kontio and Eetu Pikkarainen

  Â
https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/other-books/schools-in-transition/

Â

Â

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                            /Bruce

Â

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On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.07.22.48]

Â

On 2017/06/7 8:25 PM, Alison Powers wrote:

Martin - I am confused because you say:

Â

MT: Rick says the controlled variable is in the environment, which I say cannot be true, because in the environment there exists no independent reference variables nor sources from which they can be determined independently of observation
of the moment-by-moment values of the environmental variable itself.

But then Rick responded to me in the PCT Research thread:

Â

RM: The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

Â

Â

I construed that sentence from Rick to be a shot in a different long-standing and apparently irresolvable argument, which I had intended to ignore. I realize there’s no point in reiterating the fact that the result of applying a function
to a bunch of variables is itself a variable, but that’s the nub of the argument in which that sentence was a shot. Rick disagrees – it’s mathematics and therefore just an opinion open to contradiction.

Â

However, to me he certainly suggests in that sentence that the controlled variable is in the environment, whether it is a function of other variables in the environment (presumably controlled ones) or should be treated as the result of that
function. Certainly the function that defines the CEV is the perceptual function. We have never had any disagreement about that. The question is whether the arguments to that function are in the environment as he explicitly says they are.

Â

But consider instead Rick’s recent statements about “behaviour”, which provide the context for interpreting the sentence you quote [From Rick Marken (2017.06.06.1225). I have highlighted a few phrases and sentences. I don’t think I need more
than this, though I could go back into the archives and find interactions between us when Rick has argued against me that the controlled variable IS in the environment, quite explicitly. Yesterday’s message should be enough to make the point:

---

RM:  Saying that “behavior is control” simply calls attention to the fact what we call “behaviors” are both actions and results; in PCT lingo, behaviors are both outputs and the variables controlled by those outputs – controlled variables.
So the behavior called “tying shoelaces” points to a control process where the controlled variable is the state of the laces, the reference state of this variable is “tied” and the outputs that produce this result are the hand movements the get the laces tied.
Moreover, what we see as the output component of a behavior are typically controlled variables themselves and what we see as the controlled variable component of behavior is typically an output itself. For example, the movements (outputs) used to produce the
reference state of a controlled variable (tied laces) are themselves a controlled variable; their speed and direction are the controlled result of muscle forces. And the tied laces (the controlled variable) that result from those outputs (movements) are themselves
outputs that are the means of controlling another variable, the “onness” of the shoes.

Â

RM: So “control” is just a more precise definition of the informal term “behavior”. “Control” refers to the observation of a variable being maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. And this is what we can see is what is
going on with the things we call “behaviors”. “Tying shoelaces”, for example, refers to the observation that a variable (the state of the laces) is maintained in a reference state (consistently brought to the state “tied”) protected from disturbance (the different
initial state of the laces, variations in the forces the affect the laces, etc). When you are able to see behavior – any named behavior – as being both output that affects the state of a controlled variable and a controlled variable itself – you have learned
to see behavior through control theory glasses. By the way, this is all discussed in the first 2 chapters of “Controlling People”.

---

Â

MT. In all of that is there any suggestion that a controlled variable might be a perception? I think not. Everything refers to the controlled variable being a state of the environment that can be observed by another person. In those two paragraphs,
the only reference to perception is in the “P” of “PCT” up front. If Rick had said, for example, in the second highlighted clause “the controlled variable is the [perceived] state of the laces”, I would have no problem. But he didn’t, and any casual reader
might think he meant (and maybe he did mean) the actual state of the laces in the environment.

Â

MT. We all know the form of the control loop, at least in its simplest “canonical” form. We also know that real organisms have limitations such as sensory thresholds, which mean that any particular value of an external variable gives rise
to an uncertain value of the perceptual variable that is produced by its perceptual function (actually a hierarchy of perceptual functions), and we know that neural firings are actually not a continuous smooth “neural current”. What we also know is that the
reference value for a perceptual signal is generated from within the organism, and does not exist in the environment (contrary to what Rick seems to imply in the fourth line of each paragraph). Control of a perception may not even correspond to control of
anything another observer could perceive in the environment, if the perception includes any component from imagination.

Â

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist
in the environment. I would like to keep clear that however well the perception corresponds to a state of the environment, it is not the state of the environment, though it is the state that is controlled.
To confuse the two is…confusing.

Â

Martin

Â

Â

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)]

···

Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

On Jun 10, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)]

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

If there is a contradiction between common sense and strict PCT definition, it can be an impediment to communication.

But what harm is done if we acknowledge that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we perceive that we are stabilizing that aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input? The caveat is that perceptions are the only possible evidence for this. So what? Perceptions are our only possible evidence for any conclusion, and the conclusions themselves are perceptions. We do not deny on that account the existence of that which we perceive. We just acknowledge our limitations.

Our canonical diagram is solipsistic. Spend a little time, if you will, thinking about collective control, when two or more individuals are controlling “the same thing”. A while back I posted a diagram of the Test for the Controlled Variable as an example of two individuals controlling the “same variable”. Necessarily, there is some topological rearrangement in the part of the diagram that describes one of the individuals.

<unnamed.jpg>

During active intervention part of the TCV, the behavioral outputs of the observer-experimenter are disturbances to the variable that the subject is controlling.

Assume that you are the experimenter-observer. By virtue of careful performance of the Test for the Controlled Variable you determine that the subject S is controlling a variable that you perceive, represented in the diagram as the green rectangle between the two control systems.

Your perception of that variable is labeled S.o in the diagram, and the subject’s perception of it is labeled S.s. You successfully perform the Test, and thereby demonstrate that your perception is equivalent to the subject’s perception. (Or you might prefer to say that your [imagined] perception of the subject’s perception, based on your perception of the variable, is accurate.) That equivalence touches on the root of the problem under discussion.

The variable is controlled, protected from disturbances. During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your perception S.o at its reference value despite your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude (justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s = S.o.

Notice that, by this demonstrated equivalence, the subject S is now controlling your perceptual input S.o by controlling his perceptual input S.s.

Would it be simpler to say that S is controlling that aspect of the environment which you perceive as S.o (the green rectangle in the diagram) by controlling his perception S.s of that aspect of the environment? When we include other agents in the control system diagram, does Martin’s CEV (the green rectangle above) make for a simpler and more intuitively satisfying account?

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10]

Perhaps I expressed myself badly - or you did not read it properly. I have nothing against the reality or importance or necessity of environment.

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

Eetu
(Lähetetty kännykästä / Sent from mobile)

Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com kirjoitti 9.6.2017 kello 19.24:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.09.12:23 ET)]

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2 –

Except for imagination, the environment is necessary in order to have a closed loop. Think about that.

/Bruce

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 5:28 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen
eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-09 2]

EP: Bruce, again I agree largely, but I think you understood me wrong. I was not talking about knowledge (I intended to resume to it sometimes later…) but only about the conncept of control. What you write here about the
reality of our environment and the possibility of the reliability of our knowledge about it and especially the truthfulness of scientific knowledge is quite OK. But that was not the issue.

EP: The issue was just the concept of control. And it comes up also below: “[Science]
gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming that
when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment. [italics by EP]�

EP: From the next possible facts:

• a person perceives something in the environment
• there really is something in the environment “causingâ€? just that perception (not a hallucination or error)
• the person has a reference value for that perception
• there is a difference between perceptual and reference values causing error and output
• the output manages to cause certain kind of changes to that something in the environment
• as a consequence of those changes the person’s perception changes to the refence value
  it does NOT follow that the person controls that something in the environment. It follows only that she controls her perception (of that something). As an everyday experience this seems and sounds like the person were
  controlling that something in the environment. But just the beauty of the PCT is that we can make the differentiation and understand that all we can ever control is our perceptions.

EP: In everyday life we cannot help saying that someone controls the temperature of the room or that someone did a controlled somersault. But here is theoretical / scientific PCT discussions this either unjustified assumption
or unjustified incoherence causes endless confusion.

EP: We don’t control our environment by controlling our perceptions because strictly speaking there are two different kind of processes which do not both justify the use of the term “control�. Neither do we control our
perceptions by controlling our environment. What we do is that we control our perceptions by affecting some aspect of our environment and as a consequence of that the aspect of environment (usually) becomes stabilized somehow (in a certain way).

Eetu

–

Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)–

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08–

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

I believe that you are convinced that this settles the matter.

The most direct evidence of the reality of that which is perceived is that the environment pushes back and sometimes even bites. To perceive as we wish to perceive requires control; that control often requires effort (against what?);
that control is often disturbed by unforeseen and even unperceived disturbances (whence?); that control often has unintended consequences (arising from what?). John Kirkland’s post in this thread alludes to unintended consequences of that complex of controlled
variables called “industrialization since 1800”.

It would be most peculiar to say that to be scientific we must deny that our experiments, models, and theory give us knowledge of reality. An essential point about PCT is that if the performance of a model conforms very closely to that of a living subject
then the structure of the model informs us about what must necessarily be structures in the living subject.

Look at the fundamental first methodological steps of PCT, the Test for the Controlled Variable. When the experimenter E succeeds in determining what perception (perceptual variable) the subject S is controlling, E is justified in saying that S really has that
perception and is controlling it. This is because E is controlling what E perceives to be the same variable in such a way as to disturb S’s control of it.

To do this, E imagines a transform or translation of a perception that E is controlling. To identify what perception to control, E guesses what S is controlling. The transformation is from E’s point of view to S’s point of view. Point of view upon what? Upon
that which E presumes to be a real variable in the environment which E and S are perceiving from their respective points of view. It is not obvious how one might make sense of the Test, much less carry it out, without this presumption of reality.

Another way to put the conundrum, coming at it from the other direction, is the truism that science never proves anything. Proof is possible only for mathematics and logic.

What science yields us is a succession of provisional and serviceable models of reality (that is, of that aspect of reality of which the particular field of science treats). In other words, it gives us perceptions plus the best available justification for assuming
that when we control those perceptions we are controlling realities in the environment.

When I say provisional and serviceable, I mean that we make do with the best theory that is still standing when the dust of argument settles, or (as in the case of Newtonian vs. relativistic vs. quantum physics) the best theory for the purposes at hand–or
to pick another familiar example, sometimes waves are a more useful model of light, sometimes particles are.

In short, the conclusions of science are high-level perceptions that enable us to control lower-level perceptions better and more reliably than non-science and nonsense conclusions do. And they do so precisely because they (apparently) correspond better to
whatever it is that is really real, independent of our perceptions. They better equip us to identify and control variables that matter to us, to resist disturbances to our control, and maybe even to avoid unintended side effects, or at least recognize them
in time to bring them, too, under control.

Conversely, our perception that we are better able to control under system concepts and principles of science than we are with non-science or nonsense system concepts and principles is our justification for taking the system concepts and principles of science
to be true–that is, taking them to be realities. The argument is circular, but it appears to have been a virtuous circle so far.

/Bruce

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-08]

Bruce, I largely agree. Some comments though:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.08.07:48 ET)]

Begin with some PCT truisms.

All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it.

(Not sure about this, but I will turn to it sometimes later – it depends on definitions. I agree that all our knowledge iis based on perceptions.)

All that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it.

That is funny and fuzzy saying, at least for me: sounds like our perceptions were in the environment. I would say that we cannot control anything in the environment but only our perceptions of it.

I control many perceptions of our environment without exerting the actions that maintain them under control. Other people, or other agents, exert the actions that maintain them under control.

Or they just happen to be (temporarily) so that our perceptions of them remain near the reference.

Among the evidence that I control such perceptions is the observation that, should control of them lapse, I act in such a way that other people or agents resist the disturbance and re-establish control of them.

A recent example: the street signs for Pinehurst Avenue and Chase Road were swapped, so that each designated the other road. My wife called my attention to it. We contacted the Public Works Department. They fixed it.

What’s the point of this? All that we can know of our environment is our perceptions of it, and we presume that our perceptions are the realities that we perceive. (We presume this even though we know that our perceptions are selective and
omit infinitely many aspects of the environment, some of which we know about because we or others have extended the senses with scientific instruments.) This presumption is justified by our success controlling in the environment and by the like success of
all our human and pre-human ancestors without whose survival we would not be here.

That is extremely important. Our success in control of our perceptions is highly depending on other people and other actors – and finally on the objects or our perceptions.

By this justified presumption, we project the universe of our perceptions into the otherwise unknowable universe of our environment.

That justified presumption extends to the fact that all that we can control of our environment is our perceptions of it. We are justified in the presumption that the controlled variable is in the environment. Every time two or more of us
control what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment we obtain further justification of that presumption. Examples of two or more of us controlling what we perceive to be the same variable in the environment are conflict, collective control,
and the Test for the Controlled Variable.

Here I disagree. This is a natural presumption of our everyday life. But I think that PCT just makes us abandon that presumption at least in theoretical i.e. scientific context. In everyday talk and thinking we may say that we control something
in the environment and that something is possibly controlled also by some other person. But we should know better that we and those other persons are controlling only our or their own perceptions and nothing in environment. That object or something in the
environment OF which our perception is may be the same OF which the other persons’ perceptions are. But we do not control that object or whatever there is in the environment but just our own perceptions.

We routinely forget that this is a presumption, and we are justified in doing so.

No, we are not justified in doing so if we are scientifically studying “behavior as control of perception�.

It is impossible to argue whether or not the controlled variable is in the environment without forgetting that we make this presumption, and that it is a presumption. If we accept the justification (which we must, in order to do things together,
including arguing, and which we routinely do to survive) then we thereby assert that it is in the environment. But when we wish to identify things in a control theory diagram as a tool of analysis, we remember that this is a presumption, merely the projection
of our perceptions onto the otherwise unknowable environment, and we must acknowledge that it is in the perceived environment, the universe of perception, which we perceive to be shared between and among us, and really out there, largely because of the routine
successes of collective control.

Yes that is right, I agree with this.

I know of no way out of the conundrum other than to acknowledge it. I believe it is foolish to argue about it.

The only way out perhaps is staying strict and careful with our concepts. We must tell when we use every day “control� and when PCT “Control�.

–

Eetu Pikkarainen

PhD (Ed.), Dos., University Lecturer (in Education)

Faculty of Education, University of Oulu, Finland

Schools in Transition: Linking Past, Present, and Future in Educational Practice

Edited by Pauli Siljander, Kimmo Kontio and Eetu Pikkarainen

[

https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/other-books/schools-in-transition/](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.sensepublishers.com_catalogs_bookseries_other-2Dbooks_schools-2Din-2Dtransition_&d=DwMGaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=0nhfyP3k5-Wr6mhZrUnj5mPm1NDoqG-YillmP7AEVms&s=0r7kgNNHJhKIUPUNRy_M4-6gMGtyCTrV7vOjwub4cW4&e=)

                         /Bruce

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Martin Taylor mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.07.22.48]

On 2017/06/7 8:25 PM, Alison Powers wrote:

Martin - I am confused because you say:

MT: Rick says the controlled variable is in the environment, which I say cannot be true, because in the environment there exists no independent reference variables nor sources from which they can be determined independently of observation
of the moment-by-moment values of the environmental variable itself.

But then Rick responded to me in the PCT Research thread:

RM: The controlled variable is not in the outer environment; rather it is a function of physical variables that are in the outer environment; the function is called a perceptual function.

I construed that sentence from Rick to be a shot in a different long-standing and apparently irresolvable argument, which I had intended to ignore. I realize there’s no point in reiterating the fact that the result of applying a function
to a bunch of variables is itself a variable, but that’s the nub of the argument in which that sentence was a shot. Rick disagrees – it’s mathematics and therefore just an opinion open to contradiction.

However, to me he certainly suggests in that sentence that the controlled variable is in the environment, whether it is a function of other variables in the environment (presumably controlled ones) or should be treated as the result of that
function. Certainly the function that defines the CEV is the perceptual function. We have never had any disagreement about that. The question is whether the arguments to that function are in the environment as he explicitly says they are.

But consider instead Rick’s recent statements about “behaviour”, which provide the context for interpreting the sentence you quote [From Rick Marken (2017.06.06.1225). I have highlighted a few phrases and sentences. I don’t think I need more
than this, though I could go back into the archives and find interactions between us when Rick has argued against me that the controlled variable IS in the environment, quite explicitly. Yesterday’s message should be enough to make the point:

---

RM: Saying that “behavior is control” simply calls attention to the fact what we call “behaviors” are both actions and results; in PCT lingo, behaviors are both outputs and the variables controlled by those outputs – controlled variables.
So the behavior called “tying shoelaces” points to a control process where the controlled variable is the state of the laces, the reference state of this variable is “tied” and the outputs that produce this result are the hand movements the get the laces tied.
Moreover, what we see as the output component of a behavior are typically controlled variables themselves and what we see as the controlled variable component of behavior is typically an output itself. For example, the movements (outputs) used to produce the
reference state of a controlled variable (tied laces) are themselves a controlled variable; their speed and direction are the controlled result of muscle forces. And the tied laces (the controlled variable) that result from those outputs (movements) are themselves
outputs that are the means of controlling another variable, the “onness” of the shoes.

RM: So “control” is just a more precise definition of the informal term “behavior”. “Control” refers to the observation of a variable being maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. And this is what we can see is what is
going on with the things we call “behaviors”. “Tying shoelaces”, for example, refers to the observation that a variable (the state of the laces) is maintained in a reference state (consistently brought to the state “tied”) protected from disturbance (the different
initial state of the laces, variations in the forces the affect the laces, etc). When you are able to see behavior – any named behavior – as being both output that affects the state of a controlled variable and a controlled variable itself – you have learned
to see behavior through control theory glasses. By the way, this is all discussed in the first 2 chapters of “Controlling People”.

---

MT. In all of that is there any suggestion that a controlled variable might be a perception? I think not. Everything refers to the controlled variable being a state of the environment that can be observed by another person. In those two paragraphs,
the only reference to perception is in the “P” of “PCT” up front. If Rick had said, for example, in the second highlighted clause “the controlled variable is the [perceived] state of the laces”, I would have no problem. But he didn’t, and any casual reader
might think he meant (and maybe he did mean) the actual state of the laces in the environment.

MT. We all know the form of the control loop, at least in its simplest “canonical” form. We also know that real organisms have limitations such as sensory thresholds, which mean that any particular value of an external variable gives rise
to an uncertain value of the perceptual variable that is produced by its perceptual function (actually a hierarchy of perceptual functions), and we know that neural firings are actually not a continuous smooth “neural current”. What we also know is that the
reference value for a perceptual signal is generated from within the organism, and does not exist in the environment (contrary to what Rick seems to imply in the fourth line of each paragraph). Control of a perception may not even correspond to control of
anything another observer could perceive in the environment, if the perception includes any component from imagination.

MT. It seems to me that regardless of what may be in Rick’s mind (and he agreed with me the other day about Behaviour being the control of perception), the words he uses can easily lead a reader to conclude that controlled variables exist
in the environment. I would like to keep clear that however well the perception corresponds to a state of the environment, it is not the state of the environment, though it is the state that is controlled.
To confuse the two is…confusing.

Martin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10--
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â

Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â

FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as "control of input" isn't permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â
BestÂ
Rick
 >

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant
<http://www.nickols.us/&gt;DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC
"Assistance at a Distance"
<https://www.amazon.com/author/frednickols&gt;View My Books on Amazon

···

Sent from my iPad>>>>

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[bnhpct]

Of course I agree with you, and admit to carelessness in stating an axiom. In saying that I agreed with Eetu (and I believe everyone else in this conversation, including Martin), I framed it as a tautology, “control is control”.

Eetu had said:

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

That beginning paragraph would better have read:
Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. In the definition of control, it is the input that is controlled. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

What about the rest of what I said?

···

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â
Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â
FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.19:14 ET)]

Pertinent to the question:

“Control theory is relevant to manual tracking because people are controlling an aspect of  the  world  when  they  are  performing  this  task.   For  example,  in  the  typical  manual control task the subject is asked to keep a cursor aligned with a moving target. In order to perform  this  task  the  subject  must  control  an  aspect  of  the  world,  the  position  of  the cursor,  keeping  it  aligned  with  the  target  despite  the  fact  that  the  target’s  position  is changing continuously and, often, unpredictably.”

Wm. T. Powers, “Of Thermostats and Humans: Â Comparing Manual to Perceptual Control Theory”, Paper presented at the 1st European Workshop on Perceptual Control Theory, The University of Wales, Abristwyth, 1994.Â

https://www.dropbox.com/s/uyzx6vgddy6k1t6/ThermoPeople.doc?dl=0

···

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 6:35 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

Of course I agree with you, and admit to carelessness in stating an axiom. In saying that I agreed with Eetu (and I believe everyone else in this conversation, including Martin), I framed it as a tautology, “control is control”.

Eetu had said:

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

That beginning paragraph would better have read:
Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. In the definition of control, it is the input that is controlled. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

What about the rest of what I said?

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â
Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â
FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1700)]

···

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

BN:Of course I agree with you, and admit to carelessness in stating an axiom. In saying that I agreed with Eetu (and I believe everyone else in this conversation, including Martin), I framed it as a tautology, “control is control”.

Eetu had said:

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

RM: But I already explained that this statement is wrong. The environment is what an observer sees as being outside of the control system. Therefore, the only thing an observer knows about the controlling done by an organism is that some of the things the observer sees in the organism’s environment are under control and this control can be seen to be accomplished by the actions oft the organism. So there is no “issue” about whether or not we control anything in the environment; in fact, that’s all we know for sure because we can see it happening. The variables that we see being controlled are the data that are to be explained by theory.Â

RM: And there is no question about the definition of control in PCT. As I said, control exists when a variable (that an observer sees as being in the environment of the control system.) is maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. This is the phenomenon that PCT was developed to explain – the phenomenon of control (or the “fact of control”, per the subtitle of LCS III).Â

BN: That beginning paragraph would better have read:

Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. In the definition of control, it is the input that is controlled.

RM: That says that you agree that the explanation of control is provided by PCT: that it is perceptual input that is controlled. And I agree too.Â

Â

BN: But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

RM: I think that in the practical conduct of our lives we never think about such things; we just assume that we are doing things in the real world; our perceptions are reality to us (at least they are to me). So when I turn the the faucet handle in the shower I assume I am turning a faucet handle; not a perception of a faucet handle that I hope corresponds to a real faucet handle. Â

Â

BN: What about the rest of what I said?

RM: I think you made an excellent point by calling to our attention the fact that the environment seen by an observer is itself a perception! In PCT when we talk about the environment side of the control diagram  (the other side being the control system) we are talking about the perceptual world of the observer of the system. So the perceptual world of the observer is a function of the same environment as is the perceptual world of the system. And as you correctly point out, this means that it is possible, using the test for the controlled variable, for the observer to perceive the same aspect of that environment as the control system. I  disagree with your description of the test for the controlled variable as a conflict between observer and system (they are not controlling the same perception; the system is controlling perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for seeing whether or not there is a relationship between disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception of S.s, which you call S.o. But other than that your analysis was brilliant!

BestÂ

Rick

Â

/Bruce

–

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â
Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â
FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1705)]

···

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.19:14 ET)–

Pertinent to the question:

“Control theory is relevant to manual tracking because people are controlling an aspect of  the  world  when  they  are  performing  this  task.   For  example,  in  the  typical  manual control task the subject is asked to keep a cursor aligned with a moving target. In order to perform  this  task  the  subject  must  control  an  aspect  of  the  world,  the  position  of  the cursor,  keeping  it  aligned  with  the  target  despite  the  fact  that  the  target’s  position  is changing continuously and, often, unpredictably.”

Wm. T. Powers, “Of Thermostats and Humans: Â Comparing Manual to Perceptual Control Theory”, Paper presented at the 1st European Workshop on Perceptual Control Theory, The University of Wales, Abristwyth, 1994.Â

https://www.dropbox.com/s/uyzx6vgddy6k1t6/ThermoPeople.doc?dl=0

RM: Boy did you make my day!! I’m afraid that paper was written by Richard S. Marken, not William T. Powers. Â

BestÂ

Rick

–

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 6:35 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

Of course I agree with you, and admit to carelessness in stating an axiom. In saying that I agreed with Eetu (and I believe everyone else in this conversation, including Martin), I framed it as a tautology, “control is control”.

Eetu had said:

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

That beginning paragraph would better have read:
Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. In the definition of control, it is the input that is controlled. But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

What about the rest of what I said?

/Bruce

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â
Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â
FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.00.10]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1230)]

Not a bad mistake, since the effect is as though it were true. The

thermostat is actually controlling (in an old-fashioned one at
least) the angle of bend of a bimetallic strip. It does this by
switching a furnace and/or airconditioner on and off. The air
temperature change then affects the bend of the bimetallic strip. An
external observer who can feel the air temperature but cannot see
the strip observes that the temperature seems to be controlled.
That’s the “seductive illusion”.

I think it is an unimportant illusion, provided one is concerned

with observable effects and not with how those effects are created.
How the effects occur is a matter for theory, and when one is
concerned with the details of theory, then it is important not to be
seduced by the illusion.

Two very different questions. Whether Bill did see it as you say is

rather immaterial if he was trying to explain the interaction
between the controller and the experimenter. I rather doubt he did,
knowing as he did that what was being controlled was the
controller’s perception of the coin layout.

 Which leads to the second question, which is about some observer

other than the controller being able to observe the effects of
control. If the controlling has not observable effects, then no
observer can tell whether something is being controlled. Think, for
example, of the complex control in imagination being performed by a
composer before a note is written on the first stave of a score.
Would you say the composer is not controlling any perceptions of the
music? Nobody else can see it happening, can they?

I can imagine controlling the taste of a liquid so that it comes to

be the taste of lemonade. If I did, then some outside observer could
taste that liquid and perceive that it had the taste of lemonade, so
I don’t know why you keep insisting that the taste of lemonade is
not in the environment (perhaps because Bill said so?). As for the
rules of algebra, what action in imagination or in the environment
could you perform to alter them?

I would agree 100% with these paragraphs. Apart from the necessity

of the ordering of “Once the person … then it’s appropriate…”,
I think it’s a pretty good summary of what I have often been trying
to say, including in this thread.

If these last paragraphs are your view (as they are mine), then why

did you write the contradictory first half of that message?

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2017.06.09.16.34)–

…

            MT: Of course (a dangerous phrase

when communicating with you), if the perception is truly
a relatively noise-free representation of something in
the environment on which the control system is acting,
then a reader could buy into the all too seductive
illusion that some environmental variable is being
controlled.

          RM: So is a control engineer making a bad mistake in

seeing the home thermostat as controlling the air
temperature near the sensor?

                                                                          MT.

It seems to me that regardless
of what may be in Rick’s mind
(and he agreed with me the other
day about Behaviour being the
control of perception), the
words he uses can easily lead a
reader to conclude that
controlled variables exist in
the environment.

RM: Ignoring the fact that I know that
controlled variables are not in the
environment, what would be so bad
about a reader concluding that they
are variables in the environment?

          Was Bill Powers making a bad mistake in seeing the

subject in the coin game controlling the arrangement of
the coins on the table? How do you even know that a
perception is being controlled if you don’t see something
in the controller’s environment being controlled?

            MT: And again "of course", the

effectiveness of controlling a perception on the
organism’s welfare depends almost entirely on the
perception being of something really in the environment.

          RM: I disagree. We control many perceptions that

contribute to our welfare yet correspond to nothing that
is really in the environment – things like the taste of
lemonade and the rules of algebra.

…

      RM:  I think the first thing a person interested in PCT should

learn is how to see control when it’s happening. In many
cases, what is seen will appear to be control of something in
the environment. For example, in the compensatory tracking
task it looks like the person is controlling the distance
between two lines out in the environment. In catching
baseballs it looks like the fielder is controlling for being
under the ball that is out in the environment. In driving a
car it looks like the driver is controlling for keeping the
car in its lane, both of which are in the environment.

      RM: Once the person has grasped the

concept of behavior as control – once the person can see
behavior through control theory glasses – then it’s
appropriate to introduce the theory that accounts for this
controlling: PCT. The theory says that what is actually being
controlled is a perceptual variable – the variable that the
observer sees being controlled, but from the controller’s
point of view. So the person doing the tracking is controlling
the distance between lines from his or her perspective:
controlling his or her perception. Same for the fielder
controlling for getting under the ball and the driver
controlling for keeping the car in it’s lane.

      RM: So seeing behavior as the control

of variables in the environment is really the first step in
understanding behavior. If you just stopped there this view of
behavior would indeed be a mistake. But the person interested
in PCT would learn that the next step in understanding
behavior is to try to see the controlling from the point of
view of the behaving system. That is, the person would learn
how to test to determine the the perceptual variables that are
actually being controlled using the Test for Controlled
Variables.

      RM: The real mistake is imagining that

controlled variables exist only as perceptions inside the
organism. If this were true, there would be no way for anyone,
other than their possessors, to know about them. But,
fortunately, there is evidence for their existence in the
observable behavior of organisms. You just have to know how to
see what appears to be control of variables in controller’s
environment from the controller’s perspective.

[bnhpct]

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.09:05 ET)

My, my, I’m making mistakes right and left. Now a mistaken authorship. Glad you don’t mind. !-) Â I was clearing some open tabs in my browser, found that paper open, reread the beginning of it, and jumped to a hasty conclusion.

This may be another hasty conclusion. You said (Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1700))

I Â disagree with your description of the test for the controlled variable as a conflict between observer and system (they are not controlling the same perception; the system is controlling perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for seeing whether or not there is a relationship between disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception of S.s, which you call S.o.Â

By this definition two individuals can never be in conflict because it is impossible for two individuals to control the same perception. Only internal conflict is possible, where one individual is controlling one perception with two reference values, one in each of two control loops. I don’t think that is what you intend.Â

Does this mean that interpersonal conflict is necessarily conflict over that in the environment which the respective perceptions ‘represent’?Â

Or does it mean that when A controls sensory input at value S.a it is a disturbance to B’s control of sensory input at value S.b?Â

As I put it, describing the Test (Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)):

The variable is controlled, protected from disturbances. During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your perception S.o at its [imputed] reference value despite your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude (justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s = S.o.

“You” (the observer-experimenter) are controlling your perception S.o of the environment variable at a reference value slightly different from the observed reference value that you impute to the subject’s control of his perception S.s of the environment variable. The subject resists this disturbance. For purposes of the Test, you do this repeatedly with variations in the conflicting reference value. (Also verifying that the subject is in fact perceiving the environment variable, is capable of affecting its perceived state, etc., the other aspects of the Test.)

This appears to me to be a conflict, albeit a purposeful and purposely gentle and transient conflict. Please explain my error.

···

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 8:03 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1700)]

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

BN:Of course I agree with you, and admit to carelessness in stating an axiom. In saying that I agreed with Eetu (and I believe everyone else in this conversation, including Martin), I framed it as a tautology, “control is control”.

Eetu had said:

The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.

RM: But I already explained that this statement is wrong. The environment is what an observer sees as being outside of the control system. Therefore, the only thing an observer knows about the controlling done by an organism is that some of the things the observer sees in the organism’s environment are under control and this control can be seen to be accomplished by the actions oft the organism. So there is no “issue” about whether or not we control anything in the environment; in fact, that’s all we know for sure because we can see it happening. The variables that we see being controlled are the data that are to be explained by theory.Â

RM: And there is no question about the definition of control in PCT. As I said, control exists when a variable (that an observer sees as being in the environment of the control system.) is maintained in a reference state, protected from disturbance. This is the phenomenon that PCT was developed to explain – the phenomenon of control (or the “fact of control”, per the subtitle of LCS III).Â

BN: That beginning paragraph would better have read:

Â

I do understand, and I do agree with you. In the definition of control, it is the input that is controlled.

RM: That says that you agree that the explanation of control is provided by PCT: that it is perceptual input that is controlled. And I agree too.Â

Â

BN: But in the practical conduct of our lives we also have no doubt that when we stabilize a perceptual input against disturbances we also stabilize an aspect of the environment which is the proximal source of that input.

RM: I think that in the practical conduct of our lives we never think about such things; we just assume that we are doing things in the real world; our perceptions are reality to us (at least they are to me). So when I turn the the faucet handle in the shower I assume I am turning a faucet handle; not a perception of a faucet handle that I hope corresponds to a real faucet handle. Â

Â

BN: What about the rest of what I said?

RM: I think you made an excellent point by calling to our attention the fact that the environment seen by an observer is itself a perception! In PCT when we talk about the environment side of the control diagram  (the other side being the control system) we are talking about the perceptual world of the observer of the system. So the perceptual world of the observer is a function of the same environment as is the perceptual world of the system. And as you correctly point out, this means that it is possible, using the test for the controlled variable, for the observer to perceive the same aspect of that environment as the control system. I  disagree with your description of the test for the controlled variable as a conflict between observer and system (they are not controlling the same perception; the system is controlling perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for seeing whether or not there is a relationship between disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception of S.s, which you call S.o. But other than that your analysis was brilliant!

BestÂ

Rick

Â

/Bruce

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.10.1405)]

[Fred Nickols (2017.06.10.1640 ET)

eetu Pikkarainen 2017-06-10–
The issue is ONLY that we do NOT control anything in the environment but only our own perceptions - even though the control is realized by affecting the environment. Question is about the definition of control in PCT.Â
Â

BN: I do understand, and I do agree with you. Control is defined as control of input.Â
FN: Sorry, Bruce, but to define control as “control of input” isn’t permitted. That speaks to what is controlled but what is control?

RM: Took the words right out of my mouth, Fred!!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

Writer & Consultant

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

“Assistance at a Distance”

View My Books on Amazon

Sent from my iPad

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27]

      Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.09:05 ET)

Responding to Rick Marken…

…

You said ( Rick Marken
(2017.06.10.1700))

          I  disagree with your

description of the test for the controlled variable as a
conflict between observer and system (they are not
controlling the same perception; the system is controlling
perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for
seeing whether or not there is a relationship between
disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception
of S.s, which you call S.o.

      By this definition two individuals can never be in conflict

because it is impossible for two individuals to control the
same perception.

I don't think that was the point -- at least it wouldn't be mine.

There are lots of ways for individuals to be in conflict without
needing to control the same perception. All that is necessary is
that when A and B are controlling their own perceptual variables PA
and PB, A’s actions disturb PB and B’s actions disturb PA. The
conflict may be resolvable, but it exists until the external
variables VA and VB (defined by their respective perceptual
functions) can coexist at their different reference levels. Suppose,
for example, that PA is x+y and PB is 2x+y, and they have reference
values 3 and 2 respectively. If x=-1 and y=4, both PA and PB will be
at their reference values, so they can co-exist.

However, if A acts to counter a disturbance to VA the action will

influence VB and therefore PB, and vice-versa. This creates a
feedback loop between A and B, the sign of which might be positive
or negative. If it is positive, there is a degree of conflict, and
if the loop gain is greater than +1, the conflict will escalate
exactly as it would in the special (and as you note, impossible to
realize in practice) case in which PA and PB are identical. All that
is required for conflict to occur is that the two perceptions are
not independent and that the sign of the mutual influence loop is
positive.

…

As I put it, describing the Test (Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)):

            The

variable is controlled, protected from disturbances.
During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way
as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference
value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your
perception S.o at its [imputed] reference value despite
your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude
(justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s =
S.o.

        "You" (the

observer-experimenter) are controlling your perception S.o
of the environment variable at a reference value slightly
different from the observed reference value that you impute
to the subject’s control of his perception S.s of the
environment variable.

That doesn't describe the Test as I understand it. In the Test, the

experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable
the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The
experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the
disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but
thereafter does not further influence it. In the coin game, for
example, the experimenter places a coin somewhere of makes a new
pattern and then observes how the subject does or does not replace
the moved coin. The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep
the coin where the experimenter placed it.

The subject resists this
disturbance. For purposes of the Test, you do this
repeatedly with variations in the conflicting reference
value. (Also verifying that the subject is in fact
perceiving the environment variable, is capable of affecting
its perceived state, etc., the other aspects of the Test.)

        This appears to me to be a

conflict, albeit a purposeful and purposely gentle and
transient conflict. Please explain my error.

In my view, the error is in the hypothesis that the experimenter has

a reference value for the result of the perceptual function under
test and is controlling for perceiving the variable to have that
value.

Martin

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –

The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep the coin where the experimenter placed it.

I agree. The disturbance is a transient conflict, not a persisting one.

In the Test, the experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but thereafter does not further influence it.

How do you control a perception that the disturbing action influences the variable without controlling the state of that variable?

···

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27]

      Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.09:05 ET)

Responding to Rick Marken…

…

You said ( Rick Marken
(2017.06.10.1700))

          I  disagree with your

description of the test for the controlled variable as a
conflict between observer and system (they are not
controlling the same perception; the system is controlling
perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for
seeing whether or not there is a relationship between
disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception
of S.s, which you call S.o.

      By this definition two individuals can never be in conflict

because it is impossible for two individuals to control the
same perception.

I don't think that was the point -- at least it wouldn't be mine.

There are lots of ways for individuals to be in conflict without
needing to control the same perception. All that is necessary is
that when A and B are controlling their own perceptual variables PA
and PB, A’s actions disturb PB and B’s actions disturb PA. The
conflict may be resolvable, but it exists until the external
variables VA and VB (defined by their respective perceptual
functions) can coexist at their different reference levels. Suppose,
for example, that PA is x+y and PB is 2x+y, and they have reference
values 3 and 2 respectively. If x=-1 and y=4, both PA and PB will be
at their reference values, so they can co-exist.

However, if A acts to counter a disturbance to VA the action will

influence VB and therefore PB, and vice-versa. This creates a
feedback loop between A and B, the sign of which might be positive
or negative. If it is positive, there is a degree of conflict, and
if the loop gain is greater than +1, the conflict will escalate
exactly as it would in the special (and as you note, impossible to
realize in practice) case in which PA and PB are identical. All that
is required for conflict to occur is that the two perceptions are
not independent and that the sign of the mutual influence loop is
positive.

…

As I put it, describing the Test (Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)):

            The

variable is controlled, protected from disturbances.
During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way
as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference
value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your
perception S.o at its [imputed] reference value despite
your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude
(justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s =
S.o.

        "You" (the

observer-experimenter) are controlling your perception S.o
of the environment variable at a reference value slightly
different from the observed reference value that you impute
to the subject’s control of his perception S.s of the
environment variable.

That doesn't describe the Test as I understand it. In the Test, the

experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable
the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The
experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the
disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but
thereafter does not further influence it. In the coin game, for
example, the experimenter places a coin somewhere of makes a new
pattern and then observes how the subject does or does not replace
the moved coin. The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep
the coin where the experimenter placed it.

The subject resists this
disturbance. For purposes of the Test, you do this
repeatedly with variations in the conflicting reference
value. (Also verifying that the subject is in fact
perceiving the environment variable, is capable of affecting
its perceived state, etc., the other aspects of the Test.)

        This appears to me to be a

conflict, albeit a purposeful and purposely gentle and
transient conflict. Please explain my error.

In my view, the error is in the hypothesis that the experimenter has

a reference value for the result of the perceptual function under
test and is controlling for perceiving the variable to have that
value.

Martin

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

The standard definition of conflict in PCT as I recall involves two control systems controlling the same variable with different reference values.

Your more nuanced definition is interesting to delve into. To look at it diagrammatically, please permit me to change the names of your variables. Where > means “change to”,

A > S B > O

PA > S.s PB > S.o

VA > E.s VB > E.o

If I understand what you mean by ‘external variables’, E.s and E.o are both ‘located’ in the green rectangle in the diagram. It is important to emphasize an obvious simplification, that the source of the reference value R is not shown on either side. It is the higher level(s) that make the conflict in the TCV purposefully transient. But setting aside for now the question whether the TCV is in fact a conflict (which you dispute), let’s just consider this as a diagram of a conflict situation

Apply your description of conflict, with variables renamed as indicated above:

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 {variable names changed)–

There are lots of ways for individuals to be in conflict without needing to control the same perception. All that is necessary is that when S and O are controlling their own perceptual variables S.s and S.o, S’s actions disturb S.o and O’s actions disturb S.s. The conflict may be resolvable, but it exists until the external variables E.s and E.o (defined by their respective perceptual functions) can coexist at their different reference levels. Suppose, for example, that S.s is x+y and S.o is 2x+y, and they have reference values 3 and 2 respectively. If x=-1 and y=4, both S.s and S.o will be at their reference values, so they can co-exist.

However, if S acts to counter a disturbance to E.s the action will influence E.o and therefore S.o, and vice-versa. This creates a feedback loop between S and O, the sign of which might be positive or negative. If it is positive, there is a degree of conflict, and if the loop gain is greater than +1, the conflict will escalate exactly as it would in the special (and as you note, impossible to realize in practice) case in which S.s and S.o are identical. All that is required for conflict to occur is that the two perceptions are not independent and that the sign of the mutual influence loop is positive.

Referring to the diagram, the ‘bone of contention’ is the CEV, which for S is S.s projected into the environment as E.s, and which for O is S.o projected into the environment as E.o. But all that S knows about E.s is his perception S.s, and all that O knows about E.o is her perception S.o. But wait, no, are you saying that what is projected into the environment is a higher-level perception? That the Program-level perception x+y which resolves at the lowest level to S.s, and the Program perception 2x+y which resolves to S.o are the perceptions that are projected into the environment where we see the green rectangle in the diagram? Are you going ‘up a level’ (or two or more levels) from the actual level of conflict, the ‘bone of contention’?

···

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27]

      Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.09:05 ET)

Responding to Rick Marken…

…

You said ( Rick Marken
(2017.06.10.1700))

          I  disagree with your

description of the test for the controlled variable as a
conflict between observer and system (they are not
controlling the same perception; the system is controlling
perception you call S.s and the tester is controlling for
seeing whether or not there is a relationship between
disturbances and the behavior of the observer’s perception
of S.s, which you call S.o.

      By this definition two individuals can never be in conflict

because it is impossible for two individuals to control the
same perception.

I don't think that was the point -- at least it wouldn't be mine.

There are lots of ways for individuals to be in conflict without
needing to control the same perception. All that is necessary is
that when A and B are controlling their own perceptual variables PA
and PB, A’s actions disturb PB and B’s actions disturb PA. The
conflict may be resolvable, but it exists until the external
variables VA and VB (defined by their respective perceptual
functions) can coexist at their different reference levels. Suppose,
for example, that PA is x+y and PB is 2x+y, and they have reference
values 3 and 2 respectively. If x=-1 and y=4, both PA and PB will be
at their reference values, so they can co-exist.

However, if A acts to counter a disturbance to VA the action will

influence VB and therefore PB, and vice-versa. This creates a
feedback loop between A and B, the sign of which might be positive
or negative. If it is positive, there is a degree of conflict, and
if the loop gain is greater than +1, the conflict will escalate
exactly as it would in the special (and as you note, impossible to
realize in practice) case in which PA and PB are identical. All that
is required for conflict to occur is that the two perceptions are
not independent and that the sign of the mutual influence loop is
positive.

…

As I put it, describing the Test (Bruce Nevin (2017.06.10.16:35 ET)):

            The

variable is controlled, protected from disturbances.
During the Test, you were controlling S.o in such a way
as to make it depart somewhat from is observed reference
value. Because the subject acted so as to maintain your
perception S.o at its [imputed] reference value despite
your disturbing control actions on S.o, you conclude
(justifiably) that S is controlling S.s and that S.s =
S.o.

        "You" (the

observer-experimenter) are controlling your perception S.o
of the environment variable at a reference value slightly
different from the observed reference value that you impute
to the subject’s control of his perception S.s of the
environment variable.

That doesn't describe the Test as I understand it. In the Test, the

experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable
the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The
experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the
disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but
thereafter does not further influence it. In the coin game, for
example, the experimenter places a coin somewhere of makes a new
pattern and then observes how the subject does or does not replace
the moved coin. The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep
the coin where the experimenter placed it.

The subject resists this
disturbance. For purposes of the Test, you do this
repeatedly with variations in the conflicting reference
value. (Also verifying that the subject is in fact
perceiving the environment variable, is capable of affecting
its perceived state, etc., the other aspects of the Test.)

        This appears to me to be a

conflict, albeit a purposeful and purposely gentle and
transient conflict. Please explain my error.

In my view, the error is in the hypothesis that the experimenter has

a reference value for the result of the perceptual function under
test and is controlling for perceiving the variable to have that
value.

Martin

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42]

Let's take an example used by Bill. S (I remember it as being Dag,

but perhaps not. I’ll use the name anyway). Dag is driving, Bill is
a passenger. Dag is controlling for keeping the car in its proper
lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test whether Dag
is controlling that hypothesized variable. Bill knows that if the
steering wheel is turned significantly away from where it is now,
the car will go our of its lane (a “contingency”, as Bill noted in
another message to Kent), so Bill applies force to the steering
wheel and the car begins to move out of lane. Dag perceives this and
does the ordinary control against disturbance by altering the force
he applies to the steering wheel. The car returns to its lane.
Bill observes that Dag appears to be controlling the position of the
car in its lane. It is true that Dag maintained the angle of the
steering wheel, but Bill has observed that while Dag was driving he
had altered that angle frequently, so although Dag might be
controlling it, he was not controlling it to a steady reference
value, as he seems to be doing for the position of the car in its
lane. As for the force Dag applies to the steering wheel, Bill
cannot observe that. Bill is controlling a perception of the force
he applies, but not his perception of the steering wheel angle, and
as Dag applies a counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose
Dag’s force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an
accident).
Let’s take another example in which the variable in question is not
controlled. Dag is driving Bill on a big empty parking lot. Bill
applies force to the steering wheel and Dag lets go of the wheel.
The car changes direction. Now Bill knows that if Dag had not been
controlling the car’s direction when it was on the road, his
application of force to the wheel would have made the car change
direction more than it did when they were on the road. Bill is not
controlling the direction of the car in either instance. He is
controlling a force which would change the state of the
direction-of-the-car perception.
Martin

···

On 2017/06/11 1:22 PM, Bruce Nevin
wrote:

          [Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

            Martin Taylor

2017.06.11.09.27 –

        The experimenter does

not fight the subject to keep the coin where the
experimenter placed it.

        I agree. The disturbance is

a transient conflict, not a persisting one.

          MMT> In the Test, the

experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized
variable the subject is controlling, and does not control
it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a
perception that the disturbing action did influence the
hypothesized variable, but thereafter does not further
influence it.

        How do you control a

perception that the disturbing action
influences the variable without controlling the state of
that variable?

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.15.53 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42 –

as Dag applies a counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose Dag’s force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an accident).

This is a nice illustration of how and why the disturbance is purposeful and transient because control at a higher level terminates it after observing the effect (or lack of expectable effect if it is resisted).

(It wasn’t Dag driving, IIRC, but no matter.)

Dag is controlling the position of the car in the lane by means of varying rotary force on the steering wheel. Bill is disturbing the position of the car in the lane by means of briefly applying rotary force to the steering wheel. Dag resists the disturbance by the same means.

If the disturbance did not affect the heading of the car Dag would not resist it, unless because it disturbed a different higher-level perception, such as a perception of who should properly be in control of the car.

In both cases, the disturbance is to the higher level perception (the heading of the car in the lane). This is shown in a scenario where, unbeknownst to Dag, there are dual controls (as for driver education) or he is in a ‘self-driving’ car, and another agent has taken over keeping the car properly aligned in the lane. When he feels the wheel moving appropriately without his effort he may be startled and take action from higher levels of control (“Hey, what’s going on here?”) but he won’t resist the movements of the wheel because the input perception of the heading of the car in the lane still matches the reference. Externally applied force on the wheel is not a disturbance unless it causes a disturbance at the higher level; which is as much as saying that Bill’s externally applied force on the wheel is a disturbance at the higher level controlling the heading of the car in the lane.

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –
In the Test, the experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but thereafter does not further influence it.

Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET) –
How do you control a perception that the disturbing action influences the variable without controlling the state of that variable?

···

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42]

  On 2017/06/11 1:22 PM, Bruce Nevin

wrote:

          [Bruce Nevin

(2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

            Martin Taylor

2017.06.11.09.27 –

        The experimenter does

not fight the subject to keep the coin where the
experimenter placed it.

        I agree. The disturbance is

a transient conflict, not a persisting one.

          MMT> In the Test, the

experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized
variable the subject is controlling, and does not control
it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a
perception that the disturbing action did influence the
hypothesized variable, but thereafter does not further
influence it.

        How do you control a

perception that the disturbing action
influences the variable without controlling the state of
that variable?

Let's take an example used by Bill. S (I remember it as being Dag,

but perhaps not. I’ll use the name anyway). Dag is driving, Bill is
a passenger. Dag is controlling for keeping the car in its proper
lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test whether Dag
is controlling that hypothesized variable. Bill knows that if the
steering wheel is turned significantly away from where it is now,
the car will go our of its lane (a “contingency”, as Bill noted in
another message to Kent), so Bill applies force to the steering
wheel and the car begins to move out of lane. Dag perceives this and
does the ordinary control against disturbance by altering the force
he applies to the steering wheel. The car returns to its lane.

Bill observes that Dag appears to be controlling the position of the

car in its lane. It is true that Dag maintained the angle of the
steering wheel, but Bill has observed that while Dag was driving he
had altered that angle frequently, so although Dag might be
controlling it, he was not controlling it to a steady reference
value, as he seems to be doing for the position of the car in its
lane. As for the force Dag applies to the steering wheel, Bill
cannot observe that. Bill is controlling a perception of the force
he applies, but not his perception of the steering wheel angle, and
as Dag applies a counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose
Dag’s force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an
accident).

Let's take another example in which the variable in question is not

controlled. Dag is driving Bill on a big empty parking lot. Bill
applies force to the steering wheel and Dag lets go of the wheel.
The car changes direction. Now Bill knows that if Dag had not been
controlling the car’s direction when it was on the road, his
application of force to the wheel would have made the car change
direction more than it did when they were on the road. Bill is not
controlling the direction of the car in either instance. He is
controlling a force which would change the state of the
direction-of-the-car perception.

Martin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2017.06.11.1640)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.06.11.00.10)–

MT: Two very different questions.

RM: Not really. The point of both is that you can’t “see” what another person is controlling; a controlled perception is an inference based on observation of the fact that certain variables in what is perceived by an observer as the subject’s environment are controlled (maintained in reference states, protected from disturbance).Â

MT: Whether Bill did see it as you say is

rather immaterial if he was trying to explain the interaction
between the controller and the experimenter.

RM: Bill was demonstrating how to determine what aspect of the environment – what perception – the subject is controlling. When all disturbances to a zig zag pattern of coins were resisted he concluded that the subject was controlling for a perception of a zig zag (or “N” or “Z”) pattern of coins. This is an inference based on an observation of what Bill or anyone would see as control of a pattern of coins on a table, all of which appears to be in the subject’s environment.Â

Â

MT: I rather doubt he did,

knowing as he did that what was being controlled was the
controller’s perception of the coin layout.

RM: Yes, he assumed, based on PCT, that the subject was controlling a perception. But that perception is an inference based on the subject’s observed control of a pattern of coins in the environment. Â

MT: Which leads to the second question, which is about some observer

other than the controller being able to observe the effects of
control. If the controlling has not observable effects, then no
observer can tell whether something is being controlled. Think, for
example, of the complex control in imagination being performed by a
composer before a note is written on the first stave of a score.
Would you say the composer is not controlling any perceptions of the
music? Nobody else can see it happening, can they?

RM: No indeed.You can’t tell what a person is doing when they aren’t doing anything. The TCV is aimed at determining the variables around which behavior, not imagination, is organized. Â I think it would be a good idea to produce ways to study control in imagination; I think some of the studies in cognitive psychology, such as the lovely Shepard/Metzler mental imagery experiment, are a good start.

          RM: : Was Bill Powers making a bad mistake in seeing the

subject in the coin game controlling the arrangement of
the coins on the table? How do you even know that a
perception is being controlled if you don’t see something
in the controller’s environment being controlled?

MT: And again “of course”, the effectiveness of
controlling a perception on the organism’s welfare depends almost entirely on
the perception being of something really in the environment.

Â

RM: I disagree. We control many perceptions that contribute
to our welfare yet correspond to nothing that is really in the environment –
things like the taste of lemonade and the rules of algebra.

MT: I can imagine controlling the taste of a liquid so that it comes to

be the taste of lemonade. If I did, then some outside observer could
taste that liquid and perceive that it had the taste of lemonade, so
I don’t know why you keep insisting that the taste of lemonade is
not in the environment (perhaps because Bill said so?).

RM: No, because the taste is a function of the chemical variables that are in the environment (according to the models of chemistry, that is). So the taste is a perception that can exist only in a system that can compute that function of those variables – a perceiving system.

MT: As for the

rules of algebra, what action in imagination or in the environment
could you perform to alter them?

RM: The rules of algebra are what they are; they are not alterable. They can be perceived in the way algebraic expressions are manipulated. Â You can see if a person can control for following the rules of algebra by seeing whether the person can reliably detect and correct violations of (disturbances to) those rules. Math teachers do this all the time.Â

MT: I would agree 100% with these paragraphs.

RM: Super!Â

MT: If these last paragraphs are your view (as they are mine), then why

did you write the contradictory first half of that message?

Â

RM: Obviously I didn’t see them as  contradictory. But I’m still glad you liked the last paragraphs.Â

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

…

      RM: Â I think the first thing a person interested in PCT should

learn is how to see control when it’s happening…

      RM: The real mistake is imagining that

controlled variables exist only as perceptions inside the
organism. If this were true, there would be no way for anyone,
other than their possessors, to know about them. But,
fortunately, there is evidence for their existence in the
observable behavior of organisms. You just have to know how to
see what appears to be control of variables in controller’s
environment from the controller’s perspective.Â

[DagArchive]

[Dag Forssell 2017.06.11.18.20 PDT]
Yes, that was myself driving. November 3, 1991. Southbound on the 405 freeway in Los Angeles, left (fast) lane. Close to divider. Bill asked if he might do a test. -Yes. Bill grabbed the wheel and applied a fairly strong, but not sudden, force. Wheel never turned much and car did not change position in its lane by much at all.
I must have written abut it on CSGnet, because Runkel picked it up in People As…

Dag

···

At 11:58 AM 6/11/2017, you wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.14.42]

On 2017/06/11 1:22 PM, Bruce Nevin wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –

The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep the coin where the experimenter placed it.

I agree. The disturbance is a transient conflict, not a persisting one.

In the Test, the experimenter has no reference value for the hypothesized variable the subject is controlling, and does not control it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that the disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but thereafter does not further influence it.

How do you control a perception that the disturbing action influences the variable without controlling the state of that variable?Â
Let’s take an example used by Bill. S (I remember it as being Dag, but perhaps not. I’ll use the name anyway). Dag is driving, Bill is a passenger. Dag is controlling for keeping the car in its proper lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test whether Dag is controlling that hypothesized variable. Bill knows that if the steering wheel is turned significantly away from where it is now, the car will go our of its lane (a “contingency”, as Bill noted in another message to Kent), so Bill applies force to the steering wheel and the car begins to move out of lane. Dag perceives this and does the ordinary control against disturbance by altering the force he applies to the steering wheel. The car returns to its lane.

Bill observes that Dag appears to be controlling the position of the car in its lane. It is true that Dag maintained the angle of the steering wheel, but Bill has observed that while Dag was driving he had altered that angle frequently, so although Dag might be controlling it, he was not controlling it to a steady reference value, as he seems to be doing for the position of the car in its lane. As for the force Dag applies to the steering wheel, Bill cannot observe that. Bill is controlling a perception of the force he applies, but not his perception of the steering wheel angle, and as Dag applies a counter-force, Bill does not correspondingly oppose Dag’s force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get killed in an accident).

Let’s take another example in which the variable in question is not controlled. Dag is driving Bill on a big empty parking lot. Bill applies force to the steering wheel and Dag lets go of the wheel. The car changes direction. Now Bill knows that if Dag had not been controlling the car’s direction when it was on the road, his application of force to the wheel would have made the car change direction more than it did when they were on the road. Bill is not controlling the direction of the car in either instance. He is controlling a force which would change the state of the direction-of-the-car perception.

Martin

[DagArchive]

[Dag Forssell 2017.06.11.18.20 PDT]
Yes, that was myself driving. November 3, 1991. Southbound on the 405
freeway in Los Angeles, left (fast) lane. Close to divider. Bill asked if
he might do a test. -Yes. Bill grabbed the wheel and applied a fairly
strong, but not sudden, force. Wheel never turned much and car did not
change position in its lane by much at all.
I must have written abut it on CSGnet, because Runkel picked it up in
People As…

Dag

···

At 11:58 AM 6/11/2017, you wrote:

[Martin Taylor
2017.06.11.14.42]

On 2017/06/11 1:22 PM, Bruce Nevin wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2017.06.11.23:22
ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.06.11.09.27 –

The experimenter does not fight the subject to keep the coin where
the experimenter placed it.

I agree. The disturbance is a transient conflict, not a persisting
one.

In the Test, the experimenter has no reference value for the
hypothesized variable the subject is controlling, and does not control
it. The experimenter does disturb it, and controls for a perception that
the disturbing action did influence the hypothesized variable, but
thereafter does not further influence it.

How do you control a perception� that the disturbing action influences
the variable� without controlling the state of that variable?�
Let’s take an example used by Bill. S (I remember it as
being Dag, but perhaps not. I’ll use the name anyway).� Dag is
driving, Bill is a passenger. Dag is controlling for keeping the car in
its proper lane (or so Bill hopes). Bill is not. Bill wants to test
whether Dag is controlling that hypothesized variable. Bill knows that if
the steering wheel is turned significantly away from where it is now, the
car will go our of its lane (a “contingency”, as Bill noted in
another message to Kent), so Bill applies force to the steering wheel and
the car begins to move out of lane. Dag perceives this and does the
ordinary control against disturbance by altering the force he applies to
the steering wheel. The car returns to its lane.

Bill observes that Dag appears to be controlling the position of the car
in its lane. It is true that Dag maintained the angle of the steering
wheel, but Bill has observed that while Dag was driving he had altered
that angle frequently, so although Dag might be controlling it, he was
not controlling it to a steady reference value, as he seems to be doing
for the position of the car in its lane. As for the force Dag applies to
the steering wheel, Bill cannot observe that. Bill is controlling a
perception of the force he applies, but not his perception of the
steering wheel angle, and as Dag applies a counter-force, Bill does not
correspondingly oppose Dag’s force increase (Bill doesn’t want to get
killed in an accident).

Let’s take another example in which the variable in question is not
controlled. Dag is driving Bill on a big empty parking lot. Bill applies
force to the steering wheel and Dag lets go of the wheel. The car changes
direction. Now Bill knows that if Dag had not been controlling the car’s
direction when it was on the road, his application of force to the wheel
would have made the car change direction more than it did when they were
on the road. Bill is not controlling the direction of the car in either
instance. He is controlling a force which would change the state of the
direction-of-the-car perception.

Martin