Winter School 2017 "Human Action Control"

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a 'clinical' speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise... Any tips on how to hold my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo...

If you have a PhD student presenting any (PCT) work, it could be a good opportunity for them...

Warren

http://www.pi.uni-tuebingen.de/arbeitsbereiche/kognition-und-handlung/events/winter-school-2017-human-action-control.html

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.09.24.0900 EDT)]

Congratulations, Warren! I followed the link to the winter-school 2017 site
and was surprised to find it referencing a different literature than the one
I am familiar with on motor control. According to the announcement:

"The selection of topics was guided by two dominating theories in the
fields: (1) The Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel, M�sseler, Aschersleben
& Prinz, 2001) and (2) the Perception-Action Model (PAM; Milner & Goodale,
1995) about the function of the ventral and the dorsal pathway of visual
information processing."

I took a quick look at the abstracts of the cited papers and a more recent
one by Hommel (2009). According to the latter,

"The theory of event coding (TEC) is a general framework explaining how
perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively
represented and how their representations interact to generate perception
and action."

And

"If actions are cognitively represented by codes of their perceptual
consequences, one may ask whether representations
of perceived events and of produced actions differ at all. TEC makes the
strong claim that they do not."

As I have not yet read Hommel (2009) beyond the first page or so, I am in
danger of misrepresenting the theory of event coding, but on the surface at
least, it does seem to bear some relation to PCT. After all, in PCT, the
actions of a control system are closely tied to their consequences for the
controlled perception. However, in PCT these actions are not seen as being
"cognitively represented by their perceptual consequences." Instead,
actions and consequences are simply connected to form part of the control
loop. PCT simply recognizes the existence of control systems and holds that
the required linkages may be created through the process of reorganization.

TEC and PCT seem to be designed to address different questions. PCT assumes
that actions are products of control-system operation with the function of
bringing the controlled perception close to its reference level despite the
effects of disturbances and changes in reference level. PCT asks what
perceptions are under control, under what circumstances, and how the
relevant control systems are organized within the nervous system. TEC asks
how, given an action, we "know" its likely perceptual consequences. TEC's
answer is that actions and their perceptual consequences are "encoded" by a
common representation.

I don't know that TEC and PCT are necessarily incompatible, although Bill
Powers rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by "encoding" and
"decoding" messages. An area where PCT needs further development has to do
with the question of what happens to control systems when they are not in
use. I am not currently using the control system that involves turning the
steering wheel on my car in order to keep the car going where I want it to
go. Bill suggested that perhaps the references were set to a value that
would keep that output deactivated, but it seems more likely to me that such
systems, having been learned, can be brought into being or dismissed by
activating/deactivating associative linkages among the control-system
components. Supporters of TEC might suggest, I suppose, that experience
teaches what actions produce what perceptual effects, forming an
action-perception unit represented by a common code. This unitization would
make it relatively easy to establish control over the perception as it is
already associatively linked to actions by means of which control can be
exerted.

Given that I really don't know much about TEC, please take these musings as
pure speculation. The main things I want to communicate are (1) the Winter
School's focus seems to be more on how actions relate to perceptions than on
traditional motor control issues, and (2) the action-perception folks may
appreciate learning how the linkage between action and perception allows the
perceptions so linked to be controlled.

Bruce

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 12:04 AM
To: <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Cc: Henry Yin <hy43@duke.edu>; Prof. Roger K. Moore
<r.k.moore@sheffield.ac.uk>; Shaktee S <shaktee120@gmail.com>; Carla Brown
<carlabrownojeda@hotmail.co.uk>; Andrew Healey
<andrew.healey-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>; Andrew willett
<anwillett@vassar.edu>; Vyv Huddy <v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk>
Subject: Winter School 2017 "Human Action Control"

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international
motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a 'clinical'
speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise... Any tips on how to hold
my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters
and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo...

If you have a PhD student presenting any (PCT) work, it could be a good
opportunity for them...

Warren

http://www.pi.uni-tuebingen.de/arbeitsbereiche/kognition-und-handlung/events
/winter-school-2017-human-action-control.html

Bruce, the inside line is that the proposers of both theories have read Powers and I thnk they have essentially picked and chosen from Powers their own brand of the theory with less breadth and less of the important details. I won't be quite as cynical when I meet them!
Warren

···

On 24 Sep 2016, at 13:59, Bruce Abbott <bbabbott@frontier.com> wrote:

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.09.24.0900 EDT)]

Congratulations, Warren! I followed the link to the winter-school 2017 site
and was surprised to find it referencing a different literature than the one
I am familiar with on motor control. According to the announcement:

"The selection of topics was guided by two dominating theories in the
fields: (1) The Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben
& Prinz, 2001) and (2) the Perception-Action Model (PAM; Milner & Goodale,
1995) about the function of the ventral and the dorsal pathway of visual
information processing."

I took a quick look at the abstracts of the cited papers and a more recent
one by Hommel (2009). According to the latter,

"The theory of event coding (TEC) is a general framework explaining how
perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively
represented and how their representations interact to generate perception
and action."

And

"If actions are cognitively represented by codes of their perceptual
consequences, one may ask whether representations
of perceived events and of produced actions differ at all. TEC makes the
strong claim that they do not."

As I have not yet read Hommel (2009) beyond the first page or so, I am in
danger of misrepresenting the theory of event coding, but on the surface at
least, it does seem to bear some relation to PCT. After all, in PCT, the
actions of a control system are closely tied to their consequences for the
controlled perception. However, in PCT these actions are not seen as being
"cognitively represented by their perceptual consequences." Instead,
actions and consequences are simply connected to form part of the control
loop. PCT simply recognizes the existence of control systems and holds that
the required linkages may be created through the process of reorganization.

TEC and PCT seem to be designed to address different questions. PCT assumes
that actions are products of control-system operation with the function of
bringing the controlled perception close to its reference level despite the
effects of disturbances and changes in reference level. PCT asks what
perceptions are under control, under what circumstances, and how the
relevant control systems are organized within the nervous system. TEC asks
how, given an action, we "know" its likely perceptual consequences. TEC's
answer is that actions and their perceptual consequences are "encoded" by a
common representation.

I don't know that TEC and PCT are necessarily incompatible, although Bill
Powers rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by "encoding" and
"decoding" messages. An area where PCT needs further development has to do
with the question of what happens to control systems when they are not in
use. I am not currently using the control system that involves turning the
steering wheel on my car in order to keep the car going where I want it to
go. Bill suggested that perhaps the references were set to a value that
would keep that output deactivated, but it seems more likely to me that such
systems, having been learned, can be brought into being or dismissed by
activating/deactivating associative linkages among the control-system
components. Supporters of TEC might suggest, I suppose, that experience
teaches what actions produce what perceptual effects, forming an
action-perception unit represented by a common code. This unitization would
make it relatively easy to establish control over the perception as it is
already associatively linked to actions by means of which control can be
exerted.

Given that I really don't know much about TEC, please take these musings as
pure speculation. The main things I want to communicate are (1) the Winter
School's focus seems to be more on how actions relate to perceptions than on
traditional motor control issues, and (2) the action-perception folks may
appreciate learning how the linkage between action and perception allows the
perceptions so linked to be controlled.

Bruce

-----Original Message-----
From: Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 12:04 AM
To: <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Cc: Henry Yin <hy43@duke.edu>; Prof. Roger K. Moore
<r.k.moore@sheffield.ac.uk>; Shaktee S <shaktee120@gmail.com>; Carla Brown
<carlabrownojeda@hotmail.co.uk>; Andrew Healey
<andrew.healey-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>; Andrew willett
<anwillett@vassar.edu>; Vyv Huddy <v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk>
Subject: Winter School 2017 "Human Action Control"

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international
motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a 'clinical'
speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise... Any tips on how to hold
my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters
and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo...

If you have a PhD student presenting any (PCT) work, it could be a good
opportunity for them...

Warren

http://www.pi.uni-tuebingen.de/arbeitsbereiche/kognition-und-handlung/events
/winter-school-2017-human-action-control.html

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.24.12.08]

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.09.24.0900 EDT)]

Congratulations, Warren! I followed the link to the winter-school 2017 site
...

I took a quick look at the abstracts of the cited papers and a more recent
one by Hommel (2009). According to the latter,

"The theory of event coding (TEC) is a general framework explaining how
perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively
represented and how their representations interact to generate perception
and action."

And

"If actions are cognitively represented by codes of their perceptual
consequences, one may ask whether representations
of perceived events and of produced actions differ at all. TEC makes the
strong claim that they do not."

...

I don't know that TEC and PCT are necessarily incompatible, although Bill
Powers rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by "encoding" and
"decoding" messages.

I haven't followed the link and know less about TEC than Bruce does. But I think a comment is is order about coding.

...Supporters of TEC might suggest, I suppose, that experience
teaches what actions produce what perceptual effects, forming an
action-perception unit represented by a common code. This unitization would
make it relatively easy to establish control over the perception as it is
already associatively linked to actions by means of which control can be
exerted.

That's what reorganization does in PCT, isn't it?

Bill may have rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by encoding and decoding messages, but I think he had a particular view of what those terms imply. Every perceptual function decodes the input from the environment and from imagination. The reorganization mechanism encodes the actions the are intended to influcence perceptions in different directions in different contexts. The whole hierarchy is a distributed encoding decoding scheme.

I suspect the difference between this kind of PCT distributed coding-decoding and "how perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively represented and how their representations interact to generate perception and action"is encapsulated in Roger's footnote of temperature control in a room without a thermostat [[Roger K. Moore 2016.9.23.11.10 BST], which I take the liberty of copying here:

"Heating an arbitrary room to a particular temperature requires the injection of just the right amount of heat based on the room�s size, the presence of other sources of heat and the means for heat loss. All this can be calculated analytically, but if any of the variables change, e.g. a window is opened or more people come into the room, then these disturbances would have to be sensed, their implications measured and the overall calculations repeated. Realising that such changes are unpredictable and happening all the time, and that the number of required sensors would get out of hand, the stochastic modeller decides instead to collect a database (in an attempt to capture the unexplained variability) with which to train a probabilistic system. The resulting device gives the right temperature 95% of the time (as long as the test conditions match the training conditions) but, in order to reduce the error rate even further, the only approach that is found to work is to collect more and more data. After many years of research, there is still a residual of variability that cannot be explained, and performance asymptotes. Through all this, it has been failed to notice that a simple thermostat would have quite adequately handled the infinity of possible conditions to a defined level of accuracy."

PCT-coding produces intended consequences, while TEC-coding produces expected consequences or planned consequences. There's a big difference in the results, in an uncertain universe. As Rabbie Burns said: "The best laid plans of mice and men gang aft agley".

But controlled perceptions with intended consequences do so less easily.

I repeat, I'm going only by what Bruce said, not from any other source of information about TEC.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.26.0850)]

Bruce Abbott (2016.09.24.0900 EDT)

BA: As I have not yet read Hommel (2009) beyond the first page or so, I am in danger of misrepresenting the theory of event coding, but on the surface at least, it does seem to bear some relation to PCT.

RM: Unless the theory of event coding is an explanation of how organisms control, its relationship to PCT is completely superficial.

BA: After all, in PCT, the actions of a control system are closely tied to their consequences for the controlled perception.

RM: In PCT, controlled perceptual variables and the reference signals that specify the states of these variables are theoretical constructs that explain the observable fact that organisms act to maintain variable aspects of their sensory input -- controlled variables -- in reference states. If the theory of event coding doesn't account for the existence of reference states for controlled variables then it has nothing to do with PCT.

BA: TEC and PCT seem to be designed to address different questions.

RM: Yes!! TEC is apparently aimed at explaining the perceptual basis of action. PCT is aimed at explaining how organisms control.

BA: PCT assumes that actions are products of control-system operation with the function of bringing the controlled perception close to its reference level despite the effects of disturbances and changes in reference level. PCT asks what perceptions are under control, under what circumstances, and how the relevant control systems are organized within the nervous system. TEC asks how, given an action, we "know" its likely perceptual consequences. TEC's answer is that actions and their perceptual consequences are "encoded" by a common representation.

RM: Yes, I think that's a nice way to put it.

BA: I don't know that TEC and PCT are necessarily incompatible, although Bill Powers rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by "encoding" and "decoding" messages.

RM: Yes, the model of perception in PCT does not involve "encoding" and "decoding" messages (from the senses, I presume). The PCT model of perception is constructivist, not decodivist. But these superficial differences between the theories are not what makes them incompatible. The deep inconsistency is that PCT is an explanation of the controlling done by living organisms and TEC isn't.

BA: An area where PCT needs further development has to do
with the question of what happens to control systems when they are not in
use.

RM: I agree. How about some research ideas?
Best
Rick

···

I am not currently using the control system that involves turning the
steering wheel on my car in order to keep the car going where I want it to
go. Bill suggested that perhaps the references were set to a value that
would keep that output deactivated, but it seems more likely to me that such
systems, having been learned, can be brought into being or dismissed by
activating/deactivating associative linkages among the control-system
components. Supporters of TEC might suggest, I suppose, that experience
teaches what actions produce what perceptual effects, forming an
action-perception unit represented by a common code. This unitization would
make it relatively easy to establish control over the perception as it is
already associatively linked to actions by means of which control can be
exerted.

Given that I really don't know much about TEC, please take these musings as
pure speculation. The main things I want to communicate are (1) the Winter
School's focus seems to be more on how actions relate to perceptions than on
traditional motor control issues, and (2) the action-perception folks may
appreciate learning how the linkage between action and perception allows the
perceptions so linked to be controlled.

Bruce

-----Original Message-----
From: Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@gmail.com>wmansell@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2016 12:04 AM
To: <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Cc: Henry Yin <<mailto:hy43@duke.edu>hy43@duke.edu>; Prof. Roger K. Moore
<<mailto:r.k.moore@sheffield.ac.uk>r.k.moore@sheffield.ac.uk>; Shaktee S <<mailto:shaktee120@gmail.com>shaktee120@gmail.com>; Carla Brown
<<mailto:carlabrownojeda@hotmail.co.uk>carlabrownojeda@hotmail.co.uk>; Andrew Healey
<<mailto:andrew.healey-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>andrew.healey-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>; Andrew willett
<<mailto:anwillett@vassar.edu>anwillett@vassar.edu>; Vyv Huddy <<mailto:v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk>v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk>
Subject: Winter School 2017 "Human Action Control"

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international
motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a 'clinical'
speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise... Any tips on how to hold
my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters
and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo...

If you have a PhD student presenting any (PCT) work, it could be a good
opportunity for them...

Warren

<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.pi.uni-2Dtuebingen.de_arbeitsbereiche_kognition-2Dund-2Dhandlung_events-2520_winter-2Dschool-2D2017-2Dhuman-2Daction-2Dcontrol.html&d=CwMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=j0BVbN093sQ4hBK1x0jAa2K4DRl1DupVQ8H6GZuxcu4&s=ay8PJ6bCYK6oQb8J9Bla7ckMK79aluUoh4s9Et3b8Hw&e=&gt;&gt; http://www.pi.uni-tuebingen.de/arbeitsbereiche/kognition-und-handlung/events
/winter-school-2017-human-action-control.html

--
Richard S. Marken
"The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves." -- William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.26.0950)]

···

Martin Taylor (2016.09.24.12.08)–

MT: Bill may have rejected the idea that the nervous system operates by encoding and decoding messages, but I think he had a particular view of what those terms imply. Every perceptual function decodes the input from the environment and from imagination.

RM: I don’t think this is the correct way to view the operation of perceptual functions in the PCT model. In PCT, perceptual functions “construct” perceptual variables from sensory input. These constructed perceptual variables may or may not correspond to entities or variables that are actually “out there” in the environment. An example of a perceptual variable that corresponds to something that is not “out there” but completely constructed by a perceptual input function is, of course, Bill’s example in B:CP of the taste of lemonade. An example of a perceptual variable that corresponds pretty closely to something out there is the loudness of a sound, which corresponds to the amount of energy in the sound.

RM: It’s important to understand this model of perception because one of the main goals of research testing the PCT model is to determine the nature of the perceptual variables that an organism is controlling when it is seen to be carrying out some behavior. Determining the nature of perceptual variables that are under control is equivalent to determining the nature of the perceptual functions that construct these variables. That’s what the test for the controlled variable is all about: determining the perceptual variables that are constructed from the organism’s sensory input that correspond to the aspects of the environment that are being controlled – controlled variables.

Best

Rick

I suspect the difference between this kind of PCT distributed coding-decoding and "how perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively represented and how their representations interact to generate perception and action"is encapsulated in Roger’s footnote of temperature control in a room without a thermostat [[Roger K. Moore 2016.9.23.11.10 BST], which I take the liberty of copying here:

“Heating an arbitrary room to a particular temperature requires the injection of just the right amount of heat based on the room’s size, the presence of other sources of heat and the means for heat loss. All this can be calculated analytically, but if any of the variables change, e.g. a window is opened or more people come into the room, then these disturbances would have to be sensed, their implications measured and the overall calculations repeated. Realising that such changes are unpredictable and happening all the time, and that the number of required sensors would get out of hand, the stochastic modeller decides instead to collect a database (in an attempt to capture the unexplained variability) with which to train a probabilistic system. The resulting device gives the right temperature 95% of the time (as long as the test conditions match the training conditions) but, in order to reduce the error rate even further, the only approach that is found to work is to collect more and more data. After many years of research, there is still a residual of variability that cannot be explained, and performance asymptotes. Through all this, it has been failed to notice that a simple thermostat would have quite adequately handled the infinity of possible conditions to a defined level of accuracy.”

PCT-coding produces intended consequences, while TEC-coding produces expected consequences or planned consequences. There’s a big difference in the results, in an uncertain universe. As Rabbie Burns said: “The best laid plans of mice and men gang aft agley”.

But controlled perceptions with intended consequences do so less easily.

I repeat, I’m going only by what Bruce said, not from any other source of information about TEC.

Martin


Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Adam Matic 2016.9.28]

···

On Sat, Sep 24, 2016 at 6:04 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a ‘clinical’ speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise… Any tips on how to hold my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo…

Oh, Daniel Wolpert is there. He’s got an interesting talk about movement neuroscience on TED from 2011. https://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_wolpert_the_real_reason_for_brains

I like his reasons for studying movement.

The similarity with PCT is that he is using control theory to explain movement, but the difference is it is the modern variety, with internal models and bayesian learning and things like that. Still, there are theorists who don’t think control theory needs to be involved in explaining movement - the equilibrium point theorists, uncontrolled manifold theorists… The latter ones reject computational complexity of modern control theory as not plausible which seems like a valid point. So, in my view, PCT explanation of movement kinda has “the good parts” of both sides, use of negative feedback control and relative computational simplicity (trough hierarchical control).

David Rosenbaum has a book on movement control: https://books.google.hr/books?hl=en&lr=&id=MsFmds_ACBwC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=David+A.+Rosenbaum&ots=18NvDKdZPg&sig=bHkG2nzCSyJ3L_e-Iiz1M2jfNMc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=David%20A.%20Rosenbaum&f=false

I would guess these two might have interesting comments on Bill’s ArmCoordination and ArmReorganization demos, if they could get over the ‘control of input / perception’ instead of ‘control of output / plant’ twist.

Best,

Adam

Thank you Adam, well pointed out! The book by Rosenbaum is extremely comprehensive and covers a wide range of theories so one would hope he has taken stock of the field of motor control. I might send them my slides leading up to the talk…
Warren

···

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:58 AM, Adam Matic adam.matic@gmail.com wrote:

[From Adam Matic 2016.9.28]

On Sat, Sep 24, 2016 at 6:04 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Bit of a coup, I have myself down as an invited speaker at an international motor control conference in Germany. I think I am assumed to be a ‘clinical’ speaker, so they are in for a bit of a surprise… Any tips on how to hold my own with this bunch?

I am hoping to do an overview of work conducted by my undergraduate, masters and PhD students as well as a series of studies on the rubber band demo…

Oh, Daniel Wolpert is there. He’s got an interesting talk about movement neuroscience on TED from 2011. https://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_wolpert_the_real_reason_for_brains

I like his reasons for studying movement.

The similarity with PCT is that he is using control theory to explain movement, but the difference is it is the modern variety, with internal models and bayesian learning and things like that. Still, there are theorists who don’t think control theory needs to be involved in explaining movement - the equilibrium point theorists, uncontrolled manifold theorists… The latter ones reject computational complexity of modern control theory as not plausible which seems like a valid point. So, in my view, PCT explanation of movement kinda has “the good parts” of both sides, use of negative feedback control and relative computational simplicity (trough hierarchical control).

David Rosenbaum has a book on movement control: https://books.google.hr/books?hl=en&lr=&id=MsFmds_ACBwC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=David+A.+Rosenbaum&ots=18NvDKdZPg&sig=bHkG2nzCSyJ3L_e-Iiz1M2jfNMc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=David%20A.%20Rosenbaum&f=false

I would guess these two might have interesting comments on Bill’s ArmCoordination and ArmReorganization demos, if they could get over the ‘control of input / perception’ instead of ‘control of output / plant’ twist.

Best,

Adam

Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
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Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

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Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory