Words

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1500)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.1501)

PCT control system error and
reference conditions are not the same as system goals and mistakes. Very
often we speak of “error” when we are talking about mistakes, and when
we speak of reference conditions we are really talking about goals. It
gets confusing. These words are not interchangeable, yet we all use them
as if they were.
I agree that error in a control system is not the same as a mistake.
But I think the reference condition in a control system is exactly what
we mean when we talk about people having goals.
I think of a mistake as an outcome that was not intended. When I press
“5” rather than “2” when dialing the phone, that is a mistake if my intention
was to press “2”. Such a mistake may or may not be associated with control
system error. If it is associated with error, then the mistake should be
quickly corrected as the control system acts to bring the result (“5”)
to its goal (reference) state (“2”). If there is no error then the
mistake is not corrected. A mistake is typically defined with respect
to the intentions of the actor. So if the actor’s intent was to press “5”
and “5” was pressed, then there was no mistake even if an observer knows
that “5” was, in fact, the wrong button to press if the actor was calling
his mother, say. In my “prescribing error” paper I suggested that we call
this kind of “mistake” a “failure”. A mistake is, then, an unintended outcome.
A failure is an intended outcome that is judged wrong by an observer (such
as a teacher). It seems to me that it would be very hard to make such distinctions
without the help of PCT.

Regarding “goal” and “reference” here is Webster’s Revised Unabridged
Dictionary definition number 1: the state of affairs that a plan is intended
to achieve and that (when achieved) terminates behavior intended to achieve
it.

This sounds a lot like the reference state of a controlled variable
to me. Since that reference state is specified by the reference signal,
I tend to think of the reference signal (or the value of that signal, the
reference condition) as the goal. But the word “goal” is ambiguous because
it can refer to the reference signal value or to the reference state of
the controlled variable itself. For example, a thermostat is
set to 70 degrees. That’s the reference condition. The actual temperature
(the controlled variable) is whatever it is at the moment. When the temperature
is 70 degrees is in the reference (goal) state. So when we say that the
thermostat’s goal is 70 degrees do we mean that the reference is set to
70 or that a temperature of 70 is the goal? If it’s the former, then the
goal is always there, in the thermostat, as the reference. If it’s the
latter, then the goal doesn’t exist until the temperature in the room (the
state of the controlled variable) is actually 70 degrees. I prefer the
first interpretation but understand the second as legitimate.

This illustrates the problem of mapping the control model to everyday
language. Defining words like “goal” and “mistake” so we know what
we’re talking about is certainly a good idea. But I think that the clearest
definition of what we are talking about is given by the model. When
there is ambiguity, we can always go back and say what we mean in terms
of the functions and variables in the model. I don’t think it is
possible to develop a lexicon or dictionary that is as clear and unambiguous
as the model itself.

Best

Rick

···

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Senior Behavioral Scientist

The RAND Corporation

PO Box 2138

1700 Main Street

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971

Fax: 310-451-7018

E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.1501) ]

PCT control system error and reference conditions are not the same as system goals and mistakes. Very often we speak of “error” when we are talking about mistakes, and when we speak of reference conditions we are really talking about goals. It gets confusing. These words are not interchangeable, yet we all use them as if they were. A main reason I suggested a lexicon.

Marc

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1650)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.1840)

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1500)
But I think the reference condition in a control
system is exactly what we mean when we talk about people having goals.
I disagree here. A reference
condition is a very specific type of goal and has a very specific meaning
to the model. Goal is also used to mean the state of an entire system or
parts of a system. Here is where you and Gregory are having a tough time.
Bruce is saying that as long as his “goals” are being met, it doesn’t matter
what error’s he has to deal with. The error’s become insignificant because
he is attaining higher level “goals” while some lower level goals ( reference
conditions ) are not being met. Do you see this?
I don’t know what I’m supposed to see. But it seems unlikely that this
has anything to do with why Bruce and I are having a tough time.
It seems to me that the “tough time” started after Bill made what I
thought was a wonderful observation [Bill Powers (2003.05.22.1613 MDT)]
which was that by setting a goal (of proving the “adaptive illusion”) he
was creating error which he experienced as a positive emotion because
the goal felt reachable (and was reached, I might add!!). I seconded that
emotion [Rick Marken (2003.05.22.2200)] and it seemed to me that
Bruce G. then rose to speak against the emotion (that should make us even,
Bill;-)). But I really have no idea what he was objecting to (or even whether
he was objecting). But it doesn’t really matter since no one’s going
out to do any experiments on it, anyway. Bill’s was just a wonderful observation
about emotion with which I was able to empathize completely.

Best regards

Rick

···

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Senior Behavioral Scientist

The RAND Corporation

PO Box 2138

1700 Main Street

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971

Fax: 310-451-7018

E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.1840) ]

···

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1500)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.1501) --
PCT control system error and reference conditions are _not_ the same as system goals and mistakes. Very often we speak of "error" when we are talking about mistakes, and when we speak of reference conditions we are really talking about goals. It gets confusing. These words are not interchangeable, yet we all use them as if they were.

I agree that error in a control system is not the same as a mistake.

OK, but we tend to treat it the same when we talk.

But I think the reference condition in a control system is exactly what we mean when we talk about people having goals.

I disagree here. A reference condition is a very specific type of goal and has a very specific meaning to the model. Goal is also used to mean the state of an entire system or parts of a system. Here is where you and Gregory are having a tough time. Bruce is saying that as long as his “goals” are being met, it doesn’t matter what error’s he has to deal with. The error’s become insignificant because he is attaining higher level “goals” while some lower level goals ( reference conditions ) are not being met. Do you see this? The problem is in the use of the word Goal. It should not be used in the model. Bruce G. has it right. We should talk about model reference conditions as model reference conditions.

This illustrates the problem of mapping the control model to everyday language.

Sure does.

Defining words like “goal” and “mistake” so we know what we’re talking about is certainly a good idea.

Ok, so why not go with it?

But I think that the clearest definition of what we are talking about is given by the model.

For the model. Not for the larger system.

When there is ambiguity, we can always go back and say what we mean in terms of the functions and variables in the model.

The purpose as I see it is not to eliminate the ambiguity. It’s to specify meaning to a specific usage of the word.

I don’t think it is possible to develop a lexicon or dictionary that is as clear and unambiguous as the model itself.

Don’t confuse a lexicon with a dictionary. They are different, and used for different purposes. A lexicon as know it is used to define words and terms for specific uses, such as medical or legal terms. A lexicon is a vocabulary used by a certain group to communicate meanings. Bruce G’s book Inventing Reality is an excellent look at how physicists developed their own vocabulary (lexicon). In fact it was in re-reading that book that I thought a lexicon for PCT/HPCT would be worthwhile.

Marc

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2042)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1500)]

I agree that error in a control system is not the same as a mistake.
But I think the reference condition in a control system is exactly what
we mean when we talk about people having goals.

Regarding "goal" and "reference" here is Webster's Revised Unabridged
Dictionary definition number 1: the state of affairs that a plan is
intended to achieve and that (when achieved) terminates behavior
intended to achieve it.

I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
this definition, pedaling is not a goal, since I do not stop pedaling
once I begin (until I reach my destination). Yet I think of pedaling as
a controlled behavior with an ever changing reference level. Where have
I gone wrong?

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1800)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2042)--

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1500)]

> Regarding "goal" and "reference" here is Webster's Revised Unabridged
> Dictionary definition number 1: the state of affairs that a plan is
> intended to achieve and that (when achieved) terminates behavior
> intended to achieve it.

I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
this definition, pedaling is not a goal, since I do not stop pedaling
once I begin (until I reach my destination). Yet I think of pedaling as
a controlled behavior with an ever changing reference level. Where have
I gone wrong?

Pedaling is also a state of affairs. It is achieved by muscle behavior that
terminates when the goal state of affairs (pedaling) is achieved

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.23.2044)]

···

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1650)]

I don’t know what I’m supposed to see. But it seems unlikely that this has anything to do with why Bruce and I are having a tough time.

Ok,

It seems to me that the “tough time” started after Bill made what I thought was a wonderful observation [Bill Powers (2003.05.22.1613 MDT)] which was that by setting a goal (of proving the “adaptive illusion”) he was creating error which he experienced as a positive emotion because the goal felt reachable (and was reached, I might add!!).

The “goal” in this case having how many concurrent control systems?", One?, I don’t think so. When one sets any “higher” level “goal” ( lets say, from Program level up ) many lower level control systems are concurrently in use. You’re bound to have a lot of error among all the control systems. The question becomes; Exactly which “goals” ( reference conditions ) “count” ( i.e. help toward the realization of the higher level goal)?, and which don’t. All reference conditions are not created equal with regard to attaining any higher level “goal”. I happen to agree with both of you. I think you are talking about different things.

But it doesn’t really matter since no one’s going out to do any experiments on it, anyway.

Excuse me. How do you know what anyone is going to try and do? Your not being very helpful in constructing an experiment that might prove to be useful in this area.

Marc

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2130)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1800)

Pedaling is also a state of affairs. It is achieved by muscle behavior that
terminates when the goal state of affairs (pedaling) is achieved

Yes, indeed. Much in the same way that World War II was a stimulus for
Skinner, I suppose. I'll try to remember that "state of affairs" covers
a multitude of sins.

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1915)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2130)

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1800)

>
> Pedaling is also a state of affairs. It is achieved by muscle behavior that
> terminates when the goal state of affairs (pedaling) is achieved

Yes, indeed. Much in the same way that World War II was a stimulus for
Skinner, I suppose.

Say what?

I posted this definition of goal:

the state of affairs that a plan is intended to achieve and that (when
achieved) terminates behavior intended to achieve it.

Then you said:

I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
this definition, pedaling is not a goal

So then I pointed out that pedaling can be seen as a goal in terms of the
dictionary definition I gave. All you have to do is look at pedaling as an
achieved state of affairs in itself (words used in the definition), rather than
as just a means of achieving some state of affairs, like riding a bike. I was
just pointing to the hierarchical nature of control using words in the
dictionary definition. Pedaling is a goal state of affairs that is achieved by
contracting and relaxing muscles; riding a bike is a goal state of affairs that
is achieved, in part, by pedaling; going to the park is s a goal state of
affairs that is achieved, sometimes, by riding a bike. I don't see what "Much
in the same way that World War II was a stimulus for Skinner, I suppose" has to
do with that.

I'll try to remember that "state of affairs" covers a multitude of sins.

In a way, yes, it does. It is a generic way of referring to the current state of
some variable aspect of the environment. A state of affairs can be the current
size of he pupil, the current distance of one person from another, the current
rate of change in the optical angle of a ball as seen by a fielder, the current
temperature, etc. "State of affairs" was the term used in the dictionary
definition of "goal", probably because it would be more familiar to readers than
"state of some variable aspect of the environment".

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.23.2030 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2042)--

I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
this definition, pedaling is not a goal, since I do not stop pedaling
once I begin (until I reach my destination). Yet I think of pedaling as
a controlled behavior with an ever changing reference level. Where have
I gone wrong?

What's wrong is thinking of control systems as completely correcting error.
In special cases, it's possible to get very close to zero error, but all
that keeps any real control system in action is the remaining error. If the
error ever actually went to zero, the action would eventually run down and
cease.

The reason it seems that errors are corrected is that in many cases the
sensitivity of the output function to error is very high. This does not
mean that large amounts of output are produced, but that errors are kept
very small in relation to the reference signal. The perceptions very nearly
match the reference signal, yet the small discrepancies that remain are
sufficient to cause all the variations in action that prevent the error
from getting any larger.

I once built a temperature controller that kept the temperature of a large
room constant to within 0.01 degree C. The air was constantly stirred by
fans to assure fast response of the heaters to very small fluctuations in
temperature. The result was that a mercury thermometer on the wall
continuously indicated a temperature of 22 degrees C, exactly at the set
point -- but you could also see continuous fluctations in the meter showing
the power being delivered to the heaters in walls, ceiling, and floor. The
guy I built it for wondered one day how that could be -- if all
disturbances were being cancelled so the temperature always remained at the
set point, what caused the fluctations in heater power? The answer was
simple to show him: I just connected a meter to the amplified error signal
after the comparator, so he could see the continuous fluctations of
temperature -- all less than 0.01 degree C, but plenty to drive the heaters
from a quarter on to three quarters on. The answer was that the temperature
was NOT at the set point, but only near it. You just needed to look more
closely to see that.

So there is a reference condition for pedaling, and your motor activities
are producing forces that keep your legs doing the pedaling _very nearly_
in the way that the reference condition specifies. The slight differences
between the perceived pedaling and the reference pedaling are, when
amplified, sufficient to drive the output function (probably what they call
a central pattern generator) to pedal faster and slower so as to remain
close to the phase and frequency of pedaling specified by the reference
signal(s). If you think only in terms of pedaling or not pedaling, or if
any rate of pedaling within a certain range is enough to be consciously
perceived as pedaling, you will see only that pedaling is occurring
"exactly" as you wish. But "exactly" is a gross exaggeration, as you would
see if you had instrumentation to show exactly what was going on, to a one
more decimal place than you can otherwise see, or bother to see.

Note that when you come to the upslope of a hill -- let's say when Lance
Armstrong comes to a hill, he sees an opportunity to leave the pack behind,
and sets his speed reference level appreciably higher. At the same time, I
am sure he would say that he feels a spurt of adrenalin and a jolt of extra
glucose in his bloodstream (felt, of course as a surge of energy), and that
this breakaway move feels really good. The actual increase in pedaling
speed reference signal (with the perception at 100 units) might be from 101
units to 102 units, but that is a doubling of the error, and of the drive
to the muscles, and of energy being expended. The perception is still
within 2% of the reference signal, yet the result at lower levels is a
pronounced increase in activity and in preparation for activity.

That's the kind of increase of error I'm talking about: not from 0 to 75
miles, but from 101 to 102 units of reference signal, or from a 1% error to
a 2% error. And it's not the error itself that feels good, since we don't
perceive error signals (as of 2003.05.23). What feels good are all the
things that go on as a result of the increase in error signals. They feel
good because the change in reference signal that starts the process is
deemed good -- what we mean by good is "closer to our reference signals."
Whatever feelings go with a good goal are taken to be good feelings. I know
that's backward to common sense, but take it under advisement.

Best,

Bill P.

I don't know if this addresses the problem you saw, but the internet
doesn't provide for fast conversations.

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce gregory (2003.0524.0637)]

Bill Powers (2003.05.23.2030 MDT)

That's the kind of increase of error I'm talking about: not from 0 to 75
miles, but from 101 to 102 units of reference signal, or from a 1% error to
a 2% error. And it's not the error itself that feels good, since we don't
perceive error signals (as of 2003.05.23). What feels good are all the
things that go on as a result of the increase in error signals. They feel
good because the change in reference signal that starts the process is
deemed good -- what we mean by good is "closer to our reference signals."
Whatever feelings go with a good goal are taken to be good feelings. I know
that's backward to common sense, but take it under advisement.

Consider it done. Thanks.

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.24.1016 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1915)--

> Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2130)
>
> Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1800)
>
> >
> > Pedaling is also a state of affairs. It is achieved by muscle
behavior that
> > terminates when the goal state of affairs (pedaling) is achieved

Bruce Gregory said:
> I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
> this definition, pedaling is not a goal

Rick said:

So then I pointed out that pedaling can be seen as a goal in terms of the
dictionary definition I gave. All you have to do is look at pedaling as an
achieved state of affairs in itself (words used in the definition), rather
than
as just a means of achieving some state of affairs, like riding a bike.

This didn't address Bruce G's point. If pedaling is driven by error, and
you achieve the reference state of pedaling, the error disappears and the
muscle behavior terminates, according to what you said. So as soon as you
pedal, you stop pedaling.

By the way, I omitted mentioning another point about the term "goal" that
Marc Abrams has been bringing up. When we speak of conscious experience,
awareness encompasses many systems at once operating within some range of
levels. So to experience a goal is to experience a lot of reference signals
at the same time (by imagining/remembering). We give the collection a name,
and treat it as a single thing. The same applies to conscious experience of
real perceptions. To represent a conscious experience we would need a model
containing many control systems, each controlling one dimension of the
total experience.

The model is our best guess about what is "really" going on in the brain
when we have conscious experiences, but it is not exactly what we
experience. Neither do we experience everything the model, and observation
of others, tells us must be going on. So there is a close relationship
between experience and the behavior the model produces, but it is not a
one-to-one correspondence.

Best,

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.24.1015)]

Bill Powers (2003.05.24.1016 MDT)--

>Bruce Gregory said:
> > I see a problem. When I ride my bike, I find I must pedal. According to
> > this definition, pedaling is not a goal

Rick said:
>So then I pointed out that pedaling can be seen as a goal in terms of the
>dictionary definition I gave. All you have to do is look at pedaling as an
>achieved state of affairs in itself (words used in the definition), rather
>than as just a means of achieving some state of affairs, like riding a
bike.

This didn't address Bruce G's point. If pedaling is driven by error, and
you achieve the reference state of pedaling, the error disappears and the
muscle behavior terminates, according to what you said. So as soon as you
pedal, you stop pedaling.

Sorry. I didn't understand this to be Bruce's point. I thought he was saying
that he must pedal in order to ride his bike and that, therefore, since, by
the dictionary definition I posted, a goal is "the state of affairs that a
plan is intended to achieve..." pedaling is not a goal. (See the quote from
Bruce G. above to see how I might have come to this conclusion).

I did consider the possibility that he was referring to the part of the
definition that says that, when achieved, a goal "terminates the behavior
intended to achieve it". But then I thought that if that were what he meant,
he would have asked why pedaling doesn't stop when you are riding the bike.
Had he asked it that way, I probably would have given an answer similar to
yours, about error never really going to zero so that there is always some
error driving the actions (pedaling, in this case) that keep the results in
the goal state -- something the dictionary definition of "goal" gets wrong.

What threw me was Bruce saying that, according to the definition, pedaling is
_not a goal_. I responded by pointing out that pedaling is as much a goal by
this definition as is riding the bike. If Bruce's problem with the definition
was with the idea that when a goal is achieved it terminates the behavior that
produces it (which is also my problem with the definition) I think it would
have been clearer if he had said "According to this definition pedaling should
stop when I am riding my bike". In that case, I would have agreed that that's
a problem with the definition and that in real control systems there is always
some small amount of error that drives the actions (behavior) that
continuously achieve the goal.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Marc_Abrams1]

from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.24.1536) ]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.24.1016 MDT)]

HALLELUJAH. This is _exactly_ what I have been trying to say. Thank you
Bill.

Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1915)--

> > Bruce Gregory (2003.0523.2130)
> >
> > Rick Marken (2003.05.23.1800)

By the way, I omitted mentioning another point about the term "goal" that
Marc Abrams has been bringing up. When we speak of conscious experience,
awareness encompasses many systems at once operating within some range of
levels. So to experience a goal is to experience a lot of reference

signals

at the same time (by imagining/remembering). We give the collection a

name,

and treat it as a single thing. The same applies to conscious experience

of

real perceptions. To represent a conscious experience we would need a

model

containing many control systems, each controlling one dimension of the
total experience.

The model is our best guess about what is "really" going on in the brain
when we have conscious experiences, but it is not exactly what we
experience. Neither do we experience everything the model, and observation
of others, tells us must be going on. So there is a close relationship
between experience and the behavior the model produces, but it is not a
one-to-one correspondence.

Now, in this vein I believe Argyris can help us look at the upper levels of
the hierarchy. I think it would be tragic if we ( I ) did not attempt to
look at the available data. Argyris has been working with a control model
that he is unaware of. I believe that we have _COMPLEMENTARY_ ideas. Bill
has a theory of Behavior. Argyris has a PO of human interaction and
organizations. It's a natural fit.

If I were to try and illustrate the relationship, I would use the Olympic
symbol of three circles ( a Venn diagram if you will ) the one on the left
is PCT (Psychology ) the one in the center is Action Science, and the one
on the right is Sociology. There is some overlap ( how much I could not say
specifically ) but the overlap is not contradictory. Action Science is
explained by PCT. This will offer Action Science researcher/practitioners
the opportunity to understand how to their methods work and how they might
improve them. We get a better look at how our experience might inform the
model.

Again, thanks Bill.

Happy flying

Marc

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.24.1617 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.24.1536)--

>HALLELUJAH. This is _exactly_ what I have been trying to say. Thank you

Good.

>This will offer Action Science researcher/practitioners the opportunity
to understand >how to their methods work and how they might improve them.

I am happy to leave those contacts to you. A great deal depends on Argyris
himself, and his immediate supporters. I hope they give you a friendly
reception.

Best,

Bill P.

[Marc_Abrams1]

from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.24.1955) ]

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.24.1617 MDT)]

I am happy to leave those contacts to you. A great deal depends on Argyris
himself, and his immediate supporters. I hope they give you a friendly
reception.

Initial contacts have been good. I'll keep everyone posted.

Marc

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.11.22.11.26NZT)

Bill in an earlier conversation mentioned words and what they can or can’t
mean in terms of other words objects etc.

This is a very important concept because what
exactly are words if they don’t only relate to objects but to each other.

This is what I think words are.

They are the symbolization of sound, that’s
it.

This seems like a rather trivial statement
but sound (acoustics) is not at all a trivial subject. It’s full of twist
and turns. I also think that sound (with the help of in-“sight”- a
play on words) is materiality’s desire to be known.

The DNA crystal has a sound characteristic called a phonon from what I
have heard the wavelength corresponds to the size and configuration of the DNA molecule.

Scientists are now saying that there is quantum
mechanical sound.

To be sure sound is not trivial at
university (in structural design) we were shown the Tacoma Narrows bridge disaster on many
occasions. Internal vibrations (sound) are a very important aspect of design.

Regards

Gavin

···

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.11.22.15.15NZT)

For those of you who may be interested in
the concept of sound and symbols here is a short list of subjects on the
concept of sound.

• Semiotics (Peirce)

•  Acoustics (Science of Sound) (too
  

  many to mention includes Newton ) has
  over 11 sub-subjects music, medicine, speech, etc. from the fields of
  engineering, art, life sciences and earth sciences. Covers information
  theory.
• Semantics (Korzybski)
• Cymatics (Jenny)
• Music (too many too mention)

•  Language and culture (don’t
  

  know)
• Linguistics (don’t know)

I have been asking myself the very trivial
question so what exactly is sound. And such a beautiful instrument we have to hear
sound. Like the grandest grand piano in the universe.

(Our ears and its parts and our brain, the
cochlea is just marvel of engineering)

Without sight we can’t have symbols
so we need sight to integrate sound, which is interesting because at some level
sound (vibration) and heat (vibration) are one and the same.

And PCT needs to be able to seamlessly integrate
this subject in its entirety “a very difficult task”.

Regards

Gavin

···

[Jim_Dundon]

jim dundon 2010.11.21 11:04 et

I think when you say that words are symbolization of sound, you are referring to the written symbols. The spoken word is is obviously not the symbolization of sound. As I see it, spoken words are the phonetic expression of an experience. Without them our experience is not enlargeable. They put a limit or a boundary on mental activity. They parse the capacity of our ability to experience into identifiable recallable units. Using words, talking, is part of the experience of grabbing hold of our mental and emotional processes, our experience, and communicating it to ourselves and to each other.

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.11.22.11.26NZT)

Bill in an earlier conversation mentioned words and what they can or can’t
mean in terms of other words objects etc.

This is a very important concept because what
exactly are words if they don’t only relate to objects but to each other.

This is what I think words are.

They are the symbolization of sound, that’s
it.

This seems like a rather trivial statement
but sound (acoustics) is not at all a trivial subject. It’s full of twist
and turns. I also think that sound (with the help of in-“sight�- a
play on words) is materiality’s desire to be known.

The DNA crystal has a sound characteristic called a phonon from what I
have heard the wavelength corresponds to the size and configuration of the DNA molecule.

Scientists are now saying that there is quantum
mechanical sound.

To be sure sound is not trivial at
university (in structural design) we were shown the Tacoma Narrows bridge disaster on many
occasions. Internal vibrations (sound) are a very important aspect of design.

Regards

Gavin

···

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

(Gavin Ritz 2010.11.24.13.12NZT)

jim dundon
2010.11.21 11:04 et

I think when you say that words are
symbolization of sound, you are referring to the written symbols. The spoken word is is
obviously not the symbolization of sound. As I see it, spoken words are
the phonetic expression of an experience. Without them our experience is
not enlargeable. They put a limit or a boundary on mental activity. They
parse the capacity of our ability to experience into identifiable recallable units.
Using words, talking, is part of the experience of grabbing hold of our
mental and emotional processes, our experience, and communicating it to
ourselves and to each other.

You got it
Jim. Spoken words are sound.

(Gavin
Ritz 2010.11.22.11.26NZT)

Bill in an earlier conversation mentioned words and what they can or
can’t mean in terms of other words objects etc.

This is
a very important concept because what exactly are words if they don’t only
relate to objects but to each other.

This is
what I think words are.

They are
the symbolization of sound, that’s it.

This
seems like a rather trivial statement but sound (acoustics) is not at all a
trivial subject. It’s full of twist and turns. I also think that sound (with
the help of in-“sight”- a play on words) is materiality’s desire to be known.

The DNA
crystal has a sound characteristic called a phonon from what I have heard the
wavelength corresponds to the size and configuration of the DNA molecule.

Scientists
are now saying that there is quantum mechanical sound.

To be
sure sound is not trivial at university (in structural design) we were shown
the Tacoma Narrows bridge disaster on many occasions. Internal vibrations (sound) are
a very important aspect of design.

Regards

Gavin

···