Zen and the Art of PCT

[Bill_Powers1]

Okay, think of something that
gives you a feeling of peace or joy or happiness. Like a daughter or
something like that. Now, how do you know you are joyful or peaceful? You
have to feel it in the body to notice it generally…I notice it in my
chest. when I imagine my sister as a child I feel a freedom in my chest
and a releasing in my body–like a feeling space and freedom in my body.
Now…I don’t know if I am really feeling this “in my muscles”
in the usual sense of muscular feeling or sensation. Just check our the
chest area and see…is it in the muscles? or bone? It doesn’t feel to me
like it is a kinesthetic sense exactly. I may not understand kinesthetic
sense, but I think of muscles and movement as a sensation in the
kinesthetic sense. It seems to be felt in the body, but it doesn’t feel
like typical sensation on my skin, in my muscles. It feels like something
else. Do you notice this?
[From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.-545 MDT)]

Jason Gosnell (2005.06.23.
17:55 CST) –

Of course, but I don’t interpret it the same way. You can feel the
biochemical states of your body as well as the states of muscles, as when
you feel excited or otherwise geared up for action (or exhausted or
lethargic …). But that’s just the somatic component of what people call
an emotion – you’re ignoring the cognitive part that goes on in your
brain. When you imagine something such as a sister or a child, you’re
generating perceptions in your perceptual hierarchy, and you have
preferences, goals, intentions, regarding those perceptions. Perhaps
imagining absent persons reduces error signals, if the people are not
present and you wish they were, so you relax the myriad little efforts –
and conflicting efforts – that the wishing produces. You say that
feeling of relaxation “feels good.” There are many
possibilities, and only the Occupant knows which are true – and the
occupant, the observer, must use the brain to form thoughts about those
experiences. The conclusions could easily be mistaken. The observer knows
only what the brain constructs for it to know, and the brain often gets
wrong ideas about things.

Don’t forget that what you call your body is, according to PCT, a set of
perceptual signals in your brain. You can’t experience your physical body
directly any more than you can experience the external world directly.
You’re describing perceptions of your body that exist in your brain, and
thoughts about those perceptions, the thoughts also existing in your
brain. While you can’t be mistaken about having these experiences,
anything you think or say about them can be mistaken.

It feels like a kind of energy
or feeling or sense. But not the way most people talk about sensations.
Gendlin calls it a felt-sense and says it is felt in the body, but it is
more than our usual mere sensations–like someone pinching your arm or
feeling an itch to scratch. So, it is not in muscle or bone or
skin.

Yes. You can feel the effects of too much or too little adrenaline, of
too much or too little blood glucose, of diseases, of pain, of sexual
arousal, of breathing or suffocation, of digestion, or inner cold or
fever, and probably many things that have never been specifically
identified (the medical profession has not been overly interested in
phenomena of consciousness, the area where the Eastern philosophers did
their best observing – and their least-informed theorizing). I doubt
that you can identify what you’re actually detecting just by feeling
things, since most of us can only imagine what exists inside our skins,
and know nothing of biochemistry or physiology. To say it’s an
“energy” is only to say it makes you feel like doing something,
or gives you a thrill, or things like that – you (and I) have no idea
what is really causing those sensations. Guessing about the causes isn’t
much use, and is pointless anyway since we have better ways of finding
out than guessing and making up stories.

Another example, have you ever
felt a heaviness in the chest stressing about something. It is not
exactly a sensation in the sense of muscular or skin sensations–it feels
like a heaviness is the best one can do in that case. And it is felt
around the area of the chest.

Well, speak for yourself. I don’t experience that very much, though grief
has similar physical symptoms (as do quite a few other emotional states).
You can certainly experience those feelings, but I doubt that you can
know much about what is causing them without examining the whole
experience, which includes your perceptions, goals, and actions at higher
levels. That provides an explanation at several levels of analysis (if
explanations are what is on your mind just then), but of course not at
the physiological level. It takes a lot of equipment to discover the
physiological facts. They didn’t have that equipment, or the means of
using it, a thousand years ago, or six thousand. They had to guess.
Guessing doesn’t get you very far toward understanding Nature.

Best,

Bill P.

[Jason_Gosnell]

[From Jason Gosnell (2005.06.24. 1045CST)]

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.-545 MDT)]

Yes. You can feel the effects of too much or too little adrenaline, of too much or too little blood glucose, of diseases, of pain, of sexual arousal, of breathing or suffocation, of digestion, or inner cold or fever, and probably many things that have never been specifically identified (the medical profession has not been overly interested in phenomena of consciousness, the area where the Eastern philosophers did their best observing – and their least-informed theorizing). I doubt that you can identify what you’re actually detecting just by feeling things, since most of us can only imagine what exists inside our skins, and know nothing of biochemistry or physiology. To say it’s an “energy” is only to say it makes you feel like doing something, or gives you a thrill, or things like that – you (and I) have no idea what is really causing those sensations. Guessing about the causes isn’t much use, and is pointless anyway since we have better ways of finding out than guessing and making up stories.<<

Okay–all good points. I appreciate the feedback. I need to digest it all now, so I’m getting off this issue for the time being.

I did notice in the PCT book I have–The Meaning of Control (I think?)–in your talk about attention and the background of experience that I had a few ideas occur which may have been expressed elsewhere by PCTers…I don’t know. Is that background basically info running through consciousness actually coming from from other levels of control? And is that why it is important to attend to? First, I notice the disturbance as it is expressed, then I may begin to detect what appear to be “causes.” But, both of these could be called superficial detections–they are on the surface of awareness now…They are important, but not the whole ball game. The active parts of the control system underneath these experiences so to speak can be detected in the background. Say, for example, a background monologue which when focused on may reveal some of my “underlying beliefs” (some previously organized perceptions?) about this experience.

If this is so, then one could make a case for stopping, accepting in the sense of “openness to experience”, and allowing some composure with these experiences–the experiences at the level of expression and the detection of what appear to be causes (usually a superficial level of blaming goes on here when we point out causes if you ask me). All of this in the service of allowing the background of awareness to be “noticed.” It’s kind of like one’s peripheral vision–if your peripheral vision is highly active–i.e., it is open and receptive–then one can respond to events in that visual field. But, if the peripheral vision is somewhat shut down, and I think this can happen when we get hyper-focused on one thing–the information from the larger visual field cannot be seen. Even if it is not in central vision, we can respond to these peripheral experiences…and then if needed focus on what was a peripheral experience with a centralized vision…just shift to attending to it primarily and allow the background again to be open.

Perhaps all of awareness has this same type of central and peripheral features…well, it would have to because the awareness is just sensory right? If all of this is so, then there may be a case for relaxing central focus enough to allow the periphery to be there to pick up info–other perceptions/experience–and then focus on it directly as needed–so to speak. As you say in the book, people throughout history have apparently noticed this kind of phenomenon and called it different things: Meditation being one name. I’m interested in this because one step in formal sitting meditation–whether you are focusing on a question or a sensation like the breath–is to have a relaxed or open focus–at least open enough, for other information to arise in awareness and be seen, even if it is seen as background.

Regards…Jason Gosnell

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Powers [mailto:powers_w@FRONTIER.NET]
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2005 8:26 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Zen and the Art of PCT

Okay, think of something that gives you a feeling of peace or joy or happiness. Like a daughter or something like that. Now, how do you know you are joyful or peaceful? You have to feel it in the body to notice it generally...I notice it in my chest. when I imagine my sister as a child I feel a freedom in my chest and a releasing in my body--like a feeling space and freedom in my body. Now...I don't know if I am really feeling this "in my muscles" in the usual sense of muscular feeling or sensation. Just check our the chest area and see...is it in the muscles? or bone? It doesn't feel to me like it is a kinesthetic sense exactly. I may not understand kinesthetic sense, but I think of muscles and movement as a sensation in the kinesthetic sense. It seems to be felt in the body, but it doesn't feel like typical sensation on my skin, in my muscles. It feels like something else. Do you notice this?

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.-545 MDT)]

Jason Gosnell (2005.06.23. 17:55 CST) –

Of course, but I don’t interpret it the same way. You can feel the biochemical states of your body as well as the states of muscles, as when you feel excited or otherwise geared up for action (or exhausted or lethargic …). But that’s just the somatic component of what people call an emotion – you’re ignoring the cognitive part that goes on in your brain. When you imagine something such as a sister or a child, you’re generating perceptions in your perceptual hierarchy, and you have preferences, goals, intentions, regarding those perceptions. Perhaps imagining absent persons reduces error signals, if the people are not present and you wish they were, so you relax the myriad little efforts – and conflicting efforts – that the wishing produces. You say that feeling of relaxation “feels good.” There are many possibilities, and only the Occupant knows which are true – and the occupant, the observer, must use the brain to form thoughts about those experiences. The conclusions could easily be mistaken. The observer knows only what the brain constructs for it to know, and the brain often gets wrong ideas about things.

Don’t forget that what you call your body is, according to PCT, a set of perceptual signals in your brain. You can’t experience your physical body directly any more than you can experience the external world directly. You’re describing perceptions of your body that exist in your brain, and thoughts about those perceptions, the thoughts also existing in your brain. While you can’t be mistaken about having these experiences, anything you think or say about them can be mistaken.

It feels like a kind of energy or feeling or sense. But not the way most people talk about sensations. Gendlin calls it a felt-sense and says it is felt in the body, but it is more than our usual mere sensations--like someone pinching your arm or feeling an itch to scratch. So, it is not in muscle or bone or skin.

Yes. You can feel the effects of too much or too little adrenaline, of too much or too little blood glucose, of diseases, of pain, of sexual arousal, of breathing or suffocation, of digestion, or inner cold or fever, and probably many things that have never been specifically identified (the medical profession has not been overly interested in phenomena of consciousness, the area where the Eastern philosophers did their best observing – and their least-informed theorizing). I doubt that you can identify what you’re actually detecting just by feeling things, since most of us can only imagine what exists inside our skins, and know nothing of biochemistry or physiology. To say it’s an “energy” is only to say it makes you feel like doing something, or gives you a thrill, or things like that – you (and I) have no idea what is really causing those sensations. Guessing about the causes isn’t much use, and is pointless anyway since we have better ways of finding out than guessing and making up stories.

Another example, have you ever felt a heaviness in the chest stressing about something. It is not exactly a sensation in the sense of muscular or skin sensations--it feels like a heaviness is the best one can do in that case. And it is felt around the area of the chest.

Well, speak for yourself. I don’t experience that very much, though grief has similar physical symptoms (as do quite a few other emotional states). You can certainly experience those feelings, but I doubt that you can know much about what is causing them without examining the whole experience, which includes your perceptions, goals, and actions at higher levels. That provides an explanation at several levels of analysis (if explanations are what is on your mind just then), but of course not at the physiological level. It takes a lot of equipment to discover the physiological facts. They didn’t have that equipment, or the means of using it, a thousand years ago, or six thousand. They had to guess. Guessing doesn’t get you very far toward understanding Nature.

Best,

Bill P.
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[Bill_Powers1]

Is that background
basically info running through consciousness actually coming from from
other levels of control? And is that why it is important to attend
to?
[From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.1436 MDT)]
Jason Gosnell (2005.06.24.
1045CST)–
There are several assumptions here, which are basically propositions that
seem to fit experience though its hard to think of any way to prove them
true or false.
The first is that reorganization follows the focus of conscious
attention. This doesn’t mean that consciousness by itself causes
reorganization or is responsible for directing it or carrying it out; it
just means that consciousness seems to select, by focusing on one part of
the whole system, a target for reorganization if there is intrinsic error
that is arousing the reorganizing processes. If there is no intrinsic
error, no reorganization occurs in any case (but maybe there is some
minimum rate of reorganization).
The reason for this proposal is that we need some way to help
reorganization affect parts of the brain associated with problems that
need fixing and leave alone other parts that are working well. Having
reorganization follow awareness is one way to accomplish this necessary
end, and it seems to fit experience in general. While there is some
evidence for slight tendencies toward unconscious learning, in the vast
majority of cases conscious attention is the sine qua non of
learning, remembering, problem-solving, conflict resolution, and so forth
– everything having to do with changes in one’s internal
organization.

The second major premise concerns the way levels of organization are
involved in the MOL. Just as an exercise or meditation process, the MOL
is a simple and interesting way for one person to guide another’s
awareness to higher levels in the existing hierarchy (or less easily, for
one person alone to explore higher levels). That’s all it was when my
late friend Kirk and I first came across the idea. When the process goes
to its natural end point, the result is a state of mind that is quite
serene and calm, and nice to experience. However, in most sessions of the
MOL this process gets hung up in conflicts or other problems, where the
background thoughts that come up are contradictory to each other, or
where some form of conflict appears. This effectively prevents going much
higher until the problem is resolved.

I’m pretty sure that this process of going up levels does not, by itself,
create anything that isn’t already there. But it results in being aware
from viewpoints that are not often visited, viewpoints developed earlier
in life and that explain why lower levels are doing what they are doing,
but which are seldom in consciousness. We normally operate from the
viewpoint of systems in middle levels of the hierarchy, neither very
detailed nor at the most general levels possible. People on CSGnet, for
example, seem to spend a lot of time using their verbal systems (how else
would they communicate?) – the levels I call “program level”
or in that vicinity. If you asked anyone composing a post to this net
what the ultimate reason for writing it is, most likely that person would
have to stop and examine the internal world for a while before coming up
with even a preliminary answer. Yet there is surely a higher-order reason
that accounts for what the person is doing, and probably several layers
of reasons. The “reasons” are whole levels of control systems,
with goals to be satisfied and means of action that entail adjusting
reference signals in lower systems. They operate, however, unconsciously
most of the time, until something calls attention to them, such as an MOL
practitioner.

Sorry for the long answer but this calls for some detail. Now what
happens when you run into a conflict while doing the up-a-level stuff?
You come across something you want to do, be, have, accomplish … but
are not doing, being, etc. Normally if you want to do something, you mean
that there is a reference signal for perceiving some outcome, and you are
in process of making it happen or keeping it happening. But sometimes
that is not the result. So what is keeping this control system from
working? One answer is, a second reference condition contrary to the
first one that is, in effect, cancelling the first reference
signal.

So we have a conflict. But you can go on paying attention to wanting to
do and also not to do something as long as you like, and reorganizing
away like crazy, without doing any more than stirring the boiling pot.
That’s because however you alter the characteristics of the control
systems at the level where the conflict is expressed, there are still two
contradictory reference signals demanding two mutually contradictory
states of the experienced world at the same time. The only way to
eliminate the conflict is to change one or both of those reference
signals.

And the only way you can do that is to reorganize at the level that is
generating those reference signals. That’s why you have to turn the focus
of attention to a higher level (presumably, bringing reorganization to
bear at that level). The lower system that is receiving contradictory
orders is not the one that needs to be changed even though that’s the one
where the problem seems to be.

It often happens that the conflict originates more than one level above
the level where it’s expressed or observed. In that case you just have to
keep going until you get to the level where a change can alter the
conflict.

First, I notice the
disturbance as it is expressed, then I may begin to detect what appear to
be “causes.” But, both of these could be called superficial
detections–they are on the surface of awareness now…They are
important, but not the whole ball game. The active parts of the control
system underneath these experiences so to speak can be detected in the
background. Say, for example, a background monologue which when focused
on may reveal some of my “underlying beliefs” (some previously
organized perceptions?) about this experience.

Yes, that is the basic idea expressed in somewhat different words. What
you refer to as “underlying beliefs” I would call
“higher-order perceptions and reference signals,” since in PCT
the directions are reversed from the way psychologists have talked about
levels. “Deeper” in Freud’s scheme is “higher” in
mine.

The main thing about the background systems is that they are setting the
reference signals for the foreground systems. That’s how they have their
effects. They are defining the “right” states for the
foreground perceptions, the states we experience as “no error.”
When our attention is on the foreground, we are not aware that there is
any explanation for “right” and “wrong” states of our
perceptions; they are simply right or wrong. Why does it seem wrong to be
driving toward New Jersey? Aha, because (I have just realized) we decided
to have this year’s CSG meeting in Toronto, only I forgot that. But only
the conscious levels forgot it: the higher levels are still saying
“Toronto, Toronto, Toronto.” That’s where the uneasy sense of
something wrong came from. Not from below; from above. Toronto,
stupid.

In that case, there is probably still some unfinished business having to
do with New Jersey, so there’s a bit of a conflict, which will probably
resolve right away when I see the problem.

I always wondered why the primitive Id had so much power over the
sophisticated and socially brainwashed Superego, with the poor Ego being
pulled this way and that between them. But it doesn’t work out that way
in PCT. The Id is associated with what I call intrinsic reference
signals, goals we simply inherit as prerequisites for living. The Id ,
then, would go with the reorganizing system, which can alter the
hierarchy to keep the life support systems, and other systems, working
(and reproducing). The Superego would be the higher-order systems that
determine the goals that the Ego, the conscious self, sees as the
“right” states of its experiences. The Ego, as they say,
“knows the difference between right and wrong.” The only thing
it doesn’t know is why some things are right and others are wrong. That’s
determined by higher-level systems, many drilled into the brain in
childhood.

Notice how subtly the Masters of the Internet have appealed to the
ancient primitive needs of those who log into web sites: the first thing
they ask for is the user’s ID.

Once a person has revisited higher levels a few times, I think awareness
becomes expanded to be more in contact with the higher systems, though
only monks and the like decide to live all day every day at the highest
level they can find. But that’s a personal matter – I’m just admitting
that continual enlightenment is not my cup of tea.

Perhaps all of awareness has
this same type of central and peripheral features…well, it would have
to because the awareness is just sensory right? If all of this is so,
then there may be a case for relaxing central focus enough to allow the
periphery to be there to pick up info–other perceptions/experience–and
then focus on it directly as needed–so to speak. As you say in the book,
people throughout history have apparently noticed this kind of phenomenon
and called it different things: Meditation being one name. I’m interested
in this because one step in formal sitting meditation–whether you are
focusing on a question or a sensation like the breath–is to have a
relaxed or open focus–at least open enough, for other information to
arise in awareness and be seen, even if it is seen as
background.

I think awareness is just one thing. All the rest is the hierarchy of
control systems. It’s not that awareness itself is sensory; it’s that the
objects of awareness are sensory, or more generally, perceptual. We are
aware of signals in our brains, and I think almost exclusively of
perceptual signals (not output signals, ever). The levels are created by
the organization of the brain, not the organization of awareness. When we
are aware, we are aware as if from the point of view of some set of
neural systems at some level in the hierarchy: the conscious world
appears to have the characteristics that those levels are organized to
perceive and control. If you shift awareness to another part of the
system, it doesn’t seem that you change; instead, it’s the world that
shows new characteristics while the former ones fade out of view. That’s
how I have worked it out, anyway. You can listen to music for the sense
of uplift you get, or you can listen to see if the lead trumpet is
playing sharp. Same awareness, different levels of perception.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.24.1856)]

In a message dated 6/24/2005 6:05:29 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, powers_w@FRONTIER.NET writes:

Is that background basically info running through consciousness *    actually coming from from other levels of control*    ? And is that why it is important to attend to?

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.1436 MDT)]

Jason Gosnell (2005.06.24. 1045CST)–

There are several assumptions here, which are basically propositions that seem to fit experience though its hard to think of any way to prove them true or false.
I’d like to know what you believe you can ‘prove’ to be ‘true’ or ‘false’ in any empirical science, with mathematics not considered to be an empirical science, and more importantly, how would you know it to be so?

Do you believe you can prove PCT to be the ‘truth’?

regards,

Marc

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30 EST)]

From Bill Powers (2005.06.24.1436 MDT)]

I appreciated your two last mails to Jason Gosnell.

Normally if you want to do something, you mean that there
is a reference signal for perceiving some outcome, and you
are in process of making it happen or keeping it happening.
But sometimes that is not the result. So what is keeping this
control system from working? One answer is, a second
reference condition contrary to the first one that is, in effect,
canceling the first reference signal.

May I exemplify your last sentence and analyze this example. We find it on
this list time an again.
The Neckar cube.
In one of your last mails (I didn't find it back) I think you said that if
you wished to see the cube toward the top/down, then you saw it toward the
top. If you wanted to see it toward the front/in you saw it toward the
front/in.
The "picture" on retina is the same, I guess you control the figure on the
configuration level and maybe the reference signal can be retraced to the
relationship level. If I not pronounce any wished angle of incidence it
happens my perception changes between the two I mentioned. A little
conflict.

This can be done with many figures (configurations) and I appreciated the
way Allan F Randall discussed the change between the two (or more) figures
we can be conscious. He explained it some different than what you do. But
that isn't the point.

The point is that we may change between two or more perception when we
control perceptions at higher levels in the same way. Here we must wait
longer time between the changes, maybe more than many days.
Is the Necker example and what we call a hallucination the same type of
change? What is wrong if we say that a schizophrenic person who is
hallucinating may control a perception where e.g. the two references comes
fro the System Concept level or from the Categorizing level?

bjorn

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.25.1242 MDT)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30 EST) –

May I exemplify your last
sentence and analyze this example. We find it on

this list time an again. The Neckar cube. In one of your last mails (I
didn’t find it back) I think you said that if you wished to see the cube
toward the top/down, then you saw it toward the top. If you wanted to see
it toward the front/in you saw it toward the front/in. The
“picture” on retina is the same, I guess you control the figure
on the configuration level and maybe the reference signal can be retraced
to the relationship level. If I not pronounce any wished angle of
incidence it happens my perception changes between the two I mentioned. A
little conflict.

In the Neckar Cube illusion, there is no depth information at all, so the
orientation that’s seen depends on imagining that information. If you
simply imagine that the distance to one corner is large, the whole
configuration changes (it seems) so everything looks right for that
assumption.
This is confusing because it seems that we are imagining the figure
itself, but remember that the depth we perceive is not at the same level
as the lines that makes up the cube. Normally the depth signals that go
with the various parts of the figure are computed from two
different configurations, one from each eye. So the depth signal
belongs to a higher level than the perceptions of the lines and corners.
We don’t have to imagine anything different at the level of sensations,
contrasts, colors, corners, and so on. We just have to add from
imagination that “sense of depth” that is added by binocular
vision. That’s just a signal, it doesn’t look like a line or a
corner.

That’s probably why it’s so hard to describe what you do to make the cube
seem to flip inside out. You’re simply making a signal appear in your
brain, not anything you can actually see in the picture. All you
experience is that one corner seems “close” to you, and in the
next moment, the opposite corner seems close instead.

Is the Necker example and what
we call a hallucination the same type of

change? What is wrong if we say that a schizophrenic person who is

hallucinating may control a perception where e.g. the two references
comes

from the System Concept level or from the Categorizing
level?

That leaves a lot of levels between the hallucination (at the sensation
level) and the reference signals. I think hallucinations are simply
imagined perceptions at a low level, so it seem that actual sensations
and intensities are present. Normally we imagine at higher levels, so we
don’t experience the imagined perceptions as “real.” You
imagine “a dog barking” as a set of categories, but you don’t
experience a dog suddenly barking into your ear and startling you, as a
hallucination would do.

If you imagined the Necker Cube in full color, with shadows, shading, and
some lines passing in front of others, you would be hallucinating. When
you only imagine the missing depth information, it’s called an
illusion.

Best,

Bill P.

···

bjorn

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.06.25.1215)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30 EST)

Bill Powers (2005.06.24.1436 MDT)

Normally if you want to do something, you mean that there
is a reference signal for perceiving some outcome, and you
are in process of making it happen or keeping it happening.
But sometimes that is not the result. So what is keeping this
control system from working? One answer is, a second
reference condition contrary to the first one that is, in effect,
canceling the first reference signal.

May I exemplify your last sentence and analyze this example. We find it on
this list time an again. The Neckar cube...

The "picture" on retina is the same, I guess you control the figure on the
configuration level and maybe the reference signal can be retraced to the
relationship level. If I not pronounce any wished angle of incidence it
happens my perception changes between the two I mentioned. A little
conflict.

There is no conflict involved in the Neckar cube that I can see. What Bill was talking about, I believe, was a conflict where an intended state of a perceptual variable (an outcome, such as smoking) is not produced because another systems wants a different, incompatible state of that same perceptual variable (a different outcome, such as not smoking). The conflict results from the fact that two control systems have different references for the state of the same perceptual variable (smoking), so neither state is consistently achieved.

I don't believe this kind of conflict is involved in the Necker cube. After all, you can produce either perception at will, something you can't do when there is a conflict. In the Neckar cube you have two possible perceptions that can result from the same physical situation (as you note). The difficulty of getting one perception rather than another seems to lie on the input side. Perhaps the (moderate) difficulty we have in switching between the different perceptions results from the fact that these perceptions are computed by the same input functions whose parameters must somehow be changed (how/) to produce perceptual signals that represent mutually exclusive perceptions.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bozo_the_Clown]

In a message dated 6/25/2005 3:17:02 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

[From Rick Marken (2005.06.25.1215)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30 EST)

Bill Powers (2005.06.24.1436 MDT)

Normally if you want to do something, you mean that there
is a reference signal for perceiving some outcome, and you
are in process of making it happen or keeping it happening.
But sometimes that is not the result. So what is keeping this
control system from working? One answer is, a second
reference condition contrary to the first one that is, in effect,
canceling the first reference signal.
How or why would one ‘reference’ condition ‘cancel’ another one out? What type of process might be involved? How is a ‘decision’ like this made?

Don’t worry yourself Bill, I don’t expect an answer from you. These are questions I am asking myself. Others on the list might have similar ones.

May I exemplify your last sentence and analyze this example. We find
it on
this list time an again. The Neckar cube…

The “picture” on retina is the same, I guess you control the figure on
the
configuration level and maybe the reference signal can be retraced to
the
relationship level. If I not pronounce any wished angle of incidence it
happens my perception changes between the two I mentioned. A little
conflict.
Bjorn, it is not what is on the retina that counts, not completely anyway. What we ‘perceive’ is a combination of sensory inputs from many sources. The ‘five senses’ as we know them date back to Aristotle. Check out the New Scientist Feb 4, 2005 issue. The cover story; Why we have at least 21 senses.

A difference in what we actually see and what we think we see is a common occurrence. What we are supposed to see is more important than what might actually be out there.

Why is this so? I would say because that is the way we want to see it and because it minimizes ‘error’. Just my guess tossed into the ring.

There is no conflict involved in the Neckar cube that I can see. What
Bill was talking about, I believe, was a conflict where an intended
state of a perceptual variable (an outcome, such as smoking) is not
produced because another systems wants a different, incompatible state
of that same perceptual variable (a different outcome, such as not
smoking).

Rick, I’ll ask you the same questions as Bill with the same expectation of no answer.

How and why is this ‘decision’ made? Do we have little men inside of us having arguments (i.e. conflicts)? What is it dopamine at 20 paces?

The conflict results…

Huh? You just said there was no conflict. Are you using this word to mean something different here?

from the fact that two control systems
have different references for the state of the same perceptual variable
(smoking), so neither state is consistently achieved.

Could you explain this process using the hierarchy to give a clear example of what you are talking about?

How was this ‘decision’ made?

I don’t believe this kind of conflict is involved in the Necker cube.
After all, you can produce either perception at will,
Can you? I am currently looking at a book, and I want to see a cake instead, but I can’t seem to do it. I can visualize a cake, but I can’t make that book go away and replace it with a cake.

I envy your imagination.

something you
can’t do when there is a conflict. In the Neckar cube you have two
possible perceptions that can result from the same physical situation
(as you note). The difficulty of getting one perception rather than
another seems to lie on the input side. Perhaps the (moderate)
difficulty we have in switching between the different perceptions
results from the fact that these perceptions are computed by the same
input functions whose parameters must somehow be changed (how/) to
produce perceptual signals that represent mutually exclusive
perceptions.
Sounds wonderful, but again I ask you to explain it in terms of a PCT process.

This is a typical thread on CSGnet. Asking a question here is like going to the Oracle at Delphi. You ask a question and get a response from the ‘all knowing’ sage. In this case two PCT ‘sages’.

Instead of closing a conversation with half-baked answers, why not try and open it up for discussion and see where it gets you?

I guess if PCT doesn’t explain something it just isn’t worth talking about until it does. That is, until Powers comes up with a way of shoe-horning it into his ideas.

Give me a break.

regards,

Marc

“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne

“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.

“It’s not what people don’t know that is the problem. It’s what people know that ain’t so, that creates all the fuss.”
Will Rogers

[Jason_Gosnell]

[Jason Gosnell (2006.06.26 22.22 CDT)]

Bill: Thank you. I will be chewing on this for awhile. I have pasted here the 6 steps of Focusing by Eugene Gendlin. He found out about these by listening to therapy tapes and he discovered that the people who “got better” in therapy were all doing the same thing. He says that they would go into a general felt-sense about things and start trying to describe the experiences they were having, often in the body. So, they would have sort of vague impressions about the feeling of a thing and begin to try to sort it out. This is not really complicated as it looks below. As an example, of a man afraid of losing his wife: “I was feeling…maybe lonley, like she was going to leave me…yes, that’s right, it feels like a an ache in my chest and my throat is tight. I am imagining what it would be like if she left…” and so on. He claims that the non-improvers did not do this one thing. What they did was one of two things…1. they stayed stuck in their story with a lot of excess verbiage, never getting with their felt-sense as he calls it, 2. They emoted a lot–constant crying or whatever and never got out of that emotive phase or if they did they shuttled between emoting and the story, but never in-between to sense in their body.

I am very interested in the process as compared to PCT and MOL. So I am going to compare notes and see what I can find out. This is more of the subjective side of MOL perhaps with PCT giving an explanation of this process. They put a lot of emphasis on going into the body which I am not sure is necessary other than to sense error directly as a starting point, i.e., to get in touch with error signals as bodily sensed. But, there may be more to that aspect than I can see now.

See below if you care to look at it…

Regards, Jason

What follows is a lightly edited excerpt from The Focusing Manual, chapter four of Focusing.

The inner act of focusing can be broken down into six main sub-acts or movements. As you gain more practice, you won’t need to think of these as six separate parts of the process. To think of them as separate movements makes the process seem more mechanical than it is - or will be, for you, later. I have subdivided the process in this way because I’ve learned from years of experimenting that this is one of the effective ways to teach focusing to people who have never tried it before.

Think of this as only the basics. As you progress and learn more about focusing you will add to these basic instructions, clarify them, approach them from other angles. Eventually - perhaps not the first time you go through it - you will have the experience of something shifting inside.

So here are the focusing instructions in brief form, manual style. If you want to try them out, do so easily, gently. If you find difficulty in one step or another, don’t push too hard, just move on to the next one. You can always come back.

Clearing a space

What I will ask you to do will be silent, just to yourself. Take a moment just to relax . . . All right - now, inside you, I would like you to pay attention inwardly, in your body, perhaps in your stomach or chest. Now see what comes there when you ask, “How is my life going? What is the main thing for me right now?” Sense within your body. Let the answers come slowly from this sensing. When some concern comes, DO NOT GO INSIDE IT. Stand back, say “Yes, that’s there. I can feel that, there.” Let there be a little space between you and that. Then ask what else you feel. Wait again, and sense. Usually there are several things.

Felt Sense

From among what came, select one personal problem to focus on. DO NOT GO INSIDE IT. Stand back from it. Of course, there are many parts to that one thing you are thinking about - too many to think of each one alone. But you can feel all of these things together. Pay attention there where you usually feel things, and in there you can get a sense of what all of the problem feels like. Let yourself feel the unclear sense of all of that.

Handle

What is the quality of this unclear felt sense? Let a word, a phrase, or an image come up from the felt sense itself. It might be a quality-word, like tight, sticky, scary, stuck, heavy, jumpy or a phrase, or an image. Stay with the quality of the felt sense till something fits it just right.

Resonating

Go back and forth between the felt sense and the word (phrase, or image). Check how they resonate with each other. See if there is a little bodily signal that lets you know there is a fit. To do it, you have to have the felt sense there again, as well as the word. Let the felt sense change, if it does, and also the word or picture, until they feel just right in capturing the quality of the felt sense.

Asking

Now ask: what is it, about this whole problem, that makes this quality (which you have just named or pictured)? Make sure the quality is sensed again, freshly, vividly (not just remembered from before). When it is here again, tap it, touch it, be with it, asking, “What makes the whole problem so ______?” Or you ask, “What is in this sense?”

If you get a quick answer without a shift in the felt sense, just let that kind of answer go by. Return your attention to your body and freshly find the felt sense again. Then ask it again.

Be with the felt sense till something comes along with a shift, a slight “give” or release.

Receiving

Receive whatever comes with a shift in a friendly way. Stay with it a while, even if it is only a slight release. Whatever comes, this is only one shift; there will be others. You will probably continue after a little while, but stay here for a few moments.

IF DURING THESE INSTRUCTIONS SOMEWHERE YOU HAVE SPENT A LITTLE WHILE SENSING AND TOUCHING AN UNCLEAR HOLISTIC BODY SENSE OF THIS PROBLEM, THEN YOU HAVE FOCUSED. It doesn’t matter whether the body-shift came or not. It comes on its own. We don’t control that.

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[Bill_Powers1]

have pasted here the 6
steps of Focusing by Eugene Gendlin. He found out about these by
listening to therapy tapes and he discovered that the people who
“got better” in therapy were all doing the same thing. He says
that they would go into a general felt-sense about things and start
trying to describe the experiences they were having, often in the
body.
[From Bill Powers (2005.06.27.0902 MDT)]

Jason Gosnell (2006.06.26 22.22
CDT)–

Interesting that Gene Gendlin’s name should come up. He was at Carl
Rogers’ Counselling Center at the University of Chicago when my wife Mary
was an intern there, and she knew him and his wife. I met him but didn’t
get to know him. I volunteered to take part in a limited-time therapy
experiment in which I think he was involved, but I don’t remember. I was
“Mr. Oak” in the report, some time in the late 1950s. It was a
good experience, and probably influenced my ideas about therapy.

I am very interested in the
process as compared to PCT and MOL. So I am going to compare notes and
see what I can find out. This is more of the subjective side of MOL
perhaps with PCT giving an explanation of this process. They put a lot of
emphasis on going into the body which I am not sure is necessary other
than to sense error directly as a starting point, i.e., to get in touch
with error signals as bodily sensed. But, there may be more to that
aspect than I can see now.

I agree that it may not be necessary to start by being in touch with body
sensations, but on the other hand that’s all part of expanding the scope
of awareness, isn’t it? I assume that’s a good thing. Also, just reading
through the steps, it seems likely that a person in the Focusing process
would become aware of background thoughts and explore them, though
there’s no particular encouragement of that in Gendlin’s method, that I
can see. In fact, the instructions seem to be aimed more down than
up.
One of the main points in common with MOL is the emphasis on simplicity
and on simply going through a process. This is quite in line with the
Rogerian non-directive therapy method in which all the work is done by
the client. Rather than the therapist acting like a doctor trying to
diagnose the problem and fix it, in our approaches the therapist is
simply trying to facilitate the natural processes of reorganization in
the client. MOL is probably not quite as non-directive as pure Rogerian
client-centered therapy; I’d place it between the Focus approach and the
client-centered approach in terms of directiveness.
Richard Robertson was at the Counselling Center at the same time and I’m
sure could tell us more about Gene Gendlin. How about it, Dick?
One thing that’s definitely similar between Focusing and MOL is Gendlin’s
idea of not “going inside” whatever the client is observing,
but maintaining an objective or external viewpoint. But Gendlin seems not
to have noticed that when a person is refraining from identifying with
the problem, he or she is still looking from some viewpoint at the
problem, and that viewpoint (what I call the background thought,
attitude, or feeling) is, in my opinion, the most important thing to
explore next. Gendlin seems to want to direct attention to the
problem as if from an external point of view, and I suppose there is
encouragement to say what one thinks about it, but do you agree that
there doesn’t seem to be any emphasis on examining the new viewpoint
itself?
Actually Gendlin seems to be recommending a point of view to the
client – “receiving” the experience in a friendly accepting
away. That seems limiting; what if the person’s actual higher-level
perceptions have to do with hate, or fear, or grief? Rather than
recommending a higher viewpoint, I much prefer simply trying to bring out
whatever background thoughts and attitudes are actually there, friendly
or not. In fact, both Tim Carey and I have found out that one must be
careful about trying to guess what’s in the background – pushing for any
particular thought or attitude can bog down the process. The whole point
is to find out what is already there.

Thanks for sending the quotes. Maybe we should be in touch with Gendlin
– what do you think, Dick R? Would he be interested? I rather doubt it,
since he’s deep into developing his own methods. But what the
heck.

Best,

Bill P.

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen(2005.06.27,20:15 EST)]

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.25.1242 MDT)]
This mail is in HTML format.

**>In the Neckar Cube illusion, there is no depth information at all,

so the orientation that’s seen depends on imagining that information.
If you simply imagine that the distance to one corner is large, the
whole configuration changes (it seems) so everything looks right
for that assumption.
You have used the concept illusion before, but I think that concept has the effect of confusing when we have our basis in PCT. I will try to express what I mean and what I have done and I appreciate your comments. I should have had some help from Wolfgang Zocker here?.
If you by depth information think upon the different angle left eye/object/right eye when you 1.) look at the left corner/top-front or you look at 2.)the left corner/top-behind, we know the angle becomes smaller the farther away the point we focus in 3D nature. We say that when both eyes focus on a point, we have to revolve each eye. The angle left-eye/object/right-eye becomes smaller the further away the point is in 3 D nature. We perceive
the way each eye revolve as a depth information.**

Pardon me for using Norwegian concepts.

I have studied the same angles when I look upon the 2 D Necker cube.

Here is a figure and some corners/angles (top side).

The figure shows my left Eye, EL and my right eye, ER. The paper is 40 cm in front of me and the corner top/left/behind, corner D is 1 cm to the right from corner A. The corner B is 2,5 cm to the right of corner A because the side in the cube is 2.5 cm. The line ADB is the paper and the angels

EL-A-ER= 11.3099325. The angel EL-D-ER = 11.3583417. And the angel EL-B-ER = 11.4054109

The interesting thing here is that the angel between the eyes and the point D, which is “farther away”, is greater than the angle between the eyes and point A.

When I see the cube wit the side AB nearest me, This doesn’t harmonize.

And when I see the cube with the side DC nearest me it doesn’t harmonize that the angel EL-B-ER is greater than the angle EL-D-ER.

Then I made a cube of transparent plastic and hold it in my hand. It was no problem to wish to see the cube with corner A near me and see it. It was neither a problem to wish to see the cube with corner D near me and see it (even if I knew the corner D is further away).

Then I draw a “Necker” cube where I can see all but three edges (below).

This time I can’t change between different cubes, but I can change between a cube and a part of a room if I see it from the ceiling.

**I think Mary and Bill have given us a PCT basis: from Mary Powers 2004.06.02 and [From Bill Powers (2004.05.31.1316 MDT)] to study Neckers cube.

According to the best models of sensory perception available, that means we
do not know directly the connection of perceptions to anything outside the
nervous system. That does not, of course, prevent us from constructing
models of what lies outside the nervous system.
But these constructions are our own"thinking". When you say “there is no information at all” this is your model. This is your thinking after and at the same time you perceive the perceptual signals. An I think Allan F. Randall’s essay about quantum phenomenology is interesting when he talk about a shift in consciousness and not a shift in perception.**

http://home.ican.net/~arandall/Phenomenology/

I think as you that the orientation that’s seen depends on imaging (remembering) that information. I agree that you simply imagine (remember) that the distance to one corner is large and the whole configuration changes. That was also my in my “From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30 EST)”.

I am not found of the word illusion, because I think too much would be an illusion and we will never learn to know what the real world really is… If it is correct to say that the cube is an illusion, I think we must have correct information about the world out there and perceive it in a different way. We don’t have any reference from the world out there, we just have our perception and then we can’t say that our perception is different from something we don’t know. Mary and you did say it quite clear “We can construct models (this is our thinking (my words)) of what lies outside the nervous system”.

It isn’t enough to make a cube in transparent plastic hold it with your left hand and touch the corner up/left/behind with your right hand then touch the corner up/left/front, perceiving the world out there with other senses. I can still imagine/(remember)/wish to see the behind corner in front and see it. The way I think upon the Necker cube is as follows.

This is why I think we change between the two (or more) cubes.

I look at the Necker cube.

I don’t know anything about the figure on the paper.

There come light waves from the paper to my retina. These light-waves hit my retina different places.

In the Input functions the energy from the light waves are transformed to electrochemical perceptual signals. I can describe these perceptual signals with its frequency.

Some of these perceptual signals goes to a comparator where it meet a reference signal with a value lower than the reference signal and nothing happens. Some of these perceptual signals goes to a comparator where it meet a reference signal with a value a bit greater than the reference signal. Let me analyze this.

Copies of perceptual signals go to level two, three and higher. From a higher level than the configuration level, maybe the relationship level, there comes output signals/reference values to the third level where I control configurations. Both reference signals, my wish to se the corner A in front or the wish to see the corner D in front.

If my consciousness could let me perceive the two figures, everything would be just disorder.

But my consciousness helps me I can just perceive one figure at the time. Very often I perceive the figure I wish to perceive. But it happens I perceive one figure and then another figure without wishing anything special. The two percept just changes.

The last sentence above was the reason for me to compare the Knickers cube and hallucinations.

bjorn

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.27,20:40 EST)]

From Rick Marken (2005.06.25.1215)
There is no conflict involved in the Neckar cube that I can see. What
Bill was talking about, I believe, was a conflict where an intended
state of a perceptual variable (an outcome, such as smoking) is not
produced because another systems wants a different, incompatible state
of that same perceptual variable (a different outcome, such as not
smoking). The conflict results from the fact that two control systems
have different references for the state of the same perceptual variable
(smoking), so neither state is consistently achieved.

If we actually not smoke at the moment, but we wish to smoke, we are in
imagination state. If we at the same time have another different wish, not
to smoke, then there must be a conflict. There are two references, "wish
to" and "not wish to", and one perception. The perception of not smoking
behavior.

If we lighten a cigarette, there is still a conflict. We have the two
references and the perception of smoking behavior.

I still think there is a conflict.

I don't believe this kind of conflict is involved in the Necker cube.
After all, you can produce either perception at will, something you
can't do when there is a conflict.

If you are a smoker and wish to be a non smoker, I guess you have a conflict
always. I think it happens that a smoker says "no thank you" when he is
offered a cigarette. He has a conflict, but he produces a certain perception
at will (what ever Will is).
It happens that a smoker says "Yes thank you" when he is offered a
cigarette. He has a conflict, but he produces another certain perception at
will.

I can't see the difference between smoking and Neckers cube.

In the Neckar cube you have two possible perceptions that
can result from the same physical situation
(as you note). The difficulty of getting one perception rather than
another seems to lie on the input side.

I thought that was what happened in a conflict. You have two references
"inside you" and the same physical situation.

Perhaps the (moderate) difficulty we have in switching between the
different perceptions results from the fact that these perceptions
are computed by the same input functions whose parameters must
somehow be changed (how/) to produce perceptual signals that
represent mutually exclusive perceptions.

If you say that the loop that controls I wish to see corner A in front and
the loop that controls I wish to see corner D in front are computed by the
same input functions, I think you are wrong.

I think the switching has something to do with small errors because the
perception signals are less than but not so much greater than the reference
signal.
bjorn

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.27.1636)]

In a message dated 6/27/2005 2:46:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, bsimonsen@C2I.NET writes:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.27,20:40 EST)]

I still think there is a conflict.

Between whom or what? What exactly is a ‘reference level’ ? If you have two thoughts, you have two perceptions. I say the one that reduces error the most ‘wins’.

I don’t believe this kind of conflict is involved in the Necker cube.
After all, you can produce either perception at will, something you
can’t do when there is a conflict.

If you are a smoker and wish to be a non smoker, I guess you have a conflict
always.

I don’t think so. If smoking was actually ‘causing’ you that much ‘error’, you would quit. The fact of the matter is that smoking is providing more good than harm, or at least that is what you are perceiving. Are your perceptions ‘accurate’? Your belief system thinks so.

If you say that the loop that controls I wish to see corner A in front and
the loop that controls I wish to see corner D in front are computed by the
same input functions, I think you are wrong.

I think the switching has something to do with small errors because the
perception signals are less than but not so much greater than the reference
signal.

How does this ‘switching’ occur? How would an ‘error’ determine who or what gets ‘switched’?

regards,

Marc

“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne

“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.

“It’s not what people don’t know that is the problem. It’s what people know that ain’t so, that creates all the fuss.”
Will Rogers

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.28, 10:10 EST)]

From Marc Abrams (2005.06.27.1636)
Between whom or what? What exactly is a 'reference level' ? If
you have two thoughts, you have two perceptions. I say the one
that reduces error the most 'wins'.

The brain is organized in the way it is organized. Some places nerve
areas/places receive signals from two different areas that we know control
different perceptions. In PCT these areas/neurons are called the Comparator.
You know about the inferior olive. I think it was you who distributed an
elucidation about "Olivio-cerebellar cluster-based universal control system"
by Kazantsev, Nekorkin, Makarenko and Llinas.
If you look at the Discussion section you find that the Olivio-cerebellar
system represents a high level controller for movement execution. To me this
is what PCT call a reference, a reference for second order level. At this
level we know perceptual signals come from Nucleus Dorsalis and other
places. In this way the central nuclei of cerebellum becomes a meeting place
for reference signals and perceptual signals. This is what PCT calls a
comparator. This is not new to you, I am sure.

If you are a smoker and wish to be a non smoker, I guess you have a

conflict

always.

I don't think so. If smoking was actually 'causing' you that much 'error',
you would quit. The fact of the matter is that smoking is providing more
good than harm, or at least that is what you are perceiving. Are your
perceptions 'accurate'? Your belief system thinks so.

Yes, some people quit and some people really feel the conflict and still
other people just feel the conflict now and then. One reference is usual
stronger than the other, and very often I think our consciousness helps us
to not be conscious of one of the perceptions.
Yes I agree that smoking often may provide more good than harm. It depends
who you are and the real world around you.

I think the switching has something to do with small errors because the
perception signals are less than but not so much greater than the

reference

signal.

How does this 'switching' occur? How would an 'error' determine who
or what gets 'switched'?

I am not able to tell you that in a short statement. But the Brain is a
dynamical system. The different output signals are dependent on reference
signals in the brain (the state of the brain), feedback signals and
perceptual signals representing different variables from the extern world.
Changes in this dynamical system may result in changes of different
perceptions, which we are aware. This changes may be called "switching".

a mail from you 2005.06.27

Bjorn, it is not what is on the retina that counts, not completely
anyway. What we 'perceive' is a combination of sensory inputs
from _many_ sources. The 'five senses' as we know them date
back to Aristotle. Check out the _New Scientist_ Feb 4, 2005
issue. The cover story; _Why we have at least 21 senses_.

I agree.

A difference in what we actually see and what we _think_ we see is
a common occurrence. What we are _supposed_ to see is more
important than what might actually be out there.

I think we perceive our perceptions. The difference you talk about helps us
to change our perceptions to the one you think is most important, what we
are supposed to see, our references. I prefer to replace your word
_supposed_ to the word wish.

Why is this so? I would say because that is the way we _want_ to
see it and because it minimizes 'error'. Just my guess tossed into the

ring.

That is the way also I think.

bjorn

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.28.0714)]

In a message dated 6/28/2005 4:06:07 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, bsimonsen@C2I.NET writes:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.28, 10:10 EST)]

From Marc Abrams (2005.06.27.1636)
Between whom or what? What exactly is a ‘reference level’ ? If
you have two thoughts, you have two perceptions. I say the one
that reduces error the most ‘wins’.

The brain is organized in the way it is organized.

Ok.

Some places nerve areas/places receive signals from two different areas that we know >control different perceptions.

How do you know this? You and I can’t even agree on exactly what a ‘perception’ is let alone understand how it gets from one place to another, or why.

In PCT these areas/neurons are called the Comparator.

That’s what they might be called in PCT. The bigger question is do they exist in the empirical world. I don’t think we have ‘decision’ neurons, sorry. Maybe you have a cite or two for your beliefs? Care to share them?

You know about the inferior olive. I think it was you who distributed an
elucidation about “Olivio-cerebellar cluster-based universal control system”
by Kazantsev, Nekorkin, Makarenko and Llinas.

Yes Bjorn, but that paper and your leap to comparator neurons is quite a gap. Llinas and company were not talking about a PCT type of control process.

If you look at the Discussion section you find that the Olivio-cerebellar
system represents a high level controller for movement execution.

Sorry, I do not believe in ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ levels. I think there are interactions and influences that we don’t fully understand and, to say that one ‘level’ dominates, or totally depends on its existence with another level I think is way premature.

‘Feedback’ destroy’s any hierarchy. A hierarchy is strictly a one-way affair.

Do you have some further or later information that can confirm or even suggest that what you are saying is so?

I am not opposed to your ideas Bjorn, I just don’t think at this point in time I feel confident enough in what we know to say such things. Its obvious you do.

If so, how do you plan on going about showing others this is in fact the case?

To me this
is what PCT call a reference, a reference for second order level. At this
level we know perceptual signals come from Nucleus Dorsalis and other
places. In this way the central nuclei of cerebellum becomes a meeting place
for reference signals and perceptual signals. This is what PCT calls a
comparator. This is not new to you, I am sure.

No, not new. I just don’t subscribe to that line of thinking.

I tried saying this in a post the other day about the hierarchy.

If, after empirical research has validated the existence of some hierarchy, I will be more than happy to join the hierarchy team. But that has not yet happened, and I don’t think it ever will.

I think it far more likely that some type of influence network is involved.

I could certainly be wrong about this, but why stick myself in a corner with no options when I have so little to go on about the actual structure and organization involved?

I think far to much time is spent trying to shoehorn in a set of ideas, rather than trying to understand the dynamics and functionality of what is actually going on.

Who really cares about how many and what ‘type’ of ‘levels’ might be involved, if any, when we still can’t even define what a ‘control process’ looks like.

By this I mean, if you stop a control system, in our case an individual, in any point in time, in PCT terms exactly what is the ‘state’ of the system? Is it in our current perceptions?, Our current set of beliefs? Our actions? How could we determine the ‘state’ and for what purposes?

Our ‘beliefs’ are not currently part of the model, so using PCT to understand how control affects them is not doable. The same with our emotions.

Psychology is the study of the mind, not behavior. Behavior was just a vehicle Watson and company felt they could use to study the mind. It didn’t work out quite as well as they had hoped for, but it wasn’t a total waste. Not by a long shot, just incomplete

Yes, some people quit and some people really feel the conflict and still
other people just feel the conflict now and then. One reference is usual
stronger than the other, and very often I think our consciousness helps us
to not be conscious of one of the perceptions.
Yes I agree that smoking often may provide more good than harm. It depends
who you are and the real world around you.

Bjorn, the real question here is not who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, but how would or could we go about testing our conjectures? We all have our opinions, the question becomes which one has the most currency. Until we find a way of coming up with a way of testing a conjecture, I’m afraid we will have to allow for the pluralism in thought. That is, until we can test and find a way to refute, each person’s ‘theories’ are as valid as the next.

And since this forum is devoted to the ideas of one William T. Powers who do you think ‘wins’?

He thinks he does by discussing just what he would like to discuss, but I wonder if Bill ever thought about how many babies he might have thrown out with the bath water over the last 50 years because it had to be his way or the highway?

How does this ‘switching’ occur? How would an ‘error’ determine who
or what gets ‘switched’?

I am not able to tell you that in a short statement.

I’m not so sure you could tell me, even if you wrote a book, at this time.

But the Brain is a
dynamical system. The different output signals are dependent on reference
signals in the brain (the state of the brain), feedback signals and
perceptual signals representing different variables from the extern world.

AND internal world, please don’t forget that

Changes in this dynamical system may result in changes of different
perceptions, which we are aware. This changes may be called “switching”.

I call it simply part of the controlling process.

I think we perceive our perceptions.

Please clarify this. I’m not sure what you mean by this.

The difference you talk about helps us
to change our perceptions to the one you think is most important, what we
are supposed to see, our references. I prefer to replace your word
supposed to the word wish.

Our ‘changes’ in perceptions are not always conscious ones. Have you ever tried looking at something and not see it there? But we don’t control all perceptions.

I think it might be far more fruitful to try and understand how and why all this takes place rather than trying to ‘prove’ the existence of some hierarchy, but this is just one man’s opinion and I’ll run with it my way thank you.

Why is this so? I would say because that is the way we want to
see it and because it minimizes ‘error’. Just my guess tossed into the
ring.

That is the way also I think.

Bjorn, I envy your enthusiasm and I wish more of your ideas were explored here on CSGnet. We learn from making mistakes, acknowledging the existence of them, and hopefully finding a better way.

If we go around looking for validation for our ideas we will find them. It is much more difficult to accept the fact that you have been walking around with the wrong set of ideas, and a better set exists somewhere out there.

I have worn my ignorance on my sleeve here in CSGnet but it has paid off in a very big way for me. I’m much more knowledgeable about how really ignorant I am in most areas, so I know that I must keep an open mind because you never know from where or whom the next great idea may come from.

I’m glad Bill Powers and Rick Marken among others, are comfortable in their ignorance. I’m not, and never will be. It’s a shame PCT has to be mired in it as well.

regards,

Marc

“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne

“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.

“It’s not what people don’t know that is the problem. It’s what people know that ain’t so, that creates all the fuss.”
Will Rogers

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.28,17:30 EST)]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.28.0714)

Some places nerve areas/places receive signals from two different
areas that we know control different perceptions.

How do you know this? You and I can't even agree on exactly what a
'perception' is let alone understand how it gets from one place to another,

or why.

I read it in different papers and books. I started with an essay written by
Rusenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow. I continued with BCP, a wonderful book with
a content and structure we must wait still in thirty years to see an
equivalent. Later I followed up some of the references in BCP. That is old
texts, but I see modern neurologist still use some of the references in
their books. The last book about the brain I studied was Susan Greenfield:
"The human Brain". She has an overview, but she should have studied BCP.

>In PCT these areas/neurons are called the Comparator.

That's what they might be called in PCT. The bigger question is do they
exist in the empirical world. I don't think we have 'decision' neurons,

sorry.

Maybe you have a cite or two for your beliefs? Care to share them?

I am surprised when you say "That's what they might be called in PCT". You
have been in this group longer than me and I say "That's what they are
called in PCT. Comparators are neuron as the other cells in the Brain.
I don't know if Comparators exist in the empirical world, it depends who
have the experience.

Did I write about 'decision' neurons?

Yes Bjorn, but that paper and your leap to comparator neurons is quite
a gap. Llinas and company were not talking about a PCT type of control

process.

They don't use the word. And I guess you are correct. Sorry for them.

If you look at the Discussion section you find that the Olivio-cerebellar
system represents a high level controller for movement execution.

'Feedback' destroy's any hierarchy. A hierarchy is strictly a one-way

affair.

I have worked in a hierarchy a whole life. There I learned that questions
about "how to handle things" were _sent up_ and rules how to do it were
_sent down_. Sorry this was a digression.

Do you have some further or later information that can confirm or
even suggest that what you are saying is so?

Yes, If I read between the lines.

If so, how do you plan on going about showing others this is in fact the

case?

I am still too insecure. But I feel progress. Very often after comments from
Bill, I have to take a step backward. But after some days I feel I continue
my progress.

I think it far more likely that some type of influence network is involved.

My comprehension about network and SD is at a minimum. I try to learn the
nomenclature.

Bjorn, the real question here is not who is 'right' or 'wrong', but how
would or could we go about testing our conjectures?

Yes I think important to test our conjecture using a well defined model.

How does this 'switching' occur? How would an 'error' determine who
or what gets 'switched'?

I am not able to tell you that in a short statement.

I'm not so sure you could tell me, even if you wrote a book, at this time.

Well if you are correct, I have still a way to walk.

bjorn

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.28.1132)]

In a message dated 6/28/2005 11:29:32 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, bsimonsen@C2I.NET writes:

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.28,17:30 EST)]

In PCT these areas/neurons are called the Comparator.
ME:
That’s what they might be called in PCT. The bigger question is do they
exist in the empirical world. I don’t think we have ‘decision’ neurons,
sorry.

Maybe you have a cite or two for your beliefs? Care to share them?

I am surprised when you say “That’s what they might be called in PCT”. You
have been in this group longer than me and I say "That’s what they are
called in PCT. Comparators are neuron as the other cells in the Brain.

I don’t believe ‘comparators’ exist as such.

I don’t know if Comparators exist in the empirical world, it depends who
have the experience.

Did I write about ‘decision’ neurons?

Maybe I misread. A ‘comparator’ is a ‘decision’ making process. It ‘decides’ which course of action to take. No?

Do you have some further or later information that can confirm or
even suggest that what you are saying is so?

Yes, If I read between the lines.

Reading between the lines is fine. How about a little bit of confirmation somewhere along the line.

If so, how do you plan on going about showing others this is in fact the
case?

I am still too insecure. But I feel progress. Very often after comments from
Bill, I have to take a step backward. But after some days I feel I continue
my progress.

Toward what end?

Bjorn, the real question here is not who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, but how
would or could we go about testing our conjectures?

Yes I think important to test our conjecture using a well defined model.

And how about testing that model against empirical data? PCT has used a models. What have those models revealed about the workings of the mind? What have those models been able to show us about how control might actually occur in an individual?

I agree that the model shows quite clearly a trial and error process (i.e. control) but it reveals little of anything else.

Well if you are correct, I have still a way to walk.

We all do, but the trip should be the enjoyment, no?

regards,

Marc

“Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known”
Montaigne

“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.”
Richard Hooker (1554? - 1600)
English theologian.

“It’s not what people don’t know that is the problem. It’s what people know that ain’t so, that creates all the fuss.”
Will Rogers

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.06.28.0900)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.27,20:40 EST)

Rick Marken (2005.06.25.1215)
There is no conflict involved in the Neckar cube that I can see.

If we lighten a cigarette, there is still a conflict. We have the two
references and the perception of smoking behavior.

I still think there is a conflict.

Yes. In the smoking example I gave there is conflict: two control systems
want the same perceptual variable (cigarettes smoked/hr, say) in two
different states. One system wants this variable at a reference level of
zero (the no smoking system) and the other wants it at some non-zero value
(say 5 cigarettes/hour). Of course, this variable can't be in both states at
the same time. What happens depends on the relative gains of the two
systems. If the systems are of approximately equal gain the perceptual
variable will end up being kept in a "virtual" reference state somewhere
between the two references -- ie., between 0 and 5 -- so the person in this
conflict will appear to have "cut down".

I've attached a little spreadsheet that demonstrates a conflict. There are
two systems involved. If the grey shaded cell is set to -1 (as it is when
you get the sheet) there is no conflict because the two systems are
controlling two different perceptions. System 1 controls Q1+Q2 and system 2
control Q1-Q2. These two perceptual variables are mathematically independent
so the two systems can simultaneously bring these perceptions to their
reference values (currently set to 0 and 5). By the way you "run" the
spreadsheet by hitting the F9 key. Make sure iteration is set to "on" in the
calc preferences.

When you change the "conflict" setting in the grey cell to 1 you have a
conflict because now both systems are controlling the same perception:
Q1+Q2. When you do this you will see that the perceptual variable in each
system is brought to a value between the two references: 2.5. This is
because both systems are of equal gain.

I can't see the difference between smoking and Neckers cube.

In the smoking example (as in my demo) two systems are _simultaneously_
trying to bring the _same_ perceptual variable to two different states. I
the Necker cube, one (but possibly two) systems _alternate_ controlling for
different perceptions (call it cube with face A front and cube with face A
rear). It's true that you can't simultaneously perceive these two
perceptions: you can't see face A front and face A rear at the same time.
But you're not trying to do this. First you try to see face A front. Once
you get this perception you can perceive it as long as you like. Or you can
try to perceive face A rear, which you can do (usually after some mental
work) and then you can perceive this perception as long as you like.

So there is no "fight" between control systems in the Necker cube as there
is in the smoking example and in my demo. The "fight" or "conflict" is
between two control systems _simultaneously_ trying to bring the same
perceptual variable to two different states.

Best regards

Rick

Conflict.xls (10.5 KB)

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.06.28.1214)]

In a message dated 6/28/2005 12:04:26 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

[From Rick Marken (2005.06.28.0900)]

I’ve attached a little spreadsheet that demonstrates a conflict.
A conflict between whom and what?

Who defines what a controlled variable is? Can one exist independently of others? If not, what kind of relationship must necessarily exist between ‘conflicting’ loops and variables?

Is one control loop = to one controlled variable?

Your supposition is that your spreadsheet represents a living individual. To me it simply represents two control systems, living or robotic.

How can you show me that your spreadsheet does not represent a robot?

regards,

Marc

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2005.06.27.1450 MDT)]
Bjorn Simonsen(2005.06.27,20:15 EST)–
I have studied the same angles when I look upon the 2 D Necker cube.

Here is a figure and some corners/angles (top side).

The figure shows my left Eye, EL and my right eye, ER. The
paper is 40 cm in front of me and the corner top/left/behind, corner D is
1 cm to the right from corner A. The corner B is 2,5 cm to the right of
corner A because the side in the cube is 2.5 cm. The line ADB is the
paper and the angels

EL-A-ER= 11.3099325. The angel EL-D-ER = 11.3583417. And the angel
EL-B-ER = 11.4054109

The interesting thing here is that the angel between the
eyes and the point D, which is “farther away”, is greater
than the angle between the eyes and point A.

Binocular depth information is contained in the convergence angle between
the eyes. So you can tell how far away the piece of paper is on which the
Necker Cube is drawn. However, there is no (or very little)
difference between the convergence angles for the various parts of
the surface. Look at your figure: the difference in convergence
angle is only 0.1 degree or six minutes of arc between the leftmost point
and the rightmost point. The limit of visual acuity is around 1 to 2
minutes of arc for normal vision.

Hold your hand with the thumb toward your eyes and the little finger
farthest away (curl the other fingers out of the way). If you focus on
the thumb, the little finger is doubled; if you focus on the little
finger, the thumb is doubled. My eyes are separated by about 60
millimeters. If the thumb is 200 mm from my nose and the little finger is
330 mm away, the convergence angle for the thumb is 17 degrees and for
the little finger it is 10.4 degrees. The angles are different by almost
400 minutes of arc. (By the way, an “angel” is a supernatural
being with wings, an “angle” is a measurement of relative
direction or rotation).

I don’t think you get any significant depth information from a
convergence difference of only 6 minutes of arc. If you look at the
Necker Cube on a piece of paper at right angles to your direction of
gaze, there is no perceptible doubling of any part of the figure when you
look at a different part.

When I see the cube
wit the side AB nearest me, This doesn’t harmonize.

And when I see the cube with the side DC nearest me it doesn’t harmonize
that the angel EL-B-ER is greater than the angle EL-D-ER.

Then I made a cube of transparent plastic and hold it in my
hand. It was no problem to wish to see the cube with corner A near me and
see it. It was neither a problem to wish to see the cube with corner D
near me and see it (even if I knew the corner D is further
away).

This is substituting imagined depth perception for actual depth
perception. I know this can be done, but it’s hard, especially if the
object is close to your eyes. Remember that the Necker Cube is a simple
orthographic projection, so there is no perspective in the picture. In a
perspective drawing there might be some distortion that would provide at
least some depth information. If you made a cube out of wire and looked
at its shadow in sunlight, you would see exactly the same shadow with the
cube in two different orientations. The Necker Cube is like that
shadow.

But these constructions are
our own"thinking". When you say “there is no information
at all” this is your model.

I am using the same physics model, geometry, and mathematics that you
use. When I say there is no depth information in the Necker Cube, I mean
that there is no binocular disparity between parts of the figure
sufficient to provide human depth perception. The figure is in fact FLAT.
If you draw two overlapping flat squares and then draw lines to connect
the corresponding corners, you have a Necker Cube. Seeing it as a cube
instead of a flat figure is entirely a product of human imagination,
whichever way you see it. Both ways of seeing a cube require the brain to
generate, internally, missing information. The “true”
perception would be of a 2-dimensional drawing.

I think the control systems in the brain try to find classifications for
all perceptions, after we have learned to do this. This becomes an
automatic operation when the control systems are organized. If
information is missing, the missing perceptions are imagined, and
adjusted until the result can be recognized – classified and named. We
do this all the time. When we look at a rug on the floor of a room, we
imagine a complete rug, not a rug with parts missing where a chair, a
sofa, and a table block our view of it. Gestalt psychologists studied
this sort of thing and called it “closure.” So as far as I can
see, the Necker cube is just one instance of a more general phenomenon of
imagination. We often see things that we can’t identify at first, and try
out different hypotheses, imagining enough missing parts or features to
see if the classification that results is reasonable. If it isn’t, we try
imagining other possible missing parts or features, until we get a
convincing member of a known category. [I seem to be using “class” and “category” interchangeably.]

In the case of the Necker cube, there are three possible categories: cube
with corner A closest, cube with corner B closest, and flat overlapping
squares with their corners connected. If you rule out the third category,
then you have to try imagining the missing information that will make the
figure fit either of the first two categories. Either one can be created
equally well, correcting the error in the appropriate category.

But in most adults this has become an automatic process, and it’s not
easy to

create the missing information voluntarily. If you attend long enough,
random reorganization (reorganization follows awareness) will produce
occasional flips, but since that entails increased error during the flip,
it is hard to start the process. The control system for the current
orientation tries to maintain that category, so a large perturbation is
needed to switch to the other one. I sometimes have this problem when
looking at the craters of the moon through a telescope. They suddenly,
and spontaneously, turn into bumps, and it sometimes takes many minutes
of trying, or even walking away from the eyepiece, to get them to turn
back into craters.

I think as you that the
orientation that’s seen depends on imaging (remembering) that
information. I agree that you simply imagine (remember) that the distance
to one corner is large and the whole configuration changes. That was also
my in my “From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.06.25,17:30
EST)”.
I am not found of the word illusion,

“Fond” is the word. “Found” is the past tense of
“find” meaning to recover something that was lost, or to
encounter something accidentally. “To be fond of” means the
same as “to like”, or “haben gern”.

because I think too
much would be an illusion and we will never learn to know what the real
world really is…

Do you think we learn to know what the real world really is? I think we
simply develop mental models that we are satisfied to use because they
work well enough for our purposes. I don’t know of any way to know what
the real world really is. If you know of a way, please tell me what it
is!

If it is correct to say
that the cube is an illusion, I think we must have correct information
about the world out there and perceive it in a different way. We don’t
have any reference from the world out there, we just have our perception
and then we can’t say that our perception is different from something we
don’t know. Mary and you did say it quite clear “We can construct
models (this is our thinking (my words)) of what lies outside the nervous
system”.

Yes, but that means that all we have are the models. We have no way of
seeing if they actually match what is really outside us. All we can
really say is “IF the world were organized like this model, the
model would explain its behavior.” And don’t forget that in the case
of the Necker Cube, in the “real world” the so-called cube is a
flat figure lying in one plane.

This is why I think we change
between the two (or more) cubes.
I look at the Necker cube.
I don’t know anything about the figure on the paper.
There come light waves from the paper to my retina. These light-waves hit
my retina different places.
In the Input functions the energy from the light waves are transformed to
electrochemical perceptual signals. I can describe these perceptual
signals with its frequency.
Some of these perceptual signals goes to a comparator where it meet a
reference signal with a value lower than the reference signal and
nothing happens. Some of these perceptual signals goes to a comparator
where it meet a reference signal with a value a bit greater than the
reference signal. Let me analyze this.
Copies of perceptual signals go to level two, three and higher. From a
higher level than the configuration level, maybe the relationship level,
there comes output signals/reference values to the third level where I
control configurations. Both reference signals, my wish to se the corner
A in front or the wish to see the corner D in
front.

So far this is just a description of the HPCT model. I agree with it,
though my version above includes the category level. We’re both just
guessing. Guesses don’t cost anything, and they’re worth every
penny.

If my consciousness could let
me perceive the two figures, everything would be just
disorder.

What do you mean, “disorder”? Random? Scattered all over the
place? Jumping around senselessly? I don’t think the word
“disorder” explains what is wrong with perceiving both figures
are once. Martin Taylor claims to be able to see both orientations at the
same time (which I can’t even imagine, so I have no idea what he
means).

But my consciousness helps me
I can just perceive one figure at the time. Very often I perceive the
figure I wish to perceive. But it happens I perceive one figure and then
another figure without wishing anything special. The two percept just
changes.

Since you consciously experience only one orientation at a time, you
don’t know what would be wrong with seeing both at once: you were just
guessing when you said it would lead to “disorder.” Maybe you
just mean the same thing I said: you can’t imagine it. But that doesn’t
mean there’s anything disorderly about it: it just means you can’t
imagine it. Maybe someone else can.

I agree that the perceptions “just change” in most cases. I’m
not even sure that wanting them to change affects when the changes occur.
Maybe just wanting and having it not happen creates enough error to start
reorganization, which then randomly tries imagined perceptions until a
change happens and you feel better. I know that it feels very annoying
for those craters on the moon to turn into bumps when I’m enjoying the
view or looking for something special.

The last sentence above was
the reason for me to compare the Knickers cube and
hallucinations.

Yes, I think I have to agree that the Necker Cube is a hallucination. The
three-dimensionality of the cube seems very real, though if you compare
it with a perspective cube or a shaded solid cube it’s clearly not as
real as it could be.

However, it would be even more hallucinatory if the lines of which the
cube is made were also being imagined, so another person wouldn’t see
anything at all on the piece of paper!

Best,

Bill P.