I created this Topic for people who are taking (or who have taken) my Zoom course entitled Zooming in on PCT. I welcome your questions about what has been presented in the course as well as suggestions for ways to present the material more effectively.
3 Likes
Hi Rick,
Thank you for organising and presenting your PCT course, I really enjoyed the first session and Iâm eagerly looking forward to the second.
As part of the talk you mentioned that control systems work to protect controlled variables from disturbances that are often unpredictable and undetectable. Could you expand on what you mean when you say disturbances are undetectable? In particular, from whoâs perspective, the observer or the actor, are they undetectable?
Kind regards,
Tom
Hi Tom
Thank you for organising and presenting your PCT course, I really enjoyed the first session and Iâm eagerly looking forward to the second.
And thank you for participating.
As part of the talk you mentioned that control systems work to protect controlled variables from disturbances that are often unpredictable and undetectable. Could you expand on what you mean when you say disturbances are undetectable? In particular, from whoâs perspective, the observer or the actor, are they undetectable?
From the point of view of the actor â actually, from the point of view of the control system within the actor that is controlling a particular variable â disturbances to the controlled variable are invisible because the state of that variable represents the combined effect of these disturbances and the systemâs own outputs.
So, for example, the control system in a driver controlling the position of the car on the road perceives and controls only that variable. The state of that variable â say itâs the visual position of the car relative to the lane lines â is always the combined result of disturbances (the variable forces that affect the position of the car such as cross winds, road surface quality, etc.) and variable outputs (like steering wheel movements). Since the effect of the disturbance is always mixed with the effect of outputs on the controlled variable, the driver has no way of knowing whether the observed variations in the controlled variable are due to disturbances or their own output. In fact, those variations in the controlled variable are always a joint result of both. In order to control, all the system has to perceive is the variations in the state of the controlled variable; it doesnât have to know anything about the cause of those variations.
An observer of the driver would also find it difficult to see the disturbances that are present in this situation. In order to âseeâ these disturbances the observer would have to know what variable is being controlled and how it is affected by other variables.
There are circumstances in which the presence of disturbances would become more obvious to both the actor (driver) and the observer. This occurs when the disturbance is abrupt and strong enough so that the controlled variable makes a large (but hopefully brief) deviation from itâs reference state, such as when the crosswind comes in a sudden intense gust. In order to âseeâ that this sudden deviation is a result of a disturbance to the controlled variable, the observer (and systems in the actor that are able to observer the controlling done by the car position control system) have to know 1) what variable is being controlled 2) the reference state of that variable and 3) the state of the output that affects the controlled variable (the sudden deviation of the car from its lane could be the result of the driver accidentally turning the wheel too far in one direction).
But even if all these things are known controlled variable, irs reference state and the state of system output â neither the observer nor the actor (driver) can actually âseeâ disturbances in an exact, quantitative sense since all they see is the effect of disturbances on the controlled variable which, even when this effect is pronounced, is still a joint effect of output and disturbance.
We will talk about this a bit more in the session tomorrow when we talk about the failure of the cause-effect model of control. Thatâs because psychologists who want to see controlling (purposeful behavior) as being consistent with a cause effect model of behavior have tried to save that model by claiming that the outputs that compensate for disturbances to a controlled variable are caused by the disturbances themselves or by their perceived effects on the controlled variable. In fact, the appearance that a control system is âreactingâ to disturbances (or their effects) is an illusion. As we will see when we discuss control theory, a control system keeps the controlled variable in a reference state by âreactingâ only to deviations of a perceptual analog of the controlled variable from a reference specification for the state of that variable. The system knows (and needs to know) nothing about the cause of those deviations (error signals).
Hope this helps but feel free to ask about it in âclassâ tomorrow.
Best
Rick
1 Like
Hello Rick,
Thank you for creating this course and Eva for suggesting this space.
Kind regards from Argentina!
Maria
Hi Rick. Having just watched Vid#1, I started to ponder about smooth actions (the non-slip between cup and lip) and wondered how PCT deals with sudden, abrupt, unexpected, unplanned incidents. For instance when you went to call Linda, most viewers smiled. Much humour is like an unexpected collision of patterns. My question: is PCT predicated in the notion of transitivity; that there is continuity? Since continuity and transitivity have such a powerful grip on our reasoned existence (precedents as in legal matters, logic and so forth), Iâve taken to looking into non-transitivity, like when things go bang unexpectedly (including violent outbursts). As youâll know, an example of non-transitivity is the familiar paper-rock-scissors game (if paper trumps rock and rock trumps scissors, paper does not trump scissors). The closest I can imagine as an example of pure luck (non-transitive discontinuity) is drawing a card from a new shuffled deck. Second question: could gambling (as well as animism, magic, superstition, mysticism) be examples of what Iâm edging up to calling the PCT illusion? Cheers.
I received some email questions from 2 students and I will try to answer them here. These first ones are from Malou Laureys (ML). I am RM.
ML: memory: does PCT make a difference between implicit emotional memories (when Amygdala is still involved because of unprocessed emotions of stressful events) and explicit autobiographical memories and how?
RM: At the moment the PCT model of emotion and memory is in its infancy since there is no research aimed at testing it. But in its current state PCT would say that all emotions are the sensed physiological consequence of error and differ only in terms of the cognitive interpretation placed on the cause of that error. To the extent that an emotion is remembered it would be a memory of the cognitive interpretation of the physiological state. And since such memories are always about the error in oneâs own control system(s) such memories are always autobiographical. So I guess I would say ânoâ, PCT makes no distinction between implicit emotional memories and explicit autobiographical memories. All memories of emotion are autobiographical.
ML: what is the link between memories and reference levels?
RM: Reference signals (not levels â those are the observed states of controlled variables) can be stored as addressable memories.
ML: reorganization: is it always random?
RM: I would say yes. Reorganization presumably happens when control is not working. If one knew how to repair a non-working control process then that repair process would itself be a non-randomly operating control system. Random reorganization happens when the control hierarchy doesnât know how to âfixâ itself.
ML: reference levels: conscious/unconscious reference levels?
RM: According to PCT, consciousness operates outside the perceptual control hierarchy. I think one can become conscious of oneâs reference levels â oneâs own specifications (goals) for perceptions; these specifications can become the object of conscious awareness by being played back as perceptions.
ML: origin of reference levels: genes, past experiences, conscious choices ?
RM: All three. But the most common source of reference levels (actually, reference signals, which specify the levels of a controlled variable) are higher level systems in the control hierarchy. Genes are presumably the source of reference specifications for intrinsic (mainly physiological) variables; past experiences influence â via reorganization â the way higher level control systems set references for lower level control systems; and conscious choices reflect the volitional aspect of consciousness making random (arbitrary) selection of references as a way of solving conflict. In PCT, having to choose or decide is always a sign that there is a conflict. Skilled control never requires choice or decision.
ML: does each level in the hierarchy have intrinsic reference levels?
RM: No, intrinsic references are for physiological variables, like blood O2 levels, that are affected by the performance of the perceptual control hierarchy.
ML hierarchical levels of perception: what do you think is the level above system concepts? where does this level gets its reference levels from?
RM: I donât know whether there is a level above system concepts or what level might be. Indeed, I donât know whether the system concept level (or any other level) actually exists. The whole hierarchy is a hypothesis although there is pretty good evidence for the existence of levels up to programs. But above that, who knows. The theory does say that if there is a top level of the hierarchy the systems at this level get their references set via reorganization, which means that it would be tough to change it. Which seems right. If the top level actually is systems concepts then surely the religion (or lack thereof) one is raised in would count as a system concept. And since people typically continue to control for that system concept as a grown up (by maintaining the practices and/or beliefs of that religion) itâs pretty good evidence that once the reference for that system concept has been established through rearing itâs tough to change it.
RM: And hereâs some questions from Marissa Brioni
MB: - from an MOL psychotherapy perspective, why does a disruption in the clientâs talk/body language/etc. indicate a background thought?
RM: I donât think there is a formal explanation for these disruptions in the PCT model. But that wonât stop me from trying to give a PCT explanation of them. A âbackground thoughtâ is another way of describing the âpoint of viewâ from which the clientâs consciousness is aware of what they are talking (or body languaging) about. The âpoint of viewâ or âbackground thoughtâ is presumed to be from some level of the hierarchy relative to the level at which the clientâs problem (conflict) manifests itself. A disruption presumably occurs when the clientâs point of view suddenly shifts to a different level in the hierarchy (up or down) from the one they are currently at. So suddenly they are aware of what they are talking about from a new perspective. When this happens they are likely to experience what they are saying or doing as an error relative to what they would want to say or do from this new point of view. So they stop what they are currently saying or doing in order to eliminate the error â hence, the observed disruption. And there is often laughter or giggling , which suggests that the physiological consequences of the error are being âspentâ or used up by this activity. One of my favorite examples of this phenomenon happens at the beginning of Dylanâs 115th dream:
See if you can figure out the point of view change that resulted in the laughter that disrupted the beginning of the track.
MB: - how does one know when goals shift upwards in the hierarchy?
RM: Itâs not goals that shift upwards but âpoint of viewâ. And right now whether that point of view shifted up or down is based on an interpretation of what the client said; whether the client now seems to be discussing things from a higher or lower point of view. Basically, it is part of the âartâ of doing MOL therapy. As a non-artist myself Iâve always hoped that someone could write a paper (possibly called âMOL for Dummiesâ) that would explain in terms understandable to beginners like myself how to tell whether, after a disruption, a client is now looking at the problem from a higher or lower level point of view.
Hope this helps.
Best regards
Rick
1 Like
Hi John
JK: Hi Rick. Having just watched Vid#1, I started to ponder about smooth actions (the non-slip between cup and lip) and wondered how PCT deals with sudden, abrupt, unexpected, unplanned incidents. For instance when you went to call Linda, most viewers smiled. Much humour is like an unexpected collision of patterns. My question: is PCT predicated in the notion of transitivity; that there is continuity?
RM: I think you are talking about two different kinds of sudden, abrupt, unexpected, unplanned incidents. One kind are just abrupt disturbances to a controlled variables, such as a push on the ladyâs arm while she is lifting the teacup.If the push is abrupt but not too strong it will show up as a brief deviation of the arm from the path to which it will be quickly restored; if it is too strong then the tea will be spilled. All this is explained by the disturbance resisting characteristics of control that keeps the controlled variable exactly matching a (possibly varying) reference signal in the face of nominal disturbances.
RM: I think calling Linda in for the demo was a different kind of âdisturbanceâ. I donât think it was a disturbance to any variables anyone was controlling. I think it was more like what you say it was: an unexpected collision of patterns. One âpatternâ was a formal lecture; the other was an informal domestic interaction. I think this led to a change in âpoint of viewâ with respect to what was being passively observed (passive observation mode in PCT) resulting in an error for some people, the physiological consequences of which were âspentâ in smiling or laughing. [Perhaps this is what laughing and crying are about, by the way; using up the adrenaline/ acetylcholine, etc resulting from error].
RM: I think this is what happens in general with humor; a joke âworksâ when the punch line results in an abrupt change in point of view. For example: A horse walks into a bar and the bartender says âwhy the long faceâ?. I think this is funny (well, I think itâs kind of funny) to the extent that the punch line abruptly changes your point of view from the stereotype of the consoling bartender to one who is puzzled by an obvious physical characteristic of horses.
RM: Anyway, thatâs my story and Iâm stickinâ to it⌠until Iâm convinced otherwise;-)
Best regards
Rick
Thanks for your reply to my initial question Rick. We are in agreement over pattern collisions (variations on Koestlerâs bisociation); no need to get hoarse over it. Iâll mull over the second one regarding non-transitivity and hope somebody else might chip in to give me a nudge.
Regarding your vid#2 I dug out the 1980 PMS article from your Mind Readings book since the recently posted copy sliced off margins. 1980, thatâs 40 years ago; party time. My first question here is why did that article not shake things up â was it badly written, was it the wrong audience, was it simply skipped over, was it too much of a disturbance â why? Moving on, could you provide (briefly) an example of compensatory tracking without feedback to participants and (hereâs the question) whether these results are unrelated to PCT (which needs feedback)? Finally, when those adopting PCT strike othersâ S->R walls, what hints could you offer for making a difference, perhaps even breaching these? (after Robert Frostâs metaphor.) Cheers.
Thank you Rick!
Iâll have your answers sink in for awhile before I come up with follow-up questions to your answers 
Malou
Hi John
JK: Thanks for your reply to my initial question Rick.
RM: You are welcome but I see I didnât directly address your original questions so let me give it a try again. You asked:
JK: My question: is PCT predicated in the notion of transitivity; that there is continuity?
RM: I donât think so. PCT is âpredicatedâ only on the idea that behavior is a process of control. This controlling can apparently work even when the controlled variable is intransitive, as it is in the ârock, paper, scissorsâ game, where you are controlling for relationships between hand shapes. Kids can control for these relationships quite skillfully even though they are are intransitive: the rock that beats scissors is beaten by the paper that is beaten by the scissors. This intransitivity doesnât seem to affect their ability to call the winner of each throw But maybe Iâm not seeing why you think PCT might be predicated on the notion of transitivity. Perhaps what you mean is monotonicity rather than transitivity. I think PCT (and control theory in general) does assume monotonic relationships between variables in control loops. Although the E. coli reorganization system does work around non-monotonicity in the output function.
JK: Second question: could gambling (as well as animism, magic, superstition, mysticism) be examples of what Iâm edging up to calling the PCT illusion? Cheers.
RM: The only PCT illusion I know of is what has been called the âbehavioral illusionâ which was discussed (not by name) in the first session in terms of the fable of the blind men and the elephant. It is the illusion that behavior is a cause-effect process (either caused by stimuli, cognitive calculations or reinforcing consequence). Controlling can look like any of these three things but , in fact, it is none of them.
Best
Rick
Hi Rick,
Thank you for taking the time to reply.
Regarding disruptions: I think your explanation is compelling and I prefer your suggested use of âpoint of viewâ (rather than background thought). I enjoyed the Bob Dylan clip and have no idea as to what shift in his hierarchy resulted in the laughter ⌠Did he start singing too soon in the first bit?
Regarding recognising whether the shift is from a lower / higher point of view (I realised my error in calling it âgoalâ and corrected myself in a later email): I like the idea of âMOL for Dummiesâ. I am still reading Tim Careyâs âThe MOL - How to do psychotherapy without getting in the wayâ and hope to learn something about interpreting the clientâs shift in the correct direction.
Best wishes,
Marisa
Hi Marissa
MB: Hi Rick,
Thank you for taking the time to reply.
RM: My pleasure.
MB: Regarding disruptions: I think your explanation is compelling and I prefer your suggested use of âpoint of viewâ (rather than background thought).
RM: I like it better too.
MB: I enjoyed the Bob Dylan clip and have no idea as to what shift in his hierarchy resulted in the laughter ⌠Did he start singing too soon in the first bit?
RM: I keep forgetting that not everyone was living through the 60s along with me;-) Bob Dylan was a folk singer who, much to the dismay of many of his fans, âwent electricâ in the late 60s and that song (called âBob Dylanâs 115th Dreamâ) was on the first album that had some of his electric songs. Indeed, one side of the album was all acoustic, like in the folk days, and the other side was all electric, in the new âfolk rockâ style. Thet 115th dream was actually the first cut on the electric side (I think). Anyway, I think Bob burst into laughter because he starts singing with just the acoustic accompaniment and gets through the whole first line without noticing that the electric backup hasnât come in. I think he didnât notice the absence of electric backup because he was playing the song from the point of view of being a folk singer, which had been his familiar point of view for years. But once he completed the first line he was jogged to the new point of view â as an electric rocker. That is, I think his consciousness moved to the new âelectricâ point of view. I think he found this change in point of view hugely funny because he had been getting tremendous amounts of flack for moving from acoustic folk to electric rock and it must have taken a lot of courage for him to make that move. When he found himself playing from the old point of view it must have created a rather huge error, the energy of which was being dissipated in uproarious laughter.
RM: Anyway, thatâs my interpretation. I donât know if itâs right but I think it sounds good;-)
MB: Regarding recognising whether the shift is from a lower / higher point of view (I realised my error in calling it âgoalâ and corrected myself in a later email): I like the idea of âMOL for Dummiesâ. I am still reading Tim Careyâs âThe MOL - How to do psychotherapy without getting in the wayâ and hope to learn something about interpreting the clientâs shift in the correct direction.
RM: Thatâs great! You are looking in the right place. Tim is a gem!
Best
Rick
Hi all,
Nice to see how the forum could be used for questions, answers and discussion. I hope that also after the class is over, this forum will be a good place to interact. Especially since not everyone is able to join the classes on Saturdays, but follows the course in another tempo by watching the video.
One question I had for one of the other participants of the course, I think Ryan? In the discussion around positive emotions, you mentioned Spinoza. I found that there are quite some ways Spinozaâs view on emotions could fit the PCT framework. Have you got any other ideas on Spinoza and PCT? Iâd be interested in discussing those.
For other participants interested in the phenomenology of the different perceptual levels, please find my earlier post on this forum: Experiences across the hierarchy. Although all hypothetical (as Rick mentions), trying to get a grip on higher level control systems adds a lot to our understanding of MOL, and is fun as well. For example, the discussion about something being a tiger or not (as discussed by Ted Cloak), could be interpreted as a category level perception, in which âyouâ discern things as absolutely a tiger, or not a tiger at all (I donât believe tigerness is dimensional).
Best,
Eva
1 Like
Hi all,
I recently came across a youtube video of a talk by Karl Friston. A couple of minutes into the video has asks the audience to participate in a game. Iâve copied a link to the video below
The game seems quite similar to the coin game discussed on Saturday, in that the participants have to work out an abstract rule. Friston uses the idea of active inference and lots of complicated looking maths to explain how participants work out the rule. However, it seems to me that participants are actually (implicitly) using the TCV to work out the rule. Would anyone be able to give a more detailed PCT-based explanation of what is happening here?
Thanks,
Tom
1 Like
Hi Tom
TM: I recently came across a youtube video of a talk by Karl Friston. A couple of minutes into the video has asks the audience to participate in a game. Iâve copied a link to the video below
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1egnoCWgUg
TM: The game seems quite similar to the coin game discussed on Saturday, in that the participants have to work out an abstract rule. Friston uses the idea of active inference and lots of complicated looking maths to explain how participants work out the rule. However, it seems to me that participants are actually (implicitly) using the TCV to work out the rule. Would anyone be able to give a more detailed PCT-based explanation of what is happening here?
RM: This game is, indeed, similar to the coin game. The S is Friston and the audience is E. S is controlling for an aspect (perception) of the dots. He tells you a lot about what perception this might be. For example, he says (in not so many words) that he is controlling for a rule about which color dot is the ârightâ one. And he says that the rule depends on the center dot. So the controlled variable is what we would call a program type perception: if (something about center dot is true) then (right dot is somewhere based on this).
RM: It differs from the coin game mainly in that the disturbances are produced by the S. This is actually like the situation of a naturalist who is trying to infer what an organism is controlling based on how it deals with naturally occuring disturbances. The disturbances in this case are the varying arrangement of dots across the different cards. How this disturbance affects the controlled variable depends on how S (Friston) responds to Eâs (the audienceâs) guesses about the âcorrectâ dot.
RM: So E carries out the Test pretty much the way it is done in the coin game. E probably starts by coming up with several possible hypotheses based on the appearance of the different cards. Then based on one of these hypotheses E guesses what the âcorrectâ dot is in the first card. In this video, whatever Eâs hypothesis was it led to a correct selection. So the hypothesis was tried on the next; it might have had to be revised based on the dots in the next card. But eventually (very quickly in the video) E gets the correct hypothesis and is able to select the correct dot from there on.
RM: So E has discovered the perception controlled by S. A program perception in this case: if center color is green then correct color is in center (green), if center color is blue, then correct color is right and if center color is red then correct color is left. Pretty complicated perception but a controlled perception nevertheless, controlled by Friston.
RM: I havenât looked at Fristonâs description of the inference process but Iâm sure itâs similar to what I described above as the way of testing for the controlled variable.
Hi Rick,
In the last class, you mentioned - when talking about MOL, towards the end - that you believe reorganisation happens in a way which may differ from what others suggest.
Did you say that you think reorganisation changes the perception or that reorganisation changes the reference?
Thank you for clarifying.
Best wishes,
Marisa
Hi Marissa
In the last class, you mentioned - when talking about MOL, towards the end - that you believe reorganisation happens in a way which may differ from what others suggest.
Did you say that you think reorganisation changes the perception or that reorganisation changes the reference?
I donât remember what I said but Iâm pretty sure that, in the PCT model, reorganization can change the input function (which determines how we perceive) or the output function (which determines how references are set for lower level systems) in any control loop. And I think this is true of real learning or conflict resolution as well. Some reorganization, such as that involved in child development, involves changes in both input and output functions; the child learns to perceive the world in new ways (such as in depth) and it learns how to vary itâs references so that it can control these newly constructed perceptual variables (such as learning to act so as to control its distance from things). Other reorganizations may involve changes in just output (the way we set references); I think thatâs what happens in conflict resolution.
Reorganization is just a way to learn how to control (as in the case of the child) or to change the way you currently control so that you can control more effectively (as in conflict resolution). We donât really know that much about what is involved in reorganizing control systems but, according to the model, there are really only two aspects of controlling that can be reorganized and those are the input function and the output function of controll systems.
Hope that helps.
Best
Rick
1 Like
Hi Rick,
Thank you for your thorough reply, as always.
I will mull over it and plan to get back to you with my own example so as to ensure I get this right.
Best wishes,
Marisa