A Vexing Question

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

I wrestle still with the notion of control of variables out there and my perception of them. Here are some thoughts I jotted down. Looking forward to some informed responses.

In plain language, to control something is to make it be the
way you want. In a more technical sense,
to control something is to align its current state with its desired state. In Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), Bill
Powers asserted that what is controlled is perception. We have a reference state for some variable
and we perceive its current state. If
there is an unacceptable discrepancy between the reference state and the
perceived state, an error exists, and we act (behave) to close or correct
it. We make our perception match or
align with our reference.

Let’s say I want the thermostat to be set at 70
degrees. I go over to the thermostat and
see that it is set to 64 degrees. I turn
it up from 64 to 70 degrees. Now my
perception of the thermostat setting is aligned with my desired setting. I want it set to 70 degrees and I perceive it to be set to 70 degrees.

Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some very
heated discussions: Do I control the
thermostat setting or just my perception of it?

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.05.16.05]

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

      I wrestle still with the notion of control of variables out

there and my perception of them. Here are some thoughts I
jotted down. Looking forward to some informed responses.

        In

plain language, to control something is to make it be the
way you want. In a more technical sense,
to control something is to align its current state with its
desired state. In Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), Bill
Powers asserted that what is controlled is perception. We
have a reference state for some variable
and we perceive its current state. If
there is an unacceptable discrepancy between the reference
state and the
perceived state, an error exists, and we act (behave) to
close or correct
it. We make our perception match or
align with our reference.

        Let’s

say I want the thermostat to be set at 70
degrees. I go over to the thermostat and
see that it is set to 64 degrees. I turn
it up from 64 to 70 degrees. Now my
perception of the thermostat setting is aligned with my
desired setting. I want it set to 70 degrees and I perceive
it to be set to 70 degrees.

        Now

comes the kind of question that can trigger some very
heated discussions: Do I control the
thermostat setting or just my perception of it?

The short answer to that question is: If you intend an inclusive

“or”, the answer is “Yes”. If you intend an “xor”, then the answer
is “No”.

A longer answer is that changes in the thermostat's real-world

setting, whatever that might be, cause corresponding changes in the
perceptual value. Actions you perform to reduce the difference
between the perceptual value create changes in the thermostat’s
real-world setting, and that’s the only way that you can change your
perceptual value for the thermostat setting.

All this says is that properly speaking, you control neither or both

the real-world or the perceived value, because control is a property
of the loop, not of the actions or the variables. It’s an emergent
property that you can’t locate anywhere but in the whole loop.

Having said that, you may have a legitimate question about the route

of the loop. Is there actually a thermostat out there, or are you
under hypnosis or having a dream? Bill P frequently reminded us that
the only things of which we can be sure are our own perceptions. We
can never be sure what causes them. What you can say is that IF
there really is a thermostat causing your perception, then you are
controlling both it and your perception or you are controlling
neither, to exactly the same extent.

What you cannot say is that the real thermostat in the environment

is set relative to some reference value that is also in the
environment. It isn’t. It is set relative to a value in the
environment that is what you would perceive it being set to if your
internal perception was equal to your internal reference value. In
that sense, you might be justified in claiming that your perception
is the only thing you control and the environmental real-world
setting just tags along. But if you just want to talk casually, it’s
fine just to say that you controlled the thermostat setting.
Everybody will know what you mean, even if a PCT theorist will know
something other than what a person “off-the-street” would know. It’s
all just words. What happens in a control loop is one thing. How you
talk about it is another.

To my mind, most words in any natural language, including English,

have very fuzzy boundaries, and “control” is no exception. Depending
on the impression you want to convey to your audience, you can be as
precise or as loose as you want. If you want to teach about exactly
what is implied by “control”, you have to start by being loose, and
say something like “See that thermostat? I’m going to control its
setting by changing it to 70, then to 50, then back to 70, and
there’s nothing it can do to stop me”. Then you might get a little
more precise, and say something like “How could I do that? I had to
know what I wanted the setting to be, but how did I know what it was
so that I could change it? Surely I had to have perceived in my head
what its setting was, and whether that was what I wanted it to be,
didn’t I? So I couldn’t have actually controlled the thermostat
setting you were looking at, could I?” And then finally, you could
talk about the loop, and how you can’t change one without changing
the other all around the loop, and come to the conclusion that
either you must have controlled neither or you controlled both
because both are variables in the loop, which is where the property
of “control” resides.

Martin

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-06_07:43:36 UTC]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.05.16.05]

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

Yes, exactly, it is about words: how strictly or loosely and how consistently you want or need to use your words.

The PCT definition of control is something like: “Drawing a variable to a preset reference value (zone) and keeping it there�.

For this kind of phenomenon to exist a loop is required.

If we think about living beings, it is their self-preservation which requires control: the control of their internal state between the critical values. Organisms live in interaction with their environments and so most of the important control
loops go through the organism and its environment as depicted in canonical PCT diagrams. Around the control loop there are many variables. Only one of these variable has a reference value. It is a variable called perception and that is why we talk about control
of perception. Strictly speaking it is the only variable which could be controlled.

But many other variables in the loop are interdependent with perception and that is why also their values change in interesting ways when perception is controlled. About some of them it is possible to say that also they must be drawn to
a certain value (zone) and kept there – evenn though they do not have their own preset reference values. That “must beâ€? value of the perceived environmental variable is often (somewhat misleadingly) called reference state. Even the output variable has a “must
be� value which depends on both reference and disturbance. Only disturbance is independent variable so it is certainly not controlled. (Like also the reference!)

We could say that the perception variable is controlled by setting some other variables, especially the CEV or corresponding complex environmental variable or that-which-is-perceived, to their “must be� values in relation to reference (and
the output variable in relation to both reference and disturbance). Loosely speaking, they are “also controlled�. And strictly speaking they are controlled(e) (= the term I have suggested for “environmental control�).

But if we again think from the point of view of an organism which is controlling its perception we could say that it is interested only in its perceptions. It doesn’t and cannot care a bit what happens in the environment. As Martin said
perceptions are all we have. Only when we observe someone else controlling we can differentiate between the perception and the environment of that controller. But here again we ourselves are operating only with our own perceptions (=observations).

To Martin I comment that “control� is not a property of the loop. “Control� is not adjective but active verb which denotes an event or a process and requires both subject and object: During a certain time something controls something. Instead
the “ability to control� is a dispositional emergent property of a certain kind of loop. Thus you have to say that the loop controls something - if you don’t want to change the meaning of the word “control� to a passive verb like “to become controlled�. And
even then you had to say either that the whole loop becomes controlled or something in the loop becomes controlled. If for example output is not controlled then the whole loop is not controlled, and nothing requires to say that both CEV and perception are
controlled.

I like to think that an organism is an entity which can play a role of a subject by controlling its perception by interacting with its environment. When it controls its perceptions it forms loops by affecting some parts of its environment
in such ways that it can create to itself the perceptions which fit with its references. For example if I want to control a perception of nice beer in my throat, I have to find a beer and drink it. But I would not say that I control the beer. Instead I only
control for that nice feeling I get when that kind of liquid flows from mouth to stomach. But if I need or want to speak loosely I can of course say that I control what happens to that bottle of beer. (Sounds like I am thirsty…)

Eetu

  • Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.05.16.05]

···

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

I wrestle still with the notion of control of variables out there and my perception of them. Here are some thoughts I jotted down. Looking forward to some informed responses.

In plain language, to control something is to make it be the way you want. In a more technical sense, to control something is to align its current state with its desired state. In Perceptual
Control Theory (PCT), Bill Powers asserted that what is controlled is perception. We have a reference state for some variable and we perceive its current state. If there is an unacceptable discrepancy between the reference state and the perceived state,
an error exists, and we act (behave) to close or correct it. We make our perception match or align with our reference.

Let’s say I want the thermostat to be set at 70 degrees. I go over to the thermostat and see that it is set to 64 degrees. I turn it up from 64 to 70 degrees. Now my perception of the thermostat
setting is aligned with my desired setting. I want it set to 70 degrees and I perceive it to be set to 70 degrees.

Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some very heated discussions: Do I control the thermostat setting or just my perception of it?

The short answer to that question is: If you intend an inclusive “or”, the answer is “Yes”. If you intend an “xor”, then the answer is “No”.

A longer answer is that changes in the thermostat’s real-world setting, whatever that might be, cause corresponding changes in the perceptual value. Actions you perform to reduce the difference between the perceptual value create changes in the thermostat’s
real-world setting, and that’s the only way that you can change your perceptual value for the thermostat setting.

All this says is that properly speaking, you control neither or both the real-world or the perceived value, because control is a property of the loop, not of the actions or the variables. It’s an emergent property that you can’t locate anywhere but in the whole
loop.

Having said that, you may have a legitimate question about the route of the loop. Is there actually a thermostat out there, or are you under hypnosis or having a dream? Bill P frequently reminded us that the only things of which we can be sure are our own perceptions.
We can never be sure what causes them. What you can say is that IF there really is a thermostat causing your perception, then you are controlling both it and your perception or you are controlling neither, to exactly the same extent.

What you cannot say is that the real thermostat in the environment is set relative to some reference value that is also in the environment. It isn’t. It is set relative to a value in the environment that is what you would perceive it being set to if your internal
perception was equal to your internal reference value. In that sense, you might be justified in claiming that your perception is the only thing you control and the environmental real-world setting just tags along. But if you just want to talk casually, it’s
fine just to say that you controlled the thermostat setting. Everybody will know what you mean, even if a PCT theorist will know something other than what a person “off-the-street” would know. It’s all just words. What happens in a control loop is one thing.
How you talk about it is another.

To my mind, most words in any natural language, including English, have very fuzzy boundaries, and “control” is no exception. Depending on the impression you want to convey to your audience, you can be as precise or as loose as you want. If you want to teach
about exactly what is implied by “control”, you have to start by being loose, and say something like “See that thermostat? I’m going to control its setting by changing it to 70, then to 50, then back to 70, and there’s nothing it can do to stop me”. Then you
might get a little more precise, and say something like “How could I do that? I had to know what I wanted the setting to be, but how did I know what it was so that I could change it? Surely I had to have perceived in my head what its setting was, and whether
that was what I wanted it to be, didn’t I? So I couldn’t have actually controlled the thermostat setting you were looking at, could I?” And then finally, you could talk about the loop, and how you can’t change one without changing the other all around the
loop, and come to the conclusion that either you must have controlled neither or you controlled both because both are variables in the loop, which is where the property of “control” resides.

Martin

[Eetu Pikkarainen
2018-11-06_07:43:36 UTC]

Â

  [Martin Taylor 2018.11.05.16.05]

     …

Â

      To Martin I comment that “control� is not a

property of the loop. “Control� is not adjective but active
verb which denotes an event or a process and requires both
subject and object: During a certain time something controls
something.

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-06_17:31:23 UTC]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.06.10.46]

···

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-06_07:43:36 UTC]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.05.16.05]

  ...

To Martin I comment that “control� is not a property of the loop. “Control� is not adjective but active verb which denotes an event or a process and requires both subject and object: During a certain time something
controls something.

Granting your point, I might ask who or what controls the perception that is controlled? Is it the reference signal? I would not think so. It isn’t active. It’s just a name for a number that may change. Also, the perception can be controlled in a loop that
has no reference signal input, which would seem to rule out the reference. But if not that, what?

A simple answer to your first question: the one who controls the perception is the one whose the perception is. If it is my perception the (only) one who can control it is me. Certainly not the reference and neither even the comparator.
(As you see I am changing my mind: it is not, after all, the loop which controls.)

Instead the “ability to control� is a dispositional emergent property of a certain kind of loop. Thus you have to say that the loop controls something - if you don’t want to change the meaning of the word “control�
to a passive verb like “to become controlled�.

Yes, that is what I tried to suggest. The loop controls something. Maybe I could have worded it better by saying that “controlling” is a property of the loop. It’s not simply an ability to control, since if the loop exists, it does control.

That is a good point! Ability to control is no a property of the loop but of the organism, the same entity whose the perception is and who is controlling that perception (c.f. above). When to loop exists the control happens, but the organism
controls using that loop. Loop is a little like a tool: For example the saw is not sawing but a carpenter saws using the saw. The saw cannot saw but neither the carpenter can saw without the saw. It is only the whole totality of the carpenter and saw which
makes sawing possible and realized. Similarly control is not possible without the whole loop but still it is not the loop which controls.

And even then you had to say either that the whole loop becomes controlled or something in the loop becomes controlled.

I disagree with this. The loop is not the object of control. The values of variables in the loop are, and the loop is the active agent. The question is whether to say that one variable specifically is controlled, two variables are controlled, or all variables
are controlled. The question is not whether they vary in any particular way, but what you choose to say about them, and that depends on what you think your chosen audience will understand you to be implying. I don’t think there is a right and wrong way to
choose what to say, except that if your chosen audience misunderstands, you probably chose wrong.

For a CSGnet audience, I would usually say loosely that perception and CEV are controlled because they tend toward a real or virtual reference value, or more tightly that only the perception is controlled, because it is the only variable that corresponds to
a real reference value.

Agreed.

I would not say that the output is controlled, because its value varies all over the lot while the perception and CEV remain relatively stable as the disturbance changes. I would not say that the error is controlled,
because it always trends toward zero, no matter what else changes.

Perhaps that is a common case but not necessary. It is also possible that the disturbance is relatively stable and then is also the output, and that the reference changes and then also perception and CEV will change. But I would neither
normally say that output is controlled
:wink:

If for example output is not controlled then the whole loop is not controlled, and nothing requires to say that both CEV and perception are controlled.

I would say that the output is “determined” rather than that it is “controlled” by the control loop given any history of the external inputs.

Well said!

But we agree that it’s all about words, not about how control works. I hope I did not choose too wrongly.

We have discussed so much that I believe we think similarly about how control works. But if I or another discusser uses the words only loosely (or which is worse, inconsistently) then we cannot know what the
other one thinks.

Eetu

Martin

[Rick Marken 2018-11-06_15:20:10]

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

FN: I wrestle still with the notion of control of variables out there and my perception of them.Â

RM: I think your problem stems from the idea that your perception is of variables “out there”. I believe the solution to your problem lies in understanding the PCT model of perception. In PCT perception is a function of variables “out there”.Â

FN: Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some very
heated discussions:Â Do I control the
thermostat setting or just my perception of it? Â

RM: The thermostat setting is “just a perception”. Everything you experience is “just a perception”; perception is all you get. What you don’t get are the “variables out there” of which your perceptions (according to the PCT) are a function. Also, according to PCT, when you control perceptions such as the thermostat setting you are controlling the function of “variables out there” to which the perception corresponds.Â

RM: So the notion that we control perceptions of variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because it implies that there are variables out there – like thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled. This leads to the idea that control of the variables “out there” is somehow separate from control of the perceptions of those variables. This is not the PCT model of how perception (and control) works.Â

RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out there” that is controlled. So when you control a perceptual variable – such as the position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual function that defines that perceptual variable.

RM: I think as a popularizer of PCT you have a problem when you explain that PCT views behavior as the “control of perception” since lay people (and apparently a good number ostensible PCT experts) tend to think of perception as just an imperfect representation of what is really “out there”. I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that, according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes), configurations (like shapes), relationships (like proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words, explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in the PCT model of purposeful behavior!Â

Best

Rick

Â

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-07_07:20:09 UTC]

···

[Rick Marken 2018-11-06_15:20:10]

EP: Rick, am I right when I interpret your thinking so that “thermostat setting� and all that kind of things about which we often think that we have perceptions of are perceptions themselves? And out there is something we cannot say what
it is – except perhapps physics can?

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

FN: I wrestle still with the notion of control of variables out there and my perception of them.

RM: I think your problem stems from the idea that your perception is
of variables “out there”. I believe the solution to your problem lies in understanding the PCT model of perception. In PCT perception is a
function of variables “out there”.

EP: That is somewhat unclear. For me those two expressions have quite same or at least compatible meaning:

  1. perception is
    of variables “out there”

  2. perception is a
    function of variables “out there”

Do you possibly mean that perception is not a representation of variables out there? (Even this is problematic because function is a representation.)

FN: Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some very heated discussions: Do I control the thermostat setting or just my perception of it?

RM: The thermostat setting is “just a perception”. Everything you experience is “just a perception”; perception is all you get. What you don’t get are the “variables out there” of which your perceptions (according to the PCT) are a function. Also, according to PCT, when you control
perceptions such as the thermostat setting you are controlling the function of “variables out there” to which the perception corresponds.

EP: This seems to support my initial interpretation.

RM: So the notion that we control perceptions
of variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because it implies that there are variables out there – like thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled. This leads to the idea that control of the variables “out there” is somehow separate
from control of the perceptions of those variables. This is not the PCT model of how perception (and control) works.

EP: Here you seem to deny that there are variables at all “out there�. But that would mean that all perceptions were imaginations or hallucinations. Thus there must be variables which our perceptions are (functions) of. When we say that
we perceive a “thermostat setting� we perceive something in “out there� even though the “thermostat setting� is the name we give to our perception. When we say that we have a perception
of thermostat setting we should say that we have a “thermostat setting perception�, is it this what you meant?

RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input functions)
defines the aspect of the “variables out there” that is controlled. So when you control a perceptual variable – such as the position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also known as “reality”)
that is defined by the perceptual function that defines that perceptual variable.

EP: What you mean by “aspect�? It is normally a quite qualitative concept meaning something like feature, side, point of view, direction. Is “aspect� a function with many arguments? Or do you mean that the perceptual input function is a
multi-argument function and “aspect� is the set or collection of the variables “out there� which are the arguments of that function?

If you this is what you mean could we then say that that perception is not
of variables out there but of those sets or collections of variables out there?

If so could we then say that the CEV (“corresponding complex environmental variable�) is just that set or collection of variables “out there� which is the aspect of reality the perception is a function of?

RM: I think as a popularizer of PCT you have a problem when you explain that PCT views behavior as the “control of perception” since lay people (and apparently a good number ostensible PCT experts) tend to think
of perception as just an imperfect representation of what is really “out there”.

EP: But a (multi-argument) function of a set or collection of variables “out there� IS a representation of the values of those variables in that collection, isn’t it? Is it perfect or imperfect is quite another question, but many possible
uncertainty factors from quantum phenomena to intermediate disturbances in the situation of the perception to the varying internal state of our nervous system supports the cautious use of the word “imperfect�.

I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that, according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as intensities (like loudness), sensations
(like tastes), configurations (like shapes), relationships (like proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words, explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in the PCT model of purposeful behavior!

EP: I would say that according to PCT models we control the perceptions i.e. the values of the multi-argument perceptual input functions by affecting the values of the variables of the perceived aspects of the world i.e. the values of the
variables which belong to the sets or collections of the arguments of those perceptual functions.

EP: (btw. the higher we rise in the perceptual hierarchy the more the possible uncertainty factors multiply and the more we have reason to assume that perceptions are imperfect.)

Eetu

  • Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

Best

Rick

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

It's all words, but I find it interesting that Rick has reverted to

a form of language he hasn’t been using much in recent months. In
answering Eetu, he does as at one time he used to do in a good
proportion of his messages, treating the phrase “according to PCT”
as a suitable substitution for “in my opinion”.

Let's try to analyze Rick's answer to Fred, with the understanding

that everything I say is just my opinion.

This is not just "in PCT". Given that everything you know of the

world comes through your senses, it is a truism, on which any
philosophy of the relationship between us and the world, other than
pure solipsism, must be based.
Here we come into questionable territory, in the unsupported
assertion in the second sentence. By itself, the sentence could be
read as saying (correctly, in my opinion) that the variables you
perceive as being “out there” are not provably “out there”. The
context, however, argues that this would be the wrong interpretation
of Rick’s intent, which seems more likely to be that there simply
are no “variables out there”. That also is unprovable, and Rick
offers no evidence to support it. In my opinion, according to PCT we control perceptual variables in
order to keep our intrinsic variables in a condition to support
continued life. I believe this to be the bedrock foundation of PCT.
In my opinion, PCT includes a necessary assumption that there exists
a “real reality” (to use a term favoured by Bill Powers) that we
perceive and on which we act. This reality consists of more than
simply the bare influences of real reality on the sense organs that
provide the base data on which we construct our perceptions. The
assumption is that there really is some complex world “out there” on
which we act and that we perceive.
Again, I don’t think that’s just “according to PCT”. If you don’t
include solipsism as a possibility, I don’t see how you could avoid
this conclusion, no matter what your theory of what happens inside
the organism, be it a person, a bacterium, or a flower (unless your
theory includes “extra-sensory perception”).
This is one of those places where logic flies out of the window. Now
I am not saying that there is a variable out there we label “logic”,
which has the property of being able to fly, and that there is
something in real reality knowable as a “window” that has a property
that things with the ability to fly can fly out of. Rick’s “logic”
would lead to the conclusion that because we believe that there
exists no such flying object departing through a window, therefore we think we perceive has a counterpart in real reality.
The PCT question, in my opinion, is why we construct the particular
functions that PCT calls Perceptual Input Functions (or just
Perceptual Functions) that we do, rather than arbitrary functions
selected from the (literal) infinity of possibilities. The PCT
answer is “reorganization”. The PCT explanation of “reorganization”
is that by reorganizing to control perceptual variables created by
those functions our intrinsic variables have an increased chance of
the organism continuing to live in the real reality environment that
happens to influence its sensor systems.
Again, that is not a logical conclusion, and would not be, even had
the earlier statements all been true. Whether one is talking about
PCT or about any other non-magical theory, the variables in the
complex reality “out there” can be recovered only through what
happens at the sensory inputs that are influenced by real reality. Underlying this illogic, I think, is something that continued to
come up all through previous incarnations of this dispute. I never
could be sure what it was those times, and I’m not sure what it is
now. Sometimes it seemed as though Rick did not believe that a
function of variables produced a variable as the result of its
operation. But I think the more important issue is one that Powers
sometimes brought up, which was that the perceptual functions inside
the organism were constructed by the organism. This was treated as
tantamount to saying that they were arbitrary.
I think the idea that our persistent perceptual functions (those
that stick around) are arbitrary is inconsistent with the idea that
by controlling them the organism enhances its chances of continued
survival in good health, and that reorganization by the e-coli
method or any other that helps maintain the intrinsic variables in
good condition will require perceptual functions to produce
perceptions that can be controlled by influencing corresponding
variables in real reality. It is much more likely that a perception
whose control enhances the maintenance of the intrinsic variables is
a perception of some property of real reality (a “variable out
there”) than that it is an arbitrary function of perceptual
variables.
In my opinion, this is correct.
Yes, I agree with this, too. But how does it relate in any kind of
ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions,
and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual
function being produced?
This is a very different point, a question of PR (public relations).
However, I believe that most people accept the idea that
hallucinations, dreams and illusions contain perceptions of things
that are not “out there”, even though the perceiver may a the time
think that their environment does contain those things. So it may
not be as much of n issue as you make it out to be.
Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can
control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that
perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality
IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and
you have survived long enough to have that perception.
Martin

···

[Rick Marken 2018-11-06_15:20:10]

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

            FN: I wrestle still with the notion of control of

variables out there and my perception of them.Â

        RM: I think your problem stems from the idea that your

perception is of variables “out there”. I believe
the solution to your problem lies in understanding the PCT
model of perception. In PCT perception is a * function of*variables “out there”.

              FN:

Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some
very
heated discussions:Â Do I control the
thermostat setting or just my perception of it? Â

RM: The thermostat setting is “just a
perception”. Everything you experience is “just a
perception”; perception is all you get. What you don’t get
are the “variables out there” of which your perceptions
(according to the PCT) are a function.

        Also, according to PCT, when you control perceptions such

as the thermostat setting you are controlling the function
of “variables out there” to which the perception
corresponds.

RM: So the notion that we control perceptions of
variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because
it implies that there are variables out there – like
thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled.

nothing

        This leads to the idea that control of the variables "out

there" is somehow separate from control of the perceptions
of those variables.

        This is not the PCT model of how perception (and

control) works.Â

        RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input

functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out
there” that is controlled.

        So when you control a perceptual variable -- such as the

position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are
controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also
known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

        RM: I think as a popularizer of PCT you have a problem

when you explain that PCT views behavior as the “control of
perception” since lay people (and apparently a good number
ostensible PCT experts) tend to think of perception as just  an
imperfect representation of what is really “out there”.

        I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that,

according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world
around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as
intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words,
explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in
the PCT model of purposeful behavior!

Best

Rick

Â

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

** Distance Consulting
LLC**

“Assistance at A Distance”


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-11-07_17:45:04]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-07_07:20:09 UTC]

Â

EP: Rick, am I right when I interpret your thinking so that “thermostat settingâ€? and all that kind of things about which we often think that we have perceptions of are perceptions themselves?

RM: Yes, that’s a nice way to put it.Â

RM: I think your problem stems from the idea that your perception is
of variables “out there”. I believe the solution to your problem lies in understanding the PCT model of perception. In PCT perception is a
function of variables “out there”.Â

Â

EP: That is somewhat unclear. For me those two expressions have quite same or at least compatible meaning:

  1. perception is
    of variables “out there”
  2. perception is a
    function of variables “out there”
    EP: Do you possibly mean that perception is not a representation of variables out there? (Even this is problematic because function is a representation.)

RM: Yes, I agree it’s unclear because “variables” means something different in the two phrases. In expression 1, “variables” are variable aspects of experience; like the position of the thermostat dial, the color of the room, the type of sofa against the wall, etc. In expression 2, “variables” are the physical variables that are the basis of the perceptions of the position of the thermostat, the color of the room, the type of sofa, etc.Â

 RM: So the notion that we control perceptions
of variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because it implies that there are variables out there – like thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled. This leads to the idea that control of the variables “out there” is somehow separate
from control of the perceptions of those variables. This is not the PCT model of how perception (and control) works.Â

Â

EP: Here you seem to deny that there are variables at all “out thereâ€?.

RM: Yes, I would be doing that if I meant “variables” in the sense of meaning 2. But here I mean “variables” in the sense of meaning 1; I deny that there is, for example, a “position of the thermostat dial” variable out there to be perceived as “position of the thermostat dial”. I believe (consistent with the PCT model and its evidential base) that the “position of the thermostat dial” is a perception constructed by perceptual functions in the organism from the sensory effects of physical variables.

 RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input functions)
defines the aspect of the “variables out there” that is controlled. So when you control a perceptual variable – such as the position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also known as “reality”)
that is defined by the perceptual function that defines that perceptual variable.

Â

EP: What you mean by “aspectâ€?? It is normally a quite qualitative concept meaning something like feature, side, point of view, direction. Is “aspectâ€? a function with many arguments?

RM: Yes.Â

Â

EP: Or do you mean that the perceptual input function is a
multi-argument function and “aspectâ€? is the set or collection of the variables “out thereâ€? which are the arguments of that function?

 RM: No, I use “aspect” to refer to the function of physical variables (actually, the sensory effects of those variables) that defines the perception. So the aspect of the environment (perception) that is controlled when you control the area of the rectangle in my “What is size” demo (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html) is defined by the mathematical function: height x width. When you control perimeter, the aspect of the same environment that is controlled is defined by the mathematical function: 2* (height+ width).Â

EP: If you this is what you mean could we then say that that perception is not
of variables out there but of those sets or collections of variables out there?

 RM: I suppose. But that’s not what I meant so it’s not a problem. What I meant is, I hope, clarified in my paragraph above.Â

 EP: But a (multi-argument) function of a set or collection of variables “out thereâ€? IS a representation of the values of those variables in that collection, isn’t it?

RM: The function represents an aspect of the variables “out there”; it can’t possibly represent those variables themselvesÂ

Â

EP: I would say that according to PCT models we control the perceptions i.e. the values of the multi-argument perceptual input functions by affecting the values of the variables of the perceived aspects of the world i.e. the values of the
variables which belong to the sets or collections of the arguments of those perceptual functions.

RM: That’s exactly right. I think it would be clearer if you left out “the values of the variables of the perceived aspects of the world” and just said:Â “According to PCT we control perceptions – the values of the multi-argument perceptual input functions – by affecting the values of the variables which belong to the sets or collections of the arguments of those perceptual functions”.

 EP: (btw. the higher we rise in the perceptual hierarchy the more the possible uncertainty factors multiply and the more we have reason to assume that perceptions are imperfect.)

RM: What is a “perfect” perception? Is it a perception that is perfect in the sense that it is an exact representation of what is actually “out there”? Or is it a noise free analog of the aspect of the aspect of the environment that is defined by the perceptual function? I think only the latter definition of perfection makes sense in PCT.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

···

Â

Â

Eetu

  • Please, regard all my statements as questions,

   no matter how they are formulated.

Â

Â

Â

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin (2018.11.08.09:01ET)]

Ooh, goody! We get to talk (again) about stuff that words are incapable of adequately indicating! Three cheers for constructivist epistemology!

Rick Marken 2018-11-06_15:20:10 –

RM: The thermostat setting is “just a perception”. Everything you experience is “just a perception”; perception is all you get. What you don’t get are the “variables out there” of which your perceptions (according to the PCT) are a function.

Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18 –

MMT: Here we come into questionable territory, in the unsupported assertion in the second sentence. By itself, the sentence could be read as saying (correctly, in my opinion) that the variables you perceive as being “out there” are not provably “out there”. The context, however, argues that this would be the wrong interpretation of Rick’s intent, which seems more likely to be that there simply are no “variables out there”. That also is unprovable, and Rick offers no evidence to support it.Â

The important verb is “get” where Rick said «What you don’t get are the “variables out there”.» I don’t see any assertion about the existential status of those variables. He’s only talking about “getting” access to those variables by some supposed means other than by perceptions of them.

I think the problem you are skewering doesn’t come up until a little farther on:

RM: So the notion that we control perceptions of variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because it implies that there are variables out there – like thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled.

I think that Rick is saying we can’t claim a 1-1 correspondence between a complex perceptual construct (“the taste of lemonade” is a stock example) and some unitary variable in the environment.

Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-11-07_07:20:09 UTC –

EP: That is somewhat unclear. For me those two expressions have quite same or at least compatible meaning:

  • perception is of variables “out there”
  • perception is a function of variables “out there”

EP: Do you possibly mean that perception is not a representation of variables out there? (Even this is problematic because function is a representation.)

Rick Marken 2018-11-07_17:45:04 –

RM: Yes, I agree it’s unclear because “variables” means something different in the two phrases. In expression 1, “variables” are variable aspects of experience; like the position of the thermostat dial, the color of the room, the type of sofa against the wall, etc. In expression 2, “variables” are the physical variables that are the basis of the perceptions of the position of the thermostat, the color of the room, the type of sofa, etc.Â

Variables (sense 1) are experienced but not communicable, variables (2) are theoretical and communicable, and the relation between them is a story told about the theory. The theory and its story are inseparable, and communication of the theory and of the story is by collective control.

···

/BN

On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 11:30 AM Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

It's all words, but I find it interesting that Rick has reverted to

a form of language he hasn’t been using much in recent months. In
answering Eetu, he does as at one time he used to do in a good
proportion of his messages, treating the phrase “according to PCT”
as a suitable substitution for “in my opinion”.

Let's try to analyze Rick's answer to Fred, with the understanding

that everything I say is just my opinion.

[Rick Marken 2018-11-06_15:20:10]

From Fred Nickols (2018.11.05.1531 ET)

            FN: I wrestle still with the notion of control of

variables out there and my perception of them.Â

        RM: I think your problem stems from the idea that your

perception is of variables “out there”. I believe
the solution to your problem lies in understanding the PCT
model of perception. In PCT perception is a * function of*variables “out there”.

This is not just "in PCT". Given that everything you know of the

world comes through your senses, it is a truism, on which any
philosophy of the relationship between us and the world, other than
pure solipsism, must be based.

              FN:

Now comes the kind of question that can trigger some
very
heated discussions:Â Do I control the
thermostat setting or just my perception of it? Â

RM: The thermostat setting is “just a
perception”. Everything you experience is “just a
perception”; perception is all you get. What you don’t get
are the “variables out there” of which your perceptions
(according to the PCT) are a function.

Here we come into questionable territory, in the unsupported

assertion in the second sentence. By itself, the sentence could be
read as saying (correctly, in my opinion) that the variables you
perceive as being “out there” are not provably “out there”. The
context, however, argues that this would be the wrong interpretation
of Rick’s intent, which seems more likely to be that there simply
are no “variables out there”. That also is unprovable, and Rick
offers no evidence to support it.

In my opinion, according to PCT we control perceptual variables in

order to keep our intrinsic variables in a condition to support
continued life. I believe this to be the bedrock foundation of PCT.
In my opinion, PCT includes a necessary assumption that there exists
a “real reality” (to use a term favoured by Bill Powers) that we
perceive and on which we act. This reality consists of more than
simply the bare influences of real reality on the sense organs that
provide the base data on which we construct our perceptions. The
assumption is that there really is some complex world “out there” on
which we act and that we perceive.

        Also, according to PCT, when you control perceptions such

as the thermostat setting you are controlling the function
of “variables out there” to which the perception
corresponds.

Again, I don't think that's just "according to PCT". If you don't

include solipsism as a possibility, I don’t see how you could avoid
this conclusion, no matter what your theory of what happens inside
the organism, be it a person, a bacterium, or a flower (unless your
theory includes “extra-sensory perception”).

RM: So the notion that we control perceptions of
variables out there is just not consistent with PCT because
it implies that there are variables out there – like
thermostat settings – to be perceived and controlled.

This is one of those places where logic flies out of the window. Now

I am not saying that there is a variable out there we label “logic”,
which has the property of being able to fly, and that there is
something in real reality knowable as a “window” that has a property
that things with the ability to fly can fly out of. Rick’s “logic”
would lead to the conclusion that because we believe that there
exists no such flying object departing through a window, therefore nothing
we think we perceive has a counterpart in real reality.

The PCT question, in my opinion, is why we construct the particular

functions that PCT calls Perceptual Input Functions (or just
Perceptual Functions) that we do, rather than arbitrary functions
selected from the (literal) infinity of possibilities. The PCT
answer is “reorganization”. The PCT explanation of “reorganization”
is that by reorganizing to control perceptual variables created by
those functions our intrinsic variables have an increased chance of
the organism continuing to live in the real reality environment that
happens to influence its sensor systems.

        This leads to the idea that control of the variables "out

there" is somehow separate from control of the perceptions
of those variables.

Again, that is not a logical conclusion, and would not be, even had

the earlier statements all been true. Whether one is talking about
PCT or about any other non-magical theory, the variables in the
complex reality “out there” can be recovered only through what
happens at the sensory inputs that are influenced by real reality.

Underlying this illogic, I think, is something that continued to

come up all through previous incarnations of this dispute. I never
could be sure what it was those times, and I’m not sure what it is
now. Sometimes it seemed as though Rick did not believe that a
function of variables produced a variable as the result of its
operation. But I think the more important issue is one that Powers
sometimes brought up, which was that the perceptual functions inside
the organism were constructed by the organism. This was treated as
tantamount to saying that they were arbitrary.

I think the idea that our persistent perceptual functions (those

that stick around) are arbitrary is inconsistent with the idea that
by controlling them the organism enhances its chances of continued
survival in good health, and that reorganization by the e-coli
method or any other that helps maintain the intrinsic variables in
good condition will require perceptual functions to produce
perceptions that can be controlled by influencing corresponding
variables in real reality. It is much more likely that a perception
whose control enhances the maintenance of the intrinsic variables is
a perception of some property of real reality (a “variable out
there”) than that it is an arbitrary function of perceptual
variables.

        This is not the PCT model of how perception (and

control) works.Â

        RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input

functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out
there” that is controlled.

In my opinion, this is correct.
        So when you control a perceptual variable -- such as the

position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are
controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also
known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

Yes, I agree with this, too. But how does it relate in any kind of

ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions,
and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual
function being produced?

        RM: I think as a popularizer of PCT you have a problem

when you explain that PCT views behavior as the “control of
perception” since lay people (and apparently a good number
ostensible PCT experts) tend to think of perception as just  an
imperfect representation of what is really “out there”.

This is a very different point, a question of PR (public relations).

However, I believe that most people accept the idea that
hallucinations, dreams and illusions contain perceptions of things
that are not “out there”, even though the perceiver may a the time
think that their environment does contain those things. So it may
not be as much of n issue as you make it out to be.

        I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that,

according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world
around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as
intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words,
explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in
the PCT model of purposeful behavior!

Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can

control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that
perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality
IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and
you have survived long enough to have that perception.

Martin

Best

Rick

Â

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

** Distance Consulting
LLC**

“Assistance at A Distance”


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

        RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input

functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out
there” that is controlled.

MT: In my opinion, this is correct.

RM: Indeed it is.Â

        RM: So when you control a perceptual variable -- such as the

position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are
controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also
known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

MT: Yes, I agree with this, too.

RM: Correct again.Â

Â

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of

ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions,
and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual
function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.Â

RM: The PCT model of perception views all perceptual variables this way; all are signals that are analogs of variations in aspects of the organism’s environment (internal and external) that are defined by the perceptual functions that produce them. The main aim of PCT research is to determine what aspects of the environment – what perceptions – are being controlled when organisms are seen to be behaving in various ways.

        RM: I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that,

according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world
around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as
intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words,
explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in
the PCT model of purposeful behavior!Â

MT: Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can

control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that
perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality
IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and
you have survived long enough to have that perception.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all functions of physical variables in the real world.Â

RM: Per the PCT model, there is no “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity or runniness in the real world. All that’s out there are physical variables: the v’s in the diagram of the PCT model in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. I believe we perceive the world as we do – we construct from physical reality perceptions of things like “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity and runniness – because perceiving it in this way proved evolutionarily adaptive to do so. I believe that it’s possible to have developed different ways of perceiving the same physical environment that would also have been evolutionarily adaptive. I think Powers’ had a demonstration of this but I can’t find it at the moment. So I don’t think it is reorganization that is responsible for the way we perceive the world; reorganization is an individual level phenomenon. I think evolution led to the way we perceive the reality – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

BestÂ

Rick

···


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.09.15.33]

[Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

                  RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of

perceptual input functions) defines the
aspect of the “variables out there” that is
controlled.

MT: In my opinion, this is correct.

RM: Indeed it is.

Thank you, Oh guru. I am glad to know that I am correct. That's much

better than just knowing that we have the same opinion on the
matter.

                  RM: So when you control a perceptual variable

– such as the position of the dial that sets the
thermostat – you are controlling the aspect of
the “variables out there” (also known as
“reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

MT: Yes, I agree with this, too.

RM: Correct again.Â

Â

          MT: But how does it

relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the assertion that
there is no corresponding variable “out there” that the
organism can influence by its actions, and whose existence
enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual function
being produced?

        RM: Let's try the "taste of lemonade" example again. The

taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from
being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no
variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of
lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable;
the physical variables that are the basis of this perception
are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory
effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a
taste.

Without accepting or rejecting this claim, I ask what relevance does

it have to the question at issue?

        RM: The PCT model of perception views all perceptual

variables this way; all are signals that are analogs of
variations in aspects of the organism’s environment
(internal and external) that are defined by the perceptual
functions that produce them.

We know we agree on this. It has been established by my saying I

agree, and with Rick saying he agreed (Oh sorry, not that he agrees,
but that I am actually correct, which is rather different). It seems
unnecessary to repeat it here.

                  RM: I think a way to overcome this problem is

to say that, according to PCT, we control various
aspects of the world around us (which, in PCT, are
called perceptions), such as intensities (like
loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In
other words, explain control of perception the way
it is conceived of in the PCT model of purposeful
behavior!Â

          MT: Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception

you can control by influencing what appears to be in the
environment, that perception is likely to be of something
that really in real reality IS in the environment, because
reorganization has made it so, and you have survived long
enough to have that perception.

        RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real

reality are physical variables that are the basis of
our perceptions.

I disagree here. According to PCT (see, I can use that synonym for

“in my opinion”, but here I am channelling Bill Powers anyway),
there exists a real reality, but all we can know of it is through
our perceptions. The rest of what we know is that we exist to
perceive whatever we do perceive. That there are physical variables
forming the basis of our perceptions is as unknowable as is whether
the chair I perceive myself to be sitting on exists in real reality.

According to PCT (my opinion now), we are alive because we and our

ancestors back to the beginning of life were lucky enough to be able
to affect real reality in ways that kept our intrinsic variables in
good condition long enough for our ancestors to produce descendants;
we and they did that by controlling internal variables that
corresponded to some property of real reality that they could
influence.

Either PCT is dead wrong or at least some of our perceptions do

correspond to complex properties of real reality. That doesn’t mean
all our perceptions do, by any means. We keep (again according to
PCT) reorganizing to create new perceptual functions that might be
controllable by action on real reality. If they can’t be controlled,
they might be reorganized out of existence. If they can, but to the
detriment of our intrinsic variables, they will probably be
reorganized out of existence. Natural Selection works on perceptual
functions, just as it does on genes. What works is likely to stick
around longer than what doesn’t.

      ...I believe we perceive the world as

we do – we construct from physical reality perceptions of
things like “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity and
runniness – because perceiving it in this way proved
evolutionarily adaptive to do so.

Good. That's acknowledged as an opinion. And it is one on which we

agree, as I explained above.

      I believe that it's possible to have

developed different ways of perceiving the same physical
environment that would also have been evolutionarily adaptive.

Sure. We agree on that, too. But with some caveats, particularly

that whatever perceptual functions evolved to produce perceptions
our ancestors controlled, they must have been ones that helped them
to survive with their intrinsic variables in good shape. We don’t
perceive the electrical field variations in water. Some fish do. Are
they not perceiving the real reality that lets them evade predators
or to catch prey?

      I think Powers' had a demonstration of

this but I can’t find it at the moment. So I don’t think it is
reorganization that is responsible for the way we perceive the
world; reorganization is an individual level phenomenon.

Put an "only" in there (as in "I don't think it is only

reorganization") and we agree again.

      I think evolution led to the way we

perceive the reality

Agreed, but indeed individuals do see the world differently because

of reorganization. Could you follow the days-old track of an
antelope through a semi-desert bush, and could someone who grew up
to do that naturally find a good meal in a city downtown without
guidance?

      -- and if Powers' hypothesis is

correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual
functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so
different types of hierarchically related perceptual
variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs,
principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the
types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to
be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors
– that is what we should be testing when we do research on
purpose.

If you say so. I think it would be more valuable to the world at

large if we could use PCT to figure out how to make
life more controllable for people and other animals in this
overcrowded world. Granted, the research you want may well be a
crucial part of that effort, but we can’t tell yet. Basically, it
seems that Kent is, if not the only one, one of very few who are
working to this end. Your effort seems to be devoted to telling
Galileo to polish a better telescope lens, while opposing his use of
the telescope to discover the moons of Jupiter.

Martin
···

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[From Bruce Nevin (2018.11.09.16:55 ET)]

Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28Â --Â

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all *functions of *physical variables in the real world.  Â

Yes, the best we’ve got seems to be reductionism to variables defined in physics and chemistry.Â

As far as looking for the ‘really real’, however, that’s just swapping one set of perceptions for another set which we are more comfortable thinking of as ‘really real’. It’s just saying that collectively controlled perceptions of lay people are perceptual constructs (any variables that we can talk about are collectively controlled, if only in the talking about them), but some perceptions that are collectively controlled by physicists and chemists are ‘really real’, in the sense that they correspond one-to-one to ‘really real’ physical variables in the environment. We feel that successes of the ‘hard’ sciences warrant attributing this ‘really real’ status to those perceptions, not so our quotidian successes controlling our lay perceptions. Â

But we don’t fully participate in the collective control of those variables unless we are qualified and up to date physicists or chemists. Most of us participate to some degree in collective control of hopefully more or less similar perceptions, including some of the words that physicists and chemists use, and maybe even some of the chemical and mathematical formulae and diagrams. Interestingly, physicists by and large are not among the True Believers. Engineers are more apt to be, because they depend upon products of science to design and make things that work reliably. Also in this general direction is a lovely scaly dragon of our culture called Scientism.

A perception such as ‘the taste of lemonade’ can be analyzed into chemical components and distinct sensory input functions at the periphery of the nervous system, and a combining perceptual input function presumed by theory to exist somewhat farther in from the periphery – “the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste”. Oil, water, and lemon juice can be further analyzed into components in respect to mixture, chemical interaction, electrical charges, and molecular structure, but only to the extent that these may affect the neural signals produced by peripheral sensory inputs.Â

Ah, if only the taste of lemonade (and other things) were so simple. A fun exposure to some other inputs:

https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/variety-is-the-spice-of-life/

https://www.sciencefriday.com/articles/can-taste-color/

So, OK, maybe that’s more reason to give less credence to the reality of our quotidian perceptions (that word again) and more to those of physics and chemistry, which are frankly elements of theories without the immediacy of ordinary subjective perception. Â

Now that’s all perfectly clear, right?

···

/BN

On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 1:36 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

        RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input

functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out
there” that is controlled.

MT: In my opinion, this is correct.

RM: Indeed it is.Â

        RM: So when you control a perceptual variable -- such as the

position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are
controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also
known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

MT: Yes, I agree with this, too.

RM: Correct again.Â

Â

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of

ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions,
and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual
function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.Â

RM: The PCT model of perception views all perceptual variables this way; all are signals that are analogs of variations in aspects of the organism’s environment (internal and external) that are defined by the perceptual functions that produce them. The main aim of PCT research is to determine what aspects of the environment – what perceptions – are being controlled when organisms are seen to be behaving in various ways.

        RM: I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that,

according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world
around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as
intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words,
explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in
the PCT model of purposeful behavior!Â

MT: Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can

control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that
perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality
IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and
you have survived long enough to have that perception.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all functions of physical variables in the real world.Â

RM: Per the PCT model, there is no “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity or runniness in the real world. All that’s out there are physical variables: the v’s in the diagram of the PCT model in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. I believe we perceive the world as we do – we construct from physical reality perceptions of things like “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity and runniness – because perceiving it in this way proved evolutionarily adaptive to do so. I believe that it’s possible to have developed different ways of perceiving the same physical environment that would also have been evolutionarily adaptive. I think Powers’ had a demonstration of this but I can’t find it at the moment. So I don’t think it is reorganization that is responsible for the way we perceive the world; reorganization is an individual level phenomenon. I think evolution led to the way we perceive the reality – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_10:32:57]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.09.15.33]

          MT: But how does it

relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the assertion that
there is no corresponding variable “out there” that the
organism can influence by its actions, and whose existence
enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual function
being produced?

        RM: Let's try the "taste of lemonade" example again. The

taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from
being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no
variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of
lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable;
the physical variables that are the basis of this perception
are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory
effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a
taste.

MT: Without accepting or rejecting this claim, I ask what relevance does

it have to the question at issue?

 RM: I believe the question at issue was whether there is a variable “out there” that corresponds to the perception that the organism can control. The “taste of lemonade” is relevant to this question because when you make lemonade (control for the taste of lemonade) you are controlling a perceptual variable that doesn’t corresponds to a variable “out there”; the taste of lemonade doesn’t exist as a variable “out there” in the environment; is a perceptual variable that is a particular function of several physical variables. A different function of the same physical variables would not produce a perception of the taste of lemonade.Â

        RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real

reality are physical variables that are the basis of
our perceptions.

MT: I disagree here. According to PCT... there exists a real reality, but all we can know of it is through

our perceptions.

RM: This is not really the best way to verbally describe the PCT model of perception. The model does assume the existence of physical reality – it’s the “environment” side of diagrams of the PCT model – but in PCT perception is not a process aimed a “knowing” that reality. Perception is a process of constructing neural analogs of aspects of that reality. I think it is somewhat misleading to say that we know reality through our perceptions because it implies that there is only one correct way to perceive reality. But it is easily demonstrated that we can perceive the same reality in more than one way and all ways can be “correct”. This is demonstrated by my “What is size” demo (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html), where the same reality can be perceived as either a perimeter or an area and either one can be correctly controlled.Â

      RM: -- and if Powers' hypothesis is

correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual
functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so
different types of hierarchically related perceptual
variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs,
principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the
types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to
be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors
– that is what we should be testing when we do research on
purpose.

MT: If you say so. I think it would be more valuable to the world at

large if we could use PCT to figure out how to make
life more controllable for people and other animals in this
overcrowded world.

Â

RM: In order to use PCT to make life better for people in an overcrowded world you have to know what perceptions people are controlling for and how they can control them. So testing to determine what perceptions people want or need to control for must be at least an implicit part of research aimed at making things better for people. Basic PCT research must inform applied research and vice versa.Â

BestÂ

Rick

···


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_10:59:42]

[From Bruce Nevin (2018.11.09.16:55 ET)]

Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28Â --Â

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all *functions of *physical variables in the real world.  Â

BN: Yes, the best we’ve got seems to be reductionism to variables defined in physics and chemistry.Â

 RM: What is it that you think we’re trying to “get” that makes "variables defined in physics and chemistry" the best we’ve “got”?

BN: As far as looking for the ‘really real’, however, that’s just swapping one set of perceptions for another set which we are more comfortable thinking of as ‘really real’.

RM: The PCT model of perception is not "looking for the ‘really real’ ". The PCT model just assumes that there is a real world on the other side of our senses and that this world (the “environment side” of PCT diagrams) is the models of physics and chemistry.Â

Â

BN: Ah, if only the taste of lemonade (and other things) were so simple. A fun exposure to some other inputs:

https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/variety-is-the-spice-of-life/

https://www.sciencefriday.com/articles/can-taste-color/

BN: So, OK, maybe that’s more reason to give less credence to the reality of our quotidian perceptions (that word again) and more to those of physics and chemistry, which are frankly elements of theories without the immediacy of ordinary subjective perception. Â

BN: Now that’s all perfectly clear, right?

RM: Not really. It’s not clear to me how this post relates to the topic of this thread, which I think is the PCT model of perception. Feel free to try again if you like but if you do please avoid using the term “collective control” since it elicits in me a strong urge to throw things at the computer screen;-) But if you just can’t resist, please explain what the hell you mean by the term.Â

Best

Rick

Â

···

/BN

On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 1:36 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

        RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input

functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out
there” that is controlled.

MT: In my opinion, this is correct.

RM: Indeed it is.Â

        RM: So when you control a perceptual variable -- such as the

position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are
controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also
known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual
function that defines that perceptual variable.

MT: Yes, I agree with this, too.

RM: Correct again.Â

Â

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of

ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions,
and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual
function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.Â

RM: The PCT model of perception views all perceptual variables this way; all are signals that are analogs of variations in aspects of the organism’s environment (internal and external) that are defined by the perceptual functions that produce them. The main aim of PCT research is to determine what aspects of the environment – what perceptions – are being controlled when organisms are seen to be behaving in various ways.

        RM: I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that,

according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world
around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as
intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes),
configurations (like shapes), relationships (like
proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words,
explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in
the PCT model of purposeful behavior!Â

MT: Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can

control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that
perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality
IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and
you have survived long enough to have that perception.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all functions of physical variables in the real world.Â

RM: Per the PCT model, there is no “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity or runniness in the real world. All that’s out there are physical variables: the v’s in the diagram of the PCT model in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. I believe we perceive the world as we do – we construct from physical reality perceptions of things like “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity and runniness – because perceiving it in this way proved evolutionarily adaptive to do so. I believe that it’s possible to have developed different ways of perceiving the same physical environment that would also have been evolutionarily adaptive. I think Powers’ had a demonstration of this but I can’t find it at the moment. So I don’t think it is reorganization that is responsible for the way we perceive the world; reorganization is an individual level phenomenon. I think evolution led to the way we perceive the reality – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_15:14:17]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.10.16.42]

  MT: This being the eve of Armistice Day,

and the 100th Anniversary of the original, let’s see if we can
make peace.

RM: Sure. Let’s peacefully agree that what you call PCT has very little overlap with what I call PCT. So what I do with PCT is of little value to you and what you do has little value to me. It has ever been thus and it will ever be thus. Peace be with you.

Best

Rick

Â

···

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_10:32:57]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.09.15.33]

                      MT: But how does it

relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the
assertion that there is no corresponding
variable “out there” that the organism can
influence by its actions, and whose existence
enhanced the likelihood of just this
perceptual function being produced?

                    RM: Let's try the "taste of lemonade" example

again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the
taste can vary from being more to being less
like lemonade) but there is no variable “out
there” that corresponds to the taste of
lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual
variable; the physical variables that are the
basis of this perception are the chemicals
(water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects
are combined by a perceptual function to produce
a taste.

            MT: Without accepting or rejecting this claim, I ask

what relevance does it have to the question at issue?

          Â RM: I believe the question at issue was whether there

is a variable “out there” that corresponds to the
perception that the organism can control.

I'm afraid I disagree. I would have agreed, had you said that the

question at issue was whether there can be a variable “out there”
that corresponds to some perception that the organism can control.
The reason I asked how the question was relevant was that no light
can be shed on this question by discovering either that the “taste
of lemonade” is a variable “out there” or that it isn’t.

          The "taste of lemonade" is relevant to this question

because when you make lemonade (control for the taste of
lemonade) you are controlling a perceptual variable that
doesn’t corresponds to a variable “out there”; the taste
of lemonade doesn’t exist as a variable “out there” in the
environment;

That is something you don't know, and maybe cannot know. It is an

unsupported, and perhaps unsupportable, assertion.

is a perceptual variable that is a particular function
of several physical variables. A different function of the
same physical variables would not produce a
perception of the taste of lemonade.

On that we can definitively agree. But it really isn't relevant to

what we seem both to agree on, that a function of several variables
that produced a perception of something we can influence so as to
control that perception and that helps maintain intrinsic variables
in a healthy state will stick around in spite of evolutionary or
reorganizational changes longer than one that we cannot control by
action on the environment. If one can control X+Y and by doing so
help one’s intrinsic variables, whereas controlling X-Y does nothing
for the intrinsic variables, a perceptual function that produces
X+Y is likely to survive longer than one that produces X-Y.

                    RM: According to the PCT model, what

constitutes real reality are physical variables
that are the basis of our perceptions.

            MT: I disagree here. According to PCT... there exists a

real reality, but all we can know of it is through our
perceptions.

          RM: This is not really the best way to verbally

describe the PCT model of perception.

It's not supposed to describe any PCT model of perception. It's a

basis on which any model of perception, PCT or not, must be based.

          The model does assume the existence of physical

reality – it’s the “environment” side of diagrams of the
PCT model – but in PCT perception is not a process aimed
a “knowing” that reality.

Agreed. "Knowing" that reality is a side-effect of learning through

evolutionary and reorganizational processes to control the outputs
of those functions that happen to help our ancestors’ and our own
survival likelihoods when they are controlled.

          Perception is a process of constructing neural analogs

of aspects of that reality. I think it is somewhat
misleading to say that we know reality through our
perceptions because it implies that there is only one
correct way to perceive reality.

I dispute that this is a necessary corollary. But what I would say

is that what we know of reality is only what we do perceive. How
well that actually represents reality is unknowable. All we can do
at any moment is act as though what we perceive and are able to
control is our current best bet as to what reality is like.

          But it is easily demonstrated that we can perceive the

same reality in more than one way and all ways can be
“correct”. This is demonstrated by my “What is size” demo
(https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html ),
where the same reality can be perceived as either a
perimeter or an area and either one can be correctly
controlled.

Yes, indeed. What you show is that the object has more than one

property that can be controlled, perimeter and area being two such
properties. They are not in any sense conflicting. It says no more
than the standard diagram of the PCT hierarchy or your own
spreadsheet says, that the perceptual function at any level has
several inputs from the level below, and may well have output that
influences several reference values at the level below.

                  RM: -- and if Powers'

hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the
development of perceptual functions (in humans,
anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of
hierarchically related perceptual variables:
intensity, sensation, configuration… programs,
principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory
– of the types of perceptual variables that
organisms are presumed to be controlling when we
see them carrying out various behaviors – that is
what we should be testing when we do research on
purpose.

            MT: If you say so. I think it would be more valuable to

the world at large if we could use PCT to
figure out how to make life more controllable for people
and other animals in this overcrowded world.

Â

      RM: In order to use PCT to make life better for people in an

overcrowded world you have to know what perceptions people are
controlling for and how they can control them.

That's an assertion that might well be correct. I have never, that I

remember, disparaged finding the controlled perceptions as a way of
addressing different situations, and I don’t do so now. What I do
disagree with is your insistence that it is the only
proper form of PCT research.

      So testing to determine what perceptions people

want or need to control for must be at least an implicit part
of research aimed at making things better for people. Basic
PCT research must inform applied research and vice versa.

I think we agree here, too, though I do have a technical issue with

how the actual testing procedure would be performed in a complex
situation, such as what perceptions are controlled by the many
individuals who are involved in, say, a court trial of a person
accused of bank fraud. I think that there would need to be an awful
lot of assumptions, such as that the accused is controlling for
retaining the ability to control his location (i.e. not going to
jail).

I think we agree on most things here, but there remains one apparent

bone of contention, which is that I perceive you to be asserting
that no perception has any relation to real reality, whereas I claim
that some do, and the ones that have survived longest and are in
common with the longest line of ancestors are the ones most likely
closest to representing reality fairly.

I have also claimed in he past, though not in this recent thread,

that perceptions (such as “the taste of lemonade”) about which we
can talk, and that we can influence in other people by our actions
that influence our own perceptions, also exist “out there”, though
perhaps not in material or physical form. That was the thesis of my
1993 CSG presentation, which you said you understood after the
presentation, having not understood it when this discussion had come
up earlier that year. I maintain this position still, and maybe if
you will again understand it if you go back and replay my 1993 talk
(from Dag’s archives or from
http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Movie/TaylorCSG1993.mp4 ,
starting at 19minutes 15 seconds into the talk.

Martin

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                  "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
  Â
            Â
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Rick,

well I really don’t understand what’s wrong with Bills’ way of writing that you wouldn’t understand. I was already once angry on Barb and Bruce Nevin, because they wanted to show understanding of PCT as language problem. But in your case it’s obviously that it’s not problem the language you use for understanding what’s out there and how organisms function. It’s problem scientific knowledge and evidences that are used for understanding PCT.

You are repeating your RCT nonsense for years. And I answered you in the same way with Bills’ literature for I don’t how many times and you still don’t understand.

I admitt I needed some years to start understanding what Bill was saying to me and what he really wrote about, but it’s odd that somebody needs 40 years+ and still don’t understand what he wrote. All I want is that we would all participate in understanding great inventor. You are not helping. As we don’t have his word we just have to understand what he wrote. I know it’s hard to unify oppinions because every LCS perceive reality in a little bit diferent way according to “control and controlled content” in his hierarchy. But there must be the way how could we come to “equal” understanding what Bill wrote.

Again you are not using any evidences to support you RCT theory. It’s just because you think so (you imagine) and you think that the only right way are you perceptions of the “reality out there”. You are the only one who sees the “Real Reality”. I don’t know when you’ll understand that there are also other people perceving reality and that we have to find some consensus. Becasue some sciences are offering very strong evidences about how organisms function. That’s the final goal of PCT. Isn’t it ?

PCT is general theory about how organisms function. There are many theories which try to explain the same thing. I consider PCT to be the best. We just have to prove that to the world. But first we all have to understand what Bill really wrote about. You don’t seem to understand.

Rick you are making all the time at least one same mistake. You are generalizing from one experiment. What kind of science is that ? And other mistake is that you are using to much imagination instead of using some real evidences which could support your “imagination”.

I’ll do you a favour and I’ll repeat myself by copying and pasting what I already done for at least 30x. It seems that you don’t understand the basics of PCT. Your RCT theory is seriously deviating from PCT.

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

  1. CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

  2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

  3. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state which is “cannonically controlled” along with “Control of perception”.

  4. INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

  5. COMPARATOR : ???

  6. ERROR SIGNAL : ???

HB : Does this look like you understand PCT ?

PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

  1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

  1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

  1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Bill P (B:CP)

  1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.

Diagram (LCS III)

RM : ….since lay people (and apparently a good number ostensible PCT experts) tend to think of perception as just an imperfect representation of what is really “out there”.

HB :

I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that, according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), …

HB : With what we control various aspects of the world arround us ? It’s definitelly not control of behavior !!! So what it is ???

Bill and Kent used term “stability” in outer environment instead of “control”,

Bill Powers to Phil Runkel :

First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally. – William T. Powers

Kent M : The fact that the control of perceptions tends to stabilize variables in the physical environment provides a useful focus for analysis when we move from considering the actions of isolated individuals to talking about social interactions.

HB : I personally think that Bills’ and Kent’s statements and understanding what is out there use more suitable term (stability) to support Bills’ statements about not having direct knowledge of what we are doing to reality but still “the whole control loop” controls.

Bill P :

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

RM : …such as intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes), configurations (like shapes), relationships (like proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words, explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in the PCT model of purposeful behavior!

HB : In real organism this is not all. Hierarchy is still a problem to understand how it really works in organisms (diagram down), not just because there is a “question mark” on the top of it, but there are also some other misunderstandings.

I’m trying to explain for years, speccially to Powers ladies that PCT is not finished yet. We have to develope and upgrade it (and remove question mark), and the first step is finnishing diagram on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) or improved version of that diagram which was done by Bill and it was exposed by Dug.

How would it know that a signal is an error signal ? I don’t know. But error signals as we model the system now do have a special relation to control systems: they are ouputs of comparators, and comparators are simple subtractors, much the same in any control system. Is that enough to make them recognazible? Again, I don’t know. But let leave that question open until some sort of data comes our way to help us decide.

HB : We see that the whole hierarchy has a problem about comparators, which are main part of hierarchy. And there are some other problems which will be seen more clearly with detailed analysis of how organisms function.

Do we really have to wait that some data comes our way to help us ? How much time ? Decade, century ?

Or it’s better that we start working and ???

cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0

Boris

Best

Rick

image002109.jpg

···

If nobody read what Bill wrote on the end of diagram down, it says this : Bill P (diagram down) :

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Rick, Martin

image002109.jpg

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Friday, November 9, 2018 7:35 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: A Vexing Question

[Rick Marken 2018-11-09_10:33:28]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.07.10.18]

RM: In PCT, perception (in the form of perceptual input functions) defines the aspect of the “variables out there” that is controlled.

MT: In my opinion, this is correct.

HB : Even if this would be correct it would hold just in some cases of behavior. It’s not general how control loop works in PCT. Generally it’s not “the aspect of the variables out there that is controlled”. But perception which is affected by output of the system. Generally speaking this would hold in any behavior. With limiting yourself to “control of aspect outside” you are lost in some behaviors that you can explain but then that is not PCT any more : geneal theory about how orgsnisms function, but some local theory of which I call RCT.

RM: Indeed it is.

RM: So when you control a perceptual variable – such as the position of the dial that sets the thermostat – you are controlling the aspect of the “variables out there” (also known as “reality”) that is defined by the perceptual function that defines that perceptual variable.

MT: Yes, I agree with this, too.

HB : Because this is special case of PCT (setting thermostat) it’s problematic to generally talk about how people always control something in environment (24/7) like in organism. Whatever is happening in outer environment is something that happens occassionaly so we can’t talk about something constantly (generally) being controlled in environment and also not that control loop “controls” something outside all the time on the basis of “control of perception”.

There is generally no “cannonical principle” in PCT. So generally control loop is not “controlling perception” (what happens continually all the time) just because it “defines the aspect of the variables out there” that is “controlled”, but because its’ keeping organism alive. There are other more important things that “control of perception” has to do.

“Control of perception” keeps homeostasis in organism and consequently there can be seen “effects of organisms” control in external environment through actions as means of control.

The “aspect” of the “variables out there” is not part of control loop (LCS III). Show me where you see it ??? I can’t see it.

cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0

HB : “Aspect” of environment is self evident if we understand physiology of organisms functioning. So it does not need special emphasis. We can’t perceive all the environment at one moment.

HB : There were other ways how Bill tried to distinguish special cases of changing events “out there” under “effects of output”, to somehow “separate” it from his general theorethical background.

I’ll repeat myself because I noticed that you perceive the same text so much differently that maybe repeating could cause that we could maybe see i tw+one day in the same way.

Bill Powers to Phil Runkel :

First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally. – William T. Powers

HB : And also Kent is sharing this oppinion.

Kent M : The fact that the control of perceptions tends to stabilize variables in the physical environment provides a useful focus for analysis when we move from considering the actions of isolated individuals to talking about social interactions.

HB : At least I agree with Bill and Kent. I think that term stability much more fit into general frame of PCT (definitions and diagram) than term “control”. Definition of control clearly distinguish what is control in organism which is all time active (24/7) and actions through (both) environments and stability in environments happens only when organisms wants to cancel (counteract) effects of disturbances (also). We could call it “influence” on external environment which is the term that Martin used.

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : Rick is clearly neglecting basics of PCT and his own definition of control is exactly opposite to Bills’ who is author of PCT.

RM :

CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

HB : Rick is talking about how his theory fits to PCT and what he is saying is always in agreement with PCT. He is talking for example “According to PCT”, what actually means according to RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory). It can be shown and proved through CSGnet archives that Rick is using some other theory what can be seen from his definitions of control loop.

Rick is seriously misleading CSGnet forum and public as I think his RCT theory is nonsense.

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

  1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

  2. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state which is “cannonically controlled” along with “Control of perception”.

  3. INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

  4. COMPARATOR : ???

  5. ERROR SIGNAL : ???

HB : Barb and Alie, could you persuade Rick to start using original Bill Powers definitions of control loop and of course right explanation of PCT diagram.

Let us see how control loop in PCT works :

PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

  1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

  1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Bill P (B:CP)

  1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.

Boris

RM: Correct again.

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions, and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.

RM: The PCT model of perception views all perceptual variables this way; all are signals that are analogs of variations in aspects of the organism’s environment (internal and external) that are defined by the perceptual functions that produce them. The main aim of PCT research is to determine what aspects of the environment – what perceptions – are being controlled when organisms are seen to be behaving in various ways.

RM: I think a way to overcome this problem is to say that, according to PCT, we control various aspects of the world around us (which, in PCT, are called perceptions), such as intensities (like loudness), sensations (like tastes), configurations (like shapes), relationships (like proximity), sequences (like melodies), etc. In other words, explain control of perception the way it is conceived of in the PCT model of purposeful behavior!

MT: Which is, IN MY OPINION, that if there is a perception you can control by influencing what appears to be in the environment, that perception is likely to be of something that really in real reality IS in the environment, because reorganization has made it so, and you have survived long enough to have that perception.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions. When we control things like the taste of lemonade, the vertical optical velocity of a baseball or the “runniness” of scrambled eggs we are controlling perceptual variables that have their basis in physical reality; there are really combinations chemicals “out there” that are the basis of our perception of the “lemonadeness” of the mixture; there is really a moving object out there that is the basis of our perception of vertical optical velocity; and there are really collections of atoms and molecules out there that are the basis of our perception of the “runniness” of the eggs. But the “lemonadeness” perception is not a perception of “lemonadeness” in the real world; the vertical optical velocity perception is not a perception of vertical optical velocity in the real world; and the “runniness” perception is not a perception of runniness in the real world. According to PCT, these perceptions are all functions of physical variables in the real world.

RM: Per the PCT model, there is no “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity or runniness in the real world. All that’s out there are physical variables: the v’s in the diagram of the PCT model in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. I believe we perceive the world as we do – we construct from physical reality perceptions of things like “lemonadeness”, vertical optical velocity and runniness – because perceiving it in this way proved evolutionarily adaptive to do so. I believe that it’s possible to have developed different ways of perceiving the same physical environment that would also have been evolutionarily adaptive. I think Powers’ had a demonstration of this but I can’t find it at the moment. So I don’t think it is reorganization that is responsible for the way we perceive the world; reorganization is an individual level phenomenon. I think evolution led to the way we perceive the reality – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…

image001191.png

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Saturday, November 10, 2018 7:33 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: A Vexing Question

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_10:32:57]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.09.15.33]

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions, and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.

MT: Without accepting or rejecting this claim, I ask what relevance does it have to the question at issue?

RM: I believe the question at issue was whether there is a variable “out there” that corresponds to the perception that the organism can control. The “taste of lemonade” is relevant to this question because when you make lemonade (control for the taste of lemonade) you are controlling a perceptual variable that doesn’t corresponds to a variable “out there”; the taste of lemonade doesn’t exist as a variable “out there” in the environment; is a perceptual variable that is a particular function of several physical variables. A different function of the same physical variables would not produce a perception of the taste of lemonade.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions.

MT: I disagree here. According to PCT… there exists a real reality, but all we can know of it is through our perceptions.

Bill P (B:CP) :

cid:image001.png@01D4797F.0E5C3B40

HB : I don’t know what Rick understands under subjectivelly experienced ? I understand it as Martin. We can experience “reality” only through our sensors and that’s all we can know about reality.

HB : But again I’m amazed by Ricks’ way of explaining PCT. He is trying to explain PCT without using any PCT evidence as usual.

RM: This is not really the best way to verbally describe the PCT model of perception. The model does assume the existence of physical reality – it’s the “environment” side of diagrams of the PCT model – but in PCT perception is not a process aimed a “knowing” that reality.

HB : Where did you see this in PCT literature ? So what perception is for ?

RM : Perception is a process of constructing neural analogs of aspects of that reality.

HB : So what is this different to saying that “perception” is process of “knowing” reality – aspect of reality ? Whether you construct “perception” to “know” reality or you construct neural signals which are “input” to “knowing” reality is quite the same thing.

Can you explain to us how perceptions are constructing neural analogs of aspects of reality ? And what’s this different to saying that all we can know about reality is through our perceptions ???

Bill P (B:CP) :

…it si even more apparent that the first order perceptual signal reflects only what happens at the sensory endings : the source of the stimulation is completely indefined and unsensed. If any information exists about the source of the stimulus, it exists only distributed over millions of first order perceptual signals and is explicit in none of them.

RM : I think it is somewhat misleading to say that we know reality through our perceptions because it implies that there is only one correct way to perceive reality.

HB : Ha,ha,ha. I hope I understood wrong. Are you saying that “knowing” reality through our perceptions is not the only “correct” way to perceive reality. Which are other ways ???

See definition above. How can we know what is out there beside “perceiving reality” ??? There is only one way. We know about reality ONLY through our perceptions. What’s the other “correct” way of knowing reality beside through our perceptions ? Ups sorry I forgot that you are using also “Extrasensory perceptions”, Telepathy, Telekinesis, and other “Spiritual” and “Astro” stuff…

RM : But it is easily demonstrated that we can perceive the same reality in more than one way and all ways can be “correct”.

HB : So perception is afterall the only way of “knowing” reality ??? And people can perceive reality differently. That’s what quite well Bill showed in his PCT and beside him Bruce Nevin some time ago.

BN : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina.

RM : This is demonstrated by my “What is size” demo (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html), where the same reality can be perceived as either a perimeter or an area and either one can be correctly controlled.

HB : I told you once that your demos show what you want them to show. Your demos are useless. They are not really the only right evidences what happens when we percieve reality. What does it mean that something is correctly controlled ? Is it perceived through “extrasensory receptors” and controlled through Telekinesis ? Is this what you meant by “correctly controlled” ? Rick don’t make of yourself a clown.

RM: – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

MT: If you say so. I think it would be more valuable to the world at large if we could use PCT to figure out how to make life more controllable for people and other animals in this overcrowded world.

RM: In order to use PCT to make life better for people in an overcrowded world you have to know what perceptions people are controlling for and how they can control them. So testing to determine what perceptions people want or need to control for must be at least an implicit part of research aimed at making things better for people. Basic PCT research must inform applied research and vice versa.

HB : Right. So why you don’t use PCT way of research ??? To understand how organisms function and speccially how nervous system really function.

Bill P (B:CP) :

The TCV is method for identifying control organization of nervous system….

There will be ambiguous cases : the disturbance may be only weakly opposed. That effect could be due not to poor control system but to a definition of actions that are only remotely linked to the actual controlled quantity.

For example : if when you open the window I sometimes get up and close it, you might conclude that I am controlling the position of the window when in fact I only shut it if the room gets too chilly to suit me. I could be controlling sensed temperature very precisely, when necesarry, but by a variety of means : shutting the window, turning up the termostat, putting on a sweater, or exercising. You are on the track of the right controlled quantity, but haven’t got the right definition yet. It is safest to assume that an ambiguous result from TCV is the fault of the hypotehsis and to continue looking for a better definition of the controlled quantity.

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Rick, Martin

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2018 12:14 AM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: A Vexing Question

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_15:14:17]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.10.16.42]

MT: This being the eve of Armistice Day, and the 100th Anniversary of the original, let’s see if we can make peace.

RM: Sure. Let’s peacefully agree that what you call PCT has very little overlap with what I call PCT. So what I do with PCT is of little value to you and what you do has little value to me. It has ever been thus and it will ever be thus. Peace be with you.

HB : The problem is not that Martin’s overlap with what you call PCT is not good. Problem is that your’s overlap with Martin’s is not good. It’s odd because you both agreed that PCT is general theory about controlling in organisms. So the overlap should be perfect. Martin respects that basic “mantra” of PCT. What about you Rick ?

Bill P. at all (50th Anniversary, 2011) :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms

HB : On how many ways do organisms function ? As I see the problem Martin is firmly on the ground and he has clear in mind what is basically important in PCT :

MT earlier : According to PCT (my opinion now), we are alive because we and our ancestors back to the beginning of life were lucky enough to be able to affect real reality in ways that kept our intrinsic variables in good condition long enough for our ancestors to produce descendants; we and they did that by controlling internal variables that corresponded to some property of real reality that they could influence.

HB : As I see it, this is in perfect accordance to William T. Powers definition of control :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

HB : Martin even didn’t use term “control” for “effects on outside variables” but he used “they could influence”. That means that “control” of outside environment is not continuous to some “the same” genetical reference point like in organism, where lack of control means death. But if people don’t influence external environment (do not “control” what happens quite offen) is usually not problematic, as they try again or do something else. In organism control failure can be fatal. Control processes in internal environment are much more determined than control loop through external environment. It’s somehow not so firmly determined and constant.

Boris

Best

Rick

[Rick Marken 2018-11-10_10:32:57]

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.09.15.33]

MT: But how does it relate in any kind of ordinary logic to the assertion that there is no corresponding variable “out there” that the organism can influence by its actions, and whose existence enhanced the likelihood of just this perceptual function being produced?

RM: Let’s try the “taste of lemonade” example again. The taste of lemonade is a variable (the taste can vary from being more to being less like lemonade) but there is no variable “out there” that corresponds to the taste of lemonade. The taste of lemonade is a perceptual variable; the physical variables that are the basis of this perception are the chemicals (water, oil, lemon juice) whose sensory effects are combined by a perceptual function to produce a taste.

MT: Without accepting or rejecting this claim, I ask what relevance does it have to the question at issue?

RM: I believe the question at issue was whether there is a variable “out there” that corresponds to the perception that the organism can control.

I’m afraid I disagree. I would have agreed, had you said that the question at issue was whether there can be a variable “out there” that corresponds to some perception that the organism can control. The reason I asked how the question was relevant was that no light can be shed on this question by discovering either that the “taste of lemonade” is a variable “out there” or that it isn’t.

The “taste of lemonade” is relevant to this question because when you make lemonade (control for the taste of lemonade) you are controlling a perceptual variable that doesn’t corresponds to a variable “out there”; the taste of lemonade doesn’t exist as a variable “out there” in the environment;

That is something you don’t know, and maybe cannot know. It is an unsupported, and perhaps unsupportable, assertion.

is a perceptual variable that is a particular function of several physical variables. A different function of the same physical variables would not produce a perception of the taste of lemonade.

On that we can definitively agree. But it really isn’t relevant to what we seem both to agree on, that a function of several variables that produced a perception of something we can influence so as to control that perception and that helps maintain intrinsic variables in a healthy state will stick around in spite of evolutionary or reorganizational changes longer than one that we cannot control by action on the environment. If one can control X+Y and by doing so help one’s intrinsic variables, whereas controlling X-Y does nothing for the intrinsic variables, a perceptual function that produces X+Y is likely to survive longer than one that produces X-Y.

RM: According to the PCT model, what constitutes real reality are physical variables that are the basis of our perceptions.

MT: I disagree here. According to PCT… there exists a real reality, but all we can know of it is through our perceptions.

RM: This is not really the best way to verbally describe the PCT model of perception.

It’s not supposed to describe any PCT model of perception. It’s a basis on which any model of perception, PCT or not, must be based.

The model does assume the existence of physical reality – it’s the “environment” side of diagrams of the PCT model – but in PCT perception is not a process aimed a “knowing” that reality.

Agreed. “Knowing” that reality is a side-effect of learning through evolutionary and reorganizational processes to control the outputs of those functions that happen to help our ancestors’ and our own survival likelihoods when they are controlled.

Perception is a process of constructing neural analogs of aspects of that reality. I think it is somewhat misleading to say that we know reality through our perceptions because it implies that there is only one correct way to perceive reality.

I dispute that this is a necessary corollary. But what I would say is that what we know of reality is only what we do perceive. How well that actually represents reality is unknowable. All we can do at any moment is act as though what we perceive and are able to control is our current best bet as to what reality is like.

But it is easily demonstrated that we can perceive the same reality in more than one way and all ways can be “correct”. This is demonstrated by my “What is size” demo (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html), where the same reality can be perceived as either a perimeter or an area and either one can be correctly controlled.

Yes, indeed. What you show is that the object has more than one property that can be controlled, perimeter and area being two such properties. They are not in any sense conflicting. It says no more than the standard diagram of the PCT hierarchy or your own spreadsheet says, that the perceptual function at any level has several inputs from the level below, and may well have output that influences several reference values at the level below.

RM: – and if Powers’ hypothesis is correct, evolution has led to the development of perceptual functions (in humans, anyway) that construct 11 or so different types of hierarchically related perceptual variables: intensity, sensation, configuration… programs, principles, and system concepts. It’s this theory – of the types of perceptual variables that organisms are presumed to be controlling when we see them carrying out various behaviors – that is what we should be testing when we do research on purpose.

MT: If you say so. I think it would be more valuable to the world at large if we could use PCT to figure out how to make life more controllable for people and other animals in this overcrowded world.

RM: In order to use PCT to make life better for people in an overcrowded world you have to know what perceptions people are controlling for and how they can control them.

That’s an assertion that might well be correct. I have never, that I remember, disparaged finding the controlled perceptions as a way of addressing different situations, and I don’t do so now. What I do disagree with is your insistence that it is the only proper form of PCT research.

So testing to determine what perceptions people want or need to control for must be at least an implicit part of research aimed at making things better for people. Basic PCT research must inform applied research and vice versa.

I think we agree here, too, though I do have a technical issue with how the actual testing procedure would be performed in a complex situation, such as what perceptions are controlled by the many individuals who are involved in, say, a court trial of a person accused of bank fraud. I think that there would need to be an awful lot of assumptions, such as that the accused is controlling for retaining the ability to control his location (i.e. not going to jail).

I think we agree on most things here, but there remains one apparent bone of contention, which is that I perceive you to be asserting that no perception has any relation to real reality, whereas I claim that some do, and the ones that have survived longest and are in common with the longest line of ancestors are the ones most likely closest to representing reality fairly.

I have also claimed in he past, though not in this recent thread, that perceptions (such as “the taste of lemonade”) about which we can talk, and that we can influence in other people by our actions that influence our own perceptions, also exist “out there”, though perhaps not in material or physical form. That was the thesis of my 1993 CSG presentation, which you said you understood after the presentation, having not understood it when this discussion had come up earlier that year. I maintain this position still, and maybe if you will again understand it if you go back and replay my 1993 talk (from Dag’s archives or from http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Movie/TaylorCSG1993.mp4, starting at 19minutes 15 seconds into the talk.

Martin

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery