02.03.2010 1344
According to PCT is it accurate to say that we act always and only on what we believe? Can it ever be otherwise?
jim d
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2100 UT)]
02.03.2010 1344
According to PCT is it accurate to say that we act always and only on what we believe? Can it ever be otherwise?
jim d
While waiting for someone more knowledgeable than I to respond, I will make a few comments. First the word “belief” covers a lot of territory. I find it helpful to think in terms of implicit beliefs and explicit beliefs. Implicit beliefs are those we act as though we believe but have probably never put into words. For example, I believe it is safe to open the closet door even though I may never have thought about it in those terms. In a sense, we always act in accordance with our implicit beliefs, which are usually based on our experience. Explicit beliefs I call stories. “The earth travels around the sun once during the course of a year,” is one such story. “There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is the prophet of God.” Is another story. There is no necessary connection between our explicit beliefs and our actions.
So I would say that PCT says that we always act in accordance with our implicit beliefs, but not because of them. I open the closet door because I have a goal that can be achieved by doing so, not because I believe it is safe to do so.
Bruce
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1315)]
02.03.2010 �1344
According to PCT is it accurate to say that we act always and only on what
we believe?
No.
Can it ever be otherwise?
Yes.
Best
Rick
···
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 10:49 AM, Jim Earle <jannim@comcast.net> wrote:
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2120 UT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1315)]
02.03.2010 1344
According to PCT is it accurate to say that we act always and only on what
we believe?No.
Can it ever be otherwise?
Yes.
Don't you always "believe" that the action you take will bring you closer to your goal?
Bruce
···
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 10:49 AM, Jim Earle <jannim@comcast.net> wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1330)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2120 UT)--
Don't you always "believe" that the action you take will bring you closer to your
goal?
I am rarely even aware of the actions that are achieving my goals. But
the question had to do with PCT, and in PCT beliefs (whatever those
are; in PCT beliefs are imaginations) have nothing to do with control
(keeping perceptions at their reference).
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2150 UT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1330)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2120 UT)--
Don't you always "believe" that the action you take will bring you closer to your
goal?I am rarely even aware of the actions that are achieving my goals.
I knew there was something really different about you.
But
the question had to do with PCT, and in PCT beliefs (whatever those
are; in PCT beliefs are imaginations) have nothing to do with control
(keeping perceptions at their reference).
I thought imaginations were perceptions.
Bruce
[Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.16.43]
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1330)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2120 UT)--
Don't you always "believe" that the action you take will bring you closer to your
goal?
I am rarely even aware of the actions that are achieving my goals. But
the question had to do with PCT, and in PCT beliefs (whatever those
are; in PCT beliefs are imaginations) have nothing to do with control
(keeping perceptions at their reference).
I agree with Rick about awareness of actions. As a personal example, one of the hardest things my piano teacher had to do was to get me to be aware of what fingering I was using in different passages.
As I understand the word, "belief" is always about something. It is itself a perception, but it is a perception of the likelihood that some other perception actually corresponds to soemthing else, usually a state of the unknowable "real world". The word "about" suggests we are talking of some kind of relationship, though not at the low level usually taken to represent relationship perceptions, since what the belief is "about" may be a very high-level perception.
I think of two kinds of relationship: "Belief that X is true" and "Belief in X". The latter is more difficult to pin down, since is it more wisely and vaguely applied. Often, "I believe in X" is used when X represents the abilities or trustworthiness of some person real or imaginary. It might also be used when X represents the real-world existence of someone, but usually not of something. "I believe in Barack Obama" means that I think him likely to be doing the right things to bring about a state I would like to see, whereas "I believe in Beelzebub" means I believe the truth of the statement 'Beelzebub exists in the real world'".
When one uses "Belief that X is true" in the sense of Bruce's question: "Don't you always 'believe' that the action you take will bring you closer to your goal", one is talking about control in imagination. The belief perception is a perception of the imagined result of the proposed action. It is part of planning. The belief is about the unknowable real-world environmental feedback path. And the short answer to Bruce's question in this context is "I don't know, but it might be worth a try if I can't think of anything better".
If I understood correctly, Bruce started this with the notion that the belief depends on the action, rather than the reverse concept that is implied by the cited question. If Rick is correct about awareness (as I believe him to be 
), then Bruce's original position is highly defensible. I perceive that I did X, I peceive that as a consequence of my doing X, I have perceived state changes to Y and Z, at least one of which has reduced the error in my perception of Y or Z. Therefore, I believe I did X in order to bring about the change in Y or Z. It's a statement about the unknowable real-world truth of the proposition that this action was indeed the output of a control system controlling the perception of Y or Z.
To summarize, I see "belief" as a relationship perception, in which one of the related elements is an unknowable and therefore imagined state of the real world, and the other is some perception that could be at any level in the perceptual hierarchy. One can say "I believe that chair is red" or "I believe the current government is subverting Democracy" with equal ease.
Martin
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1410)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.03.2150 UT)--
Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1330)]
I am rarely even aware of the actions that are achieving my goals.
I knew there was something really different about you.
Are you aware of the variations in muscle tensions that achieve your
constantly changing postural goals; the limb movements that achieve
goals like moving the steering wheel or keeping your balance; etc?
But the question had to do with PCT, and in PCT beliefs (whatever those
are; in PCT beliefs are imaginations) have nothing to do with control
(keeping perceptions at their reference).I thought imaginations were perceptions.
They are. Perceptions that are not based on sensory input.
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.1514 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.16.43 --
MT: To summarize, I see "belief" as a relationship perception, in which one of the related elements is an unknowable and therefore imagined state of the real world, and the other is some perception that could be at any level in the perceptual hierarchy. One can say "I believe that chair is red" or "I believe the current government is subverting Democracy" with equal ease.
What you say makes sense. In my private dictionary I think of a belief as the least reliable statement of fact, with knowing as the most reliable. Knowing is much harder to achieve than believing, since believing can be achieved by a simple decision to believe. Knowing can require a lot of observing and testing, and the results may never reach that final degree of confidence.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Dag Forssell (2010.02.03.1750 PST)]
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.1514 MST)]
…
What you say makes sense. In my private dictionary I think of a belief as the least reliable statement of fact, with knowing as the most reliable. Knowing is much harder to achieve than believing, since believing can be achieved by a simple decision to believe. Knowing can require a lot of observing and testing, and the results may never reach that final degree of confidence.
But… but…
I was taught school way back when (in religious studies) that belief is worth more than knowledge, because belief is from God.
Best, Dag
[From Dag Forssell (2010.02.03.1750 PST)]
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.1514 MST)]
...
What you say makes sense. In my private dictionary I think of a belief as the least reliable statement of fact, with knowing as the most reliable. Knowing is much harder to achieve than believing, since believing can be achieved by a simple decision to believe. Knowing can require a lot of observing and testing, and the results may never reach that final degree of confidence.
But... but...
I was taught school way back when (in religious studies) that belief is worth more than knowledge, because belief is from God.
Best, Dag
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0300 UT)
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.1514 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.16.43 –
MT: To summarize, I see “belief” as a relationship perception, in which one of the related elements is an unknowable and therefore imagined state of the real world, and the other is some perception that could be at any level in the perceptual hierarchy. One can say “I believe that chair is red” or “I believe the current government is subverting Democracy” with equal ease.
What you say makes sense. In my private dictionary I think of a belief as the least reliable statement of fact, with knowing as the most reliable. Knowing is much harder to achieve than believing, since believing can be achieved by a simple decision to believe. Knowing can require a lot of observing and testing, and the results may never reach that final degree of confidence.
BG: What is the mechanism by which you simply decide to believe? Could I simply decide to believe I am a lawn chair?
Bruce
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0313 UT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1410)]
BG: I thought imaginations were perceptions.
RM: They are. Perceptions that are not based on sensory input.
BG: So you are saying that these perceptions have nothing to do with control. I take it then that they are uncontrolled perceptions. That’s interesting.
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.2010 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0300 UT) --
BG: What is the mechanism by which you simply decide to believe? Could I simply decide to believe I am a lawn chair?
I don't know what the mechanism is; tell me what a belief is at the level of mechanisms, and perhaps I could do a little better. I can speak only of my usages of terms like this.
As to believing you are a lawn chair: If you were desperately unhappy to the point of suicide, and someone you trusted told you all that could be cured if you became a lawn chair, and that you could become a lawn chair just by having faith in a higher power and accepting the Truth as this person was revealing it to you, I expect that you would begin to believe you were a lawn chair, which can done by imagining that you are one in as much detail as possible and ignoring logic and the evidence of your senses. Belief is a matter of faith, and faith is not a matter of reasoning or evidence; it is acceptance independent of reasoning and evidence. Once acceptance has occurred, reasoning and evidence can be selected to fit the belief. A lawn chair has a back and front, feet and legs, and is covered partly in fabric. That's true of me, too. See? I am a lawn chair.
Of course this would not be anything more than a belief, since there can be no question of testing the truth of a belief or subjecting it to logical analysis or rules of evidence. You could say "I devoutly believe that I am a lawn chair", and that would be true. But you couldn't say, under my usages of these words, that you know you are a lawn chair. If you said the latter, I could demand proof. I can't demand proof of a belief; if you observe that you believe something you can't be mistaken; you do believe it. That has nothing to do with whether what you believe is true. Consider dying anorexic girls who believe they are too fat regardless of what other people say or what they see in a mirror. If they can believe they are too fat despite that skeleton in the mirror, you can believe you are a lawn chair.
If you say you know something, you're saying it should seem true to me, too. Sometimes, after much hard labor, that turns out to be the case. I have to agree with you. You are most probably not a lawn chair.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03l.2055 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0313 UT) --
BG: I thought imaginations were perceptions.
RM: They are. Perceptions that are not based on sensory input.
BG: So you are saying that these perceptions have nothing to do with control. I take it then that they are uncontrolled perceptions. That's interesting.
BP: I know that Rick is going to give the same answer, but I'm sitting here, so ...
We can and do control imagined perceptions. They are much easier to control than perceptions which can be changed only by acting on the outside world with our muscles or glands. In fact, we can control imagined perceptions which we couldn't possibly control by acting on the real environment. Behavior, after all, is only one link in a process by which we control perceptions. When controlling imagined perceptions, we may or may not use imagined behaviors, but we definitely don't use any behaviors that someone else could see. I can imagine throwing you over a locomotive, or a locomotive over you. And I just made a cow jump over the moon.
Seems to me Rick said very similar things not very long ago.
Best,
Bill P.
(Gavin Ritz 2010.02.04.17.50NZT)
[From Bruce
Gregory (2010.02.04.0313 UT)]
[From
Rick Marken (2010.02.03.1410)]
BG: I thought
imaginations were perceptions.
RM: They are. Perceptions that are not based on sensory input.
Sensory
input even at the visual level is actually not much at all, almost 80% is
perceptions. So much for eye witness testimony. Mostly its reference signals. Maybe you are a lawn chair but I’m
seeing some else. Luckily we are all very similar and our common perceptions don’t
vary too much but don’t bet on it at higher levels.
BG: So you are saying
that these perceptions have nothing to do with control. I take it then that
they are uncontrolled perceptions. That’s interesting.
Bruce
[Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.23.45]
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0300 UT)
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.1514 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.16.43 –
MT: To summarize, I see “belief” as a
relationship perception, in which one of the related elements is an
unknowable and therefore imagined state of the real world, and the
other is some perception that could be at any level in the perceptual
hierarchy. One can say “I believe that chair is red” or “I believe the
current government is subverting Democracy” with equal ease.What you say makes sense. In my private dictionary I think of a belief
as the least reliable statement of fact, with knowing as the most
reliable. Knowing is much harder to achieve than believing, since
believing can be achieved by a simple decision to believe. Knowing can
require a lot of observing and testing, and the results may never reach
that final degree of confidence.
BG: What is the mechanism by which you simply decide to believe?
Could I simply decide to believe I am a lawn chair?
I have a different take on it than Bill does. I would turn your
question around and ask “What is the mechanism by which I decide that
this pattern of light and dark patches is a lawn chair”. Can you simply
decide to perceive that pattern as a lawn chair? If, as I argue, a
belief is a perception of a relationship, then it is legitimate to ask
by what mechanism it is created, but I would not usually anticipate
that one “decides” to have a particular perception.
In the case of deciding to perceive the object as a lawn chair, it is
quite possible one would go through a process of saying to oneself “It
seems to be made of wood, it seems to have a flat part on which one
could sit, so it’s a chair. Now what kind of chair is it? It looks too
big and crudely made for a living room, and it looks as though it would
withstand some rain, so I decide to perceive it as a lawn chair”. But I
don’t think you very often “decide” to perceive something as this or
that, whether at the category level of the example, or at any other
level.
So, thinking of “belief” as a kind of perception, I’m not at all sure
one can “decide” to have a particular belief. One believes to a certain
degree that this or that proposition about the real unknowable world is
true, in the same way that any other perception has a value that can be
compared to a reference value. The real question is whether the
“belief” perception can be a controlled perception. I’m not at all sure
it can. And only if one can control one’s degree of belief about a
proposition can one “decide” to have that belief.
So, can you, Bruce Gregory, decide to believe that you are a lawn
chair, meaning that you have no notion that it might not be so?
Martin
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.1227 UT)]
[Martin Taylor 2010.02.03.23.45]
So, thinking of “belief” as a kind of perception, I’m not at all sure
one can “decide” to have a particular belief. One believes to a certain
degree that this or that proposition about the real unknowable world is
true, in the same way that any other perception has a value that can be
compared to a reference value. The real question is whether the
“belief” perception can be a controlled perception. I’m not at all sure
it can. And only if one can control one’s degree of belief about a
proposition can one “decide” to have that belief.
BG: This is what I call an implicit belief. Implicit beliefs are subject to change when new evidence emerges (I believed it was safe to walk across the floor, but they it gave way under my weight). I think Bill is talking about what I call explicit beliefs, although I would not be so quick to say that they are matters of faith, and I do not think we decided to accept them (unless you say that most of the statements we hold to be true are matters of faith). Most people believe that the Apollo astronauts landed on the moon because doing so is consistent with what they saw and what they heard. A small minority believe that this story is a hoax perpetrated by those in authority. We tend to believe the stories told by those in authority. When we find that an authority lacks credibility, we tend to discount the stories they tell. I reserve the word faith for situations in which there is no evidence for the truth of a statement and the person of faith declares that there is no conceivable evidence that would lead them to the conclusion that they are mistaken.
I agree that one must be able to control one’s degree of belief about a proposition in order to “decide” one has that belief.
Bruce
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.1615 UT)]
[From Bill Powers (2010.02.03.2010 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.0300 UT) --
BG: What is the mechanism by which you simply decide to believe? Could I simply decide to believe I am a lawn chair?
I don't know what the mechanism is; tell me what a belief is at the level of mechanisms, and perhaps I could do a little better. I can speak only of my usages of terms like this.
BG: Fair enough. I was trying to understand your usage. In my experience, we do not believe things simply because we decide to do so. Sometimes we believe something because someone in authority told us it was a fact. Many people believe the earth goes around sun and not the other way despite the evidence of their senses. They believe it because someone in authority, probably a teacher, told them it was true. According to the way you use belief, it shows faith in authority. Sometimes we believe something because it is consistent with our goals. We tend to discount or ignore evidence that poses an obstacle to achieving a goal. Republicans hold conflicting beliefs without apparent discomfort. They believe we should eliminate the deficit and reduce taxes at the same time. Few of them acknowledge that the only way to accomplish this is to sharply restrict access to healthcare.
What you call a belief, I would call a story we accept as true. What I call an implicit belief (that the floor will not give way when I walk across it) is not a belief according to the way you use the term. That's fine.
Bruce
[From Rick Marken (2010.02.04.0910)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.02.04.1227 UT)--
BG: This is what I call an implicit belief. Implicit beliefs are subject to
change when new evidence emerges (I believed it was safe to walk across the
floor, but they it gave way under my weight).
I don't see how your "implicit belief" differs from an "explicit
belief". The belief about the safety of the floor is an imagined
perception, just like any other belief. Presumably you developed this
belief because there was some question about the safety of the floor.
The belief about the floor may have been based on evidence (a
structural analysis) or other imaginations. But when you actually went
to walk across the floor, the floor failed. This might lead you to
give up your belief in the safety of the floor; but maybe not. People
have been known to maintain their beliefs in the face of contrary
evidence;-) I know people who could fall through a floor they
believed was safe and blame it on Bill Clinton;-)
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com