[From Marc Abrams (2001.0926.2222)
[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0926.2045)]
.
One place to start might be to provide humanitarian aid to the Afghans via
the U.N. and the Red Crescent.
I believe we are currently supplying Afghanistan with approximately 177
million a year in aid.
Have you seen the USA bags of flour being off loaded from trucks on CNN
Marc
[From Marc Abrams (2001.0927.1237)]
[From Bruce Gregory (2001.09270503)]
Hi,
Hi 
How much do you think it will cost to "get" bin Laden?
A hellava lot more then 177 mil. But it will be worth every penny.
Marc
"Applying PCT" can mean extrapolating from controlled laboratory situations to living control systems in complex social situations.
Consider the model of manipulation by countercontrol. In the rubber-band demo of counter-control, or in a mouse-cursor experimental setup, the input signal goes to one and only one input function. In actual situations with living control systems, any given input goes to an indeterminate number of input functions. The difficulty is in attempting to extrapolate from the laboratory scenario with its (appropriately!) artificial limitations to a living situation with indeterminate complexity.
In an experimental setup, there typically is one controlled variable ("knot over mark", or "cursor aligned with mark") and qi is input to one comparator at the level of the hierarchy where the CV is controlled. All input signals are from the environment (nothing is imagined). A measured output quantity qo plus a measured disturbance quantity d together determine a measured input quantity qi. The structure of a control loop with a reference input r determines the value of the variable qo so that qi approximates r.
Consider the extrapolation to faithfulness and spousal attention.
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.23.0920)]
>If you knew that she uses faithfulness (o) to control some other
>variable (qi), such as how much attention you pay to her. Then you could
>disturb qi, by varying the amount of attention you pay to you wife (d),
>for example, and, thus, influence her level of faithfulness. This works
>as long as it's true that your wife is, indeed, controlling qi (your
>attention to her) by varying o (faithfulness) to compensate for d (your
>attentiveness). If it's true that your wife is, indeed, controlling qi
>in this way, then you can control her faithfulness (o) by varying d
>since, according to control theory o = -1/g(d). This is an S-R
>relationship -- d is the stimulus (S) and o is the response (R) that
>exists because qi is under control and qi = o+d.
'Faithfulness' is not a measurable output quantity. It might be a complex variable controlled by her, if she is kind of naive. But I think we should assume she recognizes that any demonstrations of 'faithfulness' that you don't perceive can make no difference to your attentiveness. Her 'faithfulness' has to be perceived by you to be means of her controlling your attentiveness to her. In fact, it must be be a variable controlled by you, or at least she must believe that it is, and she is controlling her perception of how you perceive her 'faithfulness'. So she is producing a number of outputs that constitute 'faithfulness'. Probably a great variety and number of different outputs, wouldn't you say? Smiling on one occasion. Not smiling on another occasion (different person present). And so on. What does it mean to say that these diverse outputs {qo1 .. qon} constitute 'faithfulness?'. What matters is that you perceive them as 'faithfulness'. How does your perception get to be something that she controls?
One possibility is that she imagines your perception of her. She imagines what it is like to be you perceiving her, and she imagines a perception of what she is doing from your point of view. Over time, getting acquainted, getting to know you better, she tunes this imagined perception of your perception of her. Imagining the perceptions of another person is I think what is called empathy.
Consider the case where she believes that you are controlling her faithfulness to you when in fact you are not. All you are controlling is her belief that you are controlling her faithfulness to you. Not much left of 'faithfulness' but her imagination.
You might propose that she simply does whatever it takes to control your attentiveness to her. But I don't think you could call that controlling faithfulness as means of controlling your attentiveness. Because 'faithfulness' is not her behavioral output. It is your perception of her behavioral outputs. Potentially any of her behavioral outputs can be construed as part of 'faithfulness' or as part of 'unfaithfulness'. Ask any jealous spouse. Ask Othello. Ask Desdemona. Ask Leontes and Hermione.
Now Leontes went nuts all on his own, but Iago did manipulate Othello. How? Not by countercontrol. Rather, by playing on the ambiguity of practically all perceptual inputs in a natural setting. Is that handkerchief a token of betrayal, or did she lose it? In my experience this kind of manipulation is far more frequent than countercontrol. "Appearances", I think they call it sometimes.
But that's a different topic, isn't it.
Bruce Nevin
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.25.1520)]
Welcome back Bill Powers. Thanks for the report on the meeting.
Bruce Nevin wrote -
'Faithfulness' is not a measurable output quantity.
It is a measurable variable. I was _assuming_ that it was used by the
wife to control attention. So I was assuming that it is an output variable.
Her 'faithfulness' has to be perceived by you to be means of her
controlling your attentiveness to her.
Yes. The husband not only has to be able to perceive her faithfulness
but he has to be _controlling_ for it, using variations in his own
attentiveness as the means of effecting control. This has to be true in
order for the wife to be able to successfully control the husband's
attentiveness by varying her own faithfulness.
So she is producing a number of outputs that constitute 'faithfulness'.
Probably a great variety and number of different outputs, wouldn't
you say?
Yes. If the husband was inattentive then my analysis would say that the
wife would definitely be putting out;-)
What does it mean to say that these diverse outputs {qo1 .. qon}
constitute 'faithfulness?'.
It means that the effective output is a function of those "diverse
outputs". The lateral position of a mouse is also a function of many
diverse outputs (muscle tensions, hand positions, etc); the effective
output is the number in the computer that results from all these outputs
and is added to cursor position.
How does your perception get to be something that she controls?
It doesn't. In my analysis, the wife is always controlling her own
perception of the husband's attentiveness.
One possibility is that she imagines your perception of her.
Consider the case where she believes that you are controlling her
faithfulness to you when in fact you are not.
These are irrelevant possibilities and considerations. If the wife is
using faithfulness (o) to control for your attention (qi) then you can
control her level of faithfulness by applying a disturbance (d), such as
variations in your attentiveness, to qi.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
Now Leontes went nuts all on his own, but Iago did manipulate Othello. How?
Not by countercontrol. Rather, by playing on the ambiguity of practically
all perceptual inputs in a natural setting. Is that handkerchief a token of
betrayal, or did she lose it? In my experience this kind of manipulation is
far more frequent than countercontrol. "Appearances", I think they call it
sometimes.But that's a different topic, isn't it.
Bruce Nevin
Very nicely done! My day spent looking at the condition of grazing and hay
fields in central Kansas, a day away from the net, was well spent. I'm
planning on writing a careful summing up on blaming the victim, but I am going
to take my time.
Bill Powers' post, in my perception, removes the any reason for continuing the
thread, or reason for haste in composing a "summing up."
Your suggestion about the difference between "lab" results and "real" life
prompted me to think of an example. When the pilot in command tells the co-
pilot "gear down" ordinarily the co-pilot moves the gear lever to the down
position. The co-pilot does this with extreme reliablity. Ordinarily, the
command pilot only says "gear down" as a part of the landing sequence. If what
you observe is the landing sequence, and only the landing sequence you might
come to think that the command pilot "controls" the co-pilot's hand causing him
to move the gear lever to the down position. However, if the command pilot
during cruise says, "gear down" the co-pilot rather than lowering the gear will
react instead with the words, "What did you say?" This relationship could be
tested by seeing what happens during crew training in a simulator. Doing it
flight would potentially risk destroying the aircraft-- if that is there are no
interlocks between airspeed and the gear switch.
Am I on track here?
Thanks for your contribution during my absence, the sequence wasn't quite what
I had in mind when I was thinking last summer about "controlling the CSGnet"
but maybe its close enough.
Bill Williams
______________________________________________________________________
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I think you meant this to be direct to me and not to csgnet.
It could be worse. I remember some years ago when David Goldstein roundly insulted Martin Taylor in a post he intended to be private to an individual.
The only difficult bit is about "controlling the CSGnet", which I don't fully understand (but maybe I do), and others surely will bridle at.
I'll do what I can to redirect attention.
Bruce
[From Bruce Nevin (010925 23:20 EDT)]
>Your suggestion about the difference between "lab" results and "real" life
>prompted me to think of an example.
Your example of interaction of pilot and copilot doesn't involve either form of manipulation, but it does illustrate how the same input to the copilot's ears (or output from the pilot's mouth) constitutes a very different perception depending upon whatever else is concurrently perceived. Could be as simple as an element in a familiar, rehearsed sequence not making sense outside of that sequence.
Bruce Nevin
At 05:43 09/26/2001 +0300, William Williams wrote:
I think you meant this to be direct to me and not to csgnet.
It could be worse. I remember some years ago when David Goldstein roundly
insulted Martin Taylor in a post he intended to be private to an individual.The only difficult bit is about "controlling the CSGnet", which I don't
fully understand (but maybe I do), and others surely will bridle at.I'll do what I can to redirect attention.
Bruce
Oh, Dear!!!!! How awkward of me. Well, I can live with it. Sorry to involve
you in this by my ineptness. I'm of the opinion that what I'm controlling
for-- a more civil, more open, less confrontational CSGnet is defensible.
my regards and regrets,
Bill Williams
______________________________________________________________________
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[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.0910)]
William Williams wrote:
When the pilot in command tells the co- pilot "gear down" ordinarily
the co-pilot moves the gear lever to the down position...If what
you observe is the landing sequence, and only the landing sequence
you might come to think that the command pilot "controls" the co-pilot's
hand causing him to move the gear lever to the down position. However,
if the command pilot during cruise says, "gear down" the co-pilot rather
than lowering the gear will react instead with the words, "What did you
say?"
Excellent observation. What you've shown here is that the pilot's
ability to control the co-pilot's outputs depends on what perceptual
variable the co-pilot is controlling. When the co-pilot is controlling
for "landing sequence", the pilot's "gear down" is a disturbance to that
perceptual variable; the co-pilot compensates for this disturbance by
moving the gear lever to the down position. When the co-pilot is
controlling for "cruise", the pilot's "gear down" is now a disturbance
to a different perceptual variable; the co-pilot compensates for this
disturbance by saying "what did you say?"
Your example shows clearly that one's ability to control another
person's outputs by disturbance to a controlled variable depends on what
variable is actually being controlled. In my example, the husband can
control his wife's faithfulness by varying the amount of attention he
pays to her as long as the wife is controlling for his attention. When
the wife, for whatever reason, stops controlling for his attention, then
the husband can no longer control her faithfulness by varying his
attention to her.
By the way, the most interesting thing I discovered when I developed my
"Control of Behavior demo
(http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ControlDemo/Coercion.html) was that
you really have to change the variable you are controlling in order to
avoid having your outputs controlled by disturbance. I had thought that
you could avoid being controlled in this way by continuously changing
your reference for the variable you are controlling. But the demo shows
that variation in the reference for a controlled variable does _not_
make it impossible (or even more difficult) for a controller to control
your outputs by applying disturbances to the variable you are
controlling. This is really the main reason why I put the demo on the
net, since the basic principle of control of output via disturbance to a
controlled variable can be demonstrated rather well by the rubber band
demo. But in that demo, the controllee is typically asked to keep the
reference for the controlled variable (knot position) fixed at some
value (knot on dot). My demo shows that your outputs can be controlled
just fine even if you are continuously changing the reference state for
the controlled variable.
The only way to avoid having your outputs controlled by disturbance to a
perceptual variable you are controlling is to _stop_ controlling that
variable.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (20010926.1244)]
Rick Marken (2001.09.26.0910)
Excellent observation. What you've shown here is that the pilot's
ability to control the co-pilot's outputs depends on what perceptual
variable the co-pilot is controlling. When the co-pilot is controlling
for "landing sequence", the pilot's "gear down" is a disturbance to that
perceptual variable; the co-pilot compensates for this disturbance by
moving the gear lever to the down position. When the co-pilot is
controlling for "cruise", the pilot's "gear down" is now a disturbance
to a different perceptual variable; the co-pilot compensates for this
disturbance by saying "what did you say?"
I would have thought that if the pilot had said anything other than "gear
down," it would have represented a disturbance to the perceptual variable
"landing sequence." The co-pilot is expecting the pilot to say "gear down"
and would have reacted to anything else by saying, "what did you say?".
[ From Bill Williams UMKC 26 September 2001 12:00 CST ]
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.0910)]
The only way to avoid having your outputs controlled by disturbance to a
perceptual variable you are controlling is to _stop_ controlling that
variable.
I think we aggree-- as long as we are talking about a situation in
which we are engaged in "controlling." And, I think we also might be
in aggreement that "bombing the shit out of them" (the disturbance)
isn't a "control process"-- not at least in the way we usually think of
a "control process." If in the rubber band experiment the experimental
subject pulls out a hammer and smashes your hand that has been tugging
on the other end of the rubber bands, is he/she or not engaging in a
control process?
I would expect that if enough people adopted control theory then it
would be neccesary to comprehensively adjust the meanings of all the
terms which are used to designate intensional behavior. Until that time
there is going to be lots of what I think is called equvication--
or confusion resulting from using one word to represent two situations.
best
Bill Williams
______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.25.1030)]
Bruce Gregory (20010926.1244)--
I would have thought that if the pilot had said anything other than
"gear down," it would have represented a disturbance to the perceptual
variable "landing sequence."
That's correct too. Everything the pilot says is a "disturbance" in PCT
as long as it is an independent effect on the variable the co-pilot is
controlling. Variations in the disturbance to a controlled variables
(such as variations in what the pilot says) lead to variations in what
the co-pilot does to compensate for the disturbance: o = -1/g(d). When
the pilot says "gear down" the copilot pushes the gear lever down to
compensate for the disturbance; when the pilot says "hard a lee" the
pilot says "say what?" to compensate for that one.
Bill Williams (26 September 2001 12:00 CST)
I think we aggree-- as long as we are talking about a situation in
which we are engaged in "controlling."
Great ! I agree.
And, I think we also might be in aggreement that "bombing the shit
out of them" (the disturbance) isn't a "control process"
I think the people doing the bombing are almost certainly controlling
for something. Bombing may not be the action that will actually produce
the desired result. But if there is a desired result -- that is, if the
bombing is done for a purpose (good or ill) -- then the bombing is part
of a control process.
Just so we don't get tangled up again, let me say that I think bombing
in order to solve this terrorist problem would be a very poor strategy.
It would probably produce more rather than fewer terrorists, assuming
that reducing the number of terrorists was the purpose of the bombing.
If in the rubber band experiment the experimental subject pulls out a
hammer and smashes your hand that has been tugging on the other end
of the rubber bands, is he/she or not engaging in a control process?
As you know, you can't tell whether a behavior is purposeful or not by
simply looking at the behavior. The hand smashing may have been a
purposeful result or an accidental side effect. If the subject moves the
hand (applies a disturbance to the hypothetical controlled variable:
hammer smashing hand) after it is smashed and the hammer smashes the
hand in the new location, I would become pretty confident that the
smashing was done on purpose: someone was controlling for smashing the
subject's hand.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0926.1356)]
Rick Marken (2001.09.25.1030)
That's correct too. Everything the pilot says is a "disturbance" in PCT
as long as it is an independent effect on the variable the co-pilot is
controlling.
Suppose the pilot says nothing. I assume that would also constitute a
disturbance to the perceptual variable the co-pilot is controlling.
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1150)]
Bruce Gregory (2001.0926.1356)--
Suppose the pilot says nothing. I assume that would also constitute a
disturbance to the perceptual variable the co-pilot is controlling.
Yes, you're correct. A disturbance is a _variable_ that changes its
value over time. Zero is one possible value of that variable. In a
tracking task, the disturbance influences the state of the cursor even
while, for some time period, the value of the disturbance may be zero.
In copiloting, what the pilot says influences the state of the variables
the co-pilot controls even while, for some period of time, the pilot may
say nothing.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
[From Bill Williams 26 September 20001 3:15 CST ]
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.25.
Bill [Williams]
> I think we aggree-- as long as we are talking about a situation in
> which we are engaged in "controlling."Great ! I agree.
> And, I think we also might be in aggreement that "bombing the shit
> out of them" (the disturbance) isn't a "control process"I think the people doing the bombing are almost certainly controlling
for something. Bombing may not be the action that will actually produce
the desired result. But if there is a desired result -- that is, if the
bombing is done for a purpose (good or ill) -- then the bombing is part
of a control process.Just so we don't get tangled up again, let me say that I think bombing
in order to solve this terrorist problem would be a very poor strategy.
It would probably produce more rather than fewer terrorists, assuming
that reducing the number of terrorists was the purpose of the bombing.
We're in aggreement in this regard.
> If in the rubber band experiment the experimental subject pulls out a
> hammer and smashes your hand that has been tugging on the other end
> of the rubber bands, is he/she or not engaging in a control process?As you know, you can't tell whether a behavior is purposeful or not by
simply looking at the behavior. The hand smashing may have been a
purposeful result or an accidental side effect. If the subject moves the
hand (applies a disturbance to the hypothetical controlled variable:
hammer smashing hand) after it is smashed and the hammer smashes the
hand in the new location, I would become pretty confident that the
smashing was done on purpose: someone was controlling for smashing the
subject's hand.
Actually what I intended to say was that the _subject_ pulls out
the hammer and smashes the experimentor's hand. What I had in mind
was the subject _reorganizing_ the experiment by eliminating the
disturbance rather than controlling it-- I'm assuming that after
having his/her hand smashed the experimentor loses interest in being a
disturbance. So perhaps the description of situations which
involve violence rather than using the term "counter-controlling"
should instead employ a nominclature of "re-organizing" such as
"We're going to re-reorganize them into oblivion." This
nominclature would still fall under the general rubric of
control theory. While I think there are matters of substance
involved here, it would help enormously if everyone employed
a consistent terminology. You don't see the attack as part of
a process of control. Others, however, see war as a continuation
of politics. And, then there are questions about ultimate and
proximate causation. So, its too easy to get as you say "tangled up"
in "It tis, It taint."
Best
bill Williams
______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1510)]
Bill Williams (26 September 20001 3:15 CST) --
You don't see the attack as part of a process of control.
Actually, we are in complete agreement. I most certainly _do_ see the
terrorist attack as part of a process of control. The terrorists are
controlling for what I'm pretty sure is some vision of a pure, Islamic
world.
What I don't see is the victim (the US in this case) controlling for
being attacked; so I don't blame the US for the attack. I also don't see
the attack as the result of conflict between the US and the terrorists;
the US has not been in an escalating struggle with the terrorists over a
religious vision. What I do see is a US that has been unintentionally
disturbing the terrorists vision of a pure, Islamic world by being an
overwhelmingly successful, free and tolerant society.
Terrorism is a form of control called coercion; it's the use of the
credible threat of harm to get people to do what is wanted. What the
terrorists want the US to do is disappear. They don't even want us to
help the starving people in the countries where they live. If the US
air-lifted humanitarian aid to the Afghan people the terrorists would
kill anyone who accepted it. The terrorists are controlling (via
coercion) for a world sans the US; a world of ignorance, want, and fear
run by them for the sake of Allah.
People who use coercion to control human behavior are typically
reluctant to take responsibility for their own behavior. So they blame
their victims for the pain that is inflicted on them. Thus, terrorists
point to US policies as justification for the pain that is inflicted on
the US. Bill Powers (2001.09.25.0953 MDT) suggests that the US "change
[the] behavior that is giving them [the terrorists] a justification for
what they do". I think this is unlikely to work with terrorists, who can
find any justification they want to continue to try to coerce the US out
of existence. But I do think it is worthwhile to try to adjust our
policies (and our message) so that we communicate a better image to the
unfortunate masses who are being held hostage by these criminals. We
have to act, in the Muslim world, more like the Magnificent Seven than
the Ugly American.
Best regards
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
MindReadings.com
10459 Holman Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Tel: 310-474-0313
E-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0926.2045)]
Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1510)
What I don't see is the victim (the US in this case) controlling for
being attacked; so I don't blame the US for the attack.
It might be a good idea to avoid the term blame altogether. I think we all
agree that the U.S. was not controlling for being attacked. This was not an
outcome intended by the U.S.
I also don't see
the attack as the result of conflict between the US and the terrorists;
the US has not been in an escalating struggle with the terrorists over a
religious vision.
Quite so.
What I do see is a US that has been unintentionally
disturbing the terrorists vision of a pure, Islamic world by being an
overwhelmingly successful, free and tolerant society.
The immediate problem from Osama bin Laden's point of view seems to be that
U.S. troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia and that the U.S. is the major
power supporting Israel.
Terrorism is a form of control called coercion; it's the use of the
credible threat of harm to get people to do what is wanted. What the
terrorists want the US to do is disappear. They don't even want us to
help the starving people in the countries where they live. If the US
air-lifted humanitarian aid to the Afghan people the terrorists would
kill anyone who accepted it. The terrorists are controlling (via
coercion) for a world sans the US; a world of ignorance, want, and fear
run by them for the sake of Allah.
They may be controlling for an Islamic world free of Western influence.
They certainly want a world sans Israel.
People who use coercion to control human behavior are typically
reluctant to take responsibility for their own behavior. So they blame
their victims for the pain that is inflicted on them. Thus, terrorists
point to US policies as justification for the pain that is inflicted on
the US. Bill Powers (2001.09.25.0953 MDT) suggests that the US "change
[the] behavior that is giving them [the terrorists] a justification for
what they do". I think this is unlikely to work with terrorists, who can
find any justification they want to continue to try to coerce the US out
of existence. But I do think it is worthwhile to try to adjust our
policies (and our message) so that we communicate a better image to the
unfortunate masses who are being held hostage by these criminals. We
have to act, in the Muslim world, more like the Magnificent Seven than
the Ugly American.
One place to start might be to provide humanitarian aid to the Afghans via
the U.N. and the Red Crescent.
Bruce Gregory
is an American ex-patriot.
He lives with the poet And painter
Gray Jacobik
and their canine and feline familiars in
Pomfret, Connecticut
[ From Bill Williams UMKC 26 September 20001 7:45 CST ]
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1510)]
We have to act, in the Muslim world, more like the Magnificent Seven
Can you suggest any other movies that can watch so that our foreign policy
thinking can be HCT ( Hollywood Control Theory ) correct? I am in favor
of our adopting an adult approach to foriegn policy, and I don't mean by
adult, adult movies.
Untill someone sugggests a better source, I think Karen Armstrong's
_The Battle for God_ provides a good introduction to fundamentalist
thinking in Christian, Jewish and Islamic faiths. Actually I can't
see that there is anything wrong with fundamentalist thinking, as such
its just that religious fundamentalism starts with the wrong fundamentals.
So does suggesting that US policy should take its lead from a Hollywood
shoot-em-up. It once worried me that you were doing the "cause" of control
theory a dis-service by making such statements. Now, I'm inclined to think
that there is little reason to worry in this regard. The damage you
can do is likely to be self-limiting in virtue of its extreme implausiblity.
Best
Bill Williams
______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/
[From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1930)]
Me:
What I don't see is the victim (the US in this case) controlling for
being attacked; so I don't blame the US for the attack.
Bruce Gregory (2001.0926.2045)
It might be a good idea to avoid the term blame altogether.
Why?
"Blame" seems like a perfectly good term to me, especially since we have
PCT and can, therefore, understand how intentional ("blamable") behavior
works. I think the people who would (and do) avoid the term "blame" are
behaviorists who look at all behavior as being the result of internal or
external causes. It would make no more sense for a behaviorist to blame
a terrorist for killing innocent people than it would be for him to
blame Mars for moving in an elliptical orbit.
Me:
We have to act, in the Muslim world, more like the Magnificent Seven
Bill Williams (26 September 20001 7:45 CST)
Can you suggest any other movies that can watch so that our foreign policy
thinking can be HCT ( Hollywood Control Theory ) correct?
The Seven Samurai.
I know. It's not Hollywood.
It once worried me that you were doing the "cause" of control theory
a dis-service by making such statements.
I would really appreciate it if you would tell me what the "cause" of
control theory is. When I started working on control theory I didn't
realize I was working in the service (or disservice) of a cause.
Best regards
Rick
---
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313
PCT offers many ways to look at this problem, and what people are controlloing
when they look at it using PCT theory or any other is very much apparent.
Such that decrying fundmanentism per sa, I don not think this very narrow
interpretation of an issue does not just apply to religion. Could in some
quarters US be thought of as having a fundamentalist view of money. I was
disturbed that in the US Tennis the winner was announved as not winning a
trophy but a Cheque for THE Grand SUM of 800 000...
To me alot of the agruements are losing me... and I feel like what is happneing
is that different contributors are controlling different variables however
there behaviour is _disturbing_ what others are controlling. What people should
control is not specified in the theory, and thus I don't think it will answer
alot of these arguements.
Quoting William Williams <w.d.williams@EMAIL.RO>:
[ From Bill Williams UMKC 26 September 20001 7:45 CST ]
> [From Rick Marken (2001.09.26.1510)]
>
> We have to act, in the Muslim world, more like the Magnificent Seven
>
Can you suggest any other movies that can watch so that our foreign
policy
thinking can be HCT ( Hollywood Control Theory ) correct? I am in
favor
of our adopting an adult approach to foriegn policy, and I don't mean
by
adult, adult movies.Untill someone sugggests a better source, I think Karen Armstrong's
_The Battle for God_ provides a good introduction to fundamentalist
thinking in Christian, Jewish and Islamic faiths. Actually I can't
see that there is anything wrong with fundamentalist thinking, as such
its just that religious fundamentalism starts with the wrong
fundamentals.
So does suggesting that US policy should take its lead from a
Hollywood
shoot-em-up. It once worried me that you were doing the "cause" of
control
theory a dis-service by making such statements. Now, I'm inclined to
think
that there is little reason to worry in this regard. The damage you
can do is likely to be self-limiting in virtue of its extreme
implausiblity.Best
Bill Williams______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/
Rohan Lulham
PhD Student
Department of Architecture
University of Sydney
Australia
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