Control of reinforcement

Sounds like an interesting article. I do remember coming across a few
articles in the past, very few.

I suspect that the Psychologists who come the closest will be found in the
area of Family Therapy where a systems perspective is at least respectable.
Another thought is to look at Psychologists who study reinforcement
preferences.

Warmest regards,
David

···

From: David Goldstein
Subject: Re: Control of reinforcement [From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]
Date: 10/18/98

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Marken <rmarken@EARTHLINK.NET>
To: Multiple recipients of list CSGNET <CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU>
Date: Sunday, October 18, 1998 12:03 PM
Subject: Re: Control of reinforcement

[From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]

Yesterday [Rick Marken (981017.1650)] I asked Bruce Abbott
the following:

what I want to know is whether, after they perform their
version of The Test for the Controlled Variable, conventional
psychologists have a special name for the dependent variables
that turn out to be controlled variables?

I don't know if Bruce will help me out on this or not; he seems
to be a bit cranky towards me these days. So I just want to say
that I would really appreciate help on this from any of the
psychologists (or sociologists, etc) on CSGNet who might know
something about how behavioral scientists have delt with
controlled variables.

Let me give some context again. I am planning to write a paper
on _controlled variables_ (indeed, the current working title
is "Controlled Variables") which I want to try to publish in a
major psychological journal (the curernt target is Psychological
Review). The thesis of the paper will be that psychologists have,
by and large, ignored or been completely unaware of the existence
of controlled variables. The paper will explain what controlled
variables are, why they are important and how to find them.

What I need to know about are cases where psychologists _have not_
ignored or been unaware of the existence of controlled variables.
In particular, I want to find published psychological research
studies where the researchers _themselves_ did or said things that
indicate that _they_ were attentive to or aware of the fact
(or even the _possibility_) that some variables were being
_controlled by_ their subjects. I want to be able to include
references to these research studies in my paper.

I think such papers exist; I have found one or two in the baseball
catching literature. But even in these papers the evidence of
awareness of controlled variables is often fleeting -- a brief
mention of the "desired" state of a variable, for example. But if
there are other papers where the _researchers themselves_ seem to
be aware of the possibility that a variable might be _controlled by
the subject_ then I would like to get the reference.

What I _don't want_ are examples of research that can be
_interpreted_ (by you) in terms of controlled variables. I know
that virtually any research project can be explained in terms
of controlled variables. The problem with this is that such
explanations are useless until they are tested (it was easy to
explain operant behavior, for example, in terms of control of
reinforcement rate; but it turns out that what little evidence
we have on this -- since no tests have been done to determine
what variable(s) _are_ controlled in operant experiments --
suggests that rate of reinforcement is not a controlled variable).
The other problem with this is that it makes it seem like the
people who did the research _were_ aware of the possible existence
of controlled variables. I am only interested in reporting (in my
paper) examples of research where the researchers _themselves_
were _actually_ aware of the possible existence of controlled
variables.

If you do know of published psychological resarch papers in
which there is evidence that the researcher(s) knew about the
possible existence of controlled variables (it's not necessary
that the term "controlled variable" appear in the paper; just
any terminology or data collection that suggests an awareness
that the subjects were trying to get something for themselves)
please send me the reference in APA format: author (year), title,
journal, volume, pages.

Thanks

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Rick Marken (981018.1110)]

Bill Powers (981017.1708 MDT) re: Bruce Abbott (981017.1630 EST)

Please pay careful attention to Bruce's words.

Bruce Gregory (981017.2017 EDT) --

I try to, Bill, but I never succeed in reading into them the
subtle attacks on PCT that you and Rick discern. I'll have to
try harder.

YThat would be nic. And a good place to start trying harder is
with Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Tim Carey (981019.0555)]

[From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]

I don't know if Bruce will help me out on this or not; he seems
to be a bit cranky towards me these days. So I just want to say
that I would really appreciate help on this from any of the
psychologists (or sociologists, etc) on CSGNet who might know
something about how behavioral scientists have delt with
controlled variables.

I'm really looking forward to your paper Rick. At my university the
academics I have spoken do not know a thing about controlled variables.
IV/DV research is alive and going strong down under.

With regard to references. A couple of weeks ago Isaac sent me these
references:

NATURE, May 14, Vol 393, "Postural Control in hte Mollusk"
NATURE, April 16, Vol 392, "Multiple stored views and landmark guidance in
ants"

Isaac describes these as two "test-like" studies. I haven't had a chance to
check them out but I trust his judgement. They may be what you're looking
for. Sorry about the reference it's not a complete APA but that was all
Isaac sent me.

Cheers,

Tim

[From Bruce Gregory (981018.1600 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981018.1110)

YThat would be nic. And a good place to start trying harder is
with Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT).

Thanks. I'll check it out. I want to play with the big guys...the ones
who _really_ know what its all about. I want to grow up to be just
like you, Rick.

Bruce Gregory

From [ Marc Abrams (981018.1607)

[From Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT)]

Granted, although I have a hard time imagining how you
measure "availability." How did you prove that

"availability", >rather than, say, amount of food in the
cup, was controlled?

Not trying to be cute, but what difference does it make? We
are controlling so many things at the same time and they
change so frequently why does it matter what one CV in one
person ( or rat in this case ) is controlling at one
specific point in time. What does it prove? What kinds of
insights are to be gained with this kind of knowledge? This
has been my agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"
_what_ a cv is for any one person. The _test_ might put you
in the ballpark, but that is for _one_ cv not _all_ cv's
that might be controlled for at that time.

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Marc

[From Bruce Abbott (981018.1730 EST)]

Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT) --

Bruce Abbott (981017.2155 EST)

What a strange thing to say, after I have proposed that availability of food
in the chamber is controlled, rather than its rate of occurrence.

Granted,

I've separated this from the rest of your sentence, so that it gets noticed.
But now comes a caveat:

although I have a hard time imagining how you measure
"availability." How did you prove that "availability", rather than, say,
amount of food in the cup, was controlled?

You're right--the experiment wasn't designed to test how _much_ food the rat
wanted to see in the cup before it stopped pressing and started eating. On
CRF (1 press per food-delivery), some rats did develop the habit of pressing
twice (and thereby getting two pellets into the cup) before moving to the
cup and consuming the food. But that falsify my statement that the rats
controlled for having food in the cup, it elaborates it by specifying a that
they wanted a specific quantity there. On schedules other than CRF, by the
way, the rat never allowed two pellets to accumulate in the cup before
moving to the cup and eating what was there.

It

is also obvious that ruling out one CV does not rule out the possibility
that the rat's actions may be controlling some other CV. It's not the sort
of logical error I'm likely to commit.

OK, I hoped not and now you say you don't make this sort of error. I can
only accept your claim until you disprove it (it doesn't take long: see
below).

I looked below: the promised disproof is not there. Instead, I find you
making the same error you made the first time. (See below.)

In that model, decreasing the reinforcement rate

(by lengthening the average interreinforcement interval of the VI schedule)
was supposed produce an increased rate of lever-pressing as the rat
attempted to offset the reduced reinforcement rate. In fact the opposite
happened. The model is incorrect.

No, the opposite did NOT happen, because the (apparent and illusory)
decrease in the rate of pressing was not caused by a decrease in the rate
of reinforcement, but by time away from the lever that affected both the
apparent rate of pressing and the apparent rate of reinforcement.

Bill, you're making a terrible mistake here; I only wish I could figure out
how to set your thinking strait about this. All I can do is try.

First, we are talking about performance on variable-interval schedules, not
ratio schedules. Both require the rat to press the lever in order to
receive food pellets, but -- and I'll separate this for emphasis -- the two
schedules

        differ in their their environmental feedback functions.

On ratio schedules, each pellet is delivered only after a certain number of
lever-presses has been completed. The ratio of the ratio schedule specifies
the number of lever-presses per pellet delivery. Pellet delivery is thus
directly proportional to responses completed and consequently, rate of
pellet delivery depends directly on rate of responding.

On interval schedules, each pellet is delivered only after (a) a certain
interval of time has passed since the previous pellet delivery and (b) a
single lever-press has occurred _after_ the interval has elapsed. (Any
presses occurring prior to the end of the interval are counted but have no
effect on pellet delivery.) What is the nature of this environmental
feedback function?

To answer this question, I'll start with the case in which the interval is
of fixed length (a so-called fixed-interval or FI schedule). For
simplicity, assume that we replace the rat with a timer that closes the
switch on the lever every t seconds. The fixed interval is tau seconds.

From this information we can deduce the following three cases:

1. If t is equal to tau, then a pellet will be delivered for each
    "response" (tick of the timer) at a rate of one pellet per tau
    seconds. Every response will be immediately followed by food
    delivery.

2. If t is greater than tau, then a pellet will be delivered for each
    response at a rate of one pellet per t seconds. Every response will
    be immediately followed by food delivery.

3. If t is less than tau, then a pellet will be delivered only when nt
    is greater than or equal to tau, and n-1 responses will occur without
    being followed immediately by food delivery.

Assume that tau = 30 seconds (an FI 30-s schedule) and t = 8 seconds. The
first three responses produce nothing (nt = 24 seconds, less than tau). The
fourth response occurs at nt = 32 seconds, 2 seconds greater than tau, and
is immediately followed by pellet delivery. The "programmed" interpellet
interval is tau (30 seconds), but the "observed" interpellet interval (for
this particular interval) is 32 seconds, or about 6.7% longer than it would
be if the timer were running at an infinite rate rather than at one tick
per 8 seconds.

But this analysis assumes that the rat can generate accurately timed
responses at a constant interval. In fact the intervals between responses
vary to some degree. In that case the time at which a given response occurs
will be unrelated to the time at which tau elapses. If the mean time
between responses is 8 seconds, then sometimes a response will occur just as
tau elapses, producing the reward, and sometimes it will occur just prior to
tau elapsing, producing nothing. In the latter case the next response will
occur on average 8 seconds later. It can be shown that on average the delay
between the end of tau and the next response will be t/2. Thus, for t = 8
seconds, the observed time between rewards will be tau + t/2 = 30 + 8/2 = 34
seconds.

_Doubling_ the response rate to 1 press per 4 seconds cuts the time between
rewards to 32 seconds. Doubling it again cuts it to 31 seconds. Doubling
it yet again cuts it to 30.5 seconds. So an increase in response rate from
7.5 responses per minute (1 press per 8 seconds) to 60 responses per minute
(1 press per second) reduces the average waiting time for food from 34
seconds to 30.5 seconds, or about a 10% improvement in waiting time at a
cost of an 8-fold increase in response rate. As tau increases, there is a
decline in the percentage improvement in waiting time produced by a given
increase in response rate. For example, on FI 300-s, the obtained reward
interval at 1 press per 8 seconds is 304 seconds (within 1.3% of the
theoretical optimum), and this falls to 300.5 seconds (about 1.2%
improvement) at 1 press per second.

In variable interval schedules, tau changes after each reward, but tau
averages to some specified value. The variation in tau makes it impossible
for the rat (or anyone else) to "time" responses to match tau, which makes
the analysis in terms of the rat's somewhat variable response rate have even
more force: the end of tau and occurrence of the next response can be
treated as randomly related with some specified mean difference.

So as you should be able to see, at relatively high rates of responding,
rate of reward is nearly independent of rate of responding (that is, reward
rate varies little with variation in response rate). Rats on VI schedules
typically maintain response rates sufficient to place them within this
region of the environmental feedback function. Until the increase in t
becomes significant, the reduced response rates associated with higher
values of tau are not accompanied by any appreciable change in reward rate.

The
independent variable is time away from the lever; the two apparent rates
both depend on time away from the lever and are not causally related to
each other (based on _that_ measurement).

The rat can reduce its response rate by (a) generating a longer average time
between presses wile standing at the lever or (b) maintaining a relatively
constant rate while at the lever but spending a greater time away from the
lever. I have indicated that both changes occur on VI schedules over the
range of values of tau investigated. What I don't see is why you think the
difference is so important, as if the rat's doing b rather than a somehow
invalidated my analysis. It doesn't.

The prediction from PCT is that a disturbance of a controlled variable and
the action that does the controlling will vary equally and oppositely. But
any application of that principle presupposes you have successfully
identified a controlled variable. PCT does not predict what variables will
prove to be controlled. PCT is not at fault for predicting that rate of
reinforcement is a controlled variable.

Do you imagine that I believe otherwise? Show me where I said that PCT was
at fault. Go ahead. It's time to back up your assertions -- or rather,
aspersions.

My assumption was at fault: that if
the rate of reinforcement varied, it was because the rate of pressing
varied as well as because of the change in ratio (this was all on FR
schedules). You then proved with data that the rate of pressing was
effectively a constant, and thus was actually independent of both rate of
reinforcement and schedule.

Yes -- for ratio schedules. Different ballgame altogether. Entirely
different environmental feedback function, you can't generalize from the
ratio-schedule result to the VI-schedule situation we are discussing.

I decided, and said a year and a half ago, that the particular model I came
up with couldn't be right because it assumed that the rate of pressing
changed with the (hypothetical) error. I acknowledged at the same time that
my fit of a control-system model to the Motheral data was spurious. Why are
you still harping on this? Do you want me to repeat once a week, or day,
that my first attempt at a specific model wasn't correct?

The VI result was reported to you -- privately -- last Spring. I haven't
mentioned it since -- until now. I brought it up because of this:

  Bill Powers (981014.0522 MDT)

  By the way, I recall that you were quite sure the story would be different
  for Variable-Interval schedules. As I recall, your more recent experiments
  with VI schedules seemed to be showing the same effect: no significant
  variations in pressing rate on different schedules. Is that still holding up?

I mentioned your prediction because it was that prediction that led to my
interest in reevaluating the VI interval-length vs response rate data, and
because Rick had gone so far as to claim that this would be a crucial
experiment between PCT and reinforcement theory. If my memory serves, he
has made this claim again fairly recently, and I wanted to disabuse him of
the notion.

I'm sure that a perfectly good PCT model can be built that will handle these
data. However, it does give one pause for thought. The results confirm a
perfectly clear if only loosely qualitative prediction based on
reinforcement theory. That does not mean that reinforcement theory is
correct, but at least it made a definite prediction. Given our present
state of knowledge, PCT's predictions can only be made, as it were, after
the fact, that is, after you have learned what variables are being
controlled and how.

Or could it be -- this just occurred to me -- that while rate of food
delivery is not a controlled variable, you're assuming it might still be a
reinforcer? That, of course, is ruled out because the behavior rate is
constant and does not vary with rate of food delivery. The same data that
rule out rate of food delivery as a controlled variable rule it out as a
reinforcer. The behavior rate does not change with "reinforcement" rate.

Not so, reinforcement theory can handle these observations -- again because
of the difference between ratio and interval schedules. We went over this
once before, but you refused to listen to me then, and now you repeat the
assertion as if we'd never had the conversation. You leave me little hope
that a second attempt would make any greater impression on you, so I'll just
leave it at that.

Your VI example in which both behavior rate and reinforcement rate decline
means nothing because the actual cause of the decline is time away from the
lever; it is not the decline in reinforcement rate that causes the decline
in behavior rate.

You keep saying this but the logic of it -- if any there be -- escapes me.
See my above discussion of how VI schedules work.

There I go again, trying to pull the wool over everyone's eyes. How
fiendishly clever of me.

I'm beginning to think it's your own eyes you're pulling the wool over.

Bill, you're blind to your own blindness.

_Of course_ reinforcement rates decline with increases in the interval used
in the schedule -- changing the interval sizes is how we experimentally vary
the reinforcement rate.

That is not what I am talking about. If time away from the lever increases
with the interval or ratio, that alone will result in a decline in behavior
rate and reinforcement rate, when both are measured as total number during
a session divided by duration of the session. You do not see any
significant change in pressing rate (corrected for collection time) until
the animal starts spending significant time away from the lever in addition
to collection time. This occurs at the higher intervals or ratios.

Your statements apply correctly to ratio schedules. They are wrong when
applied to interval schedules. Why do you keep bringing up the ratio data
when we are discussing the interval study?

Perhaps so, but that is irrelevant. Time away from the lever increases with
increased intervals, doesn't it? That would automatically decrease both
apparent rates equally: pressing and reinforcement. If your mind-set tells
you that pressing rate depends on reinforcement rate, you will interpret
that simultaneous decline as causal, when it is not.

It is your mind-set, not mine, that is the problem. You keep thinking in
terms of ratio schedules, and drawing conclusions that do not apply to the
inteval schedules under discussion. Then, when the results do not agree
with my statements, you attribute the problem to _my_ thinking!

But on high VI schedules, most programmed interreinforcement
intervals are long enough that (a) reinforcement-events would not have
occurred during most pauses and (b) most pauses will end relatively soon
after a programmed interval has elapsed and the next reinforcement
opportunity set up. Reinforcement rate consequently is little affected.

That is mathematical gibberish, Bruce. What is little affected is the
_whole-session_ reinforcement (and behavior) rate. The short-term behavior
rate is drastically affected. You are rationalizing.

We're talking about slightly different things, Bill. When the rat is
pausing, it is not responding and of course "the short-term behavior rate is
drastically affected," if by short-term you mean the duration of the pause.
But what I'm talking about is a somewhat longer interval -- the time between
presses (some of which consist of pauses away from the lever) relative to
the durations of tau. So long as the pauses are much shorter than tau,
there will be little effect of these pauses on the obtained rate of reward.
And that, my friend, is not mathematical gibberish, and it is not rationalizing.

And don't forget that the data consist of the times at which each and every
response occurred, not session averages. However, it is convenient to
report the result in terms of session averages, because those averages
reflect the typical rates observed at any time within a session.

More gibberish. It is convenient because you get the answer you want, not
because there is either logical or mathematical justification for this
number-juggling. The data initially consist of each and every response.
When you use session averages, you throw out most of the relevant information.

If the session averages and averages computed for various times within a
session are similar, then one can argue strongly that one is as good as the
other for depicting the relationships observed. Tell me, Bill, if you were
assessing the performance of a control system at various levels of gain
while the system was under a relatively constant disturbance, how would you
proceed? Would you average over the noise in the CV being produced by the
small variations in the disturbance to find the level of the CV produced at
each value of gain for a given reference level? Is there anything terribly
wrong with this procedure, when the observations are taken after the system
has passed beyond the transient values of start-up? Because that's exactly
analogous to what my procedure involved.

But we can state with certainty that increasing X, the programmed interval
size (which is independent of the rat's behavior), reliably results in a
lowered response rate, Y.

That is because it reliably decreases the fraction of the total time the
rat spends pressing the bar. You are varying both numerators (total
presses, total reinforcements) while the demonominator stays the same
(session duration). There is no causal relation between X and Y.

There is no reason why Y (number of responses emitted) should fall just
because X (number of rewards programmed) has been reduced -- after all, the
denominator stays the same. Furthermore, as noted previously (and proven
above) X can change over a wide range while hardly affecting X' (number of
rewards obtained) at all. Thus the major reason X' changes is because X has
been manipulated by the experimenter.

If you
deliberately close your eyes to the obvious explanation of the decline in X
and Y, you can claim an overall effect, but in doing so you only reveal
that you want the conclusion to be true more than you want to arrive at it
by legitimate means.

Really, Bill, you're getting to be like Rick -- you think you can accurately
guess at other people's motives. Not only that, but it seems to me that you
have such confidence in your own thinking that it never occurs to you that
you might be mistaken; consequently you brashly accuse anyone whose
conclusions disagree with yours of muddy or even biased thinking. I've
never had that degree of confidence that I've correctly understood or
reasoned about something, and for that reason I've always been willing to
consider yours or anyone else's arguments on their merits, on the chance
that I've missed something significant. Sometimes I've discovered that my
thinking was wrong, but even then I can take comfort in the fact that I've
learned something. I've learned quite a bit from you, Bill. But I've also
learned that you don't know everything, and that you can on occasion be
quite wrong in your opinions. If you could bear that in mind, perhaps you
would be less inclined to treat me like the village idiot in your replies.

Regards,

Bruce

[From Bruce Abbott (981018.1920 EST)]

Rick Marken (981018.1600) --

Marc Abrams (981018.1607)

why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in
this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.

Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent
question that could be asked of a conventinoal psychologist: Why
does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a reinforcement
schedule matter? It matters because most psychologists (like Bruce
Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior. So
learning things like "variable interval schedules produce higher
rates of responding than fixed ratio schedules" tells them something
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in
applied settings; they can tell managers "if you want more work
out of your employees pay them at random intervals rather than
for fixed amounts of work".

If you're going to tell this little fairy tale, Rick, at least get your
facts straight.

1. Bruce Abbott doesn't believe that environmental events control
    behavior, not in the sense that you mean "control." You know
    that, but for some reason you evidently feel compelled to lie
    about it. (Try increasing your medication: that may help
    control the cumpulsion.)

2. You have the schedule effects reversed and failed to mention an
    important qualifier. Ratio schedules support a higher rate of
    responding than interval schedules do, _when rate of reward is
    equated between the schedules_. For someone who supposedly
    got a PhD. in experimental psychology you sometimes display an
    amazing ignorance of the subject. Perhaps that explains why
    you decided to abandon the field.

Hmmm. I'm getting a little peevish myself! Time to up my own dosage . . .
again. There, I feel much better now.

Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular
variable matters because control theorists believe that behavior
is the control of perception. So learning things like "a rat
controls the probability of a reinforcement" tells them something
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in
applied settings; they can tell managers "don't try to control
your workers work levels by controlling the rewards they get
because they are trying to control the rewards themselves and
you will just get into conflict with them".

If all control theory can do is tell managers that they can't do their jobs,
it isn't going to become very popular. As a control theorist myself, I
would tell managers to arrange work conditions so that employees can achieve
control over many variables important to them (self-esteem, job
satisfaction, morale, perception of being treated fairly, fair wage for good
work, and so on) while behaving in ways that also help the managers to
acheive their goals and thus maintain control over variables important to
them (like meeting production schedules, avoiding unnecessary costs, getting
high quality in the work product, etc.). With some degree of effort it may
even be possible to suggest ways in which employees' efforts to achieve
control over their own important variables also contribute to the managers'
achieving their own goals. This may involve setting up contingencies which
allow the employees to bring certain of their CVs toward desired levels by
efforts which also (not incidentally) contribute to achievement of the
managers' goals.

This advice avoids the conflict problem emphasized in your advice while
helping managers to get what they want, too.

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Which ones?

You see, Marc, he's forgotten already. In fact, he's forgotten to answer
your excellent first question, as well!

Regards,

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (981018.1600)]

Tim Carey (981019.0555)

I'm really looking forward to your paper Rick. At my university
the academics I have spoken do not know a thing about controlled
variables.

They probably just haven't read Bruce Abbott's methods text which,
I'm sure, explains how you can tell a dependent variable that is
controlled from a dependent variable that isn't.

With regard to references. A couple of weeks ago Isaac sent me these
references:

NATURE, May 14, Vol 393, "Postural Control in hte Mollusk"
NATURE, April 16, Vol 392, "Multiple stored views and landmark
guidance in ants"

Thanks very much. That's a good start.

Marc Abrams (981018.1607)--

why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in
this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.

Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent
question that could be asked of a conventinoal psychologist: Why
does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a reinforcement
schedule matter? It matters because most psychologists (like Bruce
Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior. So
learning things like "variable interval schedules produce higher
rates of responding than fixed ratio schedules" tells them something
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in
applied settings; they can tell managers "if you want more work
out of your employees pay them at random intervals rather than
for fixed amounts of work".

Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular
variable matters because control theorists believe that behavior
is the control of perception. So learning things like "a rat
controls the probability of a reinforcement" tells them something
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in
applied settings; they can tell managers "don't try to control
your workers work levels by controlling the rewards they get
because they are trying to control the rewards themselves and
you will just get into conflict with them".

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Which ones?

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (9810.22000]

Rick Marken (981018.1815)]

Seems to me like the only peeved people around here are you,
Marc and the persistently peeved Bruce Gregory.

You must have me confused with somebody else. Since I turned in my PCT
card, I am hardly ever peeved. Bored, yes. Peeved, no. Isaac gave me
copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry, Repetition, and
Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it was only five years
ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb material like these
articles. Instead we get the drivel that clogs CSGnet today. (Oops, I
do sound peevish, don't I?) Why don't take a leave of absence from the
net and write something of the quality of your articles in _Mind
Readings_? You can't really get much satisfaction from saying the same
thing over and over again. I can't believe there are too many of us
who get satisfaction from hearing you play your one note refrains. If
we haven't gotten it by now, what makes you think that continuing to
play it will make any difference? Remember, trying to teach a pig to
sing doesn't work and only succeeds in annoying the pig.

Oink. Oink.

Bruce Gregory

[From Rick Marken (981018.1815)]

Me:

psychologists (like Bruce Abbott) believe that environmental
events control behavior.

Bruce Abbott (981018.1920 EST)

If you're going to tell this little fairy tale, Rick, at least
get your facts straight.

1. Bruce Abbott doesn't believe that environmental events control
    behavior, not in the sense that you mean "control."

I meant "control" in the sense that you mean "control" (whatever
that is). A PCTer doesn't believe that the environment controls
behavior, in _any_ sense of the word "control"; the environment
is _controlled_ by behavior.

2. You have the schedule effects reversed... For someone who
supposedly got a PhD. in experimental psychology you sometimes
display an amazing ignorance of the subject. Perhaps that
explains why you decided to abandon the field.

Yes. I was just holding on by my fingertips.

Hmmm. I'm getting a little peevish myself!

Seems to me like the only peeved people around here are you,
Marc and the persistently peeved Bruce Gregory.

If all control theory can do is tell managers that they can't do
their jobs, it isn't going to become very popular.

Well, now you know why control theory isn't going to become very
popular... at least in the near future. The problem is that many
managers seem to assume that there job is to control people. Control
theory doesn't tell these managers that they can't so their job;
it just says that, if they see their job to be "controlling" then
they are going to experience constant conflict.

As a control theorist myself, I would tell managers to arrange
work conditions so that employees can achieve control over many
variables important to them (self-esteem, job satisfaction, morale,
perception of being treated fairly, fair wage for good work, and so
on)

How did you determine that employees are controlling these
variables? How did you determine that control of these variables
was important to every employee? You don't mention suggesting
to the manager that s/he negotiate with the employees before
arranging work conditions so that employees can achieve control;
what if many -- or most -- employees think the manager's well-
intentioned arrangements suck?

This advice avoids the conflict problem emphasized in your
advice while helping managers to get what they want, too.

This advice is behaviorism re-phrased in PCT-speak, something you
do with considerable aplomb.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

From [ Marc Abrams (981018.2210) ]

[From Rick Marken (981018.1600)]

Marc Abrams (981018.1607)--

why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in
this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.

Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent
question that could be asked of a conventinoal

psychologist:

Why?, We are not looking for the same things. We already
know that most conventional psychologists do not research
the CV, even if they know about it.

Why does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a
reinforcement schedule matter? It matters because most
psychologists (like Bruce Abbott) believe that

environmental >events control behavior.

So?, What does that have to do with my question?

So learning things like "variable interval schedules

produce >higher rates of responding than fixed ratio
schedules" tells >them something about the behavior of
organisms.

Like what? I am _dead_ serious. What insight or new
knwoledge does this provide? and _again_, what does this
have to do with my question?

And they can use this data in applied settings; they can

tell >managers "if you want more work out of your employees
pay >them at random intervals rather than for fixed amounts
of >work".

I see you haven't done much business consulting :-). How
would knowing what one cv from one individual change how you
would deal with that kind of problem. ( I am not suggesting
that the one suggested by you is a real one )

Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular
variable matters because control theorists believe that
behavior is the control of perception.

I could not agree more. But _one_ cv, _one_ perception. I'm
not comfortable with the notion that interactions and
actions can be explained by the dynamics of _one_ cv.

So learning things like "a rat controls the probability of

a >reinforcement" tells them something about the behavior of

organisms.

You said this before, so I'll ask again, _What_ does it tell
them?

And they can use this data in applied settings; they can

tell >managers "don't try to control your workers work
levels by >controlling the rewards they get because they are
trying to >control the rewards themselves and you will just
get into >conflict with them".

Yes, and people have their palms read, and do _all_ kinds of
BS to try and figure out how to get other people to do what
they want them to do. No news scoop here. But Rick, what
does this have to do with my question?

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Which ones?

Any

Marc

[From Chris Cherpas (981018.1900 PT)]

Chris Cherpas (981016.2340 PT)--

I think kids learning about PCT, and especially how it relates
to understanding themselves, i.e., in a computer curriculum full
of experiments that gradually build up the hierarchy, would be
fantastic.

Tim Carey (981018.-655)--

I'd be keen to hear where you're up to in your thinking with this.

I come from a perspective of doing computer-based curricula,
so you may need to translate (also my native language is
American, rather than English).

Many proposals have been made to teach higher-order thinking,
problem-solving, and other undoubtedly worthy skills that
presumably transcend the merely rote, factual, algorithmic,
and otherwise basic skills that make up much of the curricula
of public schools. To a great extent, I think that if students
could get individualized tutoring and practice with greater
amounts of better structured curriculum materials, they'd be
better thinkers and problem-solvers than any previous
generation by virtue of just having a more extensive repertoire
of elements to recombine for whatever purposes arose in their
lives...all without miracle programs on How to Solve It,
exploreware for discovering Pythagorea's theorem on their own,
or whole language, whole math, and whole holism.

Individualized computer-based systems could do a lot for
achieving that kind of educational improvement without
having to resort to fanciful, wish-fulfilling notions
about teaching all-purpose super-concepts and methods
that automatically integrate all experience into expert
wisdom, wherein each child learns the secrets that
previously only people like Einstein knew, but
just didn't know how to communicate to others...

But another "meta-" approach to pursue, assuming you've
already established a system for continuously improving
the standard track, is to take individualization another
step further. Computer technology has made it feasible
for programs, teachers, and students to examine, analyze,
and model extensive amounts of each student's history
of going through an educational process. That in itself
is an advance for tracking and repairing, planning and
explaining, various aspects of the process. But what
if we use not only a rational methodology for experimenting
with the "contents of subjects" in relation to individual
learning, but also develop a theory of the student
from the perspective of PCT?

At the bottom of the hierarchy, one can imagine a suite
of PCT-based "psychophysics" experiments which students
could run to give themselves, and the system, a profile
of their perceptual capabilities. The data could have
many uses, including using them as examples for teaching
analysis skills (which are already being taught starting
at the kindergarten level). Individualization of the
standard material could be refined by testing and updating
the evolving perceptual capabilities of students, which
so obviously varies to anyone who has watched children of
the same age exhibiting variations in say, the ability
to use the computer mouse. Consider that millions of
students would be providing data to improve PCT itself
all the while.

But all that barely gets to what I think you are asking
about, which I promise to spout on about in a future
message, but have run out of time at the moment.

Best regards,
cc

From [ Marc Abrams (981018.2246) ]

[From Bruce Gregory (9810.22000]

Thank you Bruce. I could not have said it any better.

Marc

[From Rick Marken (981018.1950)]

Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --

(Oops, I do sound peevish, don't I?)

Indeed.

Remember, trying to teach a pig to sing doesn't work and only
succeeds in annoying the pig.

Excellent advice. But it's so much fun watching pigs who think
they _can_ sing. It's kind of like watching Elmer Fudd sing
Wagner:"Kill da wabbit! Kill da wabbitt!

Best

The Waskelly Wabbitt

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bill Powers (981018.2237 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (981018.1730 EST)--

Bill, you're making a terrible mistake here; I only wish I could figure out
how to set your thinking strait about this. All I can do is try.

I understand interval schedules, and even variable-interval schedules. I
understand that you are talking about VI schedules. I understand all of
your painstaking illustrations of elementary relationships. Let's cut to
the chase.

Me:

The
independent variable is time away from the lever; the two apparent rates
both depend on time away from the lever and are not causally related to
each other (based on _that_ measurement).

You:

The rat can reduce its response rate by (a) generating a longer average time
between presses wile standing at the lever or (b) maintaining a relatively
constant rate while at the lever but spending a greater time away from the
lever. I have indicated that both changes occur on VI schedules over the
range of values of tau investigated. What I don't see is why you think the
difference is so important, as if the rat's doing b rather than a somehow
invalidated my analysis. It doesn't.

Suppose the rat happened to stay at the lever during the whole session,
pressing at some average rate and getting food pellets at some other
average rate (which would happen on any schedule). Pressing would produce a
total number P of presses during the session and a total number of
reinforcements R. If the duration of the session is T, we have a mean
pressing rate of P/T and a mean reinforcement rate of R/T.

Now, arbitrarily, let us add a period of duration tau at the end of the
session, during which no pressing of the lever takes place, and thus no
reinforcements ever occur. We can simply remove the rat from the cage and
let it do other things beside press the bar, while we let the clock run for
an additional tau minutes or hours or days. Now, at the end of the
additional time period, we calculate the mean rate of pressing and the mean
rate of reinforcement. They are P/(T+tau) and R/(T+tau). Notice that
P/(T+tau) is less than P/T if tau and T are positive numbers. Can you
conclude from this that a decrease in the session-average rate of
reinforcement has caused a decrease in the session-average rate of pressing?

Obviously it makes no difference if we add the extra time tau at the end of
the session of continuous responding, or break it up into many much shorter
periods during which the rat is away from the lever. Also the type of
schedule makes absolutely no difference.

Periods away from the bar create a spurious indication of an effect of a
changing reinforcement rate on the calculated rate of pressing. Spurious.

And finally, if it is true that the rat spends more time away from the
lever when the scheduled intervals are longer, we can express this as tau =
f(I) where f is some positive monotonic function and I is the scheduled
interval. The result:

mean pressing rate = P/(T+f(I))

mean reinforcement rate = R/(T+f(I))

Note that neither P nor R is a function of the interval, and the decrease
in mean pressing rate is not due to the decrease in the mean reinforcement
rate.

As to who is blind, I leave that to others to say. You have yet to admit
that there is a single thing wrong with the basic methods and analyses of
EAB, so you must think me an extraordinarily stupid person for seeing so
many problems (quite independently of what PCT has to say).

Bill

[From Bill Powers (981018.1147 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (981018.1607) --

Granted, although I have a hard time imagining how you
measure "availability." How did you prove that

"availability", >rather than, say, amount of food in the
cup, was controlled?

Not trying to be cute, but what difference does it make? We
are controlling so many things at the same time and they
change so frequently why does it matter what one CV in one
person ( or rat in this case ) is controlling at one
specific point in time.

I've heard this from you more than once, and am still not impressed. It's
like saying that the physical world has so many things going on in it at
once that there's no point in looking for any regularities in the details.
The point, which I'm sure you could supply as well as I if you stopped
feeling threatened, is to find regular laws that stay the same in the midst
of all those ever-changing details. To do that you have to study what is
going on at one specific point in time, then another, then another -- until
you can predict how all these variables are going to change through time in
recognizeable patterns.

What does it prove? What kinds of insights are to be gained with this kind
of knowledge? This has been my agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"
_what_ a cv is for any one person. The _test_ might put you
in the ballpark, but that is for _one_ cv not _all_ cv's
that might be controlled for at that time.

You're obviously asking these questions as a way of expressing doubt that
there are any real answers. But my answer is that what is to be gained is
EVERYTHING: the first real understanding of human nature in the history of
the world.

Best,

Bill P.

···

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Marc

From [ Marc Abrams (981019.0221) ]

Let me begin this post with a short note. I had a major
heart attack in April of 1997. Because of that my kidney
function was greatly reduced and I became anemic. I could
not attend this years conference because of my health ( two
episodes of congestive heart failure, one right before the
conference ) and deeply regretted it. For the past month I
have been _extremely_ ill. Sleeping upwards of 14- 16 hours
a day and feeling like death ( which i really thought was
not far away ). Last week in my visit to my hematologist we
tried a new therapy of medication to help elevate my red
blood count which was down to about 7. ( normal being 14 ) I
am feeling _much_ stronger and certainly much more
clearheaded over the past week then I have in a long time. I
am going to be all right. I am not a bad person nor do I
have evil intentions. I like PCT. I believe it will one day
be the way all of us are taught about behavior. Bill, I
sometimes think you think I am some wise ass punk from NY
looking to give you a hard time. Get a life my friend. It's
_real_ precious, I _know_, and not worth wasting on BS. I
am here because I think PCT is right about behavior, but it
ain't finished ( I don't give a Sh-t was marken says.) I am
here because it matters to me. I would like to be able to
contribute someting to the cause. If the only thing I can
contribute are worthwhile questions then that's what i will
continue to do. You don't want to read them don't. I ask
them because I want answers to them I don't have time to
waste trying to break yours or anyone elses chops. Including
Marken's.

[From Bill Powers (981018.1147 MDT)]

I've heard this from you more than once, and am still not
impressed.

I can tell from the number of times I've gotten some
response to it. This is the first. I really don't care if
you are impressed. I don't ask questions to impress people
with how much I know I ask becase I _don't_ know and I would
_like_ to know. Do you have a particular problem with that
style or do you think I'm being some kind of smart ass or
doubting thomas.

It's like saying that the physical world has so many things
going on in it at once that there's no point in looking for

any >regularities in the details. The point, which I'm sure
you >could supply as well as I

Bill, if there are no answers to my questions. say so. I
think there are. I think modeling might give us some insight
into the dynamics of the PCT process. I think discussion
about it might help. Are you saying that what you did 40
years ago is the extent of what can be done and known. I
don't believe that to be true.

if you stopped feeling threatened,

Threatened about what? I want to learn, I want to
understand. Do I need to learn it and understand it exactly
like you did an do. These questions are important to me.

is to find regular laws that stay the same in the midst
of all those ever-changing details. To do that you have to
study what is going on at one specific point in time, then
another, then another -- until you can predict how all

these >variables are going to change through time in

recognizeable patterns.

I do not disagree How do you intend to do this? At one
specific point in time any number of interactions are taking
place both inside and outside the individual. Can this all
be replicated. I don't think so. How do you decide _what_ to
look at. Well I think a basic model of the environment with
a basic PCT agent doing somrthing real might give us a
clue. Who knows? Or are we going to feel sorry for ourselves
because others can't and won't do what we are incapable of
doing. Bill, if you have, in your mind, a next step that
requires certain types of research and work, come out and
say so. I'll shut up, sit on the sidelines watch, try to
develop the kind of models i think might help and that'll be
it. It all might be one big waste of time, but I see
_nothing_ coming constructively from Rick.lately. I have
asked Rick on any number of occasions privately, if there is
any kind of data i might be able to collect or get, ir there
are any experiments I might be able to help with. I have
gotten _0_ responses.

What does it prove? What kinds of insights are to be
gained with this kind of knowledge? This has been my
agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"
_what_ a cv is for any one person. The _test_ might put
you in the ballpark, but that is for _one_ cv not _all_

cv's

that might be controlled for at that time.

You're obviously asking these questions as a way of
expressing doubt that there are any real answers.

Bill, you don't use your own theory. This statement could
not be any further from the truth. Is that why I recommended
the SD modeling to the list? Is that why I got you in touch
with Bob Eberlein. Sorry pal your off base. I _know_ there
are answers. Just gotta figure out what the right questions
are.

But my answer is that what is to be gained is
EVERYTHING: the first real understanding of human nature
in the history of the world.

Not if you stay where you are, and I am asking the kinds of
questions that you are going to have to answer at some point
in time, for your statement above to prove accurate

Marc

[From Bill Powers (981019.0549 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (981019.0221) --

If PCT is so wonderful, how come it can't make you well? Unfortunately,
when it comes to practical applications, there are just too many where
something wonderful is needed but, as it happens, there is nobody who can
supply it. We have to accept the state of knowledge as it is, knowing that
it's not good enough but also knowing that if we give up trying to make it
better, it will never be any better than it is. And it does help to realize
that it's better than it used to be -- if you were living 100 years ago,
you'd be dead.

You want to make a contribution to the future. So do I. I think we're both
doing it, all of us on CSGnet are doing it. We're involved in the
development of an idea that is greater than any person, not to inflate our
egos or to dominate other people, but because of what it will mean for the
future, after we're gone. This puts us in contact with generations not yet
born, so in a way we're already living beyond our lifetimes. What we do now
will still be a part of the lives of all people in a hundred or even a
thousand years. Maybe not exactly the part we now imagine, but the bases of
PCT are too firm for it to be overthrown and forgotten.

This is why we have to be firm about sticking to and teaching the basics of
PCT. The applications will come, but only if enough people begin to realize
just how different a negative feedback control system is from any other
kind of organization. This is why it's important to play with a Vensim
model of a thermostat -- not because the world needs to understand
thermostats, but because the world needs to understand, deeply and
intuitively, the implications of an organization in which the actions are
only a means for controlling a sensory representation of the external
world. By experimenting with the model, you can challenge your own
intuition, until you get to the point where you can predict correctly what
will happen when you change the model and disturb its operation in all
possible ways. And then you will understand WHY the results are as they
are. Understanding why is far more important, right now, than applying the
theory to real behavior. It's the "why" that will lead to endlessly
multiplying applications.

But this means that we have to let go of the anchors of theories that are
really not theories at all, but are merely incomplete summaries of WHAT
happens. Despite the hopes of pure empiricists, knowing WHAT happens is
only a feeble and deceptive substitute for knowing WHY it happens. When you
know why, you can predict and understand things that haven't happened yet,
that may never have happened before, and that certainly have never been
understood before. You can see how to bring about new results by doing
different things to the environment. This is very different from studying
only what happens, and confining your predictions to the statement that the
future is likely to repeat the past. If that's all you know, that's all
that will happen.

When we try to apply PCT today, we do so without benefit of research and
without knowing where PCT will lead and how it will change. That's all
right, of course; we always act with insufficient knowledge, and can get
away with it exactly because we are control systems and can correct
mistakes. But if we have to choose, because of limitations on ability or
resources, between developing more applications and teaching the
fundamentals of negative feedback control, it's the teaching that will have
effects far outlasting any applications we can dream up right now.

Neither you nor I, Marc, will live to see the ultimate flowering of PCT,
this kernel of a revolution we have in our custody. Time and chance
happeneth to us all; you may outlive me, and we both have already outlived
younger and healthier people (I'm thinking of Kenny, too). But PCT will
outlive us both, and somewhere in the future it will seen as more valuable
than any other treasure we could be laying up in our lifetimes. It holds
the key to human nature, to the nature of all living systems, to a complete
revolution in all the sciences that study life -- and in all the people who
live it.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (981019.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --

Isaac gave me copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry,
Repetition, and Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it
was only five years ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb
material like these articles. Instead we get the drivel that
clogs CSGnet today... Why don't [you --meaning me;-))] take a
leave of absence from the net and write something of the quality
of your articles in _Mind Readings_?

Just out of curiosity, what is the "drivel" that clogs CSGNet
today? I presume some of this drivel is coming from Bill Powers
since you are contrasting his "superb material" of five years
ago with today's drivel. So what is Bill saying that's so drivelly
now as opposed to what he was saying in his earlier articles?

I'd like to know because it seems to me that the stuff Bill posts
to the net is magnificent. I think CSGNet is a GREAT resource for
learning PCT and that CSGNet, in particular, has a very low drivel
to quality ratio compared to other internet "chat rooms".

As for me, I've written several articles since _Mind Readings_;
some publsihed; some not (though not through lack of trying).
Some of these articles are available at my website:

http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/papers.html

They were written while I was on the net. I think they're as
good (or poor) as anything in _Mind Readings_. And, of course,
you are familiar with my "Dancer..." paper which was just
published a year ago. I think it's a pretty darn good paper --
and, again, one written while I was on CSGNet; indeed, I got
some help (indirectly) with that paper via CSGNet.

I think that what I say on the net is basically the same as
what I write in my papers. What am I saying now that you
consider drivel? Maybe you could fill out a little table
like the one below:

       Brilliant Stupid, Post-
   _Mind Readings_ | _Mind Readings_
    era material(s) | CSGNet drivel

···

-----------------------------------------
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >
                     >

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Gregory [981019.1130 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981019.0800)

Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --

> Isaac gave me copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry,
> Repetition, and Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it
> was only five years ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb
> material like these articles. Instead we get the drivel that
> clogs CSGnet today... Why don't [you --meaning me;-))] take a
> leave of absence from the net and write something of the quality
> of your articles in _Mind Readings_?

Just out of curiosity, what is the "drivel" that clogs CSGNet
today? I presume some of this drivel is coming from Bill Powers
since you are contrasting his "superb material" of five years
ago with today's drivel. So what is Bill saying that's so drivelly
now as opposed to what he was saying in his earlier articles?

Most of the drivel comes from you, but Bill occasionally contributes. It
largely consists of pontifications in the absence of data. I would remind
you, but I refuse to start one of these absurd exchanges again. The drivel
consists of lengthy "corrections" to imagined mistakes of understanding. It
also consists of gratuitous insults such as, "psychologists (like Bruce
Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior." We are all
quite familiar with your views on Bruce Abbott, myself, and everyone else
for that matter. Reminding us of your prejudices is, frankly, quite boring.
I am prepared to stipulate that only you, Bill, and Mary really understand
PCT, just stop reminding us of the fact. If you have something constructive
to add, please do, you have much to offer. If you want to play your hostile,
defensive, and paranoid act, please don't.

When Bill has thought carefully about something and presents his reasoning
to us, the results are as good as anything he has ever done. Frankly, they
are about the only thing that makes CSGnet worthwhile. But he too has been
both defensive and paranoid lately. One would almost think that the two of
you imagine that the Bruces and Marc have somehow devoted their lives to
undermining PCT, which only three people in the world understand to begin
with. I speak for all of us when I say that nothing could be further from
the truth. If we didn't share your view of the deep and fundamental
importance of PCT we wouldn't be wasting our time on CSGnet.

Bruce Gregory