Conversation Analysis (CA)

[From Rick Marken (980328.1300)]

Bruce Nevin (980327.1650 EST) --

My hypothesis (980326.1934 EST) was that the kid is controlling a
perception of the communicative relationship "you're listening to
what I have to say" and that the kid is controlling particular
conventional means for attaining that relationship.

Ok. Now I have a better idea of what you meant by "clear channel";
it is the perception of someone "paying attention" to what you
are saying. I am _very_ familiar with that perceptual variable
(especially in its "not paying attention" state;-); now I know
how to apply disturbances to that variable to see if a kid
acts to keep that perception in a certain state.

The main point I was trying to make in my comments about CA was
that it is important to remember that the Test is an _iterative_
process. This is _very_ different from the conventional "one shot"
approach to research, where a variable is manipulated, the responses
are measured and the results tallied. The Test is a _process_. The
goal of this process is to discover which of one's _own_ perceptions
corresponds to a the perception controlled by another organism. The
process involves more than manipulating one disturbance to see if
a hypothesized controlled variable is, indeed, under control. If
a hypothesized controlled variable _is_ protected from disturbance,
then you apply _other_ disturbances to see if they also have the
expected effect (none) on the controlled perception. When a
disturbance does not have the predicted effect (none), the hypothesis
about the controlled variable must be revised and new disturbances
applied to see if they have the expected effect. This process
continues until you can confidently and accurately predict which
disturbances will and which will not have an effect on the state of
the controlled variable.

I very strongly recommend "The Coin Game" (B:CP, p. 235) to anyone
who really wants to learn how to study the behavior of a control
system. One should do this game several times with several different
people. Then I think you will see what I mean when I say that
determining the perceptions a person is controlling involves
_iteration_. You will find that you must continually change your
hypothesis about what perception is being controlled and you
will find that you must apply _many_ different disturbances until
you are convinced that you really know what perception is under
control. You will see that there is a _lot_ more to figuring out
what perception an organism is controlling than determining whether
disturbance X influences behavior Y.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Nevin (980327.1732 EST)]

Rick Marken (980328.1300) --

The
goal of this process is to discover which of one's _own_ perceptions
corresponds to a the perception controlled by another organism.

Yes.

Language and culture are different from the coin game in that, once you
have reason to believe the other person speaks and understands the same
language as you (English, say) and knows the same interaction rituals as
you ("You know what?" "What?") you don't have to go fishing very far to
identify which of the available conventional *means* the person is using to
express a meaning, seek cooperation, or whatever the person is doing *by
means of* that mechanism. Their intentions in other respects are still
uncertain, but, to identify the linguistic means by which they are seeking
to achieve those intentions, introspection into your own command of those
means is a far surer and more valid method than it can be when
investigating matters that are not so tightly constrained by shared
convention.

A crude analogy would be if you constrained the coin game by saying they
had to make a configuration in the shape of a letter of the alphabet.
(Wouldn't work for lots of letters, even with 5 coins, but you get the
point.)

Ok. Now I have a better idea of what you meant by "clear channel";
it is the perception of someone "paying attention" to what you
are saying. I am _very_ familiar with that perceptual variable
(especially in its "not paying attention" state;-); now I know
how to apply disturbances to that variable to see if a kid
acts to keep that perception in a certain state.

You illustrate my point so well.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Rick Marken (980328.1820)]

Bruce Nevin (980327.1732 EST)

Language and culture are different from the coin game in that,
once you have reason to believe the other person speaks and
understands the same language as you (English, say) and knows
the same interaction rituals as you ("You know what?" "What?")
you don't have to go fishing very far to identify which of the
available conventional *means* the person is using to express a
meaning, seek cooperation, or whatever the person is doing *by
means of* that mechanism.

But the coin game is not used to identify the _means_ used to control
perceptions. It is used to identify the perceptions (like "meanings")
that a person is controlling (that is, it is used to determine
what a person is "doing"). I think the coin game is a perfect
example of what we want to do to study language and culture; we
want to determine the perceptions people are controlling when they
are doing what we see as linguistic and cultural behavior.

A crude analogy would be if you constrained the coin game by saying
they had to make a configuration in the shape of a letter of the
alphabet.

I don't see the analogy. One of the wonderful features of language
is that we can do so many things with it. I submit that the analogy
between language and the coin game is that, with language, you are
constraind to controlling perceptions based on a fixed set of words;
in the coin game you are constrained to controlling perceptions
based on a fixed set of coins. That is, the perceptions controlled
in either case are not very constraind at all. Imagine all
the perceptions I might be controlling when I utter the words
"Green eggs and ham". Similarly, imagine all the perceptions
I might be controlling when I lay out 2 dimes (Ds) and 2 quarters
(Qs) in the following pattern:

     D D

         Q

     Q Q

I don't see how linguistic and/or cultural "constraints" could make
the job of determining the perception I'm controlling by saying
"Green eggs and ham" any easier than determining the perception
I am controlling by laying the coins out as above. You've got to
do some significant "fishing" for the controlled variable in
either case. Don't you agree?

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Nevin (980329.0705 EST)]

Rick Marken (980328.1820)]

Imagine all
the perceptions I might be controlling when I utter the words
"Green eggs and ham".

The point I am making is this: when you hear me utter the words "Green eggs
and ham" you have no doubt (assuming you *have* heard me) that I have
uttered the word "green," the word "eggs," the word "and," and the word
"ham," in that order, with a recognizeable English sentence intonation
contour. (The intonation contour could be "Green eggs and ham?" or "Green
eggs and ham!" or even "Green! Eggs and Ham!" as well as "Green eggs and
ham." as I believe you intended.)

···

I don't see how linguistic and/or cultural "constraints" could make
the job of determining the perception I'm controlling by saying

                                           ---------------------

"Green eggs and ham" any easier than determining the perception
I am controlling by laying the coins out as above. You've got to
do some significant "fishing" for the controlled variable in
either case. Don't you agree?

I agree absolutely about

the perception you are controlling by saying "Green eggs and ham."
                        ---------------------

Your saying those words in a particular way is your *means* of controlling
perceptions that are not at all plain to me. But your intention to
pronounce those four words with that intonation (whatever you mean by them)
is not at all in doubt.

What linguistics focusses primarily upon (or should!) is

the perceptions you control in order to say "Green eggs and ham."
                     -----------------------

That is what the study of language is about.

How odd for neophyte me to be reminding you that we need to start at a more
basic level before we can move on to more ambitious issues.

At those higher levels there will be other

perceptions that we control by doing things in a conventional manner.
                     ------------------------------------------------

It will be important for us to understand first

the perceptions we
control in order to do things in a conventional manner.
------------------------------------------------------

That is what the study of culture is about.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bill Powers (980329.0659 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (980329.0705 EST)--

It will be important for us to understand first

the perceptions we
control in order to do things in a conventional manner.
------------------------------------------------------

That is what the study of culture is about.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Let me give my version and see if you
agree.

First, culture or society is a concept in the mind of the individual. In
order to control this concept, the individual adopts and adheres to certain
principles: for example, "All people are created equal" and "The greatest
good for the greatest number" and "all people have an inalienable right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These and other similar
principles are perceived, together, as the American concept of a free
society. If enough people construct the same perception on the same
principles, a coherent society results.

Disturbances sometimes occur that are perceived as tending to change this
concept, for example when another country appears to threaten to invade us
and substitute some other system of government. Then the individual must
_vary_ the basic principles in order to oppose the disturbance of the
perceived and preferred system. It now becomes necessary to treat some
people (the enemy) as if they are _not_ created equal, are _not_ to be
counted among those for whom the greatest good is to be done, and are _not_
granted the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Instead,
the individual commits to the principle of destroying the enemy.

I say that the individual controls the concept at the higher level, but of
course this control will amount to little unless a large number of people
adopt the same principles and interpret them in terms of effectively the
same higher concept. Defense against disturbances will not succeed unless
large numbers of people alter their principles in just the way needed to
counteract the disturbances.

Part of this control of social systems involves dealing with individuals
within the same nominal society who are not acting in concert with the
majority, especially those who act against what the majority wishes to
maintain as a way of life. These people are treated as being sympathetic to
the enemy, or as being enemies of the system themselves. Members of the
majority vary their basic principles as a way of dealing with these
aberrant members of the society. They punish, changing the right to the
pursuit of happiness. They incarcerate, changing the right to liberty. They
execute, changing the right to life. These are the means they use to force
the deviants to alter their own basic principles back toward those the
individual has adopted as the basic principles. Again, these changes in
principles by one individual have little effect unless many individuals use
the same changes as a way of meeting disturbances.

Thus a culture is a perception in the individual, and if enough individuals
perceive in the same way and act in the same way against disturbances of
cultural perceptions relative to similar reference levels, the perceptions
will be strongly controlled through concerted actions of many people.

This picture can be elaborated, for example by bringing in artificial aids
like written and unwritten laws and physical artifacts, but as I see it, it
is never necessary to give society or culture any real existence outside of
human perceptions and actions.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Nevin (980329.1044 EST)]

Bill Powers (980329.0659 MST)--

It will be important for us to understand first

the perceptions we
control in order to do things in a conventional manner.
------------------------------------------------------

That is what the study of culture is about.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Let me give my version and see if you
agree.

You're trying to tackle this at way too high a level.

"All people are created equal" and "The greatest good for the greatest
number" and "all people have an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" are prescriptive precepts at the highest levels, not
conventions that are used as means for controlling other, higher perceptions.

Try: When you greet someone if they put out a hand at something like waist
level you put out yours, grasp hands and move them up and down together,
then let go and your hands are once more available for whatever else you
do; and likewise if you put your hand out first. It's the right hand. You
know what right is vs. left and so do they.

Try: for "unclean" things like toilet paper you always use your left hand,
and you never use your left hand for things like eating. (Moslem practice).

Try: if someone asks "Where are you going?" you don't tell them where you
are going and why, you say something like "to the town, and you?" (The
island Truk in the Pacific. Our equivalent is "Hi, how are you?" and
something like "Fine, you?".)

Try: smile at people you pass in the street (midwest), or, don't make eye
contact on the street (New York).

But even this is too hard to deal with right off. First get the bit about
language as conventional means, as distinct from what we do with those
means. That's in the parts of my (980329.0705 EST) to which you did not
reply, and in my next post after that, in the "consilience" thread.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Gregory (980329.1200 EST)]

Bill Powers (980329.0659 MST)

Thus a culture is a perception in the individual, and if enough individuals
perceive in the same way and act in the same way against disturbances of
cultural perceptions relative to similar reference levels, the perceptions
will be strongly controlled through concerted actions of many people.

This picture can be elaborated, for example by bringing in artificial aids
like written and unwritten laws and physical artifacts, but as I see it, it
is never necessary to give society or culture any real existence outside of
human perceptions and actions.

The use of the word "real" is always a tip off that someone is trying to
sell philosophy rather than science! Is pressure "real"? How about volume?
Temperature? Adopting the approach you take, I would have to say no. The
only thing that is "real" is the motion of atoms and molecules. "In
principle" we can explain PCT in terms of these motions! On the other hand,
if you are making the considerably more modest claim that society and
culture can be described in models based on human perceptions and actions,
I will watch with interest. Society may well embody "emergence."
Thermodynamics has not been eliminated by statistical mechanics.

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (980329.1002 sMST)]

Bruce Nevin (980329.1044 EST)--

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Let me give my version and see if you
agree.

You're trying to tackle this at way too high a level.

"All people are created equal" and "The greatest good for the greatest
number" and "all people have an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" are prescriptive precepts at the highest levels, not
conventions that are used as means for controlling other, higher perceptions.

Try: When you greet someone if they put out a hand at something like waist
level you put out yours, grasp hands and move them up and down together,
then let go and your hands are once more available for whatever else you
do; and likewise if you put your hand out first. It's the right hand. You
know what right is vs. left and so do they.

This still doesn't take us outside the individual's brain, does it? What
I'm trying to do is to deal with social and cultural things from the
standpoint of the individual, the only real point of view there is. If you
want to start at lower levels, fine. If you've seen people shaking hands
and wish to do it yourself, the description you give above is appropriate
-- it describes what each individual who wants to shake hands with another
has to learn to perceive and control. The details change with time -- the
hippie's hooked thumbs, the low fives and the high fives. One of my
acquaintances here in Durango is a stubborn ex-hippie; he starts out with a
normal handshake, then rotates it into the hippie version. Every time we
meet and shake hands, I'm surprised, and then quickly remember that this
is H-- and he does it funny, and I cooperate with the modified grip to be
nice. I suppose he thinks that everyone else shakes hands funny. Or maybe
it's just part of the image he wants to project. Who cares? I do it to
avoid a lot of awkward fumbling.

Try: for "unclean" things like toilet paper you always use your left hand,
and you never use your left hand for things like eating. (Moslem practice).

If you want to understand this custom, you have to ask how a child would
come to behave in this way. It doesn't happen by osmosis or other magical
processes. The child who uses the wrong hand is forcefully told that
something wrong has been done, and emotional and physical force is applied
to make sure that the "right thing" is done. I don't think there's anything
subtle about such "cultural influences." The adults land with both feet on
the child who violates the cultural norms. The child who doesn't want to be
chastised learns what to do to avoid it.

Try: if someone asks "Where are you going?" you don't tell them where you
are going and why, you say something like "to the town, and you?" (The
island Truk in the Pacific. Our equivalent is "Hi, how are you?" and
something like "Fine, you?".)

Again, there's nothing subtle about this. If someone asks you, "How are
you," and you actually start telling how you are, the other person will
quickly lose interest, and may even cut you short -- obviously your answer
is not what was expected. You eventually realize that other people just
reply "Fine, and you?" and you stop responding with the medical history. If
enough people reply with the medical history, the ones who have been
greeting people with "How are you?" will stop doing that if they don't
really want to know.

Try: smile at people you pass in the street (midwest), or, don't make eye
contact on the street (New York).

As a pedestrian, don't ever make eye contact with a motorist in any city.
This is not an arbitrary custom. If the motorist sees you looking at him
or her, the motorist assumes you will avoid getting run down, and will
drive on without pausing. If you're not looking, however, the motorist has
to conclude that you're not going to dodge because you haven't seen the
car, so he or she has to stop.

In the nightlife district of any city, don't go around gratuitously smiling
at people if you don't want to be asked how much you charge and for what.

These are not just customs. There are practical reasons for them. And no
stereotype can cover all the cases.

But even this is too hard to deal with right off. First get the bit about
language as conventional means, as distinct from what we do with those
means. That's in the parts of my (980329.0705 EST) to which you did not
reply, and in my next post after that, in the "consilience" thread.

I'm not sure what to reply to. From my point of view you attach too much
importance to the social or cultural aspects, as if there were some agency
outside of all individuals that somehow actively influences the individual.
I see no such agencies; all I see are individuals interacting with other
individuals. If a lot of individuals control the same things in the same
way, it's not hard to figure out why, and the "why" always boils down to
the fact that cooperation is easier than conflict. For me, this is a
liberating way of seeing societies and social interactions. I can't deal
with a social system; I never encounter anything but individuals, with whom
I _can_ (often) deal. To me, culture and society are just metaphors.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (980329.1048 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980329.1200 EST)--

The use of the word "real" is always a tip off that someone is trying to
sell philosophy rather than science! Is pressure "real"? How about volume?
Temperature? Adopting the approach you take, I would have to say no. The
only thing that is "real" is the motion of atoms and molecules. "In
principle" we can explain PCT in terms of these motions! On the other hand,
if you are making the considerably more modest claim that society and
culture can be described in models based on human perceptions and actions,
I will watch with interest. Society may well embody "emergence."
Thermodynamics has not been eliminated by statistical mechanics.

This isn't the sense of "real" that I mean. When I model a behavioral
control system, I am proposing that there is a "real" system behind the
model. That is, if you could put electrodes on all the neurons involved,
you would find actual pathways and connections corresponding to the diagram
we use for the model. When I model a two-level control system, I am
proposing that the higher level is made of neurons that are physically
distinct from those that make up the lower level; that the higher level is
not just a different way of looking at the same neurons that make up the
lower level. The neurons involved in the first-level spinal control systems
are not the neurons that make up the visual control systems which employ
the spinal control systems to produce actions.

If you say that there is a level of control above the 11th (or whatever)
level of neural control systems, in my way of modeling you are proposing
that there is a physical system distinct from the 11 levels of neural
control systems. That is what I would consider a "real" model of social
control. If there is no physically distinct system, then you're just
speaking metaphorically; there isn't _really_ any social control system --
it's just that people _en masse_ sometimes behave in ways that give the
impression of a social control system.
If there were "really" a social control system, you should be able to trace
out the physical connections leading to its input function, the physical
processes that constitute the input, conparison, and output functions, the
physical signal pathways through which one function is connected to other
functions, and the physical pathways through which the output function
causes changes in its environment --the 11-level neural hierarchy. If you
can't point to such things so we can observe them, you're not talking about
a "real" control system but only a metaphorical one.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (980329.1319 EST)]

Bill Powers (980329.1048 MST)]

If there were "really" a social control system, you should be able to trace
out the physical connections leading to its input function, the physical
processes that constitute the input, conparison, and output functions, the
physical signal pathways through which one function is connected to other
functions, and the physical pathways through which the output function
causes changes in its environment --the 11-level neural hierarchy. If you
can't point to such things so we can observe them, you're not talking about
a "real" control system but only a metaphorical one.

Sorry. I keep forgetting that there is always an implied "According to HPCT"
before your statements.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980329.1410)]

Bill Powers (980329.1048 MST) --

>If there were "really" a social control system, you should be

able to trace out the physical connections leading to its input
function, the physical processes that constitute the input,
conparison, and output functions, the physical signal pathways
through which one function is connected to other functions, and
the physical pathways through which the output function causes
changes in its environment --the 11-level neural hierarchy. If
you can't point to such things so we can observe them, you're
not talking about a "real" control system but only a metaphorical one.

Bruce Gregory (980329.1319 EST) --

Sorry. I keep forgetting that there is always an implied "According
to HPCT" before your statements.

It seems to me that the implied preface to Bill's statements is
always "Based on my attempt to perform an unbiased analysis of
the situation..."

I have found that there is nothing more satisfying and enlightening
than reading Powers without preconceptions -- about _anything_:
society, culture, language, perception, science, behavior, politics,
religion, PCT or whatever. At least I _think_ that that's why I
find it so satisfying; I suppose the other possibility is that I
read Powers with preconceptions like everyone else -- it's just
that all my preconceptions happen to match his;-)

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (980329.1810 EST)]

Rick Marken (980329.1410)]

Bruce Gregory (980329.1319 EST) --

Sorry. I keep forgetting that there is always an implied "According
to HPCT" before your statements.

It seems to me that the implied preface to Bill's statements is
always "Based on my attempt to perform an unbiased analysis of
the situation..."

Sorry, but Bill is definitely biased. I share his bases, but I recognize
them as such. Anyone who claims to be unbiased (which Bill does not) is
suspect in the extreme. This network consists of biased people who are
pushing one model of behavior as far as it will go. It goes impressively
far. That doesn't mean, however, that all other models are rendered useless.
(Although you are unlikely to admit this.) I am not arguing for another
model when it comes to culture, but I am not ready to defend the position
that all theoretical terms other than those in PCT are not "real". Am am,
however, prepared to accept that this is so in your world.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980329.1530)]

Bruce Gregory (980329.1810 EST)

I am not arguing for another model when it comes to culture

Then what are you arguing for? I really don't understand. It seems
to me that you and Bruce Nevin don't like the PCT idea that culture
is something we perceive about the behavior of interacting control
systems. What theory of culture do you like? Why?

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (980329.1847 EST)]

Rick Marken (980329.1530)

Bruce Gregory (980329.1810 EST)

I am not arguing for another model when it comes to culture

Then what are you arguing for? I really don't understand. It seems
to me that you and Bruce Nevin don't like the PCT idea that culture
is something we perceive about the behavior of interacting control
systems. What theory of culture do you like? Why?

I think we like the PCT model fine. At least I do. Bruce Nevin is slighlty
put off by the fact that culture seems to be treated as a side effect. I
think his point is very well taken. Language is not a side effect--it is a
main effect. I am simply pointing out that invalidating anyone else's model
of culture is a waste of time. They are never persuaded and it makes one
sound shrill. "Never complain. Never explain."

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980329.1640)]

Bruce Nevin (980329.0705 EST) --

The point I am making is this: when you hear me utter the words
"Green eggs and ham" you have no doubt (assuming you *have* heard
me) that I have uttered the word "green," the word "eggs," the
word "and," and the word "ham," in that order, with a recognizeable
English sentence intonation contour.

But the words are still controlled perceptions. You are probably
often correct about what word perceptions a person intends to
produce -- but I doubt that there is ever "no doubt" about it.

In order to know what perception a person is controlling for, you
have to test, using the methods illustrated by the coin game. For
example, you may be surprised to know that I was actually
controlling for saying the name of the latest Dutch action hero
(Greeneg san Damm) not for the title of a Dr. Seuss tale.

My point was that the coin game illustrates the basic methodology
for determining the perceptions people control -- whatever those
perceptions may be. You seemed to be saying that the methodology
of The Test (as illustrated by the coin game) is not relevant
(or necessary) to the determination of the perceptions a person
is controlling when those perceptions are linguistic (like words)
or cultural (like religious rituals, say). It is with this point
(if it was your point) that I take issue.

Bruce Gregory (980329.1847 EST)--

Bruce Nevin is slighlty put off by the fact that culture seems to
be treated as a side effect. I think his point is very well taken.
Language is not a side effect--it is a main effect.

Some aspects of culture are, indeed, "effects". By this, I think
you mean they are perceptions that are actively controlled by
the individuals that make up the culture. Language is a good
example. We control for using English in the US; it's an aspect
of our culture. Similarly, people control for religious perceptions
(going to church, writing the word "god" as G-D, singing gospel
songs, etc), ethnic perceptions (eating gefilte fish, using yiddish
expressions, etc). It's all still control of perception by
individuals. But some of these perceptions (like the perception
of being a member of a church) can only be controlled if several
people control for the same (or similar) perceptions simultaneously.

But some aspects of culture are likely to be side effects of
control. For example, American culture is rather violent. I
don't think this is because Americans control for shooting each
other; it's probably a side effect of the fact that many Americans
(as individuals) control for the "right" to own guns.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (980329.2105 EST)]

Rick Marken (980329.1640)

But some aspects of culture are likely to be side effects of
control. For example, American culture is rather violent. I
don't think this is because Americans control for shooting each
other; it's probably a side effect of the fact that many Americans
(as individuals) control for the "right" to own guns.

Only the Test will tell us if you are correct. I suspect that some Americans
_do_ control for shooting each other. Members of teen age gangs for example.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980329.2120)]

Me:

But some aspects of culture are likely to be side effects of
control. For example, American culture is rather violent. I
don't think this is because Americans control for shooting each
other; it's probably a side effect of the fact that many Americans
(as individuals) control for the "right" to own guns.

Bruce Gregory (980329.2105 EST) --

Only the Test will tell us if you are correct. I suspect that
some Americans _do_ control for shooting each other. Members
of teen age gangs for example.

I was not clear; I should have said: "American culture is rather
violent. I don't think this is because Americans control for
shooting each other more than do people in other cultures."

My point was this: _violence_ is a cultural variable that you can
perceive by looking at the murder rates for different cultures. I
think the murder rate (per capita) in the US is on the order of
a hundred or more times what it is in, say, Sweden, Germany or Japan.
I bet (though I may be wrong) that the per capita incidence of
people getting pissed off at each other is about the same in the
US, Sweden, Germany and Japan. I suspect that the murder rate
is particularly high in the US because when people in the US do
get pissed off at each other there is often a gun nearby to help
turn this anger into a murder. So the different murder rates (a
cultural variable) across cultures is a _side effect_ of the
fact that people in each of these cultures are controlling for
different rules regarding the distribution of guns. So active
individual _control_ of a "principle" type perception ("right
to bear arms") has an _uncontrolled_ "cultural" side effect
(high murder rate).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (980330.1020 EST)]

Rick Marken (980329.2120)

My point was this: _violence_ is a cultural variable that you can
perceive by looking at the murder rates for different cultures. I
think the murder rate (per capita) in the US is on the order of
a hundred or more times what it is in, say, Sweden, Germany or Japan.
I bet (though I may be wrong) that the per capita incidence of
people getting pissed off at each other is about the same in the
US, Sweden, Germany and Japan. I suspect that the murder rate
is particularly high in the US because when people in the US do
get pissed off at each other there is often a gun nearby to help
turn this anger into a murder. So the different murder rates (a
cultural variable) across cultures is a _side effect_ of the
fact that people in each of these cultures are controlling for
different rules regarding the distribution of guns. So active
individual _control_ of a "principle" type perception ("right
to bear arms") has an _uncontrolled_ "cultural" side effect
(high murder rate).

Again, we need the test. If guns are not available do Americans
continue to murder each other? (The Swiss have lots of guns. Do
they not get pissed off the way Americans do?) I take your
point, but have reservations about your example. The
availability of guns may be irrelevant. The important point may
be whether guns "show up" in the culture as a way to resolve
disputes.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980331.1320)]

I had an interesting experience recently that brought home (to me)
the fact that there is some serious controlling going on when we
are involved in conversations. The experience occurred while I was
watching the tape of the conversation that started last year's ('97)
CSG meeting. The conversation was about PCT and social systems
and the main participants were Paul Stokes and Bill Powers. Although
I was mainly on the sidelines of the conversation, I remember
feeling rather emotionally involved. But when I watched the tape
of the conversation I felt no emotion at all; moreover, the
conversation on the tape seemed far less emotionally charged
than it did when it was happening.

I interpret this experience as follows: when the conversation
was actually happening, I was controlling for perceiving _something_
-- possibly for perceiving that certain points were being made.
Sometimes these points were made by others but occasionally I
would chime in to try to make a point myself. But for various
reasons (mainly internal conflict, I imagine, like wanting to make
a point but not wanting to insult anyone) the perceptions I was
controlling for in that conversation were never completely under
control. There was always some error. I think it was this error
that was responsible for the emotions I experienced during that
conversation.

When I watched the tape of the conversation, however, I was not
controlling for making any points in the conversation; I was
just controlling for seeing what happened at the meeting. Since
I was not controlling for making any points, the comments that
had been disturbances when I was actually _in_ the conversation
were just things people were saying when I watched the tape. Since
I was not controlling for making points, I was not feeling any
error resulting from any failure to make those points and, hence,
no emotion.

I've had a similar experience while re-reading the archives of
conversations on CSGNet. I remember feeling _very_ emotionally
involved in the conversation about _information about the
disturbance_; I was controlling with _very high gain_ for making
my point in that conversation. But I remember rereading the posts
some weeks later and feeling no emotion at all. I still thought
the opposing arguments were wrong but it just didn't seem to
matter so much; I wasn't controlling for perceiving agreement from
Martin, for example;-)

So one lesson from all this is: when you are in a conversation you
are controlling perceptions; when you are unable to maintain
those perceptions at their reference levels the conversation is
going to get "heated".

Another lesson is that it's possible to perceive variables without
controlling them (the "passive observation" model of B:CP). When
I watched the tape I could perceive what points people were trying
to make and I wasn't woprried about whether or not they were the
points that "should" be made (according to my own references).

Another lesson mighht be: it's tough to see that you are controlling
when you are controlling. That's why the method of levels (MOL) is
so totally cool; it brings your attention to the fact that you _are_
controlling.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Avery Andrews 980331.1018 Eastern OzTime]

(From Rick Marken (980331.1320))

I interpret this experience as follows: when the conversation
was actually happening, I was controlling for perceiving _something_
-- possibly for perceiving that certain points were being made.
Sometimes these points were made by others but occasionally I
would chime in to try to make a point myself. But for various
reasons (mainly internal conflict, I imagine, like wanting to make
a point but not wanting to insult anyone) the perceptions I was
controlling for in that conversation were never completely under
control. There was always some error. I think it was this error
that was responsible for the emotions I experienced during that
conversation.

As usual, I haven't managed to keep up with the twists and turns of this
thread, but the course is moving on, and has now gotten to `Adjacency Pairs'
such as: Invitation - Accept/Refuse, which are described as `resources for
organizing talk'.

I conjecture that this (standard) way of putting things amounts to falling
for the `rings' fallacy big-time, like saying that `rings are a resource
for organizing social interaction in gatherings'. What I think is going
on is that adjacency pairs are epiphenomena generated by the fact that
when people talk, they are in the first instance trying to get some
reference level satisfied (by producing the first member of the pair);
the second member is some action whereby the addressee signals that state
that they've gotten into (so that the speaker's reference may or may not
be satisfied, yet). The pairing organization results from the channel
constraint that it's disfavored to have two people talking at once.

Well, there's a great deal to sift through and sort out here, and this
kind of thing seems to take me lots of time (and there's heaps of reading
that I haven't done, ...

Avery