Conversation Analysis (CA)

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
21

[From Bruce Gregory (980331.1936 EST)]

Rick Marken (980331.1320)

So one lesson from all this is: when you are in a conversation you
are controlling perceptions; when you are unable to maintain
those perceptions at their reference levels the conversation is
going to get "heated".

Another lesson is that it's possible to perceive variables without
controlling them (the "passive observation" model of B:CP). When
I watched the tape I could perceive what points people were trying
to make and I wasn't woprried about whether or not they were the
points that "should" be made (according to my own references).

At the risk of revealing even more of my ignorance, this is the way _I_ look
at the story you related. My approach focuses on the perception rather than
the exercise of control, but I think the two versions are equivalent. In the
first case, the conversation "called you forth". It engaged you as a
participant. If I had been there, in my own perceptual world, the
conversation might not have that effect at all. I probably would have
remained an observer, as you did while viewing the video. The video
obviously failed to call you forth in the same way. Might it have? I would
think so. I saw Jesse Helms on TV this evening and he certainly called me
forth--but a lot less than he would have before I realized that he is living
in his own world, just as I am living in mine. People go to movies to be
called forth in some way. Some manage to go many times (as to _Titanic_
which some teen age girls are reported to have seen a dozen times) and seem
to be called forth powerfully time and again by what must be a very familiar
combination of images and sounds.

Another lesson might be: it's tough to see that you are controlling
when you are controlling. That's why the method of levels (MOL) is
so totally cool; it brings your attention to the fact that you _are_
controlling.

Another way I see that I am controlling is by asking myself what exactly is
calling me forth in this situation? The point of course is that while I
cannot perceive my reference levels, I can perceive the elements of the
world that are "inviting" me to exercise control.

Bruce

22

[From Bill Powers (980331.1917 MST)]

Rick Marken (980331.1320)--

Nice comments about being involved in the conversation while it's going on,
but not when viewing the tape of it. I agree with your analysis -- when
you're not involved in controlling for any outcome, there's (almost) no
emotion.

Best,

Bill P.

23

[From Bruce Gregory (980331.2130 EST)]

Bill Powers (980331.1917 MST)

Rick Marken (980331.1320)--

Nice comments about being involved in the conversation while it's going on,
but not when viewing the tape of it. I agree with your analysis -- when
you're not involved in controlling for any outcome, there's (almost) no
emotion.

Imagine yourself watching a movie about genocide. You are very upset by
certain scenes. What outcome are you controlling for?

Bruce

24

[From Rick Marken (980331.2115)]

Bruce Gregory (980331.2130 EST) --

Imagine yourself watching a movie about genocide. You are very
upset by certain scenes. What outcome are you controlling for?

Many possibilities. Maybe I am controlling for seeing life instead
of death; for seeing beauty instead of ugliness; for seeing people
treated with respect instead of contempt. Or maybe (as was
the case when I went to see "Shindler's List") I am controlling
for paying considerably less than $7.50 to see a shallow moral
tale masquarading as an important lesson about human nature.

The point is that we feel emotion when we perceive (in reality
or imagination) what we don't _want_ to perceive but can do
little about (we can't bring that perception to its wanted --
reference -- state); we want to control the perception but can't.
This is why theater works, I think. A good play or movie presents
us with perceptions that we _want_ in certain states; we want to
control those perceptions -- like the perception of a sinking
ocean liner, of two lovers separated by circumstance, of a king
who disowns the daughter who loves him only according to her bond.

If we get the perceptions we want (the lovers live happily ever
after) we walk out happy; if we don't (the ship sinks, the daughter
dies trying to save the king from her "loving" sisters) we walk
out sad or mad. But if we don't care about these perceptions -- if
we don't _want_ them to be in one state rather than another; if,
in other words, we don't want to control these perceptions-- then
we don't feel much of anything and we get what we here in
Holloywood call a "bomb".

Love ya baby

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

25

[From Bill Powers (980401.0208 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980331.2130 EST)--

Imagine yourself watching a movie about genocide. You are very upset by
certain scenes. What outcome are you controlling for?

"I want not to be seeing this." "I want for this not to be happening to
that person." This is a case where you are perceiving something for which
your reference level is zero, so any perception at all is an error.

The "upsetness," I think, is due to the conflict between wanting to do
something to stop the perception and knowing that there is nothing that can
be done, because it's a movie. After one or two exposures to such scenes, I
tune them out, and avoid seeing them again. The reason, I think, is that
the confict is just too intense for me, yet I don't want to resolve it by
accepting what I am seeing as OK. I don't want to "get used to it."

Best,

Bill P.

26

[From Richard Kennaway (980401.2038 JST)]

Bruce Gregory (980329.1319 EST):

Bill Powers (980329.1048 MST)]

>If there were "really" a social control system, you should be able to trace
>out the physical connections leading to its input function, the physical
>processes that constitute the input, conparison, and output functions, the
>physical signal pathways through which one function is connected to other
>functions, and the physical pathways through which the output function
>causes changes in its environment --the 11-level neural hierarchy. If you
>can't point to such things so we can observe them, you're not talking about
>a "real" control system but only a metaphorical one.

Sorry. I keep forgetting that there is always an implied "According to HPCT"
before your statements.

The only HPCT-dependent part of that quote I can see is the words "the
11-level neural hierarchy". The rest is simply a requirement that a
claim of the existence of a control system be demonstrated by exhibiting
the physical existence of the parts listed above. HPCT contains a claim
about where those physical components are to be found, but their
physical existence somewhere is simply what it means for there to be a
control system.

-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk
   (The etl.go.jp address is temporary until 7 April 1998.)

27

[From Bruce Gregory (980401.0721 EST)]

Richard Kennaway (980401.2038 JST)]

The only HPCT-dependent part of that quote I can see is the words "the
11-level neural hierarchy". The rest is simply a requirement that a
claim of the existence of a control system be demonstrated by exhibiting
the physical existence of the parts listed above. HPCT contains a claim
about where those physical components are to be found, but their
physical existence somewhere is simply what it means for there to be a
control system.

Quite so. I was resisting the implication that all models must be control
system models. On this net, however, that is the agreed upon ground rule.

Bruce

28

[From Bill Powers (980401.0651 MST)]

Richard Kennaway (980401.2038 JST)--

Bill:

>If you
>can't point to such things so we can observe them, you're not talking
>about a "real" control system but only a metaphorical one.

BruceG: >> Sorry. I keep forgetting that there is always an implied

"According to HPCT" before your statements.

Richard:

The only HPCT-dependent part of that quote I can see is the words "the
11-level neural hierarchy". The rest is simply a requirement that a
claim of the existence of a control system be demonstrated by exhibiting
the physical existence of the parts listed above. HPCT contains a claim
about where those physical components are to be found, but their
physical existence somewhere is simply what it means for there to be a
control system.

BruceG:

Quite so. I was resisting the implication that all models must be control
system models. On this net, however, that is the agreed upon ground rule.

My claim is that all models of the behavior of individual organisms must be
control models, because all organisms are organized as control systems. Do
you have some other model of organisms that you would like to propose (and
defend)?

Best,

Bill P.

29

[From Bruce Gregory (980401.0940 EST)]

Bill Powers (980401.0651 MST)

My claim is that all models of the behavior of individual organisms must be
control models, because all organisms are organized as control systems. Do
you have some other model of organisms that you would like to propose (and
defend)?

Nope. I just don't want to rule them out a priori. If someone
comes up with such a model I won't ignore it just because it is
not a control model. Until then, however, I'll stick with
control models (once I understand them--I think I'm almost ready
for the quiz on Figure 6.1. Is this an open book or a closed
book quiz?).

Bruce

30

[From Rick Marken (980401.0840)]

Bruce Gregory (980331.1936 EST) --

My approach focuses on the perception rather than the exercise
of control, but I think the two versions are equivalent.

No, I think your approach is rather different than the PCT approach.
See below.

In the first case, the conversation "called you forth". It engaged
you as a participant.

Saying it this way gives the impression that it's the conversation
that has the purpose (of "calling one forth"), not the person carrying
on the conversation (who has the purpose of, say, making a point).
Bruce Abbott would see the conversation as "calling one forth" but
not me (or Bill or anyone else who understands PCT).

If I had been there, in my own perceptual world, the conversation
might not have that effect at all.

You are describing a "cognitive" version of S-R theory. It says that
its the perception of S that causes behavior, not S itself. But
it's still a cause-effect model. For example, if S is a lion in
your perceptual world then you run; if the same S is a kitten in
my perceptual world then I don't run. This is _not_ PCT. In PCT,
perceptions don't cause behavior (running or not running); in PCT,
perceptions have "effects" only if they differ from internal
reference specifications.

Another way I see that I am controlling is by asking myself what
exactly is calling me forth in this situation?

To correctly describe what is "calling you forth" you would have to
include a description of the perceptual state you _want_ (the
reference state). You could not correctly describe what is calling
you forth just by describing the perception! You would also have
to describe the reference state. For example, if you said "my
perception of jewish children being shot calls forth anger and
the desire to stop the shooters" you would be wrong because you
left out the reference state: "I don't want jewish children shot".

The point of course is that while I cannot perceive my reference
levels, I can perceive the elements of the world that are
"inviting" me to exercise control.

We _can_ perceive our reference levels -- in imagination (and also
in fact since, under normal circumstances, our perceptions are
nearly always at or near their reference levels). The world may
appear to be "inviting" you to exercise control but PCT shows
that this is an illusion; the world -- the inanimate world -- doesn't
carry out purposes (like "inviting", "affording" or whatever). It's
very important (I think) to remember that it's not the world (as
perceived) that is doing the inviting; it's ourselves doing the
_wanting_. That fifth of Jack Daniels isn't inviting me to drink it;
it just _feels_ inviting because I want to get smashed.

Looking at the world (of perception) as doing the "inviting"(or
the "calling forth") is not only factually wrong (we know that
perception is _controlled_, it doesn't control), it is also the
first step down the slipperly slope toward 1) turning into Bruce
Abbott and 2) believing that people (like Bruce Abbott) are not
responsible for their own behavior (controlled results of their
actions):wink:

Bill Powers (980401.0651 MST)--

Do you [Bruce Gregory] have some other model of organisms [besides
PCT] that you would like to propose (and defend)?

Bruce Gregory (980401.0940 EST) --

Nope. I just don't want to rule them out a priori.

I think PCTers have been rather good about only ruling out
alternative models of behavior _a postriori_ (after experimental
test). Actually, there is really only one alternative to the PCT
model and that's the lineal cause-effect model. This model turns
up in _many_ guises; S-R theory, neural net theory, dynamic systems
theory, reinforcement theory, information processing theory, model
based control theory, etc, etc. I think we have done a pretty good
job of developing experimental tests that rule out the lineal
causal model in all of its guises -- but the goulish model keeps
reappearing in new forms so this is probably a never ending task.
The task will end only when scientists see that organisms control
their inputs, that _only_ a control of input model (like PCT) can
explain this kind of behavior, that current models are _not_ control
of input models and that the only methods appropriate to the study
of control of input are those that (unlike current methods) are
based on an understanding of the nature of control.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

31

[From Bill Powers (980401.1005 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980401.0940 EST)--

I think I'm almost ready
for the quiz on Figure 6.1. Is this an open book or a closed
book quiz?).

Hope I pass it. Open book, of course, and not limited to B:CP.

Best,

Bill P.

32

[From Bruce Gregory (980401.1242 EST)]

Rick Marken (980401.0840)

Bruce Gregory (980331.1936 EST) --

> My approach focuses on the perception rather than the exercise
> of control, but I think the two versions are equivalent.

No, I think your approach is rather different than the PCT approach.
See below.

if they differ, they I have failed to convey my meaning. let's
see.

> In the first case, the conversation "called you forth". It engaged
> you as a participant.

Saying it this way gives the impression that it's the conversation
that has the purpose (of "calling one forth"), not the person carrying
on the conversation (who has the purpose of, say, making a point).
Bruce Abbott would see the conversation as "calling one forth" but
not me (or Bill or anyone else who understands PCT).

This is terminology. I model an interaction just the way you
do. The person carrying on the conversation perceives the other
person, not his or her "point". Which is not to say that he or
she does not have a point.

> If I had been there, in my own perceptual world, the conversation
> might not have that effect at all.

You are describing a "cognitive" version of S-R theory. It says that
its the perception of S that causes behavior, not S itself. But
it's still a cause-effect model. For example, if S is a lion in
your perceptual world then you run; if the same S is a kitten in
my perceptual world then I don't run. This is _not_ PCT. In PCT,
perceptions don't cause behavior (running or not running); in PCT,
perceptions have "effects" only if they differ from internal
reference specifications.

In my way of talking "internal reference specifications" are
intimately tied to perceptual possibilities. If no perceptual
organization exists that allows a lion to "show up", I cannot
have an internal reference specification that is part of a
control loop.

> Another way I see that I am controlling is by asking myself what
> exactly is calling me forth in this situation?

To correctly describe what is "calling you forth" you would have to
include a description of the perceptual state you _want_ (the
reference state). You could not correctly describe what is calling
you forth just by describing the perception! You would also have
to describe the reference state. For example, if you said "my
perception of jewish children being shot calls forth anger and
the desire to stop the shooters" you would be wrong because you
left out the reference state: "I don't want jewish children shot".

True, but I cannot perceive my desired perceptual state. I can
however perceive that I am upset. When I notice this, I can ask
myself what is it that I am perceiving is conflicting with some
internal preference.

> The point of course is that while I cannot perceive my reference
> levels, I can perceive the elements of the world that are
> "inviting" me to exercise control.

We _can_ perceive our reference levels -- in imagination (and also
in fact since, under normal circumstances, our perceptions are
nearly always at or near their reference levels).

You are designed differently from me. I can infer my reference
levels, but I cannot perceive tthem.

The world may
appear to be "inviting" you to exercise control but PCT shows
that this is an illusion; the world -- the inanimate world -- doesn't
carry out purposes (like "inviting", "affording" or whatever). It's
very important (I think) to remember that it's not the world (as
perceived) that is doing the inviting; it's ourselves doing the
_wanting_. That fifth of Jack Daniels isn't inviting me to drink it;
it just _feels_ inviting because I want to get smashed.

The fifth of Jack Daniels shows up in your perceptual world as
inviting you to drink it. Telling you to reset your reference
level for getting smashed probably is not going to work.
Suggesting that you need to perceive the Jack Daniels in a way
that does _not_ call you forth _may_ be somewhat more
productive.

Looking at the world (of perception) as doing the "inviting"(or
the "calling forth") is not only factually wrong (we know that
perception is _controlled_, it doesn't control), it is also the
first step down the slipperly slope toward 1) turning into Bruce
Abbott and 2) believing that people (like Bruce Abbott) are not
responsible for their own behavior (controlled results of their
actions):wink:

I love slippery slopes :wink: You _are_ responsible for the way the
world shows up for you. This is the message of PCT!

Bill Powers (980401.0651 MST)--

> Do you [Bruce Gregory] have some other model of organisms [besides
> PCT] that you would like to propose (and defend)?

Bruce Gregory (980401.0940 EST) --

>Nope. I just don't want to rule them out a priori.

I think PCTers have been rather good about only ruling out
alternative models of behavior _a postriori_ (after experimental
test). Actually, there is really only one alternative to the PCT
model and that's the lineal cause-effect model. This model turns
up in _many_ guises; S-R theory, neural net theory, dynamic systems
theory, reinforcement theory, information processing theory, model
based control theory, etc, etc. I think we have done a pretty good
job of developing experimental tests that rule out the lineal
causal model in all of its guises -- but the goulish model keeps
reappearing in new forms so this is probably a never ending task.
The task will end only when scientists see that organisms control
their inputs, that _only_ a control of input model (like PCT) can
explain this kind of behavior, that current models are _not_ control
of input models and that the only methods appropriate to the study
of control of input are those that (unlike current methods) are
based on an understanding of the nature of control.

Hear! Hear!

You and I are talking about the _same_ models of behavior. Your
approach is that of modeler who wants to understand that
behavior. My approach is motivated by the attempt to answer the
questions, "What does the world look like to a living control
system?" "How can I take advantage the way I am designed to
better achieve my ends?" I can see that my language is
off-putting for you, and probably for others on the net(but not
necessarily for others in the "real world"!). I'll try to cast
whatever I say in a modeler's perspective, because that will
minimize any disturbance to preferred perceptions.

Bruce

33

[From Rick Marken (980401.1110)]

Bruce Gregory (980401.1242 EST)

In my way of talking "internal reference specifications" are
intimately tied to perceptual possibilities.

I don't like this way of talking because it sneaks the evaluation
into the perception itself. Perceptual variables are just perceptual
variables; a particular state of a perceptual variable is neither
good nor bad in itself; it just _is_. It's our references for the
desired state of a perceptual variable that determine whether a
particular perception is good or bad. Variations in these references
are independent of variations in the state of the perceptual variable.
This accounts for the fact that we often deal with the same perception
(such as the perception of a thick, juicy steak) as good (if we are
hungry) or bad (if we are stuffed) at different times.

You are designed differently from me. I can infer my reference
levels, but I cannot perceive tthem.

I think we can perceive our reference levels in imagination. When
we think of how we would like things to be (what we would like
to eat for dinner, who we would like to make love to, etc) we are
seeing the reference states of perceptual variables.

Telling you to reset your reference level for getting smashed
probably is not going to work.

Correct. We can't arbitrarily change our goals; they vary
as they do to achieve higher level goals. What we have to do
is see the problem from the perspective of the system that is
setting the "problem" goal. That's what the method of levels (MOL)
is about. Once you can see why you are setting the problem goal
you might be able to think of ways to achieve the higher level
goal in a less problematic manner.

Suggesting that you need to perceive the Jack Daniels in a way
that does _not_ call you forth _may_ be somewhat more
productive.

I disagree. Why would this be more productive? What am I to
produce? What does it mean to perceive something in a way that
does not call forth the undesired action? Does it mean that
I should try to perceive the Jack Daniels as something that will
not get me smashed? As something that will poison me? If I succeed
in seeing it that way, what prevents me from reaching for the Old
Overholt that's right next to it (and a bit cheaper to boot)? Do
I have to learn to perceive everything in a way that will not call
forth getting myself smashed? If I am able to do that, won't I
just be living with the pain of never being able to achieve one
of my goals (getting myself smashed)?

I think many clinicians do describe the "clinical" message of
PCT just as you state it above: the person with a problem has
to learn to perceive the world in a way that does not call forth
the problematic behaviors. I think this is a _terrible_ way of
describing the clinical message of PCT; it seems to me that it
misses the point completely. The point is that our problems can
only be solved by changing _how we want_, not how we perceive.
People with problems have to learn to _want_ in a new way; not
how to perceive in a new way. It's not necessarily easy to want
in a new way; our structure of wants exists as it does because
it is how we have learned to control for most of the perceptions
that matter to us. But we can change the way we want when we
become conscious of _why_ we want the perceptions that are
causing us problems. The MOL is the basic approach to changing
_how_ we want; that's why (I think) it's such an important
clinical tool.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

34

[From Bruce Abbott (980401.1455 EST)]

Rick Marken (980401.0840) to Bruce Gregory --

Looking at the world (of perception) as doing the "inviting"(or
the "calling forth") is not only factually wrong (we know that
perception is _controlled_, it doesn't control), it is also the
first step down the slipperly slope toward 1) turning into Bruce
Abbott and 2) believing that people (like Bruce Abbott) are not
responsible for their own behavior (controlled results of their
actions):wink:

Re (1): It's already happening! (That's why Bruce came up with the same
"exception proves the rule" example I did.)

Re (2): Thanks for using me as an example of people.

Regards,

Bruce

35

[From Tim Carey (980402.0645)]

[From Rick Marken (980401.1110)]

Hi Rick,

causing us problems. The MOL is the basic approach to changing
_how_ we want; that's why (I think) it's such an important
clinical tool.

I really liked your MOL analysis ... thanks,

Tim

36

[From Bruce Gregory (980401.1605 EST)]

Rick Marken (980401.1110)

Bruce Gregory (980401.1242 EST)

> In my way of talking "internal reference specifications" are
> intimately tied to perceptual possibilities.

I don't like this way of talking because it sneaks the evaluation
into the perception itself. Perceptual variables are just perceptual
variables; a particular state of a perceptual variable is neither
good nor bad in itself; it just _is_. It's our references for the
desired state of a perceptual variable that determine whether a
particular perception is good or bad. Variations in these references
are independent of variations in the state of the perceptual variable.
This accounts for the fact that we often deal with the same perception
(such as the perception of a thick, juicy steak) as good (if we are
hungry) or bad (if we are stuffed) at different times.

This is a very important point as far as I am concerned. You
express a view of perception that I think calls very careful
analysis. I agree that it is conceptually simpler to say that we
perceive the same steak with a different reference level. I
question however that this is what the experience feels like.
Does the bird watcher experience the same bird as the non-bird
watcher, but will a different reference level? I don't think so.
For the same reason I question whether I see the same steak
under the two conditions you describe. We need some data here to
resolve this one.

> You are designed differently from me. I can infer my reference
> levels, but I cannot perceive tthem.

I think we can perceive our reference levels in imagination. When
we think of how we would like things to be (what we would like
to eat for dinner, who we would like to make love to, etc) we are
seeing the reference states of perceptual variables.

I can perceive what I imagine to be what I want, but I can only
infer what I want. Ram Dass said most people think that they
want to go to God, when what they want is to want to go to God.
In the popular expression, everybody wants to go to heaven, but
nobody wants to die.

> Telling you to reset your reference level for getting smashed
> probably is not going to work.

Correct. We can't arbitrarily change our goals; they vary
as they do to achieve higher level goals. What we have to do
is see the problem from the perspective of the system that is
setting the "problem" goal. That's what the method of levels (MOL)
is about. Once you can see why you are setting the problem goal
you might be able to think of ways to achieve the higher level
goal in a less problematic manner.

The higher level system is perceiving something and trying to
bring that perception to a reference state. It is this
perception that I am trying to talk about.

> Suggesting that you need to perceive the Jack Daniels in a way
> that does _not_ call you forth _may_ be somewhat more
> productive.

I disagree. Why would this be more productive? What am I to
produce? What does it mean to perceive something in a way that
does not call forth the undesired action? Does it mean that
I should try to perceive the Jack Daniels as something that will
not get me smashed? As something that will poison me? If I succeed
in seeing it that way, what prevents me from reaching for the Old
Overholt that's right next to it (and a bit cheaper to boot)? Do
I have to learn to perceive everything in a way that will not call
forth getting myself smashed? If I am able to do that, won't I
just be living with the pain of never being able to achieve one
of my goals (getting myself smashed)?

See above cryptic comment :wink:

I think many clinicians do describe the "clinical" message of
PCT just as you state it above: the person with a problem has
to learn to perceive the world in a way that does not call forth
the problematic behaviors. I think this is a _terrible_ way of
describing the clinical message of PCT;

You're just saying that... I do have a gift for words, don't I?

it seems to me that it
misses the point completely. The point is that our problems can
only be solved by changing _how we want_, not how we perceive.

Exactly backward. That is unless you can change _how we want_.
I'd love to be a fly on the wall when you advise Bill how to
deal with his most pressing problem (Clinton that is. I don't
know what Powers's most pressing problem is.)

People with problems have to learn to _want_ in a new way; not
how to perceive in a new way.

Ditto. "Mr. President, you need to _want_ in a new way..."

It's not necessarily easy to want
in a new way; our structure of wants exists as it does because
it is how we have learned to control for most of the perceptions
that matter to us. But we can change the way we want when we
become conscious of _why_ we want the perceptions that are
causing us problems.

I've heard it said that Jews don't want really want to feel
better, they just want to understand _why_ they feel miserable.
You can guess the ethnic background of the chap who made this
remark. (He also said as a result of practicing in Boston he
had discovered that Catholics don't want to be told they are
not guilty. They want to be told that they are guilty but that
they are forgiven.)

The MOL is the basic approach to changing
_how_ we want; that's why (I think) it's such an important
clinical tool.

Too clinical for me. I understand coaching, but not shrinking.

Bruce

37

Phil Runkel in reply to Rick Marken, who wrote on 31 March about being in
a conversation versus having the purpose only of observing it -- even a
video of one you were once in.

Good, good. I agree with all your lessons.

38

[From Rick Marken (980401.2230)]

Bruce Gregory (980401.1242 EST) --

In my way of talking "internal reference specifications" are
intimately tied to perceptual possibilities.

Me:

I don't like this way of talking because it sneaks the evaluation
into the perception itself. Perceptual variables are just perceptual
variables...It's our references for the desired state of a
perceptual variable that determine whether a particular perception
is good or bad.

Bruce Gregory (980401.1605 EST) --

This is a very important point as far as I am concerned. You
express a view of perception that I think calls very careful
analysis.

And we have done that analysis. Every test of the PCT model is
a test of this view of perception. Since PCT has passed every
test so far, I feel comfortable believing that this is the way
it works; perceptual variables (like the distance of the cursor
from a target) are just perceptual variables; whether a particular
state of that variable (like 0 distance from the target or 2 cm to
the right of the target) is "good" (and calls for no action) or
"bad" (and calls for action to move it to a "good" state) depends
on the reference for the state of that perceptual variable.

Does the bird watcher experience the same bird as the non-bird
watcher, but will a different reference level?

This is a different question. My guess is that bird watchers
can perceive (and have references for) variables that the non-bird
watcher cannot (yet) perceive. For example, bird watchers can
perceive categories of bird that the non-bird watcher cannot
perceive. But it is still true that whether a particular state
of one of the bird watcher's perceptual variables is perceived
as "good" or not depends on what state of this variable the
bird watcher wants to perceive. If the bird watcher is looking
for red breasted thrushes, the perception of a red breasted
thrush is "good" and the perception of some other type of thrush
is not.

For the same reason I question whether I see the same steak
under the two conditions you describe. We need some data here
to resolve this one.

The data from our tracking tasks suggests that we perceive
the same steak relative to different references.

The higher level system is perceiving something and trying to
bring that perception to a reference state. It is this
perception that I am trying to talk about.

I thought the question was whether perceptions "call fortht" certain
behaviors because the perceptions themselves are intrinsically
desirable or not. I am arguing that perceptions, like the
perception of a distance from the cursor to the target, a bottle
of Jack Daniels or a child being shot, are just perceptions; they
are not intrinsically desirable or undesireable. It seems like they
have "intrinsic" desirability" but, according to PCT, this is an
illusion. The "desirability" of a perception is determined by the
difference between that perception and one's reference for the state
of that perception.

Me:

The point is that our problems can only be solved by changing
_how we want_, not how we perceive.

Ye:

Exactly backward.

Try my "Cost of Conflict" demo. That demo is set up so that there
is no way to control the cursor in both the X and Y dimensions; if
you want to keep the cursor aligned with the target in the X
dimension you knock it away from the target in the Y dimension;
when you try to keep the cursor aligne with the target in the
Y dimension you knock it away from the target in the X dimension.
If you try to achieve both goals (X and Y alignment) you are
fighting against yourself. There is no way to solve this problem
by changing _how_ you perceive the situation. For exmaple, you
have the same problem if you manage to perceive the cursor and
target in polar rather than X-Y coordinates. The only way to
solve the problem is to change your goals; if you abandon the
goal of controlling in the Y dimension you can successfully
control in the X dimension; if you abandon the goal of controlling
in the X dimension you can successfully control in the Y dimension.

You can also solve the problem by changing _what_ you perceive
(and control). For example, you can percieve the dot (target)
moving on an imaginary diagonal line through the center of the
X-Y plot. You can control for keeping the dot on this line
(if the line has the right slope); you can't control where on
the line the dot is located but you can keep the dot on this
line.

I suppose you can say that you have solved your problem by
perceiving the situation in a new way. But note that you have
still had to _change goals_ in order to do this. You had to
change from the goal of keeping the dot in a particular
X-Y location (controlling the perception of the X and Y position of
the dot) to the goal of keeping the dot on an imaginary diagonal
line (controlling the perception of diagonal dot movement). You
had to change goals regarding the perception you were going to
control. Just learning that there is a different perception that
can be controlled in this situation doesn't solve the problem.
You can only solve the problem (regain control) by abandoning
your existing goals (for perception of a particular X-Y position)
and adopting a new goal for a new perceptual variable (diagonal
movement).

Solving control problems is mainly, I think, a matter of changing
your goals regarding the perceptions you control.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

39

[From Bruce Gregory (980402.0541 EST)]

Rick Marken (980401.2230)

And we have done that analysis. Every test of the PCT model is
a test of this view of perception. Since PCT has passed every
test so far, I feel comfortable believing that this is the way
it works; perceptual variables (like the distance of the cursor
from a target) are just perceptual variables; whether a particular
state of that variable (like 0 distance from the target or 2 cm to
the right of the target) is "good" (and calls for no action) or
"bad" (and calls for action to move it to a "good" state) depends
on the reference for the state of that perceptual variable.

You know that I admire your tracking experience. Nevertheless, they deal
with very simple perceptions. I don't think its a good idea to push them
uncritically to very complex perceptions. I can't seen any reason, from my
understanding of PCT, why a perception could not consist of input from the
Amygdala even those this is not the case in a typical tracking experiment.

Does the bird watcher experience the same bird as the non-bird
watcher, but will a different reference level?

This is a different question. My guess is that bird watchers
can perceive (and have references for) variables that the non-bird
watcher cannot (yet) perceive. For example, bird watchers can
perceive categories of bird that the non-bird watcher cannot
perceive. But it is still true that whether a particular state
of one of the bird watcher's perceptual variables is perceived
as "good" or not depends on what state of this variable the
bird watcher wants to perceive. If the bird watcher is looking
for red breasted thrushes, the perception of a red breasted
thrush is "good" and the perception of some other type of thrush
is not.

I am not sure how "good" got into this discussion. If I am responsible, I
apolgize. If you are looking for a rare species of thrush your reference
level for that perception will allow the perception to call you forth. I
still think we need data to determine if this means that the perception or
only the reference level changes when you have seen a large number of these
hitherto rare thrushes.

For the same reason I question whether I see the same steak
under the two conditions you describe. We need some data here
to resolve this one.

The data from our tracking tasks suggests that we perceive
the same steak relative to different references.

See above.

The higher level system is perceiving something and trying to
bring that perception to a reference state. It is this
perception that I am trying to talk about.

I thought the question was whether perceptions "call fortht" certain
behaviors because the perceptions themselves are intrinsically
desirable or not.

I can see how you came to this conclusion. It was not my attention to make
this claim. I was trying to say that often when you learn a new perceptual
organization you seem to establish a reference level for the perception. (A
proper backhand grip feels like "this"). When you see the ball coming toward
your backhand side, the perception "calls forth" your back hand grip. At
least this is what it feels to a LCS playing tennis.

I am arguing that perceptions, like the
perception of a distance from the cursor to the target, a bottle
of Jack Daniels or a child being shot, are just perceptions; they
are not intrinsically desirable or undesireable. It seems like they
have "intrinsic" desirability" but, according to PCT, this is an
illusion. The "desirability" of a perception is determined by the
difference between that perception and one's reference for the state
of that perception.

I only object to the "just perceptions" part. Perceptions of Mozart's music
may be just perceptions, but they don't seem that way to this LCS.

I suppose you can say that you have solved your problem by
perceiving the situation in a new way.

Like Bruce Abbott, I am grateful for any concession, no matter how small or
grudgingly given!

But note that you have
still had to _change goals_ in order to do this. You had to
change from the goal of keeping the dot in a particular
X-Y location (controlling the perception of the X and Y position of
the dot) to the goal of keeping the dot on an imaginary diagonal
line (controlling the perception of diagonal dot movement). You
had to change goals regarding the perception you were going to
control. Just learning that there is a different perception that
can be controlled in this situation doesn't solve the problem.
You can only solve the problem (regain control) by abandoning
your existing goals (for perception of a particular X-Y position)
and adopting a new goal for a new perceptual variable (diagonal
movement).

Exactly. And just knowing that you had to change goals doesn't solve the
problem. You have to discover the perception whose control will allow you to
solve the problem.

Solving control problems is mainly, I think, a matter of changing
your goals regarding the perceptions you control.

Solving control problems is mainly, I think, a matter of changing the
perceptions you control.

Bruce

40

[From Bill Powers (980402.0556 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980402.0541 EST)--

If you are looking for a rare species of thrush your reference
level for that perception will allow the perception to call you forth.

I am reminded more and more of those videos you sent me, in which people
are asked to explain the phases of the moon, the seasons, and other
supposedly simple phenomena. What is this "calling forth" you keep talking
about? Is this part of how you explain the operation of a control system to
yourself? It reminds me of "affordance" -- is it also part of Gibson's scheme?

Perhaps we need a review of the basic operation of a control system. Could
you explain to me what your understanding is? Here are some questions that
may help us focus on any problems there are:

Suppose the reference signal for a perceptual control system is set to some
value midway in its range, and that initially the value of the perception
is zero:

1. Will the action be the greatest when the perception is zero or when it
matches the reference signal?

2. Suppose the perception is caused by a positive direction of action:
    a. If the reference signal increases, will the action increase or
decrease?
    b. If the perceptual signal increases, will the action increase or
decrease?

After you've thought about those questions a while, consider these:

If a birdwatcher is looking for a thrush, what is the state of the
perception of the thrush at that point? Is the birdwatcher perceiving a
thrush? Is the reference signal zero or nonzero? Is the error signal large
or small? What is the state of the action directed toward finding a thrush?

After the birdwatcher has spotted a thrush, what is the state of the
perception relative to the reference setting? What is the value of the
error signal? What is the state of the action directed toward finding a
thrush?

When you've pondered these questions enough, you may want to re-examine
your image of the perception "calling forth" an action, and draw some
conclusions about the compatibility of that image with PCT.

Best,

Bill P.