[From Rick Marken (980402.0800)]
Bruce Gregory (980402.0541 EST) --
I don't think its a good idea to push them [the results of
tracking studies] uncritically to very complex perceptions.
Actually, I've also done studies where subjects track rather
complex perceptions (sequences, as in the "Hierarchy of Perception
and Control" experiment at:
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ ControlDemo/HP.html
and even programs). In all cases, the control model, which sees
perceptions as signals, works just fine; no "calling forth" involved
at all.
I can't seen any reason, from my understanding of PCT, why a
perception could not consist of input from the Amygdala even
those this is not the case in a typical tracking experiment.
Ah, this is what I thought you might be getting at. Perceptions
(like the perception of a child being shot or of a judge finally
making a reasonable decision) have an affective component. There
is emotion involved when we fail to control a perception (as
when we see a child being shot on screen, a perception that
deviates by miles from our reference for what we should be
perceiveing, and we can't do nothing about it) or when a perception
suddenly arrives at its reference state and we have done nothing
to make it happen. These emotions result from the sudden increase
or decrease in an error signal that results from the change in
the state of the perceptual variable. The perception of the
emotion is actually an uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) perception
that is quite _separate_ from the perception that is being controlled
(the perception of the treatment of children and the perception of
justice).
If you are looking for a rare species of thrush your reference
level for that perception will allow the perception to call you
forth.
This is an illusion, just like the illusion that consequences
"call forth" behavior. This is precisely the illusion that
PCT is trying to dispel. If you want to keep believing that this
is a "legitimate" way of looking at things (from the perspective
of the behaving system) then, I'm afraid, you have a very bad case
of Bruce Abbott disease; I hope it's not chronic.
I only object to the "just perceptions" part. Perceptions of
Mozart's music may be just perceptions, but they don't seem
that way to this LCS.
That's because they include an emotional component. When I
hear Mozart a lot of error signals suddenly go to zero. The
Mozart is just a state of many different perceptual variables
(style, melodiousness, fluidity, etc) that feel particularly
good (to you and me) because they match a lot of references.
Amazingly, the same perceptions have no emotional content at all
to many people. In some cases this may be because these people
are not able to perceive the musical variables we perceive. But
in many cases it is clear that people are perceiving the same
musical dimensions that I am perceiving (I deduce this based on
discussions with these people, who are often musically sophisticated).
These people just don't have the same references I have for these
musical dimensions. What I feel when I listen to Mozart is what
two of my best friends feel when they listen to Frank Zappa (who
I like also, just not like Mozart). My friends and I probably
perceive the world in just about the same way; we just have
different references for those perceptual variables.
Solving control problems is mainly, I think, a matter of changing
the perceptions you control.
My example of ways to solve the "Cost of Conflict" problem shows
that this is clearly not the case. It's true that one way to solve
control problems is to change the perceptions one controls (which
includes a change in goals); but it is also possible to solve
problems by changing goals for perceptions you are already
controlling. Thus, the most general approach to control problem
solution is to _change goals_, not to change perceptions.
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken