FW: What's perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.21.12.39]

This is essentially the answer I was intending to write to Rick.

Anyone can imagine and simulate arbitrary perceptual functions, as
in Rick’s spreadsheet, but unless the results of applying those
functions is effective in controlling some perception,
reorganization will soon modify or eliminate them. The perceptual
functions that persist are the ones that prove useful. It’s not so
much that the perception produced by the function is controllable,
though that is often true, it is that controlling that function is
useful, eventually in sustaining the intrinsic variables in states
that allow life to continue, but more immediately in forming parts
of other controllable perceptions. [Parenthetically, this was J. G.
Taylor’s main insight, as expressed in “The Behavioral Basis of
Perception”, Yale UP, 1962].
Consider the mirage, as depicted in many a cartoon of a person
crawling over a desert. The person perceives a lake. We, the
omniscient outside observers, know there is no lake. But why does
the person have a perceptual function that would allow him to see –
not a shimmering patch AS a lake – but a lake?
The reason is, I think, that lakes may have been useful perceptions
in control of other perceptions such as slaking thirst, rowing a
boat, appreciating beauty, and so forth. A perceived lake is a
perceived lake, not a perceived combination of coherently transient
patches of light and shade over a vertically limited extent, etc.
etc. It’s just a lake. Is the lake a real lake? Who knows? But it’s
a good perceptual function to have for the purpose of controlling
one’s perceptions if every time one has that catenation of
properties, one can slake thirst, row a boat, and appreciate the
beauty.
Someone flying over a “real” lake would see that lake just as would
the person on the ground. The catenation of properties at the
sensory level would not be the same, but the higher level properties
of “boundedness” (is that in the environment?), wateriness, etc.
would be the same. But not so for the lake that is a mirage. It is
still a perceived lake, but that lake doesn’t stay put when the
crawling man moves over the desert. He never gets to drink from it.
We omniscient observers say it isn’t a real lake. That’s not a
question of interpersonal agreement, but a statement that the
perceptions that seem real come from functions that usually produce
single valued (or vector) results that are useful in control or that
are usefully controlled, even if sometimes those functions produce
perceptions that don’t allow for such uses or that cannot themselves
be controlled.
The CEV and qi have the same status in this respect. Both, at the
sensory level, are complexes of more than one variable, unless qi is
specifically the physical input to a sensory unit such as a visual
cone or an inner hair cell. Both are single valued results of
applying the same function, but in computing qi, the inputs come
only from the environment, whereas the CEV has no such limitation.
It might also incorporate inputs from memory and imagination, or be
produced entirely from imagination, as are probably most perceptions
in dreams. Even then, the CEV is perceived AS being in the
environment.
I agree that the combination is likely to produce a taste. I cannot
say that this taste would be “lemon” for someone who has never seen
a lemon or been told that this taste is “lemon”. However, for
someone who does associate this taste with lemon, the perception
of “lemon taste” would be as real as any other, and would be
perceived as a property of a substance, even if there happened to be
no substance, but only electrical stimulation of some neurons.
Nobody else would be able to perceive that particular CEV, which, if
there was a real substance, would be controllable by, say, adding
sugar or tomato juice to the mix.
That is indeed as it is perceived to be. Is it a mirage? I think
not, because it can be used in controlling other perceptions, and
moreover, to someone else who has a perceptual function that
produces a perception of how “lemony” a taset might be, my addition
of sugar or tomato juice will influence that person’s “lemoniness”
perception. That kind of cross-personal influence is an argument for
considering the taste to be in an environment accessible to both
people. The taste of that drink could be a Collective Complex
Environmental Variable (CCEV), controllable by a virtual controller
composed of all the people who control their own perceptions of the
taste by contributing ingredients to the mix. They won’t perceive
the same taste, but they would all be controlling it as though there
was a virtual controller with a controlled taste perception.
That’s not the essence of my reply. My essential point is that a
controlled variable is one that is compared with a reference value.
The difference between those two values determines the influence
that alters the controlled variable’s value so that it approaches
the reference value. In the environment where qi is supposed to
exist, no such reference value is supposed to exist. Therefore qi
cannot be a controlled variable.
I think this quibble is mistaken, both as regards qi and as regards
the CEV. Imagine any function of N variables, but we take N=2 for
easy visualisation, and call those variables x and y. For every
possible x-y pair, the function produces a value z, which can be
visualized as a height above the x-y plane. The function defines a
surface of hills and valleys over the plane. The volume in which
this surface exists is 3-dimensional, but the surface is only
two-dimensional. Some other function would produce a different
surface of hills and valleys in the same 3-dimensional volume. What
the functions do is reduce by one the dimensionality of possible
variation. Every point on the 2-D surface produces the same output
from the function. When N is greater than 2, the function that
produces a single value defines an analogous set of “hills and
valleys” that form a hypersurface of N-1 dimensions.
There’s no “complex unity”. There is only a complex set of
possibilities that all produce the same result, the same pattern of
hills and valleys. The job of the Test for the Controlled Variable
is to try to find, from the infinite set of possible functions (an
infinity greater than the infinity of real or complex numbers), some
function that produces pretty much the same surface as the function
that produces the controlled variable – the perception.
Here I contradict you, to argue that intersubjective agreement is a
perception that has no different status in “reality” from any other
perception. To me, the test of “objectivity”, if that word is not
intrinsically paradoxical, is the stability of the perceptual
function as used in control, either of itself or as a component of
other perceptions. Intersubjective agreement is indeed useful in
controlling many perceptions, but can be tested in most cases of
apparent agreement on a particular item by attempting to use that
item in controlling some different perception. That two men crawling
across the desert both agree that they see the same lake makes the
lake no more real than if there were only one person crawling. Of
course, there might “really” be an oasis in sight, and this reality
could be tested when the two men found they could drink from it.
Again “of course”, there might be no desert, and both might be
hypnotized to perceive themselves in that situation. I don’t think
that matters, because the perception each would have is that the
lake was no mirage, but was a real lake. It would matter, however,
if the hypnosis persisted to the extent that the subject died of
thirst thinking that the water was real.
Do you really believe that? Do you always assume that your
perception of a dark patch on a cold sidewalk is wetness? That could
be very dangerous in a Toronto winter. Or do you just assume that
you veridically see a dark patch and not use that perception in
controlling any other perception? (For the benefit of those living
in more tropical climes, a dark patch on the sidewalk might, but
probably does not, mean that the sidewalk is covered by ice, and a
careless step might mean a dangerous, possibly fatal, fall). I don’t
find it paralyzing to step carefully onto such a dark patch to see
whether my foot slips before I put my full weight on it.
It’s not mind games to try controlling something that depends on a
perception that may not be veridical, as the desert crawlers
discover when they die of thirst, or the walker on a possibly icy
sidewalk finds when the tentative step determines that the wet patch
is or is not ice.
Martin

···

In response to [From Rick Marken
(2015.12.20.1830)] and

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:

        BN: There are two questions in play. The first question

is the ever-recurrent epistemological one: How real is our
control? That devolves to: How real are our perceptions? I
think successful control of a perception is our only warrent
for attributing reality to it, that collective control
strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that
successful collective control implicitly includes and is
based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables,
and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing
reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when
replicated). Doing science is our best intellectual way of
determining what is real.

        BN: The variable q.i is an excellent instance of a

perceptual variable to which we are strongly warrent to
attribute reality because we determine it by doing science.

        BN: The second question is: Are  q.i and the CEV

equivalent. q.i is a single variable perceived and measured
by the observer; the CEV is by definition a complex of more
than one variable.

        BN: Rick (2015.12.20.1830) proposes that you and he are

in violent agreement, with a spreadsheet as means of
verification. Below, I offer verbal evidence in support of
this. You may not have seen this, which was posted during
the time in which you weren’t reading CSG-net.

Rick Marken (2015.12.12.1245)

          RM: I would say that the PCT stance on perception (or,

epistemology) is that the perceptions that we control are
constructions based on sensory data that is caused by an
external (environmental) reality that is approximated by
the models of physics and chemistry, and these
constructions are not arbitrary but have functional
significance in the sense that they allow us to control
the aspects of physical reality that we have to be able to
control in order to be able to survive. In other words, I
would say that the PCT stance is constructivist – realist
– functionalist.

        BN: So Rick is a realist in regard to the models of

physics and chemistry. These models of course are
perceptions. Realism here is a belief that doing science in
the fields of physics and chemistry constructs perceptions
that accord so well with reality (whatever that may be) that
we are warrented to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat.
That warrent is functional and provisional.

        BN: On this basis, my point was about the character of

the “supposed-to-exist” CEV. My understanding is that
intensity receptors perceive variables identified by physics
and chemistry (in the example, sugar and acid) and generate
perceptions. Input functions at the sensation level combine
these intensity perceptions. In the example, they construct
the unitary perception of the taste of lemon.

        The term CEV suggests that, to the same extent that we

are warrented in supposing that the sugars and acids of
lemon juice are really in the environment (warrented as
variables identified by physics and chemistry), we are
likewise warrented in supposing that lemon flavor is really
in the environment.

        BN: I may have a slightly different approach to your

disagreement with each other.

Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)

          RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled

quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not
only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is
kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some
“complex” variable in the environment that is controlled.
The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function
of environmental variables, like the function of acid and
sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that
doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the
environment.

        BN: I understand, yes, that you reply "No, no, the CEV is

not controlled, only the perception of it is controlled."
This quarrel hinges on answers to question 1 above.

        BN: My quibble here is with this definition of q.i as a

(singular) function of (plural) environmental variables. The
making of them into a complex unity happens in the
perceptual hierarchy. Fructose is perceived as sweet; citric
acid is perceived as sour. Fructose and citric acid are
commingled in a lemon. Intensity perceptions of sweet and
sour are combined to construct the sensation of the taste of
lemon juice. But at the interfaces between the taste sensors
in the organism’s mouth and the physical environment outside
those sensors there is a q.i for sugar and a q.i for acid,
aggregated for populations of sensors. Each q.i is
transformed by sensors into an intensity perception. At any
higher level of the hierarchy we are no longer speaking of
q.i, we are speaking of signals p that are constructed at
the level below. The above formulation suggests that there
is a single, unitary q.i = “a ratio of x sucrose to y citric
acid” corresponding to the taste of lemon. From your term
CEV a reader is liable to infer that there is, and likewise
the same inference might be made from Rick’s definition of
q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental
variables.

        BN: The variable q.i is an instrumental measurement that

can be observed by more than one person and replicated by
anyone. Such instrumental measurements have a certain claim
to be objective, the only claim of which I am aware, namely,
intersubjective agreement.

        BN: Of course the measurement, the process of measuring,

the instruments of measurement themselves, cannot be
demonstrated to be anything more than controlled
perceptions. When we crank the epistemological implications
of PCT up to the paradoxical sticking-place, intersubjective
agreement appears to me to be our only route out of
solipsism. Equally of course, as each of us in turn have
acknowledged at one time or another, we assume that our
perceptions are veridical, at least in some functional
sense. Seriously not to do so would surely be paralyzing.

        I doubt that anyone has carried that line of

epistemological doubt any farther than mind games.

/Bruce Nevin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.22.1830)]

TCVModelwColor.xlsm (38.9 KB)

TCVModelwColor1.xlsm (38.2 KB)

···

Martin Taylor (2015.12.21.12.39)–

  In response to [From Rick Marken

(2015.12.20.1830)] and

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:

        BN: ... I

think successful control of a perception is our only warrent
for attributing reality to it, that collective control
strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that
successful collective control implicitly includes and is
based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables,
and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing
reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when
replicated)…

MT: This is essentially the answer I was intending to write to Rick.

Anyone can imagine and simulate arbitrary perceptual functions, as
in Rick’s spreadsheet, but unless the results of applying those
functions is effective in controlling some perception,
reorganization will soon modify or eliminate them.

RM: Well, this isn’t quite what I was after as a comment on the spreadsheet. The perceptual functions in that sheet are, indeed, “arbitrary”, but only so as to make the point that what is called the controlled quantity and notated q.i is the observer’s view of the perception, p, that a controller is controlling.

RM: The spreadsheet is meant to demonstrate that the controlled quantity is not an entity in the environment; it is a variable aspect of the environment that is defined by the perceptual function. The observer doing the Test for the Controlled Variable (the Test) is trying to determine what this perceptual function is. The observer does this by testing hypotheses about the perceptual variable that the controller is controlling. These hypotheses are actually guesses about the nature of the perceptual function that produces the controlled perceptual variable. These hypotheses can be implemented using mathematical functions (as they are in the spreadsheet) or using one’s own perceptual systems (as they are in the example of “The Coin Game” on pp. 236-238 of B:CP, 2nd edition).

RM: Regardless of how hypotheses about the perceptual function (and, hence, about the perception that is under control) are implemented, the resulting perception is the controlled quantity, q.i, seen from the perspective of the observer. If the Test shows q.i to be under control (it is protected from disturbances that should cause to vary) then we conclude that our perception of the controlled quantity, q.i, corresponds to the perceptual variable (the controlled variable) that the controller is actually controlling. (Emphasis mine;-)

RM: So when our perception of q.i passes the Test – it is shown to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of the controlled variable) is equivalent to the perception,p the controller is controlling. This has led me to make some revisions of my spreadsheet demonstrating the TCV. These are mainly changes in notation and the data available to the user when doing the Test. The new spreadsheet is attached.

RM: Now all you see in the upper left is gray cells that can be used to change your hypothesis about the perceptual function that is producing the perception that the controller is controlling. That perceptual function is hidden so that you are now in the same position as an observer doing the Test for real. You (the observer) have reason to believe that the controller is controlling a perceptual variable that is a linear function of two environmental variables, x.1 and x.2. So you adjust the coefficients of x.1 and x.2 (under the constraint that the coefficient of x.2 must be >0, otherwise the feedback effect of the output on the controlled quantity will be zero or positive).

RM: Each change of the coefficients changes q.i, your hypothesis about the perception that is under control. You test the accuracy of each hypothesis by seeing whether the controller protects the hypothetical controlled variable, q.i, from disturbance. The extent to which this happens is measured by the Stability value in the green cell. When the stability of q.i is up above .9 then q.i, as defined by the coefficients of the perceptual function, is being protected from disturbance and it can be concluded that q.i is very close to the perception, p, that is actually under control.

RM: Once you find a definition of q.i that has a high Stability value – i.e. your perception of the controlled variable, q.i, seems to correspond to the perception, p, that the controller is controlling – you can see how well you did (something you can’t do in the real Test) by hitting Ctrl u which unhides the actual perceptual function that defines p.

RM: So that’s it for now. Again, I’d really appreciate some comments (from anyone) on this spreadsheet. I know that methodology is not everyone’s cup of tea but I do think that understanding the Test can give you a better understanding of PCT even if you are not into PCT as a researcher.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.23.17.53]

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.22.18:30 ET)]

(Martin Taylor 2015.12.21.12.39) –

      Mirage and black ice: the higher in the hierarchy, the

farther from q.i, the more ambiguity, and the greater the need
for additional perceptual input. I don’t see that these bear
on the question of justifying a distinction between q.i and
CEV.

      As we both have pointed out, a strict understanding of q.i

would apply only to a single sensor. Or maybe to a set of
sensors of the same type (e.g. retinal cells sensitive to
green). Not awfully useful for PCT experiments.

That's certainly not how I have understood qi, either from Bill's

writings or from Rick’s. As I understand qi (Rick’s version) is is
the scalar result of applying the perceptual input function to the
sensory input variables. It is not in the environment, as I had
though from the diagrams, but is another name for the perceptual
variable. However, another observer who has access to those same
sensory input variables could, in principle, produce a scalar
variable whose value was equal to qi (p). I had thought that qi was
supposed to be in the environment, but Rick’s message [From Rick
Marken (2015.12.22.1830)] makes clear that it is not. It’s just
another name for the perception.

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.22.1830)]
MT: Anyone can imagine and simulate
arbitrary perceptual functions, as in Rick’s spreadsheet, but
unless the results of applying those functions is effective in
controlling some perception, reorganization will soon modify or
eliminate them.

    RM:  Well, this isn't quite what I was after as a comment on

the spreadsheet. The perceptual functions in that sheet are,
indeed, “arbitrary”, but only so as to make the point that what
is called the controlled quantity and notated q.i is ** the
observer’s view** of the perception, p, that a controller
is controlling.

I agree with this, which I had not understood before. What I had

understood before is what you say next, which contradicts the above.

    RM: The spreadsheet is meant to demonstrate that the

controlled quantity is not an entity in the environment; it is a
variable aspect of the environment that is defined by the
perceptual function.

This I disagree with for a reason often stated. A controlled

quantity is a quantity that is compared with a reference value and
is influenced by processes that depend on the resulting difference.
There is no quantity in the environment that could serve as a
reference value for a variable in the environment.

The CEV, in contrast, IS in the environment perceived by the

controller, though it may not be in any environment perceptible by
another.

    The observer doing the Test for the Controlled Variable (the

Test) is trying to determine what this perceptual function is.

This I do agree with.

    The observer does this by testing hypotheses about the

perceptual variable that the controller is controlling. These
hypotheses are actually guesses about the nature of the
perceptual function that produces the controlled perceptual
variable. These hypotheses can be implemented using mathematical
functions (as they are in the spreadsheet) or using one’s own
perceptual systems (as they are in the example of “The Coin
Game” on pp. 236-238 of B:CP, 2nd edition).

RM: ** Regardless of how hypotheses about the perceptual
function (and, hence, about the perception that is under
control) are implemented, the resulting perception is the
controlled quantity, q.i, seen from the perspective of the
observer**. ** If the Test shows q.i to be under control (it
is protected from disturbances that should cause to vary) then
we conclude that our perception of the controlled quantity,
q.i, corresponds to the perceptual variable (the controlled
variable) that the controller is actually controlling.** (Emphasis
mine;-)

Well, you can emphasise it, but consider. If the actual perceptual

function is, say, x+y, then 2x+y or x^(3/2)+y and an infinite number
of other functions will be shown to be “protected from disturbances
that vary”. Not every member of that infinite set of functions can
be the perceptual function. But I do now see that qi IS the
experimenter’s perception of the controlled perceptual variable, and
is not at all a variable in the environment. So we can say that if
the experimenter finds a function that produces a variable that sees
to be controlled, that function produces results that are correlated
with the function that produces the controlled variable.

  RM: So when our perception of q.i passes the Test -- it is shown

to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of the
controlled variable) is equivalent to the perception,p the
controller is controlling.

More correctly, "when our perception of qi passes the Test -- it is

shown to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of
the controlled variable) is correlated with the perception, p the
controller is controlling."

So qi is a perception in an experimenter of a perception controlled

by some external controller. I’m quite happy with that. All I want
to be clear about is that nothing in the environment is controlled
unless there is also something in the environment that provides a
reference value for it, and a mechanism whereby the difference
affects the variable in question.

Now back to Bruce:

  these problems don't justify a distinction

between q.i and CEV. What is relevant to a quantitative model is
q.i. What is the relevance of a CEV?

A CEV is someting percepvied by the controller (and the Analyst) to

be in the environment of the controller. Its relevance is that it
can be disturbed by influences independent of the controller,
resulting in perceptual effects. If the Analyst did not have a CEV
to work with, (a) the loop would be incomplete, and (b) there would
be no place for a scalar disturbance variable to be introduced into
the loop. Now that we have determined that qi is a perception in an
experimenter of the controlled perception, the result of applying a
designed or evolved function to measurable variables, we can see
that it has no relevance to the actual operation of the control loop
under study. It is far from identical to the CEV, as I had imagined
it might be before reading Rick’s message.

Martin

Martin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.24.1120)]

···

John Kirkland (2015.12.22)–

JK: Reading about Rick’s description from fiddling about with colour mixing reminded me of a series of publications generated from an approach we designed (and others, internationally, continue to deploy) for probing into colour blending perceptions.

JK: By way of background we started this line of enquiry many years ago when playing around with Benham discs. See http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/col-Benham/index.html My colleague (David Bimler, who’s become something of an expert in colour perception) wrote a little programme for creating these discs, that were then printed on white paper and stuck onto 45rpm vinyl records. We used a $5 stackable turntable so when the change lever was flicked a new one dropped onto the spinning turntable for viewing.

RM: Pertinent to nothing PCT, it turns out that I know the fellow who invented the stackable turntable. He was a good friend of the family; he just passed away this year. Bob Metzner was his name; a really nice, sweet, brilliant guy (got his degree from California Institute of Technology, where Feynman taught. I’m one degree of separation from him too; my aunt, the beatnik, used to go to parties where he played his bongos;-).

JK: Briefly, the black/white flicker of a Benham disc tends to be reported as what’s known as “subjective colour” usually a pastel green, blue, red, brown, etc… OK, that’s by way of background to our question: What would colour deficient (aka colour-blind) people report?

RM: I believe the colors result from the differing temporal responses of the different types of cone cells.

JK: First off we needed to design a simple procedure for assaying anybody’s colour vision…We selected evenly spaced hue/saturation and two values of value. Our initial studies were to do with validation.

JK: Secondly, we assembled trilemmas (sets of three swatches) and arranged these as corners of a small implicit triangle, printed onto credit-card sized card.

Thirdly, the task itself. A deck consists of 75 cards (we have two parallel decks). Working under controlled light conditions participants shuffled the deck and deal from the top. Their job was to report which triad is different from the remaining ones being careful not to focus on value but stick to differences in hue (with examples).

RM: I don’t quite understand this. Were they looking for a difference between one card and another or differences within a triad on a card?

JK: Fourthly, and finally, what’s this to do with PCT?

RM: Everything living systems do has to do with PCT;-)

JK: After all these years, and triggered by Rick’s recent report of his method, I wonder if we’d been unknowingly carrying out PCT research all along.

RM: It sounds like it to me. I’m not quite sure of exactly what the subjects were doing but it sounds like they were being asked to control for a “similarity” or “equality” relationship between color patches. The triads are a disturbance to this perception and the subject’s responses – saying which patch matches best or whatever – is the action that compensates for the disturbance. Based on the pattern of responses you are inferring what colors are and are not a disturbance to the relationship.

RM: The only thing I can think of that would make it “more” like PCT research would be to use a method of adjustment rather than a paired comparison procedure and do it with individual subjects (which you may have done so this suggestion may be irrelevant; but generally PCT research is based on looking at the result of testing “one-subject-at a time” rather than “averaging over subjects”).

JK: OK Rick (anybody), here’s where I need some help. What we’ve got here is “visual lemonade”. But because the referents (swatches) are standardised it is possible to make some inferences about the underlying built-in mechanisms. That’s not the focus of my current PCT-related question. Instead, it is, “What is a PCT-related explanation of what we’ve been doing with this approach?” Diagrams welcomed too.

RM: I would have to know more details of the approach. But I think this is an important – but difficult – question to answer. Because it does seem like a lot of these psychophysical tasks are very much like tests to see what kinds of perceptual variables people control – or can control; they are kind of like the TCV. This will have to be something I include in my paper (or whatever it is I produce) on how to do PCT research. I’ll get on it as soon as I figure out what’s wrong with my spreadsheet demo. Both you (in private) and Martin (in a subsequent post in this thread, I think) have pointed out flaws in that TCV demo that I will have to figure out before I do any more pontificating about how to do PCT research;-)

Best regards

Rick

As an aside #1. We created lozengers too, and asked people to report what they saw in screen-presented patterns (like many 3-faced cubes). When colours blend it is reported as if a line appears, immediately highlighting the odd-one-out “different” trilemma member.

Aside #2. David has been carrying out some reanalyses of others’ data and that team reported: a. pre-clinical indicators of Type II diabetes, and b. pre-clinical signs of heavy-metal poisoning (mercury in Brazil gold-fields).

Not bad from messing around with Benham discs and asking a naive question.

BTW, we never got around to conducting research aimed at answering the original question, what CVD people report when watching spinning black-and-white patterns.

Season’s greetings to one and all, from summer.

JohnK

.

–
Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com wrote:

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:

Hi, Martin.

Martin Taylor 2015.12.19.12.39–

MMT: Rick usually asserts that the controlled quantity, qi, is objectively in the environment and can be directly influenced by an external observer. […]

MMT: My position is quite the opposite. I say that we ONLY can control our perceptions. A perception is produced by some function whose input arguments may be composed entirely from sensory variables that are influenced by a supposed-to-exist environment […].

MMT: When we talk, we omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat … and simply assert that there exists a real world through which our PCT model suggests our perceptions (real to us) are controlled.

BN: Perhaps you can allow Rick (and me) the grace occasionally to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat as well?

BN: There are two questions in play. The first question is the ever-recurrent epistemological one: How real is our control? That devolves to: How real are our perceptions? I think successful control of a perception is our only warrent for attributing reality to it, that collective control strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that successful collective control implicitly includes and is based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables, and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when replicated). Doing science is our best intellectual way of determining what is real.

BN: The variable q.i is an excellent instance of a perceptual variable to which we are strongly warrent to attribute reality because we determine it by doing science.

BN: The second question is: Are q.i and the CEV equivalent. q.i is a single variable perceived and measured by the observer; the CEV is by definition a complex of more than one variable.

BN: Rick (2015.12.20.1830) proposes that you and he are in violent agreement, with a spreadsheet as means of verification. Below, I offer verbal evidence in support of this. You may not have seen this, which was posted during the time in which you weren’t reading CSG-net.

Rick Marken (2015.12.12.1245)

RM: I would say that the PCT stance on perception (or, epistemology) is that the perceptions that we control are constructions based on sensory data that is caused by an external (environmental) reality that is approximated by the models of physics and chemistry, and these constructions are not arbitrary but have functional significance in the sense that they allow us to control the aspects of physical reality that we have to be able to control in order to be able to survive. In other words, I would say that the PCT stance is constructivist – realist – functionalist.

BN: So Rick is a realist in regard to the models of physics and chemistry. These models of course are perceptions. Realism here is a belief that doing science in the fields of physics and chemistry constructs perceptions that accord so well with reality (whatever that may be) that we are warrented to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat. That warrent is functional and provisional.

BN: On this basis, my point was about the character of the “supposed-to-exist” CEV. My understanding is that intensity receptors perceive variables identified by physics and chemistry (in the example, sugar and acid) and generate perceptions. Input functions at the sensation level combine these intensity perceptions. In the example, they construct the unitary perception of the taste of lemon. The term CEV suggests that, to the same extent that we are warrented in supposing that the sugars and acids of lemon juice are really in the environment (warrented as variables identified by physics and chemistry), we are likewise warrented in supposing that lemon flavor is really in the environment.

BN: I may have a slightly different approach to your disagreement with each other.

Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)

RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled. The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.

BN: I understand, yes, that you reply “No, no, the CEV is not controlled, only the perception of it is controlled.” This quarrel hinges on answers to question 1 above.

BN: My quibble here is with this definition of q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental variables. The making of them into a complex unity happens in the perceptual hierarchy. Fructose is perceived as sweet; citric acid is perceived as sour. Fructose and citric acid are commingled in a lemon. Intensity perceptions of sweet and sour are combined to construct the sensation of the taste of lemon juice. But at the interfaces between the taste sensors in the organism’s mouth and the physical environment outside those sensors there is a q.i for sugar and a q.i for acid, aggregated for populations of sensors. Each q.i is transformed by sensors into an intensity perception. At any higher level of the hierarchy we are no longer speaking of q.i, we are speaking of signals p that are constructed at the level below. The above formulation suggests that there is a single, unitary q.i = “a ratio of x sucrose to y citric acid” corresponding to the taste of lemon. From your term CEV a reader is liable to infer that there is, and likewise the same inference might be made from Rick’s definition of q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental variables.

BN: The variable q.i is an instrumental measurement that can be observed by more than one person and replicated by anyone. Such instrumental measurements have a certain claim to be objective, the only claim of which I am aware, namely, intersubjective agreement.

BN: Of course the measurement, the process of measuring, the instruments of measurement themselves, cannot be demonstrated to be anything more than controlled perceptions. When we crank the epistemological implications of PCT up to the paradoxical sticking-place, intersubjective agreement appears to me to be our only route out of solipsism. Equally of course, as each of us in turn have acknowledged at one time or another, we assume that our perceptions are veridical, at least in some functional sense. Seriously not to do so would surely be paralyzing. I doubt that anyone has carried that line of epistemological doubt any farther than mind games.

/Bruce Nevin

[_Boris_Hartman]

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen vvalues in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

1.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

2.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

3.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III)Â can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.Â

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.   Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.   Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.   Organism is controlling, not environment…
   

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.Â

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB :Â I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There aare cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled.  As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.Â

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Â

Boris

Bruce

[_Boris_Hartman]

Bruce,

you were speaking to Bill and Henry not to me. So could you please avoid :

BA : Please don’t confuse »traditional engineering control theory« with »modern engineering control theory.« Bill relied on traditional engineering control theory and its analytic techniques.

HB : You are again using conotation to »describe« my state. Am I confusing something ? Whatever you are refering that I could be confusing, it’s directed to Bill and Henry Yin. I just wrote their critics. So critics are theirs not mine.

If you’ll go back to our conversation about »The kid who doesn’t talk« you could easily see that my writings and understanding of PCT stays the same. And Bill didn’t object to my writings then. Even more. He was encouranging me to keep on converstaion with you in the way I did. So I don’t think that I deserve »lable« or »stigma« which you gave to me. I’m not chaging my statements daily or weekly as Rick is doing. Whatever he is doing I call confusion and by my oppinion he is »dragging« the whole CSGnet into a confussion.

So please be careful when you are accusing me of something, although I’d rather see if you don’t do it.

If you think that somebody is confusing something about »control theory«, you should turn to Bill’s literature and Henry Yin.

As I understood Henry Yin he was mostly generaally criticizing whether »control« is in environment or in organism. I don’t see what this has to do with »traditional engineering control theory« or »modern engineering control theory« ? Do they confuse »control inside« and control outside« ?

Boris

···

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 6:01 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.12:00 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:25 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

Your theoretical explanation of Wieners »control theory« is bellow so I’ll not »copy-paste« it here. I’ll just try to look for differences in Bill’s and Wieners theories. If it is »the same«, why did Bill wrote his theory ?

BA : Boris, you can’t be a proponent of PCT and at the same time hold that we shouldn’t be equating machines and organisms. I’ll try to make clear why this is so.

BA : Now let’s examine what you take Bill to be saying about control systems.

HB : I think that Bill criticized Wiener and “engineering control theoryâ€?. So I think there are more problems in just “equatingâ€? theories …

<

Bill P : For now the relevant aspect of Wiener’s diagram is the fact that it is drawn so that one may consider the whole unit in terms of stimulus and respons, just as behaviorists have always done.

Bill P : Unspoken in Wiener’s diagram, by the way, are the reorganizing system’s intrinsic reference levels….

Where did you find these quoted sentences? Winer offered several diagrams; I have no idea which one Bill refers to here.

Bill P :

Regarding the underpinnings of PCT: There was no one in cybernetics/systems theory after Ashby’s book in 1953 (Design for a Brain) from whom I learned anything about control theory and its role in behavior. Wiener’s book of 1948, which I read in 1952 thanks to Kirk Sattley, got me started: the concept of feedback control, and the particular relations to behavior that he laid out, clicked in my mind as the obvious successor to all the psychological models I had ever heard of, including the one in which I then believed. Ashby’s book gave me an organized view of how one would start applying these principles on a grander scale—it was as much his organization as his ideas that turned me on./span>

Bill P : Wiener and Ashby inspired me to go back to the sources of the ideas that they had adopted. When I did, I gradually came to realize that neither of them had learned very much about control systems.

Bill did not invent control theory; he took an existing body of knowledge from control system engineering and from it borrowed the negative feedback control system as the basic control model for PCT. As Bill noted above, his initial inspiration for doing this was provided by reading Winer’s book. Ashby provided the idea for the reorganizing system, including its »intrinsic variables« (which Ashby called »essential« variables).

HB : I’m sure you can find more Bill’s critics on Wieners model. what by my opinion tell us that thinking about “Control theory� wasn’t simply transferred to PCT.

HB: But I think that most comprehesible critics of engineering “control theory� was given by Henry Ying. His article is worth of reading as I think he is the only one whom I saw upgrading PCT till now. I think that he could be very helpful in conflicting understanding of PCT.

Henry Yin :

4.2. Control of Input. A control system always controls its input, not output [7]. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

According to mainstream engineering control theory, a control system controls its outputs, not its input. This is perhaps the most common fallacy today, both in engineering and in the life sciences [49, 55, 56]. This fallacy, an unfortunate legacy of cybernetics, is the result of imposing the perspective of the observer rather than using the perspective of the organism or controller. The mistake is to assume that what the engineer perceives and records, the “objective� effect of the system, is the output of the system.

The problem here is that »mainstream engineering control theory« uses the terms »input« and »output« differently than we do in PCT. When the control-system engineer speaks of »output«, he or she is referring to the variable that the system is controlling, whereas we use »output« to refer to the actions by means of which the control system acts to exert that control. When the control-system engineer speaks of »input« he or she is referring to the reference. Consequently, when Henry says that, »according to mainstream engineering control theory, a control system controls its outputs,not its input,« he is correct – but given the engineer’s definnitions of those terms, the statement is not a fallacy, it’s a correct description!

As Henry notes, the engineer’s problem is to design a system to be used by human beings. If you want a room to be a certain temperature, you change the reference setting on the thermostat (you input that setting) and if the system works properly, the result is that the room temperature is brought to the set temperature (the system produces or »outputs« the user’s desired room temperature). So using »input« to refer to the setting of the reference and »output« to refer to the system’s sensed value of the variable under control makes good sense.

The problem is not that mainstream engineering control theory has it wrong, the problem is that some folks who have endeavored to apply control theory to human and animal behavior have incorrectly understood the engineer’s term »output« to mean »behavior« or »actions« and »input« to mean »stimulus«.

The common assumption that output is controlled ignores the perspective of the organism that is doing the controlling. By imposing his own desire and perspective, the engineer ignores the autonomy of the negative feedback controller, for he is always trying to make the machine do what he wants. He can only accomplish this by adjusting the reference signal, as the user operates a thermostat by adjusting the temperature setting. Since this is the signal generated by the user, it is usually labeled as the input to the system. In a biological organism, however, the reference signal is always internal to the organism.

Again, it’s not the control engineer who is doing this. Those who attempt to apply control theory to living organisms while misunderstanding the engineer’s meaning of those terms are doing this.

Please don’t confuse »traditional engineering control theory« with »modern engineering control theory.« Bill relied on traditional engineering control theory and its analytic techniques. What he objected to was modern control theory, with its Kalman filters, feed-forward mechanisms, and a set of mathematical techniques that yield »optimal control« while making it just about impossible to understand how the resulting system accomplishes what it does.

Bruce A.

[Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

1.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

2.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

3.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way. The whole point< of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. Myy critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

4.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

5.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

6.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.   Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.   Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.   Organism is controlling, not environment
   

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Boris

Bruce

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[_Boris_Hartman]

Hi Bruce,

sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.

BA :

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.

So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«

In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is very different from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) is as I have claimed very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?

The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW« describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.

Medical dictionary ( Physiology)
A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e…, the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.

In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?

So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.Â

HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.

In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.

Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is nature.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.

Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.

Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.Â

There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we. Â

Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :

HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved compoonents (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in thhe same way. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.

Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).

Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »eendless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.

If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.

1.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

2.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neuronss, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way.&nbbsp; The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

3.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

4.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

5.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.   Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.   Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.   Organism is controlling, not environment…
   

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulaation. There are cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Boris

Bruce

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[Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.06.0950 EDT)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 8:26 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Hi Bruce,

sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.

Hi Boris,

I’m truely sorry, but as I just stated in my last reply to Rick, I really have spent too much time on CSGnet given that I have gotten behind on some important committments. (I’m currently facing a deadline for revising my research methods book, for one.) I do intend to get back to you with a reply, but I’m afraid it will probably be at least another month before I can devote the time to a careful consideration of your post.

Best wishes,

Bruce

---

BA :

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.

So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«

In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is very different from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) is as I have claimed very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?

The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW« describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.

Medical dictionary ( Physiology)
A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.

In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?

So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.

HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.

In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.

Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is nature.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.

Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.

Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.

There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.

Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :

HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologicallly evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they willl function in the same way. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.

Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).

Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Best,

Boris

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your cchoosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.

If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.

1.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

2.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way.&nbspp; The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »enndless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

3.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

4.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

5.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.   Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.   Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.   Organism is controlling, not environment…
   

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Boris

Bruce

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[_Boris_Hartman]

Bruce,

I understand. Please take as much as time as it takes you to answer. Although I’m hoping that you wil come with »whole« answer. I’m also »caught in time«.

With all respect,

Boris

···

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 3:49 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.06.0950 EDT)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 8:26 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Hi Bruce,

sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.

Hi Boris,

I’m truely sorry, but as I just stated in my last reply to Rick, I really have spent too much time on CSGnet given that I have gotten behind on some important committments. (I’m currently facing a deadline for revising my research methods book, for one.) I do intend to get back to you with a reply, but I’m afraid it will probably be at least another month before I can devote the time to a careful consideration of your post.

Best wishes,

Bruce

---

BA :

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.

So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«

In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is very different from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) is as I have claimed very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?

The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW« describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.

Medical dictionary ( Physiology)
A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.

In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?

So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.

HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.

In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.

Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is nature.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.

Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.

Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.

There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.

Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :

HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolvedd components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will functionn in the same way. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.

Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).

Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Best,

Boris

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.

If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.

1.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

2.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endlless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

3.   It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

4.   Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

5.   Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.   Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.   Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.   Organism is controlling, not environment…
   

/span>

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Boris

Bruce

---

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[bleach]

Boris, this is a very interesting discussion. Where I’m having a
problem though is with your comments about 'zero reference.'Â No
what I’m about to say may well be nothing more than me showing my
ignorance of more current biological research…

In control theory we usually talk in a way to suggest that the

reference is a 'steady state signal.'Â Indeed it is likely that it
usually is. However, most will think in terms of either a signal
level or maybe the result of a calculation.

As I understood it, from many years ago, neuron outputs are

essentially 'pulses.'Â Thus a reference would be some ‘pulse rate’
(I don’t believe that pulse width is an option with neurons).

As far as control theory is concerned there is nothing wrong with

the idea of a pulse rate comparator that generates some output pulse
rate that is in some way proportional to the difference between the
two inputs (reference and perceptual signal). There would, of
course either need to be a another signal indicating the ‘polarity’
of the error, or the comparator output with no error would be some
steady state pulse rate that would then vary up or down depending
upon the ‘polarity’ of an error.

Pulse width control is actually similar and normally the comparator

output is a steady state width that is again varied according to the
magnitude and ‘polarity’ of any error.

I would not be surprised if it was discovered that all comparators

in the brain always have some non-zero reference signal present.Â
Some of the lower level systems OTOH do appear to have zero value
reference signals when the system is not actually active. However,
these systems are unidirectional in their operation, such as muscle
contraction or sensing temperature.

Does any of that relate to what you are talking about?

Best,
Bill

···

On 06/24/2016 06:26 AM, Boris Hartman
wrote:

        Hi

Bruce,

Â

        sorry

for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

Â

        I

see we have some troubles coming toghether with our
oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on
the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our
agreement. I hope you will not mind.

Â

BA :

        This is not to say that biological control

system will have system diagrams that are identical to the
simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock
demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological
control system, we need anatomical and physiological
evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out,
the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are
still quite a long way from being able to do that to any
significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level
1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am
currently working on implementing a more recent model that
Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Â

        HB :This is perfect beginning for possible

agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live
organism function in contrast to machines or models or
whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

Â

        I agree with you that diagrams and models are

not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological
Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way
to “ determine the actual nature of a given
biological control system, we need anatomical and
physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are
carried out�.

Â

        So

if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement
about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to
use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without
using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to
try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as
»real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

Â

        BA

: Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the
reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system
will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the
disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference
value you use. Thus, this result is not , as you had
claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

Â

        HB

: It seems that you are all the time »working« only with
model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning
and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological
facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value
0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a
change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed
by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance
with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any
value, but the question is whether model or machine will
correspond to »real world«

Â

        In

real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0
(zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system
signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the
case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing
happens). So this case is very different from the
reference signals that are present. So the result reference
0 (zero)Â is as I have claimed very special case.
Using reference signal 0 ( zero)Â means that organism is not
producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can
be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more.
Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which
is not alive do any action ?

Â

** The
»ALL-OR-NONE LAW«**
describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«.Â
All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none
response (1 or 0). The magnitude of
the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is
independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A
bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to
elicit a propagation of action potential.

Â

        Medical dictionary (

Physiology)
A rule applied
to the activation
of individual muscle
or nerve cells,
where the response to stimuli
(depolarisation) only
occurs above
a certain threshold,
usually –55

      mV, after which a complete
      action potential
      occurs that
      is maximum in intensity—i.e.,

      the strength
      of the nerve
      impulse is not
      dependent on,
      or a function of,
      the strength
      of the stimulus.

Â

        In

short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from
the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal
0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol
loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that
is impossible. How can organism work without reference that
are produced in organism ?

Â

Â

        So

as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams,
models and simulators, because values don’t represent the
»real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams,
models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with
physiological facts are necesary.Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

        HB

: So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block
demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to
real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work.
But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a
perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With
machines there is no problem which value you use whether is
0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is
designed by humans and values which are uused can be any
value human choose. The only condition I know is, that
values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0
(zero) is not.

Â

        In

the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only
Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine
or model is that human are born, they produce references and
they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce
references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they
can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned
and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences
between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

Â

        So

it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«,
without checking whether anatomical and physiological
»facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded
that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value.
This is fundamnental mistake.

Â

        Many

thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still
beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines)
is nature .And you also beleive that this is true,
otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about
plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

Â

        So

I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in
»real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real«
conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same
conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0
(zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0
(zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv
signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Â

        Reference

signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in
accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Â

Â

Â

Â

        Bill

didn’t suggested only » possible Level 1 system that operates the
skeletal muscles in 1973�, b ut
he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP,
2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest
part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external
environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block
diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live
blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the
»question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT
in critical position. The most important feature of
hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not
defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism
and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form
»references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p.
191)Â is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear
how »references« are produced.

Â

        Dag's

diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on
p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not
go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which
is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but
I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found
my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I
can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top
of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT
organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it
produces references as it should.

Â

Â

        Bruce

you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of
»Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have
also some physiological knowledge and that is your
advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole
diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working
properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences.
I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions
as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that
we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and
real organism works.Â

Â

        There

are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of
how Living beings really work or as you said : it
is a long way to �determine the actual nature of a given
biological control system�. But
we have to try, don’t we. Â

Â

        Other

answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from
arguments I clarify above. So :

Â

        HB

: Input is producing directly output. It seems like
behavioristic approach.

Â

        BA

: No,
the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The
input is transformed by the input function to a perception;
this is compared to the reference value at the comparator,
which takes the difference between reference and perception
to create the error signal. The error signal drives the
output, which affects the input via the feedback function.Â
This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to
reduce the error between the reference value and the
perception.

Â

        HB

: The output is the result of comparison between reference
and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is
the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had
in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be
produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic
sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if
organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

Â

        BA

: The beauty of control systems is that it
doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made
hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons,
muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same
way. The whole point of PCT is that human and
animal behavior can be understood as the output of
biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of
such systems just as we do any human-designed control
system.

Â

        HB

: I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be
equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin.
Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some
main principles that are making them alike, because machines
are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a
lot of troubles.

Â

        Thinking

about the equality between machines and organisms brought
you in the position where you already admitted that you made
a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer
environment by machines and control in Living beings (see
our previous discussions).

Â

        Bruce

I still think that we can come to possible agreement about
real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram
on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion.
Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to
»reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are
repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

From:
Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com ]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got
to do, with it?

Â

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Â

Hi Boris,

Â

        Below you make several claims about the

screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

Â

        HB:

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to
your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a
main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case
in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your
choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby
would say)Â are :

Â

        HB

: It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal
zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as
stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare
existance in organism as something »passing through«. I
doubt that it could contribute to understanding how
»generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean
that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear
how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

Â

        BA

: Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the
reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system
will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the
disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference
value you use. Thus, this result is not , as you had
claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

Â

        HB

: I still think that you used wrong example. The system if
you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something
when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to
make clear distinction between model and real organism,
becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real
organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you
something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also
for »real organism«.

Â

        If

you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological
evidences then you would notice that reference signal is
simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism
there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All
or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not
appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t.
Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon
trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it
means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in
physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so
there is not neural activity. This is a big difference
between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural
signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals
it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines
are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they
don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0,
but in organism references are set by the nature. They can
be set by other people.

Â

Â

Â

Â

1.      Input
is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic
approach.

Â

        No,

the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The
input is transformed by the input function to a perception;
this is compared to the reference value at the comparator,
which takes the difference between reference and perception
to create the error signal. The error signal drives the
output, which affects the input via the feedback function.Â
This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to
reduce the error between the reference value and the
perception.

Â

        In

the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input
(stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no
comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b)
there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no
feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram
of a stimulus-response system.

Â

2.      Almost
at every possible value in the diagram you could make
»endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with
»outside steady-state«, but that doesn’t mean that every
»picture« will represent how organism function.

Â

        The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a

simple control system works, both statically and
dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously
varying disturbance value and observe that the system still
acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference
value.

Â

        The beauty of control systems is that it

doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made
hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons,
muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same
way. The whole point of PCT is that human and
animal behavior can be understood as the output of
biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of
such systems just as we do any human-designed control
system.

Â

Â

Â

        This is not to say that biological control

system will have system diagrams that are identical to the
simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock
demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological
control system, we need anatomical and physiological
evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out,
the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are
still quite a long way from being able to do that to any
significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level
1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am
currently working on implementing a more recent model that
Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Â

Bruce

Â

From: Boris Hartman
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got
to do, with it?

Â

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

Â

From: Boris Hartman
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got
to do, with it?

Â

Bruce,

Â

        HB : My opinion

is that there is no “subtractor� (o-d) in environment in the
“input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using
this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s
diagram as “add effects�, is something what is common in
Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are
“addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

Â

        BA

: Boris, I agree with you: *** There is no
»subtractor« in the environment*** . But I think
you are getting confused between adding variables
and adding the values of variables.

Â

        HB

: I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s
»closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level.
But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

Â

Â

Â

        About

diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your
arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main
problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in
natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your
choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby
would say)Â are :

Â

3.      It’s
physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with
outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable
state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in
organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it
could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms
function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not
functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are
»alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

4.      Input
is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic
approach.

5.      Almost
at every possible value in the diagram you could make
»endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with
»outside steady-state«, but that doesn’t mean that every
»picture« will represent how organism function.

Â

Â

        Playing

with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for
understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing
into extremes or if use other impossible values from
organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a
model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool«
for representing how organism function in any case. So I
think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using
»diagram« in any meaning.

Â

        I

personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how
references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question
mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet
and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there
are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s
stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and
thus open the question how organism as »the whole works«
and how references are formed.

Â

        So

I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the
situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT
organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double
feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and
»homeostatic« subsystem represent.

Â

        So

my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as
possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with
»reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I
think in this way it will be finaly understood how
»references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on
the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the
»origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole«
picture of PCT organism is understaood.

Â

Â

Â

Â

        HB

: And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with
competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how
can be usefull in understanding how organism »really«
function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input
quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction«
going on in outer environment or control. In PCT
»subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as
that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how
nervous system function.

Â

        I

beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from
Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in
outer environment, human system receive only limited amount
(depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract
system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual
amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical
variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is
reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system«
from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

Â

        So

I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount
of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the
«input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances +
output) to »input function« no matter how values are
distributed.

Â

        The

question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of
possible states that diagram (LCS III)Â can offer or we can
agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s
diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

Â

Â

        If

we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree
that all Bills »definitions« stay.Â

Â

        So

can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.      Observed
behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is
control empty

2.      Perceptual
signal is controlled, but not from outside. It’s controlled
inside organism.

3.      Organism
is controlling, not environment…

Â

        If

we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with
Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are
represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed
»controled variable«, just added effects in the form of
»input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled
variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined
construct of »person in control« and observer.Â

Â

Â

Â

        And

I have one request Bruce.

        If

it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing
me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me
or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«.Â
I could also say that you were confused by putting
»subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer
environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to
discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I
think that this could lead to constructive and final
answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal
conotations. I will also try not to J

Â

        I

felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The
first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and
»patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody
ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in
our history. And I think that Fred described the right
reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no
conotations of our personality.

Â

        I'd

be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our
conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your
oppinion, so there is no need for this.

Â

        HB

:Â I think it’s better that we talk about different
oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal
partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an
agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of
us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more
productive?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

        BA

: The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent
the addition of two variables . In a negative
feedback system, the values of those two variables
will have opposite signs, in the steady state.Â

Â

        HB

: I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

Â

        We

already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what
you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral
effects to environment or it’s not general event in
environment. But we are seeking for general model of
organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I
understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really
»oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many
cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing«
the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with
no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding
effects of output, just disturbances entering »input
function«.

Â

        I

think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that
there are some »physical variables« from endless in the
world arround us which are used for forming »abstract
system« in our brains, some construction of limited
perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all
»physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input
fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in
accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to
be gathered in »input quantity«.

Â

        We

perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but
enough for more or less succesfull control of our
»survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

Â

        I

suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s
discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think
that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances
(I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input
function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled
in comparator.

Â

Â

        BA

: The variables are added, but because the values
have opposite signs, adding them results in
a value for qi equal to the difference between d and
qo!

Â

        HB

: This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of
manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.

Â

        BA

: As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a
screen shot of LiveBlock:

Â

Â

        BA

: I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme
right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The
LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output
Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of
adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box
labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

Â

        qi

= 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

Â

        HB

: The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t
see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you
want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer
environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

Â

Â

Â

        HB

: For better understanding I think that you could do more,
for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput«
and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general
solution ?

Â

        Maybe

you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ?
What does this mean for control in organism ?

        This

will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism
(there is no »control quantity« outside).

Â

Â

Â

        HB

: Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is
»protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is
insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not
entering »input function« ?

Â

        I

think that general control loop always ends in just »input
quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and
later in comparator where it si controlled.  As Bill’s
diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

Â

        So

I think that in any case not only when »disturbances«
represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the
perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be
controlled.Â

Â

        Henry

Yin :

        A

control system always controls its input, not output. Only
perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

Â

        HB

:

        So

I think that control is happening in organism not outside.
You can control what you perceive.

        And

this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking
about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control
happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT
yet. And behavior is the result of this control

        But

maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation«
of reference signal which is still under »mark of
interogation) on 11.level…

Â

        Do

you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal
control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT
organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which
original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Â

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Bruce

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mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.netmailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net

[_Boris_Hartman]

Bill,

I’ll be honest. I think you are a good guy and in other circumstances it would be a privilege to talk to you. But in this situation I’m in quite »time-trouble«, and the matter you are talking about is quite too complex for debate. It is about how nervous system works. So I’m recommending you wormly the best expert for nervous system momentally in PCT. And this is Henry Yin. He can give you much more then I can. I have mostly phisiological knowledge which includes some knowledge about nervous system, but not so much as Henry Yin can offer.

So maybe in other conditions I’ll really enjoy talking to you (maybe in company with glass of wine) but in this moment it would take me to much time which I haven’t.

I’m really sorry. But I hope you’ll understand.

With all respect,

Boris

···

From: Bill Leach [mailto:wrleach@cableone.net]
Sent: Saturday, June 25, 2016 12:35 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Boris, this is a very interesting discussion. Where I’m having a problem though is with your comments about ‘zero reference.’ No what I’m about to say may well be nothing more than me showing my ignorance of more current biological research…

In control theory we usually talk in a way to suggest that the reference is a ‘steady state signal.’ Indeed it is likely that it usually is. However, most will think in terms of either a signal level or maybe the result of a calculation.

As I understood it, from many years ago, neuron outputs are essentially ‘pulses.’ Thus a reference would be some ‘pulse rate’ (I don’t believe that pulse width is an option with neurons).

As far as control theory is concerned there is nothing wrong with the idea of a pulse rate comparator that generates some output pulse rate that is in some way proportional to the difference between the two inputs (reference and perceptual signal). There would, of course either need to be a another signal indicating the ‘polarity’ of the error, or the comparator output with no error would be some steady state pulse rate that would then vary up or down depending upon the ‘polarity’ of an error.

Pulse width control is actually similar and normally the comparator output is a steady state width that is again varied according to the magnitude and ‘polarity’ of any error.

I would not be surprised if it was discovered that all comparators in the brain always have some non-zero reference signal present. Some of the lower level systems OTOH do appear to have zero value reference signals when the system is not actually active. However, these systems are unidirectional in their operation, such as muscle contraction or sensing temperature.

Does any of that relate to what you are talking about?

Best,
Bill

On 06/24/2016 06:26 AM, Boris Hartman wrote:

Hi Bruce,

sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.

BA :

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.

So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«

In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is very different from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) is as I have claimed very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?

The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW« describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.

Medical dictionary ( Physiology)
A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.

In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?

So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.

HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.

In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.

Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is nature.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.

Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.

Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.

There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.

Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :

HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologiccally evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they wwill function in the same way. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.

Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).

Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Best,

Boris

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diaggram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is not, as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.

If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.

1.  Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

2.  Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (nneurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same wway. The whole point of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Bruce,

HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.

BA : Boris, I agree with you: There is no »subtractor« in the environment. But I think you are getting confused between adding variables and adding the values of variables.

HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.

About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen valuues in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

3.  It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero  with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
   

4.  Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
   

5.  Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless«  of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
   

Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.

I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.

So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.

So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.

HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly one of the main principles how nervous system function.

I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.

So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.

The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.

If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.

So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :

1.  Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
   

2.  Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
   

3.  Organism is controlling, not environment…
   

If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.

And I have one request Bruce.

If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J

I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.

I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.

HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?

Best,

Boris

BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two variables. In a negative feedback system, the values of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.

HB : I suppose you meant »two plus signs entering qi«.

We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.

I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.

We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.

I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.

BA : The variables are added, but because the values have opposite signs, adding them results in a value for qi equal to the difference between d and qo!

HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.

BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:

BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to minus 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.

qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15

HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.

HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?

Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?

This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).

HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?

I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.

So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.

Henry Yin :

A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB :

So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.

And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control

But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…

Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).

Boris

Bruce

---

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[_Boris_Hartman]

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output).  I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

Best,

Boris

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

···

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

Best

Rick

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of thee glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

/p>

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Bill P.:

When we ….»explain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behhaving system«…. we construct  an objective model aas if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

Best

Rick

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1530)]

···

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:19 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:Â

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

Â

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

RM: How can you say it doesn’t change anything else besides perception when you just said that we act on the world. In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive and control. PCT is not solipsism. It’s a theory (a belief, for those of you in the belief thread) that, like any theory, accounts for observable phenomena.Â

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

RM: Yes, the output function is a carefully defined theoretical concept. However, what you see and informally call a person’s “output”, such as moving their arm, is actually a controlled result of other means (variations in muscle tensions in this case). That is, what you see as a person’s “output” is the (possibly varying) reference state of a controlled variable.

Â

 Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

Â

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

Â

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

RM: Of course, that is a definition of the output function. It’s not a definition of output or, more importantly, what we see as (and informally refer to as) a person’s “output”.Â

Â

HB: I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

RM: I don’t understand what physiological evidences would have to do with it. Bill developed PCT to explain the controlling that he saw people (and other organisms) do; that is, he developed PCT to explain observable behavior; behavior that is occurring out there in the world. He went to some length to make sure (and to show) that the theory was consistent with physiological evidences.Â

Â

HB: it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it.

RM: All we know is our perception. That IS our reality. PCT is aimed at explaining one aspect of that reality: the behavior of living organisms. Before you can explain the reality of behavior you have to know what it is that you are explaining. Conventional psychologists see behavior as “caused output”; Powers saw it as variables maintained in reference states, protected from disturbance; that is, he saw behavior as control. PCT was developed to explain that reality.Â

Â

HB: So behavior involve no control.

RM: If that were true there would be no need for control theory to explain it.

Â

HB: If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside.

RM: You do it by being in a closed negative feedback relationship with those perceptions. Check out the diagram of a control system model or, better yet, build a model yourself and you’ll see how it works.Â

HB:Â HBIt’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article.

RM: I already have and it’s quite different from yours. The main problem with yours is that it is solipsistic and, thus, completely outside the realm of science. There are many other problems with your understanding of PCT but solipsism is really the show stopper for me. It makes what you say about PCT completely uninteresting because there is just no where to go with it, scientifically. So I probably won’t respond to your posts very much (unless by some miracle you join the reality-based community) unless I see some other egregious misconception of yours about PCT.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

 The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Â

Bill P.:

When we ….»explaain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we construct  an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]

Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –

BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.

BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.

BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception. We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the  best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an effective way to reality.Â

BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.Â

···

On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Â

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the gllass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…/p>

Â

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Â

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

Â

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Â

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

Â

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

Â

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

Â

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

Â

Â

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

Â

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

Â

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Â

Bill P.:

When we ….»explain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we connstruct  an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

Â

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

Â

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

Â

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

Â

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

Â

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.Â

Â

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

Â

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

Â

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

Â

Â

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.Â

Â

HB :

Â

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.Â

Â

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

Â

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.Â

Â

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.Â

Â

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.Â

Â

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0Â from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.Â

Â

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.Â

Â

 RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

Â

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

Â

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Â

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.21.2055 ET)]

Boris, yes, I agree that our control of perceptual input appears to have effects on the environment. The appearance is such that our control of the perception appears to be our control of that which is perceived. I cannot join you in denying that it is in fact control of that which is perceived, because I don’t know whether it is or not. I have no way of knowing. Maybe you do.

HB: Well Bruce my positive opinion about you is rising rapidly, Â …

Reports indicate that I have my ups and downs. Seems to depend a lot on whose perceptions are reported.

HB: … despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet.Â

I did? That’s a surprise to me! It wasn’t something that I perceived. At least not consciously.

···

On Sat, Nov 21, 2015 at 7:31 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Â

Â

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 8:07 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]

Â

Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –

Â

BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

Â

BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.

Â

HB :

I agree. Any person has it’s own imagination of presenting the world outside to him. So for somebody »we can control something in environment« and by others oppinion we can’t. We can just »affect environment«, as Bill propossed. I think that »affecting« environment has more physiological support than oppinion about »controlling environment«.

Â

BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.

Â

HB:

I agree. I never siad that there is no environment outside and Bill did neither. It could be maybe misunderstanding. We all assume that there is environment out there. The difference is whether we beleive that we are »controlling environment outside« or it is just affected by the inside control though means of control (support to control).

Â

In either way we assume that there is environment out there. I think that Bill was right to assume that there are only effects of output percived in environment. So the difference is only whether those »effects to environment« are controlled or not. Perceptions of physiological researches are on Bill’s side.

Â

BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception.

Â

HB : I agree. J. Yes, we control disturbed perception not environmental variables. Environmental variables are just affected by output thus disturibng (changing) our perceptions which are later controlled. I really don’t know anymore what we are arguing about J.Â

Â

Â

BN : We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the  best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an effective way to reality.Â

Â

HB : I agree. Well Bruce my positive oppinon about you is rising rapidly, despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet. But it’s better than Rick, who wanted to »delete« me. I think we are about to come to agreement, but anyway i’ll try to vanish after that.Â

Â

BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.Â

Â

HB :

The difference between Bill and you is only in that Bill justifiably beleived that also aspects of environment that the perception correspond to are »affected« not »controled« by output. It looks like a little word »game«. But it’s not. It’s supported with strong physiological evidences that Bill provided with his theory. I think that’s why we can find »effects« not »control« in Bill’s diagram. He could have easily put in diagram »controlled efects«. But he didn’t. Isn’t it that a good reason that we ask ourselves WHY ?

Â

Boris

Â

/Bruce

Â

Â

On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Â

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the percepttion of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It mmeans that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…>

Â

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Â

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

Â

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Â

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

Â

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

Â

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

Â

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

Â

Â

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

Â

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

Â

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Â

Bill P.:

When we ….»explain behavior in terms of somee physical model of a behaving system«…. we construct > an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

Â

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

Â

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

Â

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

Â

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

Â

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.Â

Â

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

Â

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

Â

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

Â

Â

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.Â

Â

HB :

Â

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.Â

Â

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

Â

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.Â

Â

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.Â

Â

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.Â

Â

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0Â from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.Â

Â

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.Â

Â

 RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

Â

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

Â

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Â

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Â

[_Boris_Hartman]

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]

Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –

BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.

HB :

I agree. Any person has it’s own imagination of presenting the world outside to him. So for somebody »we can control something in environment« and by others oppinion we can’t. We can just »affect environment«, as Bill propossed. I think that »affecting« environment has more physiological support than oppinion about »controlling environment«.

BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.

HB:

I agree. I never siad that there is no environment outside and Bill did neither. It could be maybe misunderstanding. We all assume that there is environment out there. The difference is whether we beleive that we are »controlling environment outside« or it is just affected by the inside control though means of control (support to control).

In either way we assume that there is environment out there. I think that Bill was right to assume that there are only effects of output percived in environment. So the difference is only whether those »effects to environment« are controlled or not. Perceptions of physiological researches are on Bill’s side.

BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception.

HB : I agree. J. Yes, we control disturbed perception not environmental variables. Environmental variables are just affected by output thus disturibng (changing) our perceptions which are later controlled. I really don’t know anymore what we are arguing about J.Â

BN : We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an effective way to reality.

HB : I agree. Well Bruce my positive oppinon about you is rising rapidly, despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet. But it’s better than Rick, who wanted to »delete« me. I think we are about to come to agreement, but anyway i’ll try to vanish after that.Â

BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.

HB :

The difference between Bill and you is only in that Bill justifiably beleived that also aspects of environment that the perception correspond to are »affected« not »controled« by output. It looks like a little word »game«. But it’s not. It’s supported with strong physiological evidences that Bill provided with his theory. I think that’s why we can find »effects« not »control« in Bill’s diagram. He could have easily put in diagram »controlled efects«. But he didn’t. Isn’t it that a good reason that we ask ourselves WHY ?

Boris

/Bruce

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »»on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that aalter the world of perception…

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Bill P.:

When we ….»eexplain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we construct an objective model as if our own perceeptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 8:07 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

Best

Rick

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM
To: ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’
Subject: RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]

RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.

RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,

HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?

Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?

Best,

Boris

then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).

HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?

That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.

HB :

RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.

RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.

RM: So perception is part of the theory (control theory) that accounts for the fact of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.

RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.

RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.

RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 from S’s perspective. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.

RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.

RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be objectively determined to be a control process without saying anything about it theoretically being perception that is controlled.

You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing that a person is controlling to knowing precisely what they are controlling.

RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.

Best

Rick

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Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble