FW: What's perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[_Boris_Hartman]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1530)]

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »on thee table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter tthe world of perception…

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

RM: How can you say it doesn’t change anything else besides perception when you just said that we act on the world. In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive and control.

HB : You can assume that you changed something in the world arround you. You are partly right : In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive… If you would stay at thhis statement, than we could make an agreement. But it seems that you can’t. You have to involve control.

HB : We affect outisde environment with our actions, we do not control in outside environment with our actions.Â

HB : Bill is saying that we act to make a perception of the glass change…. So he probably assumed that he also affected the glass with his action.

Maybe some thoughts of Henry Yin.

HY : Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.

HB : It seems that Henry agree with Bill, that you can’t know what did you do to environment, if it is not perceived,

How do you know when you act on the world to influence (change) those aspects, that you control anything in environment ? How do you know you controlled thiee aspects of the world outside ?

RM : PCT is not solipsism. It’s a theory (a belief, for those of you in the belief thread) that, like any theory, accounts for observable phenomena.

HB : So now you are judging what is PCT ? Are you the author of PCT ? Whatever Bill wrote about PCT is PCT. And are you aying that Bill’s PCT is solipsism ?

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

RM: Yes, the output function is a carefully defined theoretical concept. However, what you see and informally call a person’s “output”, such as moving their arm, is actually a controlled result of other means (variations in muscle tensions in this case).

RM: Of course, that is a definition of the output function. It’s not a definition of output or, more importantly, what we see as (and informally refer to as) a person’s “output”.

HB : I objected many times that you read things as you want. If you will look more carefully at Bill defintion you will notice, that also »output« is included. .

Bill P.: OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

HB : It’s clearly written that signal inisde is converted into correpsonding »set of efects on the immediate environment of the system«. Do you think that other »person’s output« is not a »set of efects on the immediate environment of the system«  ? Are you saying that »person’s output« is »controlled result« of muscle tension ??? Â

Are you saying that MUSCLE tension is not included in »ouptut function« ? What is »muscle tension« for you ? Where can you put it »closed loop« and how can it have »controlled« result without perception ?

RM : That is, what you see as a person’s “output” is the (possibly varying) reference state of a controlled variable.

HB : Reference state of which possibly varying »controlled variable« ?

HB: I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

RM: I don’t understand what physiological evidences would have to do with it.

HB : Physiological evidences are needed to prove »controlled effects« on the immediate environment of the system. Can you prove it ? Bill’s »output funtion« is talking just about SET OF EFFECTS TO IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT of the system. Or if we translate it into Person’s behavior then »set of efffects« correspond to »observable behavior«. There is no »controlled effects« mentioned. You can see it in diagram (LCS III) ???  Just effects.

But it seems that you are saying that physiological evidences are not needed to prove »controlled effects« on the environment ? Do I understand you right ? It seems that you are saying that Person’s behavior is »controlled result« of varying muscle tension ? Prove it ?

RM : Bill developed PCT to explain the controlling that he saw people (and other organisms) do; that is, he developed PCT to explain observable behavior; behavior that is occurring out there in the world.

HB : If you’ll read article 50th Anniversary (2011) again you will noitice that PCT is supoosed to be general theory about how organisms function not about what organisms do. It’s a huge difference. Observable behvaior is important but just supporting to internal control of organism. The most important is that organism control. First you have to understand this and how references are formed. It’s still on 11th level the »?« sign.

Bill P : CONTROL :

Do you agree with this Bill’s »defitnion« ?

RM : He went to some length to make sure (and to show) that the theory was consistent with physiological evidences.

HB : Are you contradicting yourself ?

RM (earlier) : I don’t understand what physiological evidences would have to do with it.

HB: it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it.

RM: All we know is our perception. That IS our reality.

HB :  What you are saying here is pure »SOLIPSISTIC VIEW«.  And you are accusing Bill that he is solipsisst ?

RM : PCT is aimed at explaining one aspect of that reality: the behavior of living organisms.

HB : PCT is aimed to explain the functioning of living beaings (organisms) and consequently behavior as supporting tool. But speccially is aiming to explain »Control of Percetpion«.

RM : Before you can explain the reality of behavior you have to know what it is that you are explaining.

HB : Right. The problem is that you don’t.

HB: So behavior involve no control.

RM: If that were true there would be no need for control theory to explain it.

HB : But that is exactly what PCT is explaining. Behavior is not control. It’s just effects on outer environment. Check it in diagram (LCS III). Do you see any »controlled effects« on envrionment. Or any other »controlled variable« in environment ?

HB : Do you agree with Bill’s diagram or not ?

Or you will »repair« it with your doctrine about »controlled variable« (CV) in external environment and »controlled effects« on input quantity ?

HB: It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article.

RM: I already have and it’s quite different from yours. The main problem with yours is that it is solipsistic and, thus, completely outside the realm of science.

HB : Our views are different in respect to Bill’s. My view is »attached« on Bill’s. if you are saying that your view is different from mine, you are saying that yours is different from Bill’s as I was mostly quoting him. He si the author of PCT not I.

So you have to match your theory to his and I’m giving you a chance to show how much your RCT is matching PCT.

And if you are saying that Bill’s view is solipsistic than it must be something wrong with your understanding of solipsissm or/and understanding of PCT. So I’ll try again with main Bills »defitnitions«. Just say whether you agree with them or not.

Bill P. Â

INPUT FUNCTION :

COMPARATOR :

ERROR :

ERROR SIGNAL :

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

FEED-BACK FUNCTION :

Bill P (LCS III):

The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the acrtion of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

REALITY :

HB : DO YOU AGREE WITH THESE »DEFINITIONS« ?

If you don’t agree than change them if you are so sure that you are right, not Bill. If you’ll not change them I’ll understand that you agree with them and your »self-regulation« definitons are not in PCT actual any more. No control in outer environment. No behavior is control. No protection of »controlled variables« and so on…. JUST »EFFECTS« TO OUTER ENVIRRONMENT ….

If you don’t understand Bill’s defitnitions and diagrma, then we can conclude that you follow some of your own RCT (RICK’S CONTROL THEORY) which goes something like this :

Correct me if I’m wrong about how your »control loop« function :

OUTPUT : Behavior is control

FEED-BACK : aspect of environment that is controlled by behavior (ouptut) of the system)

INPUTÂ : Physical variables that are probably coming from “controlled aspect of environment” to sensors which create a “controlled perceptual variable” (in afferent nerv fibres)

COMPARATOR : Controlled perceptual variable is matched to reference and it seems that is controlled again as it is coming from already controlled aspect in environment.

ERROR SIGNAL : “controlled signal” that is activating muscle tension. Control is involved in muscle tension and consequently in OUTPUT “Behavior is control”… and so on ¦

So we have :

BEHAVIOR AS CONTROL, control some “controlled aspect of environment” called “controlled variable”, which emits physical variables to sensors , which forms “controlled perceptual variable” in afferent nerv fibers and which are “controlled” in comparator when matching to reference. “Controlled error signals” exactly activate muscles, which emit controlled effects to environment called "BEHAVIOR IS CONTROL"…. And all arround the loop again and again.

You RCT is quite an “amazing” and amusing “control theory”. But it’s on your level.

But I’m interested if you see any diference between Bill’s PCT and yours RCT ??? Your RCT is supposed to be »scientific« and Bill’s solipsisitic… What kind of science do you disseminate ?

RM : It makes what you say about PCT completely uninteresting because there is just no where to go with it, scientifically. So I probably won’t respond to your posts very much (unless by some miracle you join the reality-based community) unless I see some other egregious misconception of yours about PCT.

HB : He,he you are running out of arguments and away from your »monstres construction« RCT, which has nothing to do with science. Your »scientific« failures with your demos and test are total disaster ? And you call this »understanding of PCT« ?

In your »self-regulation community« I assume that »behavior is control« will have central point.

And besdie »behavior is control« I assume that there are also »controlled variables« in outer environment, which are »controlled to some reference state«, and »errors« are perceived through »Controlled perceptual variable«, which is again controlled in comparator when matching with references, and so on… Is thhis what you are offering to your members.

For now I see no difference between yours and Carvers »self-regulation«. So you’ll have to change something that you will prove that you understand PCT and that you could »enter« the PCT community, or those who understand PCT, not self-regulation.

Yes you made me angry with your ignorante understanding and speccially with your manipulations with solispsism (which you are part of), what is coming out always when you run out of arguments and you become »insulting«.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 12:30 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:19 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Bill P.:

When we ….»exxplain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we construct an objective model as if our own perceeptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Best,

Boris

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Abbott]

[Bruce Abbott (2015.11.22.0945 EST]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2015 2:41 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1530)]

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:19 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state –“ when we make the perception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

RM: How can you say it doesn’t change anything else besides perception when you just said that we act on the world. In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive and control.

HB : You can assume that you changed something in the world arround you. You are partly right : In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive… If you would stay at tthis statement, than we could make an agreement. But it seems that you can’t. You have to involve control.

HB : We affect outisde environment with our actions, we do not control in outside environment with our actions.

Hi Boris, I hope you don’t mind my jumping into this debate. I am hoping that I can resolve the issue in question, which is whether a control system controls only its perceptual input, or whether it may also control something in the environment. Â

To make my argument clear, I will use the example of a common mechanical control system, one designed to control the temperature of a room. This system includes a thermostat, which is connected to a furnace that can supply heat to the room. It is a one-way control system in that it can only deal with errors on the low side, turning on the furnace when the room temperature falls below the set point (reference level).

The thermostat contains the sensor for room temperature and a means by which a person can adjust the set point.  It outputs an error signal that is proportional to the difference between the set point and the sensed room temperature. This signal determines the heat-output of the furnace, which is proportional to the size of the error signal. The heat output produced by the furnace warms the room.

Because it is winter and the room is warmer than the outside air, heat inside the room migrates through the walls and window-panes of the room to the outside, causing the room temperature to drop below the set point. This leakage thus acts as a disturbance to room temperature. As the room’s temperature drops, the temperature sensor’s reading also drops. It the sensed temperature falls below the set point, an error develops, turning on the furnace, which starts outputing heat in proportion to the size of the error. This heat warms the room, thus opposing the disturbance and bringing the sensed room temperature back toward the set point.

Please note the following facts:

1.  The engineer who designed this system wanted it to control the ***actual*** temperature of the room, not merely the temperature as sensed by the thermostat.
   

2.  The only thing the system can know about the room's temperature is the temperature reported by its sensor, that is, its *perception* of the room's temperature.
   

3.  But the sensor was designed so that sensed temperature tracks the room's actual temperature.
   

4.  Therefore, controlling the sensed or perceived temperature ***also*** controls the room's actual temperature, as the designer intended.
   

5.  The system controls both the actual and sensed temperature by acting directly on the actual room temperature (supplying heat to the room), not directly on the perception.  The disturbance (heat loss) also acts directly on the actual room temperature.  Thus both the disturbance and the control system's output act directly on an environmental variable (the room's actual temperature).  Thus there is a real environmental variable that disturbances act upon, and that the system acts upon to control.
   

So why did Bill Powers emphasize the fact that control systems control their perceptions? For two reasons:

1.  If the sensor is defective, the system will still attempt to control the temperature of the room *as sensed*, but this temperature may bear no regular relationship to the room's *actual* temperature.
   

2.  If the system is designed to control some combination of variables, the perceptual signal values will reflect the combined values of those variables and not the value of any single variable in the system's immediate environment.
   

Of course, we humans can know only what our sensors tell us. We have no direct access to the outside reality, whatever that may be. One can even adopt the position that such a reality does not exist. Bill Powers recognized this fact, but like most people, he preferred to believe that there is a reality beyond our perceptions, and that by controlling our perceptions, we also control numerous variables belonging to the reality beyond our perceptions.Â

Indeed, if one assumes that such a reality exists, it follows that evolution would produce living control systems whose control over their various perceptions thereby controls those aspects of reality that must be controlled if they are to survive. Thus, when I move my perceived arm to a peceived position so as to reach a perceived coffee cup, I believe that I am moving a real arm toward a real coffee cup. By controlling my sensed perceptions of my perceived arm’s position, I am thereby also controlling the actual position of my real arm.

I don’t think I can explain it any better than that.

Bruce A.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.22.0900)]

[Bruce Abbott (2015.11.22.0945 EST]

HB : We affect outisde environment with our actions, we do not control in outside environment with our actions.

BA: Hi Boris, I hope you don't mind my jumping into this debate. I am hoping that I can resolve the issue in question, which is whether a control system controls only its perceptual input, or whether it may also control something in the environment...

5. The system controls both the actual and sensed temperature by acting directly on the actual room temperature (supplying heat to the room), not directly on the perception. The disturbance (heat loss) also acts directly on the actual room temperature. Thus both the disturbance and the control system's output act directly on an environmental variable (the room's actual temperature). Thus there is a real environmental variable that disturbances act upon, and that the system acts upon to control...

BA: I don't think I can explain it any better than that.

RM: Excellent job, Bruce. What do you think are the chances that Boris will now change his mind and agree that an aspect of the environment is controlled when a perception of that aspect of the environment is controlled? I'm going to say 100% under the assumption that what I believe reflects what I'm controlling for.
Best
Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
<Mind Readings.com
Author of <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=VDNORDWfjkjHjd4wwJ5xA4JrCi3iL0zjvjNdpL3qZXg&s=Y3DUrF1mlpfr-YW6PWLxHPCncYrY8v82AbxwGkycsf0&e=&gt;Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

Hi, Bruce,

sorry not to answer your part about thermostat, as I think Henry Yin did good explanation where could be problems with equating »machines« and »organiams«. So I’ll just continue where you make some conclussions about »control of external environment«.

BA : Of course, we humans can know only what our sensors tell us. We have no direct access to the outside reality, whatever that may be. One can even adopt the position that such a reality does not exist. Bill Powers recognized this fact, but like most people, he preferred to believe that there is a reality beyond our perceptions, and that by controlling our perceptions, we also control numerous variables belonging to the reality beyond our perceptions.

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It’s his theory. We don’t control external environment, we affect it. Whatever Bill beleived, his statements in FUNCTION and COMPARATOR and his DIAGRAM are very clear. Just effects to external environment what is plausible with physiological »facts«. So I’d like to know what is wrong with his statements.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the acrtion of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

So you can beleive Bill or not. I do.

But nobody is saying that you are not free to propose changes to generic diagram and put »controlled effects« into »feed-back function« or »CV« (controlled variables) into immediate environment of control system, and consequently change all the loop, as Rick is proposing last years.

BA : Indeed, if one assumes that such a reality exists, it follows that evolution would produce living control systems whose control over their various perceptions thereby controls those aspects of reality that must be controlled if they are to survive.

HB : All organisms »control« for constant internal environment – »homeostasis«, including pplants. That’s what Bill theory is about :

Bill P :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.

HB : And that’s what control is about :

Bill P :

BA : Thus, when I move my perceived arm to a peceived position so as to reach a perceived coffee cup, I believe that I am moving a real arm toward a real coffee cup. By controlling my sensed perceptions of my perceived arm’s position, I am thereby also controlling the actual position of my real arm.

HB : You are free to think so. It’s your perception or what you are experiencing… I suppose that you probably with your control rreasoning perceive any behavior as »control«. But how many people on the world percive behavior in the same way as you do ? And I think that many self-regulation theorist do perceive it in the way you do. Maybe most of the people.

But my oppinon is, that Bill was right when he put just effects to outer environment »even to a cup of coffee« to control perception. If you don’t think so, please show where you think he was wrong. I’m speccially interested in how would you change Bill general diagram about control loop to suit your oppinion, How you imagine that »control« comes to outer environment ?

BA : I don’t think I can explain it any better than that.

HB : You don’t need to Bruce. Thank you for your oppinion.

But Bill’s »definintion« of FUNCTIONS, COMPARATOR and DIAGRAM say more than 1000 words we could spent on talkings what we beleive about what is happening in »reality«. Probably every human and animals if they could talk would have it’s own explanation. I just watched how snake would predictably perceive the outer world through it’s specific sensors. It’s not the world we are sensing.

Bill has strong physiological background for the statements about output affecting outer envirronment, not »controlled effects«. But I think that Henry Yin could explain why Bill put »effects« into outer environment, not »control«.

For now you can agree with Bill or you can change Bill’s theory into what you and Rick propose.

Putting »control« into outer environment, means at least to me chaniging »definitions« and » diagram«. And changing »output function« into »behavior is control« and changing »feed-back function« into »controlled effects on aspect of environment«. And changing »perceptual signal« to »controlled perceptual variable« as Rick is proposing in his RCT. Whatever you change in one segment of control loop has consequences on other components of the loop. But I expect also that you will support everything with evidences.

Do you really want these changes ? Can you Rick and others who beleive in »control« in outer environment support yoor »new theory« with physiological evidences. And can you solve the mistery in diagram on p. 191, B:CP where total confussion is on. It’s not even clear how purposes or refereces are formed in organism.

Isn’t it better that you would direct your energy into vital questions of PCT, not into marginal.

If you think that changes are needed to PCT, please propose them. Or better leave PCT as it is and make »new theory«, your own theory about how »control« in outer environment is possible and how it works ?

I beleive that Bill was right whatever he proposed.

Best,

Boris

Bruce A.

···

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2015 3:48 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[Bruce Abbott (2015.11.22.0945 EST]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2015 2:41 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1530)]

RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:19 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the percception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…IIt means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…¦

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

RM: How can you say it doesn’t change anything else besides perception when you just said that we act on the world. In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive and control.

HB : You can assume that you changed something in the world arround you. You are partly right : In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive… If you would stay at this statement, than we couldd make an agreement. But it seems that you can’t. You have to involve control.

HB : We affect outisde environment with our actions, we do not control in outside environment with our actions.

BA : Hi Boris, I hope you don’t mind my jumping into this debate. I am hoping that I can resolve the issue in question, which is whether a control system controls only its perceptual input, or whether it may also control something in the environment.

HB : So you think that output is controlled too ? If you control something in the environment you are propbably assuming that »controlled effects« are to environment. And this means that you are »controlling output«.

BA : To make my argument clear, I will use the example of a common mechanical control system, one designed to control the temperature of a room. This system includes a thermostat, which is connected to a furnace that can supply heat to the room. It is a one-way control system in that it can only deal with errors on the low side, turning on the furnace when the room temperature falls below the set point (reference level).

HB : So you somehow assume that »machines« are functioning the same as »organisms« ?

BA : The thermostat contains the sensor for room temperature and a means by which a person can adjust the set point. It outputs an error signal that is proportional to the difference between the set point and the sensed room temperature. This signal determines the heat-output of the furnace, which is proportional to the size of the error signal. The heat output produced by the furnace warms the room.

HB : O.K.

BA : Because it is winter and the room is warmer than the outside air, heat inside the room migrates through the walls and window-panes of the room to the outside, causing the room temperature to drop below the set point. This leakage thus acts as a disturbance to room temperature. As the room’s temperature drops, the temperature sensor’s reading also drops. It the sensed temperature falls below the set point, an error develops, turning on the furnace, which starts outputing heat in proportion to the size of the error. This heat warms the room, thus opposing the disturbance and bringing the sensed room temperature back toward the set point.

HB : If this is tha way how »furnace« function, I don’t see where is »control of output«. Here I see that you are talking just about »error« which is consequence of difference between »perception« and »set-point. But we are asking all the time whether output is controlled or not. And if the »output is controlled«, how control is transfered to »output«.

Please note the following facts:

1.  The engineer who designed this system wanted it to control the ***actual*** temperature of the room, not merely the temperature as sensed by the thermostat.
   

What is »actual temperature in the room« ? How do you come to the »actual temprature« of the room ? The engineer who designed it wanted to have effects in the room that will help him control it’s internal temperature or anybody’s else. The goal of furnace is to keep temperature close to the temprature wanted by human who is regulating the functioning of the furnace. The final goal is to keep people warm. There is no »actual tmperature«, it’s just sensed by human or by furnace.

2.  The only thing the system can know about the room's temperature is the temperature reported by its sensor, that is, its *perception* of the room's temperature.
   

O.K.

3.  But the sensor was designed so that sensed temperature tracks the room's actual temperature.
   

Again. What is rooms »actual temperature« ?

4.  Therefore, controlling the sensed or perceived temperature ***also*** controls the room's actual temperature, as the designer intended.
   

I think that Henry Yin explained where is the problem with engineers thinking and »thinking« of the organisms

HY :

5.  The system controls both the actual and sensed temperature by acting directly on the actual room temperature (supplying heat to the room), not directly on the perception.  The disturbance (heat loss) also acts directly on the actual room temperature.  Thus both the disturbance and the control system's output act directly on an environmental variable (the room's actual temperature).  Thus there is a real environmental variable that disturbances act upon, and that the system acts upon to control.
   

So why did Bill Powers emphasize the fact that control systems control their perceptions? For two reasons:

1.  If the sensor is defective, the system will still attempt to control the temperature of the room *as sensed*, but this temperature may bear no regular relationship to the room's *actual* temperature.
   

2.  If the system is designed to control some combination of variables, the perceptual signal values will reflect the combined values of those variables and not the value of any single variable in the system's immediate environment.
   

BA : Of course, we humans can know only what our sensors tell us. We have no direct access to the outside reality, whatever that may be. One can even adopt the position that such a reality does not exist. Bill Powers recognized this fact, but like most people, he preferred to believe that there is a reality beyond our perceptions, and that by controlling our perceptions, we also control numerous variables belonging to the reality beyond our perceptions.

HB : Bill Powers beleived that we are affecting environment not controlling it, as it’s obviously sen from his general diagram. If you control some aspect of environment, there are behaviors (ouptuts) which are not »controlling« anything in environment, as I presented them. So whatever you are proposing is not a general theory, but speccial theory which in some cases present »controlled aspect of environment«.

I’m supoorting hie beleive, because I think that he proved it with physiological beckground. So I think that diagram which he formed is based on solid physiological ground. On what ground is your theory of RCT theory based upon. ? What physiological evidences can you offer to prove tha »output is controlled«, that »aspect of environment« is controlled« and that perceptual signal is »controlled perceptual variable«. Are you aware of the consequences if you say that »something is controlled« in environment ? You have to prove that this is possible, because Bill proved (by my oppinion) with physiological means that ouptut is affecting enviroment,not controlling. There are just effects in environment, there is no »controlled effects«.

If Bill thought that people are »controlling« environment than he would probbaly did so. Remember the words of Barb, how Bill carefully choosed his words. But he didn’t put into diagram and his »definitons« anything what couls resemble »control«.

He put it clearly that just »effects« not »controlled effects« are send to immediate environment.

By your »definition« something has to act in the environment so that »numerous variables« in environment are »controlled«. What is causing »numerous variables« in environment to be controlled ? Behavior (output) ? But than you are saying that behavior is controlled ouptut, and there are »CV« in environment, which are »controlled« by this »controlled behavior« ? There is no »set of effects to immediate enviroment, but »controlled effects« ?

And you probbaly assume that »controlled effects« on environment has some influence on »input function«, which is producing »controlled perceptual variable« ? But if you think so, than you think th same as Rick does in his RCT (Rick’s control theory).

The problem I see here is that you are introducing new concept to »control in organisms«. So many things in Bills’ diagram has to be changed. And also his »definitions«.

So if you don’t agree with Bill’s diagram, than i expect you will propose changes, so to fit your »new theory«.

Then only option I see is to chnage PCT diagram and »defitnitions« or you leave as it is, and you and Rick make »new theory RCT« in which you have »CV« in environment, and »behavior is controlled«, and sensed physical variables coming from »CV« »wears« control and perceptual signal »wears« control too, and so on arround the loop.Â

So Bill’s »definitions« have to be changed.

OUTPUT FUNCTION :

INPUT FUNCTION :

FEEDBACK FUNCTION :

EROR SIGNAL :

COMPARATOR :

BA : Indeed, if one assumes that such a reality exists, it follows that evolution would produce living control systems whose control over their various perceptions thereby controls those aspects of reality that must be controlled if they are to survive.

BA : Thus, when I move my perceived arm to a peceived position so as to reach a perceived coffee cup, I believe that I am moving a real arm toward a real coffee cup. By controlling my sensed perceptions of my perceived arm’s position, I am thereby also controlling the actual position of my real arm.

HB : So if I understand right what you are saying is that you are controlling your muscles to keep the actual position of your »real arm« ? That could tell you any »self-regulation« theorist or »behaviorist«, because there is a strong illusion, that we are controlling

But now we need only physiological evidence that this is possible. Bill in his general diagram presents only effects, no controlled effects. So Bruce why don’t you propose change in Bil’s diagram. It’s easy to talk, Do something. Find physiological evidences that will support what you are talking. I’m supporting Bill’s decission as it is. Just effects to immediate environment, and no »controlled efects« in immediate environment.

BA : I don’t think I can explain it any better than that.

HB : Well now I’m waiting for some consequences of your explanation, because I don’t see it fits in PCT ? Please propose changes so that »control« will be »seen« in enviroment. The best way is to offer some physiological evidences for »your theory« of »controlled efects« in environment.

I think that Bill has them. So i’m with every »definition« he used and I’m fully suporting his diagram. And I think that Henry Yin supports it too, on the bases what I saw him writing.

Bruce A.

[Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.24.10:05 EST)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:58 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Hi, Bruce,

HB: sorry not to answer your part about thermostat, as I think Henry Yin did good explanation where could be problems with equating »machines« and »organiams«. So I’ll just continue where you make some conclussions about »control of external environment«.

Boris, you can’t be a proponent of PCT and at the same time hold that we shouldn’t be equating machines and organisms. I’ll try to make clear why this is so.

Norbert Wiener’s seminal book, the one that Bill Powers read that put him on the path to PCT, was entitled Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. That title announces Wiener’s central insight, which is that the same principles of control and communication can be applied toward analyizng and understanding both animals and machines.

What Wiener understood was that there can be a »science of machines,« abstracted from any particular physical realization of the machine. A given machine in this more abstract sense can be characterized as a set of functions (transformations) that are linked together (communicate) in a particular way.  He understood that the machine will behave in the same general way regardless of the material of which it is constructed. Thus, for example, one can build an amplifier out of electronic components connected together in a particular way, or out of hydraulic components connected together in the same way. Schematically, they are the same system if the components perform the same transformations and are connected in the same way.

During World War II there had been a rapid development of control systems for doing such things as stabilizing guns on a battleship against the rocking the the ship, accurately aiming anti-aircraft guns to track and shoot down aircraft, and automatically flying aircraft (autopilots). Wiener realized that one could understand the behaviors of animals, just as one could understand the behavior of an autopilot, by identifying how the relevant components are organized into a system. In particular, the system Wiener had in mind is the control system, which is why he coined the term »cybernetics« to label this new field. It comes from the Greek, meaning »steersman.«Â

All control systems whose components carryout the same general functions and are connected in the same way will behave in identical fashion, whether those systems are implemented by the electro-mechanical components of a car’s cruise control or the driver’s iono-mechanical sensory receptors, neurons, and muscles, which when organized to form a speed control system, can similarly keep the car’s speed at the driver’s reference level (by means of adjusting foot pressure on the accelerator pedal).

PCT is in essence the application of these machine-derived principles of control to living creatures. The problem isn’t with equating machines and organisms, because at the systems-analysis level it doesn’t matter how the components and signals are formed so long as they perform analogous functions and are connected so as to form the same system of components.

The real problem with equating machines and organisms is that organisms are extremely complex. Even worse, it is notoriously difficult to observe the workings of their inner parts so that one can construct an accurate functional »wiring« diagram. Often the best we can do (given current technology) is theorize a particular organization of parts, create a simulation based on that proposal, and observe whether the simulation reproduces the organism’s observed behavior. The many PCT simulations of tracking behavior are examples of this strategy, where the control exerted by the simulation is compared to that produced by the individual in the tracking task.

Now let’s examine what you take Bill to be saying about control systems.

BA : Of course, we humans can know only what our sensors tell us. We have no direct access to the outside reality, whatever that may be. One can even adopt the position that such a reality does not exist. Bill Powers recognized this fact, but like most people, he preferred to believe that there is a reality beyond our perceptions, and that by controlling our perceptions, we also control numerous variables belonging to the reality beyond our perceptions.

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It’s his theory. We don’t control external environment, we affect it. Whatever Bill beleived, his statements in FUNCTION and COMPARATOR and his DIAGRAM are very clear. Just effects to external environment what is plausible with physiological »facts«. So I’d like to know what is wrong with his statements.

PCT is Bill’s theory, yes, but it’s an application of control theory, originally developed to understand the behavior of machines that control.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the acrtion of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

In the diagram below, the controlled variable is the small circle labeled as the »input quantity.« Its value is affected by the disturbance and by output quantity, operating on the input quantity via the feedback function. The feedback is negative, so adding the effects of feedback and disturbance accomplishes subtraction. The feedback compensates for the disturbance, so that its effect on the input quantity is minimized. That is, the value of the input quantity is controlled. The input quantity is thus the controlled variable in the environment.

The input function converts this input (sensed value of the controlled variable) to an internal representation of the controlled quantity called the perceptual signal. Because the perceptual signal tracks the value of the controlled variable in the environment, it is also controlled. The perceptual signal is the person’s inner representation of the controlled variable in the environment, so if the environmental variable is controlled, so is its perception. We can only directly know our perceptions, so from the organism’s point of view, what is controlled are its perceptions.

HB: So you can beleive Bill or not. I do.

HB: But nobody is saying that you are not free to propose changes to generic diagram and put »controlled effects« into »feed-back function« or »CV« (controlled variables) into immediate environment of control system, and consequently change all the loop, as Rick is proposing last years.

I hope I’ve made it clear by now that Bill and I are saying the same thing; I am not proposing any changes. If I had that wrong, surely Bill would have pointed that out to me.

BA : Indeed, if one assumes that such a reality exists, it follows that evolution would produce living control systems whose control over their various perceptions thereby controls those aspects of reality that must be controlled if they are to survive.

HB : All organisms »control« for constant internal environment – »homeostasis«, inncluding plants. That’s what Bill theory is about :

Bill P :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.

HB : And that’s what control is about :

Bill P :

Boris, how do you define »control«? As I define it, control involves acting on a variable in such as way (via negative feedback) as to cancel the effects of disturbances to that variable. Isn’t that what happens to the cursor in a tracking experiment as disturbances act on it but are opposed by the participant’s actions? Isn’t the cursor out there in the environment (on the computer screen)? Isn’t its movement being opposed by the participant’s arm movements, which move the mouse, which acts on the position of the cursor?

BA : Thus, when I move my perceived arm to a peceived position so as to reach a perceived coffee cup, I believe that I am moving a real arm toward a real coffee cup. By controlling my sensed perceptions of my perceived arm’s position, I am thereby also controlling the actual position of my real arm.

HB : You are free to think so. It’s your perception or what you are experiencing… I suppose that you probablly with your control reasoning perceive any behavior as »control«. But how many people on the world percive behavior in the same way as you do ? And I think that many self-regulation theorist do perceive it in the way you do. Maybe most of the people.

No, I don’t perceive just any behavior as control. Only behavior that acts to oppose changes in some observed variable. That’s the definition of control.

HB: But my oppinon is, that Bill was right when he put just effects to outer environment »even to a cup of coffee« to control perception. If you don’t think so, please show where you think he was wrong. I’m speccially interested in how would you change Bill general diagram about control loop to suit your oppinion, How you imagine that »control« comes to outer environment ?

BA : I don’t think I can explain it any better than that.

HB : You don’t need to Bruce. Thank you for your oppinion.

Well, you’re welcome, but I hope you now understand that the view I expressed was Bill’s opinion, too.

Bruce A.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.24.1900)]

···

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:58 AM, Boris Hartman <<mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net>boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It's his theory. We don't control external environment, we affect it.

RM: The idea that PCT says that we don't control aspects of the environment when we control perceptions is not only completely wrong but also morally reprehensible (from my perspective) . I don't really care about the fact that you continue to present a completely incorrect description of PCT but I do care about having you present the idea that we control only perception, not the environment as though it were a true reflection of what we learn from PCT.
RM: Why do I find the idea that we control only perception, not the environment, morally reprehensible? Because it says that people are not responsible for the environmental consequences of their controlling. It suggests that when you control for a perception of stealing someone's car then it's just your perception that is being controlled, not anything in the environment (like the car). According to you, the car might be affected by your actions but the perception you are controlling -- taking the car away from its owner -- exists only as a perception. Same is true if you are controlling for keeping people in concentration camps. Again, it's only your perception of the people being in concentration camps that is being controlled, not the people themselves The people's location may be affected by your actions but the perception that was controlled for -- of the people being herded into camps -- was just your perception; it wasn't happening in the environment.
RM: Of course, the person who has their car stolen or who has been herded into a concentration camp knows that you are controlling for more than just your perceptions. And if you told them (like you are telling us) that you are just controlling your perceptions I think they might disagree with you even more vigorously than I am.
RM:You see the problem?
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
<Mind Readings.com
Author of <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=YhvmnoqV5AzNJjqpcXU5rvRXTyGuXIPd4HFoRSUhdsE&s=U2oyJHxH0jAHC9kBKjk9PeHH1j9dT6GOCF7cdTpgirI&e=&gt;Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Bob_Hintz]

bob hintz - 11-25-15

This is a tricky example. How does one directly perceive “ownership”. If you leave the keys in your car, I might perceive an “invitation” to use the car for a little while. Anyone could see me get in the car and drive off, but they would not see me “steal” it. I might not even think that I am “stealing” it - just “borrowing” as I will bring it back when I am done.

inside/outside - perception/conception - these are not simple distinctions.

bob

···

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 8:58 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.24.1900)]

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:58 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It’s his theory. We don’t control external environment, we affect it.

RM: The idea that PCT says that we don’t control aspects of the environment when we control perceptions is not only completely wrong but also morally reprehensible (from my perspective) . I don’t really care about the fact that you continue to present a completely incorrect description of PCT but I do care about having you present the idea that we control only perception, not the environment as though it were a true reflection of what we learn from PCT.

RM: Why do I find the idea that we control only perception, not the environment, morally reprehensible? Because it says that people are not responsible for the environmental consequences of their controlling. It suggests that when you control for a perception of stealing someone’s car then it’s just your perception that is being controlled, not anything in the environment (like the car). According to you, the car might be affected by your actions but the perception you are controlling – taking the car away from its owner – exists only as a perception. Same is true if you are controlling for keeping people in concentration camps. Again, it’s only your perception of the people being in concentration camps that is being controlled, not the people themselves The people’s location may be affected by your actions but the perception that was controlled for – of the people being herded into camps – was just your perception; it wasn’t happening in the environment.

RM: Of course, the person who has their car stolen or who has been herded into a concentration camp knows that you are controlling for more than just your perceptions. And if you told them (like you are telling us) that you are just controlling your perceptions I think they might disagree with you even more vigorously than I am.

RM:You see the problem?

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.11.25.13.19]

...

To accept that we control out perceptions and NOT the environment by
no means implies that the environmental property corresponding to
the perception fails to be stabilized. You seem to equate imperfect
control with no control, which technically would mean that no
variable was controlled, ever. If you are trying to move PCT away from being a theory that uses the
control of perception to account for what we see live things do, I’m
afraid I’m not with you, and am unlikely ever to follow you there.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.24.1900)]

        On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:58 AM,

Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net
wrote:

                HB

: Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly
value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his
»definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III).
It’s his theory. We don’t control external
environment, we affect it.

      RM: The idea that PCT says that we don't control aspects of

the environment when we control perceptions is not only
completely wrong but also morally reprehensible (from my
perspective) …

      RM: Why do I find the idea that we

control only perception, not the environment, morally
reprehensible? Because it says that people are not responsible
for the environmental consequences of their controlling.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.25.1125)]

···

Martin Taylor (2015.11.25.13.19)–

MT: To accept that we control out perceptions and NOT the environment by

no means implies that the environmental property corresponding to
the perception fails to be stabilized.

RM: Please show me how that works.

MT: : You seem to equate imperfect

control with no control,

RM: No, I equate no control with no control. If all that were being asserted was that control of the environment is less perfect than control of the corresponding perception, I would not find that morally reprehensible. Indeed, it may even be true.

MT: If you are trying to move PCT away from being a theory that uses the

control of perception to account for what we see live things do, I’m
afraid I’m not with you, and am unlikely ever to follow you there.

RM: No, I’m trying to show that PCT is a theory that uses control of perception to account for what we see live things do. What we see live things do (well, what those of us who have read and understood B:CP see live things do) is control; they keep aspects of their environment in reference states protected from disturbance. This phenomenon is explained by a theory that says these “live things” are controlling perceptions relative to reference signals that specify the reference states of these perceptions and, hence, the reference states of the aspects of the environment that correspond to these perceptions.

Best regards

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

      RM: Why do I find the idea that we

control only perception, not the environment, morally
reprehensible? Because it says that people are not responsible
for the environmental consequences of their controlling.

[_Boris_Hartman]

Bruce,

I’d like to be sure if I understand clearly what you are saying. So I’ll try to sum only the part which I think is different by our oppinions.

BA : In the diagram below, the controlled variable is the small circle labeled as the »input quantity.« Its value is affected by the disturbance and by output quantity, operating on the input quantity via the feedback function. The feedback is negative, so adding the effects of feedback and disturbance accomplishes subtraction.

HB : Do I understand right that »subtractor« is outside the »controlling system« ? And that »input function« is the place where »subtraction« is going on ? And »input quantity« is fixed, really existing entity in environment ? Did Bill mentioned somewhere specifically that this is happening in environment ?

Do I understand right that »output quantitty« is affecting controlled variable the »input quantity« ? So can I understand that actions (output) are not controlled ? Just effects ? And can I conclude that Warren’s and Tim’s conclussion in their article is not right :

Warren and Timothy : …«universal property of organisms : actions as the control of sensory input«.

HB : Or they are right ? If we go with backward analyses in your oppinion about »control« we can maybe say that »output quantity« is having some controlled effects on »input quantitty« ? Or not ? Or Rick is also not right when he is saying that »behavior is control« ?

BA : The feedback compensates for the disturbance, so that its effect on the input quantity is minimized. That is, the value of the input quantity is controlled. The input quantity is thus the controlled variable in the environment.

HB : If I understand right »compensation« happens in outer environment, not in the whole control loop ? And the »input quantity« is the only »controlled variable« in the control loop ?

BA : The input function converts this input (sensed value of the controlled variable) to an internal representation of the controlled quantity called the perceptual signal. Because the perceptual signal tracks the value of the controlled variable in the environment, it is also controlled.

HB : Do I understand right that, the only »controlled variable« in environment »input quantitty« is converted to internal representation »perceptual signal«, which is thus »controlled perceptual signal« ?

BA : The perceptual signal is the person’s inner representation of the controlled variable in the environment, so if the environmental variable is controlled, so is its perception. We can only directly know our perceptions, so from the organism’s point of view, what is controlled are its perceptions.

HB : Do I understand right that »controlled perceptions« which are the result of »control process« in environment are representing the organism’s point of view of what is being controlled ?

BA :

I hope I’ve made it clear by now that Bill and I are saying the same thing; I am not proposing any changes. If I had that wrong, surely Bill would have pointed that out to me.

HB : I think that equating your and Bill’s knowledge can wait a little, because whatever you presented till now is not what is »equating« your and Bill oppinion. I’ll explain later as we »define« control.

BA : Boris, how do you define »control«? As I define it, control involves acting on a variable in such as way (via negative feedback) as to cancel the effects of disturbances to that variable.

HB : This is maybe general definition of the »control« in machines. But not in organism. Maybe here is misunderstanding. In organism control is defined as :

Bill P. and others (50th Anniversary) :

1.  **Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.**
   

2.  **At the conceptual core of the theory is the observation that living things control the perceived environment by means of behavior**
   

Also Ashby used defitnition of »control« in organisms in very similar way when he defined homeostasis :

Ashby (1960) : I propose defitnition that a form aof behaviour is adaptive if it maintains the essential variables within physiological limits.

As I see it, control in PCT is going on in organism continuosly (with milions of cooperating control units) and through actions on environment, which also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Behavior is supporting to control in organism. So it’s not necesary that it appears in every moment. The output »o« can be zero, and also »d« can be zero. And sometimes both can limit zero. Whatever imagined construct »input quanttity« represent, it’s not a general concept which could »cover« all control situations, as there are actually cases when there is no »control« in »input quantity« by your definition. But in organism control runs all the time, it can’t be that control in organisms don’t exist or stop. Organism dies.

If you are lying on the sun (sunbathing) there is no action »o«, but disturbances »d« are acting on organism, including sensors. So there is no »control« in outer environment and still organism is controlling. Orgnisms control inside not outside. I think that whatever you tried to represent as »control« is not »control in organisms«, which has to be in accordance with physiological »facts«, but control of »machines«, what by my oppinion is not the same. Â

You also exposed similar view as Bill and Ashby did in your Synopsis :Â

BA : At the heart of perceptual control theory is the idea that human beings are essentially intricate control mechanisms that function to keep certain intrinsic (or essential, see Ashby, 1952) variables within survivable limits. Intrinsic variables (variables intrinsic to the organism) include basic physiological variables such as blood glucose levels or body temperature, as well certain high-level variables whose maintenance in certain states are crucial to the individual’s well-being; the references of these intrinsic variables are genetically specified. With respect to physiological quantities, the body is known to house numerous control mechanisms that help to maintain them within the narrow limits required for efficient operation and survival. These mechanisms are capable of sensing the current levels of these controlled quantities and automatically initiating physiological changes as necessary to correct deviations of these levels from reference values, a process that the early 20th century physiologist Walter Cannon (1932) termed homeostasis.

Although at any given moment a tremendous number of physiological quantities is being automatically regulated through nonbehavioral (purely physiological) means, the regulatory mechanisms by themselves are not capable of countering all the sources of potential disturbance to the intrinsic variables. To take one example, because humans are not rooted in the soil like plants, we must seek out and consume food and water. Automatic physiological mechanisms do act against disturbances to internal levels of water and nutrition, but these only can take the form of actions to reduce the rate of depletion of these quantities. To replenish them, we must behave. That is, we must move our muscles in a way that ultimately leads to locating, obtaining, and consuming food and water. Behavior, then, is a means by which humans (and other animals) defend their intrinsic variables against disturbance.

HB : Your view upon PCT in Synopsis as I said many times before, influenced my view. In Synopsis you are clearly saying that organisms »control« inside »at any given moment«, but with behavior organisms have to »replenish essential quantities« from time to time. Behavior is not continuous. So effects of behavior on environment are occasional, when organisms needs it. And that can’t be control, because »control in organism« is continuous inside and behavior is just means of control (inside).

Your oppinion in Synopsis is by my oppinion in accordance with Ashby and Bill and I of course support it.

I hope it’s O.K. that before answering on your whole post I checked whether I understand clearly what are you saying, because I have impression that something disturbed your »whole« judgement about how organisms control. Well if I’m sincere I blame Rick for this confussion. I just wanted to avoid misunderstandings with you. And if possible I’d like to come with you in agreement. As I said I highly value your oppinion.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Bruce Abbott [mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:06 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.24.10:05 EST)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:58 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Hi, Bruce,

HB: sorry not to answer your part about thermostat, as I think Henry Yin did good explanation where could be problems with equating »machines« and »organiams«. So I’ll just continue where you make some conclussions about »control of external environment«.

Boris, you can’t be a proponent of PCT and at the same time hold that we shouldn’t be equating machines and organisms. I’ll try to make clear why this is so.

Norbert Wiener’s seminal book, the one that Bill Powers read that put him on the path to PCT, was entitled Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. That title announces Wiener’s central insight, which is that the same principles of control and communication can be applied toward analyizng and understanding both animals and machines.

What Wiener understood was that there can be a »science of machines,« abstracted from any particular physical realization of the machine. A given machine in this more abstract sense can be characterized as a set of functions (transformations) that are linked together (communicate) in a particular way. He understood that the machine will behave in the same general way regardless of the material of which it is constructed. Thus, for example, one can build an amplifier out of electronic components connected together in a particular way, or out of hydraulic components connected together in the same way. Schematically, they are the same system if the components perform the same transformations and are connected in the same way.

During World War II there had been a rapid development of control systems for doing such things as stabilizing guns on a battleship against the rocking the the ship, accurately aiming anti-aircraft guns to track and shoot down aircraft, and automatically flying aircraft (autopilots). Wiener realized that one could understand the behaviors of animals, just as one could understand the behavior of an autopilot, by identifying how the relevant components are organized into a system. In particular, the system Wiener had in mind is the control system, which is why he coined the term »cybernetics« to label this new field. It comes from the Greek, meaning »steersman.«

All control systems whose components carryout the same general functions and are connected in the same way will behave in identical fashion, whether those systems are implemented by the electro-mechanical components of a car’s cruise control or the driver’s iono-mechanical sensory receptors, neurons, and muscles, which when organized to form a speed control system, can similarly keep the car’s speed at the driver’s reference level (by means of adjusting foot pressure on the accelerator pedal).

PCT is in essence the application of these machine-derived principles of control to living creatures. The problem isn’t with equating machines and organisms, because at the systems-analysis level it doesn’t matter how the components and signals are formed so long as they perform analogous functions and are connected so as to form the same system of components.

The real problem with equating machines and organisms is that organisms are extremely complex. Even worse, it is notoriously difficult to observe the workings of their inner parts so that one can construct an accurate functional »wiring« diagram. Often the best we can do (given current technology) is theorize a particular organization of parts, create a simulation based on that proposal, and observe whether the simulation reproduces the organism’s observed behavior. The many PCT simulations of tracking behavior are examples of this strategy, where the control exerted by the simulation is compared to that produced by the individual in the tracking task.

Now let’s examine what you take Bill to be saying about control systems.

BA : Of course, we humans can know only what our sensors tell us. We have no direct access to the outside reality, whatever that may be. One can even adopt the position that such a reality does not exist. Bill Powers recognized this fact, but like most people, he preferred to believe that there is a reality beyond our perceptions, and that by controlling our perceptions, we also control numerous variables belonging to the reality beyond our perceptions.

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It’s his theory. We don’t control external environment, we affect it. Whatever Bill beleived, his statements in FUNCTION and COMPARATOR and his DIAGRAM are very clear. Just effects to external environment what is plausible with physiological »facts«. So I’d like to know what is wrong with his statements.

PCT is Bill’s theory, yes, but it’s an application of control theory, originally developed to understand the behavior of machines that control.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the acrtion of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

In the diagram below, the controlled variable is the small circle labeled as the »input quantity.« Its value is affected by the disturbance and by output quantity, operating on the input quantity via the feedback function. The feedback is negative, so adding the effects of feedback and disturbance accomplishes subtraction. The feedback compensates for the disturbance, so that its effect on the input quantity is minimized. That is, the value of the input quantity is controlled. The input quantity is thus the controlled variable in the environment.

The input function converts this input (sensed value of the controlled variable) to an internal representation of the controlled quantity called the perceptual signal. Because the perceptual signal tracks the value of the controlled variable in the environment, it is also controlled. The perceptual signal is the person’s inner representation of the controlled variable in the environment, so if the environmental variable is controlled, so is its perception. We can only directly know our perceptions, so from the organism’s point of view, what is controlled are its perceptions.

HB: So you can beleive Bill or not. I do.

HB: But nobody is saying that you are not free to propose changes to generic diagram and put »controlled effects« into »feed-back function« or »CV« (controlled variables) into immediate environment of control system, and consequently change all the loop, as Rick is proposing last years.

I hope I’ve made it clear by now that Bill and I are saying the same thing; I am not proposing any changes. If I had that wrong, surely Bill would have pointed that out to me.

BA : Indeed, if one assumes that such a reality exists, it follows that evolution would produce living control systems whose control over their various perceptions thereby controls those aspects of reality that must be controlled if they are to survive.

HB : All organisms »control« for constant internal environment – »homeostasis«, including plannts. That’s what Bill theory is about :

Bill P :

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.

HB : And that’s what control is about :

Bill P :

Boris, how do you define »control«? As I define it, control involves acting on a variable in such as way (via negative feedback) as to cancel the effects of disturbances to that variable. Isn’t that what happens to the cursor in a tracking experiment as disturbances act on it but are opposed by the participant’s actions? Isn’t the cursor out there in the environment (on the computer screen)? Isn’t its movement being opposed by the participant’s arm movements, which move the mouse, which acts on the position of the cursor?

BA : Thus, when I move my perceived arm to a peceived position so as to reach a perceived coffee cup, I believe that I am moving a real arm toward a real coffee cup. By controlling my sensed perceptions of my perceived arm’s position, I am thereby also controlling the actual position of my real arm.

HB : You are free to think so. It’s your perception or what you are experiencing… I suppose that you probably wwith your control reasoning perceive any behavior as »control«. But how many people on the world percive behavior in the same way as you do ? And I think that many self-regulation theorist do perceive it in the way you do. Maybe most of the people.

No, I don’t perceive just any behavior as control. Only behavior that acts to oppose changes in some observed variable. That’s the definition of control.

HB: But my oppinon is, that Bill was right when he put just effects to outer environment »even to a cup of coffee« to control perception. If you don’t think so, please show where you think he was wrong. I’m speccially interested in how would you change Bill general diagram about control loop to suit your oppinion, How you imagine that »control« comes to outer environment ?

BA : I don’t think I can explain it any better than that.

HB : You don’t need to Bruce. Thank you for your oppinion.

Well, you’re welcome, but I hope you now understand that the view I expressed was Bill’s opinion, too.

Bruce A.

[_Boris_Hartman]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.24.1900)]

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 3:59 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:58 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

HB : Bruce, I highly value your oppinion, and I highly value you as a person, but Bill was explicit in his »definitions« (B:CP) and his diagram (LCS III). It’s his theory. We don’t control external environment, we affect it.

RM: The idea that PCT says that we don’t control aspects of the environment when we control perceptions is not only completely wrong but also morally reprehensible (from my perspective) .

HB : Yes you said it good. From your perspective. From your perspective people are also wearing »protractor« and other tools for measuring how much they open the door (reference state in the environment) when they get out of car or when they open the door of their home. And probably for every activity they look arround for »reference states« they could »match« with their »controlled activity«.

Did you see anybody do this ? PCT has to be in accordance with nature and natural behavior of people. Outside variables are not controlled. But they are affected to the level that control in organism is possible. Actions are comsequences of control or are in accordance with control in organism, but they are not controlled. Purposes (references) are not outside of organism, They are inside organism.Â

RM : I don’t really care about the fact that you continue to present a completely incorrect description of PCT but I do care about having you present the idea that we control only perception, not the environment as though it were a true reflection of what we learn from PCT.

HB : Till now you didn’t agree with Bill’s »definitions« and with his diagram (LCS III), so I suppose that you don’t agree with PCT. But you have your RCT (Rick’s Control Theory), which represents some cheap Self-regulation Theory.

RM: Why do I find the idea that we control only perception, not the environment, morally reprehensible? Because it says that people are not responsible for the environmental consequences of their controlling. It suggests that when you control for a perception of stealing someone’s car then it’s just your perception that is being controlled, not anything in the environment (like the car).

HB : It’s your perception that somebody has stolen your car because it can’t be anything else that your perception differ from your references. But you are affecting enviroment in accordance with control inside organism causing changes in environment, which cause changes in perceptual signal, which is controlled in comparator (subtractor).

So you can only affect environment in accordance with control – matching the perception to refereces, which are seet inside youir organism. There is no controlled actions. PCT says that we don’t control our actions, we control perceptions. And you also quoted Bill that muscle tension is not controlled but rather perception of muscle tension is.

So PCT says that we don’t control ouptut, we control input.

RM : According to you, the car might be affected by your actions but the perception you are controlling – taking the car away from its owner – exists only as a perception.

Hb : Actions obviously follow control in comparator through »error« signal. So they are affecting environment in accordance with control but with »trials and erors«, set of effects to immediate environment. People are unable to control precisesly in the environemnt, so that you could for example through the ball 10x on the same spot.

Sometimes organisms are also unable to control, because effects in environemnt doesn’t necesarily have desired effects. Then nothing is controlled in environment, but people still control inside. They are trying with affecting environment. Not all actions (effects to environment) are succesfull.

RM : Same is true if you are controlling for keeping people in concentration camps. Again, it’s only your perception of the people being in concentration camps that is being controlled, not the people themselves

HB : It’s all just perception. Those who are keeping people in ocncentraction camp »control perception«, and those who are inprisoned control perception. But they all perceive environment and control perception of the others behavior. But they don’t control environment. They just affect environment and control perception to the level of the references (purposes) they produce inside organism.

RM : The people’s location may be affected by your actions but the perception that was controlled for – of the people being herded into camps – was just your perception; it wasn’t happening in the environment.

HB : Again Rick. Everything is just perception. Actions that produce »set of effects to immediate environment« are perceived. All is percpetion, and effects in environment are happening in accordance with our control in organism, but they are just trial effects until they are perceived.

RM: Of course, the person who has their car stolen or who has been herded into a concentration camp knows that you are controlling for more than just your perceptions.

HB : And through what they could know more than only through their perception ? What can people control more than just their perception ???

What I could know more than just through my perception. What is this more ? If there isn’t any perception, I and any human on the world would know nothing about nothing.

RM : And if you told them (like you are telling us) that you are just controlling your perceptions I think they might disagree with you even more vigorously than I am.

HB : I don’t know what you are disageeing. That perception is all there is ? All people can only perceive. Perception is all there is. Shut the perception and you have nothing.

RM:You see the problem?

Hb : Do you see the problem ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.28.0940 EST)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2015 1:20 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

Hi Boris,

In my replies to your questions, I will refer you to the screen shot of the LiveBlock program from LCS III shown below:

HB: I’d like to be sure if I understand clearly what you are saying. So I’ll try to sum only the part which I think is different by our oppinions.

BA : In the diagram below, the controlled variable is the small circle labeled as the »input quantity.« Its value is affected by the disturbance and by output quantity, operating on the input quantity via the feedback function. The feedback is negative, so adding the effects of feedback and disturbance accomplishes subtraction.

In the LiveBlock diagram above, the input quantity is represented by the small circle seen below the »System-Environment Boundary,« i.e., in the environment, and by the arrow leaving that circle and entering the Input Function. It is affected by disturbances (vertical arrow) and the feedback quantity (horizontal arrow coming from the Feedback Function). These two quantities add to the Input Quantity, as shown by the two plus signs. However, in normal operation the disturbance and feedback quantities change in opposite direction (because the feedback is negative), so the effect is one of subtraction, i.e., effect of feedback on the input quantity subtracts from the effect of the disturbance on the input quantity.

The circle represents the addition of these two influences to the input quantity. The arrow leaving the circle represents the resulting value of the input quantity. Both of these influences (disturbance and feedback), as well as the input quantity itself, lie in the environment of the control system.

If this were a home heating system, the input quantity would be the actual room temperature, the output quantity would be heat from the furnace, the feedback quantity would be the effect of that heat on the room’s temperature, and disturbances would be anything that disturbs actual room temperature, such as leakage of heat through the walls. Leakage of heat acts to reduce actual room temperature, whereas heat from the furnace acts to increase actual room temperature. Thus the action of the furnace (heat production) counteracts the effect of disturbances (heat loss).

HB : Do I understand right that »subtractor« is outside the »controlling system« ?

Yes, it is the little circle in the above diagram, found in the environment of the control system.

HB: And that »input function« is the place where »subtraction« is going on ?

No. The little circle is not the input function. The little circle (and the arrow leaving it) is the input quantity, qi. In my example, it’s the room temperature. The input function is the rectangle labeled as such in the LiveBlock diagram. It receives input from the input quantity and generates the perceptual signal as its output.

HB: And »input quantity« is fixed, really existing entity in environment ?

Yes, the input quantity is a really existing entity in the environment. (In the example it’s the room temperature.) It varies in response to the effects of the disturbance and feedback, so, no, it is not fixed.

HB: Did Bill mentioned somewhere specifically that this is happening in environment ?

Yes. Â Please note that the LiveBlock diagram is Bill’s diagram.

HB: Do I understand right that »output quantitty« is affecting controlled variable the »input quantity« ?

In the LiveBlock diagram, the output quantity is represented by the arrow leaving the output function and entering the feedback function. The output of the feedback function is the arrow entering the circle where the feedback and disturbances act on the input quantity.

In some versions of the diagram, the output quantity is shown directly affecting the input quantity. This is a convience done to simplify the diagram for purposes of exposition. When this is done, it is equivalent to assuming that the feedback function simply multiplies the output by a factor of 1.

HB: So can I understand that actions (output) are not controlled ? Just effects ?

In the diagram, actions (output) are not controlled. The output is simply a function of the error signal. The larger the error signal, the greater the magnitude of the output.

HB: And can I conclude that Warren’s and Tim’s conclussion in their article is not right :

Warren and Timothy : …«universal property of organisms : actions as the control of sensory input«.

Look at the LiveBlock diagram. Actions (output) are transformed into effects on the input quantity by the environmental feedback function.  They oppose the effects of disturbances on the same input quantity. The input quantity affects the control system through its sensory inputs. (In the case of the home heating system the thermostat contains the sensor of room temperature.) The Input Function takes qi as input and converts this quantity to a perceptual signal that varies as a function of the input quantity. That signal is compared to the reference signal at the comparator (middle upper block in the diagram). The comparator produces the error signal, which determines the magnitude the the output quantity via the output function.

By opposing the effects of the disturbance on qi, the system acts to control its own sensory inputs, as the system perceives them.

HB : Or they are right ? If we go with backward analyses in your oppinion about »control« we can maybe say that »output quantity« is having some controlled effects on »input quantitty« ? Or not ? Or Rick is also not right when he is saying that »behavior is control« ?

That depends on what you mean by »controlled effects.« The output quantity, acting via the feedback function, affects the input quantity (e.g., heat from the furnace affects the room temperature). But this effect by itself is not control. Control emerges from the »behavior« of the system as a whole – from the fact that output is a function of error, that the feedback onto qi is negative, and that this feedback is scaled to an appropriate magnitude and applied without too much delay. If these factors are right, then the effect will be to oppose the effect of disturbances so as to bring the internal representation of qi (its perception) close to the reference value and hold it there – in other words, the system will control.

BA : The feedback compensates for the disturbance, so that its effect on the input quantity is minimized. That is, the value of the input quantity is controlled. The input quantity is thus the controlled variable in the environment.

HB : If I understand right »compensation« happens in outer environment, not in the whole control loop ? And the »input quantity« is the only »controlled variable« in the control loop ?

Yes, compensation happens in the outer environment, where feedback affects the input quantity. However, the input quantity determines the value of the perceptual signal, which is what the control system perceives. (It has no direct knowledge of the input quantity.)  The control system controls its perception of the input quantity. To the extent that this perception corresponds to the value of the input quantity, then the input quantity is also controlled.

BA : The input function converts this input (sensed value of the controlled variable) to an internal representation of the controlled quantity called the perceptual signal. Because the perceptual signal tracks the value of the controlled variable in the environment, it is also controlled.

HB : Do I understand right that, the only »controlled variable« in environment »input quantitty« is converted to internal representation »perceptual signal«, which is thus »controlled perceptual signal« ?

Yes!

BA : The perceptual signal is the person’s inner representation of the controlled variable in the environment, so if the environmental variable is controlled, so is its perception. We can only directly know our perceptions, so from the organism’s point of view, what is controlled are its perceptions.

HB : Do I understand right that »controlled perceptions« which are the result of »control process« in environment are representing the organism’s point of view of what is being controlled ?

Yes!

BA : I hope I’ve made it clear by now that Bill and I are saying the same thing; I am not proposing any changes. If I had that wrong, surely Bill would have pointed that out to me.

HB : I think that equating your and Bill’s knowledge can wait a little, because whatever you presented till now is not what is »equating« your and Bill oppinion. I’ll explain later as we »define« control.

Well, that’s disappointing, because as I see it, Bill’s opinion and mine are the same.

BA : Boris, how do you define »control«? As I define it, control involves acting on a variable in such as way (via negative feedback) as to cancel the effects of disturbances to that variable.

HB : This is maybe general definition of the »control« in machines. But not in organism. Maybe here is misunderstanding. In organism control is defined as :

Bill P. and others (50th Anniversary) :

1.  **Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms.**
   

2.  **At the conceptual core of the theory is the observation that living things control the perceived environment by means of behavior**
   

Also Ashby used defitnition of »control« in organisms in very similar way when he defined homeostasis :

Ashby (1960) : I propose defitnition that a form aof behaviour is adaptive if it maintains the essential variables within physiological limits.

As I see it, control in PCT is going on in organism continuosly (with milions of cooperating control units) and through actions on environment, which also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Behavior is supporting to control in organism. So it’s not necesary that it appears in every moment. The output »o« can be zero, and also »d« can be zero. And sometimes both can limit zero. Whatever imagined construct »input quanttity« represent, it’s not a general concept which could »cover« all control situations, as there are actually cases when there is no »control« in »input quantity« by your definition. But in organism control runs all the time, it can’t be that control in organisms don’t exist or stop. Organism dies.

If you are lying on the sun (sunbathing) there is no action »o«, but disturbances »d« are acting on organism, including sensors.

The sun is heating my body and I am just lying there. But absence of action does not imply absence of control. Absence of action in this case means absence of error. My skin temperature as I perceive it is close enough to my internal reference that there is no error and therefore I take no action. But if my skin temperature rises enough due to the disturbing effect of the sun on my skin’s temperature, error will develop and I will move to the shade or cover up.

HB: So there is no »control« in outer environment and still organism is controlling. Orgnisms control inside not outside. I think that whatever you tried to represent as »control« is not »control in organisms«, which has to be in accordance with physiological »facts«, but control of »machines«, what by my oppinion is not the same.

While I am lying there in the sun, my skin (or body) temperature may not be hot enough to generate sufficient error that I will take action via my musculature. However, internal control systems are still monitoring skin and body temperature and comparing these as sensed to reference values. If there is error these physiological, homeostatic mechanisms will initiate actions of their own, such as sweating, that act to oppose the sun’s disturbance.  If ultraviolet rays are damaging the skin, other control systems that sense this damage will take action to oppose this effect of the sun, such as generating melonin in the skin, which absorbs the damaging rays.

All of these systems – those that require the action of the muscles and those that act inside the body in other ways (via the autonomic nervous system, glands, etc. – act all the time, and all operate via the physiological systemms of the body. There simply isn’t any difference. They are all control systems. The muscles act on the environment outside the skin, but those other control systems, though they act internally with respect to the body surface, still exert actions the affect variables in the environments of those control systems. It just happens that those invironments are inside the skin.

HB: You also exposed similar view as Bill and Ashby did in your Synopsis :

BA : At the heart of perceptual control theory is the idea that human beings are essentially intricate control mechanisms that function to keep certain intrinsic (or essential, see Ashby, 1952) variables within survivable limits. Intrinsic variables (variables intrinsic to the organism) include basic physiological variables such as blood glucose levels or body temperature, as well certain high-level variables whose maintenance in certain states are crucial to the individual’s well-being; the references of these intrinsic variables are genetically specified. With respect to physiological quantities, the body is known to house numerous control mechanisms that help to maintain them within the narrow limits required for efficient operation and survival. These mechanisms are capable of sensing the current levels of these controlled quantities and automatically initiating physiological changes as necessary to correct deviations of these levels from reference values, a process that the early 20th century physiologist Walter Cannon (1932) termed homeostasis.

BA: Although at any given moment a tremendous number of physiological quantities is being automatically regulated through nonbehavioral (purely physiological) means, the regulatory mechanisms by themselves are not capable of countering all the sources of potential disturbance to the intrinsic variables. To take one example, because humans are not rooted in the soil like plants, we must seek out and consume food and water. Automatic physiological mechanisms do act against disturbances to internal levels of water and nutrition, but these only can take the form of actions to reduce the rate of depletion of these quantities. To replenish them, we must behave. That is, we must move our muscles in a way that ultimately leads to locating, obtaining, and consuming food and water. Behavior, then, is a means by which humans (and other animals) defend their intrinsic variables against disturbance.

HB : Your view upon PCT in Synopsis as I said many times before, influenced my view. In Synopsis you are clearly saying that organisms »control« inside »at any given moment«, but with behavior organisms have to »replenish essential quantities« from time to time. Behavior is not continuous. So effects of behavior on environment are occasional, when organisms needs it. And that can’t be control, because »control in organism« is continuous inside and behavior is just means of control (inside).

Where you are going wrong, in my opinion, is assuming that lack of action implies lack of control. Of course, if we are not controlling a given variable, we take no action when the variable changes its value. But what of the variables that we do control? Lack of action means lack of sufficient error to support any action.

For many variables that we control, there is a »deadband« or range of values across which no error will be generated. The current value is »close enough« to reference. We don’t eat continuously because there is a range of nutrient levels in the digestive system and elsewhere in the body over which you will not feel hungry. Only when these levels fall below some threshold will there be an error that will impell you to action.

Another misconception you may be having is believing that the term »environment« applies only to variables outside the body. That is the environment that your muscles act on in order to control certain environmental variables, but for other control systems the environment in which they act is internal. In HPCT, for example, the »envronment« of a Level 2 control system is the Level 1 control system through which it acts and from which it receives its perceptual signals.

On further point: Imagine that I’m lying in the sun and because of some drug effect I am no longer conscious of my skin temperature. My skin temperature is rising well above the level at which I would normally take action by moving into the shade. But my perception of skin temperature is close to my internal reference for it, so I do nothing. I’m still controlling perceived skin temperature, but no longer controlling actual skin temperature.

Now imagine the opposite scenario: the drug is affecting my perception of skin temperature so that it does not relate to actual skin temperature. Suddenly my skin feels uncomfortably hot and I immediately move into the shade, even though my actual skin temperature is within the range of values over which I normally would not take action. I’m still contolling percieved skin temperature, but now this control is allowing actual skin temperature to fluctuate wildly. The latter is no longer controlled, even though perceived skin temperature still is.

The two scenarios above demonstrate why Bill placed such an emphasis on control of perception. Much of the time, by controlling a perception, we also control the environmental analog of that perception, the input quantity. In such cases the input quantity is properly referred to as the controlled quantity. (Bill used the term »quantity« to refer to physical variables, as distinguished from the term »signal,« which conveys information internally.) Sometimes the perceptual signal does not correlate well with any environmental variable, yet the control system may still be able to control its perception, as in the cases described above. Control is always control of perception, although environmental correlates of those perceptions may (or may not) be controlled as well.

HB: Your oppinion in Synopsis is by my oppinion in accordance with Ashby and Bill and I of course support it.

HB: I hope it’s O.K. that before answering on your whole post I checked whether I understand clearly what are you saying, because I have impression that something disturbed your »whole« judgement about how organisms control. Well if I’m sincere I blame Rick for this confussion. I just wanted to avoid misunderstandings with you. And if possible I’d like to come with you in agreement. As I said I highly value your oppinion.

That’s certainly O.K. with me, Boris. I hope my replies have helped to bridge the differences between us.

Best wishes,

Bruce A.

[Abbott]

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.28.1945 EST)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2015 1:20 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?

BA : In the diagram below, the controlled variable is the small circle labeled as the »input quantity.« Its value is affected by the disturbance and by output quantity, operating on the input quantity via the feedback function. The feedback is negative, so adding the effects of feedback and disturbance accomplishes subtraction.

HB : Do I understand right that »subtractor« is outside the »controlling system« ? And that »input function« is the place where »subtraction« is going on ? And »input quantity« is fixed, really existing entity in environment ? Did Bill mentioned somewhere specifically that this is happening in environment ?

Boris, in my previous reply to this post I was unable to provide a specific reference in answer to your last question above, as I was away from home and did not have access to my papers and books. Now that I’m back, here’s one prominant place where Bill discusses »The Control-system Unit of Organization« (B:CP, 1979, Pp. 60-61). I’ve added emphasis at a couple of points:

For any given feedback control behavior, a block diagram of the behaving system and its environment can be drawn as in figure 5.2. The controlled quantity which we observe objectively **is in the box labeled »remote physical phenomena.«** These phenomena are affected in two ways: as a result of the immediate (proximal) results of muscle tensions, and by other events not directly controlled (if at all) by the nervous system: the 'cause of disturbance.« The remonte physical phenomena in turn affect the minute detailed physical variables (»proximal physical stimuli«) which can cause the sensory endings of the nervous system to generate neural currents. In the environment, therefore, we have the entities of physics and the laws relating them.

The neural currents resulting from physical stimulation of nerve endings enter an »input function.« This is a neural computing device which generates a neural current—the »perceptual signal«–that variies as a function of the sensory-ending stimulations. If this input function has the form of the inverse of the function relating a one-dimensional remote physical phenomenon to the proximal stimuli, then the perceptual signal will correspond in magnitude to the magnitude of the remote physical phenomenon. For simplicity I speak here of one-dimensional phenomena such as spot displacement left or right of a target.

Bill’s discussion goes on to cover the entire control loop, but I’m not going to copy the whole thing as I assume that you have access to B:CP. The physical laws mediating the effect of the output constitute the environmental feedback function shown in the LiveBlock diagram.

Note that the box labeled »Remote Physical Phenomena« is equivalent to the little circle in the LiveBlock diagram: It has two inputs (from the disturbance and feedback) and one output. The output from this box is the effect of those remote physical phenomena on the sensory receptors, as determined by physical laws.Â

Best wishes,

Bruce A.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.30.1830)]

···

Bruce Abbott (2015.11.28.1945 EST)

For any given feedback control behavior, a block diagram of the behaving system and its environment can be drawn as in figure 5.2. The controlled quantity which we observe objectively is in the box labeled »remote physical phenomena.«

RM: Thanks for this Bruce. Bill was apparently quite consistent in his use of the term “controlled quantity” to refer to the controlled aspect of the environment – of the “remote physical phenomena” – which we can observe objectively. Of course, Bill knew that what we see as an “objective observation” is a perception. But that’s an epistemological nicety, up with which Bill was not ready to put at this point in B:CP.

RM: An example of a remote physical phenomenon – a controlled quantity – that we can observe objectively is the distance between a person and their computer screen. This distance is the observer’s view of the “remote physical phenomenon” that the person (control system) is controlling; it’s the observer’s view of the controlled quantity, q.i. The goal of the TCV is to find the definition of q.i that corresponds to the remote physical phenomenon that is under control – in this case the distance between the person and the computer screen – from the person’s (control system’s) perspective. When you come up with that definition of q.i – probably in terms of the optical angles traced out on the eye by the letters on the screen – then you have a definition of the perception, p, that the person is controlling.

RM: Thanks again for this, Bruce. Another important addition to my planned paper on the TCV.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.06.12.49]

That's a funny question. Surely when we control a perception that is

based entirely on sensory input, the complex property of the
environment defined by the perceptual function must be just as
stabilized as the controlled perception, must it not? How else could
the TCV even begin to work? Do you not believe what I wrote? If not,
I think the ball is in your court to explain how the prception can
be stabilized without the corresponding environmental variable being
equally stabilized. (Of course, if part of the perception comes from
imagination, then decoupling can obviously happen).
Maybe an illustration by way of metaphor might help in explaining
the distinction I am trying to make between “controlling” a
perception and “stabilizing” its environmental correlate (the
Complex Environmental Variable, or CEV). Imagine a major city street
on which there is a bus line. At some intersections the buses always
stop to take on and let off passengers, while at other intersections
buses stop only if the traffic prevents their movement.
By coincidence, the places where the bus stops for passengers have a
distinctive sign on a pole, whereas the places it does not stop have
no such sign. Or is it a coincidence? Does the bus stopping at those
places build the poles? Or does the bus stop there because the pole
is there? Correlative statistics would say either is equally likely,
or maybe both are the result of some other hidden variable. That’s
all correlative statistics can tell you, and the same is true of
tight correlation between the changing values of the CEV and the
perception.
An external observer watching the buses could see that the poles
remain even when no bus is nearby, and would deduce that the bus
stops there and not elsewhere because of the pole, rather than the
pole being there because of the bus having stopped. Likewise, we can
see that something inside the organism has to be controlled in order
for an external observer to think that the CEV might be controlled.
If the organism is doing the controlling, it can’t control the CEV
because the CEV isn’t inside the organism. So it must be controlling
something inside itself, a “something” we call a perception of the
CEV.
There’s another issue, too, which has to do with time. Every sensory
input takes time before its effect on the perceptual signal occurs.
There’s no guarantee that these all take the same time, as the
Astronomer Royal, Airy(?), found when he and his assistant
consistently differed in their timings of a transit.
Nineteenth-century psychologists called the effect “the personal
equation”. If there’s no guarantee that the different inputs from
the CEV take the same time to influence the perceptual signal, then
there is no moment in time when an external observer can see a CEV
corresponding to the perceptual signal. So whereas in the control
loop, each will be equally stabilized, to the external observer the
apparent CEV will be less well stabilized than the Analyst would
find the perceptual signal to be controlled.
It’s not the degree of stabilization that’s at issue, it’s the
misleading use of the word “control” in a context in which the idea
is to get people to understand that Perceptual Control Theory is
about the control of perception.
Martin
PS. I apologize if all this has been thrashed out in the delay
between your message of Nov 25 and my Dec 6 reply. But I think it’s
worth reiterating anyway.

···

(Getting back to reading old threads).

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.25.1125)]

            Martin Taylor

(2015.11.25.13.19)–

                    RM: Why do I find the

idea that we control only perception, not the
environment, morally reprehensible? Because it
says that people are not responsible for
the environmental consequences of their
controlling.

            MT: To accept that we control out perceptions and NOT

the environment by no means implies that the
environmental property corresponding to the perception
fails to be stabilized.

RM: Please show me how that works.

            MT: : You seem to

equate imperfect control with no control,

          RM: No, I equate no control with no control. If all

that were being asserted was that control of the
environment is less perfect than control of the
corresponding perception, I would not find that morally
reprehensible. Indeed, it may even be true.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1240)]

···

Martin Taylor (2015.12.06.12.49)–

MT: That's a funny question. Surely when we control a perception that is

based entirely on sensory input, the complex property of the
environment defined by the perceptual function must be just as
stabilized as the controlled perception, must it not?

RM: If by “stabilized” you mean “controlled” then “yes”. But you said above that “we control our perceptions and NOT the environment”. I don’t know how to reconcile this with “when we control a perception that is based entirely on sensory input, the complex property of the environment defined by the perceptual function must be just as stabilized”. That’s why I asked how that works. It would be nice if you could show me, preferably using a computer simulation, when you say that we control our perceptions and NOT the environment but that the complex property of the environment that is defined by the perceptual function is stabilized.

MT: How else could

the TCV even begin to work?

RM: It works because q.i – the controlled quantity, an aspect of the behaving system’s environment – is controlled. This control is explained by a model that says that a perception,p, that corresponds to q.i, is being made to match a reference signal that specifies the reference (controlled) state of p and, hence, of q.i. It doesn’t work because q.i is “stabilized” unless “stabilized” means the same thing as “controlled”, viz., maintenance of a variable in a reference state, protected from the effects of disturbance.

Best

Rick

Do you not believe what I wrote? If not,

I think the ball is in your court to explain how the prception can
be stabilized without the corresponding environmental variable being
equally stabilized. (Of course, if part of the perception comes from
imagination, then decoupling can obviously happen).

Maybe an illustration by way of metaphor might help in explaining

the distinction I am trying to make between “controlling” a
perception and “stabilizing” its environmental correlate (the
Complex Environmental Variable, or CEV). Imagine a major city street
on which there is a bus line. At some intersections the buses always
stop to take on and let off passengers, while at other intersections
buses stop only if the traffic prevents their movement.

By coincidence, the places where the bus stops for passengers have a

distinctive sign on a pole, whereas the places it does not stop have
no such sign. Or is it a coincidence? Does the bus stopping at those
places build the poles? Or does the bus stop there because the pole
is there? Correlative statistics would say either is equally likely,
or maybe both are the result of some other hidden variable. That’s
all correlative statistics can tell you, and the same is true of
tight correlation between the changing values of the CEV and the
perception.

An external observer watching the buses could see that the poles

remain even when no bus is nearby, and would deduce that the bus
stops there and not elsewhere because of the pole, rather than the
pole being there because of the bus having stopped. Likewise, we can
see that something inside the organism has to be controlled in order
for an external observer to think that the CEV might be controlled.
If the organism is doing the controlling, it can’t control the CEV
because the CEV isn’t inside the organism. So it must be controlling
something inside itself, a “something” we call a perception of the
CEV.

There's another issue, too, which has to do with time. Every sensory

input takes time before its effect on the perceptual signal occurs.
There’s no guarantee that these all take the same time, as the
Astronomer Royal, Airy(?), found when he and his assistant
consistently differed in their timings of a transit.
Nineteenth-century psychologists called the effect “the personal
equation”. If there’s no guarantee that the different inputs from
the CEV take the same time to influence the perceptual signal, then
there is no moment in time when an external observer can see a CEV
corresponding to the perceptual signal. So whereas in the control
loop, each will be equally stabilized, to the external observer the
apparent CEV will be less well stabilized than the Analyst would
find the perceptual signal to be controlled.

It's not the degree of stabilization that's at issue, it's the

misleading use of the word “control” in a context in which the idea
is to get people to understand that Perceptual Control Theory is
about the control of perception.

Martin

PS. I apologize if all this has been thrashed out in the delay

between your message of Nov 25 and my Dec 6 reply. But I think it’s
worth reiterating anyway.

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

            MT: To accept that we control out perceptions and NOT

the environment by no means implies that the
environmental property corresponding to the perception
fails to be stabilized.

RM: Please show me how that works.

            MT: : You seem to

equate imperfect control with no control,

          RM: No, I equate no control with no control. If all

that were being asserted was that control of the
environment is less perfect than control of the
corresponding perception, I would not find that morally
reprehensible. Indeed, it may even be true.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.06.15.58]

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1240)]

But that's EXACTLY what I mean by "controlled" and why I think it is

quite misleading to use the word “controlled” rather than
“stabilized” to refer to what happen to q.i when you vary the
disturbance to the CEV.

Where, oh where, is the necessary reference value for q.i inserted

into the loop? According to both of us, that separate reference
input value is what is needed if we are to say q.i is “controlled”.
There is clearly a reference value for p, inserted at the
comparator. And (if the perceptual reference value is constant)
there’s an independent reference value for q.o, the negative of the
disturbance that is inserted at the CEV. But where’s the independent
input that would provide a reference value for a controlled q.i?

The TCV works because (a) even though there is no observable

reference source for q.i, its behaviour when the disturbance to the
CEV is varied shows that something is controlled that affects q.i
enough to make it look as though it were controlled, and (b) we have
a theory that says there is something called a “perceptual variable”
linked to q.i that is indeed controlled. The TCV depends on both
(and more besides).

Martin

···

            Martin Taylor

(2015.12.06.12.49)–

            MT: How else could

the TCV even begin to work?

          RM: ... It doesn't work because q.i is "stabilized"

unless “stabilized” means the same thing as “controlled”,
viz., maintenance of a variable in a reference state,
protected from the effects of disturbance.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)]

···

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.06.15.58]

MT: But that's EXACTLY what I mean by "controlled" and why I think it is

quite misleading to use the word “controlled” rather than
“stabilized” to refer to what happen to q.i when you vary the
disturbance to the CEV.

RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled. The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.

MT: Where, oh where, is the necessary reference value for q.i inserted

into the loop?

RM: According to PCT, it exists inside the behaving system as an efferent neural signal – the reference signal.

MT: According to both of us, that separate reference

input value is what is needed if we are to say q.i is “controlled”.

RM: It’s only according to you that a separate reference input value is needed to say that q.i is controlled. In fact, all you need in order to say that q.i is controlled is to see that it passes the test for the controlled variable (TCV) which is described in Ch. 16 of B:CP, 2nd Ed).

MT: There is clearly a reference value for p, inserted at the

comparator.

RM: Yes, that’s part of PCT, the theory that explains why we observe q.i being controlled.

MT: And (if the perceptual reference value is constant)

there’s an independent reference value for q.o, the negative of the
disturbance that is inserted at the CEV.

RM: No there is not.

MT: But where's the independent

input that would provide a reference value for a controlled q.i?

RM: It’s the one inside the control system.

MT: The TCV works because (a) even though there is no observable

reference source for q.i, its behaviour when the disturbance to the
CEV is varied shows that something is controlled that affects q.i
enough to make it look as though it were controlled, and (b) we have
a theory that says there is something called a “perceptual variable”
linked to q.i that is indeed controlled. The TCV depends on both
(and more besides).

RM: The TCV works because we know that control is occurring when manipulation of an independent variable (a disturbance) has far less effect on another variable (the one suspected of being the controlled variable – or, more precisely, the one suspected of being the controlled quantity; perhaps we should call it the TCQ) than would be expected based on physical law. When we have determined that a variable is under control and that this control is being exerted by a living system (like a person) we explain this control using control theory, which, when applied to living systems, is called PCT. PCT explains the observed control of q.i as a result of the organism acting to control a perception of q.i relative to an autonomously set reference signal.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

            MT: How else could

the TCV even begin to work?

          RM: ... It doesn't work because q.i is "stabilized"

unless “stabilized” means the same thing as “controlled”,
viz., maintenance of a variable in a reference state,
protected from the effects of disturbance.

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.19.11:16 ET)]

We have to be careful not to conflate terms that are of different kinds. Such conflation or equivocation is the source of many a CSG-net disputation.

The variable qi is measured by the observer. The reference value for qi is a variable determined by that observation. It is in this sense only that you (Rick) can say that the reference value is observed and determined by the TCV.

The variable p is (in present art) inferred from the model, as is the reference value r. In some of Henry Yin’s research these variables are measured directly, but such work is only at its beginnings. For the most part, these variables are confirmed by the crafting of successful generative simulations.

The reference value for qi is not indicated in the PCT block diagram. It is related to r by the same function that transforms qi to p.

RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled. The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.

Then there are two measured values, qi and qi, and two kinds of sensors generating two level 1 perceptual signals, p and p, which are combined at level 2. Since qi and qi are both measured in the environment, they are measurements of two aspects of the environment. Martin, your term CEV asserts that these are a complex unity in the environment. Rick, you are saying that they are made a unity only within the organism, in the perceptual input function that combines p and p at level 1 into p at level 2.

Martin, you seem to be holding the Realist view that the combination in the nervous system into a ‘complex perception’ (so to speak) corresponds to a ‘complex reality’ in the environment. Is that what you intend?

/Bruce

···

On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.06.15.58]

MT: But that's EXACTLY what I mean by "controlled" and why I think it is

quite misleading to use the word “controlled” rather than
“stabilized” to refer to what happen to q.i when you vary the
disturbance to the CEV.

RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled. The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.

MT: Where, oh where, is the necessary reference value for q.i inserted

into the loop?

RM: According to PCT, it exists inside the behaving system as an efferent neural signal – the reference signal.

MT: According to both of us, that separate reference

input value is what is needed if we are to say q.i is “controlled”.

RM: It’s only according to you that a separate reference input value is needed to say that q.i is controlled. In fact, all you need in order to say that q.i is controlled is to see that it passes the test for the controlled variable (TCV) which is described in Ch. 16 of B:CP, 2nd Ed).

MT: There is clearly a reference value for p, inserted at the

comparator.

RM: Yes, that’s part of PCT, the theory that explains why we observe q.i being controlled.

MT: And (if the perceptual reference value is constant)

there’s an independent reference value for q.o, the negative of the
disturbance that is inserted at the CEV.

RM: No there is not.

MT: But where's the independent

input that would provide a reference value for a controlled q.i?

RM: It’s the one inside the control system.

MT: The TCV works because (a) even though there is no observable

reference source for q.i, its behaviour when the disturbance to the
CEV is varied shows that something is controlled that affects q.i
enough to make it look as though it were controlled, and (b) we have
a theory that says there is something called a “perceptual variable”
linked to q.i that is indeed controlled. The TCV depends on both
(and more besides).

RM: The TCV works because we know that control is occurring when manipulation of an independent variable (a disturbance) has far less effect on another variable (the one suspected of being the controlled variable – or, more precisely, the one suspected of being the controlled quantity; perhaps we should call it the TCQ) than would be expected based on physical law. When we have determined that a variable is under control and that this control is being exerted by a living system (like a person) we explain this control using control theory, which, when applied to living systems, is called PCT. PCT explains the observed control of q.i as a result of the organism acting to control a perception of q.i relative to an autonomously set reference signal.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

            MT: How else could

the TCV even begin to work?

          RM: ... It doesn't work because q.i is "stabilized"

unless “stabilized” means the same thing as “controlled”,
viz., maintenance of a variable in a reference state,
protected from the effects of disturbance.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.19.12.39]

Don't you have the two of us mixed up? Rick usually asserts that the

controlled quantity, qi, is objectively in the environment and can
be directly influenced by an external observer. If the external
observer correctly applies __ all the
phases of the TCV, the external observer will be able to see __ what exactly the controlled quantity is, and
will be able to see __ what the reference
value __ is for that controlled quantity.
My position is quite the opposite. I say that we ONLY can control
our perceptions. A perception is produced by some function whose
input arguments may be composed entirely from sensory variables that
are influenced by a supposed-to-exist environment, entirely from
memory and imagination, or from a mixture of sensory and
imagined/remembered data. However it is produced, the perception is
what is controlled, and if it is made conscious, is consciously
attributed to the environment (or to internal processes, since we
can often discriminate between them).
One set of my perceptions includes a model of the way the
supposed-to-exist real world works, a model that includes PCT. I
suppose you exist and that you also have a set of perceptions that
include a model called PCT. When we talk, we omit the
“supposed-to-exist” caveat, because using it admits solipsism (of
which I have been accused), and simply assert that there exists a
real world through which our PCT model suggests our perceptions
(real to us) are controlled.
Rick looks for functions in the environment that result in variables
that appear to be controlled, and asserts that the result of each of
these functions acting on quantities measurable by an external
observer is a true controlled variable “qi” in some control loop.
This variable therefore must exist in the environment.
I look for functions in the environment that result in variables
that appear to be controlled, and hypothesize that for each there is
a perception in the organism generated by a similar function, and
that this perception is the only variable that is controlled. The
appearance of a controlled variable in the environment is always
what you have called a “spandrel”, as the taste of lemonade example
suggests. Someone in a thread some months or years ago mentioned the
perception of “jealousy” as another. I would argue that both of
these controllable perceptions include imagined/remembered variables
as arguments to the perceptual function that generates the
perception, meaning that in principle they cannot exist in the
environment in a form accessible to an external experimenter
wielding the TCV tool.
No, but it does seem to be what Rick intends. However, to accept PCT
is to accept the proposition that there is a real reality, which may
well be extraordinarily more complex than we can imagine. We know
that whenever we (appear to) make a new kind of measuring
instrument, we (appear to) see all sorts of things we never
previously imagined, and possibly to control perceptions of those
things. When I was in Scottish high school, my chemistry teacher
claimed that we would never be able to see atoms, but now we can
write text by moving one atom at a time on an atomically flat
surface. Or such, in my solipsistic universe, I perceive to be the
case.
Martin

···

I haven’t been reading CSGnet for the
last couple of weeks, but I dropped in this morning and found
this, which seems to ask for a response from me.

[Bruce Nevin (2015.12.19.11:16 ET)]

      We have to be careful not to conflate terms that are of

different kinds. Such conflation or equivocation is the source
of many a CSG-net disputation.

      The variable qi is measured by the observer. The reference

value for qi is a variable determined by that observation. It
is in this sense only that you (Rick) can say that the
reference value is observed and determined by the TCV.

      The variable p is (in present art) inferred from the model,

as is the reference value r. In some of Henry Yin’s research
these variables are measured directly, but such work is only
at its beginnings. For the most part, these variables are
confirmed by the crafting of successful generative
simulations.

      The reference value for qi is not indicated in the PCT

block diagram. It is related to r by the same function that
transforms qi to p.

        RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled

quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not
only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is
kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some
“complex” variable in the environment that is controlled.
The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of
environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar
that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t
necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.

      Then there are two measured values, qi<acid> and

qi, and two kinds of sensors generating two level
1 perceptual signals, p and p, which
are combined at level 2. Since qi and
qi are both measured in the environment, they are
measurements of two aspects of the environment. Martin, your
term CEV asserts that these are a complex unity in the
environment. Rick, you are saying that they are made a unity
only within the organism, in the perceptual input function
that combines p and p at level 1 into
p at level 2.

in the environment** in
the environmentin the environmentin the environment**

      Martin, you seem to be holding the Realist view that the

combination in the nervous system into a ‘complex perception’
(so to speak) corresponds to a ‘complex reality’ in the
environment. Is that what you intend?

/Bruce

      On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Richard

Marken rsmarken@gmail.com
wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)]

                  [Martin

Taylor 2015.12.06.15.58]

                                MT:

How else could the TCV even begin to
work?

                              RM: ... It doesn't work because q.i

is “stabilized” unless “stabilized”
means the same thing as “controlled”,
viz., maintenance of a variable in a
reference state, protected from the
effects of disturbance.

                                        MT: But that's EXACTLY what I mean by

“controlled” and why I think it is quite
misleading to use the word “controlled” rather
than “stabilized” to refer to what happen to q.i
when you vary the disturbance to the CEV.

                RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled

quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’
terminology, not only because it’s Powers’
terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading;
it implies that there is actually some “complex”
variable in the environment that is controlled. The
controlled quantity is actually an * aspect or
function* of environmental variables, like the
function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as
the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily
exist as a variable in the environment.

                  MT: Where, oh

where, is the necessary reference value for q.i
inserted into the loop?

                RM: According to PCT, it exists inside the

behaving system as an efferent neural signal – the
reference signal.

                  MT: According

to both of us, that separate reference input value
is what is needed if we are to say q.i is
“controlled”.

                RM: It's only according to you that a separate

reference input value is needed to say that q.i is
controlled. In fact, all you need in order to say
that q.i is controlled is to see that it passes the
test for the controlled variable (TCV) which is
described in Ch. 16 of B:CP, 2nd Ed).

                  MT: There is

clearly a reference value for p, inserted at the
comparator.

                RM: Yes, that's part of PCT, the  theory that

explains why we observe q.i being controlled.

                  MT: And (if

the perceptual reference value is constant)
there’s an independent reference value for q.o,
the negative of the disturbance that is inserted
at the CEV.

RM: No there is not.

                  MT: But

where’s the independent input that would provide a
reference value for a controlled q.i?

RM: It’s the one inside the control system.

                  MT: The TCV

works because (a) even though there is no
observable reference source for q.i, its behaviour
when the disturbance to the CEV is varied shows
that something is controlled that affects q.i
enough to make it look as though it were
controlled, and (b) we have a theory that says
there is something called a “perceptual variable”
linked to q.i that is indeed controlled. The TCV
depends on both (and more besides).

                RM: The TCV works because we know that control is

occurring when manipulation of an independent
variable (a disturbance) has far less effect on
another variable (the one suspected of being the
controlled variable – or, more precisely, the one
suspected of being the controlled quantity; perhaps
we should call it the TCQ) than would be expected
based on physical law. When we have determined that
a variable is under control and that this control is
being exerted by a living system (like a person) we
explain this control using control theory, which,
when applied to living systems, is called PCT. PCT
explains the observed control of q.i as a result of
the organism acting to control a perception of q.i
relative to an autonomously set reference signal.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com

                            Author of  [                                  Doing

Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=_XObhdgTCZ6yZvAKXRP9MnISm_V6teoCVavbNXPePtg&s=7sbmN6WRi2ZpEscZlnU_e4z5zlj5Bca5e5TM0eBenyY&e=).
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