[Martin Taylor 2016.06.07.16.56]
It rather depends on what you mean by "social power". In its usual
sense, the atenfel construct isn’t very important. In that sense
what is important is getting other people to see things your way so
that collective control serves your purposes. And that gets into the
whole area of team play, party politics, religious sects, and the
like. I don’t want to go there at the kind of length available in
e-mail messages. But the relative power of two individuals,
especially when they are in conflict, that is where atenfels first
come into play.
Let’s start from the idea of one simple control loop.
If this is all you are interested in, there’s no reason to think of
splitting any of the segments represented by arrows into components.
All that matters is the influence that the variation of the value at
the tail of the arrow on the value at the head of the arrow. In most
loop analyses, the arrow represents a simple connector, so there is
even less that matters. Loop gain and transport lag is often enough.
Things get more interesting when the output of one control system
influences the ability of another to control well. That influence
might be through input “D”. That is the standard conflict situation,
in which two controller try to set their perceptions of the same
environmental variable to different reference values. The
environmental variable in question is symbolized by the small green
circle. I usually call it the Complex Environmental Variable (CEV)
of the control loop, which is converted by each competitor into
their controlled variable – their perception of the CEV.
There are, however, three other ways the output of one control loop
can affect the operation of another, either by side-effect or
deliberately. Referring to the loop diagram, it might amplify or
partially block the effect of the disturbance on the other’s CEV
(affecting the properties of the arrow at D), or it might affect
something about the link from O to the CEV or from the CEV to S.
Examples of these latter might be the insertion of a microscope so
that S can represent tiny visual objects, or the insertion of a
lever between O and the CEV so that the output can apply more force.
And here we begin to touch on the concept of an atenfel.
The microscope and the lever do not constitute the entire
environmental feedback path. As objects, they don’t even form part
of the path. What forms part of the path in the case of the
microscope is its magnifying property, while for the lever it is the
force ratio between the ends (the “mechanical advantage”) of the
lever. Those properties, not the objects, are atenfels for
controlling whatever perception the loop controls. When talking
casually, however, we often use a shorthand form that mentions the
object rather than the property, as in “the lever is an atenfel for
moving a rock”, which should be read as “the mechanical advantage
property of the lever is an atenfel for controlling a perception of
the location of the rock”.
In the shorthand form one can often substitute “tool” for atenfel,
but this should not be misunderstood as taking the physical object
“tool” to be the atenfel. The atenfel is some property of the
object, and the object has many properties of different kinds.
Moreover, the particular property is an atenfel in the environmental
feedback path of some control loop. If it isn’t part of a loop, it
is only potentially an atenfel, and that potential applies to a wide
variety of perceptions that could be controlled.
The concept of “atenfel” applies not only to properties of physical
objects we call “tools”, but also to more abstract constructs. For
example, the stability of someone’s liking for a particular food can
be an atenfel for controlling a perception of that person’s pleasure
as a guest at your table.
To go into verbal detail every time one wants to talk about an
atenfel would be very tedious, and is often pointless. Consider a
hammer. You can “use a hammer to hammer a nail into a piece of
wood”. To say that is much simpler than to say that the hardness and
weight of the hammer head are atenfels for control of a perception
of the relative location of the nail-head and the piece of wood. You
can also “use the handle of the hammer to point at something”, which
is simpler than saying that the hammer handle’s disproportionate
length width ratio is an atenfel for controlling a perception of the
angle to look in order to see the thing. But the common use of the
shorthand should not lead one to forget that the atenfel is not the
object, but is a link in the feedback path of a controlled
perception.
When I tried to use the word “effordance” to describe a very similar
concept, Bill Powers thought it was a useless concept because one
can imagine any object being used for a wide variety of purposes;
the hammer might provide effordances for driving a nail, pointing a
direction, making a hole in a sheet of drywall, being a
counterweight on a balance, murdering someone, being used as a
mirror, and so forth, so what was the point of trying to say that
the hammer had any particular effordance? Kent made a similar
objection to my use of “effordance” in an early draft of my LCS IV
chapter, and it was this discussion that led to the more refined
concept of “atenfel”, which starts with the control loop rather than
with the object. The atenfel is a link in a chain. That link allows
the influence of the output to propagate one stage around the loop.
From the viewpoint of the control loop, whether the link is a
property of an object is irrelevant. From the viewpoint of a
toolmaker, the provision of an object with the necessary property is
essential. The tool builder controls perceptions of the perceptions
for which a property of the tool should be a potential atenfel. That
property may be called a “designed atenfel”. A tool like a Swiss
Army knife is designed to have many different properties that could
become atenfels for control of frequently controlled perceptions. We
call such a convergence of potential atenfels an “atenex” (a nexus
of atenfels). The convergence may be but need not be in a physical
object. If it is a physical object, we often use a shorthand
wording, saying that the object is the atenex, as we do when talking
about individual atenfels.
Atenfels and power. I described an atenfel as a link in a chain, and a chain is as
strong as its weakest link. However, the metaphor is a bit
misleading, because the “chain” is quite likely to be a network in
which different objects have properties that could serve as a
particular atenfel. If someone takes your hammer, you might use a
hard, heavy rock to drive the nail. However, if the area is devoid
of objects with sufficient hardness and weight, and someone makes
off with the hammer, you can no longer control your perception of
the relation between the nailhead and the surface of the wood. In
the common metaphoric sense of “power”, you no longer have the power
to control that perception. You retain the skill, long since
reorganized in your hierarchy, to use the “hard-heavy” property of
an object to drive nails, but your environment does not contain that
potential atenfel, so you have no possibility of completing the
feedback loop. The thief has diminished your set of controllable
perceptions, your overall “power” to control.
This example trivially illustrates the idea of “power”. If there are
no rocks, the presence or absence of the hammer determines your
ability to control the nailhead-wood relationship perception. You
lost power when the hammer vanished. But if there is a suitable
rock, you are still able to control that perception, though less
well than before. Your power is degraded, not eliminated.
Look at it now from the viewpoint of the thief who is controlling a
perception of your ability to set the nail flush with the wood with
a reference that you should be unable to do it. Maybe he is
controlling a perception of your ability, maybe a perception of the
nailhead-wood relationship. The latter would be the usual conflict
situation, but the conflict is manifest differently, since you act
on the nailhead while the opponent does not. If there is no rock,
the capable thief can remove the hammer and thereby prevent you from
controlling that perception. He has the power to control his
perception. But if there is a suitable rock handy, he cannot control
his perception, at least not to the same extent. All he can do is
make it more difficult for you to control your perception. You lose
power to the extent that the thief is able to deploy his power.
For the thief, his environmental feedback loop is made up of a chain
or network of atenfels, of which the controlled perception
“stealing” is one. If you can use the rock, this atenfel becomes a
weak link in the chain, and his control of his perception of your
ability to set the nailhead level with the wood is rather poor. If
good control of a perception corresponds to the metaphoric “power”,
the thief’s “stealing” provides him with little power. On the other
hand, if you have no rock at hand, the thief’s control is good, and
“stealing” is powerful. There is a power see-saw. If you retain the
power to control your perception, the thief’s “stealing” is an
atenfel that contributes very little to his power, because his
control of his perception is poor, and vice-versa.
If the thief is experiencing persistent error in a higher-level
perception – he REALLY doesn’t want that nail pounded flush – he
will reorganize to find means to inhibit your control other than
stealing the hammer. He may tie you up or break your arm so that you
cannot use any of the potential atenfels involving heavy hard
objects. But if you REALLY want that nail to be flush, you also have
other possible atenfels in your network. For example, you could ask
a friend to find a hammer and use it to pound the nail. The friend
becomes an “object” with properties that include the possibility of
being used as an atenfel for pounding nails. However it works out,
if the thief has more power, you have less, and vice-versa.
The situation is actually a non-classical conflict over the
perceived relation of the nailhead and the wood. It is non-classical
because the opponents do not compete by increasing their influence
on the CEV, but by affecting each other’s power to influence the
CEV, doing so by altering the effectiveness of the atenfels being
used by the opponent.
Influencing another’s atenfels need not decrease the other’s power.
Instead of a thief stealing the hammer, if you didn’t have one
initially a friend might lend you one, thereby giving you power to
control your perception of the relation between the nailhead and the
wood surface. In one of Kent’s examples, a whole community of people
combine to build and maintain a road, giving you the power to use a
car as an atenfel for controlling a perception of your movement
between two places on the road, whereas before the road, you might
have had to cut your way through a jungle. The road adds to your power, but it adds also to the power of anyone
else who might be controlling perceptions of movement along its
path. You and these other people were unknown to the road builders.
An object that provides power to many people unknown to the creator
of the object (if it is a created object) is part of what is
ordinarily called “infrastructure”. An infrastructure object is not
primarily an atenex, because only one property (or a related set of
properties) is used for control of similar perceptions in different
controllers. (Although, as with any object, the road has many
properties, any of which might be used as an atenfel for control of
some perception, it isn’t designed for those different purposes,
which is why we would not ordinarily treat it as an atenex.)
The idea of infrastructure is not limited to physical objects. In
his LCS IV chapter, Kent points out how stability of social
structures can also be used as an atenfel or an atenex. For example,
within an organization, the social structure includes the concept of
“role”, such as “manager”, “accountant”, “salesperson”, “secretary”.
These are fairly stable roles, and each has a designed set of
properties that can be used as atenfels for control of different
perceptions. The stability of these roles, independent of the person
playing the role, enhances the power of anyone with the ability to
use those atenfels for controlling perceptions. That ability depends
on the stable network of relationships among roles. A “janitor” does
not have the ability to control a perception of the financial status
of the organization by asking an “accountant” to provide it, but a
“manager” does. Money is a social structure that is an atenex par excellence, since
it is by design useful in control of an indefinite number of
perceptions through the activities of other people. The more money
one has, the more such perceptions one can control, including the
perception of the amount of money one has available. As the sayings
go, “money is power” and “money begets money”. In a conflict between
a person (or a role) that can use a lot of money and one who has
little, the one with more will usually win, having the ability to
use atenfels that remove or reduce the effectiveness of the other’s
atenfels in the same way that the hammer-stealing thief reduced the
power of the nail-setter.
Obviously we are getting into questions of “ownership”, which I
think is beyond the scope of this introduction to the concept of the
atenfel. After all the adage “possession is nine tenths of the law”
would seem silly if ownership were not complicated.
I hope this sketchy introduction gives you an idea of why and when
the concept of an atenfel is useful, and how it relates to the
metaphoric concept of “power” as a combination of skill and
strength.
Martin
···
[From Rick Marken (2016.06.07.1250)]
Martin Taylor (2016.06.05.20.30)–
RM: Why the special (and rather ugly, in
my judgement) name? What was wrong with
plain old “feedback function”.
MT: An atenfel is a component link in an
environmental feedback path.
RM: OK. It's hard for me to see what this might have to
do with understanding social power from a PCT perspective.