In the 150th Anniversary issue of Nature (7 Nov 2019 p31) There is the following passage: Neuroscience, like genetics, has been restricted in the questions it can ask by the data it can gather. Functional Magnetic Resonance remains a blunt tool, showing where things are happening in the brain […] but not what transpires. […].
[…] More data, although extremely valuable as a resource, will not help us without new ideas. These are i short supply. As […] Matthew Cobb at the University of Manchester writes, “no major conceptual innovation has been made in our overall understanding of how the brain works for over half a century”.
It’s no surprise, then, that the hard problem of consciousness is barely articulated, let alone understood. […] the only valid starting point for a theory of human experience. That […] view harks back to how US psychologist William James ignored “the traditional antithesis between reality and appearance”, as Nature put it in 1915. As for claims that neuroscience has banished free will (for example, because decisions can be predicted from brain scans in advance of their conscious manifestation) merely returns us to British Philosopher Gilbert Kyle’s famous “regression of mental homunculi”.
It seems to me that this passage offers several openings for PCT. The “regression of mental homunculi” issue, for example, disappears when one recognizes that the non-conscious control hierarchy necessarily functions before anything emerges into consciousness to seem like an experienced “decision”.
Of course, although PCT is a “major conceptual innovation […] in our understanding of how the brain works”, the innovation did not occur in the last half-century. To the mainstream, however, PCT thinking would even now be a novel major innovation.
I wonder if a focus on some domain in which unsolved problems have been acknowledged might be a reasonable wedge for the propagation of PCT.