Perception vs Interpretation

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2007.01.13.1413 EST)] --

I don't wish to mix in the exchange between Rick and Bjorn but one of Rick's
comments leads me to pose a question of clarification... (and to change the
subject line)

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.13.1040)]

My perceptions may not correspond to your perceptions but they are what
I control. I see myself living among people who have elected a
sociopath. You may see me as living among people who have elected a
great protector of freedom. We are clearly perceiving different aspects
of the same reality.

My question has to do with the last sentence above.

Are we indeed perceiving different aspects of the same reality or might it
be the case that we attach different meanings or interpret matters
differently? For example, I think lots of people perceive pretty much the
same thing when they look at the Patriot Act; however, I think the reactions
to the Patriot Act vary widely: some view it as distasteful but necessary;
some approve of it with little reservation; some see it as a bludgeoning of
individual freedom; etc, etc.

How, in PCT, do we distinguish between our perceptions (i.e., sensory
inputs) and the meaning or interpretation or value we place upon those
inputs?

Regards,

Fred "Still Fumbling Around with PCT" Nickols
nickols@att.net

[Martin_Taylor2]

[Martin Taylor 2007.01.13.23.05]

[From Fred Nickols (2007.01.13.1413 EST)] --

> [From Rick Marken (2007.01.13.1040)]

My perceptions may not correspond to your perceptions but they are what
I control. I see myself living among people who have elected a
sociopath. You may see me as living among people who have elected a
great protector of freedom. We are clearly perceiving different aspects
of the same reality.

My question has to do with the last sentence above.

Are we indeed perceiving different aspects of the same reality or might it
be the case that we attach different meanings or interpret matters
differently? For example, I think lots of people perceive pretty much the
same thing when they look at the Patriot Act; however, I think the reactions
to the Patriot Act vary widely: some view it as distasteful but necessary;
some approve of it with little reservation; some see it as a bludgeoning of
individual freedom; etc, etc.

Aren't those also among the perceptions that combine to form one's perception of the Patriot Act?

How, in PCT, do we distinguish between our perceptions (i.e., sensory
inputs) and the meaning or interpretation or value we place upon those
inputs?

Why would you want to distinguish them?

In my understanding of PCT, perceptions aren't sensory inputs. They are those aspects of the world that we, in the everyday sense, perceive, as well as all other potentially controllable signals of which we are not ordinarily conscious. Potentially controllable implies that there is some kind of possible feedback path through which we might attempt to influence them.

I often use the "level of democracy" as an example of a rather abstract perception. If it is "sensory input", that sensory input has occurred over a lifetime, has affected how my control systems have reorganized, and influences how I perceive current situations. I have a reference value for "level of democracy" that I perceive in different acts of authority. For that component of its complex of perceptions, my perception of the Patriot Act is very far from its reference value. As the writing of that sentence suggests, I can also perceive the difference between my perception of the Act and my perception of my reference value for Acts of the governmental authority (Parliament or Congress, or whatever institution is applicable).

This statement, of course, suggests that my perception of PCT does not conform to the strict hierarchy in which reference values are not perceptible. But so be it. Sunjectively, I believe I perceive some of them. To coin a phrase "I may not know much about X, but I know what I like!".

Martin

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.0945)]

Fred Nickols (2007.01.13.1413 EST) --

Rick Marken (2007.01.13.1040)]

We are clearly perceiving different aspects of the same reality.

My question has to do with the last sentence above.

Are we indeed perceiving different aspects of the same reality or might it
be the case that we attach different meanings or interpret matters
differently?

I think both happen and we refer to them using the same term -- "perceiving things differently" -- which makes it confusing. Perceiving different aspects of the same reality is this: I look at the thing to my left and see a rocking chair, you look at the same thing and see an obstruction to your path to the bookcase. The same physical reality is the basis of both perceptions. Attaching different meanings to the same perception is this: my wife and I both take a bite of beet but I say that I taste something awful while she says she tastes something delicious; the same perception means different things to us because we are describing that perception in terms of where it sits relative to our reference for it.

For example, I think lots of people perceive pretty much the
same thing when they look at the Patriot Act; however, I think the reactions
to the Patriot Act vary widely: some view it as distasteful but necessary;
some approve of it with little reservation; some see it as a bludgeoning of
individual freedom; etc, etc.

I agree. I think this is an instance where essentially the same perception (of the Patriot Act) means different things because people differ in their reference that perception.

How, in PCT, do we distinguish between our perceptions (i.e., sensory
inputs) and the meaning or interpretation or value we place upon those
inputs?

That is the $64 dollar question!

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[bnhpct]

[Bruce Nevin 2007.01.14 13:53 EST]

Martin Taylor 2007.01.13.23.05 --

This points to a major difficulty in identifying controlled variables,
namely, that the way the observer constructs sensory inputs into
higher-order perceptions may differ from the way the observed system
constructs sensory inputs into perceptions. It appears to be not at all
the case that all people perceive the same thing when they "look at" the
Patriot Act and differ only in their "reactions" to it.

I put "look at" in scare quotes because very few people have actually
read the Act. What does it mean to say they "look at" the Patriot Act?
What people "look at" is their construction of some more general
perceptions of politics and social life, and among them such aspects of
those perceptions that they associate with the words "the Patriot Act".
This is not in the same ballpark with looking at the rocking chair in
the corner.

Skinner (that "well known animal trainer" as Bill has called him) and
others developed techniques to "shape behavior." It appears that these
techniques manipulate conflict and reorganization to establish
references in memory. It seems to me also that these manipulations of
conflict and reorganization influence the development of input functions
in the subject organism.

If we don't like that way of accounting for the epigenesis of references
and input functions -- and we do need to account not only for
many-to-one perceptual input functions but also for many-to-one
reference input functions and one-to-many error output functions -- then
it behooves us to formulate a coherent alternative. The hypothesis of a
reorganization system proposes an explanatory mechanism for the
"shaping" practices, and those practices provide data about the
performance of the hypothesized reorganization system. They are
complementary. (Any claim of behaviorism and its congeners to account
for _behavior_ conflicts with PCT, but that is another matter.)

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.0945)--

... essentially the same perception (of the Patriot Act)
means different things because people differ in their reference
[for] that perception.

That's assuming that all the people under consideration have developed
the same input functions for perception of political and social
concepts. If you assume that, then you have to conclude that those
controlling in a way that you can plainly see leads necessarily to
disastrous results must be incompetent or stupid, and there's little
recourse, except maybe to advocate for people educated in PCT to leave
the planet and start over elsewhere. If you don't assume that, then
there are a lot more possibilities.

Lakoff's work on the metaphoric organization of cognitive processes is
not stated in PCT terms, but it does suggest some interesting hypotheses
that can be so stated, and in particular the book _Moral Politics_
suggests how people of contrasting political beliefs in the United
States today construct mutually incomprehensible complex political and
social perceptions. To see either system of beliefs clearly you have to
step out of both to a neutral point of view, and Lakoff's analysis
provides that.

  /BN

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor
Sent: Saturday, January 13, 2007 11:18 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU
Subject: Re: Perception vs Interpretation

[Martin Taylor 2007.01.13.23.05]

[From Fred Nickols (2007.01.13.1413 EST)] --

> [From Rick Marken (2007.01.13.1040)]

My perceptions may not correspond to your perceptions but they are
what I control. I see myself living among people who have elected a

sociopath. You may see me as living among people who have elected a
great protector of freedom. We are clearly perceiving different
aspects of the same reality.

My question has to do with the last sentence above.

Are we indeed perceiving different aspects of the same reality or might

it be the case that we attach different meanings or interpret matters
differently? For example, I think lots of people perceive pretty much
the same thing when they look at the Patriot Act; however, I think the
reactions to the Patriot Act vary widely: some view it as distasteful
but necessary; some approve of it with little reservation; some see it
as a bludgeoning of individual freedom; etc, etc.

Aren't those also among the perceptions that combine to form one's
perception of the Patriot Act?

How, in PCT, do we distinguish between our perceptions (i.e., sensory
inputs) and the meaning or interpretation or value we place upon those
inputs?

Why would you want to distinguish them?

In my understanding of PCT, perceptions aren't sensory inputs. They are
those aspects of the world that we, in the everyday sense, perceive, as
well as all other potentially controllable signals of which we are not
ordinarily conscious. Potentially controllable implies that there is
some kind of possible feedback path through which we might attempt to
influence them.

I often use the "level of democracy" as an example of a rather abstract
perception. If it is "sensory input", that sensory input has occurred
over a lifetime, has affected how my control systems have reorganized,
and influences how I perceive current situations. I have a reference
value for "level of democracy" that I perceive in different acts of
authority. For that component of its complex of perceptions, my
perception of the Patriot Act is very far from its reference value. As
the writing of that sentence suggests, I can also perceive the
difference between my perception of the Act and my perception of my
reference value for Acts of the governmental authority (Parliament or
Congress, or whatever institution is applicable).

This statement, of course, suggests that my perception of PCT does not
conform to the strict hierarchy in which reference values are not
perceptible. But so be it. Sunjectively, I believe I perceive some of
them. To coin a phrase "I may not know much about X, but I know what I
like!".

Martin

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1200)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 13:53 EST) --

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.0945)--

... essentially the same perception (of the Patriot Act)
means different things because people differ in their reference
[for] that perception.

That's assuming that all the people under consideration have developed
the same input functions for perception of political and social
concepts.

Right. As I said, people also perceive different aspects of the Patriot Act, which is another reason people differ in their opinions about the Act.

If you assume that, then you have to conclude that those
controlling in a way that you can plainly see leads necessarily to
disastrous results must be incompetent or stupid, and there's little
recourse, except maybe to advocate for people educated in PCT to leave
the planet and start over elsewhere. If you don't assume that, then
there are a lot more possibilities.

I don't think that's true at all. I think that people do perceive many political and social variables in the same way. Just because that's true doesn't mean that the people controlling these variables at levels I believe will likely produce disastrous results are incompetent or stupid. For example, I think everyone is capable of perceiving the degree of support (financial, military, political) we provide to various countries. That's a perceptual variable. I think people would also be able to perceive that the degree of support we give to, say, Israel is much greater than the degree of support we give to Palestine. I think many people (certainly people in the US) consider this perception to be at the right level. That is, their reference for this variable is a lot different than the reference for this variable for people in other parts of the world, like in many parts of the Arab world, for example. So even though everyone is perceiving the same variable (relative level of US support of one country relative to another), the people on one side (the US) don't see that this is producing disastrous results. These people are not stupid or incompetent (well, I think they are, but that's just my perception; it has no force on them;-)).

Lakoff's work on the metaphoric organization of cognitive processes is
not stated in PCT terms, but it does suggest some interesting hypotheses
that can be so stated, and in particular the book _Moral Politics_
suggests how people of contrasting political beliefs in the United
States today construct mutually incomprehensible complex political and
social perceptions. To see either system of beliefs clearly you have to
step out of both to a neutral point of view, and Lakoff's analysis
provides that.

This sounds silly to me. I don't find the social perceptions of those with contrasting political beliefs to be incomprehensible at all. I think they are transparently simple. If the social perceptions of contrasting political beliefs were mutually incomprehensible then why would each side object to each other at all. Indeed, _how_ could they object to each other. They wouldn't know what to object to.

But why don't we take a simple example. I am for a single payer health care system. People with contrasting political beliefs are opposed to it. What am I not understanding about them? What are they not understanding about me? What is the neural position that would allow me to understand both of us?

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 16:00 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1200)--

I don't find the social perceptions of those with contrasting
political beliefs to be incomprehensible at all. I think they
are transparently simple.

Yes, it's very reasonable that if you assume that their perceptions are
the same as yours then it would only seem to you that it was their
control of those perceptions that was incomprehensible, and you would
never notice their way of constructing sensory inputs into higher
ordered perceptions was organized differently from yours.

If the social perceptions of contrasting
political beliefs were mutually incomprehensible then why would
each side object to each other at all.

But of course neither side "sees" the social perceptions of the other,
and each side assumes that the other is constructing the same
perceptions of political and social reality as they themselves are.

Indeed, _how_ could they
object to each other. They wouldn't know what to object to.

Because they assume that their perceptions are the same reality that the
other is perceiving, they object to how the other is controlling, not to
what the other is perceiving. The possibility of objecting to how the
other constructs complex perceptions never occurs to them.

But why don't we take a simple example. I am for a
single payer health care system. People with contrasting
political beliefs are opposed to it. What am I not
understanding about them? What are they not understanding
about me? What is the neural position that would allow
me to understand both of us?

Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics: How liberals and conservatives
think. University of Chicago Press. Chapter 10, Social Programs and
Taxes.

Of course to read just this single chapter in isolation without reading
the rest of the book, or at least reading Parts I, II, and III, could
lead to facile misinterpretation. And for me to attempt to summarize for
you in email would be even less advisable.

  /BN

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.14.1524 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1200) --

I don't think that's true at all. I think that people do perceive many political and social variables in the same way. Just because that's true doesn't mean that the people controlling these variables at levels I believe will likely produce disastrous results are incompetent or stupid. For example, I think everyone is capable of perceiving the degree of support (financial, military, political) we provide to various countries. That's a perceptual variable. I think people would also be able to perceive that the degree of support we give to, say, Israel is much greater than the degree of support we give to Palestine. I think many people (certainly people in the US) consider this perception to be at the right level. That is, their reference for this variable is a lot different than the reference for this variable for people in other parts of the world, like in many parts of the Arab world, for example. So even though everyone is perceiving the same variable (relative level of US support of one country relative to another), the people on one side (the US) don't see that this is producing disastrous results. These people are not stupid or incompetent (well, I think they are, but that's just my perception; it has no force on them;-)).

You seem to be saying that everyone perceives the same political and social variables the same way. That would account for some of the things you say about what is obvious. But I'm wondering how you know this. Is this just a hunch you have, or is there actually some way to show it's true? I haven't been able to find any way to demonstrate or prove that this is the case, and would really like to know if you have done so.

I take your point that even granting that different people perceive the same basic facts as others, they can differ in the reference conditions they maintain for those facts. But I can't find a way to support even the contention that there is agreement about basic facts. People may use the same words (at least as each of them perceives and understands sound-wave vibrations) but I'm stymied at that point. How do we know what they are perceiving? The only perceptions available to us are our own.

I can understand the utility of just giving up on this question, making the appropriate assumptions, and going on as if there were no question about sharing realities. This is one way to remove self-doubt. But I can't shut off that little voice that whispers that there are people who think Bush is very intelligent (he must be because he has reached the correct conclusions), and since I haven't personally interacted with the man, my judgments about him might reflect nothing more than my disagreement with what I see as his actions. When people agree with me, the little voice asks, annoyingly, "What exactly do they think they're agreeing with?" Often I find that it's something quite different from what I am trying to say, judging by other conclusions they reach. If perceptions can be so different at higher levels why can't they be different at lower levels, too? Reasoning about this doesn't help because it's my own reasoning, too, and it's all too easy to reason in ways that lead to the most convenient conclusions. There just doesn't seem to be any place to anchor a sense of reality on this subject.

Most of the time I can get by well enough if I ignore this problem. Most of the time, satisfying myself seems to be enough to get somewhere. But when I see people raging through the streets, chanting hateful slogans and acting dangerous and out of control, I wonder how they can be so sure they are right, sure enough to scream at their supposed enemies and generally not even consider that they could be wrong, never thinking that their violent and abusive behavior may do them more harm than good. Then, when people on our side appear to think that imitating this behavior is the best way to combat the violence, it becomes painfully evident to me that others don't share even my basic perceptions of reality. We see the world in terms of different variables.

If you have found the anchor point I'm looking for, I'd really like to hear about it.

Best.

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1345)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 16:00 EST)--

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1200)--

I don't find the social perceptions of those with contrasting
political beliefs to be incomprehensible at all. I think they
are transparently simple.

Yes, it's very reasonable that if you assume that their perceptions are
the same as yours then it would only seem to you that it was their
control of those perceptions that was incomprehensible, and you would
never notice their way of constructing sensory inputs into higher
ordered perceptions was organized differently from yours.

Could we get a little more concrete here. Let's stick with the healthcare example. I perceive a system where people who receive health services have to pay for them. I want the payment to be made by a national payer (like Medicare) to which everyone contributes proportional to their income. Those with contrasting political beliefs believe that payment should be made by private insurers with insurance premiums paid by the individual and/or by their employer (if they are employed). What am I missing?

If the social perceptions of contrasting
political beliefs were mutually incomprehensible then why would
each side object to each other at all.

But of course neither side "sees" the social perceptions of the other,
and each side assumes that the other is constructing the same
perceptions of political and social reality as they themselves are.

I don't assume that. What I assume is that we are talking about the same perception -- like the perception of how healthcare is funded -- but that we want it in different states (public versus private funding). If, when discussing this, we notice that we have been talking about different perceptual variables (for example, I realize that my opponent is talking about Heath bars, not health care) then I adjust my discussion. It just doesn't seem that hard for me to determine what perceptual variables I'm talking about with other people. And neither, apparently, does most everyone else. Or is the debate about the Iraq war about two different perceptions for opponents and supporters?

Indeed, _how_ could they
object to each other. They wouldn't know what to object to.

Because they assume that their perceptions are the same reality that the
other is perceiving, they object to how the other is controlling, not to
what the other is perceiving. The possibility of objecting to how the
other constructs complex perceptions never occurs to them.

OK. Let me see if I get this right. I object to escalating the Iraq war because what I perceive as the Iraq war is not the same as what supports of escalation perceive as the Iraq war? Is that what you're saying? So I perceive the Iraq war as a nightmare and my opponents perceive it as a great noble dream, or something like that? If so, I think that's complete crap. That's just describing the same perception in terms of where it sits relative to one's reference. This is done all the time by people who want to make believe that real conflicts (about the state of some perceptual variable) are not really conflicts but just differences in the way people _perceive_ things. So that if each party could just come to see things as the other party does then all would be fine. So Israeli's see the settlements as a good thing and the Palestinian's see it a bad thing. If only the Palestinians could see it as the Israeli's do and vice versa. So the Israeli's try force the Palestinians to perceive it their way while the Palestinians try to force the Israeli's into seeing it their way. Maybe they should all read Lakoff and everything would be fine.

But why don't we take a simple example. I am for a
single payer health care system. People with contrasting
political beliefs are opposed to it. What am I not
understanding about them? What are they not understanding
about me? What is the neural position that would allow
me to understand both of us?

Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics: How liberals and conservatives
think. University of Chicago Press. Chapter 10, Social Programs and
Taxes.

I don't want to read the book when I've got you here to explain it. Why not just help me understand what you are saying about different sides perceiving things differently and how this contributes to the disagreements about healthcare funding.

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1440)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.14.1524 EST)

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1200) --

I don't think that's true at all. I think that people do perceive many political and social variables in the same way. Just because that's true doesn't mean that the people controlling these variables at levels I believe will likely produce disastrous results are incompetent or stupid.

You seem to be saying that everyone perceives the same political and social variables the same way.

No, I didn't say that. We've been around on this before and I guess we're never going to agree. Actually, I don't even know if we disagree. But I do know you don't like it when I talk about people controlling the _same_ perceptual variables. You've got your philosophical reasons for not liking me saying it. But I think the consequences of your emphasis on this minor philosophical point -- and barring people from saying that people often control the same perceptual variables -- makes it difficult for people to understand what I (perhaps alone) consider to be one of the most important implications of PCT, which is that conflict results when control systems control the same or a similar perceptual variable relative to different references.

While I don't think people perceive the same thing either, in the sense that that people don't necessarily experience the world in the same way, I think it's pretty clear that people can control what are functionally the same perceptual variables, and even do it at the same time (as when two people control the position of a cursor simultaneously).

That would account for some of the things you say about what is obvious. But I'm wondering how you know this. Is this just a hunch you have, or is there actually some way to show it's true? I haven't been able to find any way to demonstrate or prove that this is the case, and would really like to know if you have done so.

It depends on what the meaning of "same" is. I have no way of knowing whether anyone else experiences cursor position in the same way as I do. But I am sure that people act as though they are controlling the same thing I am because I can model my performance and theirs using the same representation of cursor position. So I would say that my perception of cursor position is functionally the same as everyone else's, and the proof is in the modeling.

I take your point that even granting that different people perceive the same basic facts as others, they can differ in the reference conditions they maintain for those facts. But I can't find a way to support even the contention that there is agreement about basic facts. People may use the same words (at least as each of them perceives and understands sound-wave vibrations) but I'm stymied at that point. How do we know what they are perceiving? The only perceptions available to us are our own.

Again, it depends on what you mean by perception. I'm content to define perception as a variable in a control model; if the same perceptual variable explains the behavior of different people then I'm fine with saying that they are perceiving the same variable.

I can understand the utility of just giving up on this question, making the appropriate assumptions, and going on as if there were no question about sharing realities. This is one way to remove > self-doubt.

Oh, come on. This has nothing to do with self-doubt.

But I can't shut off that little voice that whispers that there are people who think Bush is very intelligent

When I use judgmental descriptions of perceptions (like saying people are "incompetent") I am talking in polemical mode. I know very well that I am describing a perceptual variable in terms of my own reference for that variable. I think people can come to some agreement about what aspect of their common experience is described by the word "competence" -- probably not great agreement at that abstract level but better than nothing -- but I doubt that they would be able to agree on what constitutes the state of the perception that constitutes "incompetence"; that depends on their reference.

Most of the time I can get by well enough if I ignore this problem. Most of the time, satisfying myself seems to be enough to get somewhere. But when I see people raging through the streets, chanting hateful slogans and acting dangerous and out of control, I wonder how they can be so sure they are right, sure enough to scream at their supposed enemies and generally not even consider that they could be wrong, never thinking that their violent and abusive behavior may do them more harm than good.

I don't think this has to do with whether they are right or wrong about what other people are perceiving. I think this has to do with people feeling that the state of a perceptual variable (perhaps a somewhat different perception for each protester but functionally similar -- the "state of the war" for example) is not near their reference. Certainty doesn't have anything to do with it, though I'm sure these people think that they are right. For myself, when I protest things that I think are bad I do it, not because I'm sure I'm right (I'd be happy if someone could explain to me why I am wrong about things) but because they feel bad; I'm perceiving things that don't come anywhere near my references for those perceptions. If I am perceiving things incorrectly -- if, for example, Israel is actually not doing what I think they are doing to the Palestinians --then I'd be happy to find out and I'll join AIPAC (I know lots of people who are in AIPAC and I'm sure they'd be thrilled to have me join).

Then, when people on our side appear to think that imitating this behavior is the best way to combat the violence, it becomes painfully evident to me that others don't share even my basic perceptions of reality. We see the world in terms of different variables.

I have no doubt that people perceive and control the world in terms of some variables that are different from mine. But I believe it's possible to get people to perceive the world in terms of the same variables I perceive it in terms of. If I didn't believe that then I wouldn't see the point of trying to teach people how to do things like dentistry, racquetball or PCT. In order to teach people to do something you can do, you have to believe that you will somehow be able to get them to perceive (and, thus control) what you perceive and control in order to carry out that skill yourself.

If you have found the anchor point I'm looking for, I'd really like to hear about it.

I don't know what you're looking for. I've been as surprised as you to find that sometimes people were controlling different perceptions that I thought they were controlling. I thought I had agreements with people that turned out to be about different things than I had thought. But I've been far more impressed by the times when I was clearly "on the same wavelength" with another human being; when we saw eye to eye about something (like you and I almost always do about PCT) or played music with others that intertwined like a tapestry. I guess I'm just more impressed by people's ability to control what are at least functionally the same perceptions than I am disappointed by the fact that it sometimes turns out that we have been controlling different perceptions than I thought. But even when I find that people have been controlling different perceptions than me, I can usually understand what those perceptions are. I have never had the experience of finding that people don't share "even my basic perceptions of reality". What I have experienced was finding that people were perceiving the world in terms of a region of my basic perceptions of reality that I don't regularly visit -- like the region that perceives the world in terms of a God who acts as a real estate agent;-)

Best.

Bill P.

Best

Rick M.

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.1.14 19:45 EST]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1440)--

... one of the most important implications of PCT ... is that
conflict results when control systems control the same or a similar
perceptual variable relative to different references.

I disagree with this because I agree with your correction of me on
December 25:

Rick Marken (2006.12.25.1200)--

> Bruce Nevin (2006.12.25 09:56 EST)--
>
> Rick Marken (2006.12.24.2220)--
>
> Yes, that is a simpler way to put it. What I am bearing in mind is
> that the loop is closed through the environment, the CV is modeled

as

> being in the environment between the observed organism and the
> observer,

Actually, that's not quite true. The CV is a perceptual variable;
a _function_ of certain environmental variables.

Conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual
variables which are, in each of them independently, functions of the
same environmental variables. (Cooperation can also result, or
intermediate or alternating conditions.)

We have no direct access to the perceptions of others, nor do we have
direct access to environmental variables other than our perceptions of
them. In that sense, all perceptions are theoretical constructs, and
verification of them is a continuous, ongoing project of living things,
and revision by reorganization when the verification fails.

We seek collaboration in this project. Our sense that a perception is a
faithful representation of environmental variables is strongly
influenced by experiences of co-controlling those environmental
variables with others, whether in conflict, cooperatively, or
innocuously.

from such interactions with others emerge or are constructed, presumably
by reorganization, perceptions of another's behavior as constituting
some particular significance; and such perceptions of the significance
of the behavior of others have no more basis than this. It is easy to
find instances of a sound or gesture that is meaningless for one
individual but for another is a communicative act with a particular
significance. When a number of people each perceive such acts as
constituting such significance, and by testing and verifying come to
perceive (rightly or wrongly) that the significance is the same for
others as for themselves, those individuals together constitute a public
or (when the aggregate of such acts so perceived by all of them is
sufficiently extensive and consistent) a community. Complete agreement
and complete verification are not required for individuals to control in
ways that rely on assumptions of common knowledge, and such control
provides circumstances in which participating individuals more strongly
establish their perception that such assumptions are real.

Being perceived by others as a member of some "us" as distinct from all
of "them" appears to be an important controlled perception for mammals,
and it is not difficult to demonstrate the importance for this of
"signifying" in the above sense. It is prominent in the rhetoric of
politics. Disagreeing with what are perceived to be shared beliefs is
commonly felt to be a threat, and felt to be a risk by the one
disagreeing, and control of knowing what's what has been known to result
in jumping to conclusions. Of such are society and politics made, and as
social and political beings

  we are such stuff
  as dreams are made on and our little life
  is rounded with a sleep.

  /BN

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 19:51 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1345)--

I don't want to read the book when I've got you here to explain it.

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 16:00 EST)--

to read just this single chapter in isolation without reading
the rest of the book, or at least reading Parts I, II, and III,
could lead to facile misinterpretation. And for me to attempt
to summarize for you in email would be even less advisable.

What part of that do you disagree with, and what is your basis for
disagreement?

  /B

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2320)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.1.14 19:45 EST) --

Conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual
variables which are, in each of them independently, functions of the
same environmental variables. (Cooperation can also result, or
intermediate or alternating conditions.)

In order to have conflict, the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables must be non-orthogonal (produce outputs that are correlated). There will be no conflict if the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables are orthogonal. If x and y are two environmental variables, then there will be conflict between two systems if one controls x + y and the other controls 2x + 2y and there will be no conflict if one controls x + y and the other controls x - y.

Our sense that a perception is a faithful representation of environmental variables is strongly influenced by experiences of co-controlling those environmental variables with others, whether in conflict, cooperatively, or
innocuously.

I have never argued, nor do I believe, that perceptions are "a faithful representation of environmental variables". Perceptions are representations of aspects of environmental variables; what is "represented" depends on the nature of the perceptual function. But what is represented has nothing to do with "faithfulness of representation".

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2330)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 19:51 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1345)--
I don't want to read the book when I've got you here to explain it.

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.14 16:00 EST)--

to read just this single chapter in isolation without reading
the rest of the book, or at least reading Parts I, II, and III,
could lead to facile misinterpretation. And for me to attempt
to summarize for you in email would be even less advisable.

What part of that do you disagree with, and what is your basis for
disagreement?

I don't agree or disagree with it. It is just telling me to read a book to get an answer to my question, which was:

But why don't we take a simple example. I am for a single payer health care system. People with contrasting
political beliefs are opposed to it. What am I not understanding about them? What are they not understanding
about me? What is the neutral position that would allow me to understand both of us?

In other words, explain to me how my disagreement with people over healthcare financing results from me not understanding their perception and vice versa.

Regards

Rick

···

---

Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bill_Powers1]

From Bill Powers (2007.01.15.0959 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.1345) --

Could we get a little more concrete here. Let's stick with the healthcare example. I perceive a system where people who receive health services have to pay for them. I want the payment to be made by a national payer (like Medicare) to which everyone contributes proportional to their income. Those with contrasting political beliefs believe that payment should be made by private insurers with insurance premiums paid by the individual and/or by their employer (if they are employed). What am I missing?

What I assume is that we are talking about the same perception -- like the perception of how healthcare is funded -- but that we want it in different states (public versus private funding).

When you say the words "national payer," wnat sort of image comes to mind? What many people perceive as the meaning of these words is a huge building full of incompetent bureaucrats who exert petty power whenever they can, obstruct payments, and waste money, so people get even less health care than they did before, Furthermore, they rob those who work hard and prudently save their money so as to pay the costs of health care for the undeserving and lazy who will only be encouraged to get lazier.

This is not just a matter of having a different reference level for the same perceptions. It's perceiving a different reality. And they will be the first to agree with your basic premise: this is not just a matter of their way of perceiving things. They are sure they are perceiving correctly the facts of the matter, and they wouldn't agree at all that you perceive the world differently from the way they do. They would say you are just looking for an excuse to get a handout.

OK. Let me see if I get this right. I object to escalating the Iraq war because what I perceive as the Iraq war is not the same as what supports of escalation perceive as the Iraq war?

What "escalation"? The proponents see their action as a way of counteracting the violence that is going on by finally supplying enough resources to do it, correcting a deficiency that has existed for several years. Certainly, the freedom fighters of Iraq do not perceive themelves as "insurgents" or "terrorists."

Is that what you're saying? So I perceive the Iraq war as a nightmare and my opponents perceive it as a great noble dream, or something like that? If so, I think that's complete crap. That's just describing the same perception in terms of where it sits relative to one's reference.

Oh. I thought you didn't have any thoughtful, reasoned-out answer, but now I see that you do. "That's complete crap." Actually, I think you just gave a perfectly good example of how the same physical situation can be seen in two quite different ways by different people. Bush sees the "sacrifices" of the noble soldiers who are defending freedom and keeping hordes of invaders from our shores. I do think that's complete crap, but only because what I see is something entirely different going on: the slaughter of people who don't deserve it by people who think they are only defending themselves. And note that you can apply that to either side.

This is done all the time by people who want to make believe that real conflicts (about the state of some perceptual variable) are not really conflicts but just differences in the way people _perceive_ things.

But differences in the way people see things are one of the main sources of conflict between them. If I try to help you and you want to show your independence, you will see me as an interfering busybody and I will see you as an unreasonable ingrate, and that can be enough to break up a family. It's not that I have a high reference level for being an interfering busybody and you have a low one. It's that I do not perceive myself as interfering or as a busybody, but as helping and being normally compassionate. My actions are being perceived in two different ways. I would say you have an incorrect perception of me. You would say it's just a difference in reference levels for the same perception, but that isn't the problem.

Best,

Bill P.

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1040)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.15.0959 EST)--

When you say the words "national payer," wnat sort of image comes to mind? What many people perceive as the meaning of these words is a huge building full of incompetent bureaucrats who exert petty power whenever they can, obstruct payments, and waste money, so people get even less health care than they did before...

This is not just a matter of having a different reference level for the same perceptions. It's perceiving a different reality.

But it's certainly a perception I can have (otherwise I wouldn't know what you were talking about). When we get into a verbal debate about "national payer" I would certainly understand what you are describing and I might either try to convince you that "national payer" doesn't involve incompetent bureaucrats or that the bureaucrats are no more incompetent and petty than those in private insurance companies. But ultimately, we would be arguing about the state of the same perception; how to fund healthcare.

And they will be the first to agree with your basic premise: this is not just a matter of their way of perceiving things. They are sure they are perceiving correctly the facts of the matter, and they wouldn't agree at all that you perceive the world differently from the way they do. They would say you are just looking for an excuse to get a handout.

I think they are just pointing to different perceptions, real or imagined, that are used in a verbal debate about the state of one perceptual variable that is the central focus of the debate: how to fund healthcare. I think in any verbal conflict, the essence of the conflict -- the single perceptual variable that is the basis of the conflict -- is masked when each side points to other perceptual variables related to the conflict and and say "we just see things differently". For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the Palestinians say that the Israelis are oppressing them and the Israelis say that they are protecting themselves from terrorism. So you could say that the conflict is about two different ways of perceiving the same situation --the occupation of the West Bank. But, of course, that (in my inimitable words) is crap; the conflict is about one perceptual variable -- living on a sliver of real estate on the coast of the Mediterranean -- that the two parties want in different states. There is also conflict about the side issues; the "differences in the way things are perceived". But these are verbal conflicts: conflicts over how a situation should be described. Arguments about whether the occupation of the west Bank is "oppressive" or "defensive" are certainly conflicts. But the conflict is not a result of perceiving things differently; I think Israelis are perfectly capable of perceiving the occupation as oppressive and Palestinians are capable of perceiving it as defensive. The conflict is over the "correct" way to describe the situation, and that is, again, a single perceptual variable (a perception of the description of occupation/settlement of West Bank), which Israelis want in the state "defensive" and Palestinians want in the state "oppressive".

But differences in the way people see things are one of the main sources of conflict between them.

See my comments above. I continue to disagree. Is this really what you would want me to teach the students in my class on PCT -- that conflict results from people perceiving things differently? I would really have difficulty doing that, given my understanding of PCT.

If I try to help you and you want to show your independence, you will see me as an interfering busybody and I will see you as an unreasonable ingrate, and that can be enough to break up a family.

I think you are describing a conflict over how to describe a situation. The real conflict occurs when your "help" is an effort to get a perception into a different state than I want it (as you are doing right now;-). For example, if you want to help me write my name by guiding my hand we are likely to get into conflict because my reference for where my hand should be is likely to be different than your "helpful" reference for what is functionally the _same_ perception. I say "functionally" because you don't perceive what I perceive as my hand position. But you are trying to influence a perception of yours (your perception of the position of my hand) that is functionally equivalent to my perception of the position of my hand in the sense that what you do to control your perception of my hand is a disturbance to my perception of the position of my hand and what I do to control my perception of the position of my hand is a disturbance to your perception of the position of my hand. The functional equivalence between our perceptions exists in the environment; when you control your perception of the position of my hand you are influencing many of the same environmental variables that are the basis of my perception of the position of my hand. So, for all intents and purposes (so to speak;-)) when you try to "help" by controlling your perception of the position of my hand you are controlling nearly the same perceptual variable that I am controlling when I control my perception of the position of my hand. The conflict results, not from the fact that we perceive things differently but, rather, from the fact that we are controlling perceptions that are functionally nearly equivalent.

It's not that I have a high reference level for being an interfering busybody and you have a low one. It's that I do not perceive myself as interfering or as a busybody, but as helping and being normally compassionate. My actions are being perceived in two different ways. I would say you have an incorrect perception of me. You would say it's just a difference in reference levels for the same perception, but that isn't the problem.

I would say that you have an incorrect understanding of how conflict works (which takes a lot of chutzpah, being that you are the person who taught me how conflict works;-)). What you have described above is a conflict over how one would describe a situation -- the description of a relationship between people. As usual, conflict is over the state of a single perceptual variable. One person wants that perceptual variable in the state "helping" and the other wants it in the state "interfering". The conflict results from systems with different references for the _same_ perceptual variable; it does _not_ result from systems "perceiving things differently".

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.15 14:13 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2330) --

explain to me how my disagreement with people over healthcare
financing results from me not understanding their perception
and vice versa.

Single payer health insurance is a system by which the health care
expenditures of an entire population are paid for through one source -
the Federal government or a subcontracting entity - using tax revenue
from individuals and employers.

This makes it a tax-supported social program run by the central
government. All three parts of that characterization are anathema to the
right wing -- social program, tax supported, and government run. All
three parts seem OK to you, and maybe even all or most of them seem
really good, just right. This contrast is exemplary of many such
contrasts between left-wing views and right-wing views that Lakoff has
investigated.

The family is the social system that is literally closest to home, and
within which a child learns about social and political realities.
Lakoff's thesis is that people organize their perceptions of social and
political arrangements and of what constitutes morality (perceptions of
right and wrong) on the analogy of the family. He brings a lot of
evidence to bear on this thesis. More important, he offers hypotheses
about references for control that are very amenable to test, covering a
wide range of social and political phenomena.

Lakoff contrasts two concepts of the family, which he calls the strict
father model and the nurturing parent model.

The strict father model is a hierarchical arrangement of moral authority
from God, then the father, then the mother, then the children. The focus
is on teaching children right from wrong. You become a moral authority
by following a source of moral authority, and you demonstrate moral
authority by your certainty of what is right and wrong. Erring children
are to be punished until they learn right from wrong, and when they do,
then inevitably in this land of opportunity they will be successful.
Success, therefore, in addition to confidence, is secondary confirmation
of one's moral authority, and failure brings with it punishment
necessary to learning right from wrong so that you can become
successful. Social programs interfere with the natural order of things
by coddling the unsuccessful so that they do not get the painful lessons
of their failures, learn right from wrong, and become productive,
successful, upright and moral contributors to society. Taxation takes
the rewards of success from those who have demonstrated their moral
rightness and gives it to those who by their failure have shown that
they have not learned right from wrong. Social programs coddle those who
need to learn the painful lessons of their failures so that they can
learn righr from wrong and become successful. In America (though not in
other countries) when children leave the nest it is the obligation of
parents not to intrude on their lives. It is more important to be right
than to experience the uncertainty that accompanies a search for truth.

In the nurturing parent model, the parents (if there are two) share
household responsibilities, and the focus is on nurturing children and
one another, so that they become happy and fulfilled, self-disciplined
and self-reliant, free to develop their strengths as responsible and
empathetic contributors to a society of cooperating individuals. Open
and mutually respectful communication is essential, not only because the
authority of decision makers is established and reaffirmed by
communication so that those affected understand why the decision is
made, but also because all stakeholders may potentially have good ideas
to contribute, even children, and participation helps them learn to
become more effective contributors to the common good. Protection is a
form of caring, and making arrangements that protect the innocent from
the many dangers in the world -- crime, drugs, cigarettes, cars without
seat belts, pollution, pesticides, scams, unscrupulous businessmen, and
so on -- are a significant part of being responsible. Taxation is an
investment in the fabric of society, like paying dues to a country club
to pay for maintenance and administration so that the grounds and the
swimming pool are in good condition when you come to use them. Social
programs are fundamentally nurturant. Government programs and social
programs can be exploited by the unscrupulous, but that is a call to
one's responsibility to guard the unwary or weak against crime and other
dangers. Openness to the views of others can result in uncertainty while
you wait for a decision to become clear, but that is a precondition for
working together toward a better grasp of the truth.

While a lot of the evidence is in the form of what people say and how
they say it, that is true of any investigation into the higher levels of
the perceptual hierarchy. Be particularly aware that what is meant by
metaphor here is more fundamental and pervasive than language. Lakoff
has done a lot of work over the past 30 years or so on analogy in the
organization of our perceptual hierarchy, though not of course described
in just those terms. Just think of a bunch of perceptual signals that go
into perceptual input function A also going into perceptual input
function B, and you have a neurological correlate of metaphor.

This brief synopsis is not a fair representation and could easily be
trivialized and dismissed.

I don't expect that you will do anything with this information, but you
did ask.

  /BN

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1140)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.15 14:13 EST)--

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2330) --

explain to me how my disagreement with people over healthcare
financing results from me not understanding their perception
and vice versa.

Single payer health insurance is a system by which the health care
expenditures of an entire population are paid for through one source -
the Federal government or a subcontracting entity - using tax revenue
from individuals and employers....

This makes it a tax-supported social program run by the central
government. All three parts of that characterization are anathema to the
right wing -- social program, tax supported, and government run.

Yes, of course. I know that. So I don't perceive things differently from the right wing. They see single payer as a tax-supported social program run by the central government and so do I. We have the same perception of single payer, just different references for the state of that perception.

All
three parts seem OK to you, and maybe even all or most of them seem
really good, just right. This contrast is exemplary of many such
contrasts between left-wing views and right-wing views that Lakoff has
investigated.

Yes, it's a contrast of references, not ways of perceiving.

The family is the social system that is literally closest to home, and
within which a child learns about social and political realities...

The strict father model is a hierarchical arrangement of moral authority
from God...

In the nurturing parent model, the parents (if there are two) share
household responsibilities...

These could be different higher order perceptions for which people control. If you are controlling for the strict father model you'll set your reference for programs like healthcare financing differently than if you are controlling for the nurturing parent model. So the model for which different people control is the source of the different references for healthcare financing (and other things) that are the basis the right-left conflict. But, again, the basis of the conflict is different references for the same (or functionally equivalent) perceptual variables; it's not the result of perceiving things differently.

This brief synopsis is not a fair representation and could easily be
trivialized and dismissed.

I think it's a fine hypothesis about the higher level perceptions (strict father versus nurturing parent) that might be responsible for the different settings of lower level references that are responsible for the left-right conflicts. It would be nice if Lakoff could learn PCT and see that what he is describing is conflict based on different references rather than on perceiving things differently.

I don't expect that you will do anything with this information, but you
did ask.

Well, I did something which I hope is useful. I showed how it was possible to make sense of Lakoff's ideas in terms of PCT. Thanks for writing up the description; saves me a trip to the library;-)

Best

Rick

···

---

Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2007.01.18.1531 EST)] --

I'm going to return to this thread as labeled because what ensued seemed to
me to go far afield from what I was pursuing. So, let me pick up with
Rick's response to my original inquiry...

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.0945)]

> Fred Nickols (2007.01.13.1413 EST) --
>
>> Rick Marken (2007.01.13.1040)]

>> We are clearly perceiving different aspects of the same reality.
>
> My question has to do with the last sentence above.
>
> Are we indeed perceiving different aspects of the same reality or
> might it
> be the case that we attach different meanings or interpret matters
> differently?

I think both happen and we refer to them using the same term --
"perceiving things differently" -- which makes it confusing. Perceiving
different aspects of the same reality is this: I look at the thing to
my left and see a rocking chair, you look at the same thing and see an
obstruction to your path to the bookcase. The same physical reality is
the basis of both perceptions. Attaching different meanings to the same
perception is this: my wife and I both take a bite of beet but I say
that I taste something awful while she says she tastes something
delicious; the same perception means different things to us because we
are describing that perception in terms of where it sits relative to
our reference for it.

I think I get what you're saying. We both look at the rocking chair and we
both might well identify it as such. However, given different goals at the
time, we might also view the rocking chair in a different light so to speak.
To me, it not just a rocking chair, it's also an obstacle; to you, I might
be a place where you intend sitting down in a moment.

However, although our goals (or reference conditions) are different and so
we view the rocking chair differently in relation to our different goals, I
suspect (or believe) that our sensory inputs are pretty much the same else
we wouldn't agree that we're both seeing a rocking chair, regardless of how
we view it in relation to our goals. So, I'm drawn back to my original
inquiry:

> How, in PCT, do we distinguish between our perceptions (i.e., sensory
> inputs) and the meaning or interpretation or value we place upon those
> inputs?

To which Rick responded:

That is the $64 dollar question!

I think maybe I have unnecessarily confused matters with my inquiry. It
seems to me that I have been equating "perception" with "sensory input" and
that, I think would be a mistake (except at lower levels). In B:CP, Bill
defines "perception" as "A perceptual signal (inside a system) that is a
continuous analogue of a state of affairs outside the system." He then
refers to "physical quantity" which he defines as "A perception identified
as part of a physical model of external reality." He also refers the reader
to "Orders of Perception."

Anyway, my view of the rocking chair as an obstacle is also a perception,
one that ties to some internal goal or model of external reality such that I
view the rocking chair as such. My view of the Patriot Act (which Rick also
discussed) is similarly shaped by my internal models of reality, the most
relevant of which probably exist at the level of principles and systems
(although I can see how observed patterns over time could involve the levels
of configuration, transition, sequence, relationship and program). In other
words, my view of the Patriot Act is shaped not just by what I see when I
read it but also the larger context and related events over time, all of
which are affected by my mental models.

In the end, I guess I've answered my own question. Rick and I, if I may use
him, can both look at (i.e., read) the Patriot Act and, if quizzed on its
content, might well come up with similar answers. However, given our mental
models and personal histories, Rick and I might also interpret the Patriot
Act very differently.

Now, if I have that right, it seems to me that exploring mental models ought
very much to be a central part of PCT - yet I don't recall it as such.

Comments?

Regards,

Fred Nickols
nickols@att.net

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.18.1605 MST)]

Fred Nickols (2007.01.18.1531 EST) --

I think I get what you're saying. We both look at the rocking chair and we
both might well identify it as such. However, given different goals at the
time, we might also view the rocking chair in a different light so to speak.
To me, it not just a rocking chair, it's also an obstacle; to you, I might
be a place where you intend sitting down in a moment.

The problem goes a little deeper than that. The problem is that you are seeing something you call by the words "rocking chair," and you are assuming not only that the other person is perceiving the same object, but that the words "rocking chair" sound the same to the other person and indicate the same experience that you are having. Your own system is entirely self-consistent, but you can't show that it is consistent at ANY level with anyone else's world of experience. No matter how you try to cross-check to see if the other person behaves as if there is a shared experience, all of the interpretation is still taking place in your terms and in your brain, nobody else's.

It would be very interesting if we could arrive at a real answer to these questions, one way or the other. Either way, we would then be able to go on with confidence. As matters stand now, any statements about what experiences we share with others are unfounded.

Best,

Bill P.

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2007.01.19.1053 EST)] --

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.18.1605 MST)]

Fred Nickols (2007.01.18.1531 EST) --

>I think I get what you're saying. We both look at the rocking chair and
we
>both might well identify it as such. However, given different goals at
the
>time, we might also view the rocking chair in a different light so to
speak.
>To me, it not just a rocking chair, it's also an obstacle; to you, I
might
>be a place where you intend sitting down in a moment.

The problem goes a little deeper than that. The problem is that you
are seeing something you call by the words "rocking chair," and you
are assuming not only that the other person is perceiving the same
object, but that the words "rocking chair" sound the same to the
other person and indicate the same experience that you are having.
Your own system is entirely self-consistent, but you can't show that
it is consistent at ANY level with anyone else's world of experience.

I don't buy that, Bill. It might be the case that I can't prove it to your
standards but I sure as heck can to mine. Suppose I ask you to say "rocking
chair" and you subsequently utter sounds that to me are a match with my own
notion of what "rocking chair" should sound like. That's good enough for me
as far as "sounding the same." Suppose also that I show you a bunch of
pictures, some of which are of various kinds of rocking chairs and others of
which are of other objects - and you correctly identify as rocking chairs
those pictures that I consider to be of rocking chairs. That's good enough
for me. If you don't like pictures, we could use real objects (or at least
as "real" as real can be).

No matter how you try to cross-check to see if the other person
behaves as if there is a shared experience, all of the interpretation
is still taking place in your terms and in your brain, nobody else's.

I agree but that doesn't mean there are ways of checking to see if our
individual experiences have similarities - even if our checking is subject
to the same individual experience limitations.

It would be very interesting if we could arrive at a real answer to
these questions, one way or the other. Either way, we would then be
able to go on with confidence. As matters stand now, any statements
about what experiences we share with others are unfounded.

I think "unfounded" overstates the case.

Regards,

Fred Nickols
nickols@att.net