Quantum Theory and Control Theory

From Ely A. Dorsey 2005.03.29.20:50 EST

The reason I use CT instead of PCT is because the interpretations of quantum
theory will ultimately reside in some form of PCT, but before that domain
can come into the dialogue, quantum theory has to be cast in control theory
terms. The theory of explanation will intersect the domain of PCT. We will
adapt PCT to quantum theory.

The Rae book will help here.

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf Of Bryan Thalhammer
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2005 9:29 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Quantum Theory and Control Theory

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1945 CST)]

And, the drunk aware that he is hallucinating, or hallucinating and clearly
schizophrenic, has real experiences. The subjective experiences are the
reality
he experiences, including movies starlets and pink elephants. Even though
his
real experiences don't map on the real experiences most other people have,
they
are real. Yes.

The darned thing is we are talking about what we can do science on, and not
talking philosophy, but it's true, I think, you can do science on what many
people might call a hallucination.

--Bryan

[Bruce Gregory (2005.0329.1921)]

> Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1553 MST)
>
>
> I'm surprised you didn't bring up the subject of hallucinations....
> ...
> neural signals in his own brain. Nothing can be more real than that.
>
Nothing is more real than neural signals. But the drunk can be aware
that what he thinks he is seeing is a hallucination. In fact, if he
does not realize this, he is schizophrenic and a very advanced case in
my view

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1902 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0329.1748) –

In my view, the best I can ever
say is that I perceived something that I thought was
X.

But you can’t be mistaken about thinking it was X, can you? If I said,
“There is no evidence that you thought it was X,” you could
tell me that is irrelevant, couldn’t you? You know you thought it
was X.

Best,

Bill P.

From Ely Dorsey 2005.03.29.21:00 EST

Do you really observe a red light? Or do you acquiesce to the
cultural-educated experience of red lightness and link that experience to
the red light? You cannot observe a photon because of the physicality
limitations of observing a subatomic particle, but do you observe a macro
particle, such as a house or a book? Isn't observation and observing
together with measuring at the heart of the matter?

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2005 1:53 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Quantum Theory and Control Theory

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1140 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0329.1125) --

And above all, remember that the world of physics is IMAGINARY. The
real world, the only reality we can know, is the one we perceive
directly. Where physics denies that world, physics is wrong.

As far as I can tell, the world of physics is no more or less imaginary
than any other world.

I think you missed my point, or more likely I didn't explain it well enough.

If you experience the taste of chocolate, that is what you experience, and
there is no way you could be wrong about that. That is reality.

However, if you want to claim that the cause of this experience was an
actual chocolate thing interacting with your sensory endings in a physical
world, that is a theory and you can only imagine that such things are
happening. You don't experience sensory endings or chemical interactions.

The ultimate test of any theory is whether it predicts a real experience. A
physicist predicts that a spin detector will light its red light indicating
an "up" spin. If the physicist experiences a red light, he concludes that
the imaginary spin (which he can't experience directly) is "up," but it is
the experience of the red light on which he bases this conclusion. He knows
for certain that he experienced a red light, and is fairly confident that
something outside him caused that experience, so he infers, through various
theories, that a photon with an up spin might have been present. The
photon, I repeat, can't be observed separately; he can only imagine it. But
the experience of a red light can't be doubted. It really happened and he
directly perceived it.

That's what I mean.

Best,

Bill P.

Worlds are stories we tell about our experiences. As far as I can tell
we experience nothing "directly". So what we have are experiences
(perceptions) and the stories we tell to make sense of those perceptions.
One kind of story has proved exceptionally valuable because it is the
only kind of story that allows us to predict future perceptions. That
kind of story we call science.

A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1915)]

I was kinda waiting for Bill's example below. There is no question that reality
is both objective (the way things are all over the place) and subjective, as
Bill describes below, based on each individual's experience. Unfortunately, even
though objective reality is the physical reality, it can't be observed (as it
really is, all over the place) since we don't have infinite bandwidth on our
input channels. So, about that philosophical certainty of objective reality, we
can't do science at that level, only at the level of individual or aggregate
experience. So, since science is the explanation (someone else said story, but
that has bad connotations) of what we observe, then the reality we must be
concerned with is the experience of, but not the totality of, objective reality.

We can only do science with what we experience or perceive, and so, even though
experience is subjective, it's the only thing we can do science with. Sounds
strange as I type that, but I think this is the case.

If I experience God talking to me, then I guess such an experience is as
testable as my experience of hearing "concert A." Only thing is, even though
test results might return brain activity in both cases, they should detect a
sound wave in only one. Both experiences are reality. And it still sounds
strange, but according to this, I can do science on a hallucination! And that is
not being snide! :slight_smile:

--Bryan

···

[Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1553 MST)]

...

I'm surprised you didn't bring up the subject of hallucinations. If a drunk
hallucinates the traditional pink elephant in the corner of the room, is
that experience real? Definitely. The drunk is reporting on a phenomenon in
his field of awareness, that that phenomenon is actually, really, in his
field of awareness. It may not be anywhere else (like in the corner of the
room where someone else could report seeing it), but is it real. It is the
most real thing the drunk can experience: neural signals in his own brain.
Nothing can be more real than that.

Best,

Bill P.

Given all of this-it seems
accurate to me-Is it possible for someone we label schizophrenic to
differentiate between hallucinations and normal waking reality that most
of us experience?
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1905 MST)]

Jason Gosnell (2005.03.29
1730CST)–

]

Yes, in one case I know of, but I don’t know of any others so it wouldn’t
do to generalize. It proved very helpful to discuss the way we can
generate experiences internally, and to accept that they are perfectly
real experiences, though they might not have any external
counterparts.

Or, is he caught here-meaning
our normal experiences are also nothing but neural signals-so he can’t
know the difference?

That’s not the point here. The point here is that the perception, as
Martin said, is the only reality we can know. Some perceptions probably
have something to do with an external world; some probably do not. But we
can’t be mistaken about having experienced the perception, in either
case. What is useful to know is that everybody’s reality is like
this, and that it is very hard to figure out how our directly-perceived
realities relate to what Bob Clark called “Deduced Reality”,
the reality of science.

Or, does he have the
possibility of investigating the hallucinations using other senses, such
as touch, and possibly using reason and seeing if it matches his visual
sense?

I think that once a person starts such an investigation, the
investigation itself puts the person on the right track. It’s blindly
accepting all experiences as objectively real that gets us into serious
mental problems. Not the only cause, of course, but a big
contributor.

The movie called a
Beautiful Mind I didn’t see, but I remember seeing an interview with that
man (Not the actor, but the real person) and he indicated that he began
to question whether or not his thinking was “real.” And from
there, he started to overcome his “delusional” thinking. What
is going on there from a PCT perspective?

What I said above, before I read that paragraph (honest!). When you look
at your thoughts, you are perceiving them from a level higher than the
thoughts – that’s a consequence of the basic thesis of HPCT. And the
basis of the Method of Levels. When you see your thoughts as thoughts,
you have to realize that they are inside you, not outside, and that while
they are perfectly real, they are not the same as the external reality we
can only infer.

Of course, there is the same
issue for all humans-the issue of “thinking” or we call them
delusions for a schizophrenic. Our thinking is a kind of reality we
experience, but out there it is not necessarily real in some objective
sense. In meditation, the goal is to have some space around or with your
thinking or some sense of distance, I don’t know why for sure, but
presumably it is therapeutic not to be trapped in thinking. I don’t know
for sure…

I agree with you – I call it being too identified with your thoughts, so
you accept them without realizing that you are causing them yourself.
That’s how voices in the head become so pernicious – you think they are
coming from somewhere else, and you have to do what they say. Once you
see that you can start and stop them yourself, they have no more power
over you (in other words, you’re operating from a level higher than where
the voices originate).

I can’t prove any of that
“scientifically,” but my experiences seem to support those
views.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1930 CST)]

Sitting in the back row, knowing just enough about QM (and PCT :wink: ) to be
dangerous, it still seems to me that we are talking about two different things
(QM and CT). [Note, Ely keeps using "control theory" rather than the name we
have chosen to use "perceptual control theory"--is this the distinction we are
making here?] Further, while QM might be offer some interesting observations
about the physical universe, I don't think that Perceptual Control Theory (PCT)
addresses those kinds of observations.

While Schr�dlinger offers a paradox, with the [cat]/[not cat] in the box, I
don't think that the study of behavior as the control of perception includes the
possibility that the universe outside the control loop might be paradoxical.

Bill, Rick, beyond PCT, does the concept/model of a plain old control system
have to include the quantum category to continue to be valid? Seems to me that
the inclusion of a possibility of a 1 or 0 outcome not based on inputs makes for
a wacky control system? Is the possibility of a non-controlled output
destructive, or could perception, like genetic coding, be "mostly" controlled,
except for the times when it is not controlled?

Sorry if I muddy the waters.

--Bryan

···

>[Ely A. Dorsey (2005.03.29.19:12 EST)]

Bill, now that I have sent you and the group a description of the Mermin
experiment, could you or anyone reformulate that experiment as a control
theory experiment?

Ely

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1921 MST)]

Bill, now that I have sent you
and the group a description of the Mermin experiment, could you or anyone
reformulate that experiment as a control theory
experiment?

I’m really sorry to disappoint you, because your inquiries have started
several interesting threads going. A control theory experiment is an
experiment designed to investigate the properties of a control system. An
apparatus consisting of a photon generator and a couple of detectors is
not a control system, as far as I can see. The experimenter doing the
experiment is a control system (or collection of such systems), so I
could say (and have been saying) a few things about him or her. But I
don’t think that’s what you’re looking for. Is it?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1945 CST)]

And, the drunk aware that he is hallucinating, or hallucinating and clearly
schizophrenic, has real experiences. The subjective experiences are the reality
he experiences, including movies starlets and pink elephants. Even though his
real experiences don't map on the real experiences most other people have, they
are real. Yes.

The darned thing is we are talking about what we can do science on, and not
talking philosophy, but it's true, I think, you can do science on what many
people might call a hallucination.

--Bryan

···

[Bruce Gregory (2005.0329.1921)]

> Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1553 MST)
>
>
> I'm surprised you didn't bring up the subject of hallucinations....
> ...
> neural signals in his own brain. Nothing can be more real than that.
>
Nothing is more real than neural signals. But the drunk can be aware
that what he thinks he is seeing is a hallucination. In fact, if he
does not realize this, he is schizophrenic and a very advanced case in
my view

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1946 MST)]

Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1915) –

If I experience God talking to
me, then I guess such an experience is as

testable as my experience of hearing “concert
A.”

It’s fascinating to see you guys teetering on the edge of getting the
point here. My response to the above is simply “What’s to test? You
had the experience, didn’t you? Nobody can tell you you didn’t, can
they?” You are in a much better position than a guy with an
oscilloscope to tell whether or not you had a thought. All you can even
think of testing is whether the thought corresponds to anything outside
you. The point is the existence of the experience, not whether it
is related to something else. You can’t be mistaken about its
*existence.*Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1953 MST)]

Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1945 CST) –

Even though his real experiences
don’t map on the real experiences most other people have, they are real.
Yes.

Yes. There you go, as Chester used to say on Gunsmoke (prehistoric
TV show).

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1956 MST)]

Ely Dorsey 2005.03.29.21:00 EST –

Do you really observe a red
light? Or do you acquiesce to the

cultural-educated experience of red lightness and link that experience
to

the red light?

I really experience a sensation that I have learned to call a
“red” “light”. And I can distinguish it from another
sensation I have learned to call a “green” “light”. I
can’t be mistaken about those experiences, although I can be mistaken
about attributing them to something outside me.

Many of my perceptions had to be learned, so when I think “green
light” I am experiencing a learned perception. But I can’t be
mistaken about thinking that – that is, I can’t have the experience of
the term “green light” and doubt that I am having it.

The point here is that the reality is in the experiences, and the theory
is about the world we can’t experience except in the form of
perceptions.

You cannot observe a photon
because of the physicality

limitations of observing a subatomic particle, but do you observe a
macro

particle, such as a house or a book? Isn’t observation and
observing

together with measuring at the heart of the matter?

Yes, I think it is. I take “measuring” to be a precursor to
observing, because we still have to observe the outcome of the
measurement.
Basically, we can’t consciously observe a photon or a house if by those
terms you mean something that exists outside your brain. We infer
photons and houses (with, perhaps, different degrees of confidence), but
we experience only internal representations. I won’t try to answer the
question “of what?” That’s what we’re all trying to find out,
isn’t it?

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2005.03.29.23.31]

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0329.1917)]

Martin Taylor 2005.03.29.17.26

Well, that's a lot longer than I had intended. And maybe its length obscures the message, that when you "think you perceived something" you are perceiving both a perception and some other data, which together create the new "I think I see" perception.

I agree with almost everything you say, but I do not see how your analysis justifies the claim that I really see Nicole Kidman when, in fact, I don't.

If I said that my analysis justifies the claim that you really see Noicole Kidman, then I misspoke. I intended to say that you really perceived the labelling of the woman, not that you perceived the "real" Nicole Kidman.

Your analysis justifies the claim that I think I see Nicole Kidman, and in fact I can assert with certainty that I think I see Nicole Kidman, but that is all I can say with certainty, even if it really was Nicole Kidman.

Recursion is the word I think we should apply to all this "I think I see" stuff. What I perceive is what I perceive, even if a component of that is something else I perceive. What "I think" I see is itself a perception, of myself perceiving. Tentatively, I'd argue that this kind of recursion is probably limited to the logical reaches of the perceptual system (category level and above, if you go along with HPCT).

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0628)]

Rick Marken (2005.03.29.1730)

Martin Taylor (2005.03.29.17.26)

Bruce, I can understand where you are coming from, but I'm with Rick
on this. I think -- figure that one out -- that you are
misinterpreting what Rick is saying.

Great post, by the way, Martin. It makes me realize that we have both
benefited enormously, in terms of "getting" PCT, from having been students
of perception.

Needless to say, there are no right perceptions or wrong perceptions, there are simply perceptions. Since PCT does not include a labeling mechanism, the discussion of Nicole Kidman properly falls into the domain of APCT. In that domain I defer to you and Martin as students of perception.

A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0422 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2005.03.29.23.31 –

Recursion is the word I think we
should apply to all this “I think I see” stuff. What I perceive
is what I perceive, even if a component of that is something else I
perceive. What “I think” I see is itself a perception, of
myself perceiving. Tentatively, I’d argue that this kind of recursion is
probably limited to the logical reaches of the perceptual system
(category level and above, if you go along with HPCT).

How about sensations? If you feel a touch, do you need to prove to
yourself that you felt it? You may need to prove that something touched
you, but you don’t have to prove that the sensation occurred. If you see
a cube, a configuration, is there any doubt that it looks the way it
looks? If you see motion, isn’t that an indubitable experience (even if
you aren’t sure that “something moved”)?
I think that experience, at all the levels of perception, is a given. It
is what we start with. All the rest, all the higher-level categorizing
and planning and reasoning and so forth, themselves mnore experiences, is
an attempt to explain these experiences to ourselves. to create a view of
the world, of “inside and outside”, that hangs
together.
In fact, isn’t it only at the higher levels that we can even have any
doubts about the reality of what we experience? It is at our higher
levels that we figure out there must be some sort of unknown reality
beyond immediate experience, and start making models of it. We’re used to
cause-effect relationships, but sooner or later we begin to wonder
how the cause gets turned into the effect, and realize that we
don’t know. I know that it came as a shock to me, when I first read
Korzybski and started thinking about words and objects, that the world
around me might not be all that there is, and an even greater shock to
realize that with my nervous system organized the way the books said it
was organized, I didn’t even experience what was one millimeter outside
my sensory receptors. I realized that I couldn’t see light! This all
happened after I had taken my first high-school physics courses and
learned the joy of seeing the hidden regularities in the ordinary world.
I thought physics was teaching me about how the world really works, and
it never occurred to me that it was a collection of propositions that
people just like me (maybe a teeny bit smarter than me) had made up to
explain their own experiences. It didn’t occur to me that while
“energy” is a very useful concept, I couldn’t see it, touch it,
hear it. taste it, and so on. It was imaginary. A useful
fiction.
I can see how learning about these things might drive someone to
solipsism, but there’s a cure for solipsism: science. A scientist knows
he or she doesn’t know what is outside experienced reality. But the
scientist believes firmly that something is there, and that we can
learn about it. If we can’t ever check to see if we have learned
correctly, we can at least be systematic and make testable models and
demand that they work to the limit of measurement, and demand also that
all of our different models be consistent with each other. Then we can
have maximum confidence that our models have some reliable relationship
to the vast stretches of reality we can’t experience.

Of course that’s what’s wrong with quantum theory (and a lot of other
theories). It isn’t consistent with all our other models that also work
very well. “Counterintuitive” is not a nice attribute; it means
something is wrong with some model somewhere, and it could be that the
outlier is the wrong one. From Ely’s comments, I get the impression that
there are suspicions that QT might be the wrong one, though of course we
have to accept the observations.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0505 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0628) --

Since PCT does not include a labeling mechanism, the discussion of Nicole Kidman properly falls into the domain of APCT. In that domain I defer to you and Martin as students of perception.

Why do you say that PCT doesn't contain a labeling mechanism? Isn't a label also a perception? Don't we have control systems that use one perception to stand for one or more others? Labeling -- symbolizing -- occurs at the category level, where one signal comes to stand for a class of other signals. I don't see your problem here.\

Best,

Bill P.

···

A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.

[Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.08.21]

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0422 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2005.03.29.23.31 --

Recursion is the word I think we should apply to all this "I think I see" stuff. What I perceive is what I perceive, even if a component of that is something else I perceive. What "I think" I see is itself a perception, of myself perceiving. Tentatively, I'd argue that this kind of recursion is probably limited to the logical reaches of the perceptual system (category level and above, if you go along with HPCT).

How about sensations? If you feel a touch, do you need to prove to yourself that you felt it? You may need to prove that something touched you, but you don't have to prove that the sensation occurred. If you see a cube, a configuration, is there any doubt that it looks the way it looks? If you see motion, isn't that an indubitable experience (even if you aren't sure that "something moved")?

I think that experience, at all the levels of perception, is a given. It is what we start with. All the rest, all the higher-level categorizing and planning and reasoning and so forth, themselves mnore experiences, is an attempt to explain these experiences to ourselves. to create a view of the world, of "inside and outside", that hangs together.

In fact, isn't it only at the higher levels that we can even have any doubts about the reality of what we experience? ...

You write as if you want to contradict something I posted, but in reading your message, all I can see is an eloquent restatement of what I tried to suggest was possibly the case. I said "tentatively", whereas you put it as rather more definite. That's the only difference I can see.

Martin

[Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.08.24]

[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0422 MST)]

Of course that's what's wrong with quantum theory (and a lot of other theories). It isn't consistent with all our other models that also work very well.

On the contrary, there is probably no other theory in the whole of science that describes what we observe as well as does quantum theory.

There is, however, one other model that also does a very good job of describing the observed world: General Relativity.

The problem is that quantum theory and General Relativity, as yet, cannot be reconciled.

"Counterintuitive" is not a nice attribute; it means something is wrong with some model somewhere, and it could be that the outlier is the wrong one.

Why should we have ANY expectation that the models and concepts that allow us to control our perceptions on the scale of millimetres to miles and times of part-seconds to years might be relevant on scales of attoseconds or megayears, parsecs or femtometres? We never have had the ability to control perceptions on those scales, so we have no reason to expect that our intuitions based on mesoscale experience would be valid in the very small, large, short or long-lasting.

It's a remarkable fact that the abstract mathematics that is based on our ability to control in those middle scales does allow us to extend our ability to model into those scales, and thereby explain otherwise weird observations we make in the mesoscale universe of perceptual control. But it's a remarkable fact, and one that no "intuition" should give us any right to expect.

From Ely's comments, I get the impression that there are suspicions that QT might be the wrong one, though of course we have to accept the observations.

I think most scientists expect that current theories are wrong in some fundamental way, don't they?

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0923)]

Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1946 MST)

It's fascinating to see you guys teetering on the edge of getting the point here. My response to the above is simply "What's to test? You had the experience, didn't you? Nobody can tell you you didn't, can they?" You are in a much better position than a guy with an oscilloscope to tell whether or not you had a thought. All you can even think of testing is whether the thought corresponds to anything outside you. The point is the existence of the experience, not whether it is related to something else. You can't be mistaken about its existence.

Oh, I get it. It's Rene Descartes with a slight twist. Do you draw the same inference from this indisputable fact that Descartes did? I favor the version that goes, "I think therefore thoughts are." Who is this "you" who cannot be mistaken? Again we are in the domain of APCT where I pretend no understanding.

A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0932)]

Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0505 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0628) --

Since PCT does not include a labeling mechanism, the discussion of Nicole Kidman properly falls into the domain of APCT. In that domain I defer to you and Martin as students of perception.

Why do you say that PCT doesn't contain a labeling mechanism? Isn't a label also a perception? Don't we have control systems that use one perception to stand for one or more others? Labeling -- symbolizing -- occurs at the category level, where one signal comes to stand for a class of other signals. I don't see your problem here.\

We've been all through this before. I, for one, have no desire to revisit the question. If you say APCT includes labeling of perceptions, so be it.

A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.30.0915 CST)]

Yes, but after I sent this, I figured that someone might get the bright idea
that I think God is testable, which is of course not what either of us means.

But in comparison with objective realty or the average/aggregate subjective
reality of onlookers, we could get results that would show a significant
difference of subjective realties. Like a Joan of Arc or Juan Diego experience,
we could make a test that would record eye-movements, brain patterns, and
relative environmental conditions. So, we could say that for the most part,
people probably hear the wind, and a few people seem to hear God's whispers. To
the one who experiences a phenomenon subjectively, however, it is real. No
question, I agree.

I think my basic intent was to point at the difference between one's reality and
the scientific results of studying the environment, not that subjective reality
is better/worse than objective, but that they are different. Reacting to Ely's
proposal, I think Quantum mechanics theory studies objective reality, but
Perceptual Control theory studies what a person does while controling
perceptions of that objective reality.

I think that is what I am saying. :slight_smile:

--Bryan

···

[Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1946 MST)]

Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1915) --

>If I experience God talking to me, then I guess such an experience is as
>testable as my experience of hearing "concert A."

It's fascinating to see you guys teetering on the edge of getting the point
here. My response to the above is simply "What's to test? You had the
experience, didn't you? Nobody can tell you you didn't, can they?" You are
in a much better position than a guy with an oscilloscope to tell whether
or not you had a thought. All you can even think of testing is whether the
thought corresponds to anything outside you. The point is the existence of
the experience, not whether it is related to something else. You can't be
mistaken about its existence.

Best,

Bill P.